SKODA AUTO VOLKSWAGEN INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS. on 26 November 2020

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[2020] 11 S.C.R.

ASKODA AUTO VOLKSWAGEN INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED

v.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.

(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4931 of 2020)

BNOVEMBER 26, 2020

[S. A. BOBDE, A.S. BOPANNA ANDV. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

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Cs. 482 – Petition under – Seeking quashing of FIR registeredu/s. 34, 471, 468, 467, 420, 419 and 406 IPC against a companyengaged in manufacture, import and sale of passenger vehicles –High Court rejected prayer for quashing the FIR – Special LeavePetition – Plea that police cannot investigate an issue, the substratumof which is subjudice before Supreme Court against order passed byDNational Green Tribunal (NGT) and that there was long delay inlodging the complaint – Held: If perusal of FIR leads to disclosureof an offence even broadly, law courts are barred from usurpingjurisdiction of police – The order of NGT (appeal against which ispending before Supreme Court) passed on the applications whichEwere broad and general, cannot be taken as an impediment to lodgea complaint, for an individual purchaser of car – Substratum ofpolice complaint cannot be said to be subjudice before Supreme Court– Interference with impugned order not called for.

Dismissing the SLP, the CourtF

HELD: 1. The law is well settled that Courts would notthwart any investigation. If a perusal of the first information reportleads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts arebarred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the twoorgans of the State operate in two specific spheres of activitiesGand one ought not to tread over the other sphere. [Para 41][798- G-H; 799-C]

King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC18; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl.SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; S.M. Datta v.HState of Gujarat (2001) 7 SCC 659 : [2001] 2 Suppl.SCR 140 – relied on.786

2. The mere delay on the part of the 3[rd] Respondent-complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a groundto quash the FIR. The question whether the 3[rd] Respondent-complainant purchased 3 vehicles as revealed by the VAHANPortal of the Government or 7 vehicles as claimed by him in hiscomplaint, is a question of fact which has to be established onlyin the course of investigation/trial. In a petition for quashing theFIR, the Court cannot go into disputed questions of fact.[Paras 18, 19][793-F-G]

3. The order of the NGT, passed on the applications filedby certain individuals not claiming as purchasers of vehicles,cannot be taken as an impediment for an individual who purchasedcars from the manufacturers, to lodge a complaint, if he has actuallysuffered on account of any representation made by themanufacturers. Two original applications came to be filed beforethe NGT in the year 2015, alleging that the manufacturers of thevehicles in question were employing deceit devices. The filing ofthe original applications coincided with the issue of notice by theAutomotive Research Association of India to the manufacturers.The applicants before the NGT had not sought any relief forthemselves, as purchasers of vehicles. The reliefs sought by theapplicants before the NGT were broad and general. This is whythe NGT, by its final order dated 07.03.2019 directed only theCPCB to consider the initiation of prosecution in the light of theapplicable statutory regime, while ordering the manufacturers todeposit Rs.500 crores as compensation for the damage causedto the environment. The interim order passed by this Court notto take any coercive steps has to be understood only in thecontext of the directions of the NGT which had became the subjectmatter of the Civil Appeals. [Paras 21, 22, 23 and 27][794-B-E;795-A]

4. The question whether deceit devices are installed in thecars purchased by the 3[rd] respondent and the question whetherthere was any representation in this regard to the petitioner, areall questions of fact, peculiar and particular to the 3[rd ]respondent.NGT had no occasion to examine the cars purchased by the 3[rd]respondent. At this stage no one can presume whether thedefence of the manufacturer to the police complaint will be purely AB

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Aon a question of fact or purely on a question of law or on mixedquestions of fact and law. If the petitioner takes a defence that nosuch devices were installed in the cars purchased by the 3[rd]respondent or that there was no (mis) representation in thisregard, it will be a pure question of fact, which cannot be goneinto in a quash petition. If the petitioner takes a defence that theBinstallation of such devices, though true, does not violate anylaw, then it will be a pure question of law. The Court may beentitled to go into this question in a quash petition, provided thepetitioner comes up with a categorical admission that they hadinstalled such devices and yet there was no violation of the law.CThe petitioner is not expected to disclose their defence at thisstage nor can it be speculated what type of defence the petitionerwould have to the prosecution. [Para 37][797-C-F]

