VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D) BY LRS. & ORS . versus ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS on 18 September 2019

VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

v.

ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 11774 of 2018)

SEPTEMBER 18, 2019

[R. F. NARIMAN, R. SUBHASH REDDYAND SURYA KANT, JJ.]

Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 –s.32-F(1)(a) – Amendment made in s. 32 F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969– Object and purpose of – Relevancy and applicability of theobject of Amendment made in s. 32-F(1)(a) by Act of 1969 forexercise of right to purchase by a tenant of a landlord who was awidow or suffering from mental or physical disability on Tillers’day – Held: Object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevant andapplicable in deciding the scope of the right to purchase by atenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from mentalor physical disability on Tillers’ day – Successor-in-interest of awidow is obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessationof interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his rightof purchase.

Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 –s. 32-F(1)(a) – Interpretation of – Literal interpretation or goldenrule of interpretation – By introduction of s 32-F by the AmendmentAct of 1956, tenant was given right to purchase where landlordwas minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physicaldisability within one year from the expiry of the period duringwhich such landlord was entitled to terminate the tenancy u/s. 31– However, number of tenants holding land from landlords whowere minors lost right to purchase land for their failure to giveintimation within the period laid down in sub-section (1-A) of s.32 – Thus, to give the tenants fresh opportunity to purchase land,s.32-F amended by Amendment Act 49 of 1969 – Words “and forenabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlordshall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attainedmajority, before the expiry of the period during which suchlandlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy u/s. 31, inserted into

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Asub section (1)(a) – Amendment to s.32-F(1)(a) expressly covereda case of landlord who was minor and has attained majority, butother two categories ‘widow or a person subject to mental orphysical not expressly included – Held: Literal reading of s. 32-F(1)(a) would lead to absurd situation – Draftsman forgot thatwhen the addition to s. 32-F(1)(a) was made, s. 32F(1)(a) referredBto three categories of landlords and not only one – Law mayrecognise degrees of harm, but in so doing the classification shouldnever be arbitrary, artificial or evasive – Classification made infavour of tenants of minor landlords as opposed to tenants oflandlords of the other two categories is arbitrary in nature – Thus,Csuch classification would ordinarily have to be struck down asbeing violative of Art. 14 – However, instead of striking down suchclassification as a whole, the words “..of the fact that he hasattained majority..”, can be striked down, as a result s. 32-F(1)(a)now ceases to be discriminatory, since it is applicable to tenantsof all three categories of landlords – Thus, in order to read s. 32-DF(1)(a) in conformity with Art. 14, the words “..of the fact that hehas attained majority..” is eliminated so that the intimation that isto be made by the landlord has to be made to tenants of all thethree categories of landlords covered by the provision –Interpretation of statutes – Constitution of India – Art.14.EMaharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 –s. 32-F(1)(a) – Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor,etc. – Construction of s. 32 F(1)(a) – Held: Cultivating tenant inall cases where the landlord is a minor, a widow or a personsubjected to a disability, does not statutorily become owner of theFagricultural land cultivated personally by him on Tillers’ Day –These three categories of landlords are deemed to cultivatepersonally through such tenant – In any of these three cases, themoment the disability ceases, the land no longer belongs to a minor,as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died ortransferred her share with permission u/s.63, or to a person whoseGmental or physical disability ceases – Such persons are grantedone year to apply for resumption of the land on the ground thatsuch persons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuantto which an application for possession of land u/s. 29 may thenbe made – In case this is done within the time prescribed, thetenant’s right to purchase does not fructify – Right of the tenant isHpostponed, only when this is not done within the period of one year.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The object of the Amendment Act of 1969 isrelevant and applicable in deciding the scope of the right topurchase by a tenant of a landlord who was a widow or sufferingfrom mental or physical disability on Tillers’ day. The successor-in-interest of a widow is obliged to send an intimation to thetenant of cessation of interest of the widow to enable the tenantto exercise his right of purchase. [Para 50] [630-C-E]

Conclusion

2.1 The Scheme of the Maharashtra Tenancy andAgricultural Lands Act, 1948, and in particular, the 1956Amendment, which introduced Tillers’ Day, is that an absenteelandlord’s rights in the land must give way to a cultivating tenant.Statutorily, on Tillers’ Day, the landlord is divested of title andthe tenant is vested with title to agricultural land which hecultivates by dint of his own effort. It is only in three cases thatsuch purchase becomes ineffective-if the tenant fails to appearwithin the time prescribed after notice is given to him, orappears and declines purchase, or if the tenant fails to pay theentire purchase price. The widow, the minor and the personsubject to a disability are placed on the same pedestal, andthroughout their widowhood, minority or period of disability aredeemed to cultivate the land personally through their tenants –the Explanation - I to Section 2(6) makes this clear. In the vastmajority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixeddate i.e. 1[st] April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where thelandlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability thatthis right of the tenant is postponed. It is important to note thatit is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenantbecomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1[st] April, 1957.Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned underSection 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased theland on such postponed date under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possessionmade by the landlord under Section 29 is finally rejected – a datethat is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Also, underthe circumstances prescribed under Section 32(1A), again thetenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on adate on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal in thecircumstances mentioned in the said sub-section. Again, under A

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Asub-section (1B), in the circumstances mentioned in the said sub-section, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemedpurchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, in all cases coveredby s. 32, the landlord is divested of his title either on Tillers’Day or on a postponed date which is to the knowledge of thetenant, as the said date is on and from a final order of a TribunalBor a Tahsildar, as the case may be. [Para 13] [600-H; 601-A-F]

2.2 Section 32-G is a very important pointer to the fact thata tenant must be put on notice in order that the purchase priceof land be determined by the Tribunal. This notice under Section32-G(1) is in the form of a public notice in the prescribed formCin each village. Apart from this, the Tribunal shall also issue anotice individually to each tenant calling upon him to appearbefore it on the date specified in the notice. The same is thecase of a tenant who is deemed to have purchased the land onthe postponed date under Section 32-G(5). Under Section 32-ODin respect of tenancies created after Tillers’ Day, a tenantcultivating personally shall be entitled, within one year from thecommencement of such tenancy, to purchase such land withinthe ceiling area. Under sub-section (1A), this right is to beexercised by giving an intimation in that behalf to the landlordand the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period ofEone year. This again is a date which is within the knowledge ofthe tenant as the period of one year is calculated from thecommencement of his tenancy. It can thus be seen that in thecase of postponed dates under Section 32 and the right of atenant in respect of tenancies created after Tillers’ Day, theFtenant is to exercise his statutory right knowing fully well thatif he does not do so within the prescribed period or does notpay purchase price, the purchase either becomes ineffective orthe right cannot be exercised. In all these cases, the tenantknows of the time within which he must exercise his rights. [Para14] [601-G-H; 602-A-D]G

