ASSURANCE CO. LTD. versus HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. on 4 March 2020

Conclusion

1. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes itclear that the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to theopposite party, is to be with the direction to give his version of(or response to) the case (or complaint) within a period of 30days. It further provides that such period of 30 days can beextended by the District Forum, but not beyond 15 days.[Para 8][447-C-D]

2. Sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 13 of the ConsumerProtection Act provides for the opposite party to give his response‘within a period of 30 days or such extended periodnot exceeding15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’. The intention ofthelegislature seems to be very clear that the opposite partywould get the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days atthe discretion of the Forum to file its response. No furtherdiscretion of granting time beyond 45 days is intended under theAct. [Para 13][448-D-E]

3. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing ofcomplaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the AB

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Arelevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is sufficientcause given by the party, which has to be to the satisfaction of theconcerned authority. No such discretion has been provided forunder Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act for filinga response to the complaint beyond the extended period of 45days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wanted toBmake such provision mandatory but only directory, the provisionfor further extension of the period for filing the response beyond45 days would have been provided, as has been provided for inthe cases of filing of complaint and appeals. To carve out anexception in a specific provision of the statute is not within theCjurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so done, it would amount tolegislating or inserting a provision into the statute, which is notpermissible. [Para 17][449-G-H; 450-A]

4. By specifically enacting a provision under sub-Section(3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of theDprinciples of natural justice shall not be called in question wherethe procedure prescribed under sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or compliedwith, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere denial offurther extension of time for filing the response (by the oppositeparty) would not amount to denial or violation of the principles ofEnatural justice. This provision of Section 13(3) reinforces the timelimit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act. [Para 17][450-B-C]

5. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in thesame breath it is also said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’.

The legislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. ItFgoes with the objective sought to be achieved by the ConsumerProtection Act, which is to provide speedy justice to theconsumer. It is not that sufficient time to file a response to thecomplaint has been denied to the opposite party. It is just thatdiscretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30 daysGperiod) has been curtailed and consequences for the same havebeen provided under Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the ConsumerProtection Act. It may be that in some cases the opposite partycould face hardship because of such provision, yet for achievingthe object of the Act, which is speedy and simple redressal ofconsumer disputes, hardship which may be caused to a party hasHto be ignored. [Para 20][452-B-D]

6. It has been further contended that the language ofSection 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia toOrder VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and iftime can be extended for filing of written submission in a suitunder the aforesaid provision of the Code, the same would applyto the filing of response to complaint under the ConsumerProtection Act as well, and hence the provision of Section 13(2)(a)of the Consumer Protection Act would be directory and notmandatory. In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation26 of the Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearlymandates that endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of theprovisions of the Code except for such provisions, which havebeen referred to in the Consumer Protection Act and theRegulations framed thereunder, which is provided for in respectof specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the ConsumerProtection Act. It is pertinent to note that non-filing of writtenstatement under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code is not followedby any consequence of such non-filing within the time so providedin the Code. Now, while considering the relevant provisions ofthe Code, it is noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with OrderVIII Rule 10 prescribes that the maximum period of 120 daysprovided under Order VIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to bemandatory, but only directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates thatwhere written statement is not filed within the time provided underOrder VIII Rule 1 “the court shall pronounce the judgmentagainsthim, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit”. Aharmoniousconstruction of these provisions is clearly indicativeof the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to grant timebeyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may be inexceptional cases. On the other hand, sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) ofSection 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides forthe consequence of the complaint to be proceeded ex parte againstthe opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to representhis case within the time given. [Para 21][452-E-H; 453-A-B]

7. Once consequences are provided for not filing theresponse to the complaint within the time specified, and it isfurther provided that proceedings complying with the procedurelaid down under sub Section (1) and (2) of Section 13 of theConsumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in any A

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ACourt on the ground that the principles of natural justice havenot been complied with, the intention of the legislature isabsolutely clear that the provision of sub-Section 2(a) of Section13 of the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response tothe complaint is mandatory, and not directory. [Para 21][453-F-G]B

8. After noticing that there were delays in deciding thecomplaints by the District Forum, the legislature inserted sub-Section (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Actproviding for a time limit for deciding the complaints. From thisit is amply clear that the intention of the legislature was, and hasCalways been, for expeditious disposal of the complaints. Byproviding for extension of time for disposal of the cases filed, forreasons to be recorded, the legislature has provided for adiscretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extensionof the time can be provided for, and where such further extensionDis not to be granted [as in the case ofSection 13(2)(a)], thelegislature has consciously not provided for the same, so as toachieve the object of the Act. [Para 22][453-H; 454-A-B]

What would be the commencing point of limitation of 30days under Section 13 of the ConsumerProtection Act, 1986?

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9. For deciding this question, this Court may first analysethe relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and theRegulations framed thereunder. Sub-Sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) ofSection13 of the Consumer Protection Act specify that it is thecopy of the complaint which is to given to the opposite partyFdirecting him to give his version of the case within a period of 30days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days. As such,from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy ofthe admitted complaint which is to be served, after which theperiod to file the response would commence. Further, Regulation10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 also specifiesGthe procedure of issuing notice, which should be accompanied bycopy of the complaint. Regulation 10(5) clearly mentions that“along with the notice, copies of the complaint,memorandum ofgrounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other documentsfiled shall be served upon the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s)”.HThe same would alsomake it clear that it is on service of a copy of the complaint that the period of limitation for filing the responseby the opposite party shall commence. [Para 37][461-F-H;462-A]

10. Now reverting to the provisions of the ConsumerProtection Act, a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clearthat the commencing point of limitation of 30 days, under theaforesaid provisions, would be from the date of receipt of noticeaccompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receiptof the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulatedtime, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copyof the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not bein a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice,without service of the copy of the complaint, would not sufficeand cannot be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaidSection of the Act. This Court may, however, clarify that theobjection of not having received a copy of the complaint alongwith the notice should be raised on the first date itself and notthereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised at any point laterwould defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to providesimple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes.[Para 40][463-D-F]

11. To conclude, the answer to the first question is that theDistrict Forum has no power to extend the time for filing theresponse to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in additionto 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the ConsumerProtection Act; and the answer to the second question is thatthe commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receiptof the notice accompanied with the complaint by the oppositeparty, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.[Para 41][463-G-H; 464-A]

Dr. J.J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi(2002) 6 SCC635 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469 – held correct law.

Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma(2013) 11 SCC451 : [2012] 13 SCR 47; Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v.State of Maharashtra(2003) 5 SCC 413 : [2003] 3

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ASCR 409; P.M. Latha v. State of Kerala(2003) 3 SCC541 : [2003] 2 SCR 653 ; Nasiruddin v. Sita RamAgarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 : [2003] 1 SCR 634 ; E.Palanisamy v. Palanisamy(2003) 1 SCC 123 ; IndiaHouse v. Kishan N. Lalwani (2003) 9 SCC 393 : [2002]5 Suppl. SCR 522 ; Union of India v. Tecco TrichyBEngineers & Contractors(2005) 4 SCC239 : [2005] 2SCR 983 – relied on.

Lachmi Narain v. Union of India(1976) 2 SCC 953 :[1976] 2 SCR 785; Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of IndiaAIR 1962 SC 113: [1962] 2 SCR 880;FairgrowthCInvestments Ltd. v. Custodian(2004) 11 SCC 472:[2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 505;Popat Bahiru Govardhanev. Special Land Acquisition Officer(2013) 10 SCC 765:[2013] 8 SCR 241 – referred to.

SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S ChamankarDInfrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210:[2019] 3 SCR 1050; Topline Shoes Ltd. v. CorporationBank (2002) 6 SCC 33 : [2002] 3 SCR 1167 – referredto.

Kailash v. Nanhku(2005) 4 SCC 480: [2005] 3 SCRE289; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India(2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 ; NIA v.Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC 22;Nahar Enterprises v. Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd.(2007) 9SCC 466 : [2007] 2 SCR 413 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSECOLD STORAGE PVT. LTD.

[2003] 1 SCR 634(2003) 1 SCC 123[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 522[2019] 3 SCR 1050[2002] 3 SCR 1167

[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 469[2005] 3 SCR 289[2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929(2015) 16 SCC 22[2007] 2 SCR 413

[2005] 2 SCR 983

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10941-10942 of 2013.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.08.2013 and 30.09.2013of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhiin Consumer Complaint No. 52 of 2013 and in Review ApplicationNo. 309 of 2013 respectively E

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 8343 of 2014, 1083-1084, 1085-1086, 4473, 6095,5485, 10129, 10127, 10333, 10858 of 2016, 780, 4457, 2339, 4510, 5219,5574-5575, 7100, 5578-5579, 10226, 12456 of 2017, 1964, 1965, 1968,1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980,1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985-1986 of 2020.

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Dhruv Agrawal, Sr. Adv., Lav Kumar Agrawal, Ms. Usha Garg,Vaibhav Saini, Akhil Saini, Ms. Shashi Kant Mehrotra, Kundan KumarLal, Shivam Singh, Gopal Singh, Harpreet Singh Gupta, Jaideep Khanna,Aditya Raina, Udian Sharma, Vikas Mehta, Ms. Malvika Kalra, ApoorvKhator, Adith Nair, Hemant Gupta, Ms. Sunakshi Gupta, Alok Sharma,Tushar Sharma, Jinendra Jain, Vishnu Mehra, A.N. Mehrotra, Ms. SimranMehrotra, Anant M., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Nishit Agrawal, Harsh Mishra,Shrey Kapoor (for M/s. Aura & Co.), Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, G

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AUdayaditya Banerjee, Abhijit Sengupta, Atul Nagarajan, Ankit AnandrajShah, Jibran Tak, Balaji Srinivasan, Alok Kumar, Ms. Somya Yadava,Ms. Snigdha Singh, Ketul Hanshraj, Kapil Joshi, Ms. Manju Jetley, VineetMalhotra, Mohit Paul, Ms. Sunaina Phul, Shubhendu Kaushik, A.K. De,Ms. Ananya, Zahid Ali, Ms. Deepika Khinder, Pratap Venugopal, Ms.BSurekha Raman, Ms. Ayushi Gaur, Akyil Abraham Roy (for M/s. K.J.John and Co.), Joseph Aristotle S., Pragyan Sharma, Mudit Makhijani,P.V. Yogeswaran, Sumit Sinha, Ms. Supriya Juneja, Shekhar Raj Sharma,Alok Shukla, K. Maruthi Rao, Mrs. K. Radha, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari,Robin R. David, Munawwar Naseem, Dheeraj Philip, Febin Mathew,

Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar, Dhawal Mohan, Jayant Mohan, Ms.CMeenakshi Chatterjee, Arun Aggarwal, Ms. Anshika Agarwal, Ms. ShubhiAgarwal, Ms. Saloni Sharan, Vivek Salathia, Mukesh Kumar Singh,Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, Mohit Kaushik, Amit, Ashutosh Chaturvedi,Shantanu Jugtawat, Gurudatta Ankolker, Venkateswara Rao Anumolu,Chandra Mohan Anisetty, Dr. E. Seshagiri Rao, Maibam N. Singh,DPramod Dayal, Badri Prasad Singh, Ms. Neha Chaudhary, Sunil K. Khatri,Sudeep Kumar, Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom Raghuvanshi, Ms.Sangya Negi, Viiswastya K. Sharma, O.P. Gaggar, Aditya Gaggar,Sachindra Karn, Uday Gupta, Hiren Dasan, Chand Qureshi, Ms. ShivaniM. Lal, Hemant Kushwaha, Harish Dasan, M.K. Tripathi, Mrs. SarlaChandra, A.N. Arora, Shekhar Raj Sharma, Sateesh Galla, Ms. UshaERani Gara, N. Rajaraman, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Vishal Gehrana, AnmolJassal (for M/s. Karanjawala & Co.), Shekhar Kumar, Mrs. Priya Puri,P.S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Mrs. Mayuri Nayyar, Ms. Anne Mathew,Ms. Shruti Jose, D. Bharat Kumar, Tadimalla Baskar Gowtham, VishalArun, Nitin S. Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Ms. Pritha Srikumar,FS. Mahendran, Amit Shukla, Deva Shukla, Varun Punia, Bhavin R. Bhatia,Arpit Rai, Amogh Singh, Sanjeev R. Singh, Aviral Kashyap, RiteshAgrawal, Tejas Bhatia, Aishwarya Adlakha, Himanshu Shekhar, KumarMihir, Vivek Kumar, Rajesh Kumar Gupta, Gaurav Sharma, PrateekBhatia, M. T. George, Ms. Susy Abraham, Johns George, Umesh KumarGKhaitan, Rahul Gupta, Ranjey Dubey, Ms. Srishti Sharma, Yati Sharma,Shiv Ram Sharma, Dr. Harish Uppal, Tilshwa Prasad, Adith Nair,Ms. Anushree Menon, Gagan Gupta, Divya Sharma, Suryajyoti Singh,Gautam Das, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VINEET SARAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The reference made to this Constitution Bench relates to thegrant of time for filing response to a complaint under the provisions ofthe Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short ‘the Act’). The firstquestion referred is as to whether Section 13(2)(a) of the ConsumerProtection Act, which provides for the respondent/opposite party filingits response to the complaint within 30 days or such extended period, notexceeding 15 days, should be read as mandatory or directory; i.e., whetherthe District Forum has power to extend the time for filing the responsebeyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days. The secondquestion which is referred is as to what would be the commencingpoint of limitation of 30 days stipulated under the aforesaid Section.