5. The proceedings before the NGT were not intended toaddress issues relating to individuals, such as (i) whether anyDemissions manipulation software, called in common parlance as‘defeat devices’ were installed in the vehicles purchased bycertain individuals; and (ii) whether any representation was madeto the purchasers of the cars in which such devices had beeninstalled, about the emission efficiency level of the cars.Therefore, it is not correct to say that the substratum of the policeEcomplaint is something that is already the subject matter ofadjudication before this Court in the appeals arising out of theorder of the NGT. As a matter of fact, the High Court has beenfair to the petitioner, by granting protection against arrest till thefiling of the report under section 173(2) of Cr. P.C. [Paras 39,F40][798-D-G]

Case Law Reference

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From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9223 of2020.

Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mukul Rohatgi, Maninder Singh, Sr.Advs, Bishwajit Dubey, Ms. Surabhi Khattar, Aman Singhania, SumitAttri for M/s Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, Vineet Malhotra, Ayush Gupta,Swaroop Anand Mishra, Ajay Marwah, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

1. Aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to quash a FirstInformation Report (FIR for short) registered against them for theoffences punishable under Sections 34, 471, 468, 467, 420, 419 and 406IPC, the petitioner has come up with the above Special Leave Petition.

2. We have heard Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the petitioner. Mr. Maninder Singh, learned seniorcounsel appears for the 3[rd] Respondent, who is the de facto complainant.

3. The petitioner is a Company headquartered in Pune and isengaged in the business of manufacture, import and sale of passengervehicles in India. It is claimed that the petitioner has been formed by theamalgamation of three Companies by name Skoda Auto India PrivateLimited, Volkswagen India Private Limited and Volkswagen Group SalesIndia Private Limited. The petitioner claims that they are responsible forthe business operations of five automobile brands namely, Skoda,Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche and Lamborgini.

4. The Automotive Research Association of India, which is aresearch institution of the automotive industry attached to the Ministryof Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises of the Government of Indiaissued a notice dated 04.11.2015 to the Managing Directors of SkodaAuto India Private Limited, Volkswagen India Private Limited andVolkswagen Group Sales India Private Limited, calling upon them toshow cause as to why they should not come to the conclusion that thevehicles manufactured and sold by them in India, are in violation of therequirements of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules. It was alleged in thesaid notice that the study carried out by them on limited vehicle modelsfitted with Diesel EA 189 Engines led them to believe that the vehiclesmanufactured by Volkswagen, when tested on road, indicate 3-9 timesmore NOx pollution compared with the tests carried out in the laboratory A

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Aon Modified Indian Driving Cycle (MIDC). It was also alleged in thesaid notice that they had reason to believe that Diesel EA 189 Enginesfitted in BS-IV vehicles are equipped with what are called ‘defeatdevices’.

5. At about the same time, two original applications came to beBfiled before the National Green Tribunal (NGT for short), PrincipalBench. Both the applications were primarily against Skoda Auto IndiaPrivate Limited, Volkswagen India Private Limited and VolkswagenGroup Sales India Private Limited. Apart from these three companies,the Union of India (UOI), the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB)and a few others were also made parties to the original applications.C6. The particulars of these original applications are presented in atabular column for easy appreciation:- O.A.No.Name of the Names of RespondentsReliefs soughtapplicant/applicants 509 /2015 SaloniAilawadi 1. Union of India through its 1. Directing Respondents 1-3 Secretary, Ministry of Heavy to disallow the manufacturing, DIndustries & Public Enterprises. assembly and sale of the vehicles of Respondents 4-6 2.Ministry of Environment, in India till it is established Forest and Climate Change, that they are not employing Through Secretary any deceit devices or technology; 3.Central Pollution Control Board, Through its Chairman 2. To direct the Respondents 1-3 to inspect and check all the 4. Volkswagen India Pvt; Ltd., vehicles manufactured and sold EThrough its Managing Director in India to ensure that no deceit devices are used; 5.Skoda Auto India Private Limited, Through its Managing 3.To direct respondents 4-7 to Director stop production, assembly and sale of those vehicles; and 6. Volkswagen Group Sales India Private Limited, Through 4. To direct respondents 4-7 to its Managing Director rectify the engines of vehicles Falready sold in India at their 7. Volkswagen AG, Through cost. Chairman of the Board of Management 527/2015 1.Mr. Satvinder Singh 1.Volkswagen India Private 1.To restrain Sodhi Limited, Maharashtra Respondents 1-6 from selling any further automobile with 2.Mr. Vellore Ramesh 2.Volkswagen Group Sales the defeat device which Neelakantan India Private Limited, violated the applicable GMaharashtra emission norms; 3.Mr. Deepit Singh 2. To direct Respondents 106 4.Sara International 3.Volkswagen AG, Germany to disgorge all the profits Limited made by selling automobiles with cheat devices from the year 2008; and 3. To direct Respondents 1-6 to pay damages for restoration Hof environment.

