ANIL AGARWAL FOUNDATION ETC. ETC. versus STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS. on 12 April 2023

[2023] 8 S.C.R. 969

ANIL AGARWAL FOUNDATION ETC. ETC.

v.

STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 1144-1146 of 2011)

APRIL 12, 2023

[M. R. SHAH AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss. 4(1), 6, 44B – LandAcquisition Rules, 1963 – rr. 3 & 4 – Acquisition Proceedings –Allotment of land – To Private Company – For setting up ofUniversity – Undue Favour to Company – Non-compliance ofMandatory Provisions – Doctrine of Public Trust – Violation of –Appellant, a private company at that time, made a representation tothe Govt to grant land to set up a University – Necessary steps weretaken by the Govt for allotment of land – However, the LawDepartment opined that the land can be acquired only for a PublicCompany under the 1894 Act – Pursuant to which, appellantcompany passed resolution to change the status from PrivateCompany to Public Company and intimated the same to Govt. –Thereafter, Land Acquisition notifications u/s 4(1) of the Act wereissued for 6917.63 acres – Writ Petition was filed in the High Courtchallenging the entire acquisition proceedings – Division Bench ofHigh Court allowed the Petition and held that the entire proceedingwas in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions of the Act –High Court quashed the acquisition proceedings by observing thatthe public interest was affected and there was violation of rule oflaw – On appeal, held: Initiation of the acquisition proceedingswas by the Vedanta Foundation and thereafter by the Anil AgarwalFoundation, which admittedly at the relevant time and as on19.07.2006 was a private company – It was the case of appellantthat it successfully converted into the public company on 23.11.2006and it increased number of members from 3 to 7 and in terms ofSection 44 of the Companies Act, 1956, it amended its Articles ofAssociation to delete the restriction on free transferability of theshares and the same has been acknowledged by the Registrar ofCompanies (ROC) by acknowledgment dated 21.02.2007 and03.03.2011 – However, even the subsequent acknowledgment by

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Athe Registrar of Companies on 21.02.2007 and 03.03.2011 wasmuch after s.4(1) notification which were issued between 13.12.2006to 21.08.2007 – Therefore, legally, the appellant was not convertedto public company at the relevant time – At the relevant time, whenthe company was a private company, in view of the bar under s.44-BB of the 1894 Act, the lands in question could not have been soughtto be acquired by the appellant company – Subsequent conversionfrom private company to public company was an attempt to get outof the statutory provision under the Act, 1894, which is mala fideexercise on the part of the appellants – Even there was non-compliance of mandatory provisions under rr.3 and 4 of the Rules,C1963 and therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings for thebeneficiary company was vitiated – There was also non-applicationof mind by the State Government on environmental aspects andpassing of two rivers from the acquired lands in question – How themaintenance of the rivers etc. can be handed over to the beneficiaryDcompany – If the lands in question are continued to be acquired bythe beneficiary company, the control of the rivers would be with thesaid private company, which would violate the Doctrine of PublicTrust – Further, there is a Wildlife Sanctuary, just adjacent acrossthe road to the proposed university and the lands acquired –Therefore, large-scale construction for establishment of the proposedEuniversity as observed by the High Court will also adversely affectthe Wildlife Sanctuary, entire Eco system and the ecologicalenvironment in the locality – Even otherwise, there is non-applicationon part of the State Government on the requirement of the lands bythe beneficiary company – From the material on record, it appearsFthat undue benefits were proposed / in fact offered and given to thebeneficiary company providing undue largesse – It is not appreciablewhy the Government offered such an undue favour to one trust/company – Thus, the entire acquisition proceedings and the benefits,proposed by the State Government were vitiated by favourism andGviolative of Art.14 of the Constitution – High Court was justified insetting aside the entire acquisition proceedings, which was vitiatedby non-compliance of the statutory provisions under the Act, 1894and the Rules, 1963 and also vitiated by mala fides and favourismand is a clear case of the non-application of mind on relevant aspects– Constitution of India – Art. 14.H

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The initiation of the acquisition proceedings wasby the Vedanta Foundation and thereafter by the Anil AgarwalFoundation, which admittedly at the relevant time and as on19.07.2006 was a private company having three Directors on itsBoard and less than seven members. The initiation of theproceedings to acquire the identified lands, identified by theappellant company was in the month of April/June, 2006, whichwas followed by the MoU dated 19.07.2006. Therefore, therelevant date for consideration would be 19.07.2006 and not13.12.2006 as sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants.[Para 8.5][1014-F-G, H; 1015-A]

1.2 At this stage, it is required to be noted that evenotherwise the subsequent alleged conversion from privatecompany to public company was an attempt to get out of thestatutory provision under the Act, 1894. The Law Departmentspecifically observed that the land cannot be acquired by privatecompany for the purposes for which the lands were sought to beacquired, only thereafter the appellants changed the status ofthe company from private company to public company. Theaforesaid was a mala fide exercise on the part of the appellants.[Para 8.6][1015-B-C]

1.3 It is the case on behalf of the appellant that the appellantsuccessfully converted into the public company on 23.11.2006and it increased number of members from 3 to 7 and in terms ofSection 44 of the Companies Act, 1956, it amended its Articles ofAssociation to delete the restriction on free transferability of theshares and the same has been acknowledged by the Registrar ofCompanies (ROC) by acknowledgment dated 21.02.2007 and03.03.2011 is concerned, it is required to be noted and asobserved hereinabove the relevant date for consideration wouldbe June, 2006 and in any case 19.07.2006 when the MoU wasentered into. Even the subsequent acknowledgment by the ROCwas on 21.02.2007 and 03.03.2011 even much after Section 4(1)notification. Therefore, as rightly observed and held by the HighCourt legally, the appellant was not converted to public company,which as such was a Section 25 company and therefore, not apublic company. [Para 8.7][1015-D-G]

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A2. From the material on record, the High Court has giventhe specific findings that there is a non-compliance of mandatoryprovisions under Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1963 and therefore,the entire acquisition proceedings for the beneficiary companyhas been vitiated and there are checks and balances and certainmandatory procedures and requirements are to be satisfied, moreBparticularly, when the lands are to be acquired for the company,the same have to be adhered to and non-consideration of therelevant aspects, which are mandatory to be considered underRule 4 would vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings as thesubjective satisfaction by the State Government has been vitiatedCon non-consideration of the relevant aspects, more particularly,the aspects mentioned in Rule 4. [Para 8.15][1021-C-D]

3. The most important aspect, which is required to beconsidered is the non-application of mind by the State Governmenton environmental aspects and passing of two rivers from theDacquired lands in question. It is not in dispute that from the landsin question two rivers namely ‘Nuanai’ and ‘Nala’ are flowing,which as such were acquired by the State Government. How themaintenance of the rivers etc. can be handed over to thebeneficiary company. If the lands in question are continued to beacquired by the beneficiary company, the control of the riversEwould be with the said private company, which would violate theDoctrine of Public Trust. Even requiring the beneficiary companyto maintain the flow of above two rivers may also affect theresidents of the locality at large. It is also required to be notedthat just across the road, there is a Wildlife Sanctuary, which isFjust adjacent across the road to the proposed university and thelands acquired. Therefore, the large-scale construction for theestablishment of the proposed university as observed by the HighCourt will also adversely affect the Wildlife Sanctuary, entire Ecosystem and the ecological environment in the locality. It is a dutyof the State to protect the Wildlife Sanctuary and it may affect theGentire Eco system and the ecological environment in the locality.It is also required to be noted that even the distance of the seafrom the proposed Vedanta University is approximately 2000meters. Merely because the Balukhand Wildlife Sanctuary isseparated from the proposed site by a highway – Puri-KonarkMarine Drive, cannot be a ground to acquire the huge lands forH

the proposed university and as rightly observed by the HighCourt, the same will adversely affect the Wildlife Sanctuary andthe entire Eco system and the ecological environment in thelocality. The aforesaid aspects has not at all been considered bythe State Government and/or the Collector and/or the appropriateauthority even while considering the proposal and/or even theobjections under Section 5A of the Act, 1894. [Para 8.17 &8.18][1022-F-H; 1023-A-D]

4. Even otherwise, there is a non-application on the part ofthe State Government on the requirement of the lands by thebeneficiary company. The lands were proposed to be acquired atthe instance of one foundation / company and the StateGovernment was dealing with the lands belonging to theagricultural landowners. The Government is holding a public trustand has to deal with the lands belonging to private landowners,more particularly, agricultural landowners in accordance with law.The State Government could not have considered the proposalfrom only one beneficiary/trust. There may be other public trusts/ companies, who might be interested in establishing suchuniversity. Even no proper inquiry seems to have been initiatedby the Government / Collector while considering the proposal bythe beneficiary company. It is required to be noted that initially,15,000 acres of the agricultural lands was sought to be acquiredfor the proposed university. Ultimately, approximately, 8000 acresof the land belonging to the private landowners / agriculturallandowners came to be acquired. The State Government has alsohanded over the possession of approximately 495 acres of landbelonging to the State Government including the Gochar Landsetc., which could have been used for the other public purposeand even for the Gochar Lands also. It is not appreciable why theGovernment offered such an undue favour in favour of one trust/company. Thus, the entire acquisition proceedings and thebenefits, which were proposed by the State Government werevitiated by favourism and violative of Article 14 of the Constitutionof India. [Para 8.19 & 8.21][1023-E-H; 1024-A, G-H]

Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors.,(2000) 7 SCC 296: [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 496; V.Chandrasekaran and Anr. vs. Administrative Officer andOrs., (2012) 12 SCC 133: [2012] 10 SCR 603; S.P.Gupta vs. Union of India,1981 Supp SCC 87: [1982]

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ASCR 365; Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India,(1984) 3 SCC 161: [1984] 2 SCR 67; Public Union forCivil Liberties vs. State of T.N.,(2013) 1 SCC 585:[2012] 9 SCR 579; Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab,(2008) 1 SCC 728: [2007] 11 SCR 475; CityMontessori School vs. State of U.P.,(2009) 14 SCCB253: [2009] 2 SCR 630 and Common Cause, ARegistered Society vs. Union of India and Ors.(1999)6 SCC 667: [1999] 3 SCR 1279 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.1144- 1146 of 2011.EFrom the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2010 of the High Courtof Orissa at Cuttack in WP Nos.6863 of 2009, 10325 and 12948 of 2008.With Civil Appeal Nos.1148-1150, 1152-1154 And 1161-1169 of 2011.

N. Venkataraman, Sanjay Jain, ASGs, C. Aryama Sundaram,FPrashanto Sen, Rakesh Dwivedi, Sanjay Parikh, Sr. Advs., DhananjayaMishra, P. S. Sudheer, Ms. Abhisree Saujanya, Navneet Dogra, BharatSood, Ms. Shruti Jose, Aryan Rai, Milind Kumar, Vishal Meghwal, AryaTripathy, Prashant Bhushan, Pranav Sachdeva, Chinmaya Mishra, AjitPudussery, Satvik Parikh, V.C. Bharathi, Ms. Priyanka Das, Rajat Nair,H.R. Rao, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Rupesh Kumar, Ms. Nisha Bagchi,GAnukalp Jain, Raghav Sharma, Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, UdaiKhanna, Rutwik Panda, Ms. Nikhar Berry, Ms. Anshu Malik, AbhisthKumar, Raj Kumar Mehta, Aman Jha, Ms. Babita Yadav, Raman Yadav,Ms. Shubha Yadav, Gaurav Prakash Shah, Rishi Tutu, Ms. Akansha,Manoj Rajput, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Shibashish Misra, Chandan KumarHMandal, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned commonjudgment and order passed by the High Court of Orissa dated 16.11.2010passed in Writ Petition Nos. 10325 of 2008, 12948 of 2008 and 6863 of2009 by which the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed thesaid writ petitions and has quashed the land acquisition proceedings inquestion including the notifications under Section 4(1) and 6 of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1894”) and theawards passed in the land acquisition proceedings for acquisition of landsin favour of the appellant – beneficiary company and directed that thepossession of the acquired lands shall be restored to the respectivelandowners and on restoration of the possession to the landowners, theyshall refund the amounts received by them as compensation or otherwisein respect of their lands. By the impugned common judgment and order,the High Court has also quashed the grant of Government Land in favourof the beneficiary company under Rule 5 of the Government LandSettlement Rules with a direction to the State Government to resumethe lands which were granted to the beneficiary company by way oflease, the appellant – the beneficiary company and others have preferredthe present appeals.