2.3 Section 32-F was introduced by the Amendment Actof 1956 as part of a scheme of agrarian reform. The reason forthe non-obstante clause, with which the Section begins, is thatthe cultivating tenant in all cases where the landlord is a minor,a widow or a person subjected to a disability, does not statutorilyHbecome owner of the agricultural land cultivated personally by him on Tillers’ Day. This is for the reason that under Section2(6) Explanation- I, these three categories of landlords aredeemed to cultivate personally through such tenant. Theentitlement of terminating a tenancy under any one of these threecategories is contained in Section 31(3). In any of these threecases, the moment the disability ceases i.e. that the land inquestion no longer belongs to a minor, as he has become major,or to a widow, as she has died or transferred her share withpermission under Section 63, or to a person whose mental orphysical disability ceases, one year is granted for such personsto apply for resumption of the land on the ground that suchpersons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant towhich an application for possession of land under Section 29may then be made. In case this is done within the timeprescribed, the tenant’s right to purchase does not fructify. It isonly when this is not done within the period of one year, thepostponed right of the tenant springs into being. [Para 15] [602-D-H]

2.4 Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literalreading of Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had toexercise this right within a period of one year from the expiryof the one year spoken of in Section 31(3) of the Act. Literallyspeaking, therefore, even if the tenant does not know when theminor became major or when the widow died or transferred hershare, this right would cease on the expiry of one year. Realisingthat this would cause immense hardship for want of knowledgeof a special fact which is only within the landlord’s ken, thelegislature stepped in and amended Section 32-F. [Para 16 and17] [603-A-C]

2.5 Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasonsindicates that an amnesty scheme is necessary, in that a largenumber of tenants in the Bombay area who are minors have lostthe right to purchase as they have failed to give the necessaryintimation within the period laid down by statute. Under thisamnesty scheme, if a tenant held land from a landlord who wasa minor and who had obtained majority before thecommencement of the 1969 Amendment and no intimation hadbeen given, two years extra was given from the date ofcommencement of that Act in which such intimation may be AB

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574SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Agiven. This statutory object, reflected in paragraph 2 of theStatement of Objects and Reasons, is carried out by the provisoto sub-section (1A) inserted by the 1969 Amendment Act intoSection 32-F. The words ‘and for enabling the tenant to exercisethe right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation tothe tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before theBexpiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled toterminate the tenancy under Section 31, were inserted into subsection (1)(a). The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a)would show that the legislature, in keeping with the objectsought to be achieved statutorily divesting the landlord of hisCtitle and handing over the land to the cultivating tenant, cannotpossibly be achieved unless a special fact within the knowledgeof the landlord alone is first intimated to the tenant, so that hemay then, with knowledge that the minor landlord has now turnedmajor, meaningfully exercise his right of purchase under the Act.[Para 18, 19] [604-A-F]D

2.6 The vast majority of cases which came to the noticeof the legislature were cases of landlords who were minor at thetime of the 1956 Amendment Act and who turned major onlythereafter. The amnesty scheme contained in sub-section (1A),was, therefore, limited only to such cases. Unfortunately, theElegislature, when it inserted words into sub-section (1)(a) ofSection 32-F, appears to have forgotten that these words willgovern the right of tenants which has been postponed onaccount of a landlord’s disability. What appears to have beenmissed is the fact that, apart from minors, there are two otherFcategories mentioned in Section 32-F(1)(a), all of whom wouldstand on the same footing insofar as the tenant is concerned. Itwould be wholly anomalous for a tenant to be told that if hislandlord happened to be a minor who has attained majority later,he must first be intimated of this fact before he can meaningfully exercise his right of purchase; whereas to a tenant who isGsimilarly situate when the landlord is a widow, in which case nosuch intimation need be made, the tenant would suffer for nofault of his as the tenant would have no knowledge of the dateof death of the widow (which is a special fact known only to herfamily), such tenant’s right of purchase being extinguished byHtime. It seems that the draftsman of the 1969 Amendment was

overwhelmed with the amnesty scheme laid down in Section 32-F (1A), which then spilled over to the amendment made in Section32-F(1)(a), thereby unintentionally leaving out the two othercategories of landlords, where the same intimation needs to bemade to the tenant, as the death of the widow and/or the ceasingof disability are special facts known only to the landlord and hisfamily, just as in the case of a minor turning major. [Para 20][604-G-H; 605-A-C]

2.7 An absurd situation would be created by a literal readingof Section 32-F(1)(a). The landlord being a widow is protecteduntil her death. After her death, one year is given to hersuccessors in interest to exercise the right of resumption. Whenthis does not take place one year is granted from the expiry ofthis first one year to the tenant to exercise his statutory right.This cannot be done because the tenant does not know of thedeath of the widow. As a result, this very land which was notrequired by the landlord’s successors in interest for personalcultivation, goes back to the landlord under Section 32-P incases in which the landlord either has no land within the ceilinglimit or some land which does not exhaust the ceiling limit. Thisanomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reform onits head. Thus, it is to be seen whether the language of Section32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that theabsurdity mentioned and the discrimination between personswho are similarly situate be obviated. [Para 21] [605-D-F]

3. Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment,which is an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tillerof the soil statutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and,given the fact that the literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a)would be contrary to justice and reason and would lead to greathardship qua persons who are similarly circumstanced; as alsoto the absurdity of land going back to an absentee landlord whenhe has lost the right of personal cultivation, in the teeth of theobject of the 1956 Amendment, the words “.. of the fact that hehas attained majority..” are deleted. Without these words,therefore, the landlord belonging to all three categories has tosend an intimation to the tenant, before the expiry of the periodduring which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancyunder Section 31. [Para 36] [622-C-D]

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ATirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh & Ors. [1955] 2 SCR457 ; Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras [1958]SCR 739 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad BharatFinance Co. & Anr. [1966] Supp. SCR 473 ; BudhanSingh v. Nabi Bux [1970] 2 SCR 10 ; Commissionerof Income Tax, Central Calcutta v. National TajBTraders (1980) 1 SCC 370 : [1980] 2 SCR 268 ; K.P.Verghese v. ITO (1981) 4 SCC 173 : [1982] 1 SCR629 ; CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985) 4 SCC 343 : [1985] 2Suppl. SCR 711 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. KodaikanalMotor Union (P) Ltd. (1986) 3 SCC 91 : [1986] 2 SCRC927 ; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohanlal(1988) 2 SCC 513 : [1988] 3 SCR 384 ; Surjit SinghKalra v. Union of India (1991) 2 SCC 87 : [1991] 1SCR 364 ; C.W.S. (India) Limited v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 296 : [1994] 2 SCR247 ; Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000) 4DSCC 285 ; Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7SCC 273 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 324 – referred to.

Grey v. Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61 ; Salmon v.Duncombe (1886) 11 AC 627 – referred to.