SKODA AUTO VOLKSWAGEN INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. THESTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

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4 .Sk od a A uto In dia L imi ted, M aharash tra 5 .Sk od a A uto A S, C zech Rep ub lic 6 .D r.In g. h.e.F.P orsche A G , G erman y 7 .Cen tral Pollu tio n Co ntro l Bo ard, D el hi. 8 .A u tom otiv e R esearch A ssociatio n of Indi a, Pu ne 9 .U n ion of Ind ia T hrou gh M in istry o f H eavy Ind ustries an d Pub lic E nterp rises, New Delhi 1 0. G o vernm en t o f N ation al Cap ital T errito ry of Ind ia, T hro ug h D elhi P ollution Co n tro l Com mi ttee, D elhi B

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7. On 16.11.2018, the NGT recorded a prima facie finding thatthe claim of the manufacturers that they had not caused any damage tothe environment, was not acceptable. The Tribunal constituted a jointteam to give an expert opinion and in the mean time directed themanufacturers to deposit Rs. 100 crores with the CPCB.

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8. The manufacturers filed appeals before this Court in C.A. Nos.11928 and 11929 of 2018, against the preliminary finding and the interimdirection issued by the NGT. During the pendency of those appeals, theExpert Team filed a Report.

9. Therefore, this Court disposed of the aforesaid Civil Appealsgiving liberty to the manufacturers to file objections to the Report of theExpert Team and directed the Tribunal to consider those objections andto pass orders.

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10. Pursuant to the said order of this Court, the NGT allowed themanufacturers to file objections and heard both the original applicationsand disposed of the same by order dated 07.03.2019. Some of the findingsand directions by the Tribunal were:- G

(i) That the manufacturers had in fact used cheat devices tosuppress the laboratory tests;

(ii) That NOx emission was higher by Portable EmissionHMeasurement System (PEMS); A(iii) That Volkswagen vehicles gave much less NOx emission underthe Warm Test Cycles after recall;

(iv) That the emissions measured on PEMS were higher than BS-IV limit;

(v) That the manufacturers are liable to pay damages to the tuneBof Rs.500 crores; and

(vi) That the CPCB shall consider initiation of prosecution in thelight of applicable statutory regime.

11. Challenging the said order dated 07.03.2019 of the NGT, twoCCivil Appeals were filed in C.A.Nos. 4069 and 4086 of 2019. On06.05.2019 these appeals were taken up along with another Civil Appealfiled by the Inter-Continental Association of lawyers and this courtordered the issue of notice in the appeals. In the mean time, this Courtdirected that no coercive steps shall be taken against Volkswagen IndiaPrivate Limited.D

12. While things stand thus, the 3[rd ]Respondent herein lodged acomplaint with the S.H.O., Gautam Budh Nagar, on 10.07.2020, allegingthat he had bought 7 Audi Brand cars from the authorised dealers of themanufacturing Companies; that at the time of purchase, he got it clarifiedfrom the Company that they had not installed any cheat devices in theEvehicles sold in India; that however, the authorities in India found out ahigher emission of NOx; that even the NGT imposed a fine; that thecomplainant thereafter realised that he had been duped by the Company;that knowing fully well that their vehicles have been installed with cheatdevices, the manufacturer had prepared wrong records and documents;that the manufacturers and the officers of the manufacturers areFtherefore guilty of various offences under the IPC and that thereforeaction should be initiated against them.

