APS FOREX SERVICES PVT. LTD. versus SHAKTI INTERNATIONAL FASHION LINKERS & ORS. on 14 February 2020

[2020] 2 S.C.R. 811

APS FOREX SERVICES PVT. LTD.

v.

SHAKTI INTERNATIONAL FASHION LINKERS & ORS.

(Criminal Appeal No. 271 of 2020)

FEBRUARY 14, 2020

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.139 – Presumption asto legally enforceable debt or liability – Dishonour of four chequesissued by accused – Fresh consolidated cheque issued – Dishonourof the said cheque on presentation due to Stop Payment – Complaintunder s.138 – Admission of accused of issuance of cheque as wellas the signature on the cheque – Acquittal by courts below – Appealby complainant – Plea of original accused that cheque was issuedtowards the security and the complainant misused the cheque –Held: The issuance of cheque by the accused and the signature ofthe accused on the said cheque were not disputed by the accused –The accused also not disputed that there were transactions betweenthe parties – Even as per the statement of the accused, which wasrecorded at the time of the framing of the charge, he admitted thatsome amount was due and payable – In the reply to the statutorynotice, no plea was taken by accused that the cheque was given byway of security – The cheque in question was issued for the secondtime – Therefore, once the accused admitted the issuance of chequewhich bore his signature, there was presumption that there existed alegally enforceable debt or liability under s.139 Act – However,such a presumption is rebuttable in nature and the accused isrequired to lead the evidence to rebut such presumption – Theaccused was required to lead evidence that the entire amount dueand payable to the complainant was paid – The story put forwardby the accused that the cheques were given by way of security notbelievable in absence of further evidence to rebut the presumptionand more particularly the cheque in question was issued for thesecond time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured – Both, thetrial court as well as High Court, committed error in shifting theburden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, withoutappreciating the presumption under s.139 of N.I. Act – Order of

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Aacquittal is set aside – Respondents are guilty for the offence unders.138 of the Act.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.139 – Presumptionunder – s.139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and,therefore, once the issuance of the cheque is admitted and even theBsignature on the cheque is admitted, there is always a presumptionin favour of the complainant that there existed legally enforceabledebt or liability and thereafter it is for the accused to rebut suchpresumption by leading evidence.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.139 – FinancialCcapacity of the complainant – When the accused questions thefinancial capacity of the complainant in support of his probabledefence, despite the presumption under s.139 of the Act about thepresumption of legally enforceable debt and that such presumptionis rebuttable, the onus shifts on the complainant to prove his financialcapacity and at that stage the complainant is required to lead theDevidence to prove his financial capacity, more particularly when itis a case of giving loan by cash and thereafter issuance of a cheque– In the instant case, the accused never questioned the financialcapacity of the complainant.

Allowing the appeals, the CourtE

Conclusion

Allowing the appeals, the CourtE

HELD: 1. It was the case on behalf of the accused that thecheque was given by way of security and the same was misusedby the complainant. However, nothing is on record that in thereply to the statutory notice it was the case on behalf of theaccused that the cheque was given by way of security. Earlier theFaccused issued cheques which came to be dishonoured on theground of ‘insufficient funds’ and thereafter a fresh consolidatedcheque was given which has been returned unpaid on the groundof “STOP PAYMENT”. Therefore, the cheque in question wasissued for the second time. Therefore, once the accused hasGadmitted the issuance of cheque which bears his signature, thereis presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt orliability under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. However, such apresumption is rebuttable in nature and the accused is requiredto lead the evidence to rebut such presumption. The accused was required to lead evidence that the entire amount due andpayable to the complainant was paid. [Para 5.2][818-F-H; 819-A-B]

2. In the instant case, the accused never questioned thefinancial capacity of the complainant. Whenever the accused hasquestioned the financial capacity of the complainant in support ofhis probable defence, despite the presumption under Section 139of the N.I. Act about the presumption of legally enforceable debtand such presumption is rebuttable, thereafter the onus shiftsagain on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and atthat stage the complainant is required to lead the evidence toprove his financial capacity, more particularly when it is a case ofgiving loan by cash and thereafter issuance of a cheque. That isnot a case here. [Para 6.4][822-B-D]

