RAMESHWAR AND ORS versus STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. on 21 July 2022

[2022] 13 S.C.R. 711

RAMESHWAR AND ORS.

v.

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

(Miscellaneous Application No. 50 of 2019)

In

(Civil Appeal No. 8788 of 2015)

JULY 21, 2022

[UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT ANDPAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: ss. 4, 6 and 23 – Term ‘transfer’in context of *Rameshwar & Ors vs State of Haryana’s case –Meaning and nature of – Exclusion of the land from the deemedaward or forms part of the deemed award – On facts, issuance ofNotification u/s.4 on 27.08.2004, followed by the declaration u/s.6and the receipt of objections from the landowners as also the matterposted for publication of the award on 26.08.2007 – However, on29.01.2010 the State decided to withdraw from the acquisition – Inthe interim period, land owners induced to sell or transfer theirland to colonizers/developers at significantly lower rates ofcompensation – Most of the colonizers/developers entered intocollaboration agreements after the notification u/s.4 – They soughtand were granted licenses by the Department of Town and CountryPlanning – Challenged to, in the *Rameshwar’s case - This Courtheld that decision to withdraw from the acquisition was a fraud onthe power under the Land Acquisition Act and invalidated alltransfers effected from the date of publication to the date ofpublication of State’s decision to revoke the acquisition –Applications by the Haryana State Industrial and InfrastructureDevelopment Corporation-HSIIDC and several others seekingclarification of *Rameshwar’s case – Held: Term ‘transfer’ usedin *Rameshwar’s case is not confined to sale, lease or otherencrumbrance – It includes development and/or collaborationagreements, as well as licenses issued during the suspect period,whether or not in favour of the developer – Lands covered bylicenses issued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights);Karma (for which collaboration was entered into with Unitech);

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ARam Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontier (ultimately used byGodrej); Express Greens (DLF); Kalinga and Innovative amount totransfer – With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores peracre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC – With respect toGodrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre is payable by Godrej to HSIIDCB– Upon full compliance thereof, the lands covered by Green Heightsand Godrej’s projects would be excluded from the deemed award –With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land forms part of thedeemed award – Lands belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros,excluded from the deemed award – With respect to Kalinga, theHSIIDC to complete verification of all the relevant documents –CWith respect to ABW, the HSIIDC to refund the amounts payable tothe allottees of the entire project – With respect to Legend Heights,HSIIDC to hand over commercial units to allottees who were eithergranted occupation, and /or in whose favour conveyance was executed – Issuance of direction to the State to ensure that allDreferences pertaining to the acquisition are answered as expeditiouslyas possible.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

HELD: 1. It is clear that the collaboration agreementsEformed the first element of a two-step process whereby thecolonizers / developers (who might have been also land owners)having acquired lands, prior to the preliminary notification, wentahead and entered into commitments by executing collaborationagreements after the notification under Section 4, and evenFdeclaration under Section 6, with full knowledge. Theconsideration for parting with developmental rights was far higherthan the market value of the lands which they would have beenentitled to. These acts ultimately culminated with the decisionnot to acquire the lands. The second step – and the importantone persuading the State not to acquire the lands - was theGapplication for, and the grant of, development licenses. Uniformly,in all these cases, the applications were made prior to thescheduled date of publication of the award (26.08.2007). This is asignificant and tell-tale factor because there was no way theapplicants would have ordinarily known that an award would notH

be pronounced on the concerned date. In fact, the applicationclearly indicates foreknowledge that their lands would not beultimately acquired. This is what may be characterized as theproverbial ‘smoking gun’ which establishes the complicity ofthese individuals and entities. [Para 39][745-D-G]

2. Land ownership typically carries with it a bundle of rights.A landowner has the right to possess, sell, lease, develop, sub–let, occupy, etc. On an overall analysis of the common features ofall the collaboration agreements, it is evident that except for theempty husk of a title, the land owner parted with predominantand substantial rights over the property, including possession.In almost all the cases, these rights were parted for considerationwhich was far above the notified acquisition rates. This observationapplies in the case of the two companies – Frontier and Karma,who continued to be the land owners of the land. Such ‘emptyingout’ of all important attributes that constitute rights and interestover the property cannot but be viewed as a ‘transfer’. To holdotherwise would mean that after receiving substantial amounts –equal to many times over the existing market rates (that couldordinarily have been claimed by the landowner in respect of theirholding in acquisition proceedings) – and entitling the developerto create third–party rights in respect of not a few but hundredsof people, nevertheless, the landowner could still hold out andclaim their right to not part with the title. Such a conclusion woulddefy reason and commonsense and cannot be countenanced. Inthe circumstances, it is held that the collaboration agreements inall these cases which ultimately culminated in the grant of licenseswould fall within the mischief of the term ‘transfer’ as envisionedin the main judgment, as it foreclosed the enjoyment andpossession by the landowner, who willingly parted with suchrights, for valuable consideration and acquiesced to irreversiblechanges on it. [Para 40][746-A-E]

3. The findings are summarized as follows:

a. The expression ‘transfer’ used in the main judgment,Rameshwar v State of haryana (2018) 6 SCC 215 is not confined A

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Ato sale, lease or other encumbrance. It includes developmentand/or collaboration agreements, as well as licenses issued (fordevelopment) during the suspect period, whether or not in favourof the developer.

b. As a corollary to the above, the lands covered by licensesBissued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights);Karma (for which collaboration was entered into with Unitech);Ram Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontier (ultimately used byGodrej); Express Greens (DLF); Kalinga and Innovative amountto transfer.

Cc. With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores peracre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC. With respect toGodrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre is payable by Godrej toHSIIDC. Upon full compliance with directions above, the landscovered by Green Heights and Godrej’s projects shall beexcluded from the deemed award.

Dd. With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land subjectof License No. 206 of 2008 forms part of the deemed award.

e. Lands measuring 2.9875 acres and 10.881 acresrespectively belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros, are excludedfrom the deemed award.E

f. With respect to Express Greens (DLF), contentions toexclude the project from the deemed award are rejected.

g. With respect to Kalinga, it is directed that HSIIDC shallcomplete verification of all the relevant documents furnished byKalinga.F

h. With respect to ABW, it is directed that HSIIDC to refundthe amounts payable to the allottees of the entire project.

i. With respect to Speed Town, the contentions to excludethe land from the deemed award are rejected. It is held that SpeedTown shall be entitled to the compensation to be decided, inGrespect of the land, on the same basis as in the case of all othersentitled to it.

j. With respect Paramveer, the contentions to exclude thehotel block from the deemed award are rejected. All rights, titleand interest in those portions of Innovative’s properties shall H

vest in HSIIDC and be part of the deemed award. Innovativeshall be entitled to amounts like in the case of all other developers/owners in accordance with the main judgment.

k. With respect to Legend Heights, HSIIDC is directed toHand over commercial units to allottees who were either grantedoccupation, and /or in whose favour conveyance was executed.

l. With respect to Dharamveer and other petitioners, aswell as similarly placed individuals the rights and title in respectof lands under their occupation is vested with HSIIDC.

m. The State is directed to ensure that all referencespertaining to the acquisition are answered as expeditiously aspossible. The concerned reference courts are hereby directedto conclude all the proceedings in 185 references received for365 acres of land and pronounce the award in accordance withlaw within the stipulated period.

n. It is clarified that wherever the allottees have not paidthe full amounts (payable in terms of the agreements) HSIIDCshall be entitled to the same rights in law as in the case of theoriginal builder/developer, which include, but are not limited to,insisting full payment before handing over possession to theallottees. [Para 121][770-A-D; F,H; 771-A, C; 772-E; 773-C-D,F, G; 774-C, F-H]

*Rameshwar v State of haryana (2018) 6 SCC 215 –Clarified.

Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.(2008) 10 SCC 345 : [2008] 10 SCR 697; Ashok KumarJaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar AIR 2014 Cal 92; SushilKumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors. (2019) 2SCC 241 : [2018] 12 SCR 756; Unitech Ltd. v. Unionof India (2016) 2 SCC 569 : [2015] 12 SCR 992;Dharamvir v State of Haryana SLP (C) No. 5490 of2021 – referred to.

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ACIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION :Miscellaneous Application No.50 of 2019 In Civil Appeal No.8788 of2015.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2018 in C.A. No.8788of 2015 passed by the Supreme Court of India.B

With

Diary No(s). 26552/2019, MA 2150/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015,MA 2149/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, CONMT. PET.(C) No. 2226/2018 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, MA 1175/2019 in C.A. No. 8788/2015,Diary No(s). 24553/2019, Diary No(s). 45026/2019, SLP(C) No. 5490/C2021, Diary No(s). 7888/2020, CONMT. PET. (C) No. 513/2020 in C.A.No. 8788/2015, MA 1521/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, MA 2067/2020in C.A. No. 8788/2015, MA 2228/2020 in C.A. No. 8788/2015, SLP(C)No. 2147/2021, Diary No(s). 5699/2021, Diary No(s). 7775/2021, DiaryNo(s). 9505/2021, Diary No(s). 6705/2022, Diary No(s). 9002/2022, M.A.DNo. 864/2019, Diary No. 45009/2019. AND CONMT. PET. (C) No.716/2021 in MA 50/2019 in C.A. No. 8788/2015.

Tushar Mehta, SG, K.M. Nataraj, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASGs,Anil Grover, Alok Sangwan, Sr. AAGs, Brijender Chahar, Gopal ShankarNarayan, P.S. Patvalia, Sanjib Sen, Ranjit Kumar, Gopal Shankaranayan,EMs. Sonia Mathur, Pinaki Mishra, Randeep Roy, Nikhil Nayyar, R. S.Rai, Ms. Kiran Suri, Sanjiv Sen, Sr. Advs., Ms. Rashi Bansal, AmitSharma, Rajan Kr. Chourasia, Sachin Sharma, Ashok Panigrahi, ArvindKumar Sharma, Mrs. Jyoti Chahar, Karan Chahar, Ms. Pooja Chahar,Shashi Bhushan, Vinay Garg, Naman Joshi, Guneet Sidhu, Yuvraj Francis,Ms. Manisha Ambwani, Ankit Vijaywargiya, Aditya Verma, PrateekFRathee, Sunny Choudhary, Piyush Singh, Aditya Parolia, AkshaySrivastava, Rajesh Kumar, Gaurav Goel, Nithin Chandaran, Parijatkishore, Abhay Singh, M. Saurabh tanwar, Anurag Ojha, Karan Aggarwal,Mrs. Shubhangi Tuli, Devashish Bharuka, Ms. Sarvshree, JustimneGeorge, Ms. Shriya Chanda, Kapil Choudhary, Siddhant Buxy, M. L.GLahoty, Paban K. Sharma, Anchit Sripat, Pranab Kumar Nayak,Himanshu Shekhar, Nitin Bhardwaj, Ms. Anusha Magarajan, Mrs. PragyaBaghel, Ms. Samten Doma, Sourabh Tandon, Siddharth Batra, Ms.Shivani Chawla, Chinmay Dubey, Ankur Bansal, M.K. Maroria, ZohebHussain, Rajat Nair, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Sughosh Subramaniyam, RaghavSharma, Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Ms. Cleste Aggarwal, B. KrishnaHPrasad, Ms. Noopur Singhal, Rahul Khurana, Satish Kumar, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Navin Gupta, Ms. Babita Mishra, Suresh Kumar Bhan,Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Pravin Bahadur, Ms. Kritika Sachdeva, LakshyaKhanna, Jappanpreet Hore, M/S. Karanjawala & Co., Mahesh Agarwal,Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Himanshu Satija, Ms. Ayushi Amod, KunalDawar, E. C. Agrawala, Pulkit Deora, Udit Gupta, Akshay Goel, Ms.Mahima Dayani, Anup Jain, Arnav Vidhyarthi for Udit Kishan &Associates, Ms. Sugandha Batra, Ramendra Mohan Patnaik, AyushShrivastava, Ms. Rubina Virmani, Rituraj Singh, Shivendra Singh, SomeshArora, Aviral Kashyap, Vimal Sinha, Ms. Gunjan Sinha Jain, RamkrishnaVeerendra, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Abhinav Agrawal, Rajiv K.Virmani, Gaurav Jain, Atul Malhotra, Himanshu, Sourav Jindal, AbhishekhGarg, Akshay Goyal, Shish Pal Laler, Hitesh Kumar, Atul Vedant Pradhan,Aayush, Ravi Panwar, S. S. Jauhar, Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Amit Pawan,Rajat Kapoor, Rohit Rajershi, Avadh Bihari Kaushik, Ranbir Singh Yadav,Amarjeet Singh, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Mrs. Shally Bhasin, Ms.Meenakshi Chauhan, Vikas Mehta, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, RameshwarPrasad Goyal, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

INDEX

Background……………………………………………....para(s) 1-6

I. Applications filed by:

(a) M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd…………………para(s) 7-10(b) M/s. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd………………..para(s) 11-18(c) Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd……….....para(s) 19-27(d) Analysis and conclusion of I (a) (b) and (c)…para(s) 28-45II. Applications filed by:

(a) M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd and M/s. SubrosLtd……………………...........................................para(s) 46-50III. Applications filed by:

(a) Express Greens / DLF Home Developer Ltd…para(s) 51-64IV. Applications filed by:

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A(a) M/s Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd………………...para(s) 65-75V. ABW Infrastructure Ltd………………………….para(s) 76-88VI. Applications filed by:(a) Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd………………para(s) 89-101BVII. Applications pertaining to Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt.Ltd.:

1. The present judgment will dispose of various applications filedby the Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure DevelopmentECorporation (hereinafter, “HSIIDC”) and others, by way of clarificationssought on the judgment delivered by this Court in Rameshwar v. Stateof Haryana[1](hereinafter, “main judgment”).

2. The main judgment of this Court had, after duly considering thesequence of facts and developments which occurred after publicationFof the notification under Section 4 of the (now repealed) Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (hereinafter, “Acquisition Act”) on 27.08.2004, read with thefinal decision of the State of Haryana (hereinafter, “State”) dated29.01.2010 to not proceed with the said acquisition, declared as malafide and inoperative the decision dated 29.01.2010. The Court’s reasoningGwas that the State, in principle, had decided to withdraw from theacquisition afterthe notification under Section 4, which was followed bythe declaration under Section 6 and the receipt of objections from theconcerned lands owners etc., even when the matter was posted forpublication of the award on 26.08.2007. In the interim period, land owners, H1 Rameshwar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2018) 6 SCC 215.

alarmed by the prospect of losing their holdings, were induced to sell orotherwise transfer their lands to colonizers / developers at significantlylower rates of compensation. Most of such colonizers / developers hadentered into collaboration agreements after the notification under Section4, sought (and were granted) licenses by the Department of Town andCountry Planning of the State of Haryana (hereinafter, “DTCP”). ThisCourt found that upon an overall consideration of the materials (whichincluded relevant official notings in government files, ministerial decisionsand notifications), the state machinery was used to further private ends.The Court held that such a decision to withdraw from acquisition was afraud on power under the Acquisition Act. Therefore, the judgmentinvalidated all transfers effected from the date of publication of thenotification under Section 4, to the date of publication of the State’sdecision to revoke the acquisition i.e., from 27.08.2004 to 29.01.2010(hereinafter, “suspect period”).