13. Contending that as per the particulars mentioned in theVAHAN Portal of the Government, the 3[rd ]Respondent herein hadpurchased only 3 and not 7 vehicles; that the complaint lodged by theG3[rd] Respondent after more than 2½ years of the purchase of the vehicles,was malicious and full of false particulars; and that the FIR is basedentirely upon the order of the NGT, which is the subject matter of twocivil appeals before this Court, the petitioner filed a Criminal MiscellaneousWrit Petition No.9233 of 2020 before the High Court of Judicature at H

SKODA AUTO VOLKSWAGEN INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. THESTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

Allahabad. In the said Writ Petition, the petitioners sought quashing ofthe FIR.

14. By an order dated 01.10.2020, the Allahabad High Courtrejected the prayer for quashing of the FIR. However, the High Courtprotected the officers of the petitioner against arrest till the submissionof the Report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. subject however to thecondition that they shall cooperate in the investigation and also appearas and when called upon to assist in the investigation.

15. Not satisfied with a mere protection against arrest and therefusal of the Allahabad High Court to quash the FIR, the petitioner hascome up with the above SLP.

16. The main contentions of the petitioner are:-

(i) That the Police cannot investigate an issue, the substratumof which is sub judice before this Court in the civil appealsarising out of the order of the NGT; and

(ii) That the High Court failed to take note of the long delay onthe part of the 3[rd] Respondent in lodging the complaint andalso the fact that the VAHAN Portal of the Governmentshows the purchase of only 3 vehicles as against the claim ofthe 3[rd] Respondent to have purchased 7 vehicles.

17. Let us take up the second contention first, since it is capableof being dealt with, without much ado. The second contention has twoparts namely (i) that there is a long delay in lodging the complaint and (ii)that the 3[rd] Respondent-complainant, appears to have purchased only 3vehicles as against his claim to have purchased 7 vehicles.

18. The question whether the 3[rd] Respondent-complainantpurchased 3 vehicles as revealed by the VAHAN Portal of theGovernment or 7 vehicles as claimed by him in his complaint, is a questionof fact which has to be established only in the course of investigation/trial. In a petition for quashing the FIR, the Court cannot go into disputedquestions of fact.

19. The mere delay on the part of the 3[rd] Respondent-complainantin lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR.The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference toprecedents. Therefore, the second ground on which the petitioner seeksto quash the FIR cannot be countenanced.

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20. The first contention revolves around the pendency of the CivilAppeals arising out of the order of the NGT and the interim order passedby this Court in the Civil Appeals.

21. As stated earlier, two original applications came to be filedbefore the NGT in the year 2015, alleging that the manufacturers of theBvehicles in question were employing deceit devices. The filing of theoriginal applications coincided with the issue of notice by the AutomotiveResearch Association of India to the manufacturers. We have alreadyindicated broadly, in paragraphs 5-10 above as to what transpired beforethe NGT.

C22. The applicants before the NGT did not seek any relief forthemselves, as purchasers of vehicles. The reliefs sought by the applicantsbefore the NGT were broad and general. This is why the NGT, by itsfinal order dated 07.03.2019 directed only the CPCB to consider theinitiation of prosecution in the light of the applicable statutory regime,while ordering the manufacturers to deposit Rs.500 crores asDcompensation for the damage caused to the environment.

23. Therefore, the order of the NGT, passed on the applicationsfiled by certain individuals not claiming as purchasers of vehicles, cannotbe taken as an impediment for an individual who purchased cars fromthe manufacturers, to lodge a complaint, if he has actually suffered onEaccount of any representation made by the manufacturers.

24. The interim order passed by this Court on 06.05.2019 in CivilAppeal Nos. 4069 and 4086 of 2019, while issuing notice reads as follows:- “In the meantime, no coercive steps shall be taken against theFappellant viz., Volkswagen India Private Limited.”