2. At the outset, it is required to be noted that before the HighCourt, two writ petitions were filed by the original landowners whoselands have been acquired and one writ petition was filed by way ofpublic interest litigation on behalf of the small landholders, who could notapproach the Court and also on behalf of the people of the locality.

2.1 It is required to be noted that the dispute is with respect to theacquisition of about 6000 acres of land belonging to about 6000 families,affecting approximately 30,000 people.

3. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:- 3.1 That on 23.06.2006, one Mohit Kumar Rana, Principal, A.T.Kearney Limited submitted an application before the State Governmentstating that M/s. Vedanta Resources Limited is contemplating to set upa University in Orissa to impart education in under-graduate and post-graduate courses in Engineering, Medicine, Management, GeneralScience and Humanities etc. It was further stated in the application thatthe Group had given a presentation to the Hon’ble Chief Minister of A

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AOrissa during April, 2006. That after visiting different sites in Orissa,their team have selected a site on the outskirt of Puri on the Puri-Konarkmarine drive to be the place ideal for establishment of the University.Therefore, it was, inter alia, prayed that the Government of Orissa shouldmake available 15,000 acres of contiguous land around Nuanai, in thedistrict of Puri in Bhubneswar-Puri-Konark marine drive. It was alsoBprayed that the Government of Orissa should also coordinate the landacquisition process by appointment of a Special Land Acquisition Officer.The Group prayed that they require 1500 acres of land for Phase-I to beacquired by September, 2006 and the balance by December, 2006.Thereafter, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between theCGovernment of Orissa and Vedanta Foundation on 19.07.2006. TheGovernment of Orissa confirmed the availability of contiguous land ofabout 8000 acres and to make endeavour to provide an additionalcontiguous land and other facilities as required by the Foundation.

3.2 That a Private Limited Company incorporated in the nameDand style of Sterlite Foundation changed its name to Vedanta Foundationunder section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 and accordingly freshCertificate of Incorporation consequent on change of the name wasissued in July, 2004. After signing of the MOU, necessary steps weretaken by the State Government for allotment of the land to the Foundationand the Vice President of the Vedanta Foundation was directed to depositE20% of the estimated investment cost, which was subsequently reducedto 10% and necessary direction was issued to Collector, Puri to obtainadministrative approval of the project from the Higher EducationDepartment and to produce the approval along with the proposal beforethe Government.F3.3 According to the State, in the meantime, the opinion of theLaw Department was sought on the questions:- (a) Whether the foundation is an education foundation? and (b) Whether the land is required to be acquired for publicGpurpose?

3.4 Thereafter the correspondences took place between the LawDepartment and the Revenue and Disaster Management Department.The Law Department observed that land can be acquired for theproposed educational scheme under the Act, 1894 if the appropriateDepartment of the Government sponsors a Scheme to carry out that.H

Alternatively, the land can be acquired for an educational schemesponsored by a Society but with the prior approval of the Government.So observing, the Law Department opined that under the Act, 1894, landcan be acquired for public purpose provided Government sponsors tocarry out an educational scheme or by a registered society with priorapproval of the Government. Alternatively, it also opined that theAdministrative Department may verify if acquisition of land can be madeunder section 15 of the Orissa Industrial Infrastructural DevelopmentCorporation Act, 1980. After the aforesaid opinion was received, theAdministrative Department was of the view that the second option to gothrough IDCO was not feasible and suggested to consider as to whetherthe Higher Education Department will sponsor and own the project directlyand whether it would be done through a Society to be framed by theHigher Education Department.

3.5 Thereafter, it was decided to explore the alternative of thePrivate Company to be converted into a public company on which, theviews of the Law Department was again sought. The Law Departmentopined that the land can be acquired for a ‘Public Company’ under theAct, 1894 in accordance with Part VII. That Vedanta Foundation againchanged its name to Anil Agarwal Foundation. On account of the namechange, a fresh Certificate of Incorporation was obtained from theRegistrar of Companies under Section 23(1) of the Companies Act on06.09.2006.

3.6 In a meeting of the Board of Directors of Anil AgarwalFoundation held on 16.10.2006, a resolution was passed to change thestatus of the company from a private company to a public company. AnilAgarwal Foundation intimated the Department of Higher Education ofthe change of name and structure of Vedanta Foundation on 01.11.2006.On 24.11.2006, Anil Agarwal Foundation confirmed to the Secretary,Department of Higher Education that the status of the company hadbeen changed from a private to a public company. The Collector, Puri,on the same day, i.e., 24.11.2006, intimated the Joint Secretary, RevenueDepartment regarding the change of status to a public company andalso to the Department of Higher Education for revised administrativeapproval for acquisition of land for the establishment of VedantaUniversity.

3.7 That thereafter notifications under Section 4(1) of the Act,1894 were issued between 13.12.2006 to 21.08.2007 for 6917.63 acres.

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AThe said notifications inter alia indicated that the acquisition was beingconducted in terms of Chapter VII of the Act, 1894. That thereafter adeclaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued for 5619.05acres after seeking the objections under Section 5A of the Act, 1894.According to the appellant, after the awards were declared, thepossession was delivered in respect of 3342 acres of acquired land andBthe sponsored 495 acres of Government land and the compensation ofRs. 41.96 crores was also disbursed.

3.8 As a vast tract of lands belonged to the poor, small farmersand the land so acquired was at a prestigious location and thousands offamilies of farmers were affected by the acquisition of such a vast tractCof lands and that too in favour of a private company, which was malafide subsequently converted to public company, the writ petitions werefiled before the High Court challenging the entire acquisition proceedings/ process.

3.9 By the impugned judgment and order, the Division Bench ofDthe High Court has allowed the writ petitions including the public interestlitigation by holding that :-

(i) the acquisition proceedings from the stage of initiation till thedate of purported awards which in fact and in law not awardedand that the alleged taking over the possession of the lands is inflagrant violation of the statutory provision of Sections 4, 5A, 6, 9,E10, 11, 12, (2), 23, 24, read with the provisions under Part - VII ofthe Act, 1894.;

(ii) the initiation of the acquisition proceedings in favour of thebeneficiary company, on the requisition made by the VedantaFoundation by misrepresenting fact and playing fraud on the StateFGovernment, has vitiated the entire acquisition proceedings.;

(iii) that the public interest at large is affected and there is violationof rule of law.;

(iv) the Public Interest Litigation was maintainable, which was onbehalf of small land holders who have no sustenance to approachGthis Court to fight litigation.;

(v) therefore, the acquisition proceedings in its entirety in respectof persons who have approached this Court and even who havenot approached this Court are liable be quashed for the reasonthat there is flagrant violation of the provisions of the Act, 1894.

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3.10 Thereafter, the High Court has passed the following order interms of paragraph 69, which is as under:- “69. In the result, we allow the writ petitions, quash the impugnedland acquisition proceedings including the notification underSections 4(1) and 6 and the award passed in the Land AcquisitionProceedings for acquisition of land in favour of the beneficiarycompany and direct that the possession of the acquired lands shallbe resorted to the respective land owners irrespective of the factwhether they have challenged the acquisition of their lands or not.On restoration of the possession to the land owners, they shallrefund the amount received by them as compensation or otherwisein respect of their lands. We also quash the grant of GovernmentLand in favour of the Beneficiary Company under Rule 5 of theGovernment Land Settlement Rules with a direction to the StateGovernment to resume the lands which were granted to thebeneficiary company by way of lease. All concerned includingthe State Government, the land owners and beneficiary companyshall implement the aforesaid direction at an early date.”

3.11 The impugned common judgment and order passed by theHigh Court and the operative portion of the order in paragraph 69 ofjudgment are the subject matter of the present appeals.

4. Shri C. Aryama Sundaram and Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learnedsenior counsel appearing on behalf of the respective appellants havevehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case,the High Court has materially erred in quashing and setting aside theentire acquisition proceedings and that too even with respect to thelandowners whose lands came to be acquired, did not challenge theacquisition proceedings and/or even many of them did not raise anyobjections under Section 5A of the Act, 1894.

4.1 Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respectiveappellants have prayed to consider the following facts in support of theirsubmissions that the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt setting aside the entire acquisition proceedings is not warranted:-

(i) It is submitted that notifications under Section 4 of the Act,1894 came to be issued between 13.12.2006 to 21.08.2007for 6917.63 acres; A

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A(ii)Declarations under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 were issuedfor 5619.05 acres, before that the objections under Section5A of the Act, 1894 were invited;

(iii) Only 13 landowners, who were the owner of 78.89 acressubmitted their objections; with respect to 3 landowners toBthe extent of 25.61 acres, objections came to be acceptedand 10 objections came to be rejected. None of the 10rejectees had approached any Court with any grievance.

(iv) That the possession came to be delivered in favour of thebeneficiary in respect of 3342 acres of acquired land.

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(v) Possession was also delivered in respect of 495 acres ofGovernment land.

(vi) It is submitted that therefore, the possession of total 3837acres was handed over to the beneficiary.

(vii) That the beneficiary has already disbursed the compensationof Rs. 41.96 crores.

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(viii) It is submitted that in addition to compensation, ex-gratiaamount of Rs. 25.13 crores was also disbursed.

(ix) It is submitted that, thus, 3837 persons have received theEcompensation as above.

It is submitted that in view of the above facts and circumstances,the High Court has materially erred in setting aside the entire acquisitionproceedings.

4.2 It is further submitted that there were a total of 9 writ petitionersFbefore the High Court. One of them was an objector under Section 5A,however, his land was dropped from the land acquisition proceedings.He is, therefore, now only a pro forma party before this Court.

4.2.1 It is submitted that one of the original writ petitioners was aland loser, but not an objector under Section 5A. His land was alsoGdropped from the land acquisition proceedings at the stage of Section 6.

4.2.2 Five of the original writ petitioners are land losers, but notobjectors under Section 5A.

4.2.3 Two of the writ petitioners are PIL petitioners.

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4.3 It is submitted that therefore, as on today, there are a total of7 land losers before this Court, who hold approximately 11.52 acres,however, none of them filed objection under Section 5A. Learned seniorcounsel appearing on behalf of the beneficiary has stated at the Bar thatthe appellant is now willing to exclude their land from the acquisitionproceedings, even though they did not file Section 5A objection.

4.4 It is further submitted that in fact so far as the PILs beforethe High Court are concerned, the same ought not to have been entertainedby the High Court in view of the earlier dismissal of PIL being WritPetition (C) No. 6981 of 2008 which was filed by the PIL writ petitioner.

4.5 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the appellants that as observed hereinabove except few,none of the said land losers submitted any objections under Section 5A.It is submitted that as observed and held by this Court in the case ofDelhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors., (2000) 7SCC 296, all personal nature objections are deemed to be waived.

4.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of V.Chandrasekaran and Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors.,(2012) 12 SCC 133, it is further submitted that if the acquisition ischallenged by one land loser, other cannot take advantage of it if he hasnot filed objection under Section 5A of the Act, 1894.

4.7 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the respective appellants that in the present case theacquisition proceedings have attained finality, inasmuch as, after thedeclaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 and after holding inquiryunder Section 11, the awards were declared and most of the landownerswere paid the compensation and even the possession to the extent of3342 acres was handed over to the beneficiary. It is submitted thattherefore, when the acquisition has attained finality, awards have beenmade, possession taken and compensation disbursed then setting asidethe entire acquisition proceedings is not desirable.

4.8 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the beneficiary that though initially the lands were sought tobe acquired by a private company, however, thereafter the companywas converted into a public limited company after following due procedureunder the provisions of the Companies Act. He has taken us to thevarious correspondences and the orders passed converting the beneficiarycompany to public limited company.