3. Apart from invalidating the State’s final decision, the judgmentalso contained consequential directions on various aspects. Before movingfurther, it would be useful to extract these directions:

“42. Having bestowed our attention to various competingelements and issues we deem it appropriate to direct:

42.1. The decisions dated 24-8-2007 and 29-1-2010 referredto hereinabove are set aside as being brought about by malafide exercise of power. In our considered view, those decisionswere clear case of fraud on power and as such are annulled.42.2. The decision dated 24-8-2007 was taken when thematters were already posted for pronouncement of the awardon 26-8-2007. Since all the antecedent stages and steps priorthereto were properly and validly undertaken, and since thedecision dated 24-8-2007 has been held by us to be an exerciseof fraud on power, it is directed that an award is deemed tohave been passed on 26-8-2007 in respect of lands:

(ii) which were transferred by the landholders during theperiod 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010.

The lands which were not transferred by the landholdersduring the period from 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010 are notgoverned by these directions.

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42.3. Subject to the directions issued hereafter, the landscovered under aforementioned Direction 42.2 shall vest inHUDA/HSIIDC, as may be directed by the State of Haryana,free from all encumbrances. HUDA/HSIIDC may forthwith takepossession thereof. Consequently, all licences granted inrespect of lands covered by the deemed award dated 26-8-2007 will stand transferred to HUDA/HSIIDC.

42.4. Since the dropping of acquisition on 24-8-2007 andsubsequent decision dated 29-1-2010 have been set aside,the period between 24-8-2007 and up to the date of thisjudgment shall not be counted for the purposes of Section24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparencyin Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,2013.

42.5. All transactions entered into during the period from 24-8-2007 till 29-1-2010, pursuant to which the originallandholders transferred their holdings in favour of builders/private entities or third parties shall be subject to and theinterest of the respective parties shall be governed by thedirections issued hereafter.

42.6. Consistent with the directions issued in para 33 of UddarGagan [Uddar Gagan Properties Ltd. v. Sant Singh, (2016) 11SCC 378: (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 198], the builders/private entitieswill not be entitled to recover the consideration paid by themto the landholders. The sale consideration paid by thebuilders/private entities to the landholders shall be treatedtowards compensation under the award and the landholderswill not be required to refund any amount to such builders/private entities. The landholders will be at liberty to preferReference under Section 18 of the Act within a period of threemonths from today. For the purposes of maintaining suchreference the reasoning that weighed while passing awardsdated 9-3-2006 and 24-2-2007 shall be the basis. If theReference Court were to enhance the compensation, theamounts received by the landholders by way of considerationfrom the builders/private entities shall be appropriated towardssuch sum awarded by the Reference Court. If the landholdersare still entitled to something more than what they had received from the builders/private entities, the differential sum shallbe made over to them by the State of Haryana towardsacquisition of their interest in the lands in question. If,however, what the landholders had received towardsconsideration from the builders/private entities is found to bein excess of what is awarded by the Reference Court, theremainder shall not be recovered from them.

42.7. Consistent with the directions issued by this Court inparas 33.6 and 33.7 in Uddar Gagan [Uddar Gagan PropertiesLtd. v. Sant Singh, (2016) 11 SCC 378 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 198], the builders/private entities will be entitled to refund/reimbursement of any payment made to the landholders orthe amounts that had been spent on development of the land,such payments shall be made by HUDA or HSIIDC on beingsatisfied about the extent of actual expenditure not exceedingHUDA or HSIIDC norms on the subject, as the case may be.Refund will however be in respect of amount at which thelandholders sold the land and not of subsequent sales. Asregards subsequent transactions, the subsequent purchaserswill have remedies against their respective vendors. Claimsof builders/private entities entitled to refund will be taken upafter settling claims of third parties from whom the builders/private entities had collected monies. No interest will bepayable on such amounts.

42.8. The third parties from whom money had been collectedby the builder/private entities will either be entitled to refundof the amount from and out of and to the extent of the amountpayable to the builder/private entities in terms of abovedirection, available with the State, on their claims beingverified or will be allotted the plots or apartments at the agreedprice or prevalent price, whichever is higher. Every such claimshall be verified by HUDA or HSIIDC. In cases whereconstructions have been erected and the entire project iscomplete or is nearing completion, upon acceptance of theclaim, the plots or apartments shall be made over to therespective claimants on the same terms and conditions. Exceptfor such verified and accepted claims, the remaining area orapartments will be completely at the disposal of HUDA

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Aor HSIIDC, as the case may be, which shall be free and competentto dispose of the same in accordance with the prevalent policyand procedure. In order to facilitate such exercise all thirdparties who had purchased or had been allotted the plots orapartments shall prefer claims within one month from today,which claim shall be verified within two months from today.B42.9. As found by us in the preceding paragraphs, substantialsums were made over to “middlemen”. In the pendinginvestigation, CBI may do well to unravel the truth. In anycase, such hefty sums which were made over to “middlemen”cannot be said to be rightfully earned by and belonging toCthem. In fact, this actually represents the return for being ableto garner the lands in question and getting requisite licencesunder the provisions of the Haryana Act and a benefit derivedout of fraud on power. In our view, this money rightfullybelongs to the State and none other. We direct the authoritiesDof the State as well as the Central Government to reach thedepths of such transactions and recover every single pie andmake it over to the State Government. A complete investigationin the transactions including unearthing unnatural gainsreceived by “middlemen” shall be undertaken by CBI.”

4. The present applications have been preferred by HSIIDC andEseveral colonizers / developers, transferees, license holders as well asassociations of allottees of flats or commercial plots, consumers, etc.The primary question which this Court has been called upon to answeris as to the nature of the term ‘transfer’, adverted to in para 42 of themain judgment.

F5. The colonizers / developers and license holders on the onehand submitted that so long as the lands were not ‘transferred’ by theirowners (who continued to hold title), mere grant of developmental rightsor other associated rights by instruments such as builder developmentagreements, collaboration agreements, and other contracts would notamount to ‘transfer’ within the meaning of the main judgment. The standGof HSIIDC and the State (based upon the opinion of the learned AdvocateGeneral of Haryana) on the other hand was that entering into suchdevelopment agreements or contracts was in fact a ‘transfer’ as itimpeded the enjoyment of title by the owners. It was further submittedthat such agreements led to issuance of licenses, which were the basisHfor ultimately deciding not to acquire such lands.

6. To appreciate the rival contentions, it would be necessary toset out the facts in regard to the relevant transactions.

I. Applications filed by (a) M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt.Ltd.; (b) M/s. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. and (c)Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd.

a.M/s. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd. and Green HeightsProjects Pvt. Ltd.

7. Paradise Systems Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter, “Paradise”) purchased2.681 acres of land in village Lakhnaula on 06 - 07.04.2004, by registeredsale deeds.[2] On 09.09.2007, Paradise entered into a collaborationagreement with M/s. Sunshine Telecom Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter,“Sunshine”). The consideration for that agreement was ` 75 lakhs -received by Paradise. In addition, Paradise was entitled to 35% share inthe built-up commercial office space with proportionate land rights andcommon area rights of the developed property. Paradise granted the‘absolute developmental right’ of land for construction of commercialoffice space. The agreement also recorded that the period for completionof the project was to be sixty months.

8. Based on this collaboration agreement, an application was madefor grant of license to the DTCP, and License No. 59 of 2009 wasgranted on 26.10.2009. Paradise alleged that Sunshine did not adhere tothe terms of the collaboration agreement. Paradise claims to haverefunded all amounts received by it and annulled that transaction bydeed dated 30.03.2013. Paradise thereafter entered into anothercollaboration agreement with M/s. Green Heights Projects Pvt. Ltd.(hereinafter, “Green Heights”) for development of the same lands on30.03.2013. This collaboration agreement referred to License No. 59 of2009, which was valid up to 25.10.2013. Paradise parted with all rightsof development to Green Heights.[3] In terms of this collaborationagreement, Paradise received ` 28.40 crores as consideration. Thecollaboration agreement also recorded the liability of Paradise to thetune of ` 4.25 crores to the DTCP.

2 Referred to in the collaboration agreement between Paradise and Green Heights ProjectsPvt. Ltd. dated 30.03.2013. The collaboration agreement was executed on behalf ofParadise by its then director, Mr. Lalit Modi and on behalf of Green Heights ProjectsPvt. Ltd. by its director, Mr. Virendra Kumar Bhatia.

3 Detailed facts, with documents are set out in I.A. 112515/2020 in M.A. 2150 of 2020.

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A9. Both Paradise and Green Heights contend that no ‘transfer’took place in the suspect period. It was argued on their behalf by learnedSenior Advocates Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Ms. Kiran Suri that partieswere (and continued to be) the owners of the lands in question, whichwere purchased prior to the notification under Section 4 dated 27.08.2004.In these circumstances, Paradise was legitimately entitled to enter intoBcollaboration agreements, first with Sunshine Telecom, and later withGreen Heights. Paradise received valuable consideration in its agreementwith Green Heights. It was argued that Green Heights had invested `144.91 crores in the project and constructed a total of 371 units. Counselsfurther submitted that a sum of ` 139.78 crores had been received fromCallottees who booked the properties. The amounts received and theparticulars of the allottees who had paid for respective allotted unitshave been revealed to the Court by Green Heights[4]. It was thereforeurged that firstly, the transaction which Paradise entered into initiallywith Sunshine and subsequently with Green Heights, did not fall withinthe mischief of the proscribed transactions that were covered by theDmain judgment. Secondly, the project was completed and the allotteeshad paid almost the entire consideration which was utilized in theconstruction of the building. The counsels submitted that the Court shouldclarify that there was no ‘transfer’ in respect of the land covered byLicense No. 59 of 2009.

E10. HSIIDC and the State urged that though there was no ‘transfer’or conveyance of the title in the strict sense, what was apparent wasthat in terms of the collaboration agreements, though the originallandowner held nominal title, effective control of the lands was parted tothe colonizer / developer. In the case of Sunshine, the consideration wasF` 75 lakhs, which was in excess by more than twice the value ofcompensation offered under the Acquisition Act in adjacent lands. In thecase of Green Heights, Paradise received ` 28.40 crores. It wassubmitted that under the collaboration agreement, the colonizer / developerwas entitled to develop the lands, build upon it, and allot the residential or commercial unit, as the case was, to those who entered into agreementsGand paid valuable monies. Crucial rights such as possession, the right toconstruct as per one’s choice, and the right to sell, all devolved on thecolonizer / developer, who would be entitled to a share of the proceeds.Therefore, it was urged that the real purpose behind the transactions 4 I.A. No. 118401 of 2020 in M.A. No. 2150 of 2020.H

ought to be viewed holistically, and not only one facet of it, i.e., retentionof the title by the landowners. HSIIDC and the State therefore, contendedthat these lands clearly fell within the description of ‘transfers’ and shouldbe included in the award deemed to have been passed on 26.08.2007 bythe main judgment (hereinafter, “deemed award”).

b. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. and Unitech Ltd.

11. Karma Lakelands Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Karma”) hadpurchased lands in villages Manesar, Naurangpur and Lakhnaula,between 1996 and 2004. In respect of the total 207.11 acres it hadacquired, Karma was granted a conversion of land use (hereinafter,“CLU”) certificate by the State on 13.03.1996.

12. The notification issued under Section 4 had included these207.11 acres, as well as another lot of 25.95 acres in villages Naurangpurand Lakhnaula, owned by companies whose dominant shareholder (tothe extent of 90%) was also the majority shareholder in Karma. Whenthe declaration under Section 6 was published on 25.08.2005, Karma’slands, which were the subject of the CLU (207.11 acres), were droppedfrom acquisition. This was apparently in tune with the existing policy ofnot acquiring lands whose use had been converted. There is no controversyabout those lands at present.

13. In these proceedings, it is the smaller parcel of 25.95 acres ofland, which is the subject matter of consideration. Unlike the lands forwhich CLU had been obtained, these 25.95 acres were included in theacquisition proceedings, in the declaration under Section 6. In respect ofthese lands, Karma had entered into a collaboration agreement on16.02.2004, and a supplementary agreement on 24.12.2006, after thepublication of the declaration under Section 6 i.e., after 25.08.2005. Thecollaboration agreement envisaged development of these lands by M/sUnitech Ltd. (hereinafter, “Unitech”). According to the arrangement, alarge number of golf villas were to be built and given out on long-leasebasis. During the proceedings before this Court, Unitech stated that ithad paid ` 15 crores to Karma as consideration for the same.

14. By the time the supplementary agreement was executed on24.12.2006, the Delhi High Court approved a scheme of amalgamationof the land-owing companies, merging them with Karma. Karma thenapplied to the DTCP for a license to develop a group housing colony on15.01.2007. Consequently, License No. 206 of 2008 was issued on A

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A16.12.2008. Thereafter, when the award scheduled for 26.08.2007 wasnot pronounced, and the decision of the State to not acquire lands wastaken on 29.01.2010, these 25.95 acres belonging to Karma wereexcluded from acquisition.

15. Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned Senior Advocate for Karma,Bargued that the State’s attempt to include Karma’s land in the deemedaward was untenable. He also urged that the landowning companieswhich eventually merged with Karma had as a matter of fact purchasedthese lands as early as the mid-1990s. Karma’s bona fides was evidentfrom the fact that the largest portion of its acquired land, i.e., 207.11acres, was left out of the acquisition on a proper application of the existingCpolicy, which the State consciously followed. By this policy, lands whichhad CLU certificates were excluded. Therefore, the 207.11 acresearmarked for the development of the golf course which was a subjectmatter of the CLU obtained in 1996 was excluded; consequently, it didnot find place in the declaration under Section 6. It was submitted thatDeven though the non-CLU lands, i.e., 25.95 acres, did not fulfill the termsof the policy, nevertheless, the justification for not letting the State proceedwith their acquisition was that neither Karma nor its predecessors hadattempted to influence the acquisition. Karma submitted that while theselands were included in the notification under Section 6, they stood on thesame footing as the lands owned by other bona fide land owners, becauseEthey were not the subject matter of any speculation. The lands had beenpurchased at least ten years or so prior to the notification issued underSection 4. In the circumstances, Karma was justified in seeking a licenseafter waiting for a reasonable period of time, even within the suspectperiod. Mr. Chahar also pointed out that no malice or ulterior motiveFcould be attributed to Karma because its collaboration with Unitech wasentered into on 16.02.2004, which was prior to the notification underSection 4.

16. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that Karma’sapplications, i.e., M.A. No. 1046/2019, and connected applications, wereGfor directions for release of a total area of 9.7 acres. It was submittedthat these were seven distinct units of land which Karma was forced topurchase because they fall in pockets within the larger area of 207.11acres, left out of the acquisition when the declaration under Section 6was issued. It was submitted that being a contiguous land, it interferedwith the integrity of the golf course. Their inclusion in acquisition wouldH

ultimately disturb the peaceful enjoyment of land, which Karma waslegitimately entitled to. He also relied upon a policy of the State dated14.06.2012 (issued under a letter[5]) which contained a comprehensivepolicy in respect of leftover pockets of land. It was submitted that thisCourt should grant liberty to the State to release the lands which werethe matter of acquisition in view of this policy. However, at the end ofthe hearings, Mr. Chahar sought and was granted liberty to withdrawthe application (M.A. No. 1046 of 2019). The application was thereforedismissed as withdrawn on 19.04.2022.

17. Learned counsel for HSIIDC Mr. Sanjay Kumar Visen arguedthat even though Karma or its affiliates had purchased the lands earlier,only 207.11 acres was covered by a previously issued CLU. Its exclusionfrom acquisition was justifiable due to extant policy. However, with respectto 25.95 acres, it was included in the declaration under Section 6, andthere was no justification for its non-inclusion in the deemed award. Itwas urged that Karma’s intensions were clear because even after thedeclaration under Section 6 was issued, and much before the scheduleddate for the award, on an assumption that it still owned the land andcould develop it, an application was made on 15.01.2007 for license. Itwas also submitted that Karma’s submissions that the collaborationagreement with Unitech was arrived at earlier, were of no avail giventhat the supplementary agreement was also executed by the parties afterthe declaration under Section 6. Clearly, these events were meant tocreate an impediment in the acquisition and ultimately led to the decisionby which the proposed award was never announced in respect of theselands and finally, the State decided to drop the acquisition in respect of25.95 acres on 29.01.2010.