3. The first question was referred by a two judge Bench of thisCourt vide an Order dated 11.02.2016 passed in Civil AppealNo(s).1083-1084 of 2016, M/s Bhasin Infotech and InfrastructurePvt. Ltd. versus M/s Grand Venezia Buyers Association (Reg), therelevant portion of which is as under:

“There is an apparent conflict between the decisions of thisCourt in Topline Shoes Limited vs. Corporation Bank [(2002)6 SCC 33], Kailash Vs. Nankhu [(2005) 4 SCC 480], SalemAdvocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC344] on the one hand and J.J. Merchant & Ors. Vs. ShrinathChaturvedi [(2002) 6 SCC 635 and NIA Vs. Hilli MultipurposeCold Storage [2014 AIOL 4615] on the other in so far as thepower of the Courts to extend time for filing of writtenstatement/reply to a complaint is concerned. The earliermentioned line of decisions take the view that the relevantprovisions including those of Order 8 Rule 1 of the CivilProcedure Code, 1908 are directory in nature and the Courtsconcerned have the power to extend time for filing the writtenstatement. The second line of decisions which are also ofcoordinate Benches however takes a contrary view and holdthat when it comes to power of the Consumer Fora to extendthe time for filing a reply there is no such power.

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ASince the question that falls for determination here oftenarises before the Consumer Fora and Commissions all overthe country it will be more appropriate if the conflict is resolvedby an authoritative judgment. Further since the conflict isbetween Benches comprising three Judges we deem it fit torefer these appeals to a five-Judge Bench to resolve theBconflict once and for all. While we do so we are mindful ofthe fact that in the ordinary course a two-Judge Bench oughtto make a reference to a three-Judge Bench in the first placebut in the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping inview the fact that the conflict is between coordinate BenchesCcomprising three Judges a reference to three Judges may notsuffice.”

4. The other question has been referred by another Division Benchof this Court by an Order dated 18.01.2017 passed in this very appealbeing Civil Appeal No(s).10941-10942 of 2013, NIA Vs. HilliDMultipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd, the relevant portion of thejudgment is as under:

“……….what is the commencing point of the limitation of 30days stipulated in Section 13 of the Act is required to bedecided authoritatively. The declaration made in JJ Merchant’scase that the said period is to be reckoned from the date ofthe receipt of the notice by the opposite party or complaintunder the Act requires in our humble opinion, a more criticalanalysis.”

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5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at lengthFand have carefully gone through the records.

6. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the ConsumerProtection Act, in paragraph 4, it has been specifically provided that theConsumer Protection Act is “To provide speedy and simple redressalto consumer disputes, a quasi-judicial machinery is sought to beGset up at the district, State and Central levels…….”. The Preambleof the Consumer Protection Act also mentions that the Act is “to providefor better protection of the interests of the consumers”. Thenomenclature of this Act also goes to show that it is for the benefit orprotection of the consumer. From the above, it is evident that theConsumer Protection Act has been enacted to provide for expeditious H

disposal of consumer disputes and that, it is for the protection and benefitof the consumer.

7. Before we proceed to analyse and determine the questionsreferred, we may, for ready reference, reproduce the relevant provisionsof the Consumer Protection Act and its Regulations.

“Section 13. Procedure on admission of complaint. –

(1) The District Forum shall, on admission of a complaint, ifit relates to any goods,- (a) refer a copy of the admitted complaint, within twenty-onedays from the date of its admission to the opposite partymentioned in the complaint directing him to give his versionof the case within a period of thirty days or such extendedperiod not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by theDistrict Forum.

(b) ………………….

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(e) ………………….

(f) ………………….

(g) ………………….

(2) The District Forum shall, if the complaints admitted by itunder section 12 relates to goods in respect of which theprocedure specified in sub-section (1) cannot be followed, orif the complaint relates to any services,- (a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite partydirecting him to give his version of the case within a period ofthirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen daysas may be granted by the District Forum; (b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of thecomplaint, referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputesthe allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or failsto take any action to represent his case within the time given A

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by the District Forum, the District Forum shall proceed tosettle consumer dispute,-

(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by thecomplainant and the opposite party, where the opposite partydenies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint,Bor

(ii) ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice bythe complainant where the opposite party omits or fails totake any action to represent his case within the time given bythe Forum; C

(c) where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearingbefore the District Forum, the District Forum may eitherdismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits.

(3) No proceedings complying with the procedure laid downin sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be called in question in anyDcourt on the ground that the principles of natural justice havenot been complied with.

1[(3A) Every complaint shall be heard as expeditiously aspossible and endeavour shall be made to decide the complaintwithin a period of three months from the date of receipt ofEnotice by opposite party where the complaint does not requireanalysis or testing of commodities and within five months, ifit requires analysis or testing of commodities:

Provided that no adjournment shall be ordinarilygranted by the District Forum unless sufficient cause is shownFand the reasons for grant of adjournment have been recordedin writing by the Forum:

Provided further that the District Forum shall make suchorders as to the costs occasioned by the adjournment as maybe provided in the regulations made under this Act.

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Provided also that in the event of a complaint beingdisposed of after the period so specified, the District Forumshall record in writing, the reasons for the same at the time ofdisposing of the said complaint.]

H1 Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 15-3-2003).

2[(3B) Where during the pendency of any proceeding beforethe District Forum, it appears to it necessary, it may passsuch interim order as is just and proper in the facts andcircumstances of the case.]