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A4.9 Relying upon those documents, it is vehemently submitted thattherefore at the time when the Section 4 notifications were issued, thebeneficiary company was already converted to a public company.Therefore, the acquisition in favour of the beneficiary company wasabsolutely in consonance with the provisions of the Act, 1894. It is furthersubmitted that the acquisition of the lands in question in favour of theBbeneficiary trust/ company was after a detailed consultation and takinginto consideration the object and purpose of the trust / company in thefield of education etc. It is submitted that the beneficiary company /trust wants and/or desirous of establishing a very renowned university inthe State of Orissa.

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4.10 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the beneficiary company that if the impugned judgment andorder passed by the High Court is not interfered with by this Court, thereshall be serious and adverse impact in implementing the appellant’s project.

4.11 It is submitted that the appellant – beneficiary has drawn upDa Vision Plan for over 3837 acres of land, which is currently in theirpossession. It is submitted that the Vision Plan postulates a Universitycatering to 1,00,000 students and the University would be built in a phasedmanner. It is submitted that in Phase I, colleges in the field of Medicine,Liberal Arts, Science & Technology, Agriculture and Food ProcessingEand Institute of Design would be started.

4.12 It is submitted that eminent academicians are already on theadvisory/academic board of the project. It is further submitted thatadequate safeguards have been provided in Section 41 agreement thatthe land would be utilized for the University, and in case any portion ofFthe land is not utilized for the University purpose, then the said portionreverts to the State Government.

4.13 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the respective appellants that even after the acquisition ofthe lands in question, the rehabilitation measures have been taken as perGthe policy of the State Government, which are as under:-

“1.R&R Policy of State Govt. followed whereunder an R&RColony of 65.17 acres within the acquired land has beenset apart to accommodate the 230 displaced families. Itmay be noted that site of the R&R Colony has been chosenby the displaced families themselves.

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2. The project affected families are entitled to a preferenceAfor employment in the University.

3. Appellant has agreed to appoint one graduate from all landlosing families as an employee.

4. Appellant has agreed to engage landless agriculturelabourers as unskilled construction workers. In the eventthe same is not provided, then a subsistence allowance ofRs. 1500 per month would be paid to each family from dateof possession to 2010.

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5. Appellant has agreed to bear the expenditure for studentsfrom land losing families to study at DAV School, Puri.”

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4.14 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the appellants that in the present case, there is a complianceof Part VII of the Act, 1894 and the Land Acquisition (Companies)Rules, 1963 ( hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1963”). It is submittedthat in the present case, Part VII has been complied with as under:- D

“1.Part VII has been complied with as:

(i) Section 39/40 consent has been given by the StateGovernment.

(ii) Enquiry under Section 40(2)/ Rule 4 has been carried out.E

(iii) Agreement has been signed by the Foundation as mandatedunder Section 41.

(iv) Section 44B not applicable since the Appellant is a publiccompany.”

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4.15 It is further submitted that insofar as Rules, 1963 areconcerned, it is the case on behalf of the appellant that a Rule 4 enquiryis relevant only in the case when the land is identified by the companyand not by the State Government and thereafter an application is madeby the company to acquire the said identified land. It is submitted that inthe present case, the land was not only identified by the State Government(and, therefore, not by the appellant beneficiary), but done so aftersubstantially undertaking the enquiry as envisaged under Rule 4. Insupport of his above submission, Shri C. Aryama Sundaram, learnedsenior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant trust / beneficiaryhas prayed to consider the following dates and events:- G

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A“(i)April 2006- A presentation was made by Vedanta ResourcesLtd. to the Chief Minister of Odisha for setting up of aUniversity in Orissa. (Note: No Particular land identifiedby Vedanta in this presentation)

(ii) April-June, 2006 - It was known to the State Govt. that theBVedanta group had made similar representations to fewother States as well. Since the proposal presented a hugeopportunity for the State, it started the process of identifyingsuitable locations on its own, under the leadership of its topofficers, i.e. the Chief Secretary, and carried out a detailedinquiry towards identifying land keeping in mind theCconsiderations under Rule 4

(iii) After looking at various options, the State Govt. finally zeroedin on Puri.

(iv) 16.06.2006- The Office of the Chief Minister of OrissaDconvened a meeting of Secretaries of various departmentsin relation to the establishment of the University. At themeeting, State Govt. made a detailed presentation to theAppellant on the land identified by it in Puri. In the saidpresentation, considerations regarding the suitability of theland, the extent thereof, the habitation thereunder etc. haveEbeen considered in detail. [Note: this also shows Compliancewith Rule 4(1)(i) and (iii)]

(v) 23.06.2006 - Pursuant to the aforesaid presentation by theState, the Appellant made independent visits to the siteproposed in the presentation. On this basis, a letter wasFwritten to the Office of the Chief Minister by AT Kearney(a Consultant appointed by Vedanta) stating that Vedantawas interested in setting up a University in Puri.

(vi) 26.06.2006- as per direction of the State Government, theAddl. District Magistrate, Puri and the Tahasildar, Puri madeGfurther visit to the project area.

(vii) During the aforesaid exercise:a)Addl. District Magistrate, Puri and Secretary, Worksalso made aerial survey of the site. [Note: this alsoshows Compliance with Rule 4(1)(i)]H

b)Number of informal group meetings in the villageAbetween the Collector and other State Govt. officersbefore the acquisition proceedings were initiated. Thiswas done to discuss various aspects of land acquisitionincluding suitability of land, and to appraise thevillagers of the purpose of land acquisition; [Note:Bthis also shows Compliance with Rule 4(1)(i) and(iii)]

c)Visits were also made for the purpose of ascertainingthat minimum displacement was taking place out ofthe one various alternative locations C

d)Determination was also done to see that the Appellantis able to utilize the land, which were frozen,expeditiously; at various reviews, the requirement ofland was scaled down to 6000 acres; [Note: this alsoshows Compliance with Rule 4(1)(iv) and (v)]

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e)Exercise was also undertaken to find out that theland is rain fed; not irrigated; not much good qualityof agricultural land; inferior, unproductive and fallowland. [Note: this also shows Compliance with Rule4(1)(vi)]

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f)Most of the land oustees of the project area werecontacted either in meetings by the Appellants to makenegotiations for payment of reasonable price. [Note:this also shows Compliance with Rule 4(1)(ii)]

(viii) 19.07.2006 - after being satisfied about the direct and indirectbenefits to be accrued to the state, an MoU was signed toestablish the proposed university. [Note: Compliance withRule 4(1)(v)], namely, determination to ensure that theAppellant is able to utilize the land expeditiously F

(ix) 09.08.2006- The State Govt. appointed a Special LAO &special officer for R&R in order to coordinate the landacquisition process.

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(x) 29.11.2006 - the State Government, upon being satisfied,has accorded Administrative Approval for the project.

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A(xi)Minutes of the 7 Core Committee meetings between02.09.2006 and 07.02.2008 also record substantialcompliance of Rule 4.”

4.16 It is further submitted that therefore, there is a compliancewith Rules 3(1) and 3(2). It is submitted that even the Rule 4 has beenBcomplied with subsequently.

4.17 Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the StateGovernment has vehemently submitted that in the present case, there isa compliance of Sections 4, 5A, 6, 9, 11 and 12 of the Act, 1894. It isprayed to consider the following dates and events in support of complianceCof the State Government with the provisions under the Act, 1894, whichare as under:- “1.Notification under Section 4(1) has been published in theOfficial Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating inthat locality and the Collector has used public notice of thesubstance of Notification u/s.4(1) by way of beating ofDdrums at convenient places in the locality under Sec.4(1)

2. No provision in the Act for serving show cause notice tothe interested persons for inviting objections u/s. 5A. Thesame is a requirement in Karnataka because of a StateAmendment to the LA Act, 1894 Unfortunately, the sameEhas been applied by the High Court vide the impugnedjudgment even though Orissa has no such requirement.

3.13 objection petitions received from 6 villages for an areameasuring Ac 78.89. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer hasgiven notice to the objectors for hearing u/s 5-A. Heard theFpetitioners. Has forwarded the objection petitions to Govt.in the Revenue Department through the District Collectortogether with his report and the record of the proceedings.In fact, 3 of the 13 objections were allowed (25.61 acres).None of the 10 rejectees approached any Court with anygrievance.G

4. State Govt. has given public notice of declaration underSection 6(2).

5. The Collector has served notices u/s. 9 (1) in the villageand to the interested persons u/s. 9(3) calling upon them toHfile claims to compensation, as evident in the LA records.

6. After making enquiry into their respective interests, claimsto compensation and objections to the area, which theinterested persons have stated pursuant to the notices u/s.9, the Collector u/s. 11 has passed Award on the true areaof the land, the compensation allowed and the apportionmentof compensation.

7. In addition to compensation under the LA Act, 1894, ex-gratia amount of Rs. 1 lakh per acre subject to a minimumcompensation of Rs. 2 lakh acre was to be paid as approvedby the RPDAC (formed as per the State R&R Policy).This is in addition to various other benefits to beprovided, which have been enumerated at (I).B of thisNote at Page 3 above.

8. Collector has given notice of his Award to such interestedpersons u/s. 12(2) of the LA Act 1894, as evident in the LArecords.”

4.18 It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel appearingon behalf of the appellants that in fact the project does not fall in anyprohibited area. It is beyond the coastal regulatory zone. The distance ofthe sea from the proposed Vedanta University is more than 2000 meters.The Balukhand Wildlife Sanctuary is separated from the proposed siteby a highway / Puri-Konark Marine Drive. It is submitted that theSanctuary is on the seaward side, whereas the proposed site is on thelandward side.

4.19 It is submitted that there are a number of private institutionsand organizations which are on the same side of the highway as theproposed university, along with the entire village of Beldala with a largepopulation. It is submitted that Nuanai which flows through the proposedsite is not a river as alleged. It is submitted that it comprises of two man-made channels (Gabakund Cut and Siar Cut). It is submitted that theland was acquired by the State Government for constructing thesechannels. The ownership of these two channels continues to lie with theWater resources Department of the Government of Orissa. It is submittedthat in any event, all environmental requirements would be scrutinizedand looked into by the MOEF while granting environmental clearance.

4.20 Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respectiveappellants have taken us to the findings by the High Court and theirresponse, which by and large have been refereed to hereinabove.

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A4.21 Making above submissions, it is prayed to allow the presentappeals.

5. Present appeals are vehemently opposed by Shri PrashantBhushan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respectiverespondents – original writ petitioners.B

5.1 It is submitted that the instant case involves acquisition ofabout 6000 acres of land belonging to about 6000 families, and thus,involving displacement of approximately 30,000 people. It is submittedthat the Government of Orissa has showered huge largesse on theappellant company by acting in a manifestly arbitrary manner and floutingCall the mandatory provisions of the Act, 1894 and the Rules, 1963 bypre-determining the acquisition of the concerned land in favour of theappellant company. It is submitted that the said illegal action of theGovernment of Orissa gives rise to sufficient cause for espousal of publicinterest. It is submitted that the action of the State in allotting such ahuge tracts of land admeasuring 6000 acres and that too in the primeDlocation, which was nothing but a clear case of favourism andarbitrariness, which has been rightly set aside by the High Court.

5.2 It is submitted that the land acquisition proceedings includingthe notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6 and the awards passed in theland acquisition proceedings for acquisition of land in favour of theEbeneficiary company have rightly been quashed by the Hon’ble HighCourt by the impugned judgment and order, which does not require anyinterference of this Court in exercise of the powers under Article 136 ofthe Constitution of India.

5.3 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf ofFthe original writ petitioners – original landowners / land losers that in thepresent case the land was identified by the appellant company, and notby the Government as is evident from the chronology of dates and eventsand the Note Sheet of the Principal Secretary of the Chief Minister. It issubmitted that the Note sheet clearly shows, inter alia, that the appellantGcompany asked the Government of Orissa to specifically make availablefor it 15,000 acres of contiguous land around Nuanai, Puri district inBhubaneshwar-Puri-Konark by 15.06.2006.