3. Considering the fact that the accused has admitted theissuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and thatthe cheque in question was issued for the second time, after theearlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according tothe accused some amount was due and payable, there is apresumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that there exists alegally enforceable debt or liability. Of course such presumptionis rebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption theaccused was required to lead the evidence that full amount dueand payable to the complainant has been paid. In the presentcase, no such evidence was led by the accused. The story putforward by the accused that the cheques were given by way ofsecurity is not believable in absence of further evidence to rebutthe presumption and more particularly the cheque in questionwas issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques weredishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materiallyerred in not properly appreciating and considering thepresumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legallyenforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the N.I. Act.Both, the trial court as well as the High Court committed errorin shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt orliability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139of N.I. Act. Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onusclause and therefore once the issuance of the cheque has been A

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Aadmitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted,there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant thatthere exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter itis for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.The original accused - respondents are held guilty for the offenceunder Section 138 of the N.I. Act. [Paras 7, 8][822-D-H; 823-A-BC]

Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 : [2010] 6SCR 507; Kisan Rao v. Shankargouda (2018) 8 SCC165 : [2018] 5 SCR 69; K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan(2001) 8 SCC 458 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 374; KumarCExports v. Sharma Carpets (2009) 2 SCC 513 : [2008]17 SCR 572 – referred to.

–Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 held inapplicable.

Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.271 of 2020.

FFrom the Judgment and Order dated 20.04.2018 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. L.P. 258 of 2018.

With

Criminal Appeal No. 272 of 2020

Varinder Kumar Sharma, Ms. Parul Sharma, Shantanu Sharma,GAdvs. for the Appellant.

Promod Kr. Sharma, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl.L.P. No.258 of 2018 by which the High Court has dismissed the saidapplication for leave to appeal challenging the judgment and order ofacquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court acquitting the original accused- respondents herein for the offence under Section 138 of the NegotiableInstruments Act (for short, ‘the N.I. Act’) and thereby confirming thejudgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court, theoriginal complainant has preferred the present appeal.

Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl.L.P. No.259 of 2018 by which the High Court has dismissed the saidapplication for leave to appeal challenging the judgment and order ofacquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court acquitting the original accused- respondents herein for the offence under Section 138 of the NegotiableInstruments Act (for short, ‘the N.I. Act’) and thereby confirming thejudgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court, theoriginal complainant has preferred the present appeal.

2. According to the complainant, the appellant is in the business ofsale and purchase of Foreign Exchange. That the original accused -respondents herein approached the appellant for issuance of ForeignExchange Currency/USD Travel Currency Card. According to the originalcomplainant - appellant herein, a total sum of Rs.19,01,320/- was paid tothe accused through VTM (Visa Travel Money Card) which came to bewithdrawn by the accused on different days on 10.01.2014, 20.02.2014and 22.02.2014. According to the complainant, the original accused -respondents herein paid Rs.6,45,807/- only leaving a balance ofRs.12,55,513/-. According to the complainant, the respondents accusedissued four cheques total amounting Rs.9,55,574/-, which were issued infavour of the complainant. However, all the aforesaid cheques whenpresented, came to be dishonoured. According to the complainant A

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Athereafter the respondents issued one another cheque bearing No.374941of Rs.9,55,574/- of the partnership firm namely Shakti International indischarge of the legal liability. According to the complainant when thesame cheque was presented the same came to be dishonoured due to“STOP PAYMENT” vide bank memo dated 02.06.2014. Thereafter,the complainant sent a legal notice upon the original accused under SectionB138 of the N.I. Act vide notice dated 07.06.2014. Despite the service ofthe notice, the accused did not make the payment of the cheque amount.Therefore, the original complainant - appellant herein filed the complaintbefore the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The Learned MetropolitanMagistrate also believed that the cheque was issued and the same wasCreturned unpaid with remarks “STOP PAYMENT”. The LearnedMetropolitan Magistrate believed that the accused Sushil Kumar Sharmaadmitted his signature on the cheque. The Learned MetropolitanMagistrate also believed receipt of the demand notice by the accusedpersons and non-payment towards the said cheque. However, thereafterLearned Metropolitan Magistrate observed and held that there is noDlegal liability as the payment through the card is not established andproved; that the payments are prior to the issuance of the card.Resultantly, the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the complaintby judgment and order dated 20.01.2017. Feeling aggrieved anddissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the LearnedETrial Court acquitting the accused, the complainant preferred appealbefore the Learned Sessions Court. Learned Sessions Court dismissedthe said appeal on the ground that the same is not maintainable. Thereafterthe complainant filed the appeal before the High Court. By the impugnedjudgment and order, the High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmedthe order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court. Hence, theForiginal complainant has preferred the present appeal.

3. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant hasvehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the caseboth the Learned Trial Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in acquitting the original accused for the offence underGSection 138 of the N.I. Act.

3.1 It is further submitted by Learned Counsel appearing on behalfof the original complainant – appellant herein that both the Courts belowhave not appreciated and/or considered the presumption in favour of thecomplainant under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. It is further submitted byH

Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant that both theCourts below have materially erred in acquitting the accused. It issubmitted that the accused had admitted issuance of the cheque as wellas the signature on the cheque. It is submitted that therefore there is apresumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of thecomplainant. It is submitted that thereafter the onus would be upon theaccused to rebut the presumption and for that, the accused has to leadthe evidence. It is submitted that in the present case no evidence hasbeen led on behalf of the accused to rebut the presumption. It is submittedthat the presumption mandatory by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includesthe presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liabilityand therefore both the Courts below have materially erred in acquittingthe accused. In support of the above, reliance is placed on the decisionsof this Court in the case of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC441 and Kisan Rao vs. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165.

3.2 It is further submitted by Learned Counsel appearing on behalfof the complainant that even at the time of framing of the charge againstthe accused and when his statement was recorded, the accused hadadmitted that he had taken services of the Foreign Exchange and TravelCard. It is submitted that he had also admitted that he had made partpayment in discharge of the said liability and some amount was remaining.It is submitted that therefore the accused was required to lead theevidence and prove that the entire amount due and payable has beenpaid. It is submitted that therefore in view of the presumption underSection 139 of the N.I. Act, the Learned Trial Court ought to haveconvicted the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. It is submitted that therefore the High Court has erred in confirmingthe acquittal.

4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by the learned counselappearing on behalf of the accused.

4.1 It is vehemently submitted by Learned Counsel appearing onbehalf of the original accused that in the facts and circumstances of thecase both the courts below have not committed any error in acquittingthe accused.

4.2. It is further submitted that it is true that the cheque wasissued, but the same was issued towards the security. It is submitted thatas such the complainant misused the cheque to recover the dues of A

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Abusiness from Ranger Export of India. It is submitted that there is aspecific finding given by the Learned Trial Court that the complainantfailed to prove the legal liability and/or the dues of the accused for whichthe cheque was issued.

4.3 It is submitted by Learned Counsel for the accused that in theBpresent case the accused has rebutted the presumption under Section139 of the N.I. Act and has demonstrated and proved that there was nolegal liability and/or the dues, due and payable to the complainant.

4.4. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Basalingappa vs.Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, it is submitted that as held by thisCCourt once there is probable defence on behalf of the accused, thereafterthe burden shifts on the complainant to prove his financial capacity andother facts.

4.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the cases, itis prayed to dismiss the present appeal.

D5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespective parties at great length.

5.1 We have considered minutely the evidence on record, bothoral as well documentary. We have also considered and gone throughthe judgment and order passed by the Courts below acquitting theErespondents accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

5.2. What is emerging from the material on record is that theissuance of cheque by the accused and the signature of the accused onthe said cheque are not disputed by the accused. The accused has alsonot disputed that there were transactions between the parties. Even asFper the statement of the accused, which was recorded at the time of theframing of the charge, he has admitted that some amount was due andpayable. However, it was the case on behalf of the accused that thecheque was given by way of security and the same has been misused bythe complainant. However, nothing is on record that in the reply to thestatutory notice it was the case on behalf of the accused that the chequeGwas given by way of security. Be that as it may, however, it is requiredto be noted that earlier the accused issued cheques which came to bedishonoured on the ground of ‘insufficient funds’ and thereafter a freshconsolidated cheque of Rs. Rs.9,55,574/- was given which has beenreturned unpaid on the ground of “STOP PAYMENT”. Therefore, the H