25. The aforesaid interim order correlates only to the directionsissued by the NGT in paragraphs 29, 30 and 32 of its order dated07.03.2019. The direction contained in Paragraph 30 of the order of theNGT dated 07.03.2019 reads as follows:- G“We leave it open to the CPCB to consider initiation of prosecutionin the light of applicable statutory regime.”

26. In paragraphs 29 and 32 of its order, the NGT directed themanufacturers to deposit compensation to the tune of Rs.500 croreswithin 2 months.

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27. Therefore, the interim order passed by this Court not to takeany coercive steps has to be understood only in the context of theaforesaid directions of the NGT which became the subject matter of theCivil Appeals. Hence it is futile to contend that the pendency of the CivilAppeals and the interim order passed by this Court should be taken as adeterrent for anyone else to lodge a police complaint and seek aninvestigation.

28. Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for thepetitioner strenuously contended that the contents of the complaint lodgedby the 3[rd] Respondent-complainant with the Police were nothing but areproduction of the contentions made before the NGT and that actuallythe substratum of the police complaint, is what is sub judice before thiscourt. Therefore, he contends that the police cannot investigate into thesame set of allegations which form the subject matter of proceedingspending adjudication before this court.

29. But we do not think so. A little elaboration is required to showwhy we cannot agree with the above contention of the learned seniorcounsel appearing for the petitioner.

30. Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 empowers theCentral Government to make rules, regulating the construction, equipmentand maintenance of motor vehicles with respect to all or any of thematters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (p). Clause (g) of Sub-section (1)of Section 110 relates to “the emission of smoke, visible vapour,sparks, ashes, grit, or oil”.

31. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 110(1), the CentralGovernment issued a set of rules known as The Central Motor VehiclesRules, 1989.

32. Rules 112 to 114 of those Rules deal in general with “smoke,vapour, spark, ashes, grit and oil”. Rules 115 and 116 deal specificallywith “emissions of smoke, vapour” etc., from motor vehicles and “testfor smoke emission level and Carbon Monoxide (CO) level for motorvehicles”. These Rules correspond to Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) ofSection 110.

33. Rule 126 mandates every manufacturer or importer of motorvehicles other than trailers and semi-trailers to submit the prototype ofthe vehicle manufactured or imported by him for testing by the agenciesindicated therein. Rule 126A enables the testing agencies referred to in A

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ARule 126 to conduct tests on the vehicles drawn from the production lineof the manufacturer to verify whether these vehicles conform to theprovisions of the Rules.

34. In order to give effect to the mandate of the statutoryprescription, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, issued aBdocument bearing No. MoRTH/CMV/TAP-116-116, Issue No.4, whichprescribes the test method, testing equipment and other related procedurefor the purpose of testing vehicles for verifying compliance with Rules115 and 126A of the Rules for “Type Approval and Conformity ofProduction”. The document also contains the total procedure for checkingof the in-service vehicles for idling CO/HC for vehicles fitted with petrol/CCNG/LPG Engines. This document is divided into 15 parts. Part-XIVcontains the details of standards for Tailpipe Emissions from vehiclesand Test Procedures Effective for Mass Emission Standards.

35. Clause No.2.27 of Chapter-1, Part-XIV of the aforesaiddocument defines what is called a “Defeat Device”. It reads asDfollows:- “Defeat Device means any element of design which sensestemperature, vehicle speed, engine rotational speed,transmission gear, manifold vacuum or any other parameterfor the purpose of activating, modelling, delaying orEdeactivating the operation of any part of the emission controlsystem, that reduces the effectiveness of the emission controlsystem under conditions which may reasonably be expectedto be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use. Suchan element of design may not be considered a defeat device if F1. The need of the device is justified in terms of protecting theengine against damage or accident and for safe operation of thevehicle, or

2. The device does not function beyond the requirements of enginestarting or,G

3. Conditions are substantially included in the Type I or Type VItest procedure.”

36. The allegations in the complaint lodged by the 3[rd] respondentherein, are to the following effect:

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(i) that “at the time of purchase and taking delivery of the vehicles,the complainant got clarified from the accused persons whether thevehicles in India were also fitted with cheat devices”;

(ii) that despite the clarification issued by them that they had notinstalled any cheat devices, in the vehicles meant to be sold in India, thecars purchased by the complainant were found to contain such defeatdevices; and

(iii) that therefore, the manufacturer is guilty of commission ofvarious offences.