18. It was also urged by the State and HSIIDC that unlike inother cases, there had been no development on the land. Further, interestslike those of third party allottees was not involved. In these circumstances,the lands which were deliberately excluded from acquisition, after theyformed part of the final declaration, by non-publication of the award,clearly fell within the mischief of what could be termed as ‘transfer’ inthe main judgment.

c.Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd., Balbir Singh, RamPyari, M/s Earl Infotech Pvt. Ltd., and GodrejProperties Ltd.

5 No.PF-31/7/10/2012-2 TCP dated 14.06.2012.

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A19. Frontier Home Developers Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Frontier”)had originally purchased 8.568 acres of land at village Naurangpur on16.08.2004 under its erstwhile name Conway Developers Pvt. Ltd.(hereinafter, “Lot 1”). The consideration paid was 5.62 crores. Anotherparcel, i.e., 5.175 acres of land was jointly owned by one Balbir Singhand Ram Pyari (hereinafter, “Lot 2”). Both lots were included in theBnotification under Section 4, as well as the declaration under Section 6.During this period, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari entered into a collaborationagreement with M/s Earl Infotech Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “Earl”) on24.08.2006 for its development. Soon thereafter, Earl entered into adevelopment collaboration agreement with Frontier in respect of Lot 2Con 11.12.2006. Frontier agreed to jointly develop both lots. This agreementwas followed up with a supplementary agreement between Balbir Singh,Ram Pyari, and Earl under which further amounts were given to theowners as consideration.

20. On 11.12.2006, Frontier applied to the DTCP for a licenseDenclosing the collaboration agreement and related documents. Along withthis, a sum of 1.17 crores was also paid for the license. On 07.05.2008,License No. 88 of 2008 was issued in the name of Frontier, Balbir Singh,Ram Pyari and Earl in respect of the entire composite area of 13.743acres (Lot 1 + Lot 2). After the final decision of the State to drop theacquisition on 29.01.2010, on 24.06.2010, the four licensees transferredEtheir rights to develop all 13.743 acres to Godrej Properties Ltd.(hereinafter, “Godrej”).

21. In this agreement, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari were to receive55,328.60 sq. ft. of built-up area. The agreement (by clause 2.11) showedexact areas - including built up areas - which were to come up; whatFwas allocable for amenities, common facilities, etc. The considerationwas that Frontier was to have a 30% right in the gross share of revenue,and Godrej the remaining 70%. Godrej paid Frontier an interest-freedeposit equal to 16 crores of which 5.5 crores was non-refundable;in addition, Frontier’s expenses till then were reimbursed. The priorGcommitments of Frontier, including allotment of land to owners (55,328.60sq. ft.) and additional 1,00,000 sq. ft. for 50 residential flats in favor ofthe Jammu & Kashmir All India Service Officers Society was also agreedto.

22. The materials on record show that a group housing colonyHstyled as “Godrej Frontier” was developed. The occupation certificate was granted by the DTCP on 16.10.2014 for residential, EWS andcommercial units, and on 19.06.2017 for community building. The grouphousing colony comprised of 567 units in total – 475 residential, 84 EWSand 8 commercial. Godrej disclosed in its affidavit that it sold 357residential units, 8 commercial shops and 83 EWS units from its shareand a negligible number of units remained unsold, i.e., 4 residential units;1 EWS unit and a nursery school. Of the group housing units developedby Godrej Frontier, 199 units were registered in favour of third-partybuyers.

23. It was argued, on behalf of Godrej, by learned Senior AdvocatesMr. Pinaki Misra and Mr. Randeep Singh Rai that the original landownersin question were not aggrieved. They were neither parties before anyforum, nor did they allege any fraud, influence nor were theydistressed.Landowners in the present case transacted voluntarily with the colonizers/ developers. There was no allegation offraud or illegality against Godrej.It wasemphasized that the original landowners retained their respectivetitles in the project land. It was urged that this Court’s main judgmentonlyapplied to cases involving forceful and fraudulent saleof lands atthrowaway prices after the issuance of notification under Section 4 anddeclaration under Section 6. The basis of the main judgment was againstthe illegal monetary gains by thebuilders on purchasing land at throwawayprices fromfarmers by threatening them with effects of the acquisition.Inthe present case, theownership of the land was intact and no illegalmonetary gain was made. Moreover,no middle men were involved.Therefore, thepresent land was not covered by the purview ofdirectionsgiven in the main judgment.

24. Counsels highlighted the following portions of the mainjudgment:

“42.2. The decision dated 24-8-2007 was taken when thematters were already posted for pronouncement of the awardon 26-8-2007. Since all the antecedent stages and steps priorthereto were properly and validly undertaken, and since thedecision dated 24-8-2007 has been held by us to be an exerciseof fraud on power, it is directed that an award is deemed tohave been passed on 26-8-2007 in respect of lands:

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A(ii) which were transferred by the landholders during theperiod 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010.

The lands which were not transferred by the landholdersduring the period from 27-8-2004 till 29-1-2010 are notgoverned by these directions”.

B

25. In the present case, Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari owned Lot 2much before the notification under Section 4,and these landownerscontinued to hold title of the land as on the date of filing their affidavitsbefore this Court. The only difference was that the flats developed onthe land had been sold to bona fide consumers and conveyance deedsChad been executed in their favour by the landowners and the colonizers/ developers. Out of the entire flats developed on the said land, somehad been allocated to respective stakeholders including the landowners.The original landowner in the case of Lot 1 was always Frontier, whichhad also purchased the lands before the notification under Section 4. Inthese circumstances, the project should not be covered by the deemedDaward as stipulated in the main judgment.

26. It was urged that entering into collaboration agreements,applying for licenses and issuing licenses could not be construed as‘transfers’, or a burden on the title. It was submitted that these werelegitimate activities that landowners with valid title could perform. ItEwas also urged that Godrej in fact took over development five monthsafter the lands were released from the cloud of acquisition (thecollaboration agreement was dated 24.06.2010, whereas the decision ofthe State to drop the acquisition proceedings was taken on 29.01.2010).Godrej therefore could not be accused of any wrongdoing, because itFentered into agreement with bona fide land owners after any kind ofimpediment on collaboration had ceased. Furthermore, it developed theproperty by beginning construction only in 2011, after obtaining allpermissions.

27. It was lastly urged that in case the interpretation of the mainGjudgment were so as to include the present lands within the ambit of thedeemed award, then the purpose of carving out an exception in para42.2 would be defeated. Moreover, the main judgment was meant toprotect the interests of farmers, and in this case, any alternateinterpretation would end up harming their interests. Likewise, the genuineinterests of bona fide third-party consumers would be jeopardized.H

d. Analysis and conclusion of I (a) (b) and (c):

28. To discern the content and nature of the transactions wherebylandowners conferred rights upon colonizers / developers, it would benecessary to notice some relevant conditions in the collaborationagreements placed on record by the parties:

Collaboration Agreement between Balbir Singh and EarlInfotech (dated 24.08.2006)

“7. That the Owners shall execute General Power of Attorney(GPA) and Special Power of Attorney and/or any otherdocument or papers in favour of the Developer or it’s nomineeto enable the Developer to apply for all regulatory approvals,licenses, sanctions and no objections for development of thesaid land and to raise constructions thereon as agreed hereto.However, in the event, any other/further document in respectof said land the Owners have to sign the sameto enable toDeveloper to obtain the necessary license/permission andcomplete the development of the colony on the said. Land.The Owners shall sign the same without raising any objectionin any manner whatsoever and withinthe stipulated period.****

9. That the Owners further undertakes that he/she/they shallnot deal with the said land in any manner whatsoever andshall henceforth keep thesaid land free from any change, lien,litigation, claim etc. And shall notcreate any obstruction orimpedimentin the development of the said landof the‘Development’.

12. That Owners will hand over the actual physical possessionof the said land to the developer for purpose of developingfor the purpose of the residential/commercial Group Housing/industrial/Special Economic Zone complex agreed to bedeveloped at the time of signing of this agreement and toenable the developer to discharge its part of obligations.****

18. That the developer shall commence and complete thedevelopment of the said residential/Commercial/Group A

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Housing/Industrial Complex byproviding the entire finance,equipment, inputs material infrastructureand expertisenecessary to develop the Special Economic Zone/residential/Commercial/ Industrial Complex in accordance withthesanctioned plans and any modifications thereof as maybecomenecessary or agreed to during the progress of the work.That theDeveloper is fully empowered and entitled to assignthis agreement infavour of any Third Party at its absolutediscretion without any recourseto the Owners and the Ownersshall have no objection for suchassignment.

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21. The Owners shall not interfere with or obstruct in anymanner with the execution and completion of the work of developmentthe said residential/ commercial/Group Housing /Industrialcomplex and/or booking and sale of developer’s share ofdevelopment, built or unbuilt areas of the project. However,if any defect is pointed out in the development while the workis in the progress by the Owners, the same will be removedand rectified by the developer.

22. It is agreed between the parties that the possession of thesaid land once delivered/handed over to the developer forthe purpose of the aforementioned project shall not be disturbed nor anyinterference caused by the Owners till the project is complete.1t is clarified that the ownership in the said land shallcontinue to vest exclusively in the Owners and developer shallnot be entitled to claim any right, title or interest in the saidportion of the said land or any part thereof before successfulcompletion of the project complex as provided herein afterwhich the Ownership in the property shall be of both theparties as per their respective shares.

24. That the Qwners shall be entitled to retain or let out orsell the areatheir respective share to any party either in wholeor in parts, but subjectto Para No. 16 hereinabove. If in case

RAMESHWAR AND ORS. v. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

the Owners are desirous of sale oftheir residential plots areasforming part of their allocation, they shall firstoffer the samefor purchase to the Developer. It is however, madeclear thatthe Developer shall be afforded a period of two weeks fromthedate of receipt of written intimation from the owners alongwith offer in writing, to communicate its decision pertainingto purchase of the allocation of the owner, in case Developersis in a position to match the highest offer available with theOwners for sale of their property referred to above, it shallbe entitled to pay the sale consideration amount within aperiod of 90 days from the date of receipt of intimation fromthe owners and to purchase the property being alienated bythe Owners. In case Developers fails to respond within theperiod of two weeks referred to above calculated from thedate of receipt of written intimation by the Developers fromthe Owners, the Owners shall be at liberty to sell their area tothird party. The developer shall be entitled to enter into anyagreement to sell/lease/rent or to dispose of its share in anymanner to receive the payments and to execute the necessarydocuments in favor of such purchaser. The Owners shall alsojoin hands in executing the documents in favour of suchpurchaser and shall also do all other acts, deeds and thingswhich may be required to be done in order to confer legaland perfect title in favour of such purchaser and all receiptshall be issued for an on behalf of the owners and developerconclusively thereby binding both the parties for thetransaction.”

Collaboration Agreement between Balbir Singh, Ram Pyari,Earl and Godrej (dated 24.06.2010)

“2.9 The Power of Attorney shall be irrevocable (exceptinaccordance with the terms of this agreement)and theDeveloper shall be entitled to appoint one or moresubstitutesunder the said Power of Attorney for the exerciseof any or all of the powers and authorities thereunder infavour of its Affiliates.”****

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A4.2 Marketing

It is agreed between the parties hereto that the Developershallhave the exclusive marketing rights of the Project.It shallalsobe the obligation of the Developer to sell and market theareareserved for Frontier commitments.

B****

6.7 Developer shall have exclusive possession of the saidproperty and shall allow reasonable access to Frontier asmay be required. Developer also agrees to provide forinspection of all Project related information on a quarterlybasis to Frontier.

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6.8 The original title documents pertaining to Land B areinthe possession of Land B Owners. Earl and Frontiershallprocure from Land B Owners to deposit the same withtheDeveloperprior to the formation of a society of prospectivepurchaser of flats in the Project, in conformity with theApplicable law.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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In light of the above extracts of the documents, it would now benecessary to examine the true nature of the collaboration agreementswhereby the owner (title holder) parted with possession to the colonizer/ developer for payment of valuable consideration and allocation of aFcertain number of constructed units or percentage of built-up area.

29. The common refrain of the colonizers / developers was thatwhile the collaboration agreements were entered into during the suspectperiod, the title to the lands had never passed onto them. Further, (insome cases) licenses were obtained only after the time for announcingthe award had expired.

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30. The question then revolves around the true nature of thesedevelopment rights, and whether the directions issued in the main judgmentwere applicable to their ‘transfer’. In these cases, undoubtedly transferof such rights was done after the lands were notified under Section 4(except in the case of Karma where apart from the original development H

agreement dated 16.02.2004, a supplementary agreement was enteredlater into on 24.12.2006). Additionally, soon after the collaborationagreements were executed, licenses were applied for and issued (LicenseNos. 88 of 2008, 59 of 2009 and 206 of 2008) after the declarationunder Section 6 but before the State’s final decision to not acquire thelands on 29.01.2010.

31. The following are the features common to all the collaborationagreements:

i.Possession was handed over to the colonizer / developer; ii.Full rights of development – the nature, the kind of colonyor group housing units to be constructed as well as theirnumbers were at the absolute discretion of the colonizer /developer;

iii.Substantial amounts were paid to the land owner (and inthe case of Frontier, in addition to the original landowners,the intervening developer as well, such as Earl);

iv.Wherever intervening rights existed (such as those ofFrontier which had already committed to allot a certainnumber of developed or constructed units to third parties)the ultimate developer (such as Godrej) took over suchliability;

v.The landowners, and wherever applicable, the interveningdeveloper, were in addition, entitled to a share in the proceedsand to a certain number of units of constructed or developedlands defined specifically in the agreement;

vi.Power of attorney documents were executed in favour ofthe colonizer / developer, to facilitate the latter’s intent todevelop the lands;

vii.The consideration paid to landowners in all these cases farexceeded the market value of the lands, prevailing at thetime of the notification under Section 4;

viii.The landowner – and wherever applicable, the interveningcolonizer / developer – executed registered power ofattorneys to the final developer, and in all cases agreed toexecute registered sale deeds to the allottees of the colonizer/ developer as and when called upon to do so; and A

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[2022] 13 S.C.R.

Aix.In some cases, on the strength of these collaborationagreements, licenses were applied for by the landowner orby the intervening developer.

32. The nature of collaboration agreements has been discussedby this Court in Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. &BAnr.[6] In this case, the parties had entered into a collaboration agreementfor the construction of a residential building. The usual conditions, suchas handing over possession, non-interference in the project, handing overtitle documents to enable sale of constructed units to third parties, etc.were agreed to. Holding that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 wasapplicable to the collaboration agreement, and that the parties could notCbe viewed as constituting a ‘joint venture’ given the power inequalitybetween them, this Court held as follows:

“27. What then is the nature of the agreement between theappellant and the first respondent? The appellant is the ownerof the land. He wants a new house, but is not able to constructDa new house for himself either on account of paucity of fundsor lack of expertise or resources. He, therefore, enters intoan agreement with the builder. He asks the builder to constructa house and give it to him. He says that as he does not havethe money to pay for the construction and will, therefore,permit the builder to construct and own additional floor(s)Eas consideration. He also agrees to transfer an undividedshare in the land corresponding to the additional floor(s)which falls to the share of the builder. As a result, instead ofbeing the full owner of the land with an old building, hebecomes a co-owner of the land with a one-third share in theland and absolute owner of the ground floor of the newlyFconstructed building and agrees that the builder will becomethe owner of the upper floors with corresponding two-thirdshare in the land. As the cost of the undivided two-third sharein the land which the landowner agrees to transfer to thebuilder, is more than the cost of construction of the groundGfloor by the builder for the landowner, it is also mutuallyagreed that the builder will pay the landowner an additionalcash consideration of Rs 8 lakhs.