E4. The law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doingthe classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.The Statement of the Objects and Reasons for the 1969Amendment have been referred. Paragraph 2 thereof stated thata large number of cases involving minor landlords had come tothe notice of the legislature, for which reason the amnestyFscheme mentioned in sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F wasenacted. However, what was forgotten by the draftsman whenthe addition to Section 32-F(1)(a) was made was the fact thatSection 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords andnot only one. The words added by the 1969 amendment thusGgave relief to tenants only qua minor landlords and not the othertwo categories. Obviously, the classification made in favour oftenants of minor landlords as opposed to tenants of landlords ofthe other two categories is a classification which is arbitrary innature. This being the case, such classification would ordinarilyhave to be struck down as being violative of Article 14 of theHConstitution of India. However, instead of striking down such classification as a whole, what can be done is to strike down thewords “..of the fact that he has attained majority..”, as a resultof which, what is added by the 1969 Amendment to Section 32-F(1)(a) now ceases to be discriminatory, as it is applicable totenants of all three categories of landlords. Thus, in order to readSection 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14, the words “..ofthe fact that he has attained majority..” is eliminated so that theintimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made totenants of all the three categories of landlords covered by theprovision. [Para 39, 40, 44] [624-G-H; 627-A-D; 627-H; 628-A]

Appa Narsappa v. Akubai Ganapati (1999) 4 SCC 453– overruled.

Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan(2008) 9 SCC 358 : [2008] 13 SCR 508 – partlyoverruled.

Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai(1995) 5 SCC 243 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 259 ; SudamGanpat Kutwl v. Shevantabai Tukaram (2006) 7 SCC200 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 682 – distinguished.

Hiralal P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora(2016) 10 SCC 165 : [2016] 9 SCR 515 ; Secretary,Mahatama Gandhi Mission v. Bhartiya Kamgar Sena(2017) 4 SCC 449 ; D.S. Nakara v. Union of India(1983) 1 SCC 305 : [ 1983] 2 SCR 165 – relied on.

5. The submission made based on Section 14(1)(a) thatsince a tenant is bound to pay the rent every year before the31[st] May thereof, the tenant is bound to know that the personto whom he is paying rent has since died and that, therefore,knowledge cannot be brought in to the construction of Section32-F need not detain this Court. On facts in the instant case,the landlady was actually at Mumbai, whereas the tenant was atRatnagiri. Also, Section 14(1)(b) makes it clear that in case thetenant fails to pay rent before the 31[st] May of every year, thelandlord must first give a three months’ notice in writinginforming the tenant that he has not so paid the rent, within whichperiod the tenant is given time to remedy the breach. On facts,there is nothing to show that any such notice was given. The AB

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Aother submission that in the agricultural village world everyoneknows about everybody else and that, therefore, it may beassumed that a villager at Ratnagiri will know about hislandlord’s death equally cannot apply on the facts of this caseas the landlord lived and died in Mumbai. The other submissionabout the reverse situation obtaining today as opposed to theBsituation obtaining in 1956, namely, that it is tenants who arenow well off and landlords who are poor is again a perceptionwhich has no bearing either on the facts of this case or the lawthat needs to be laid down. [Para 49] [629-G-H; 630-A-C]

6. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. As aCresult, the tenant’s intimation of purchase of 2008 will now betaken on record by the authorities under the Act, who may nowproceed under the Act to determine purchase price and itspayment consequent upon which the postponed right of thetenant in this case to own the land will then come into being uponDthe statutory conditions being met. [Para 50] [630-F-G]R.L. Arora v Union of India [1964] 6 SCR 784 ; ShriRam Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar[1959] SCR 279 ; In Re Special Courts Bill 1978(1979) 1 SCC 380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476 ; ShayaraEBano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [ 2017] 7SCR 797 ; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State ofBombay AIR 1959 SC 459 : [1959] Suppl. SCR 489 ;Amrit Bhikaji Kale v. Kashinath Janardhan Trade(1983) 3 SCC 437 : [1983] 3 SCR 237 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11774of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 01.08.2014 of the HighCourt of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 10304 of 2013.

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Civil Appeal Nos. 11775-11798 of 2018.

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AAniruddha Joshi, Mrs. Shubhangi Tuli, Advs. for the Appellants.Ajit S. Bhasme, Sr. Adv., Pankaj Kumar Mishra, ShashankMangle, A. Bhasme, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advs. forthe Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byB

R. F. NARIMAN, J.

1. This case has been referred to a Three Judge Bench by adetailed judgment of a Division Bench of this Court reported as VasantGanpat Padave v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (2019) 2 SCC 788. TheCrelevant facts that are necessary for determination of the controversybefore us are set out in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the referral order asfollows:

“3. One Balwant Sawant was landlord of Survey No. 92/2,corresponding to new Survey No. 31 Hissa No. 2/10,admeasuring about 0.01.3 H.R. at Village Padavewadi, Taluka& District Ratnagiri. Balwant Sawant died on 10-5-1950 leavingbehind Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant, his widow as his legal heirand representative. Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant, widowbecame the owner of the said property. Her name was mutatedin the revenue records. The Bombay Tenancy and AgriculturalLands Act, 1948 was amended by Act 15 of 1957. Section 32as amended provided that on 1-4-1957 (Tillers’ Day), everytenant shall be deemed to have purchased from the landlord freefrom all encumbrances the land held by him as a tenant. Thepredecessor of the appellants were tenants prior to 1956-1957i.e. prior to 1-4-1957. The proceedings for declaring the appellantsas purchaser under Section 32-G were initiated during the lifetimeof the landlady, Smt Indirabai Balwant Sawant but the mutationEntry No. 1341 recorded that since landlady Indirabai BalwantSawant is a widow, the proceedings as contemplated underSection 32-G are suspended. On 12-5-1975, Smt IndirabaiBalwant Sawant executed last will and testament in favour ofAnant Mahadev Sawant, Respondent 1. Smt Indirabai BalwantSawant died on 7-5-1999. The name of Respondent 1 wasmutated in the revenue records on 29-2-2000, with regard towhich no notice was issued to the appellants, hence they werenot aware of either the death of Indirabai or mutation in favourof Respondent 1.

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4. In the year 2008, when the appellants came to know that thelandlady has died and in her place, name of Respondent 1 hasbeen mutated, they filed an application on 5-9-2008 beforeRespondent 2 — Additional Tahsildar & A.L.T. Ratnagiri,Maharashtra for fixing the purchase price under Section 32-Gof the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948(hereinafter referred to as “the 1948 Act”). Respondent 1 filedreply and opposed the said application. Respondent 2 allowed theapplication of the appellants by order dated 9-9-2011. Respondent2 held that predecessors of the appellants were tenants prior to1956-1957. Proceedings under Section 32-G for declaring theappellants as purchasers were initiated during the lifetime of thelandlady and the same were suspended on 8-1-1964 during thelifetime of the landlady being a widow. Respondent 2 fixed thepurchase price and directed the appellants to deposit the sameto enable issue of sale certificate in favour of the appellants.Aggrieved against the order dated 9-9-2011, Respondent 1 filedan appeal under Section 74 of the 1948 Act before Respondent3, Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. Respondent 3allowed the appeal vide its order dated 8-1-2013. Respondent 3held that the appellant ought to have issued notice under Section32-F within the time as prescribed and no notice having beenissued within the time as prescribed, the appellants have lost rightof purchase.