5.4 It is submitted that even the relevant clauses in theMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 19.07.2006 also show thatthe land was identified by the Company and not by the Government. It isH

submitted that as per the MoU dated 19.07.2006, it was VedantaFoundation that proposed to set up the university along with a self-contained township near Puri in Orissa with an estimated cost of Rs.15,000 crores. It is submitted that in the said MoU also there was arefence to the proposed location. It is submitted that the Government ofOrissa just confirmed the availability of the contiguous land of about8000 acres. [Clause 5 of the MoU]

5.5 It is submitted that even, the Section 41 agreement executedbetween the Government of Orissa and the Anil Aggarwal Foundationalso shows that the land was identified by the company and not by theGovernment as the said agreement says that the Company intended toestablish Vedanta University near Puri and had applied to the Governmentof Orissa for the acquisition of the land described in the schedulethereunder, written and delineated on the map annexed therein whereonthe company intended to establish Vedanta University.

5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the original writ petitioners – original landowners / land losersthat the Government of Orissa, despite knowing fully well that the VedantaFoundation had no prior track record in the field of education, includedseveral clauses in the MoU dated 19.07.2006, providing undue largesseto Vedanta like total autonomy to Vedanta University and its authoritieswith regard to administration, admission, fee structure, curriculum andfaculty selection; proposed university to have complete immunity fromany reservation laws of the State Government, all assistance in gettingregulatory approvals from UGC, AICTE etc. It is submitted that even,as per the said MoU, the Government agreed to provide 4-lane roadfrom Bhubaneshwar city to the proposed site and the Government ofOrissa shall make the land use/ zoning plan in the 5 km radius from theuniversity boundary only after Consultation with Vedanta. It is submittedthat the Government also promised to exempt all state levies/ taxes/duties namely, viz. VAT, Works Contract Tax, Stamp Duty and Entry taxon R&D equipment, educational aids, lab equipment and tools, andconstruction materials from the date of signing of the MoU. It is submittedthat the Government also promised to assist the Foundation in obtainingNOC from SPCB and all clearances from the Central Government. It issubmitted that the Government also promised to assist the Foundation inarranging rapid EIA and EMP for the project. It is submitted that theGovernment also promised to provide extraordinary huge amounts of AB

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Aelectricity and water. It is submitted that the aforesaid role of theGovernment shows clear favourism in favour of a private trust / company– Vedanta Foundation.

5.7 It is submitted that the Government of Orissa didn’t apply itsmind regarding the genuineness of the appellant company’s demand ofB10.000 acres for building the campus. It is submitted that it is to be notedthat one of the largest universities in the world - Stanford University haslesser contiguous area of around 8,100 acres. It is submitted that in thepresent case, the Government of Orissa confirmed the availability of8000 acres and promised to provide additional contiguous land as requiredby the appellant Company. It is submitted that at the relevant time, theCFoundation was a private company with 3 members of a family andlimited by guarantee of Rs. 5,000/-, and no prior track record in educationsector. It is submitted that while accepting the request by the VedantaFoundation, the Government did not consider the prior track record anddid not consider why the Vedanta group has been repeatedly indicted byDvarious Governments / authorities / courts/tribunals and agencies forsevere violations of mining laws, environmental laws, causing pollution,and violation of human rights in its mining projects in Orissa, Tamil Nadu,Goa and Karnataka.

5.8 Taking us to the observations made by the High court made inEparas 63 to 67 of the impugned judgment, it is submitted that the HighCourt has given cogent reasons and findings to hold that the landacquisition proceedings were carried out by the Government in a manifestlyarbitrary manner and had defeated the public interest. It is submittedthat therefore, the High Court has rightly entertained the Public InterestLitigations holding that the initiation of the acquisition proceedings inFfavour of the beneficiary company, on the requisition made by the VedantaFoundation by misrepresentation of facts and by playing fraud on theState Government, which has vitiated the entire acquisition proceedings.It is submitted that the High Court has rightly observed and held that thepublic interest at large is affected and there is violation of rule of law.G

5.9 Insofar as the submission on behalf of the appellant that only7 people filed section 5A objections out of approximately 6000 people,who were losing their lands is concerned, it is submitted that the factthat only 7 people filed their objections itself shows that the landownerswere either unaware of the land acquisition proceedings and/or wereHtoo weak, poor and disadvantaged and not in a position to even file objections with the Collector. Relying upon the decisions of this Court inthe case of S.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87;Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161and Public Union for Civil Liberties Vs. State of T.N., (2013) 1SCC 585, it is submitted that the High Court has rightly entertained thePublic Interest Litigation petitions and has rightly quashed the entireacquisition proceedings. It is submitted that the High Court has rightlyentertained and allowed the Public Interest Litigation petitions as by theacquisition of such a huge tract of land to the extent of 6000 acres,affecting 30,000 people, who were too weak, poor and disadvantaged,who could not approach the court for legal redress.

5.10 It is submitted that apart from Public Interest Litigations, theland losers had also challenged the acquisition. It is submitted that in thepresent case, the High Court has rightly quashed the entire acquisitionproceedings. It has been found that the Hon’ble Courts in various caseshave repeatedly quashed entire acquisitions where illegalities go to theroot of the matter. It is further submitted that even as rightly observedand held by the High Court, the entire acquisition proceedings weresuffering from arbitrariness and in Violation of the Act, 1894 and thestatutory Rules in the land acquisition process.

5.11 It is submitted that the appellant is a private company, andnot a public company. It is submitted that admittedly, the appellant claimsthat it was a private company registered under Section 25 limited byguarantee with a license issued by Central Government. However,according to the said license itself, any change to Articles of Associationis required to be approved by the Central Government. It is submittedthat herein, the resolution, dated 23.11.2006, altering the Articles ofAssociation by the appellant to convert it into a public company andincreasing the members to 7 was not approved by the CentralGovernment as per the License issued to it under Section 25 and hence,the company never became a public company. It is submitted that theaforesaid is evident even from the affidavit filed on behalf of the Registrarof Companies filed before the High Court. He has taken us to the relevantparagraphs namely paragraph Nos. 9, 10 and 12 of the affidavit filed bythe Registrar of Companies dated 15.10.2008 filed before the High Court.It is further submitted that the reliance of Vedanta on the letter dated22.11.2006 from the Ministry of Company Affairs is not any evidence ofthe company becoming a public company. It is submitted that it merely AB

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Asays that Vedanta’s “request for permission under Section 25(8) of theCompanies Act 1956 is hereby considered of conversion of the status ofthe Company from Private to a Public Company”. It is submitted thatthe same was subject to compliance of the provisions of Sections 23, 31,189(2) and 192 of the Companies Act, 1956, which are not compliedwith at all.B

5.12 It is submitted that that is why Articles of Association havenot been produced before the Core committee of the Government withoutwhich no one could understand the nature of the company. It is submittedthat the nature of company, i.e., whether it is public or private dependsupon the nature of holding of shares. It is submitted that if the membersChold the shares jointly, then as per the proviso to Section 3(c) of the Act,1956, they shall be treated only as a single member. Further, Section12(5) of Act, 1956 as to the accountability of its members could not beascertained even for Section 25 registered company. Accordingly, themembers, as can be seen from Board Meeting minutes, all the AgarwalsDseem to hold the company jointly, and therefore, it could only be a privatecompany.

5.13 It is submitted that, however, in appellant’s letter dated10.02.2011, the appellant admitted that they don’t have any shares andis a company registered on guarantee under Section 25 of the Act, 1956.EIt is submitted that when there being no shares, the pattern of holdingthe shares jointly or severally cannot be ascertained and hence thecompany could only be a private company.

5.14 It is submitted that even in the agreement executed on31.07.2007, the appellant company mentions itself only as a companyFbut do not state itself to be a public company. It is submitted that eventhe appellant failed to file prospectus or statement in lieu of the same inSchedule IV as mandated under Section 44 of the Act, 1956. It is submittedthat Schedule IV warrants disclosure of interest of each director in thecompany and share holding pattern, without which it is not possible toascertain the nature of company. It is submitted that as public companyGis any company other than a private company, share holding pattern is amust to examine the compliance of proviso to Section 3(c) of 1956 Act.

5.15 It is submitted that a public company shall, in the context ofAct, 1894, require provision in the Articles of Association enabling anypublic to purchase shares to remove the basis of private company. It isH

submitted that the scope of Section 44B should be understood on itsintention. A company constituted by three family members cannot belegally accepted as a public company if its members are increased to 7numbers by adding sons and daughters. It is submitted that therefore,the phrase “public company” should be construed by taking intoconsideration the scope and purport of Section 44B of the Act, 1894. Itis submitted that that is why an enquiry is contemplated under Section40 and the Rules framed therefor.

5.16 It is further submitted that even Clause 13 of the Section 41Agreement mandates not to pay more than 2/3[rd], i.e., 66.66% of thecompensation worked out which is in blatant violation of Section 17(3A)(3) which mandates to pay 80% of the compensation. It is submittedthat even for public purpose, the Act mandates to pay 80% before entering/ taking possession, but for private company, the aforesaid Agreementmandates not to pay more than 66.67% which is impermissible.

5.17 It is submitted that even Section 41 Agreement was executedon false premise as no such enquiry as mandated under Section 40 ofthe Act, 1894 r/w Rules, 1963 was conducted. It is submitted that thereforeSection 41 Agreement was a fraudulent exercise of power to give unduefavour to the appellant.

5.18 It is further submitted that even otherwise, admittedly, at thetime of execution of MoU with the Appellant on 19.07.2006, the appellantwas a private company and hence, the proposal ought not to have beenentertained at all but should have been rejected outrightly. It is submittedthat however, the Government showed undue interest and the entireGovernment Machinery worked hastily and acquired the lands usingemergency provision, i.e., Section 17 of the Act. It is submitted thateven on 30.07.2007, the company was not a public company. Therefore,entering into MoU/ Agreement with the appellant, a private company,which formed the basis for land acquisition is violative of the statutorybar under Sections 40(1)(aa) and 40(1)(b) and 44-B and hence, void abinitio.

5.19 It is further submitted that the appellant’s reliance onCollector’s letter, dated 25.07.2008, which was after the Section 6notification, is untenable. It is submitted that the inquiry and report of theCollector had to proceed before the Section 6 notification. It is furthersubmitted that even no inquiry was conducted under the Rules, 1963, AB

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Awhich has been established and proved from the response by the SpecialLand Acquisition Officer to the RTI query dated 27.05.2008. It issubmitted that in response to the said RTI query, the Special LandAcquisition Officer has responded that; “There was no such inquiryunder Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963”.

B5.20 It is further submitted that even in the present case, noCommittee / Core Committee was constituted by the State Governmentfrom among the persons notified under sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 and clauses(i) and (ii) of the Rules.

5.21 It is submitted that in the present case, the ‘Core Committee’Cconstituted by the Department of Higher Education, Government ofOrissa vide the notification dated 17.08.2007, was setup for the expresslystated purpose of “coordinating activities relating to lease of Governmentland and acquisition of private land, facilitating rehabilitation of displacedfamilies as per policy, expediting accreditation from relevant statutorybodies as UGC AICTE, MCI, BCI etc. enactment of an Act for theDUniversity, facilitating issues of no objection certificate from StatePollution Control Board and other bodies and expediting provision ofroad, water, electricity and telephone connectivity required for theUniversity, etc.” It is submitted that the scope, composition and purposefor establishment of the aforesaid Core Committee is completely differentEfrom the scope. composition and purpose of the Land AcquisitionCommittee envisaged under Rule 3 of the Rules, 1963. This is becausewhile the Land Acquisition Committee is required to be established forassisting the government in evaluating the feasibility and desirability ofthe proposal from a company for land acquisition, the Core Committeewas set out with the objective of facilitating the land acquisition processFwith the Government of Orissa having already pre- determined thefeasibility and desirability of the acquisition in clear contravention of thestatutory provisions.