28. The basic underlying purpose of the agreement is theconstruction of a house or an apartment (ground floor) inH6 Faqir Chand Gulati vs Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., (2008) 10 SCC 345.

accordance with the specifications, by the builder for theowner, the consideration for such construction being thetransfer of undivided share in land to the builder and grantof permission to the builder to construct two floors. Suchagreement whether called as a “collaboration agreement” ora “joint venture agreement”, is not, however, a “joint venture”.There is a contract for construction of an apartment or housefor the appellant, in accordance with the specifications andin terms of the contract. There is a consideration for suchconstruction, flowing from the landowner to the builder (inthe form of sale of an undivided share in the land andpermission to construct and own the upper floors). To adjustthe value of the extent of land to be transferred, there is alsopayment of cash consideration by the builder. But theimportant aspect is the availment of services of the builder bythe landowner for a house construction (construction of theowner’s share of the building) for a consideration.To thatextent, the landowner is a consumer, the builder is a serviceprovider and if there is deficiency in service in regard toconstruction, the dispute raised by the landowner will be aconsumer dispute. We may mention that it makes no differencefor this purpose whether the collaboration agreement is forconstruction and delivery of one apartment or one floor tothe owner or whether it is for construction and delivery ofmultiple apartments or more than one floor to the owner. Theprinciple would be the same and the contract will beconsidered as one for house construction for consideration.The deciding factor is not the number of apartmentsdeliverable to the landowner, but whether the agreement is inthe nature of a joint venture or whether the agreement isbasically for construction of certain area for the landowner.”

33. The above judgment, while clarifying the purpose ofcollaboration agreements, falls short of delving into the legal effects ofthe transfer of such development rights. Parting with rights which arefundamental to ownership, for valuable consideration (in cash or byhanding over constructed units), leaving only the nominal ‘title’ with thelandowner, is a common feature of such collaboration agreements. Given ABC

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Athe evolution in complexity of real estate contracts, and the absence ofthe definition of collaboration agreements in legislation, their interpretationby various High Courts assumes significance. In a question pertaining tothe applicability of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to such contracts, a FullBench of the Calcutta High Court in Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. AshimKumar Kar[7]while addressing the nature of development agreements,Balso answered the question in affirmative:

“45. This leads to the unavoidable discussion as to what maybe regarded as a Development Agreement as referred to inthe questions framed for the reference and the Judgments ofthis Court cited by the parties. Without intending the discussionCto be an exhaustive treatise on Development Agreements ofall hues, it may be recognized there can be several Agreements,which can be loosely described as Development Agreementsin the sense that such expression has been used in thejudgments cited in course of the present proceedings. An ownerDwithout any funds or the independent resources to construct a new building on such owner’s land may engage anotherfor such purpose with the consideration for the constructionbeing paid by allocation of a part of the constructed area.There could be several variants of the same basic structureof a Development Agreement with the Agreement eitherEproviding for the owner being entitled to a sum of money inaddition to a specified share in the constructed area or witha Developer being required to rid the land of itsencumbrances, whether monetary or otherwise, prior to theconstruction being taken up. There may be other similarFAgreements under which the Developer is required totemporarily relocate an existing tenant or occupant andultimately provide the tenant or occupant a part of theconstructed area. In the context in which certain Agreementspertaining to the construction of new buildings contemplatethe construction to be undertaken or orchestrated by a personGother than the owner of the land, whether upon the demolitionof the existing structure or otherwise, with such person otherthan the owner having a share in the constructed area, suchAgreements have now come to be regarded as Development Agreements. Whether or not such Agreements are in the natureH7 Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar, AIR 2014 Cal 92.

of collaboration or joint venture, they are loosely referred toas Development Agreements in several Judgments. SuchAgreements are not merely for the construction of any buildingor for the mere execution of any other work on the land. TheDeveloper is not merely a Contractor engaged to undertakethe construction; the Developer is, under the Agreement withthe owner, promised a part of the constructed premises asowner thereof together with the proportionate area of the land.In the context in which certain Agreements are referred to as-Development Agreements and the nonowner party to suchan Agreement is regarded as the Developer qua the nature ofthe work envisaged under the Agreement, the Developer alwayshas a share in the building or the area proposed to beconstructed – which implies a proportionate share of the piece–of earth and such Agreement envisages the Developer tohave a share of, and interest in, the final product which is theoutcome of the Agreement.

46. In such sense, a Development Agreement which envisagesthe party thereto other than the owner being responsible forensuring the construction of a building on the subject landand having a share therein, there is an inescapable contractto transfer immovable property. In form, a DevelopmentAgreement which envisages the Developer to have a share inthe building proposed to be constructed in terms of theAgreement, the Agreement may appear to be somewhat notresembling an Agreement for transfer of an immovableproperty; and, indeed, it is not an Agreement simpliciter forsale of an immovable property. In law, however, a DevelopmentAgreement of the kind described herein entails the transferof immovable property in the sense that the Developer or anassignee of the Developer, at the instance of the Developer,would be entitled not only to a part of the constructed areabut the proportionate share of the land on which theconstruction is made.”

34. Thus, collaboration agreements which enable the colonizer /developer to retain a significant portion of the constructed area asconsideration, are not in the nature of pure construction contracts. An AB

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Aanalysis of these agreements depicts the transfer of crucial rights andinterests in the property, which otherwise are enjoyed only by thelandowner, falling short only in respect of the ‘title’.

35. In Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors.,[8]thisCourt stressed on the necessity to analyze the terms of the collaborationBagreement in order to determine if any ‘charge’ or ‘interest’ had beencreated in the land. If so, such agreements could attract the applicationof the Specific Relief Act, 1963:

“17. The expression “development agreement” has not beendefined statutorily. In a sense, it is a catch-all nomenclatureCwhich is used to be describe a wide range of agreements whichan owner of a property may enter into for development ofimmovable property. As real estate transactions have grownin complexity, the nature of these agreements has becomeincreasingly intricate. Broadly speaking, (without intendingto be exhaustive), development agreements may be of variousDkinds:

17.1. An agreement may envisage that the owner of theimmovable property engages someone to carry out the workof construction on the property for monetary consideration.This is a pure construction contract; E

17.2. An agreement by which the owner or a person holdingother rights in an immovable property grants rights to a thirdparty to carry on development for a monetary considerationpayable by the developer to the other. In such a situation, theowner or right holder may in effect create an interest in theFproperty in favour of the developer for a monetaryconsideration; 17.3. An agreement where the owner or a person holding anyother rights in an immovable property grants rights to anotherperson to carry out development. In consideration, theGdeveloper has to hand over a part of the constructed area tothe owner. The developer is entitled to deal with the balanceof the constructed area. In some situations, a society or similarother association is formed and the land is conveyed or leasedto the society or association; H8 Sushil Kumar Agarwal v Meenakshi Sadhu & Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 241.

17.4. A development agreement may be entered into in asituation where the immovable property is occupied by tenantsor other right holders. In some cases, the property may beencroached upon. The developer may take on the entireresponsibility to settle with the occupants and to thereaftercarry out construction; and 17.5. An owner may negotiate with a developer to develop aplot of land which is occupied by slum dwellers and whichhas been declared as a slum. Alternately, there may be oldand dilapidated buildings which are occupied by a numberof occupants or tenants. The developer may undertake torehabilitate the occupants or, as the case may be, the slumdwellers and thereafter share the saleable constructed areawith the owner.

18. When a pure construction contract is entered into, thecontractor has no interest in either the land or the constructionwhich is carried out. But in various other categories ofdevelopment agreements, the developer may have acquired avaluable right either in the property or in the constructedarea. The terms of the agreement are crucial in determiningwhether any interest has been created in the land or in respectof rights in the land in favour of the developer and if so, thenature and extent of the rights.

19. In a construction contract, the contractor has no interestin either the land or the construction carried out on the land.But, in other species of development agreements, the developermay have acquired a valuable right either in the property orthe constructed area. There are various incidents of ownershipin respect of an immovable property. Primarily, ownershipimports the right of exclusive possession and the enjoymentof the thing owned. The owner in possession of the thing hasthe right to exclude all others from its possession andenjoyment. The right to ownership of a property carries withit the right to its enjoyment, right to its access and to otherbeneficial enjoyments incidental to it. (B. Gangadhar v. B.G.Rajalingam [B. Gangadhar v. B.G. Rajalingam, (1995) 5 SCC238, para 6] .) Ownership denotes the relationship between-a person and an object forming the subjectmatter of the AB

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ownership. It consists of a complex of rights, all of which arerights in rem, being good against the world and not merelyagainst specific persons. There are various rights or incidentsof ownership all of which need not necessarily be present inevery case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoythe thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienateit. (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee [SwadeshRanjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee, (1991) 4 SCC 572] .)An essential incident of ownership of land is the right toexploit the development, potential to construct and to dealwith the constructed area. In some situations, under adevelopment agreement, an owner may part with such rightsto a developer. This in essence is a parting of some of theincidents of ownership of the immovable property. There couldbe situations where pursuant to the grant of such rights, thedeveloper has incurred a substantial investment, altered thestate of the property and even created third-party rights inthe property or the construction to be carried out. There couldbe situations where it is the developer who by his efforts hasrendered a property developable by taking steps in law. Indevelopment agreements of this nature, where an interest iscreated in the land or in the development in favour of thedeveloper, it may be difficult to hold that the agreement is notcapable of being specifically performed. For example, thedeveloper may have evicted or settled with occupants, gotland which was agricultural converted into non-agriculturaluse, carried out a partial development of the property andpursuant to the rights conferred under the agreement, createdthird-party rights in favour of flat purchasers in the proposedbuilding. In such a situation, if for no fault of the developer,the owner seeks to resile from the agreement and terminatesthe development agreement, it may be difficult to hold thatthe developer is not entitled to enforce his rights. This ofcourse is dependent on the terms of the agreement in eachcase. There cannot be a uniform formula for determiningwhether an agreement granting development rights can bespecifically enforced and it would depend on the nature ofthe agreement in each case and the rights created under it.”

36. The recognition of transfer of valuable rights by collaborationagreements was also commented upon in Unitech Ltd. v. Union ofIndia,[9 ]whereinthis Court was concerned with whether a collaborationagreement constituted ‘transfer’ of property under Chapter XX-C ofthe Income Tax Act, 1961. Vidarbha Engineering Industries entered intoa collaboration agreement with Unitech on 17.03.1994 for developmentand construction of a commercial project at Dahipura and Untkhana inNagpur. Unitech was to retain 78% of the total constructed area,transferring the rest 22% to Vidarbha. It is imperative to note that Vidarbhaitself had leased said land from Nagpur Improvement Trust for a periodof thirty years, and could not transfer title to any third party such asUnitech. The Court interpreted Section 269-UA of the Income Tax Act,1961 which included transfer of any ‘right’ or enabling enjoyment ofimmovable property, as follows:

“6. It is clear from the agreement that the transfer of rights ofVidarbha Engineering in its land does not amount to any sale,exchange or lease of such land, since, only possessory rightshave been granted to Unitech to construct the building onthe land. Nor is there any clause in the agreement expresslytransferring 22% of the building to Vidarbha after it isconstructed by Unitech. Clause 4.6 only mentions that as aconsideration for Unitech agreeing to develop the property itshall retain 78% and the share of Vidarbha Engineering willbe 22%. In fact Parliament has defined “transfer”,deliberately wide enough to include within its scope suchagreements or arrangements which have the effect oftransferring all the important rights in land for futureconsiderations such as part acquisition of shares in buildingsto be constructed, vide sub-clause (ii) of clause (f) of sub-section (2) of Section 269-UA. There is no doubt that thecollaboration agreement can be construed as an agreementand in any case an arrangement which has the effect oftransferring and in any case enabling the enjoyment, of suchproperty. Undoubtedly, the collaboration agreement enablesUnitech to enjoy the property of Vidarbha Engineering forthe purpose of construction.There is also no doubt that anagreement is an arrangement. It must, therefore, be held that 9 Unitech Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 2 SCC 569.

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Athe collaboration agreement effectuates a transfer of thesubject land from Vidarbha Engineering to Unitech within-the meaning of the term in Section 269UA of the Act.It appearsto be the intention of parliament to cover all such transactionsby which valuable rights in property are in fact transferredby one party to another for consideration, under the wordB“transfer”, for fulfilling the purpose of pre-emptive purchasei.e. prevention of tax evasion. A judgment of the Patna HighCourt in Ashis Mukerji v. Union of India [AshisMukerji v. Union of India, (1996) 222 ITR 168 (Pat)] citedbefore us takes the view that a development agreement isCcovered by the definition of “transfer” in Section 269-UA.We note the same with approval.”

Thus, for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, the collaborationagreement was considered as a ‘transfer’, even though no title vestedDwith Vidarbha in order to pass the same to Unitech.

37. The features set out earlier in this judgment demonstrate thatthe landowner in all the cases were aware that the notification wasissued under Section 4 on 27.08.2004. No doubt, such landowners didnot acquire the land after such notification. However, during theEsubsistence of the notification, which constituted the manifest intentionof the State to acquire the lands, the third parties’ rights were consciouslycreated for substantial consideration. In the case of Paradise, the initialsum paid was 75 lakhs, and in the subsequent agreement with GreenHeights, the sum paid was 28 crores for parting with developmentFrights relating to 2.681 acres. Similarly, in the case of Balbir Singh andRam Pyari, the initial agreement with Frontier entitled the landowners to1000 sq. yds out of each developed acre plus 52 lakhs, and in thesubsequent agreement with Godrej, the landowners were entitled to55,328.60 sq. ft. of built up units, and Frontier was entitled to 30% shareof the receipts in the project. In the case of Karma, the developer UnitechGpaid 15 crores and was entitled to a share of receipts of developedunits sold.

38. The main judgment of this Court has carefully considered andgone into great lengths to examine the file notings which led to the finaldecision of the State not to acquire such lands. In the case of Frontier,H

the records clearly demonstrate that a noting was approved by the StateGovernment at the highest level that All India Service Officers of theJammu & Kashmir cadre had requested for lands for their residentialhousing society. This request was the main basis for the decision not toacquire Frontier’s lands which was the subject matter of License No.88 of 2008. After said decision, Frontier parted with all its rights to Godrej,as did the owners of other parcels of land, i.e., Balbir Singh and RamPyari. These facts clearly demonstrate how the entire state machinerywas subverted. The collaboration agreement with Godrej shows that 50residential units were committed to the Jammu & Kashmir cadre of AllIndia Service Officers (just above 10% of the total number of flatsultimately constructed). Likewise, in the case of Paradise, Frontier andKarma too, entering into collaboration agreements and the seeking grantof licenses formed the basis for the State’s final decision not to go aheadwith the acquisition even though a declaration under Section 6 had beenpublished.