(4) For the purposes of this section, the District Forum shallhave the same powers as are vested in a civil court underCode of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suitin respect of the following matters, namely:—

(i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of anydefendant or witness and examining the witness on oath;

(ii) the discovery and production of any document or othermaterial object producible as evidence;

(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;

(iv) the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysisor test from the appropriate laboratory or from any otherrelevant source;

(v) issuing of any commission for the examination of anywitness, and

(vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.

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Section 15.Appeal. — Any person aggrieved by an order madeby the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such orderto the State Commission within a period of thirty days fromthe date of the order, in such form and manner as may beprescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain anappeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it issatisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it withinthat period;

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Provided further that no appeal by a person, who isrequired to pay any amount in terms of an order of the DistrictForum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unlessthe appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fiftyper cent. of that amount or twenty-five thousand rupees,whichever is less.”

Section-19. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by an order madeby the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferredby sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer anappeal against such order to the National Commission withina period of thirty days from the date of the order in such formand manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the National Commission may entertain anappeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it issatisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it withinthat period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who isrequired to pay any amount in terms of an order of the StateCommission, shall be entertained by the National Commissionunless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed mannerfifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand,whichever is less.

Section-24A. Limitation period.

(1) The District Forum, the State Commis-sion or the NationalCommission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed withintwo years from the date on which the cause of action hasarisen.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), acomplaint may be entertained after the period specified insub-section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum,the State Commission or the National Commission, as the casemay be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaintwithin such period:

Provided that no such complaint shall be entertainedunless the National Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons forcondoning such delay.”

Relevant Provisions of the Consumer Protection Regulations,2005 are reproduced below:

“Reg.-10. Issue of notice.-(1) Whenever the Consumer Forumdirects the issuance of a notice in respect of a complaint,appeal or revision petition, as the case may be, to the oppositeparty(ies)/respondent(s), ordinarily such notice shall be issuedfor a period of 30 days and depending upon the circumstancesof each case even for less than 30 days.

(2) When there is a question of raising presumption of service,30 days notice shall be required.

(3) Whenever notices are sought to be effected by a courierservice, it shall be ascertained that the courier is of repute.

(4) Whenever appointing the courier for the purpose ofeffecting service, security deposit may also be taken.

(5) Along with the notice, copies of the complaint,memorandum of grounds of appeal, petitions as the case maybe and other documents filed shall be served upon the oppositeparty(ies)/respondent(s).

(6) After the opposite party or respondent has put inappearance, no application or document shall be receivedby the Registrar unless it bears an endorsement that a copythereof has been served upon the other side.”

Reg.-14. Limitation.

(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 15, 19 and 24A, theperiod of limitation in the following matters shall be asfollows:-

(i) Revision Petition shall be filed within 90 days from thedate of the order or the date of receipt of the order as thecase may be; A

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(ii) Application for setting aside the ex parte order under sec-tion 22A or dismissal of the complaint in default shall bemaintainable if filed within thirty days from the date of theorder or date of receipt of the order, as the case may be;

(iii) An application for review under sub-section (2) of sec-tion 22 shall be filed to the National Commission within 30days from the date of the order or receipt of the order, as thecase may be;

(iv) The period of limitation for filing any application forwhich no period of limitation has been specified in the Act,the rules of these regulations shall be thirty days from thedate of the cause of action or the date of knowledge.

(2) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Consumer Forummay condone the delay in filing an application or a petitionreferred to in sub-regulation (1) if valid and sufficient reasonsto its satisfaction are given.

Reg.-26. Miscellaneous.

(1) In all proceedings before the Consumer Forum, endeavourshall be made by the parties and their counsel to avoid theuse of provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):

Provided that the provisions of the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 may be applied which have been referred toin the Act or in the rules made thereunder.

(2) ………………..

(3) ………………..

(4) ………………..

(5) ………………..

(6) ………………..”

Question No. 1:Whether the District Forum has power toextend the time for filing of response to the complaintbeyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days, as

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. v. HILLI MULTIPURPOSECOLD STORAGE PVT. LTD. [VINEET SARAN, J.]

envisaged under Section 13(2)(a) of the ConsumerProtection Act?

8. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it clearthat the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the opposite party, isto be with the direction to give his version of (or response to) the case(or complaint) within a period of 30 days. It further provides that suchperiod of 30 days can be extended by the District Forum, but not beyond15 days.

9. Sub-Section 2(b)(i) of Section 13 of the Act provides for acomplaint to be decided on the basis of the response by the oppositeparty and the evidence of the complainant and the opposite party, whereallegations contained in the complaint are denied or disputed by theopposite party. Sub-Section 2(b)(ii) of Section 13 of the Act providesthat where no response is filed by the opposite party, the complaint maybe decided ex parte on the basis of evidence brought forth by thecomplainant.

10. Sub-Section 2(c) of Section 13 of the Consumer ProtectionAct further provides that where the complainant fails to appear on thedate of hearing before the District Forum, the District Forum may eitherdismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits. The aforesaidprovision [sub-Section 2(c)] was inserted by Act 62 of 2002, w.e.f.15.03.2003. Similarly, Section (3A) of Section 13 of the ConsumerProtection Act, which was also inserted by Act 62 of 2002, provides fordeciding every complaint as expeditiously as possible and endeavourshall be made to decide the complaint within a period of three monthsfrom the receipt of notice by the opposite party, and within five months,if the complaint requires analysis or testing of commodities. It alsoprovides that no adjournment shall ordinarily be granted by the DistrictForum, and if the same is to be granted, costs may be imposed, andfurther that reasons be recorded if the complaint is disposed of after thetime so provided.

11. From the above, it is clear that as mentioned in the Statementof Objects and Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the DistrictForum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer disputes. The samehas been further reiterated by the legislature by insertion of Section13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002.

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A12. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearlycontemplates where time can be extended by the District Forum, andwhere it is not to be extended. Like, under sub-Section (3A) of Section13, despite the best efforts of the District Forum, in situations where thecomplaint cannot be decided within the period specified therein, the samecan be decided beyond the specified period for reasons to be recordedBin writing by the District Forum at the time of disposing of the complaint.Meaning thereby that the same would not be mandatory, but onlydirectory. The phrase “endeavour shall be made”, makes the intentionof the legislature evident that the District Forum is to make every effortto decide the case expeditiously within time, but the same can also beCdecided beyond the said period, but for reasons to be recorded.