5. The appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Sub-DivisionalOfficer, filed a revision application before the MaharashtraRevenue Tribunal. There were other revisions filed by severalother tenants who were aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by acommon order dated 20-4-2013 dismissed the revisions andconfirmed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. TheMaharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that applicants were underlegal obligation to give intimation expressing their desire topurchase within time stipulated under Section 32-F, which havingnot been given, no right of purchase is available to applicants.Aggrieved against the judgment of the Maharashtra RevenueTribunal, writ petitions were filed by the appellants and severalother similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions weredismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari AB

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Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these appealshave been filed.”

2. After setting out various provisions of the MaharashtraTenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to asB“the Act”), as amended, and after referring to various judgments ofthis Court dealing, in particular, with Section 32-F of the Act, theDivision Bench then stated:

“30. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments can be restated inthe following words:

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30.1. For a landlord suffering from a disability on the Tillers’ Dayi.e. 1-4-1957, the deemed purchase shall be suspended.

30.2. Landlord suffering from a disability has a right underSection 31(3) of the Act to give notice of termination of tenancyand file an application for possession.

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30.3. Under Section 31(3), a minor, within one year from thedate on which he attains majority; a successor-in-title of a widowwithin one year from the date on which her interest in the landceases to exist; and landlord within one year from the date onwhich his/her mental or physical disability ceases to exist, canalso give an application for termination of tenancy and possession.

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30.4. Under Section 32-F, tenant has right to purchase wherelandlord was minor or a widow or a person subject to mental orphysical disability within one year from the expiry of the periodduring which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancyFunder Section 31.

30.5. The tenant, in event, does not exercise his right of purchasewithin the period as prescribed under Section 32-F(1)(a), his/herright to purchase shall be lost.

31. In the present case, it is undisputed fact that the landladydied on 7-5-1999 and within one year thereafter her successor-in-title did not exercise his right under Section 31(3) and thereafterwithin one year tenant has not given any intimation for purchaseas contemplated by Section 32-F. The question to be answeredis as to whether in the above facts, the Sub-Divisional Officer,Revenue Tribunal as well as the High Court were right in their G

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conclusion that right of the tenant i.e. the appellant has lost, hehaving not issued any intimation for purchase of the land withinone year from expiry of the period as contemplated under Section31(3).

32. The ratio of this Court as noticed above, especially in thejudgments of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum [AppaNarsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4SCC 443] , Sudam Ganpat Kutwal [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v.Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] andTukaram Maruti Chavan [Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. MarutiNarayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358] , clearly supports thesubmission of the learned counsel for the respondents that theappellants having not exercised their right to purchase underSection 32-F(1) read with Section 32-F(1-A) within the timeprescribed, the right of purchase of the tenant is lost. But thereis one aspect of the matter which needs to be noted and has notbeen considered in the above judgments rendered by two-JudgeBenches of this Court which we shall notice hereinafter.”

The Division Bench then laid emphasis upon the Statement ofObjects and Reasons to the 1969 Amendment of the 1948 Act andopined:

“37. Amendment in Section 32-F(1)(a) added by Act 49 of 1969expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor and hasattained majority. Intimation by a minor landlord who has attainedmajority has been made a statutory obligation of the landlord sothat tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other twocategories which are a widow or a person subject to mental orphysical disability have not been expressly included in theamendment incorporated by Act 49 of 1969. The Statement ofObjects and Reasons of the amendment given in 1969 as wellas the express provisions of such amendment are for the purposesand object to enable the tenant to exercise right of purchase.When for one category of landlord i.e. minor it is mandated thathe will intimate the tenant after he attained the majority so thattenant may be enabled to exercise the right of purchase, we areof the view that the same object has to be read in two othercategories of landlord that is the successor-in-title of a widowand a landlord whose mental or physical disability has been A

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ceased. When the legislative object is to facilitate a tenant of adisabled landlord after cessation of disability to exercise right ofpurchase, the same benefit needs to be extended to other twocategories of disabled landlord. We do not find any distinction inthree categories of disabled landlords nor tenant of a landlordwho was a minor can be put on any higher footing as comparedto other landlords suffering from the above two disabilities. Thequestion may be asked that amendment only expressly includedthe landlord who has attained majority to send intimation and thelegislature consciously did not include the other two categoriesof landlord i.e. successor-in-interest of a widow and landlord ofa mental and physical disability ceases to exist. The Objects andReasons and express amendment made by Act 49 of 1969 werewith a view to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase.The said legislative intendment is to be extended to all tenantsof landlords who were suffering from disability on the Tillers’Day, whether successor-in-title of a widow or a landlord whosemental or physical disability ceases. All the three categories oftenants should be extended the same benefit and provision shouldbe interpreted so that all tenants may be enabled to exercise theirright of purchase effectively and in real sense.

38. As in the present case, the tenant’s case is that he wasunaware of the death of the landlady since for the last severalyears she was living in Bombay, the date of knowledge of deathof the landlady cannot be said to be an irrelevant factor andunless the tenant is aware of the death of landlady or in case oflandlord suffering from physical or mental disability, how he willexercise his right of purchase, is an important question. The 1948Act and the amendments made by the 1969 Act were with intentto facilitate tenants to exercise their right. The amendments byAct 15 of 1957 was agrarian reform making tillers of the soilthe owners of the land which was done to achieve the object ofmaking all tillers of the soil as owners of the land. Whileinterpreting the provisions of Section 32-F(1-A) as well as Section31(3), the purpose and object of the 1948 Act, amendments madetherein from time to time cannot be lost sight off.

39. When Section 32-F of the 1948 Act gives right to purchaseto a tenant whose landlord was suffering from a disability onTillers’ Day, the exercise of right to purchase by such tenant has to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the exercise of rightmeaningful and effective. The abovesaid right cannot be defeatedon the ground that it was not exercised within the periodprescribed when the tenant is unaware as to when the periodhas begun.

40. The period prescribed for exercising the right to purchase isnot a period of limitation but a reasonable period prescribed forthe exercise of a right. The knowledge of cessation of disabilityof landlord by the tenant can only be commencement of theperiod prescribed.

41. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute needs to beinterpreted in a manner so as to make the right workable,effective and meaningful. Such right cannot be defeated unlessit is proved that tenant, even after knowing that disability hasceased, does not exercise his right within the period prescribed.

42. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in AppaNarsappa Magdum [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. AkubaiGanapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] has expressly rejectedthe submission that tenant had no intimation of the death oflandlady. Further judgments of this Court in Sudam GanpatKutwal [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai TukaramGulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] and Tukaram Maruti Chavan[Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008)9 SCC 358] also laid down the same ratio. The judgments in theabove three cases were rendered by the two-Judge Benches inwhich cases the amendments made by Act 49 of 1969 wereneither raised nor considered. We, thus, are of the view that theratio laid down in the above cases needs to be reconsidered andexplained in view of the object and purpose for whichamendments were made in Section 32-F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969as noticed above. We, thus, refer to the following questions forconsideration of a larger Bench:

42.1. (1) Whether the object and purpose of amendment madein Section 32-F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 is also relevant andapplicable for exercise of right to purchase by a tenant of landlordwho was widow or suffering from mental and physical disabilityon Tillers’ Day?

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

42.2. (2) Whether the successor-in-interest of a widow is alsoobliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation of interestof the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his right ofpurchase.

42.3. (3) In the event the answer to above Question (1) or (2)Bis in the affirmative, whether decision of this Court in AppaNarsappa Magdum [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. AkubaiGanapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] , Sudam GanpatKutwal [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai TukaramGulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] and Tukaram Maruti Chavan[Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008)C9 SCC 358] needs reconsideration and explanation.

43. Let the papers be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justicefor constituting a larger Bench. In the meantime, we direct thatthe parties shall maintain the status quo.”

D3. We have heard Shri Aniruddha Joshi, learned Advocate forthe Appellant and Shri Ajit S. Bhasme, learned Senior Advocate forthe Respondent. Shri Joshi painstakingly took us through variousprovisions of the 1948 Act and was at pains to point out that it was asocial welfare legislation enacted in furtherance of an Agrarian ReformProgramme and was, therefore, covered by Article 31A of theEConstitution of India. He laid great emphasis, in particular, upon theAmendment Acts of 1956 and 1969. By the first mentioned AmendmentAct, the statutory scheme was to divest an absentee landlord of histitle and vest title directly in the cultivating tenant of agricultural land.The landlord was given only a limited right to ask for resumption of hisFland provided certain very stringent conditions were met, provided thatsuch application was made on or before Tillers’ Day i.e. 1[st] April, 1957.He argued that in the case of three categories of persons, namely,widows, minors and persons suffering from a disability, the right of thecultivating tenant to become owner was only postponed, and Section32-F must be read narrowly so as not to interfere with the statutoryGright of purchase of the cultivating tenant. The 1969 Amendment madethis clear, but was limited only to one of the three categories, namely,minors. According to him, therefore, to sub-serve the object sought tobe achieved by the 1956 Amendment, it is clear that whether acultivating tenant is a tenant under a minor on the one hand, or a widowHor a person with a disability on the other, should make no difference to

the fact that once the landlord’s disability ceases, the tenant must firstknow that such disability has ceased before he can meaningfully exercisethe statutory right given to him within the period prescribed. Accordingto him, all the Division Bench Judgments of this Court, which have heldthat such knowledge is immaterial, are wrong in law and need to beoverruled. He stated that a manifestly absurd result would be reachedif we were to so construe Section 32-F of the Act. According to him,the one year within which the cultivating tenant may exercise hisstatutory right of purchase is only after the period of disability hasceased, in that, for example, the widow has died and one year haselapsed from the date of her death within which she has not exercisedany right to resume the land. If the Division Bench Judgments of thisCourt are correct, then since the period of one year from this date hasalso elapsed for the reason that the tenant had no knowledge of thewidow’s death and, therefore, was not able to apply in time, the resultwould be that such lands would then have to be distributed under Section32-P, under which the first preference is given again to the absenteelandlord who may then be given back this land to the extent and in themanner provided by the Act. This would turn the Object of the 1956Amendment on its head, as an absentee landlord would, after notavailing of any right to resumption, get back agricultural land from acultivating tenant only because the cultivating tenant had no knowledgeof a fact which was exclusively within the landlord’s domain. Accordingto him, therefore, applying the golden rule of interpretation, if the literalreading of Section 32-F were to lead to this absurd result, it is possiblefor us as interpreters of the law to add or subtract words which wouldremove this absurdity, which can only be the counting of the one yearperiod, so far as the cultivating tenant is concerned, from the date ofknowledge of the death of the widow. He cited a number of judgmentsin support of this proposition. He also argued that in any event, if Section32-F were to be construed literally, it would violate Article 14 as it woulddiscriminate between cultivating tenants who are similarly situate,namely, tenants whose statutory right to become owners has beenpostponed on account of the landlord’s disability. Whereas in the caseof minors, the landlord is bound to intimate the tenant of the date onwhich such minor attains majority, so that he may exercise his statutoryright in a meaningful way, there is no such obligation on a widow’ssuccessors to inform the tenant of the death of the widow, resulting inpersons who are similarly situate being deprived of their statutory right AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Afor no fault of theirs, and contrary to the Object sought to be achievedby the 1956 Amendment.

4. On the other hand, Shri Ajit Bhasme, took us through variousprovisions of the Act and argued that the rent by a cultivating tenantneeds to be paid at least annually by 31[st] May every year, which wouldBenable the cultivating tenant to know that his landlady widow has died,as otherwise rent paid to a dead person cannot be credited to suchperson’s account. He also made an emotional appeal to the Court thatin all these cases, most landlords and tenants were villagers who woulddefinitely come to know of a widow’s death by word of mouth, givenIndian village society. On law, he argued that the Division BenchCjudgments were correct. Section 32-F contains a non-obstante clause,which must be given full effect. Further, the legislature is free torecognise degrees of harm and can, therefore, pick up one class amongthree classes, where the need is felt most, for protection. He referredto the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act ofD1969 and argued that the legislature was cognizant of the fact that alarge number of cases relating to minors had come to their knowledge,which is why the legislature alleviated the rigor of the Section in so faras minor landlords were concerned. He also argued that times and climehad changed, and the impoverished tenant of yesterday is the rich tenantof today, as opposed to the impoverished landlord who continues toEremain so. According to him, the literal rule of statutory interpretationmust apply, and it is not possible for us to add or subtract words inSection 32-F when the meaning is plain and unambiguous. He then dealtwith some of the judgments that were cited by Shri Joshi and attemptedto distinguish them.F5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is importantto first advert to the Scheme of the 1948 Act. Section 2(6) refers topersons who cultivate personally. Explanation - I is important and isset out hereinbelow:

“2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless there is anything repugnantGin the subject or context, xxx xxx xxx

(6) “to cultivate personally”…

Explanation I – A widow or a minor, or a person who is subjectHto physical or mental disability, or a serving member of the armed forces shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if suchland is cultivated by servants, or by hired labour, or throughtenants.”