39. It is clear that the collaboration agreements formed the firstelement of a two-step process whereby the colonizers / developers (whomight have been also land owners) having acquired lands, prior to thepreliminary notification, went ahead and entered into commitments byexecuting collaboration agreements afterthe notification under Section4, and even declaration under Section 6, with full knowledge. Theconsideration for parting with developmental rights was far higher thanthe market value of the lands which they would have been entitled to.These acts ultimately culminated with the decision not to acquire thelands. The second step – and the important one persuading the State notto acquire the lands[10]- was the application for, and the grant of,development licenses. Uniformly, in all these cases, the applications weremade prior to the scheduled date of publication of the award (26.08.2007).This is a significant and tell-tale factor because there was no way theapplicants would have ordinarily known that an award would not bepronounced on the concerned date. In fact, the application clearlyindicates foreknowledge that their lands would not be ultimately acquired.This is what may be characterized as the proverbial ‘smoking gun’ whichestablishes the complicity of these individuals and entities.

10 In the case of Frontier Developers (earlier known as Conway), the request for de-notification was made, by a letter dated 17.08.2007, to the state of Haryana - a factnoted in the status report filed by the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter, “ED”)before the Court.

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A40. Land ownership typically carries with it a bundle of rights. Alandowner has the right to possess, sell, lease, develop, sub-let, occupy,etc. On an overall analysis of the common features of all the collaborationagreements as carried out in an earlier part of the judgment, it is evidentthat except for the empty husk of a title, the land owner parted withpredominant and substantial rights over the property, including possession.BIn almost all the cases, these rights were parted for consideration whichwas far above the notified acquisition rates. This observation applies inthe case of the two companies – Frontier and Karma, who continued tobe the land owners of the land. Such ‘emptying out’ of all importantattributes that constitute rights and interest over the property cannot butCbe viewed as a ‘transfer’. To hold otherwise would mean that afterreceiving substantial amounts – equal to many times over the existingmarket rates (that could ordinarily have been claimed by the landownerin respect of their holding in acquisition proceedings) – and entitling thedeveloper to create third-party rights in respect of not a few but hundredsof people, nevertheless, the landowner could still hold out and claim theirDright to not part with the title. Such a conclusion would defy reason andcommonsense and cannot be countenanced. In the circumstances, it isheld that the collaboration agreements in all these cases which ultimatelyculminated in the grant of licenses would fall within the mischief of theterm ‘transfer’ as envisioned in the main judgment, as it foreclosed theEenjoyment and possession by the landowner, who willingly parted withsuch rights, for valuable consideration and acquiesced to irreversiblechanges on it.41. The above observations are dispositive of the issue. However,this Court cannot be oblivious to the existing state of affairs. TheFcollaboration agreement entered into between Paradise and Green Heightsand Frontier and Balbir Singh and Ram Pyari with Godrej have led toconstruction of units. This Court has been shown materials whichestablish that in the case of Green Heights, the number of constructedunits is 438 (of which 371 have been sold) and in the case of Godrej, the constructed units is 567. It is also on record that Green Heights hasGreceived 70.92 crores as against sale value of agreements. Likewise,there is no denial of the fact that Godrej has also received substantialamounts in the range of 300 crores towards its residential units sold.In these circumstances, the Court would have to strike a proper balanceand protect the interests of such third-party consumers to ensure that H

they do not suffer on account of the past sins of the colonizers / developersor land owners, as the case may be.

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42. The main judgment recorded that in another transaction, oneof the colonizers / developers had paid 4.5 crores per acre at therelevant time (in 2009). During the hearing, learned counsel for the Statementioned that the current value of these contiguous land is to the tuneof 5.3 crores. Keeping these facts in mind, this Court is of the opinionthat to balance the equities and in the overall interest of the home buyers,for 2.681 acres which is the subject matter of the collaboration agreementbetween Paradise and Green Heights, and for 13.743acres, which is thesubject matter of collaboration agreement between Frontier, Earl, BalbirSingh, Ram Pyari and Godrej, the following sums should be paid toHSIIDC:

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i.A sum of 5 crores per acre payable in respect of 2.681acres. Therefore, final amount payable would be 2.681 acresx 5 crores= 13,40,50,000-/ (rupees thirteen crores, fortylakhs, and fifty thousand only). This amount will be paid byGreen Heights which will be entitled to recover fromParadise such proportionate sums it may be entitled to claimhaving regard to the terms of their agreement.

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ii.A sum of 5 crores per acre payable in respect of 13.743Eacres. Therefore, final amount payable would be 13.743 x 5 crores = 67, 36, 30,000/- (rupees sixty-seven crores,thirty-six lakhs and thirty thousand only). This amount willbe paid by Godrej, which shall be entitled to claim suchproportionate sums as it may be entitled to in terms of itsagreement with Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh and Ram PyariFin accordance with law.

These amounts shall be deposited with HSIIDC within six months,from the date of this judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6%per annum shall be levied from the date of default. The lands covered bythese projects shall, subject to such payments be excluded from thedeemed award.

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43. As far as Karma’s lands are concerned, the materials on recorddisclose that no development has taken place, and there is no allotmentin respect of their lands. Karma had in fact entered into a collaborationagreement with M/s Unitech Ltd., and based on that, it applied for license H

Aon 15.01.2007. The license was ultimately granted before the date ofthe decision of the State not to acquire its land. In these circumstances,this Court holds that the collaboration agreement – especially thesupplementary agreement which was entered into after even thedeclaration under Section 6 was published – the application for licenseand the grant of license constituted an irreversible clog in the ownershipBof the lands. Karma received substantial amounts to the tune of 15crores, and in terms of the agreement placed on record, was entitled tofar more substantial amounts had the development in fact been completed.In these circumstances, it is held that the collaboration agreement andthe grant of license amounted to ‘transfer’ within the meaning of theCexpression in para 42.6 of the main judgment. Such land will therefore,form part of the deemed award. The State shall take appropriate stepsand issue the supplementary award in respect of these lands within sixmonths from the date of this judgment.

44. It is also clarified that Karma would be entitled to compensationDin accordance with the Acquisition Act as on the date of the notificationunder Section 4. The compensation in such case shall be determinedwithin the same time-frame as indicated in the award. Karma shall beentitled to statutory benefits such as interest, solatium etc. on suchdetermined compensation. In the event Karma is aggrieved, it is open toit to seek such recourse or redress in law as is available.E

45. I.A No. 112515/2020; I.A. No. 117025/2020; I.A. No. 118401/2020; and I.A. No.116268/2020 of M.A. No. 2150/2020 are disposed ofin terms of the above findings and directions. I.A. No. 82000/2020 isdismissed as withdrawn as prayed for in I.A. No. 112682/2020 of M.A.1175/2019.F

II. M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Subros Ltd.

46. M/s. R.P. Estates Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “R.P. Estates”) owned2.9875 acres of land, and M/s. Subros Ltd. (hereinafter, “Subros”) owned10.881 acres. The lands of both these concerns were included in thenotification under Section 4 as well as the declaration under Section 6.GThe State decided to release these lands, as indicated by its letter toSubros dated 22.08.2007. This stand was reiterated by the State in theseproceedings, where it was submitted that as there were no saletransactions with respect to these lands, it was decided not to includethem in the deemed award. It was also stated that no developmentalHrights were parted by them.

47. Learned counsel appearing for both the entities reiterated theState’s submissions, that the lands were vested in these two concernsand continued to be so vested. In the circumstances, R.P. Estates andSubros had to be treated as bona fide land owners, since they did notenter into any transactions during the suspect period.

48. In three applications (i.e., I.A. Nos. 111557 of 2020, 111562 of2020 and 111563 of 2020) in M.A. No. 2067 of 2020, R.P. Estates furthersubmitted that it applied for license from the DTCP much after the dateof the deemed award and was granted License No. 82 of 2009 on08.12.2009. It also disclosed that developmental rights were thereaftertransferred to another enterprise called M/s. Elan Ltd. in 2013-14. Theapplication and pleadings show that the project was completed on14.01.2020 and the application for grant of occupation certificate wasthereafter made, with 305 units allotted to third parties out of a total of362.

49. Subros had initially challenged the acquisition by filing a writpetition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court.[11] However, after itreceived a letter from the DTCP, communicating recommendation forwithdrawal from acquisition, Subros withdrew its petition. Thereafter, itapplied for license, and was granted the same on 13.06.2008. Subros didnot enter into any collaboration agreement or sell its rights during thesuspect period - it sold the lands to one Akme Projects Ltd. much lateron 23.01.2012.

50. Having regard to the overall circumstances, this Court is ofthe opinion that the lands owned by both R.P. Estates and Subros shouldbe excluded from the deemed award. The judgment of the Court dated12.03.2018 is therefore clarified to the above extent. I.A. No. 111557/2020; I.A. No. 111562/2020; and I.A. No. 111563/ 2020 of M.A. No.2067/2020; I.A. No. 116120/2021; I.A. No. 116128/2021 and I.A. No.123690/2021 of M.A. No. 50/2019 are disposed off accordingly.

III. Express Greens / DLF Home Developer Ltd.

51. Express Greens was a project of DLF Home Developers Ltd.(hereinafter, “DLF”). The main judgment of this Court had dealt withthe manner in which the land for this project was acquired from theoriginal landowners in the village Manesar by a group of companies and11 M/s Subros Ltd. v State of Haryana, W.P. (C) No. 2787/2006 (dismissed on20.09.2007).

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Aentities owned or wholly controlled by ABW Infrastructure Ltd.(hereinafter, “ABW”). These lands, in aggregate, measured 33.536 acres.ABW and its group of companies obtained License No. 283 and 284 fortheir development. These lands were part of the 235 acres which ABWhad purchased during the subsistence of the acquisition proceedings.Eventually, before the final decision to drop the acquisition was taken byBthe State on 29.01.2010, the lands and licenses were transferred to DLFfor a consideration of 150.95 crores.

52. Several home buyers filed applications (I.A. No. 110995/ 2019;I.A. No. 91793/ 2020 and I.A. No. 113206/ 2020 (in M.A. (D) No.26552/ 2019), I.A. No. 36484-85/2020; I.A. No. 36487/2020 and I.A.CNo. 89570/2020 in M.A. (D) No. 7888 of 2020; I.A. No. 49986-87/2021in M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021 and I.A. No. 49990/2021 and I.A. No. 31079-81/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 6705/ 2020). The submission on behalf ofthese applicants, who sought impleadment and directions, was that interms of this Courts’ main judgment, they were entitled to clear title overDthe residential units of flats constructed and allotted by DLF. It wassubmitted that a substantial number of flats had been handed for occupationto the allottees. However, with respect to many such allottees, sale deedshad not been executed and registered. Furthermore, it was submittedthat several flats had not been completed though their allottees wereentitled to the units. In addition, during arguments it was submitted thatEcertain common amenities such as lifts had not been installed, andcommunity centres, club houses, etc. had not been completed or werenot in usable condition.

53. It was urged on behalf of Express Green Home OwnersAssociation by Mr. A. N. Nadkarni, learned Senior Advocate, that inFcases where the flats were handed over to the home buyers, not onlywould they be entitled to clear title, which necessitated clear directionsfrom this Court, but also that it would be in the overall interest of thehome buyers that the maintenance of common areas as well as thecompletion of unbuilt units should be made over to DLF.G

54. This was seconded by Mr. Gopal Shankarnarayanan, learnedSenior Advocate appearing for some home buyers, who urged that suchbuyers invested their hard-earned savings and in some cases even obtainedbank advances, on the strength of the reputation and name of DLF. Ifthe entire project were to be made over to HSIIDC, the value of theHresidential units under their occupation and ownership would considerably reduce. Therefore, it was urged that DLF be directed to complete theproject, and maintain the colony, according to the high standards it wasknown to keep.

55. In its reply (MA (D) 2665/ 2019), and during hearings, DLFrepresented by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pinaki Misra submittedthat the company was willing to undertake the balance finishing worksuch as repair and renovation of common areas, strengthening ofcompound walls, construction of club house etc. and bear all associatedexpenses. However, this was on the condition that DLF be handed overwith the entire project including the entitlement to the balance saleconsideration based upon the existing executed agreements with allotteesin respect of units allotted to them. DLF also urged in para 18 of itsreply[12] that it should be allowed to utilize FAR of approximately threelakh sq. ft. in the manner it chose. In lieu of this, it was contended thatDLF would give up its claim towards 372.83 crores in accordancewith the main judgment of this Court. In these circumstances, it wasurged that this Court should exclude the area of 33.536 acres, i.e., thesubject matter of License No. 283 and 284, from the deemed award toenable further development.

56. The State and HSIIDC resisted these contentions. It waspointed out that a detailed analysis was made in the main judgment whichdisclosed the trail of suspect transactions. ABW had acquired more than235 acres after the notification under Section 4 was issued, by threats tothe land owners. Not only was land purchased, even licenses were appliedfor and obtained – these in fact formed the backbone for the demand tothe state of withdrawal from acquisition. It was during the pendency ofthese proceedings that DLF chose to transact and purchase the landsthat it ultimately did as well as acquire all rights under the two licensesfor development of 33.536 acres which ultimately led to the ExpressGreens project.

57. It was highlighted that DLF paid over 150 crores to acquirethese rights. The clear intention of this Court in this regard is to be foundin para 42.8 of the main judgment where it clarified that third partypurchasers/allottees would be entitled to the units allotted to them andwould thereafter enjoy perfect title, and in respect of all unallotted lands,residential or constructed units, rights, title and interest would devolveabsolutely upon HSIIDC. It was submitted that the sale deeds executed 12 M.A. (D.) No. 26552 of 2021 dated 24.08.2020.

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Aby DLF would be validated by HSIIDC and wherever sale deeds hadnot been executed, they would be so executed by HSIIDC after dueverification in a time-bound manner. It was submitted that likewise withrespect to any unfinished work, the rights, title and interests in the colonywould be that of HSIIDC and not of DLF.

B58. It is evident on a reading of various parts of the main judgmentsthat ABW was in the eye of the storm. This Court’s main judgment isexplicit about the fact that DLF chose to dip its hands in murky watersby acquiring rights to the 33.536 acres as well all rights under the licensesfor 150 crores from ABW.[13] In these circumstances, there can be noquestion of seriously deliberating upon the application for release of theseC33.536 acres of land from the deemed award. There is absolutely nomerit in the submissions on behalf of DLF that the title to lands continuedwith the original owners. The entire exercise of ABW was to acquirethese lands and then transfer them to those capable of developing thelands, such as DLF. Those contentions are accordingly rejected. However,the rejection of DLF’s claim does not in any way impinge on the rights,Dtitle and interest of the allottees, who were handed over possession oftheir flats, upon payment of full consideration, or those allottees entitledto it, after payment of the balance sums. The HSIIDC shall completethe process of validating their title, including the title to the undivided andproportionate land share, within six months from the date of this judgment.E59. So far as the complaints of the home buyers are concerned,this Court had directed for the latest status report to be placed before it,which was furnished by way of an additional affidavit dated 28.04.2020,by DLF.This affidavit enclosed the details of the project. A total of 1348units were constructed, of which 1223 were sold, and 510 sale deedswere registered. Possession was granted to 882 allottees. It is evidentFtherefore that 441 allottees are yet to be handed over possession;furthermore 713 sale deeds are yet to be executed and registered. TheHSIIDC is therefore directed to ensure that the balance allottees arenotified about the execution of sale deed and the process of executionand registration of sale deed is completed in their case within six monthsGfrom the date of this judgment. HSIIDC shall ensure that a designatednodal officer is deployed to scrutinize the relevant documents and facilitatethe execution of such sale deeds.