5.22 It is submitted that the appellant’s argument that enquiryunder Rule 4 of the Rules, 1963 was not required / relevant in the presentGcase as the land was identified by the Government and not by thecompany, does not hold water. It is submitted that in the present case,the land had clearly been identified by the appellant company since thevery inception. It is submitted that even otherwise, whether the land isidentified by the company or the Government, the statutory Rule 4 cannotHbe dispensed with at all and the collector is bound to inquire into all the

things mentioned in Rule 4 of the Rules, 1963, otherwise the whole purposeof the Rules, 1963 and Part VII of the Act, 1894 will be defeated. It isfurther submitted that even the declarations under Section 6 of the Act,1894, for most of the villages were made prior to the agreement underSection 41 of the Act was executed. It is submitted that the same is incomplete contravention and breach of Rule 4 (4)(ii) of the Rules, 1963,which provides that no declaration shall be made by the appropriateGovernment under Section 6 of the Act unless the agreement undersection 41 of the Act has been executed by the company. It is submittedthat even the same is also in clear violation of Section 39 of the Act,1894 which stipulates that the provisions of Sections 6 of the Act, 1894shall not be put in force in order to acquire the land for any companyunless the Company has executed the agreement under Section 41 ofthe Act, 1894. It is submitted that therefore, as rightly observed and heldby the High Court that the entire land acquisition proceedings is void andhence all consequential proceedings were also void ab initio.

5.23 It is further submitted by the learned counsel that in the presentcase, right from the very beginning and from the time of signing of theMoU, the Government of Orissa had made its mind that the land will beavailable to Vedanta even though the mandatory requirements of Act,1894 and the Rules, 1963 were yet to be complied with, which mighthave led to the possible failure of the acquisition as the enquiries providedtherein are meant to exclude acquisition of lands if certain mandatoryrequirements are not met with.

5.24 Shri Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel has heavily reliedupon the decisions of this Court in the case of Devinder Singh Vs.State of Punjab, (2008) 1 SCC 728 and City Montessori SchoolVs. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 253 in support of his submissionthat as observed and held by this Court Part VII of the Act, 1894 and theRules, 1963 require strict compliance. It is submitted that in the presentcase, all the procedures and the requirements of Part VII of the Act,1894 and the relevant Rules, 1963 are not complied with.

5.25 It is further submitted by Shri Prashant Bhushan, learnedcounsel that in the present case, the inquiry and the objection underSection 5A of the Act, 1894 have not been properly complied with and/or adhered to. It is submitted that it was absolutely critical for the Collectorto have properly heard the objections from the affected people inaccordance with Section 5A in relation to desirability of the proposed AB

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Aproject, irrespective of the number of objections received and shouldhave made a report in accordance thereof. It is submitted that in thepresent case, the said procedure has not been followed by the Collector.

5.26 It is further submitted that even otherwise the impugned landacquisition is in violation of environmental norms. It is submitted that theBacquisition of the lands in question in favour of the beneficiary company,is bad in law in view of the fact that by Gazette Notification dated23.04.1984 published by the State Government, the nearby area of theacquired lands has been declared as Wildlife Sanctuary and two rivers,namely, “Nuanai’&’Nala’ are flowing in the acquired lands according tothe satellite map issued by the Forest Department. It is submitted thatCthe control of the said rivers will be under the said private company ifthe acquisition proceedings are held to be valid in law thereby the doctrineof public trust as held by this Court will be violated. It is submitted that inthe case of Common Cause, A Registered Society, (1999) 6 SCC667, this Court held that natural resources such as air, water, forest,Dlakes, rivers and wildlife are public properties entrusted to the Governmentfor their safe and proper use and proper protection and the doctrineenjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoymentof the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownershipor commercial purposes. It is submitted that even vast tract of landsbelonging to the State Government including Gochar lands, on the basisEof requisition made for Vedanta Company, had been de-reserved anddivested from the purpose for which it was reserved and had been madeavailable for grant in favour of the beneficiary company by way of lease.It is submitted that even the proper procedure has not been followed forgrant of lease.F

5.27 It is further submitted that even the subsequent conversionof a private company to public company was mala fide action/act. It issubmitted that the entire exercise was hurriedly done to convert theappellant company from private to purportedly public company after itwas already decided to acquire land for it and after the Law departmentGduring acquisition proceedings observed and opined that the land may beacquired only for a public company and thereby hurriedly the Articles ofAssociation and Memorandum of Association were changed in violationof the conditions of the license granted to the appellant company andwithout first informing the concerned authority of the change, whichshows that the exercise was expressly taken up to defeat the object ofHPart VII of Act, 1894. It is further submitted that currently the possession of land is still with the landowners and most of whom are agriculturistsand their agricultural lands acquired are the only source of livelihood. Itis submitted that in the present case, as submitted hereinabove,approximately 6000 families and 30,000 people are likely to be affected,if the land is taken away, then it will cause them great hardship whichcan never be compensated in monetary terms.

5.28 Making above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the presentappeals.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective partiesand on going through the impugned judgment and order passed by theHigh Court, it appears that while quashing and setting aside the entireland acquisition proceedings, the High Court had in fact identified 15issues, which are as under:-

IssuesIssue No. 1Whether the Anil Agarwal Foundation, The Beneficiary Company, is a public company in terms of the definition under section 3(1)(IV) of the Companies Act, 1956 and can the private guarantee limited company be converted to public company under section 25 of the Companies Act? Issue No. 2Whether the State Government can acquire the lands in question in favour of the beneficiary company in exercise of its eminent domain power for the purpose of establishment of the proposed Vedanta University (not in existence) in view of Section 44-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? Issue No. 3Whether the State Government on the requisition of Vedanta Foundation could have initiated the acquisition proceedings in favour of the beneficiary company by issuing notifications under Section 4(1) of the LA Act without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 39, 41 and 42 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Rules 3(2) and 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963? Issue No. 4(A) Whether the Collector was required to conduct an inquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act even in the absence of filing objections to the show cause notice along with preliminary notification proposing to acquire the lands of the land owners/interested persons in favour of a beneficiary company? and (B) Whether the Collector was required to submit his report to the State Govt. in relation to certain matters as referred to under Clause (1) of Rule-4 as it is mandatory for further action under Section 6 of the LA Act, 1894 in view of the fact that the acquisition will entail serious civil consequences of the owners of the lands?

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Issue No. 12(A) Whether the impugned notifications acquiring the lands in the locality is legal and valid, as certain lands of them are declared for Wildlife Sanctuary according to Gazette notification dated 23.4.1984 and two rivers viz. “Nuanai" and "Nala" are flowing in the lands in question according to satellite map issued by the Department of Forest, would it affect the ecology and environment in the locality?

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(B) If so, whether it amounts to violation of provisions of Wildlife (Protection) Act; Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act as well as Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) act, and Environment Protection Act of 1986 and for this reason would it affect either the public interest or public injury or violation of Rule of Law?

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Issue Nos. 13, 14 & 15

13. Whether the PIL must succeed if the question Nos. 12(A) & (B) are answered in favour of the appellants and for violation of any provisions of Land Acquisition Act as well as Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963?

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14. Whether the acquisition proceedings in its entirety liable to be quashed, if the petitioners have made out a case, by exercising judicial review power by this Court? And

15. What relief petitioners are entitled? 7. After elaborate consideration on the aforesaid issues, the Highcourt has answered the respective 15 questions as under:- E

IssuesFindings / Answers given by the High Court Issue No. 1i) As per the details mentioned in Form No. 32 filed on 19.07.2006, Whether the Anil Agarwal the Petitioner has only 3 directors Foundation, The Beneficiary on its board and less than 7 FCompany, is a public company in members, which is less than what terms of the definition under section is required for a public limited 3(1)(IV) of the Companies Act, company under Section 12 (b) of 1956 and can the private guarantee the Companies Act, 1956. limited company be converted to ii) The Petitioner had tried to change public company under section 25 of its status from a private to a public the Companies Act? company but the same was subject to compliance of Sections 23, 31, 189 (2) and 192 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Petitioner had not Gfurnished certified copy of the memorandum and articles of association as required under the provisions of Section 31 (2A) and had therefore not acquired the status of a public company. iii) The Foundation is a section 25 company, and therefore not a public limited company. H

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AIssue No. 2

Whether the State Government can acquire the lands in question in favour of the beneficiary company in exercise of its eminent domain power for the purpose of establishment of the proposed BVedanta University (not in existence) in view of Section 44-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?

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Issue No. 3

Whether the State Government on the requisition of Vedanta Foundation could have initiated the acquisition proceedings in favour of Dthe beneficiary company by issuing notifications under Section 4(1) of the LA Act without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 39, 41 and 42 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Rules 3(2) and 4 of the Land Acquisition E(Companies) Rules, 1963?

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i) Acquisition of lands for a private company is not permissible except for the purpose mentioned in Section 40(1)(a) of the Act as stated under Section 44-B of the Act. Therefore, the acquisition in question is illegal.

ii) The University in question is non- existent as no University has come into existence under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 or under the Orissa Universities Act. iii) The State Government has promulgated an Ordinance to establish an University which is untenable in law.

i) Section 4(1) notification in favour of the beneficiary company were made on the basis of a requisition filed by Vedanta Foundation, but not Anil Agarwal Foundation, which is the beneficiary company. ii) No enquiry has been made by the State Government in terms of Rule-4 read with Rule 3 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963

iii) Acquisition of lands by publishing Section 4(1) Notifications in favour of the beneficiary company is vitiated in law for the reason that before putting the provisions of Section 4 to 16 and 18 to 37 in order to acquire land no previous consent of the State Government under Section 39 was there and such consent shall not be given unless the company has executed the agreement under Section 41 of the Act. iv) Declaration under Section 6 has been made by the State Government without consulting the Land Acquisition Committee to be constituted under Rule- 3 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963.

Issues

Issue Nos. 13, 14 & 15i) Acquisition proceedings from the A13. Whether the PIL must succeed if the stage of initiation till the date of question Nos. 12(A) & (B) are awards which in fact in law is not answered in favour of the appellants awarded and the alleged taking and for violation of any provisions over possession is in violation of of Land Acquisition Act as well as the Land Acquisition (Companies) Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. Rules, 1963? ii) On the requisition made by the beneficiary company by BAnd misrepresenting facts and playing fraud on the State Government, 14. Whether the acquisition proceedings has vitiated the entire land in its entirety liable to be quashed, if acquisition proceedings. the petitioners have made out a iii) Apart from public interest the case, by exercising judicial review petitioners have also pleaded for power by this Court? And the small land owners of the marginalised section who have no C15. What relief petitioners are entitled?access to this Court to fight litigation. iv) Therefore, the acquisition proceedings in its entirety is liable to be quashed, as per the judgement of the Supreme Court in HMT House Building DCooperative Society Vs. Syed Khader & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 2244.

8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespective parties at length.

8.1 We have also gone through in detail and considered theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing andsetting aside the entire acquisition proceedings.