13. On the contrary, sub-Section (2)(a) of Section 13 of theConsumer Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give hisresponse ‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period notexceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’. TheDintention of the legislature seems to be very clear that the opposite partywould get the time of 30 days, and in addition another 15 days at thediscretion of the Forum to file its response. No further discretion ofgranting time beyond 45 days is intended under the Act.

The question of natural justice is dealt with by the legislature inEsub-Section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, whichclearly provides that “No proceedings complying with the procedurelaid down in the sub-Section (1) and (2) shall be called in questionin any court on the ground that the principles of natural justicehave not been complied with.” The legislature was conscious that thecomplaint would result in being decided ex parte, or without the responseFof the opposite party, if not filed within such time as provided under theConsumer Protection Act, and in such a case, the opposite party will notbe allowed to take the plea that he was not given sufficient time or thatprinciples of natural justice were not complied with. Any otherinterpretation would defeat the very purpose of sub-Section (3) of SectionG13 of the Consumer Protection Act.

14. The maximum period of 45 days, as provided under theConsumer Protection Act, would not mean that the complainant has aright to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to file its response.Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 clearlyHprovides that ordinarily such notice to the opposite party to file its response shall be issued for a period of 30 days, but the same can be even lessthan 30 days, depending upon the circumstances of each case.

15. Now, reverting back to the provisions of the ConsumerProtection Act to consider as to whether the provision of sub-Section2(a) of Section 13 granting a maximum period of 15 days in addition to30 days has to be read as mandatory or not, we may also consider theother provisions of the Consumer Protection Act where the legislatureintended to allow extension of period of limitation.

Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for filing ofan appeal from the order of the District Forum to the State Commissionwithin a period of 30 days. However, it leaves a discretion with theState Commission to entertain an appeal filed after the expiry of the saidperiod of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for notfiling it within the stipulated period. Similarly, discretion for filing an appealbefore the National Commission beyond the period of 30 days has alsobeen provided under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act.

Section 24A provides for the limitation period of 2 years for filingthe complaint. However, sub-Section (2) of Section 24A gives a discretionto entertain a complaint even after the period of 2 years, if there is asatisfactory cause for not filing the complaint within such period, whichhas to be recorded in writing.

16. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005also deals with limitation. In addition, the same provides for limitationwhile dealing with appeals (under Section 15 and 19) and complaint(under Section 24A). Sub-Regulation (2) of Regulation 14 provides forcondonation of delay for sufficient reasons to be recorded.

17. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of complaintor appeals beyond the period specified under the relevant provisions ofthe Act and Regulations, if there is sufficient cause given by the party,which has to be to the satisfaction of the concerned authority. No suchdiscretion has been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the ConsumerProtection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the extendedperiod of 45 days (30 days plus 15 days). Had the legislature not wantedto make such provision mandatory but only directory, the provision forfurther extension of the period for filing the response beyond 45 dayswould have been provided, as has been provided for in the cases of filingof complaint and appeals. To carve out an exception in a specific provision A

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Aof the statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is sodone, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into the statute,which is not permissible.

By specifically enacting a provision under sub-Section (3) ofSection 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the principles ofBnatural justice shall not be called in question where the procedureprescribed under sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 of the ConsumerProtection Act has been followed or complied with, the intention of thelegislature is clear that mere denial of further extension of time for filingthe response (by the opposite party) would not amount to denial or violationof the principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3)Creinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act.

18. This Court in the case of Lachmi Narain vs Union of India(1976) 2 SCC 953 has held that “if the provision is couched inprohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the useof peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative ofDthe interest that the provision is to be mandatory”. Further, hardshipcannot be a ground for changing the mandatory nature of the statute, ashas been held by this Court in Bhikraj Jaipurai vs Union of India AIR1962 SC 113=(1962) 2 SCR 880 and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd.Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC 472. Hardship cannot thus be a ground Eto interpret the provision so as to enlarge the time, where the statuteprovides for a specific time, which, in our opinion, has to be complied inletter and spirit.

This Court, in the case of Rohitash Kumar vs Om PrakashSharma (2013) 11 SCC 451 has, in paragraph 23, held as under:F

“23. There may be a statutory provision, which causes greathardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, orto an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce itin full rigor. It is a well settled principle of interpretation thathardship or inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basisGto alter the meaning of the language employed by thelegislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal ofthe statute. If the language is plain and hence allows onlyone meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if itcauses hardship or possible injustice.”

While concluding, it was observed “that the hardship caused to anindividual, cannot be a ground for not giving effective andgrammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the languageused therein, is unequivocal.”

Further, it has been held by this Court in the case of Popat BahiruGovardhane vs Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC765 that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but ithas to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes andthat the Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitablegrounds, even if the statutory provision may cause hardship orinconvenience to a particular party.

19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent isthat by not leaving a discretion with the District Forum for extending theperiod of limitation for filing the response before it by the opposite party,grave injustice would be caused as there could be circumstances beyondthe control of the opposite party because of which the opposite partymay not be able to file the response within the period of 30 days or theextended period of 15 days. In our view, if the law so provides, the samehas to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of the statute. It iswell settled that law prevails over equity, as equity can only supplementthe law, and not supplant it.

This Court, in the case of Laxminarayan R. Bhattad vs State ofMaharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413,has observed that “when there is aconflict between law and equity the former shall prevail.” In P.M.Latha vs State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 541, this Court held that“Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be applied andinterpreted equitably, but equity cannot override written or settledlaw.” In Nasiruddin vs Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577,thisCourt observed that “in a case where the statutory provision is plainand unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a differentmanner, only because of harsh consequences arising therefrom.”In E. Palanisamy vs Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC 123, it was held that“Equitable considerations have no place where the statute containedexpress provisions.” Further, in India House vs Kishan N. Lalwani(2003) 9 SCC 393,this Court held that “The period of limitationstatutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot berelaxed or departed from by equitable considerations.”

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AIt is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act is clearand unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation on equitableground.

20. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’. But in thesame breath it is also said that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’. TheBlegislature has chosen the latter, and for a good reason. It goes with theobjective sought to be achieved by the Consumer Protection Act, whichis to provide speedy justice to the consumer. It is not that sufficient timeto file a response to the complaint has been denied to the opposite party.It is just that discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30days period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same haveCbeen provided under Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer ProtectionAct. It may be that in some cases the opposite party could face hardshipbecause of such provision, yet for achieving the object of the Act, whichis speedy and simple redressal of consumer disputes, hardship whichmay be caused to a party has to be ignored.D

21. It has been further contended that the language of Section13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is pari materia to Order VIIIRule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘the Code’) andif time can be extended for filing of written submission in a suit under theaforesaid provision of the Code, the same would apply to the filing ofEresponse to complaint under the Consumer Protection Act as well, andhence the provision of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Actwould be directory and not mandatory.