13 The status report of ED reveals that on 13.04.2008, a request for transfer of licensein favour of DLF was made to the DTCP. DLF also continued to engage in correspondencein this regard (on 26.09.2008, 14.01.2010, 29.09.2010, etc.)H

60. The affidavit also discloses that a total of 116 townhouses/independent floors were constructed. 77 townhouses/independent floorswere sold and the structure of 25 of them was complete. The affidavitfurther stated that 39 houses/independent floors are unsold andconstruction of 11 townhouses are complete. Thus, all rights, title andinterest in respect of unsold 39 townhouses in the independent floorsvest with the HSIIDC, which shall deal with them in accordance with itspolicies and applicable laws. Likewise, in case of unsold apartments, allrights, title and interest shall vest with HSIIDC.

61. According to the affidavit, 96 apartments on the 15[th] towerhave been completed but no occupation certificate has yet been issued.In case the application is pending, the DTCP shall ensure due inspectionand decision on the occupation certificate. If any deficiency has to berectified the same shall be completed by the HSIIDC.

62. As far as the complaint with respect to lifts etc. is concerned,the affidavit discloses that all lifts have been installed; the certificates bythe concerned State authorities have been placed on the record. Withrespect to club houses in sector M-1, the club house has not beenconstructed – only basement structure is complete and for sector M-1(A) the club houses have not yet been issued completion certificate.With respect to the boundary wall the additional affidavit states that 218meters in tower M-1 and 434 meters in tower M-1(A) has been damaged.The HSIIDC is directed to take up work immediately and complete thesame with eighteen months from the date of this judgment, as it is in theinterest of safety and security of the residents.

63. Having regard to the above discussion, it is held that the requestof the Express Green Home Owners Association and DLF to excludethe project from deemed award is not tenable. It is accordingly rejected.It is further declared that all unconstructed and unallotted portions aswell as construction rights (such as FAR) in respect of unconstructed,unallotted plots etc., including two school sites, shall vest absolutely withHSIIDC. HSIIDC shall be entitled to develop these areas in accordancewith its policies within the frame work of the applicable Master Plandevelopment laws. DLF is therefore, entitled to collect amounts, if any,in terms of the main judgment of this Court. It shall hand over all recordsrelating to the allottees, and technical data, pertaining to the entire projectto HSIIDC within one month from the date of this judgment.

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A64. I.A. No. 110995/2019; I.A. No. 91793/2020 and I.A. No.113206/ 2020 in M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019; I.A. No. 36484-85/ 2020;I.A. No. 36487 and I.A. No. 89570/ 2020 in M.A. (D) No. 7888/ 2020;I.A. No. 49986-87 of 2021; I.A. No. 49990/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021; I.A. No. 31079-81/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 6705/ 2020 are disposedoff in the above terms.B

IV. M/s Kalinga Realtors Pvt. Ltd.

65. An application (MA No. 50/2019) was filed by Kalinga RealtorsPvt. Ltd. the first applicant, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the secondapplicant, Anant Raj Ltd. Both applicants are cumulatively referred toCas “Kalinga”. The claim in this application is for a direction for propercalculation of amounts payable by HSIIDC to Kalinga, in terms of themain judgment. It is a matter of record, that Kalinga sought NOC fromDTCP to purchase the land in October 2009. The same was granted inJanuary, 2010 and sale deed executed shortly thereafter on 23.04.2010.ABW and its group of companies had acquired License No. 67 of 2009Ddated 19.11.2009, which was transferred to Kalinga pursuant to the saledeed on 12.07.2010. Thus, Kalinga’s attempt to purchase the land andrights granted by the license clearly fell within the mischief of the mainjudgment of this Court.

66. Kalinga submits that it furnished all details and particulars, inEsupport of its claim that it had incurred expenses to the tune of 308crores[14], for the construction of the housing project called “Madelia”. Itis submitted that Kalinga expended the amounts and deployed resourcesfor the development of the area and construction of 13 towers, of which10 are complete and in respect of which claims have been received for257 allottees.F

67. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, urged that this Courthad sought information from HSIIDC, which filed replies and furtheraffidavits. Despite these, a clear picture has not been given. Instead ofverifying all the invoices and materials, apparently HSIIDC has conductedGa piece meal inquiry. It was pointed out that HSIIDC had admitted thataccording to its valuation and verification, the cost payable was 11.68crores; even that has not crystallized into a concrete assurance to pay.

68. Learned counsel pointed to an auction notice, issued byHSIIDC, in respect of Kalinga’s project, inviting prospective bidders to H14 Detailed at pg. 40 of M.A. No. 50 of 2019.

submit offers for completion. It was urged that the reserve price, includingprice for the land (12.45 acres) and the constructed towers (which weredescribed in detail in the auction notice) were grossly undervalued byHSIIDC, which has offered a pittance of 11.68 crores. It was submittedon behalf of Kalinga that HSIIDC should be compelled to revise thevaluation, within a time bound manner, and this Court should appoint anarbitrator.

69. Counsel for the State and HSIIDC urged that Kalinga cannotclaim a grievance, because it was a direct beneficiary of the transactionsduring the suspect period. It chose to enter into the field, by entering intotransactions with ABW, intending fully to make substantial profits, onaccount of the depressed cost of land. However, this Court’s mainjudgment resulted in its land being included in the deemed award - it canbe at best entitled to those amounts which it actually expended. It wassubmitted that HSIIDC was prepared to verify all the bills and invoices,provided they were genuine and arrive at the amounts payable. Counselalso submitted that in the event of a dispute, HSIIDC was prepared tosubmit the dispute to arbitration.

70. From the above discussion, it is evident that Kalinga’s grievanceis regarding the amounts it claims it is entitled to. The gap between itsclaim ( 308 crore) and what HSIIDC offered at one time ( 11.68crores) is too excessive. The materials placed on record show thatHSIIDC in fact, did put up the entire land, with the construction forauction[15] on an ‘as is where is’ basis. The date of e-auction was21.09.2021, with a reserve price of 309 crores. The advertisementalso states that 12 towers were constructed with finishing remaining;other works (EWS, community centre, etc.) were yet to be constructed.The advertisement further states that the successful bidder was to stepinto Kalinga’s shoes and complete the project.

71. It is apparent to this Court from the materials on record thatthe initial valuation of 11.68 crores made by HSIIDC is inaccurate,particularly in view of the reserve price indicated by it in the auctionnotice. However, in view of the final order proposed, no final opinion orfinding is recorded.

72. It is directed that HSIIDC shall complete verification of allthe relevant documents furnished by Kalinga. Any additional documents 15 In its portal HTTPS://HSIIDC.BIDX.IN.

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Aor invoices, or relevant materials which Kalinga may wish to rely upon,shall be furnished to HSIIDC within two weeks. Thereafter, HSIIDCshall conduct verification, and based upon that exercise, and relevantinquiries (for which it may seek such assistance of Kalinga as isnecessary) indicate the final valuation within six months from the dateof this judgment. The amount in furtherance of that valuation shall beBreleased, within three months of completion of verification. In caseKalinga disputes the figure, it is open to it to firstly accept the amountoffered, on a without prejudice basis, and secondly, indicate itsunwillingness to accept that offer towards final settlement. In such event,Kalinga and HSIIDC shall jointly submit the dispute to arbitration, to aCmutually agreed person. In the event no agreement is possible, thearbitration shall be referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre(hereinafter, “DIAC”). The Chairman of the DIAC shall then nominatean arbitrator, who shall enter upon reference. It would be advisable, insuch event, that the arbitrator also seeks the assistance of a technicalperson, versed in verification of construction related documents, as anDexpert. The fee for the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties;the proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Arbitrationand Conciliation Act, 1996.

73. Some flat owners, who had booked units in the project haveapplied for appropriate directions to HSIIDC, to refund the amountsEdeposited by them. HSIIDC shall complete the verification of documents,in relation to all those who claim refund as allottees of Kalinga, withinsix months. Such allottees or flat owners, (who have not obtainedpossession) shall be disbursed the amounts they are entitled to within sixmonths thereafter.F

74. In the event of any dispute, with respect to the entitlement oramounts payable, it is open to the concerned allottee or flat buyer to takerecourse to appropriate proceedings in law, i.e., by filing civil suit, orcomplaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It is clarified thatno proceeding, application or contempt petition in this regard, will beGentertained by this court.

75. I.A. No. 46028/2020; IA No. 59743/2020; I.A. No. 118798/2020; IA No. 103292/2020 and I.A. No. 137407/2019 in M.A. No. 50/2019; I.A. No. 30807/2020; I.A. No. 3403/2020; I.A. No. 3406/2020;and I.A. No. 191983/2019 in M.A. (D) No. 45009/2019; I.A. No. 192027/H2019 in M.A. (D) No. 45026/2019; Contempt Petition No. 716/2021 and Contempt Petition (D) No. 21733/2021 are disposed off in terms of theabove directions.

V. ABW Infrastructure Ltd.

76. ABW was earlier known as M/s. Aditya Buildwell Pvt. Ltd.ABW and its associated companies had purchased maximum landmeasuring over 235 acres. ‘ABW Aditya Niketen’ was floated by ABWin M-I, M-I(A) and M-I(C) adjoining HSIIDC Residential Sector-1,Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana. That project was the subject matter of theproceedings throughout culminating in the main judgment of this Court.

77. From 2009 onwards, 1993 allottees booked their flats, builtfloors, plots shops, commercial space as the case was, with ABW. InABW Aditya Niketan and City Centre,a residential plotted colony, on104.912 acres of land with 236 plots, 1488 of floors/flats and 269 shopsand commercial places, was to be developed and constructed, pursuantto License No. 66 of 2009 dated 09.11.2009 issued by DTCP.

78. The ABW Manesar Allottee Welfare Society, 118-C, Sector30, Gurgaon, Haryana (hereinafter, “Society”) was registered on21.09.2012. The Society has filed on behalf of its member allottees,several applications, seeking directions. It has filed charts, and proof ofpayment, by way of copy of receipts issued by ABW, to substantiate itsclaim of genuine allottees being its members. The Society has soughtimpleadment before the High Court, in the original proceedings, out ofwhich the main judgment culminated, in this Court. The society was alsoimpleaded during proceedings in this Court.

79. The Society claims that in adherence to the directions containedin para 42.8 of this Court’s main judgement, the allottees preferred theirclaims and submitted all required information to HSIIDC primarilyindicating description of the plot/unit, exact measurement of the area,purchase price and the total payment made to ABW including (a) basicsale price, (b) External and Internal Development Charges, (c) servicetax, etc. Along with the claim form, the necessary documents were alsoenclosed, namely, provisional allotment letter, payment receipts, ID proofand address proof. An attested affidavit duly supporting the contents ofthe claim was also submitted.

80. The Society claims that as there was no indication ofcompliance with the direction contained in para 42.8 of the main judgment,on 07.01.2019 it filed an application under the Right to Information Act, A

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A2007. The HSIIDC responded by its reply dated 24.01.2019 stating thatclaims of 220 plot buyers, 1270 flat/floor buyers and 157 commercialshop buyers had already been received by it. The Society claims it hasregularly and continuously impressed upon HSIIDC as to the delay inadherence and compliance of the judgement, but with no effect. TheSociety’s grievance is that despite diligence by its members, HSIIDCBfailed to verify their claims within a period of two months and after deepslumber of nine months, it moved an application (M.A. No.50 of 2019)for three months extension of time and this Court’s order dated 18.01.2019granted extension up to 22.04.2019.

81. It was submitted that even in the extended period the necessaryCcompliance was not made and once again I.A. No.68542 of 2019 (inM.A. 864 of 2019) was moved by HSIIDC for yet another extension. Itwas therefore submitted that although a comprehensive direction waspassed by this Court specifically in favour of the innocent allottees,HSIIDC’s inaction has resulted in nothing even after a lapse of 15 months.DThe Society had moved a contempt proceeding, Contempt PetitionNo.2226 of 2018 against HSIIDC as well. The Society is therefore seekingurgent directions, to HSIIDC for completion of its responsibilities.

82. It was further urged that given that HSIIDC has demonstrablyfailed in complying with the terms of this judgment, it would be in theEinterest of all allottees that the land is handed over on an ‘as is where isbasis’ to the respective buyers of plots, flats or commercial units and adirection issued consequently to HSIIDC to execute conveyance deeds.It is submitted that the Society and the buyers themselves will undertakethe work of completing the project having regard to the fact that necessaryapprovals were granted in terms of License No.66 of 2009; the zoningFplans have been approved and furthermore clearance was granted bythe concerned Forest and Environment Departments. In addition, tofacilitate development, previous deposits of EDC of 29.99 crores andIDC of 14.08 crores was paid long back by the developer, i.e., ABW.No doubt, the project land stands transferred to HSIIDC. Further, it wasGsubmitted that this circumstance is not an impediment to permit theallottees joined together through the Society and to complete the project.

83. On behalf of the State and HSIIDC, it was urged that theprocess of verification has been delayed. It was further urged that ofthe total licensed land measuring 104.682 acres, an extent of 2.306 acresHwere acquired for Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran through an award dated 27.12.2016. Furthermore, a sum of 8.31 crores was paid over tothe erstwhile owner ABW. It was further submitted that the recordsindicate total compensation paid to ABW for the land which vested inthe State under the deemed award was 12.51 crores, of which 3.32crores has been paid by the LAC, with 9.91 crores still pending.

84. It was further argued that there has been no development onthe land; that no structure or construction or development was undertakenby ABW as on date. A total of 1995 units were contemplated under thescheme - included 453 plots and 221 commercial units. Furthermore, itwas submitted -during the hearings before this Court- that a total of 270claims for refund had been made. In view of the fact that it was submittedon affidavit by HSIIDC dated 12.04.2022 that it had decided to settle270 claims on pro rata basis for 20.486 crores. Other claims on thelands of ABW measuring 104.282 acres, including buyers’ claims workingout to 128.38 crores and third-party claims working out to 172.15crores. M/s. Alchemist claimed 33.99 crores as an investor, for thecredit facility provided to ABW and its associates, which was rejected.Likewise, the claim of 1.28 crores to the land given to ABW and itsgroup companies too was rejected. After the hearings were concluded,the HSIIDC filed an affidavit indicating that the figures indicated havenow undergone a change, because more refund claims were received,driving upwards the total amounts needed to be refunded.

85. After obtaining instructions, learned counsel appearing forHSIIDC submitted that since there has been no development orconstruction, the question of granting any compensation in respect ofABW’s allottees would not arise. Therefore, the HSIIDC would refundall unverified claims on pro rata basis to the allottees and those who hadapplied under the scheme together with 6% interest per annum from thedate of this Court’s judgment.

86. As found in the main judgment as well as the previous part ofthis judgment, ABW was one of the prime movers behind the entiresubversion and abuse of the state machinery for acquisition of farmer’slands. ABW obtained licenses for 104.682 acres and floated schemesfor plots with two-three storied structures and residential as well ascommercial units. Despite the fact that licenses were granted way back,even as on the date of the judgment of this Court (and even now), nodevelopment has taken place. All that was asserted on behalf of theSociety was that IDC and EDC amounts were paid. HSIIDC’s stand is A

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Athat these charges are in fact in arrears. Having regard to the totality ofcircumstances, this court is of the opinion that the claim by the Societythat the lands be made over to it or the residents on an ‘as is where is’basis for development by them is untenable.