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8.2 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants thatthe High Court has seriously erred in quashing and setting aside theentire acquisition proceedings as only few landowners submitted theobjections under Section 5A of the Act, 1894 and that the High Courthas materially erred in entertaining and allowing the Public InterestLitigation petitions is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be notedthat in the present case, the State Government has in utter disregard tothe relevant provisions of the Act, 1894 and the Rules, 1963 had acquireda huge tract of land to the extent of approximately 7000 acres ofagricultural lands belonging to the various landowners, namely, 6000families and thus involving displacement of approximately 30,000 people.It is required to be noted that the lands in question acquired for thebeneficiary foundation / company / trust was acquired for the proposeduniversity in a prime location just adjacent to the Wildlife Sanctuary and F

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Afrom the lands in question acquired, two small rivers belonging to theState / acquired by the State are passing. The manner in which the StateGovernment has dealt with and acquired the agricultural lands belongingto 6000 families and as it in fact favoured the private limited company,which was subsequently alleged to have been converted to a publiccompany and that too without holding any proper inquiry to the needBetc., we are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly entertained thewrit petitions including the Public Interest Litigation petitions and merelybecause some persons did not file the objections under Section 5A and/or accepted a meagre compensation and/or even accepted thecompensation cannot be a ground to set aside the acquisition proceedings,Cwhich as such rightly observed by the High Court, is vitiated by notfollowing the statutory provisions under the Act, 1894 as well as theRules, 1963. It is required to be noted that as such the entire initiation ofland acquisition proceedings and even right from selection of the landwas by the company – beneficiary company and not by the StateGovernment. There is an utter non-compliance of Rule 4 of the Rules,D1963 (which shall be dealt with hereinbelow). Under the circumstances,it cannot be said that the High Court has committed any error inentertaining the writ petitions including the Public Interest Litigationpetitions. Cogent reasons have been given by the High Court in paragraphs63 to 67 while entertaining the public interest litigation petitions and theEwrit petitions, which are as under:-

“63. For the reasons stated supra, definitely the public interest isinvolved in these writ petitions filed by the public spirited persons.It is profitable to know what the apex Court ruled on the point.In People’s Union for Democratic Rights Vs. UnionFof lndia, (1982) 3 SCC 235, the Supreme Court held as under:

“2 ........ We wish to point out with all the emphasis atour command that public interest litigation which is a strategicarm of the legal aid movement and which is intended to bringjustice within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute thelow visibility area of humanity, is a totally different kind oflitigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which isessentially of an adversary character where there is a disputebetween two litigating parties, one making claim or seekingrelief against the other and that other opposing such claim orresisting such relief. Public interest litigation is brought before G

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the court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of oneindividual against another as happens in the case of ordinarylitigation, but it is intended to promote and vindicate publicinterest which demands that violation of constitutional or legalrights of large number of people who are poor, ignorant or in asocially or economically disadvantaged position should not gounnoticed and un-redressed. That would be destructive of therule of law which forms one of the essential elements of publicinterest in any democratic form of Government. The rule oflaw does not mean that the protection of the law must beavailable only to a fortunate few or that the law should beallowed to be prostituted by the vested interests for protectingand upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcementof their civil and political rights. The poor too have civil andpolitical rights and the rule of law is meant for them also, thoughttoday it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugarbarons and the alcohol kings have the fundamental right tocarry on their business and to fatten their purses by exploitingthe consuming public, have the chamars belonging to the loweststrata of society no fundamental right to earn an honest livingthrough their sweat and toil? The former can approach thecourts with a formidable army of distinguished lawyers paid infour or five figures per day and if their right to exploit is upheldagainst the Government under the label of fundamental right,the courts are praised for their boldness and courage and theirindependence and fearlessness and applauded and acclaimed.But, if the fundamental right of the poor and helpless victimsof injustice is sought to be enforced by public interest litigation,the so-called champions of human rights frown upon it as wasteof time of the highest court in the land, which, according tothem, should not engage itself in such small and trifling matters.Moreover, these self-styled human rights activists forget thatcivil and political rights, priceless and invaluable as they arefor freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vastmasses of our people. Large numbers of men, women andchildren who constitute the bulk of our population are todayliving a sub-human existence in conditions of object poverty;utter grinding poverty has broken their back and sapped theirmoral fiber. They have no faith in the existing social and AB

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economic system. What civil and political rights are these poorand deprived sections of humanity going to enforce? This wasbrought out forcibly by W. Paul Gormseley at the silver jubileecelebrations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights atthe Banaras Hindu University :

“Since India is one of those countries which has givena pride of place to the basic human rights and freedoms inits Constitution in its Chapter on Fundamental Rights andon the Directive Principles of State Policy and has alreadycompleted twenty-five years of independence, the questionmay be raised whether or not the fundamental rightsenshrined in our Constitution have any meaning to themillions of our people to whom food, drinking water, timelymedical facilities and relief from disease and disaster,education and job opportunities still remain unavoidable. We,in India, should on this occasion study the human rights /declared and defined by the United Nations and comparethem with the rights available in practice and secured bythe law of our country.”

The Only solution for making civil and political rightsmeaningful to these large sections of society would be toremake the material conditions and restructure the social andeconomic order so that they may be able to realize theeconomic, social and cultural rights. There is indeed closerelationship between civil and political rights on the one handand economic, social and cultural rights on the other and thisrelationship is so obvious that the International Human RightsConference in Teheran called by the General Assembly in 1968declared in a final proclamation:

“Since human rights and fundamental’ freedoms areindivisible, the full realization of civil and political rightswithout the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rightsis impossible.”

Of Course, the task of restricting the social economicorder so that the social and economic rights become ameaningful reality for the poor and lowly sections of thecommunity is one which legitimately belongs to the legislature and the executive, but mere initiation of social and economicrescue programmes by the executive and the legislature wouldnot be enough and it is only through multi-dimensional strategiesincluding public interest litigation that these social and economicrescue programmes can be made effective. Public interestlitigation, as we conceive it, is essentially a cooperative orcollaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State orpublic authority and the court to secure observance of theconstitutional or legal rights, benefits and privileges conferredupon the vulnerable sections of the community and to reachsocial justice to them. The state or public authority againstwhom public interest litigation is brought should be as muchinterested in ensuring basic human rights, constitutional as wellas legal, to those who are in a socially and economicallydisadvantaged position, as the petitioners who brings the publicinterest litigation before the court. The State or public authoritywhich is arrayed as a respondent in public interest litigationshould, in fact, welcome it, as it would view it an opportunity toright a wrong or to redress an injustice done to the poor andweaker sections of the community whose welfare is and mustbe the prime concern of the State or the public authority.”

In S.P Gupta v. Union of India and others, AIR 1982SC 149, the apex Court held as under:

“We would therefore hold that any member of publichaving sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicialredress for public injury arising from breach of public duty orfrom violation of some provision of the Constitution or the lawand seek enforcement of such public duty and observance ofsuch constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely essentialfor maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justiceand accelerating the pace of realization of the constitutionalobjective “Law”, as pointed out by Justice Krishna Iyer inFertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, AIR1981 SC 344,” is a social auditor and this audit function can beput into action when some one with real public interest ignitesthe jurisdiction ...... :. Another point which requires emphasisis that cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injuryby the act or omission of the State or public authority but such ABC

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act or omission also causes a specific legal injury to an individualor to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, amember of the public having sufficient interest can certainlymaintain an action challenging the legality of such act oromission.”

In the case of Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary, reportedin AIR 1993 SC 892, the Supreme Court taking note of theobservations made in the case of S.P. Gupta (supra) and numberof its earlier decisions, held as under:

“It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide havingsufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have alocus standi and can approach the court to wipe out the tearsof the poor and needy, suffering from violation of theirfundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or privateprofit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly,a vexatious petition under the colour or PIL brought before thecourt for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejectionat the threshold.

It is depressing to note that on account of such trumperyproceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days arewasted which time otherwise could have been spent for thedisposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we are secondto none in fostering and developing the newly invented conceptof PIL and extending our Ione arm of sympathy to the poor,the ignorant. the oppressed and the needy whose fundamentalrights are infringed and violated and whose grievance gounnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoidbut express our opinion that while genuine litigants withlegitimate grievance relating to civil matters involving propertiesworth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases inwhich persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untoldagony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept inincarceration for long years, persons suffering from the unduedelay in service matters, Government or private personsawaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts ofpublic revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts arelocked up, detenus expecting their release from the detentionorders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and havingtheir grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesomeinterlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutelyno public interest except for personal gain or private profiteither for themselves or as proxy or others or for any otherextraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queuemuffing their face by wearing the mask of public interestlitigation, and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolouspetitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of thecourts and as a result of which the queue standing outside thedoors of the Court never moves which piquant situation createsa frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantlythey lose faith in the administration of our judicial system”.(Emphasis added)

Further in a recent decision, in the case of State ofUttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors., reported in(2010) 3 SCC 402, the Supreme Court referring to large numberof its earlier decisions held as under:

“33. The High Courts followed this Court and exercisedsimilar jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. TheCourts expanded the meaning of right to life and libertyguaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The rule oflocus standi was diluted and the traditional meaning of“aggrieved persons” was broadened to provide access to justiceto a very large section of the society which was otherwise notgetting any benefit from the judicial system. We would like toterm this as the first phase or the golden era of the publicinterest litigation. We would briefly deal with important casesdecided by this court in the first phase after broadening thedefinition of “aggrieved person”

36. Public interest litigation is not in the nature ofadversarial litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity tothe Government and its officers to make basic human rightsmeaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of thecommunity and to assure them social and economic justicewhich is the signature tune of our constitution. The Governmentand its officers must welcome public interest litigation becauseit would provide them an occasion to examine whether the ABC

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poor and the downtrodden are getting their social and economicentitlements or whether they are continuing to remain victimsof deception and exploitation at the hands of strong andpowerful sections of the community and whether social andeconomic justice has become a meaningful reality for them orit has remained merely a teasing illusion and a promise ofunreality, so that in case the complaint in the public interestlitigation is found to be true, they can in discharge of theirconstitutional obligation root out exploitation and injustice andensure to the weaker sections their rights and entitlements.

39. The origin and evolution of public interest litigationin India emanated from realization of constitutional obligationby the Judiciary towards the vast sections of the society - thepoor and the marginalized sections of the society. Thisjurisdiction has been created and carved out by the judicialcreatively and craftsmanship.

40. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India this Courtobserved that Article 32 does not merely confer power on thisCourt to issue direction, order or writ for the enforcement offundamental rights. Instead, it also lays a constitutional obligationon this Court to protect the fundamental rights of the people.The Court asserted that, in realization of this constitutionalobligation, “it has all incidental and ancillary power includingthe power to forge new remedies and fashion new strategiesdesigned to enforce the fundamental rights”. The Court realizedthat because of extreme poverty, a large number of sectionsof society cannot approach the court. The fundamental rightshave no meaning for them and in order to preserve and protectthe fundamental rights of the marginalized section of the societyby judicial innovation and creativity stated giving necessarydirections and passing order in the public interest.

41. The development of public interest litigation has beenan extremely significant development in the history of the Indianjurisprudence. The decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1970sloosened the strict locus standi requirements to permit filing ofpetitions on behalf of marginalised and deprived sections ofthe society by public spirited individuals, institutions and/orbodies. The higher courts exercised wide powers given to them

under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. The sort ofremedies sought from the Courts in the public interest litigationgoes beyond award of remedies to the affected individualsand groups. In suitable cases, the Courts have also givenguidelines and directions. The Courts have monitoredimplementation of legislation and even formulated guidelinesin the absence of legislation. If the cases of the decades of 70sand 80s are analysed, most of the public interest litigation caseswhich were entertained by the courts are pertaining toenforcement of fundamental rights of marginalised and deprivedsections of the society.

64. In view of the clear pronouncement of law in the aforesaidcases by the Apex Court this Court has to interfere with theacquisition proceedings and grant of Government lands in favourof the Beneficiary Company to protect the public interest. Hencewe have to answer the aforesaid points in favour of the petitionerand against the opposite parties.