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cheque in question was issued for the second time. Therefore, once theaccused has admitted the issuance of cheque which bears his signature,there is presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liabilityunder Section 139 of the N.I. Act. However, such a presumption isrebuttable in nature and the accused is required to lead the evidence torebut such presumption. The accused was required to lead evidencethat the entire amount due and payable to the complainant was paid.

6. On the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act fewdecisions of this Court are required to be referred to and considered.

6.1 In the case of K.N. Beena vs. Muniyappan, (2001) 8 SCC458, it is observed and held by this Court that under Section 118 of theN.I. Act, unless the contrary is proved, it is to be presumed that thenegotiable instruments (including a cheque) had been made or drawnfor consideration. It is further observed and held that under Section 139,the Court has to presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holderof the cheque received the cheque for discharge, in whole or in part, ofa debt or liability. It is further observed that thus in complaints underSection 138, the Court has to presume that the cheque had been issuedfor a debt or liability. This presumption is rebuttable. However, the burdenof proving that the cheque has not been issued for a debt or liability is onthe accused.

6.2 In the case of Rangappa (supra) again, this Court had anoccasion to consider the presumption of existence of a legally enforceabledebt or liability under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. In the aforesaiddecision, after considering other decisions of this Court on Section 118(a)and 139 of N.I. Act, it is observed and held that there exists a presumptionwhich favours the complainant. It is further observed that the presumptionunder Section 139 of the N.I. Act is in the nature of a rebuttablepresumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence whereinthere is existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested.In Paragraph 27 this Court observed and has held as under:

“27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onusclause that has been included in furtherance of the legislativeobjective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedyin relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumptionunder Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course AB

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Aof litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offencemade punishable by Section 138 can be better described as aregulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in thenature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to theprivate parties involved in commercial transactions. In such ascenario, the test of proportionality should guide the constructionBand interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standardor proof.”

6.3 In the case of Kishan Rao (Supra) after considering thedecision of this Court in the case of Kumar Exports vs. SharmaCCarpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513, it is observed and held that the accusedmay adduce evidence to rebut the presumption, but mere denial regardingexistence of debt shall not serve any purpose. This Court in paragraph19 of that judgment considered paragraph 14, 15, 18 & 19 of the decisionin the case of Kumar Exports (Supra) as under:D

19. This Court in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets (Supra),had considered the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Actas well the Evidence Act. Referring to Section 139, this Court laiddown the following in paras 14, 15, 18 and 19:

“14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed,unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a chequereceived the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or otherliability.

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15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts areenabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstandingthat there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under theEvidence Act all presumptions must come under one or theother class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely,(1) “may presume” (rebuttable), (2) “shall presume”(rebuttable), and (3) “conclusive presumptions” (irrebuttable).The term “presumption” is used to designate an inference,affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of a fact,conveniently called the “presumed fact” drawn by a judicialtribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matterof fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by F

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legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumptionliterally means “taking as true without examination or proof”.

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18. Applying the definition of the word “proved” in Section 3of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138of the Act a presumption will have to be made that everynegotiable instrument was made or drawn for considerationand that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability oncethe execution of negotiable instrument is either proved oradmitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden toprove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by theaccused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. Thepresumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only whenthe contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque wasnot issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt orliability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makesa prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists.

19. The use of the phrase “until the contrary is proved” inSection 118 of the Act and use of the words “unless the contraryis proved” in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of“may presume” and “shall presume” as given in Section 4 ofthe Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions tobe raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When apresumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party onwhom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the factpresumed and when that party has produced evidence fairlyand reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not aspresumed, the purpose of the presumption is over.”