87. The main judgment expressly stated that it is only in casesBwhere construction is completed or nearing completion that the interestsof third party allottees were protected. However, such is not the situationin the case of 104.682 acres of land that belonged to ABW. There is nodenial that such lands have now been vested in HSIIDC as a consequenceof the main judgment of this Court and are to be included as part of thedeemed award. It is apparent that the when the Court delivered theCmain judgment, it was unaware of the true nature of acts in relation toeach project, especially in relation to ABW, i.e., that no developmenthad taken place and that allottees had merely paid certain instalments tothe colonizer / developer. Furthermore, the materials on record disclosethat a large number of claims have been made for refund. Having regardDto these facts and being aware of the practical reality that were HSIIDCmandated to now proceed with the project, it would not be reasonable toexpect completion of such project in the foreseeable future, at least forthe next 5-7 years, it would be in the fitness of things that HSIIDCrefunds the amounts payable to the allottees of the entire project, i.e.,allottees of residential units/plots and commercial or shop space. HSIIDCEshall take up this process as expeditiously as possible and facilitate theverification and payment of these amounts at the earliest, so that theprocess is completed within the next twelve months from the date of thisjudgment. In case, the HSIIDC is unable to refund the amounts, by thatdate, the sums shall carry interest at 6% p.a.F

88. I.A. No. 102358/2019; I.A. No. 189667/2019; I.A. No. 83251/2020; I.A. No. 62216/2020 in M.A. (D) No. 24553/2019; I.A. No. 42263/2022 and I.A. No. 49262/2022 in M.A. (D) No. 9002/2022; I.A. No.76605/2020 and I.A. No. 76602/2020 in M.A. No. 1521/2020; I.A. No.75955/2020 in Contempt Petition No. 513/2020; Contempt Petition No.G2226/2018; and Contempt Petition No. 716/2021 are disposed off in termsof the above directions.

VI. Speed Town Planners Pvt. Ltd.

89. Eleven applications were preferred in relation to lands thatwere inter alia, subject of license No. 175 of 2008 dated 30.09.2008

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pertaining to 2.443 acres of land in village Naurangpur acquired by GirnarInfrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “Girnar”) and License No. 76 in favourof one Navin Rao to the extent of 11.519 acres). Girnar was a whollyowned subsidiary of Unitech, and Navin Rao too was an affiliate ofUnitech. Applications were preferred by Unitech, and one Speed TownPlanners Pvt. Ltd. (hereafter “Speed Town”) which claimed to be entitledto rights to 19.56 acres.

90. In 2008, Girnar obtained license No. 175 of 2008 dated30.09.2008 for developing a commercial colony on 2.443 acres out ofthe 19.56 acres of land. The license was granted by DTCP. Out of the2.443 acres, an area of 1.5125 acres was notified under Section 4 ofAcquisition Act, on 07.08.2013 and under Section 6 on 31.07.2013. Finally,1.5125 acres of land was acquired under Award No. 13 dated 29.07.2016,for development and utilization of sectors roads (Sector 75 to 80) atGurugram. Unitech urges that the acquisition of 1.5125 acres renderedthe balance area of 0.93 acres to be commercially non-viable for anyconstruction/development thereon as it was not be possible to consumethe entire permissible FAR of 2.443 acres on the residual parcel of land.It is contended that an agreement to sell was executed on 14.03.2016between Girnar as vendor and Speed Town as vendee for the sale of aportion of land admeasuring 9.69 acres, out of balance 17.116 (19.56 -2.443 = 17.116 acres) at the rate of 4.40 crores per acre, for a totalsale consideration of 42.636 crores. Of that consideration, a sum of 33.21 crores was received by Girnar from Speed Town for sale of 9.69acres from 13.01.2016 to 18.06.2016 while an amount of 9.426 crores( 42.636 - 33.21 = 9.426) is outstanding in the books of accounts.

91. In terms of the agreement, Speed Town was obliged to clearthe balance outstanding amount of 9.426 crores upon submission ofthe sale deed for registration.

92. Applications are preferred by Unitech and Speed Town. SpeedTown claims to have entered into collaboration agreement with Girnar,on 12.02.2016. Subsequently, the agreement to sell was entered into bythe parties, and the sum of 33.21 crores was paid to Girnar. SpeedTown seeks directions that the lands in respect of which it entered intocollaboration agreement (9.69 acres) ought to be released from thedeemed award directions of this Court in its main judgment. In thealternative, it claims for a direction that Girnar should refund amountspaid by it.

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A93. During the hearing, Mr. Joydeep Gupta, learned SeniorAdvocate contended that Speed Town was a bona fide purchaser whichhad first entered into collaboration agreement with Girnar, and laterentered into agreement to sell. It was urged that Girnar’s holding companyUnitech was under a cloud and its management has been replaced byvirtue of orders of this Court.B

94. It was urged that on the basis of the main judgement, thephysical possession of Girnar’s entire land parcels, measuring 19.56 acres,(comprising of 2.443 acres of licensed and 17.117 acres of unlicensedland), was taken over by HSIIDC in furtherance of District RevenueOfficer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector’s letter No. 382/LAC datedC06.07.2018 and correspondingly reflected in the revenue records.

95. Apparently, Speed Town sent a notice dated 24.04.2018 toGirnar to refund the amount of 33.21 crores for the land along withinterest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of payment till thedate of actual refund. Speed Town invoked the arbitration clause, andDsubmitted the dispute for arbitration. This culminated in an award in itsfavour.

96. It is argued that the site inspection carried out by Unitech’sland division on 15.03.2021 noted that barring the licensed land of 2.443acres and 2.08 acres (out of the total unlicensed land parcel of 17.117Eacres), the residual land was under unauthorized cultivation sinceNovember 2020.

97. The applicants seek directions for exclusion of the lands fromthe deemed award, urging that they were not purchased from any farmersbut rather from one Angelique International Ltd. (hereinafter,F“Angelique”), a public limited company, through a registered sale deedexecuted on 23.08.2007. The main judgment was based on the premisethat the land sellers were the farmers whose only source of income wasagriculture. The entire tenor of the main judgement was therefore farmer-centric. In the case of Girnar, the position is entirely different since theland was purchased from a public limited company which was incorporatedGon 03.01.1996. It was submitted that the original owner, Angelique was a project engineering and construction company and the other assumptionsbased on which this Court delivered the main judgment, were inapplicableto it. Furthermore, the land parcels purchased by Angelique were mutatedin the name of Girnar on 06.06.2006 and 23.08.2007 and, therefore, theirHownership is prior to the dates of mutation. Hence, the seller company was not in the business of buying and selling land only for minting quickmoney by duping innocent farmers.

98. It was argued that Girnar acquired ownership of 19.56 acresfrom Angelique by registered sale deed dated 23.08.2007 whereas thecut-off date fixed by this Court was 24.08.2007 till 29.01.2010, meaningthereby that all land transactions of sale and purchase during thependency of acquisition proceedings from 24.08.2007 till 29.01.2010 werecancelled by the main judgment.

99. On behalf of the HSIIDC and the State, it was urged thatneither Unitech, nor Speed Town, were entitled to any relief. It washighlighted that the acquisition of the land from Angelique, during thesuspect period, was expressly noticed by this court. The sale deed, inthe present case, was executed just before the scheduled pronouncementof the award. Furthermore, during the pendency of proceedings, Girnartransferred its development rights to Speed Town, which chose to acquireit, and did so at its own peril. Speed Town later entered into agreementto sell. However, at the root of all these transactions, was the transfer ofownership during the suspect period, i.e., after issuance of the notificationunder Section 4. Counsel drew the notice of this Court to paras 34.2 and35 of the main judgment which clarified the issue beyond any doubt.

100. This Court’s main judgment, has noted in more than oneplace, from paras 26.1 to 26.9, and traced the sequence of events whichled to the notification of 912 acres for acquisition, the resultant panic andscramble on the part of landowners to get rid of their holdings, the purchaseof these lands, and in many places, their entering into agreements of saleor development agreements, by builders, which made no mention of theimpending acquisition, leading to a demand to drop acquisition, whichwas ultimately done at two points of time, i.e. 24.08.2007 and 29.01.2010.The transactions relating to lands owned by Girnar, and Unitech’sassociates, squarely fall within the suspect period. In these givencircumstances, Unitech’s plea, or that of Speed Town, that thecollaboration agreement with the latter- and the agreement to sell, -were executed after the suspect period, are untenable. The taint thatattaches with the initial transaction (i.e., Girnar acquiring the lands duringthe acquisition process) attaches equally, to Speed Town’s transaction,because the entire premise, which persuaded the vendor to sell the lands,was that the acquisition proceedings would go through, divesting theirtitle. However, the vendee and its holding company appeared to havefull knowledge of the nature of future events, in which they probably A

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Ahad a hand. Thus, the request for exclusion of these lands, from thedeemed award, is untenable and is accordingly rejected. Speed Townshall be entitled to the compensation to be decided, in respect of theland, on the same basis as in the case of all others entitled to it.

101. I.A. No. 128802-03/2020; I.A. No. 128807/2020 and I.A.BNo. 53868/2022 in M.A. No. 2228/2020; I.A. No. 31185/2021; I.A. No.31180/2021; I.A. No. 31182/2021; I.A. Nos. 128798-99/2021; and I.A.No. 128801/2021 in MA (D) No. 5699/2021 are disposed off in the aboveterms.

VII. Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd.

Ca. Legend Height Owners Welfare Association

102. 3.35 acres of agricultural land in Naurangpur was purchasedby two individuals, i.e., Shri Ashok Kumar Lakhotia and Shri SubhashChand Goyal by sale deeds dated 26.02.2004 and 08.03.2004. It wasclaimed that these two also obtained possession. The lands became thesubject matter of acquisition in the notification under Section 4. TheDoriginal owners sought for release of land and thereafter objected underSection 5A of the Acquisition Act. Some lands were released fromacquisition, however, the major portion was included in the declarationunder Section 6. Request for release of these lands for acquisition wasmade. This was followed up by an order dated 31.07.2007 releasing theEland from acquisition. M/s. Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd.(hereinafter, “Innovative”) thereafter entered the scene on 15.10.2007.Subsequently, they sought for and were granted license to develop thelands on 20.06.2008 (License No. 128 of 2008). Apparently, meanwhileon 19.12.2007, Innovative purchased the two parcels of lands. Innovativeclaims that pursuant to the license granted by DTCP, it developed theFland and constructed commercial tower.

103. After the main judgment was delivered, the state whileensuring the publication of the deemed award also included the landswhich were the subject matter of License No. 128 of 2008. Aggrieved,Innovative approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court in writGproceedings.[16] The writ petition however was rejected by the High Courtby an order which has been impugned in the present case by specialleave.[17]

16 M/s Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Haryana, W.P. (C) No. 18336of 2020 (dismissed on 03.11.2020).17 M/s Innovative Infradevelopers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Haryana, SLP (C) No. 2147 ofH2021.

104. The construction put up by Innovative is a commercial buildingknown as “Legend Heights”. Several individuals and entities claimed tohave purchased spaces within it. They have approached this Court byfiling an application - i.e., the Legend Height Owners Welfare Association(hereinafter, “Legend Heights Association”). It claims to represent 35individuals who allegedly paid substantial amount ranging between 13lakhs and 65 lakhs. The details of the application filed by LegendHeights Association list the amounts paid to Innovative and also describesthe units allotted in the building to the individuals.

b. Paramveer Distributors Pvt. Ltd.

105. Another set of applications has been preferred by ParamveerDistributors Pvt. Ltd., (hereinafter, “Paramveer”) a non-banking financialinstitution. It alleges having entered into an agreement with Innovativeon 08.06.2017, whereby an area measuring 96,216.03 sq. ft. was agreedto be purchased by it for a total consideration of 16 crores. The areassold was for a hotel block. The relevant condition stipulated that out of 16 crores payable by the buyer, 8.05 crores, by way of outstandingdues of one Ms. Saraswati Devi was agreed to be adjusted. Anothersum of 4.24 crores by way of outstanding dues of Paramveer, wasagreed to be adjusted. The balance amount was to be paid in the ratio of55:45 respectively.

106. Paramveer therefore contends that it is entitled to the built-up space in respect of the hotel block constructed by Innovative.

c. Analysis of VII (a) and (b)

107. HSIIDC in its response to the special leave petition and theapplications (by Legend Heights Association and Paramveer) submitsthat no construction has been undertaken with respect to the hotel block.It is argued that this Court should not take cognizance of submissions onbehalf of Paramveer since no credible material has been placed on recordto establish the genuineness of the transactions claimed by it. As far asthe commercial complex of Legend Heights is concerned, HSIIDC pointsout that since the land transactions for sale of lands, as well as thelicense in respect of these lands, was issued during the suspect period, ithas to be included in the deemed award.

108. From the factual narrative it is evident that the original ownersof lands themselves purchased the lands in early February 2004. ThisCourt cannot per se attribute the foreknowledge about the acquisition.

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B109. At the same time, this Court is cognizant of the fact that anumber of allottees appear to have invested substantial amounts (inrespect of the commercial building of Legend Heights, and not the hotelbuilding of Paramveer). Although HSIIDC is silent as to whether theoccupation certificates have been granted, there is some material onrecord (by way of averments in the special leave petition as well as inCthe application by the Legend Heights Association) that several saledeeds/conveyance were executed and registered.

110. The larger interest of justice would lie in ensuring that suchof the allottees who are either granted occupation, and /or in whosefavour conveyance has been executed, should be handed over theDcommercial units that they had originally booked. As far as others areconcerned, HSIIDC should first verify the claims of all persons/entitieswho claim to have paid substantial amounts and have not been allottedtheir spaces, and shall, depending on the stage and nature of constructionand the extent of amount paid (it is more than 75 per cent of the totalconsideration) hand over possession of the units, after due completion.E

111. In case any allottee seeks refund, HSIIDC should ensurethat the amounts are duly verified and repaid within six months of thedate of this judgment. In the case of default, HSIIDC shall pay 6% perannum as interest. In respect of all unallotted units and areas which canbe constructed upon, title shall vest exclusively with HSIIDC.F112. So far as Paramveer is concerned, this Court is of the opinion F112. So far as Paramveer is concerned, this Court is of the opinionthat the agreement entered into with Innovative records that certainamounts (over 12 crores) were due and payable to the allottees, whichwas subsequently adjusted in the builder buyer agreement for the hotel.The details of those transactions have nowhere been verified or placedon record. In addition, Innovative has stated that construction of theGhotel block has not taken place. In the circumstances, all rights, title andinterest in those portions of Innovatives’ properties shall vest in HSIIDCand be part of the deemed award.

113. Needless to add, Innovative shall be entitled to amounts likein the case of all other developers/owners in accordance with the mainHjudgment. HSIIDC shall verify its claims. In the event of any dispute in

this regard, Innovative is at liberty to press its claim in substantiativelegal proceedings and not their miscellaneous applications before thiscourt. I.A. No. 41690/2021 in M.A. (D) No. 7775 of 2021; I.A. No.84064-67/2020; I.A. No. 91091/2020; I.A. No. 84067 of 2020 in M.A.No. 50/2019 and SLP No. 2147 of 2021 are disposed off in the aboveterms.

VIII. Dharamvir & Ors.

114. 105 individuals approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court,through a common writ petition, claiming directions that they wereresidents of village Manesar.[18] The claim put forth by them was thatthey were bona fide and innocent purchasers who had acquired thelands which were included in the notification under Section 4. Theyacquired rights in respect of lands – presently under their occupationduring the suspect period, i.e., between 27.08.2004 and 29.01.2010. It isalleged that assuming the transactions to be free from any cloud on thetitle, these petitioners had even proceeded to construct upon lands. Theclaim made to the Punjab & Haryana High Court was that their landsshould be excluded from the deemed award. The High Court declinedthe claim, reasoning that the purchases were made by them during thesuspect period and this court’s judgment provided relief only to the originalland owners who had not transferred, alienated or in any manner sold orparted with rights in respect of the land. Since these petitioners admittedlyclaimed to have purchased the land when they were facing acquisition,no relief could be granted to them. It was argued on behalf of thesepetitioners by Mr. Rathi that all the petitioners invested their hard-earnedmoney and had built houses in which they have been living all this while.It was urged that many of those dwellers are ex-army personnel.