A

The deeming provision contained in Explanation I makes it clearthat the four categories mentioned are deemed to cultivate landpersonally even if such land is cultivated through tenants.

B

6. Under Section 2(8), “land” is defined as referring to land whichis used for agricultural purposes. Under Section 2(18), “tenant” includesthree categories of persons – deemed tenants under Section 4, protectedtenants and permanent tenants, as defined. Under Section 4 of the Act,a person who cultivates lawfully any land belonging to another personshall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personallyby the owner or a member of his family or by a servant on wagespayable in cash or kind or by a mortgagee in possession. Under Section4-B tenancies cannot be terminated merely on the ground that the periodfixed by an agreement has expired. Section 31 is important and is setout hereinbelow:- C

D

“31. Landlord’s right to terminate tenancy for personalcultivation and non-agricultural purpose.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 14 and30 but subject to Sections 31-A to 31-D (both inclusive),a landlord (not being a landlord within the meaning ofChapter III-AA) may, after giving notice and makingan application for possession as provided in sub-section(2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except apermanent tenancy), if the landlord bona fide requiresthe land for any of the following purposes:- E

F

(a) for cultivating personally, or

(b) for any non-agricultural purpose.

(2) The notice required to be given under sub-section (1)shall be in writing, shall state the purpose for which theGlandlord requires the land and shall be served on thetenant on or before the 31st day of December, 1956. Acopy of such notice shall, at the same time, be sent tothe Mamlatdar. An application for possession underSection 29 shall be made to the Mamlatdar on or beforethe 31st day of March, 1957.H

H

A

(3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a personsubject to mental or physical disability then such noticemay be given and an application for possession underSection 29 may be made,—

B

(i) by the minor within one year from the date on whichhe attains majority; C

(ii) by the successor-in-title of a widow within one yearfrom the date on which her interest in the landceases to exist;

(iii) within one year from the date on which mental orphysical disability ceases to exist; and

(iv) ***

DProvided that where a person of such category is a member ofa joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply ifat least one member of the joint family is outside the categoriesmentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st day ofMarch, 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has beenseparated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry isEsatisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated,having regard to the area, assessment, classification and valueof the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person inthe entire joint family property, and not in a large proportion.”

D

F7. Under Section 31-A, the right of a landlord to terminate atenancy in order to cultivate the land personally himself is subjected tovery stringent conditions. He can take possession of the land leasedonly to the extent of the ceiling area, provided the income that is obtainedfrom such land is the principal source of income for his maintenance,and not otherwise. If more tenancies than one are held under the sameGlandlord, then the landlord is competent to terminate only such tenancieswhich are shortest in point of duration. Under Section 31-B, a tenancycan only be terminated to the extent of half the area of the land leasedto the tenant and no more. Section 32 is the Section by which agrarianreform, as mentioned hereinabove, is actually achieved. This SectionHis important and is set out hereinbelow:

“32. Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers’ day –

(1) On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred toas “the tillers day”) every tenant shall, subject to theother provisions of this section and the provisions of thenext succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchasedfrom his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsistingthereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant,if, –

(a) Such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof andcultivates land personally; (b) Such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivatesthe land leased personally; and

(i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of histenancy under Section 31; or

(ii) notice has been given under Section 31, but the landlordhas not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31[st]day of March, 1957 under Section 29 for obtainingpossession of the land; or

(iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any ofthe grounds specified in Section 14, or has so terminatedthe tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on orbefore the 31[st] day of March, 1957 under Section 29for obtaining possession of the land:

Provided that if an application made by the landlord under Section29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by theMamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by theMaharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act,the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on thedate on which the final order of rejection is passed. The dateon which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafterreferred to as “the postponed date”.

Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled tothe benefit of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 31 shallbe deemed to have purchased the land on the 1[st] day of April1958, if no separation of his share has been effected before thedate mentioned in that proviso.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

(1A) (a) Where a tenant, on account of his eviction from theland by the landlord, before the 1[st] day of April, 1957, is not inpossession of the land on the said date but has made or makesan application for possession of the land under sub-section (1)of Section 29 within the period specified in that sub-section, thenif the application is allowed by the Mamlatdar, or as the casemay be, in appeal by the Collector or in revision by theMaharashtra Revenue Tribunal, he shall be deemed to havepurchased the land on the date on which the final order allowingthe application is passed.

(b) Where such tenant has not made an application, forpossession within the period specified in sub-section (1) of Section29 or the application made by him is finally rejected under thisAct, and the land is held by any other person as tenant on theexpiry of the said period or on the date of the final rejection ofthe application, such other person shall be deemed to havepurchased the land on the date of the expiry of the said periodor as the case may be, on the date of the final rejection of theapplication.

(1B) Where a tenant who was in possession on the appointedday and who on account of his being dispossessed before the1[st] day of April 1957 otherwise than in the manner and by anorder of the Tahsildar as provided in Section 29, is not inpossession of the land on the said date and the land is in thepossession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the 31[st]day of July 1969 and the land is not put to a non-agricultural useon or before the last mentioned date, then, the Tahsildar shall,notwithstanding anything contained in the said Section 29, eithersuo motu or on the application of the tenant, hold an inquiry anddirect that such land shall be taken from the possession of thelandlord or, as the case may be, his successor-in-interest, andshall be restored to the tenant; and thereafter, the provisions ofthis Section and Section 32-A to 32-R(both inclusive) shall, in sofar as they may be applicable, apply thereto, subject to themodification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchasedthe land on the date on which the land is restored to him.

Provided that, the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of theland under this sub-section only if he undertakes to cultivate the land personally and of so much thereof as together with the otherland held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceilingarea.

Explanation - In this sub-section, “successor-in-interest” meansa person who acquires the interest by testamentary dispositionor devolution on death.”

Section 32-F is the Section that falls for construction in thepresent case and is set out in toto hereinbelow:

“32-F. Right of tenant to purchase where landlord is minor,etc.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the precedingsections,—

(a) where the landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a personsubject to any mental or physical disability, the tenantshall have the right to purchase such land under Section32 within one year from the expiry of the period duringwhich such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancyunder Section 31 and for enabling the tenant to exercisethe right of purchase, the landlord shall send anintimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attainedmajority, before the expiry of the period during whichsuch landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy underSection 31:

Provided that where a person of such category is amember of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the jointfamily is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st day of March 1958 theshare of such person in the joint family has beenseparated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar oninquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in theland is separated, having regard to the area, assessment,classification and value of the land, in the sameproportion as the share of that person in the entire jointfamily property and not in a larger proportion.