In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation 26 of theConsumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that endeavourFis to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the Code except forsuch provisions, which have been referred to in the Consumer ProtectionAct and the Regulations framed thereunder, which is provided for inrespect of specific matters enumerated in Section 13(4) of the ConsumerProtection Act. It is pertinent to note that non-filing of written statementunder Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code is not followed by any consequenceGof such non-filing within the time so provided in the Code.

Now, while considering the relevant provisions of the Code, it isnoteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days provided under OrderVIII Rule 1 is actually not meant to be mandatory, but only directory.H

Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that where written statement is not filedwithin the time provided under Order VIII Rule 1 “the court shallpronounce the judgment against him, or make such order in relationto the suit as it thinks fit”. A harmonious construction of these provisionsis clearly indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court togrant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may be inexceptional cases. On the other hand, sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) of Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for the consequenceof the complaint to be proceeded ex parte against the opposite party, ifthe opposite party omits or fails to represent his case within the timegiven.

It may further be noted that in Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code,for suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a proviso hasbeen inserted for ‘commercial disputes of a specified value’ (vide Act4 of 2016 w.r.e.f. 23.10.2015), which reads as under:

“Provided further that no Court shall make an Order toextend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filingthe written statement”

From the above, it is clear that for commercial suits, time for filingwritten statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is meant to bemandatory, but not so for ordinary civil suits. Similarly, in our consideredview, for cases under the Consumer Protection Act also, the time providedunder Section 13(2)(a) of the Act has to be read as mandatory, and notdirectory.

Once consequences are provided for not filing the response tothe complaint within the time specified, and it is further provided thatproceedings complying with the procedure laid down under sub Section(1) and (2) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act shall not becalled in question in any Court on the ground that the principles of naturaljustice have not been complied with, the intention of the legislature isabsolutely clear that the provision of sub-Section 2(a) of Section 13 ofthe Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to the complaintis mandatory, and not directory.

22. After noticing that there were delays in deciding the complaintsby the District Forum, the legislature inserted sub-Section (3A) of Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act providing for a time limit for decidingthe complaints. From this it is amply clear that the intention of the A

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Alegislature was, and has always been, for expeditious disposal of thecomplaints. By providing for extension of time for disposal of the casesfiled, for reasons to be recorded, the legislature has provided for adiscretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension of thetime can be provided for, and where such further extension is not to begranted [as in the case of Section 13(2)(a)], the legislature hasBconsciously not provided for the same, so as to achieve the object of theAct.

23. In SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs K.S.Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) 12 SCC 210,this Court, was dealing with a case relating to the filing of written statementCunder the Code, in respect of a case under the Commercial Courts Act,2015. After noticing the amendments brought in Order V Rule 1, OrderVIII Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code with regard to‘commercial disputes of specified value’ under the Commercial CourtsAct, 2015 by way of insertion of the Provisos in the aforesaid provisions,Dthis Court held that “….the clear, definite and mandatory provisionsof Order V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot becircumvented by recourse to the inherent power under Section 151to do the opposite of what is stated therein”. It was, thus, held thatthere was no scope for enlarging the time for filing of written statementbeyond the period of 120 days in commercial suits, as the provision withEregard to such suits would be mandatory, and not directory. The saidjudgment has been affirmed by a Bench of three Judges in Desh Raj vsBalkishan decided on 20.01.2020 in Civil Appeal No.433 of 2020.

24. In Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11SCC 472, this Court was dealing with the provisions of the Special CourtF(Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, andthe question was whether the Special Court has power to condone thedelay in filing the petition under Section 4(2) of the said Act. Whileholding, that the said provision would be mandatory, it was held inparagraph 13 as under:G“13. It is not for the courts to determine whether the periodof 30 days is too short to take into account the variousmisfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who wishto file objections under Section 4(2) of the Act nor can thesection be held to be directory because of such allegedHinadequacy of time.”

Then, after considering the decisions of this Court in Topline ShoesLtd. vs. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33and Dr. J. J. Merchantvs. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635, this Court held that “theperiod for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in the Act is amandatory provision given the language of the Section and havingregard to the objects sought to be served by the Act.”

25. Certain other cases, which have been referred to by thelearned Counsel for the parties, have, in our considered opinion, no directbearing on the facts and issue involved in the present case relating to theConsumer Protection Act, and thus, the same are not being dealt withand considered here.

26. We may now deal with the decisions rendered by this Court,which have been referred to in the Reference Order.

27. Division Bench of this Court has referred this Question, afterobserving that there is an apparent conflict between the decisions of thisCourt in Topline Shoes (supra); Kailash Vs. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC480 and Salem Advocate Bar Association vs. Union of India (2005)6 SCC 344 on the one hand; and Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra)and NIAvs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (2015) 16 SCC 22,on the otherhand.

28. In Topline Shoes (supra), a Division Bench of this Court,while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the ConsumerProtection Act, has held that the said provision would be directory andnot mandatory. While holding so, the Bench relied on the principles ofnatural justice, and also that no consequence of non-filing of the responseto the complaint within 45 days is provided for in the Consumer ProtectionAct.

In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court held:

“It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all factsand circumstances along with the provisions of the Actproviding time-frame to file reply, as a guideline and then toexercise its discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justiceand achieve the object of speedy disposal of such caseskeeping in mind the principles of natural justice as well”.

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AIt is true that in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasonsof the Consumer Protection Act, the legislature provided that “quasi–judicial bodies will observe the principles of natural justice”,however, the same is to be observed generally, and not where the sameis specifically excluded. In the said judgment, sub-Section (3) of Section13 has neither been referred, nor taken note of. The same mandatesBthat no proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13 shall be called in question in any Courton the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been compliedwith. From this it is evident that while considering the provisions ofSection 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, the law mandates thatCthe principles of natural justice cannot be said to be violated by adoptingthe said procedure and that the time of 30 days plus 15 days provided forfiling the response to the complaint would be sufficient and final.