37. The question whether such devices are installed in the carspurchased by the 3[rd] respondent herein and the question whether therewas any representation in this regard to the petitioner, are all questionsof fact, peculiar and particular to the 3[rd ]respondent herein. NGT had nooccasion to examine the cars purchased by the 3[rd] respondent herein. Atthis stage no one can presume whether the defence of the manufacturerto the police complaint will be purely on a question of fact or purely on aquestion of law or on mixed questions of fact and law. If the petitionertakes a defence that no such devices were installed in the cars purchasedby the 3[rd] respondent or that there was no (mis)representation in thisregard, it will be a pure question of fact, which cannot be gone into in aquash petition. If the petitioner takes a defence that the installation ofsuch devices, though true, does not violate any law, then it will be a purequestion of law. We may be entitled to go into this question in a quashpetition, provided the petitioner comes up with a categorical admissionthat they had installed such devices and yet there was no violation of thelaw. We do not expect the petitioner to disclose their defence at thisstage nor would we speculate what type of defence the petitioner wouldhave to the prosecution.

38. It may not be out of context to mention here that the EuropeanUnion woke up way back in 2007 to the reality of car makers installinga software that manipulate exhaust emissions, depending upon whetherthe car ran on a test stand or on the road. After the EuropeanCommission’s Joint Research Centre found in 2011 that the levels ofharmful NOx emissions far exceeded the prescribed levels, a studyconducted by the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT)revealed similar results in the United States. In September-2015,allegations of installation of manipulation devices by car manufacturers AB

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Aemerged from the US Environmental Protection Agency and this triggeredinvestigations in several European Union States. After claims were lodgedand legal action initiated, the German Federal Motor Transport Authorityappears to have given permission in June-2016 for the recall of about 2million vehicles across Europe. In the light of these developments, oneof the manufacturers entered into an agreement with the USBEnvironmental Protection Agency in December-2016 giving certainoptions to the customers. These and the subsequent developments, whichattained notoriety as the diesel-gate scandal, led to the German FederalCourt of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof-BGH) giving a ruling on May 25,2020 in favour of the car owners for damages.C

39. It is in the backdrop of what transpired in Europe and U.S.A.,during the period from 2015 to 2019 that the action initiated by theAutomotive Research Association of India in November 2015 and theproceedings that went on before the National Green Tribunal from theyear 2015 to the year 2019, have to be seen. All of them were part of theDglobal outrage that actually concerned the damage caused to theenvironment by the emissions from the cars allegedly fitted withmanipulative devices. The proceedings before the NGT were notintended to address issues relating to individuals, such as (i) whetherany emissions manipulation software, called in common parlance as‘defeat devices’ were installed in the vehicles purchased by certainEindividuals; and (ii) whether any representation was made to thepurchasers of the cars in which such devices had been installed, aboutthe emission efficiency level of the cars.

40. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention of thelearned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the substratum of the policeFcomplaint is something that is already the subject matter of adjudicationbefore this Court in the appeals arising out of the order of the NGT. Asa matter of fact, the High Court has been fair to the petitioner, by grantingprotection against arrest till the filing of the report under section 173(2)of the Code. We do not think that the petitioner can ask for anythingGmore.

41. It is needless to point out that ever since the decision of thePrivy Council in King Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed[1], the law iswell settled that Courts would not thwart any investigation. It is only incases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed inH1 AIR 1945 PC 18

the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigationto go on. As cautioned by this Court in State of Haryana vs. BhajanLal[2], the power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and withcircumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While examininga complaint, the quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embarkupon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of theallegations made in the FIR or in the complaint. In S.M. Datta vs. Stateof Gujarat[3], this Court again cautioned that criminal proceedings oughtnot to be scuttled at the initial stage. Quashing of a complaint shouldrather be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. In S.M. Datta(supra), this Court held that if a perusal of the first information reportleads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts are barredfrom usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of theState operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not totread over the other sphere.

42. In view of what is stated above, the special leave petition isdismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

SLP dismissed.

2 (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 3353 (2001) 7 SCC 659

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