A

B

C

D

E

FG

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

(b) where the tenant is a minor, or a widow, or a personsubject to any mental or physical disability or a servingmember of the armed forces, then subject to theprovisions of clause (a), the right to purchase land underSection 32 may be exercised, -

(i) By the minor within one year, from the date onwhich he attains majority;

(ii) By the successor-in-title of the widow within oneyear from the date on which her interest in the landceases to exist;

(iii) Within one year from the date on which the mentalor physical disability of the tenant ceases to exist;

(iv) Within one year from the date on which the tenantceases to be a serving member of the armed forces:

Provided that where a person of such category is a member ofa joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply ifat least one member of the joint family is outside the categoriesmentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31[st] day of March,1958 the share of such person in the joint family has beenseparated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry issatisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated,having regard to the area, assessment, classification and valueof the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person inthe entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion.

(1-A) A tenant desirous of exercising the right conferred on himunder sub-section (1) shall give an intimation in that behalf tothe landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within theperiod specified in that sub-section:

Provided that, if a tenant holding land from a landlord (who wasa minor and has attained majority before the commencement ofthe Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment) Act,1969) has not given intimation as required by this sub-section butbeing in possession of the land on such commencement isdesirous of exercising the right conferred upon him under sub-section (1), he may give such intimation within a period of twoyears from the commencement of that Act.

(2) The provisions of Sections 32 to 32-E (both inclusive) andSections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive) shall, so far as may beapplicable, apply to such purchase”

8. Section 32-G is also important, in that, it is only after notice tothe tenant that the price of the land to be paid by the tenant to theerstwhile landlord is then determined. The relevant sub-sections of thisSection states as follows:

“32G. Tribunal to issue notice and determine price of landto be paid by tenants. –

(1) As soon as may be after the tillers’ day the Tribunalshall publish or cause to be published a public notice inthe prescribed form in each village within its jurisdictioncalling upon, –

(a) all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to havepurchased the lands, (b) all landlords of such lands, and

(c) all other persons interested therein, to appear before it on the date specified in thenotice. The Tribunal shall issue a notice individuallyto each such tenant, landlord and also, as far aspracticable, other person calling upon each of themto appear before it on the date specified in the publicnotice.

(2) The Tribunal shall record in the prescribed manner thestatement of the tenant whether he is or is not willingto purchase the land held by him as a tenant.

(3) Where any tenant fails to appear or makes a statementthat he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunalshall by an order in writing declare that such tenant isnot willing to purchase the land and that the purchaseis ineffective:

Provided that if such order is passed in default of theappearance of any party, the Tribunal shall communicatesuch order to the parties and any party on whose defaultthe order was passed may within 60 days from the dateon which the order was communicated to him apply forthe review of the same.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Axxx xxx xxx

(5) In the case of a tenant who is deemed to havepurchased the land on the postponed date the Tribunalshall, as soon as may be after such date determine theprice of the land.”

B

9. Under Section 32-M, a purchase by a tenant is ineffective onhis failure to pay purchase price, as a result of which land shall thenbe at the disposal of the Tribunal to be disposed in the manner set outin Section 32-P. Under Section 32-O, in respect of any tenancy createdafter Tillers’ Day, such tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled,Cwithin one year from the commencement of such tenancy, to purchasefrom the landlord the land held by him to the extent of the ceiling areapermissible. This can only be done if the tenant gives an intimation inthat behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal within the period prescribed.Section 32-P is also important and is set out hereinbelow:

D“32P. Power of Tribunal to resume and dispose of land notpurchased by tenant. –

(1) Where the purchase of any land by tenant under Section32 becomes ineffective under Sections 32-G or 32-Mor where a tenant fails to exercise the right to purchasethe land held by him within the specified period underSections 32F, 32O, 33C or 43-1D the Tribunal may suomotu or on an application made on this behalf land incase other than those in which the purchase has becomeineffective by reason of Section 32-G or 32-M, afterholding a formal inquiry direct that the land shall bedisposed of in the manner provided in sub-section (2).

E

F

(2) Such direction shall provide –

(a) that the former tenant be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of Section15, be surrendered to the former landlord; G

(c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannotbe surrendered in accordance with the provisions ofSection 15, the entire land or such portion thereof,as the case may be, notwithstanding that it is afragment, shall be disposed of by sale to any person H

in the following order of priority (hereinafter called“the priority list”):-

(i) a co-operative farming society the members ofwhich are agricultural labourers, landless persons orsmall holders or a combination of such persons;

(ii) agricultural labourers;

(iii) landless persons;

(iv) small holders;

(v) a co-operative farming society of agriculturists (otherthan small holders) who hold either as owner ortenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant,landless in area than an economic holding and whois an artisans;

(vi) an agriculturist (other than a small holder) who holdseither as owner or tenant as partly as owner andpartly as tenant landless in area than an economicholding and who are artisan;

(vii) any other co-operative farming society;

(viii) any agriculturist who holds either as owner or tenantor partly as owner and partly as tenant land largerin area than an economic holding but less in areathan the ceiling area;

(ix) any person, not being an agriculturist, who intendsto take to the profession of agriculture:

Provided that the State Government may, by notification in theOfficial Gazette give in relation to such local areas as it mayspecify, such priority in the above order as it thinks fit to anyclass or person who, by reason of the acquisition of their landfor any development project approved for the purpose by theState Government have been displaced, and require to be re-settled.”

10. In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR1959 SC 459, the 1956 Amendment to the Tenancy and AgriculturalLands Act came up for consideration. One of the arguments made wasthat since the landlord’s right was not extinguished statutorily on Tillers’Day, the said Act was not protected by Article 31A. This argumentwas negatived holding:

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

“41. These observations were confined to suspension of the rightof management of the estate and not to a suspension of the titleto the estate. Apart from the question whether the suspensionof the title to the estate for a time, definite or indefinite wouldamount to a modification of a right in the estate within themeaning of Article 31-A(1)(a), the position as it obtains in thiscase is that there is no suspension of the title of the landlord atall. The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately tothe tenant on the tiller’s day and there is a completed purchaseor sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant. The tenantis no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaringwhether he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by himas a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he isnot willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order inwriting declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the landand that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declarationby the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no suchdeclaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand asstatutorily effected on the tiller’s day and will continue to beoperative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the paymentof price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenantcommits default in the payment of such price either in lump orby instalments as determined by the Tribunal, Section 32-Mdeclares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the landshall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed ofby him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchasecontinues to be effective as from the tiller’s day until such defaultis committed and there is no question of a conditional purchaseor sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The titleto the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes tothe tenant on the tiller’s day or the alternative period prescribedin that behalf. This title is defeasable only in the event of thetenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is notwilling to purchase the land or committing default in payment ofthe price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant getsa vested interest in the land defeasable only in either of thosecases and it cannot, therefore, be said that the title of landlordto the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite. Ifthat is so, there is an extinguishment or in any event a modification of the landlord’s right in the estate well within the meaning ofthose words as used in Article 31-A(1)(a).”

11. Importantly, the judgment also referred to the right of thetenant to purchase land where the landlord is a minor or a widow or aperson subject to a mental or physical disability, and the Court statedthat such right is postponedtill one year after the cessation of disability.