65. For the reasons stated supra, the factual contentions urged bythe learned Advocate General, placing reliance upon the report ofthe Additional Secretary to Tourism Department, is wholly contraryto the Gazette Notification of 1984 referred to supra and theSatellite Map issued by the Forest Department to the petitioners,which is produced for our perusal. Further the legal contentionsurged on behalf of the Company by Mr. Sanjit Mohanty, learnedSenior Counsel that the petitioners have abused the process ofthis Court claiming that they are public spirited persons, is alsountenable in law for the reason that they have established thecase that interest of the public of the locality will be affected andalso there will be violation of the Rule of the law if the acquisitionof lands and grant of leasehold rights in respect of Governmentlands in favour of beneficiary Company is held to be not legal andvalid and therefore we have to hold that there is no abuse of theprocess of this Court by the petitioners in approaching this Courtespousing the public cause and public interest as the act of thestate Government is in contravention of the Notification issued bythe State Government way back in the year 1984 declaring certainlands nearby the lands acquired, as Wild life Sanctuary and thedocuments produced by the petitioners to prove the fact that two AB

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Ariver are flowing on the acquired lands. For the reasons statedsupra we are of the view that the petitioners in the PIL writ petitionshave established that they are bona fide public spirited personswho are very much interested in protecting the public interest andsee that the State Government discharged its responsibilities andfundamental duties towards the public of the locality keeping inBview ‘’the doctrine of public trust” upon the public properties.The disposal of the earlier writ petition filed by nine personsreferred to supra upon which reliance is placed by the learnedSenior Counsel on behalf of the Company in support of hiscontention that the writ petitioners in the PIL have abused theCprocess of this Court is not tenable in law, as this Court has notdecided the case on merits by answering the substantial issuesthat arose for its consideration. In the present writ petitions byurging tenable grounds they have made out a strong case forgranting the reliefs. If the PIL petitions are not allowed there willbe a continuing wrong of the State Government and the beneficiaryDCompany, which would violate the human rights of the residentsof the locality where the lands are acquired and land owners/interested persons. They are small holders of the lands who belongto the Marginalized sections of the society and therefore theyhave no access to the justice for which they have got constitutionalEright under Article 39A of the Constitution and hundreds acres ofGovernment lands are granted in favour of the company is utterviolation of law.

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66. For the foregoing reasons, absolutely there is no substance inthe contentions urged by the learned Senior counsel on behalf ofthe Company that there is no public interest involved in thesecases of PIL writ petitions filed by the petitioners and they haveabused the process of the Court is misconceived and whollyuntenable in law and the said contention is required to be rejectedand the public interested litigation writ petitions also have to beallowed.

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Answer to Point Nos. 14 and 15:

67. We have answered all the points framed in these petitionsagainst the State Government and the beneficiary Company byrecording our reasons and we have held that the acquisitionproceedings from the stage of initiation till the date of purported H

awards which in fact and law not awarded and the alleged takingover the possession of the lands is in flagrant violation of thestatutory provision of Section 4, 5A, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, (2), 23, 24,read with the provisions under Part - VII of the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894. We have also answered the points that arose for ourconsideration in the Public interest Litigation holding that theinitiation of the acquisition proceedings in favour of the beneficiarycompany, on the requisition made by the Vedanta Foundation bymisrepresenting fact and playing fraud on the State Government,has vitiated the entire acquisition proceedings. We have furtheranswered that the public interest at large is affected and there isviolation of rule of law. Therefore, we have also held the writpetitions filed by the petitioners as public interest litigation arealso required to be allowed and made observation that thepetitioners in those petitions, apart from public interest, they havepleaded on behalf of small land holders who have no sustenanceto approach this Court to fight litigation. Therefore, the acquisitionproceedings in its entirety in respect of persons who haveapproached this Court and even who have not approached thisCourt are liable to be quashed for the reason that there is flagrantviolation of the aforesaid provisions of the Land Acquisition Actas observed by Supreme Court in the case of H.M.T HouseBuilding Co-operative Society Vs. Syed Khader & Ors, reportedin AIR 1995 SCC 2244. The Supreme Court, while answering thelegal questions that arose for consideration, held that prior approvalof the Government is required under Section 44-A but as the samehas not been followed, the entire acquisition proceedings wasquashed. Further, the Supreme Court directed in the above referredcase the State Government and the Society which was in thepossession, that lands shall be resorted to the respective landowners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged theacquisition of their lands or not and at paragraph 25 of its judgmenthas directed as hereunder:

“26. We direct that as a result of quashing of the landacquisition proceedings including the notification as aforesaid,the possession of the lands shall be restored to the respectivelandowners irrespective of the fact whether they hadchallenged the acquisition of their lands or not. Onrestoration of the possession to the landowners they shall AB

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refund the amounts received by them as compensation ·orotherwise in respect of their lands. The appellant, therespondents and the State Government including allauthorities/ persons concerned shall implement the aforesaiddirections at an early date.”

BWe are in complete agreement with the view taken by the HighCourt while entertaining the writ petitions and the Public Interest Litigationpetitions.

8.3 The grounds on which the High Court has set aside the entireacquisition proceedings by holding that the same is vitiated by non-Ccompliance of the relevant provisions of the Act, 1894, have been referredto and reproduced hereinabove.

8.4 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the entire acquisitionproceedings / proceedings came to be initiated at the instance of theVedanta Foundation, which commenced in the month of April, 2006.DInitially, the company asked the Government of Orissa specifically tomake available for it 15,000 acres of contiguous land around Nuanai,Puri District in Bhubaneshwar-Puri-Konark by 15.06.2006. The processfor identifying the suitable locations was by the company. Even from thepresentation made to the Chief Minister at the relevant time and therelevant clauses of MoU dated 19.07.2006 and even the Section 41Eagreement executed between the Government of Orissa and the AnilAgarwal Foundation, it can be seen that the land was identified by thecompany and not by the Government of Orissa. The same has beendealt with and considered by the High Court in extenso.

8.5 At this stage, it is required to be noted that initiation of theFacquisition proceedings was by the Vedanta Foundation and thereafterby the Anil Agarwal Foundation, which admittedly at the relevant timeand as on 19.07.2006 was a private company having three Directors onits Board and less than seven members. It is the case on behalf of theappellants that as subsequently the Anil Agarwal Foundation, which atGthe relevant time was a private company was converted to public companyas on 13.12.2006 namely, viz., the date when the first Section 4(1)notification was issued and the relevant date for consideration would be13.12.2006 has no substance and cannot be accepted. As observedhereinabove, the initiation of the proceedings to acquire the identifiedlands, identified by the appellant company was in the month of April/

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June, 2006, which was followed by the MoU dated 19.07.2006.Therefore, the relevant date for consideration would be 19.07.2006 andnot 13.12.2006 as sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants.

8.6 At this stage, it is required to be noted that even otherwise thesubsequent alleged conversion from private company to public companywas an attempt to get out of the statutory provision under the Act, 1894.The Law Department specifically observed that the land cannot beacquired by private company for the purposes for which the lands weresought to be acquired, only thereafter the appellants changed the statusof the company from private company to public company. The aforesaidwas a mala fide exercise on the part of the appellants.

8.7 It is further required to be noted that when the appellant triedto change its status from private to public company, the same was subjectto compliance of Sections 23, 31, 189(2) and 192 of the Companies Act,1956. As observed and the findings recorded by the High Court andeven from the RTI query, it is clear that the appellant did not furnish thecertified copy of the Articles of Association (as amended) as requiredunder the provision of Section 31(2A). It is the case on behalf of theappellant that the appellant successfully converted into the public companyon 23.11.2006 and it increased number of members from 3 to 7 and interms of Section 44 of the Companies Act, 1956, it amended its Articlesof Association to delete the restriction on free transferability of the sharesand the same has been acknowledged by the Registrar of Companies(ROC) by acknowledgment dated 21.02.2007 and 03.03.2011 isconcerned, it is required to be noted and as observed hereinabove therelevant date for consideration would be June, 2006 and in any case19.07.2006 when the MoU was entered into. Even the subsequentacknowledgment by the ROC was on 21.02.2007 and 03.03.2011 evenmuch after Section 4(1) notification. Therefore, as rightly observed andheld by the High Court legally, the appellant was not converted to publiccompany, which as such was a Section 25 company and therefore, not apublic company. At this stage, Section 44B of the Act, 1894 is requiredto be referred to, which reads as under:- “44B. Land not to be acquired under this Partexcept for certain purpose for private companies otherthan Government companies. - Notwithstanding anythingcontained in this Act, no land shall be acquired under this Part,except for the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section AB

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(1) of section 40, for a private company, which is not aGovernment company.

Explanation. - “Private company” and “Governmentcompany” shall have the meaning respectively assigned to themin the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).”

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8.8 As per Section 44B of the Act, 1894, notwithstanding anythingcontained in the Act, no land shall be acquired under Part VII, exceptfor the purpose mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 40,for a private company which is not a Government company. As per theExplanation, a “private company” shall have the meaning assigned to itCin the Companies Act, 1956. As per Section 40(1) read with Section 39,a previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of theagreement is necessary (Section 39) and which shall not be given unlessthe appropriate Government be satisfied, either on the report of theCollector under Section 5A, sub-section (2) or by an enquiry held providedthat the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain the land for the erection ofDdwelling-houses for workmen employed by the company or for theprovision of amenities directly connected therewith. Sections 39 and 40reads as under:- “39.Previous consent of appropriate Government andexecution of agreement necessary. - The provisions of sections6 to 16 (both inclusive) and sections 18 to 37 (both inclusive) shallnot be put in force in order to acquire land for any company underthis Part, unless with the previous consent of the appropriateGovernment, not unless the Company shall have executed theagreement hereinafter mentioned.

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40. Previous enquiry. - (1) Such consent shall not be givenunless the appropriate Government be satisfied, either on the reportof the Collector under section 5A, sub-section (2), or by an enquiryheld as hereinafter provided, - (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain landfor the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed bythe Company or for the provision of amenities directlyconnected therewith, or G

(aa) that such acquisition is needed for the constructionof some building or work for a Company which is engaged or H

is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work whichis for a public purpose, or

(b) that such acquisition is needed for the constructionof some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful tothe public.

(2) Such enquiry shall be held by such officer and atsuch time and place as the appropriate Government shallappoint.

(3) Such officer may summon and enforce the attendanceof witnesses and compel the production of documents by thesame means and, as far as possible, in the same manner as isprovided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) inthe case of a Civil Court.”

8.9 Thus, at the relevant time, when the company was a privatecompany, in view of the bar under Section 44-B, the lands in questioncould not have been sought to be acquired / acquired by the appellantcompany de hors Section 44B read with Section 40(1)(a) of the Act,1894. Therefore, the High Court has rightly held that the acquisition wasillegal on the aforesaid ground.

8.10 At this stage, it is required to be noted that even at the relevanttime, the University in question was/is non-existent as no university hascome into existence under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956nor under the Orrisa Universities Act. The case on behalf of the appellantthat the State legislature has already passed a bill to establish the universityis neither here nor there as even as per the appellant’s response, thesame is pending assent of the Governor.

8.11 Even the High Court has given specific findings on Issue No.3 that the entire acquisition proceedings in favour of the beneficiarycompany by issuing a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act werewithout complying with the mandatory provisions of Sections 39, 40 and41 of the Act, 1894 read with Rules 3(2) and (4) of the Rules, 1963.Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1963 are as under:- “3. Land Acquisition Committee. - (1) For the purposeof advising the appropriate Government in relation to acquisitionof land under Part VII of the Act, the appropriate Governmentshall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Committeeto be called the Land Acquisition Committee.

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(2) The Committee shall consist of -

(i) The Secretaries to the Government of the Departments ofRevenue, Agriculture and Industries or such other officers ofeach of the said Departments as the appropriate Governmentmay appoint; and

(ii) such other members as the appropriate Government mayappoint, for such term as that Government may, by orderspecify, and

(iii) the Secretary to the Department or any officer nominatedby him dealing with the purposes for which the companyproposes to acquire the land.

(3) The appropriate Government shall appoint one of themembers of the Committee to be its Chairman.

(4) The Committee shall regulate its own procedure.

(5) It shall be duty of the Committee to advise theappropriate Government on all matters relating to or arising out ofacquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, on which it isconsulted and to tender its advice within one month from the dateon which it is consulted :

Provided that the appropriate Government may on a requestbeing made in this behalf by the Committee and for sufficientreasons extend the said period to a further period not exceedingtwo months.

4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regardto certain matters before initiating acquisitionproceedings. - (1) Whenever a Company makes an applicationto the appropriate Government for acquisition of any land, thatGovernment shall direct the Collector to submit a report to it onthe following matters, namely :-

(i) that the Company has made its best endeavour to find outlands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition;

(ii) that the Company has made all reasonable efforts to getsuch lands by negotiation with the persons interested thereinon payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed;

(iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for thepurpose;

(iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is notexcessive;

(v) that the Company is in a position to utilise the landexpeditiously; and

(vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agriculturalland, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as toavoid acquisition of that land.