In case of Topline Shoes (supra), this Court was also of theview that in the Consumer Protection Act, “no consequence is providedDin case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total period of 45days”. While observing so, the Bench did not take into account theprovisions of Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, whichprovides that where the opposite party fails to file response to the complaintwithin the specified time provided in Clause (a), “the District Forumshall proceed to settle the consumer dispute……… on the basis ofEevidence brought to its notice by the complainant……..”. After thesaid judgment, by Amendment Act 62 of 2002 (w.e.f. 15.03.2003), thelegislature has provided that the District Forum shall proceed to settlethe consumer dispute “ex parte on the basis of the evidence”. Theword “ex parte” has been added by the Amending Act. As we haveFobserved herein above, the consequence of not filing the response to thecomplaint within the stipulated time is thus clearly provided for in theaforesaid sub-Section, which has not been noticed by the Bench whiledeciding the aforesaid case.

29. In the case of Kailash vs. Nanhku (supra), this Court wasGdealing with an election trial under the Representation of People Act,1951, and while considering the provision under Order VIII Rule 1 ofthe Code, it held the same to be directory, and not mandatory. Whileholding so, the Court was of the view that “the consequences flowingfrom non-extension of time are not specifically provided” in the Code.The decision in the said case has no bearing on the question underH

consideration, as the present reference before us is under the ConsumerProtection Act, where, as we have already observed, consequences arespecifically provided for.

Analysis

In passing, in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the Bench referredto the case of Topline Shoes(supra), where the provision of Section 13of the Consumer Protection Act was considered to be directory, and notmandatory. In our view, the same would not have the effect of affirmingthe decision of Topline Shoes (supra) since the Court, in the aforesaidcase, was dealing with the provisions of the Code and not the specificprovisions of Consumer Protection Act.

We are thus of the opinion that Kailash vs Nanhku (supra) hasnot overruled the decision in Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) with regard tothe provision of the Consumer Protection Act.

30. Again, in the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association(supra), this Court was dealing with a case under Order VIII Rule 1 ofthe Code and in paragraph 20, it has been held as under:

“20.………The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicativeof mandatory nature of the provision but having regard tothe context in which it is used or having regard to the intentionof the legislation, the same can be construed as directory.The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice andnot to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advancethe cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of therule or procedure which promotes justice and preventsmiscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure arethe handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the presentcontext, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.”

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to refer to the provisions of OrderVIII Rule 1, along with Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code. On a harmoniousconstruction of the said provision, it held that the provisions of OrderVIII Rule 1 of the Code would be directory, and not mandatory. Relevantparagraph 21 of the said judgment is below:

“21. In construing this provision, support can also be hadfrom Order 8 Rule 10 which provides that where any partyfrom whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 orRule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or A

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Afixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment againsthim, or make such other order in relation to the suit as itthinks fit. On failure to file written statement under thisprovision, the court has been given the discretion either topronounce judgment against the defendant or make such otherorder in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. In the context ofBthe provision, despite use of the word “shall”, the court hasbeen given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronouncethe judgment against the defendant even if the writtenstatement is not filed and instead pass such order as it maythink fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision ofCOrder 8 Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmoniousconstruction is required to be applied. The effect would bethat under Rule 10 Order 8, the court in its discretion wouldhave the power to allow the defendant to file written statementeven after expiry of the period of 90 days provided in Order8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10 that afterDexpiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. Thecourt has wide power to “make such order in relation to thesuit as it thinks fit”. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order8 Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file writtenstatement is directory”.

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As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the field withregard to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and would not be applicable tocases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2) of the ConsumerProtection Act, or such other enactment wherein a provision akin toSection 13(2) is there and the consequences are also provided.

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31. The case of Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra)is one relating to theprovisions of the Consumer Protection Act, and has been decided by aBench of three Judges of this Court (which is after the decision in thecase of Topline Shoes (supra) was rendered). In this case it has beenheld that the time limit prescribed for filing the response to the complaintGunder the Consumer Protection Act, as provided under Section 13(2)(a),is to be strictly adhered to, i.e. the same is mandatory, and not directory.In paragraph 13 of the said judgment, it has been held that:

“For having speedy trial, this legislative mandate of not givingmore than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the version of the case is required to be adhered to. If this is notadhered to, the legislative mandate of disposing of the caseswithin three or five months would be defeated.

In the said case of Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra),while holding thatthe time limit prescribed would be mandatory and thus be required to bestrictly adhered to, this Court also considered the Statement of Objectsand Reasons of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2002 (whichwas subsequently enacted as Act 62 of 2002 and has come in forcew.e.f. 15.03.2003). The salient features of the same was “to providesimple, inexpensive and speedy justice to the consumers……….”and that “the disposal of cases is to be faster” and after noticing that“several bottlenecks and shortcomings have also come to light inthe implementation of various provisions of the Act” and with a viewto achieve quicker disposal of consumer complaints, certain amendmentswere made in the Act, which included “(iii) prescribing the periodwithin which complaints are to be admitted, notices are to be issuedto opposite party and complaints are to be decided”. With this objectin mind, in sub-Section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13, the opening sentence“on the basis of evidence” has been substituted by “ex parte on thebasis of evidence”. By this amendment, consequences of not filing theresponse to the complaint within the specified limit of 45 days was to bethat the District Forum shall procced to settle the consumer dispute exparte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant,where the opposite party omits or fails to take action to represent hiscase within time. For achieving the objective of quick disposal ofcomplaints, the Court noticed that sub-Section (3A) of Section 13 wasinserted, providing that the complaint should be heard as expeditiouslyas possible and that endeavour should be made to normally decide thecomplaint within 3 months, and within 5 months where analysis or testingof commodities was required. The Provisos to the said sub-Sectionrequired that no adjournment should be ordinarily granted and if granted,it should be for sufficient cause to be recorded in writing and on impositionof cost, and if the complaint could not be decided within the specifiedperiod, reasons for the same were to be recorded at the time of disposingof the complaint.

It was after observing so, and considering aforesaid amendments,this Court held that the time limit of 30 plus 15 days in filing the responseto the complaint, be mandatory and strictly adhered to.

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32. The decision of another Bench of three Judges in NIA vsHilli Multipurpose Coldstorage (supra),which has been considered inthe referring order was passed by a bench of two Judges in the samecase, after noticing a conflict of views in the cases of Dr. J. J. Merchant(supra) and Kailash vs Nanhku (supra).

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“25. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment deliveredin J.J. Merchant holds the field and therefore, we reiteratethe view that the District Forum can grant a further period of15 days to the opposite party for filing his version or replyand not beyond that.