6.4 Now so far as the reliance is placed by Learned Counselappearing on behalf of the accused on the decision of this Court in thecase of Basalingappa (supra), on going through the said decision, weare of the opinion that the said decision shall not be applicable to thefacts of the case on hand and/or the same shall not be of any assistanceto the accused. In that case before this Court, the defence by the accusedwas that the cheque amount was given by the complainant to the accused A

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Aby way of loan. When the proceedings were initiated under Section 138of the N.I. Act the accused denied the debt liability and the accusedraised the defence and questioned the financial capacity of thecomplainant. To that, the complainant failed to prove and establish hisfinancial capacity. Therefore, this Court was satisfied that the accusedhad a probable defence and consequently in absence of complainantBhaving failed to prove his financial capacity, this Court acquitted theaccused. In the present case, the accused never questioned the financialcapacity of the complainant. We are of the view that whenever theaccused has questioned the financial capacity of the complainant insupport of his probable defence, despite the presumption under SectionC139 of the N.I. Act about the presumption of legally enforceable debtand such presumption is rebuttable, thereafter the onus shifts again onthe complainant to prove his financial capacity and at that stage thecomplainant is required to lead the evidence to prove his financial capacity,more particularly when it is a case of giving loan by cash and thereafterissuance of a cheque. That is not a case here.D

7. Coming back to the facts in the present case and consideringthe fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques andhis signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issuedfor the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and thateven according to the accused some amount was due and payable, thereEis a presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that there exists alegally enforceable debt or liability. Of course such presumption isrebuttable in nature. However, to rebut the presumption the accusedwas required to lead the evidence that full amount due and payable tothe complainant has been paid. In the present case, no such evidenceFhas been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused thatthe cheques were given by way of security is not believable in absenceof further evidence to rebut the presumption and more particularly thecheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earliercheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering theGpresumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legallyenforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the N.I. Act. It appearsthat both, the Learned Trial Court as well as the High Court, havecommitted error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove thedebt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139Hof N.I. Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore once the issuance of the cheque hasbeen admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted,there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that thereexists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter it is for theaccused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.

8. In view of the reasons stated above, the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court and that of the Metropolitan Magistrateacquitting the original accused - respondents herein for the offence underSection 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be sustained and the same deservesto be quashed and set aside and are accordingly quashed and set aside.The original accused - respondents herein are held guilty for the offenceunder Section 138 of the N.I. Act. All the original accused - respondentsherein are therefore, convicted under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.Original Accused No.2 to 4 Respondent No.2 to Respondent No.4 hereinare sentenced to undergo three months simple imprisonment with a fineof Rs.10,000/- each and in default thereof to undergo further one monthsimple imprisonment. The original accused - respondents herein arealso directed to pay a sum of Rs.19,11,148/- to the original complainantby way of compensation to be paid within a period of eight weeks fromtoday.

9. Present appeal is accordingly allowed.

10. Now so far as this appeal arising out of the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court in Crl. L.P. No. 259/2018 arising outof the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court in CriminalComplaint No. 62/15 (new no. 613738/16) acquitting the original accusedfor the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is concerned, the onlydifference is with respect to the cheques amount. In the present case,four cheques each of Rs. 1,00,000/- were issued which came to bedishonoured. Except the cheques amount, there is no difference.

11. For the reasons stated in Criminal Appeal No. 271 of 2020which has been allowed today, this appeal is also allowed. The impugnedjudgment and order passed by the High Court as well as that of the trialCourt acquitting the original accused – respondents herein for the offenceunder Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be sustained and the samedeserves to be quashed and set aside and are accordingly quashed andset aside. The original accused - respondents herein are held guilty for A

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Athe offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. All the original accused- respondents herein are therefore, convicted under Section 138 of theN.I. Act. Original Accused No.2 to 4 - Respondent No.2 to RespondentNo.4 herein are sentenced to undergo three months simple imprisonmentwith a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default thereof, to undergo furtherone month simple imprisonment. The original accused - respondents hereinBare also directed to pay a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- to the original complainantby way of compensation to be paid within a period of eight weeks fromtoday.

CDevika Gujral

Appeals allowed.

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