(2) The Collector shall, after giving the Company areasonable opportunity to make any representation in this behalf,hold an enquiry into the matters referred to in sub-rule (1) andwhile holding such enquiry he shall, -

(i) in any case where the land proposed to be acquired isagricultural land, consult the Senior Agricultural Officer of thedistrict whether or not such land is good agricultural land;

(ii) determine, having regard to the provisions of sections 23and 24 of the Act, the approximate amount of compensationlikely to be payable in respect of the land which, in the opinionof the Collector, should be acquired for the Company; and

(iii) ascertain whether the Company offered a reasonable price(not being less than the compensation so determined), to thepersons interested in the land proposed to be acquired.

Explanation. - For the purpose of this rule “good agriculturalland” means any land which, considering the level of agriculturalproduction and the crop pattern of the area in which it is situated,is of average or above average productivity and includes a gardenor grove land.

(3) As soon as may be after holding the enquiry under sub-rule (2), the Collector shall submit a report to the appropriateGovernment and a copy of the same shall be forwarded by thatGovernment to the Committee.

(4) No declaration shall be made by the appropriateGovernment under section 6 of the Act unless - A

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(i) the appropriate Government has consulted the Committeeand has considered the report submitted under this rule andthe report, if any, submitted under section 5-A of the Act; and

(ii) the agreement under section 41 of the Act has been executedby the Company.”

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8.12 At the relevant time, there was no Section 41 agreement atall. Even no inquiry was made by the State Government in terms of Rule4 read with Rule 3 of the Rules, 1963. Declaration under Section 6 couldnot have been issued by the State Government without consulting theLand Acquisition Committee to be constituted under Rule 3 of the Rules,C1963. Constituting the Core Committee by the State Government, whichwas to coordinate the entire acquisition cannot be said to be constitutingthe Land Acquisition Committee as required under Rule 3. The objectand purpose of constituting the Land Acquisition Committee under Rule3 is to advise the appropriate Government on all matters relating to orarising out of acquisition of land under Part VII of the Act, 1894 onDwhich it is consulted and to tender its advise. Therefore, on this groundalso the land acquisition proceedings have been vitiated.

8.13 There is a non-compliance of mandatory requirement underRule 4 of the Rules, 1963. Before initiating land acquisition proceedingsfor the company, the Government shall direct the Collector to submit aEreport to it on the mattes mentioned in Rule 4 including which are:- “(i) that the Company has made its best endeavour to find outlands in the locality suitable for the purpose of the acquisition;

(ii) that the Company has made all reasonable efforts to get suchFlands by negotiation with the persons interested therein on paymentof reasonable price and such efforts have failed;

(iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose;

(iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive;

(v) that the Company is in a position to utilise the land expeditiously;Gand

(vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agriculturalland, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as to avoidacquisition of that land.”

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8.14 As per Rule 4(2)(i) in any case where the land proposed tobe acquired is agricultural lands, the Collector is required to consult theSenior Agricultural Officer of the District whether or not such land isgood agricultural land. The Collector is also required to satisfy anddetermine having regard to the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of theAct, the approximate amount of compensation likely to be payable inrespect of the land, which, in the opinion of the Collector, should beacquired for the company.

8.15 From the material on record, the High Court has given thespecific findings that there is a non-compliance of mandatory provisionsunder Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1963 and therefore, the entire acquisitionproceedings for the beneficiary company has been vitiated and thereare checks and balances and certain mandatory procedures andrequirements are to be satisfied, more particularly, when the lands are tobe acquired for the company, the same have to be adhered to and non-consideration of the relevant aspects, which are mandatory to beconsidered under Rule 4 would vitiate the entire acquisition proceedingsas the subjective satisfaction by the State Government has been vitiatedon non-consideration of the relevant aspects, more particularly, the aspectsmentioned in Rule 4.

8.16 Even there is a specific finding recorded by the High Courtthat the beneficiary company has not executed the MoU as requiredunder Section 41 of the Act that the State Government even undertakingas provided in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 41. While orderingso, in paragraph 53, the High Court has observed as under:- “53. Further as could be seen from the original records ofthe State Government that issuance of the preliminary notificationsand obtaining agreements from the Vedanta Foundation and thebeneficiary company are also bad in law for the reason that wehave answered point no. 1 holding that the beneficiary companyis not a public company; it is a private company limited byguarantee. Further acquisition of lands in its private companylimited by guarantee. Further acquisition of lands in its favour ispermissible only in respect of the purpose of erection of dwellinghouses for workmen employed by the company or for the provisionamenities directly connected therewith.

The MOU dated 19.7.2006 executed by Vedanta Companyin favour of the State Government was before publishing the AB

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Apreliminary notifications in respect of the acquired lands. On thebasis of the said MOU preliminary notification dated 13.12.2006to 22.12.2006 were published. Therefore, the said agreement wasnot executed by the beneficiary company in favour of the StateGovernment for publishing section 4(1) notifications by givingprevious consent by it as provided under section 39 of the LA.ActBto put the provisions of sections 4 to 16 (both inclusive) and section18 to 37 in force. Therefore, there is no valid agreement beforethe State Government to exercise the statutory power and grantprevious consent for publishing the preliminary notification. Forthis reason, publication of the preliminary notifications on the basisCof the said MOU executed by Vedanta Company does not enureto the benefit of the beneficiary company. Therefore, the saidagreement is not valid as required under section 39 read withsection 41 of the LA.Act and, therefore, acquisition of lands bypublishing section 4 (1) notification in favour of the beneficiarycompany is vitiated in law for the reason that before putting theDprovisions of section 4 to 16 and 18 to 37 in order to acquire landin favour of the beneficiary company, no previous consent of theState Government was there and such consent also shall not begiven unless the company has executed the agreement in termsof section 41 of the LA.Act. Therefore, the agreement is not onlyEnot in conformity with sub-sections (1) to (4) and (4A) of section41, but the same is not legal and valid for the reason that muchprior to the said agreement, preliminary notification were publishedand thereafter final notifications were published which are notpermissible in law. Therefore, the same is in contravention ofsection 39 of the Act.”F

8.17 The most important aspect, which is required to be consideredis the non-application of mind by the State Government on environmentalaspects and passing of two rivers from the acquired lands in question. Itis not in dispute that from the lands in question two rivers namely ‘Nuanai’and ‘Nala’ are flowing, which as such were acquired by the StateGGovernment. How the maintenance of the rivers etc. can be handedover to the beneficiary company. If the lands in question are continuedto be acquired by the beneficiary company, the control of the riverswould be with the said private company, which would violate the Doctrineof Public Trust. Even requiring the beneficiary company to maintain the H

flow of above two rivers may also affect the residents of the locality atlarge.

8.18 It is also required to be noted that just across the road, thereis a Wildlife Sanctuary, which is just adjacent across the road to theproposed university and the lands acquired. Therefore, the large-scaleconstruction for the establishment of the proposed university as observedby the High Court will also adversely affect the Wildlife Sanctuary, entireEco system and the ecological environment in the locality. It is a duty ofthe State to protect the Wildlife Sanctuary and it may affect the entireEco system and the ecological environment in the locality. It is also requiredto be noted that even the distance of the sea from the proposed VedantaUniversity is approximately 2000 meters. Merely because the BalukhandWildlife Sanctuary is separated from the proposed site by a highway –Puri-Konark Marine Drive, cannot be a ground to acquire the huge landsfor the proposed university and as rightly observed by the High Court,the same will adversely affect the Wildlife Sanctuary and the entire Ecosystem and the ecological environment in the locality. The aforesaidaspects has not at all been considered by the State Government and/orthe Collector and/or the appropriate authority even while consideringthe proposal and/or even the objections under Section 5A of the Act,1894.

8.19 Even otherwise, there is a non-application on the part of theState Government on the requirement of the lands by the beneficiarycompany. It is required to be noted that the lands were proposed to beacquired at the instance of one foundation / company and the StateGovernment was dealing with the lands belonging to the agriculturallandowners. It is required to be noted that the Government is holding apublic trust and has to deal with the lands belonging to private landowners,more particularly, agricultural landowners in accordance with law. TheState Government could not have considered the proposal from only onebeneficiary/trust. There may be other public trusts / companies, whomight be interested in establishing such university. Even no proper inquiryseems to have been initiated by the Government / Collector whileconsidering the proposal by the beneficiary company. It is required to benoted that initially, 15,000 acres of the agricultural lands was sought tobe acquired for the proposed university. Ultimately, approximately, 8000acres of the land belonging to the private landowners / agriculturallandowners came to be acquired. The State Government has also handed A

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Aover the possession of approximately 495 acres of land belonging to theState Government including the Gochar Lands etc., which could havebeen used for the other public purpose and even for the Gochar Landsalso.

8.20 From the material on record, it appears that undue benefitsBwere proposed / in fact offered and given to the beneficiary companyproviding undue largesse like:-

(i) total autonomy to Vedanta University and its authorities withregard to administration, admission, fee structure, curriculumand faculty selection; C(ii)proposed university to have complete immunity from anyreservation laws of the State Government;

(iii) all assistance in getting regulatory approvals from UGC,AICTE etc.;

(iv) the Government agreed to provide 4-lane road fromBhubaneshwar city to the proposed site;D

(v) in the agreement, the Government also agreed to make theland use/ zoning plan in the 5 km radius from the universityboundary only after Consultation with Vedanta;

(vi) the Government also promised to exempt all state levies/taxes/ duties namely, viz. VAT, Works Contract Tax, StampEDuty and Entry tax on R&D equipment, educational aids,lab equipment and tools, and construction materials fromthe date of signing of the MoU;

(vii) the Government also promised to assist the Foundation inobtaining NOC from SPCB and all clearances from theFCentral Government;

(viii) the Government also promised to assist the Foundation inarranging rapid EIA and EMP for the project;

(ix) the Government also promised to provide extraordinary hugeamounts of electricity and water.G8.21 It is not appreciable why the Government offered such anundue favour in favour of one trust/ company. Thus, the entire acquisitionproceedings and the benefits, which were proposed by the StateGovernment were vitiated by favourism and violative of Article 14 ofthe Constitution of India.

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8.22 From the aforesaid and the detailed findings recorded by theHigh Court reproduced hereinabove, we are more than satisfied that theHigh Court has not committed any error and in fact the High Court wasjustified in setting aside the entire acquisition proceedings, which hasbeen vitiated by non-compliance of the statutory provisions under theAct, 1894 and the Rules, 1963 and vitiated by mala fides and favourismand is a clear case of the non-application of mind on relevant aspects.We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.

8.23 The submission on behalf of the appellant that now theappellant is ready to confine to acquisition of 3837 acres of land only andthat they are now willing to exclude the lands belonging to 7 land losers,who have filed the writ petitions, from the acquisition proceedings and/or the landowners before this Court and/or the land belonging to the landlosers before this Court is concerned, it will strengthen our finding thatthere was no proper inquiry with respect to the requirement. As observedhereinabove, initially, 15,000 acres was proposed to be acquired, whichis now reduced to 3837 acres. Meaning thereby, the proposal was forexaggerated demand. This was mala fide intention on the part of theappellant company / foundation. At this stage, it is required to be notedthat it was the specific case on behalf of the original writ petitioners,more particularly, the Public Interest Litigation petitioners that if such ahuge land would have been acquired and/or even the lands, which arealready acquired, would be misused and/or put to use for some otherpurpose like mining activities etc. At this stage, it is required to be notedthat the lands to be acquired are agricultural lands belonging to 6000families and their only source of livelihood is on the agricultural lands,which cannot be compensated in terms of money, therefore, the proposalmade now has to be rejected outright.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all theseappeals fail and the same deserve to be dismissed and are accordinglydismissed with costs, which is quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be depositedby the appellant – beneficiary company – Anil Agarwal Foundation withthe Registrar of this Court within a period of six weeks from today andon such deposit, the same be transferred to the Orissa State LegalServices Authority.

Appeals dismissed.

(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)

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