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D26. There is one more reason to follow the law laid down inJ.J. Merchant. J.J. Merchant was decided in 2002, whereasKailash was decided in 2005. As per law laid down by thisCourt, while dealing Kailash, this Court ought to haverespected the view expressed in J.J. Merchant as the judgmentdelivered in J.J. Merchant was earlier in point of time. TheEaforesaid legal position cannot be ignored by us and therefore,we are of the opinion that the view expressed in J.J. Merchantshould be followed.”

33. Although, after the above decision, no further reference wasrequired to be made, but still we have proceeded to answer the questionFreferred to this Constitution Bench and are of the considered opinionthat the view expressed by this Court in the case of Dr. J. J. Merchant(supra) is the correct view.

Question No. 2: What would be the commencing point oflimitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer ProtectionGAct, 1986?

34. The question for determination is whether the limitation underSection 13 of the Consumer Protection Act for filing the response by theopposite party to the complaint would commence from the date of receiptof the notice of the complaint by the opposite party, or the receipt ofHnotice accompanied by a copy of the complaint.

35. In paragraph 12 of the judgment dated 04.12.2015, of threeJudge Bench of this Court, in this very case of NIA vs. HilliMultipurpose Cold Storage (supra), while referring to the commencingpoint of limitation of 30 days under Section 13(2) of the ConsumerProtection Act, it has been held that “The whole issue centres roundthe period within which the opponent has to give his version to theDistrict Forum in pursuance of a complaint, which is admitted underSection 12 of the Act. Upon receipt of a complaint by the DistrictForum, if the complaint is admitted under Section 12 of the Act, acopy of the complaint is to be served upon the opposite party andas per the provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the opposite partyhas to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days fromthe date of receipt of the copy of the complaint.”

36. However, another two judge Bench of this Court, by an Orderdated 18.01.2017 passed in this very Appeal being Civil AppealNo(s).10941-10942 of 2013, NIA Vs. Hilli Multipurpose ColdStorage,has expressed the view that the declaration made in Dr. J. J.Merchant’scase to the effect that the said period is to be reckonedfrom the date of receipt of notice by the opposite party or complaintunder the Act,requires a more critical analysis. The bench thus opinedthat “what is the commencing point of the limitation of 30 daysstipulated in Section 13 of the Act is required to be decidedauthoritatively”. It is thus that this question has been placed before usfor an authoritative decision.

37. For deciding this question, we may first analyse the relevantprovisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framedthereunder. Sub-Sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of Section13 of the ConsumerProtection Act specify that it is the copy of the complaint which is togiven to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the casewithin a period of 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15days. As such, from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is thecopy of the admitted complaint which is to be served, after which theperiod to file the response would commence.

Further, Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection Regulations,2005 also specifies the procedure of issuing notice, which should beaccompanied by copy of the complaint. Regulation 10(5) clearly mentionsthat “along with the notice, copies of the complaint, memorandumof grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other A

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Adocuments filed shall be served upon the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s)”.The same would also make it clear that it is on serviceof a copy of the complaint that the period of limitation for filing theresponse by the opposite party shall commence.

38. Even in the Code of Civil Procedure, Order VIII Rule 1Bprescribes that the written statement shall be filed by the defendantwithin 30 days from the receipt of the “summons”. “Summons” hasbeen defined in Order V Rule 1 of the Code and Rule 2 provides that“Every summon shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint.”While considering the aforesaid provisions, a two judge Bench of thisCourt in the case of Nahar Enterprises vs Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd.C(2007) 9 SCC 466 has, in paragraph 8, 9 and 10, held as under:

(8) The learned counsel appears to be correct. When asummons is sent calling upon a defendant to appear in thecourt and file his written statement, it is obligatory on thepart of the court to send a copy of the plaint and otherDdocuments appended thereto, in terms of Order 5 Rule 2 CPC.

(9) Order 5 Rule 2 CPC reads as under:

“2. Copy of plaint annexed to summons. – Every summon shallbe accompanied by a copy of the plaint.”E(10) The learned Judge did not address itself the question asto how a defendant, in absence of a copy of the plaint andother documents, would be able to file his writtenstatement…………………….……..”

39. Even in Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, sub-SectionF(5) of Section 31 provides that “after the arbitral award is made, asigned copy shall be delivered to each party”. An application forsetting aside the arbitral award is to be made under Section 34 of thesaid Act. The delivery of the award sets in motion the limitation forchallenging the award under Section 34 of the said Act. While interpretingGthe nature and scope of Section 31(5) of the said Act, a three JudgeBench of this Court in Union of India vs Tecco Trichy Engineers &Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239, has, in paragraph 6, held as under:

(6) Form and contents of the arbitral award are provided bySection 31 of the Act. The arbitral award drawn up in the H

manner prescribed by Section 31 of the Act has to be signedand dated. According to sub-section (5), “after the arbitralaward is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party”.The term “party” is defined by clause (h) of Section 2 of theAct as meaning “a party to an arbitration agreement”. Thedefinition is to be read as given unless the context otherwiserequires. Under sub-section (3) of Section 34 the limitationof 3 months commences from the date on which “the partymaking that application” had received the arbitral award.

……………”

From the above, what we notice is that wherever limitation isprovided, either for filing response/written statement or filing an appeal,it is the copy of the plaint or the order/award which is to be served onthe party concerned after which alone would commence the period oflimitation.

40. Now reverting to the provisions of the Consumer ProtectionAct, a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (2) ofSection 13 would make the position absolutely clear that the commencingpoint of limitation of 30 days, under the aforesaid provisions, would befrom the date of receipt of notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint,and not merely receipt of the notice, as the response has to be given,within the stipulated time, to the averments made in the complaint andunless a copy of the complaint is served on the opposite party, he wouldnot be in a position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice,without service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannotbe the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of theAct. We may, however, clarify that the objection of not having receiveda copy of the complaint along with the notice should be raised on thefirst date itself and not thereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised atany point later would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is toprovide simple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes.

41. To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first questionis that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing theresponse to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days inaddition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the ConsumerProtection Act; and the answer to the second question is that thecommencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

[2020] 5 S.C.R.

AConsumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the noticeaccompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not merereceipt of the notice of the complaint.

This Judgment to operate prospectively.

The referred questions are answered accordingly.

B

Ankit Gyan

Reference answered

C

D

E

F

G

H