115. During the course of hearing, HSIIDC submitted that theland occupied by such individuals are to the extent of 27 acres. HSIIDCexpressed practical difficulties in verifying the transactions claimed tobe bona fide. It was pointed out that these petitioners proceeded tocomplete the alleged transactions even though the lands were facingimminent acquisition. This court has granted relief only to those landowners who were coerced into selling lands to developers. Suchdevelopers used the acquisition proceedings to make profit and ultimatelyensure that the acquisitions were dropped. These individuals, however,ran the risk of acquisition being completed.

18 Dharamvir v State of Haryana, SLP (C) No. 5490 of 2021.

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A116. The entire tenor and reasoning of the main judgment is thatproceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were used as device,whereby through a web of holding or shell companies, developersultimately entered into transactions and paid valuable amounts towardsdevelopmental rights – during pendency of acquisition proceedings. Thoserights in turn were exploited to persuade the state machinery to withdrawBfrom the acquisition. The prices of land had risen astronomically by then.Taking all these facts into consideration, as well as the fact thatdevelopers had proceeded to develop properties and construct buildingsin which units were sold or allotted, this Court allowed only one kind ofexception, i.e., that bona fide purchasers of such units, flats or shopsCetc. to be vested with title. In respect of all unallotted, unconstructedland as well as buildings and land forming part of each of such project,title was to vest in HSIIDC.

117. Wherever development agreements were entered into andlicenses issued, and no activity took place in the form of construction orDdevelopment, land was to vest in HSIIDC. If the above thread ofreasoning were to be considered, it is apparent that third-party bonafide purchasers who secured allotment by paying valuable considerationswhich is verifiable as a matter of fact (by independent material) wasprotected. In the case of all other transactions, however, such protectionwas not extended for the simple reason that there is no manner forEverifying whether in fact a bona fide transaction of the kind allegedtook place. For these reasons, this Court is of the opinion that there is noinfirmity with the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana HighCourt.

118. As a result of the above, the right and title in respect of landsFunder occupation of these petitioners is vested with HSIIDC. It is up tothe HSIIDC to frame such scheme as is permissible in accordance withits parent enactment and a non-discriminatory manner by a scheme, inregard to such land (i.e. the 27 acres to which the petitioners and otherslike them may claim relief) as it may deem appropriate. In case theGHSIIDC chooses to do so, it shall be bound by all provisions of theMaster Plan and Zoning and such other rules and regulations as areapplicable, in the area and shall strictly enforce them.

IX. Other issues

119. During the hearing, it was submitted that out of the 688 acresHfinally notified under Section 6, 420 acres were finally included as part of the deemed award. Learned counsel urged that HSIIDC has soughtto grant benefit to developers who made colossal profits and have soughtto wriggle out from the impact of the judgment to various stratagem,including by filing applications for extension/clarification etc. During thecourse of hearing, all these applications, the submissions of all partiesand that of HSIIDC (which has also preferred this application fordirections and clarifications) were considered. Out of the 912 acresoriginally notified under Section 4 of the deemed consideration ofobjections under Section 5A, 688 acres were apparently notified underSection 6. The entire acquisition was abandoned on 29.01.2010. ThisCourt, in its main judgment has, in many places - held, in the that thestate’s decision to not to go ahead with the acquisition was mala fideand amounting to a fraud under the Acquisition Act. The HSIIDC throughits applications sought clarifications about whether the term ‘transfer’,includes only conveyance or formal transfer of lands or would it includeparting with valuable developmental rights. In an earlier portion of thisjudgment, this aspect has been elaborately dealt with, and concludedthat the expression ‘transfer’ has to be interpreted widely and not in anarrow or technical manner. Thus, in all cases where collaborationagreements were entered into or developmental rights were parted forvaluable consideration or where licenses were applied for during thesuspect period whether in favor of the original land owner who mighthave entered into collaboration agreement and received monies, thetransactions would fall within the mischief of transfer. Having regard tothese conclusions, the applicants’ apprehensions are unfounded.

120. As far as other steps with respect to acquisition are concerned,during the course of hearing, the Court was told that in respect of 365acres of land, 185 references have been received. The State shall ensurethat these are answered as expeditiously as possible the concernedreference courts are hereby directed to conclude all the proceedings in185 references and pronounce the award in accordance with law withina period of one year from the date of this judgment. All rights andcontentions of the parties are kept open. I.A. No. 118408/2020; I.A.No. 118410/2020 and I.A. No. 126826/2020 in M.A. No. 2149/2020 aredisposed off in the above terms. The applications on behalf of the Stateand HSIIDC (I.A. 2254/2019 and I.A. 100745/2020 in M.A. No. 50/2019; and I.A. 93822/2019 in M.A. No. 1175/2019) are also accordinglydisposed off.

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AConclusions and Directions:

121. In the light of the above discussion, this Court’s findings aresummarized as follows:

a.The expression ‘transfer’ used in the main judgment,especially in light of para 42.6, is not confined to sale, leaseBor other encumbrance. It includes development and/orcollaboration agreements, as well as licenses issued (fordevelopment) during the suspect period, whether or not infavour of the developer.

b.As a corollary to the above, the lands covered by licensesissued to Paradise (ultimately transferred to Green Heights);Karma (for which collaboration was entered into withUnitech); Ram Pyari, Balbir Singh, Earl and Frontier(ultimately used by Godrej); ExpressGreens (DLF); Kalingaand Innovative amount to transfer.

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c.With respect to Green Heights, a sum of 5 crores perDacre is payable by Green Heights to HSIIDC. Therefore,the final amount payable is 2.681 acres x 5 crores = 13,40,50,000 /- (rupees thirteen crores, forty lakhs, and fiftythousand only) within six months from the date of thisjudgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annumEshall be levied from the date of default. Green Heights isentitled to recover from Paradise such proportionate sumsit may be entitled to claim having regard to the terms oftheir agreement.

d.With respect to Godrej, a sum of 5 crores per acre ispayable by Godrej to HSIIDC. Therefore, final amountFpayable is 13.743 acres x 5 crores = 67,36,30,000 /-(rupees sixty-seven crores, thirty-six lakhs and thirtythousand only) within six months from the date of thisjudgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annumshall be levied from the date of default. Godrej is entitled toGclaim such proportionate sums as it may be entitled to interms of its agreement with Frontier, Earl, Balbir Singh andRam Pyari in accordance with law.

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e.Upon full compliance with directions above, the landscovered by Green Heights and Godrej’s projects shall beexcluded from the deemed award.H

f.With respect to Karma, the 25.95 acres of land subject ofALicense No. 206 of 2008 forms part of the deemed award.The State shall take appropriate steps and issue thesupplementary award in respect of these lands within sixmonths from the date of this judgment. Karma is entitled tocompensation in accordance with the Acquisition Act as onBthe date of the notification under Section 4, and is entitledto statutory benefits such as interest, solatium etc. on suchdetermined compensation.

g.Lands measuring 2.9875 acres and 10.881 acresrespectively belonging to R.P. Estates and Subros, areexcluded from the deemed award.

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h.With respect to Express Greens (DLF), contentions toexclude the project from the deemed award are rejected.It is directed that:

(i) HSIIDC shall complete the process of validating thetitle of allottees, including the title to the undividedand proportionate land share, within six months fromthe date of this judgment; D

(ii) HSIIDC shall notify the balance allottees about theexecution of sale deed - the process of executionand registration of sale deed to be completed withinsix months from the date of this judgment.HSIIDCshall ensure that a designated nodal officer isdeployed to scrutinize the relevant documents andfacilitate the execution of such sale deeds; and E

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(iii) All rights, title and interest in respect of the unsold39 townhouses in the independent floors vests withthe HSIIDC, which shall deal with them in accordancewith its policies and applicable laws. Likewise, in caseof unsold apartments, all rights, title and interest shallvest with HSIIDC.

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(iv) With respect to 96 apartments on the 15[th] towerwhich have been completed but no occupationcertificate has yet been issued, the DTCP shall ensuredue inspection and decision on the pending occupation H

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certificates. HSIIDC to complete any deficiency thathas to be rectified.

(v) With respect to club houses and boundary wall insector M-1 and M-1(A), the HSIIDC is directed totake up work immediately and complete the samewith eighteen months from the date of this judgment.

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(vi) All unconstructed and unallotted portions as well asconstruction rights (such as FAR) in respect ofunconstructed, unallotted plots etc., including twoschool sites, shall vest absolutely with HSIIDC.HSIIDC is entitled to develop these areas inaccordance with its policies within the frame workof the applicable Master Plan development laws.DLF is entitled to collect amounts, if any, in terms ofthe main judgment of this Court. It shall hand over allrecords relating to the allottees, and technical data,pertaining to the entire project to HSIIDC within onemonth from the date of this judgment.

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i.With respect to Kalinga, it is directed that

(i) HSIIDC shall complete verification of all the relevantEdocuments furnished by Kalinga. Any additionaldocuments or invoices, or relevant materials whichKalinga may wish to rely upon, shall be furnished toHSIIDC within two weeks. Thereafter, HSIIDC shallconduct verification, and based upon that exercise,and relevant inquiries (for which it may seek suchFassistance of Kalinga as is necessary) indicate thefinal valuation within six months from the date of thisjudgment. The amount in furtherance of that valuationshall be released, within three months of completionof verification.

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(ii) HSIIDC shall complete the verification of documents,in relation to all those who claim refund as allotteesof Kalinga, within six months. Such allottees or flatowners, (who have not obtained possession) shall bedisbursed the amounts they are entitled to within sixmonths thereafter.

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(iii) In the event of any dispute, with respect to theAentitlement or amounts payable, it is open to theconcerned allottee or flat buyer to take recourse toappropriate proceedings in law, i.e., by filing civil suit,or complaints under the Consumer Protection Act,1986. It is clarified that no proceeding, application orBcontempt petition in this regard, will be entertainedby this Court.

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j.With respect to ABW, it is directed that HSIIDC to refundthe amounts payable to the allottees of the entire project,i.e., allottees of residential units/plots and commercial orshop space, within the next twelve months from the date ofthis judgment, failing which interest at the rate of 6% perannum shall be levied from date of default. The lands ofABW shall form part of the deemed award.

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k.With respect to Speed Town, the contentions to excludethe land from the deemed award are rejected. It is heldthat Speed Town shall be entitled to the compensation to bedecided, in respect of the land, on the same basis as in thecase of all others entitled to it.

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l.With respect Paramveer, the contentions to exclude the hotelblock from the deemed award are rejected. All rights, titleEand interest in those portions of Innovative’s properties shallvest in HSIIDC and be part of the deemed award.Innovativeshall be entitled to amounts like in the case of all otherdevelopers/owners in accordance with the main judgment.HSIIDC shall verify its claims. In the event of any disputeFin this regard, Innovative is at liberty to press its claim insubstantiative legal proceedings and not their miscellaneousapplications before this Court m.With respect to Legend Heights, HSIIDC is directed to:

(i) Hand over commercial units to allottees who wereGeither granted occupation, and /or in whose favourconveyance was executed. As far as others areconcerned, HSIIDC to first verify the claims of allpersons/entities who claim to have paid substantialamounts and have not been allotted their spaces, and H

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shall, depending on the stage and nature ofconstruction and the extent of amount paid (it is morethan 75 per cent of the total consideration) hand overpossession of the units, after due completion.

(ii) Duly verify and pay refunds sought by any allotteewithin six months of the date of this judgment, failingwhich interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall belevied from date of default.

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(iii) In respect of all unallotted units and areas which canbe constructed upon, title shall vest exclusively withHSIIDC.

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n.With respect to Dharamveer and other petitioners, as wellas similarly placed individuals the rights and title in respectof lands under their occupation is vested with HSIIDC. Itis up to the HSIIDC to frame such scheme as is permissibleDin accordance with its parent enactment and a non-discriminatory manner by a scheme, in regard to such land(i.e., the 27 acres to which the petitioners and others likethem may claim relief) as it may deem appropriate. In casethe HSIIDC chooses to do so, it shall be bound by allprovisions of the Master Plan and Zoning and such otherErules and regulations as are applicable, in the area and shallstrictly enforce them.

o.The State is directed to ensure that all references pertainingto the acquisition are answered as expeditiously as possible.The concerned reference courts are hereby directed toFconclude all the proceedings in 185 references receivedfor 365 acres of land and pronounce the award in accordancewith law within a period of one year from the date of thisjudgment.

p.It is clarified that wherever the allottees have not paid theGfull amounts (payable in terms of the agreements) HSIIDCshall be entitled to the same rights in law as in the case ofthe original builder/developer, which include, but are notlimited to, insisting full payment before handing overpossession to the allottees.

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122. I.A. No.112515/2020; I.A. No.117025/2020; I.A. No.118401/2020; I.A. No.116268/2020; I.A. No.111557/ 2020, I.A. No. 111562/2020; I.A. No.111563/2020; I.A. No.116120/2021; I.A. No. 116128/2021,I.A. No.123690/2021; I.A. No.110995/ 2019, I.A. No. 91793/ 2020; I.A.No. 113206/ 2020; I.A. No. 36484-85/2020; I.A. No. 36487; I.A. No.89570/ 2020; I.A. No. 31079-81/2022; I.A. No.102358/2019; I.A. No.189667/2019; I.A. No. 62216/2020; I.A. No. 42263/2022; I.A. No. 49262of 2022; I.A. No. 75955/2020; I.A. No. 83251/2020; I.A. No. 76605/2020; I.A. No. 76602/2020; I.A. No. 31185/2021; I.A. No. 31180/2021;I.A. No. 31182/2021; I.A. No. 128802-03/2020; I.A. No. 128807/2020;I.A. No. 128798-99/2021; I.A. No. 53868/2022; I.A. No. 128801/2021;I.A. No. 91091/2020;I.A. No. 41690/2021; I.A. No. 84064-65 of 2020;I.A. No. 84066 of 2020; I.A. No. 84067/2020; I.A. No. 118408/2020;I.A. No. 118410/2020; I.A. No. 126826/2020; I.A. 2254/2019; I.A. 93822/2019; I.A. 100745/2020; I.A. No. 46028/2020, I.A. No. 30807/2020;I.A. No. 191983/2019; I.A. No. 192027/2019; I.A. No. 137407/2019;I.A. No. 3403/2020; I.A. No. 3406/2020; I.A. No. 59743/2020; I.A.No. 118798/2020; I.A. No. 103292/2020; I.A. No.68542 of 2019; I.A.No. 49986-87 of 2021; I.A. No. 49990/2021 in MA No. 50/2019; M.A.No. 864/2019; MA (D) 24553/2019; MA (D) 45009/2019; M.A. (D)No. 45026/2019; M.A. No. 1175/2019; M.A. (D) No. 26552/ 2019; M.A.(D) No. 7888/2020; M.A. No. 1521/2020; M.A. No. 2067 of 2020; M.A.2150 of 2020; M.A. No. 2149/2020; M.A. No. 2228/2020; M.A. (D)No. 5699/2021; M.A. (D) No. 7775 of 2021; M.A. (D) No. 9505/2021;M.A. (D) No. 6705/2020; M.A. (D) No. 9002/2022 and Contempt PetitionNo. 2226/2018, Contempt Petition No. 513/2020, Contempt Petition No.716/2021, SLP (C) No. 2147/2021 and SLP (C) No. 5490/2021 are thusdisposed off in the aforementioned terms.

Nidhi Jain

Applications disposed of.

(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

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