12. This judgment was followed in Amrit Bhikaji Kale v.Kashinath Janardhan Trade (1983) 3 SCC 437, the Court holding:

“6. The Tenancy Act was comprehensively amended byAmending Act 15 of 1957. The amendment brought in arevolutionary measure of agrarian reforms making tiller of thesoil the owner of the land. This was done to achieve the objectof removing all intermediaries between tillers of the soil and theState. Section 32 provides that by mere operation of law, everytenant of agricultural land situated in the area to which the Actapplies shall become by the operation of law, the owner thereof.He is declared to be a deemed purchaser without anything moreon his part. A Constitution Bench of this court in Sri Ram RamNarain Medhi v. State of Bombay [1959 Supp 1 SCR 489, 518-19 : AIR 1959 SC 459 : 1959 SCJ 679] held that:

“The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately tothe tenant on the tillers’ day and there is a completed purchaseor sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant. Thetitle of the land which was vested originally in the landlordpasses to the tenant on the tillers’ day and this title is defeasibleonly in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making astatement that he is not willing to purchase the land or commitdefault in payment of the price thereto as determined by theTribunal.”

Therefore, it is unquestionably established that on the tillers’ day,the landlord’s interest in the land gets extinguished andsimultaneously by a statutory sale without anything more by theparties, the extinguished title of the landlord is kindled or createdin the tenant. That very moment landlord-tenant relationship asunderstood in common law or Transfer of Property Act comesto an end. The link and chain is broken. The absent non-cultivating landlord ceases to have that ownership element of theland and the cultivating tenant, the tiller of the soil becomes theowner thereof. This is unquestionable. The landlord from the date AB

CD

EF

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of statutory sale is only entitled to receive the purchase price asdetermined by the Tribunal under Section 32-G. In other words,the landlord ceases to be landlord and the tenant becomes theowner of the land and comes in direct contact with the State.Without any act of transfer inter vivos the title of the landlord isextinguished and is created simultaneously in the tenant makingthe tenant the deemed purchaser. It is an admitted position thaton April 1, 1957 Tarachand was the landlord and Janardhan wasthe tenant. Tarachand landlord was under no disability asenvisaged by Section 32-F. Therefore on April 1, 1957 Janardhanbecame deemed purchaser and Mr Lalit could not controvert thisposition.

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7. If Janardhan became the deemed purchaser on tillers’ day,the relationship of landlord and tenant between Tarachand andJanardhan came to be extinguished and no right could be claimedeither by Tarachand or anyone claiming through him such asAshoklal or the present purchasers on the footing that they arethe owners of the land on or after April 1, 1957. This basic factis incontrovertible.

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8. It may be mentioned that Section 32-F has no application tothe facts of this case. Section 32-F postponed the date ofcompulsory purchase by the tenant where the landlord is a minoror a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disabilityon the tillers’ day. Section 32-F has an overriding effect overSection 32 as it opens with a non-obstante clause. The combinedeffect of Sections 32-F and 32 would show that where thelandlord is under no disability as envisaged by Section 32-F thetenant of such landlord by operation of law would become thedeemed purchaser but where the landlord is of a class orcategory as set out in Section 32-F such as a minor, a widow ora person subject to any mental or physical disability, the date ofcompulsory sale would be postponed as therein provided. Now,if Tarachand, the landlord was under no disability and he wasalive on April 1, 1957 and he was the owner, his tenant Janardhanbecame the deemed purchaser. This conclusion, in our opinion,is unassailable.”

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13. It can thus be seen that the Scheme of the 1948 Act, and inparticular, the 1956 Amendment, which introduced Tillers’ Day, is thatHan absentee landlord’s rights in the land must give way to a cultivating tenant. Statutorily, on Tillers’ Day, the landlord is divested of title andthe tenant is vested with title to agricultural land which he cultivatesby dint of his own effort. It is only in three cases that such purchasebecomes ineffective – if the tenant fails to appear within the timeprescribed after notice is given to him, or appears and declines purchase,or if the tenant fails to pay the entire purchase price. The widow, theminor and the person subject to a disability are placed on the samepedestal, and throughout their widowhood, minority or period of disabilityare deemed to cultivate the land personally through their tenants – theExplanation - I to Section 2(6) makes this clear. As we have seen fromthe case law extracted above, in the vast majority of cases, the landlordis divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1[st] April, 1957. It is only inexceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a personsubjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What isimportant to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenantthat the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1[st]April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentionedunder Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased theland on such postponed date under the first proviso to sub-section (1)of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlordunder Section 29 is finally rejected – a date that is to the knowledge ofboth landlord and tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribedunder Section 32(1A), again the tenant shall be deemed to havepurchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by theTribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the said sub-section. Again,under sub-section (1B), in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaidsub-section, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemedpurchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, in all cases covered bySection 32, the landlord is divested of his title either on Tillers’ Day oron a postponed date which is to the knowledge of the tenant, as theaforesaid date is on and from a final order of a Tribunal or a Tahsildar,as the case may be.

14. Section 32-G is a very important pointer to the fact that atenant must be put on notice in order that the purchase price of landbe determined by the Tribunal. This notice under Section 32-G(1) is inthe form of a public notice in the prescribed form in each village. Apartfrom this, the Tribunal shall also issue a notice individually to each tenantcalling upon him to appear before it on the date specified in the notice.The same is the case of a tenant who is deemed to have purchased AB

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Athe land on the postponed date under Section 32-G(5). Again, whenwe come to Section 32-O in respect of tenancies created after Tillers’Day, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled, within one yearfrom the commencement of such tenancy, to purchase such land withinthe ceiling area. What is important is that under sub-section (1A), thisright is to be exercised by giving an intimation in that behalf to theBlandlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period ofone year. This again is a date which is within the knowledge of thetenant as the period of one year is calculated from the commencementof his tenancy. It can thus be seen that in the case of postponed datesunder Section 32 and the right of a tenant in respect of tenancies createdCafter Tillers’ Day, the tenant is to exercise his statutory right knowingfully well that if he does not do so within the prescribed period or doesnot pay purchase price, the purchase either becomes ineffective or theright cannot be exercised. In all these cases, what is important to noticeis that the tenant knows of the time within which he must exercise hisrights.D

15. We now come to the Section which needs to be interpreted.Section 32-F was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1956 as partof a scheme of agrarian reform. The reason for the non-obstante clause,with which the Section begins, is that the cultivating tenant in all caseswhere the landlord is a minor, a widow or a person subjected to aEdisability, does not statutorily become owner of the agricultural landcultivated personally by him on Tillers’ Day. This is for the reason thatunder Section 2(6) Explanation- I, these three categories of landlordsare deemed to cultivate personally through such tenant. The entitlementof terminating a tenancy under any one of these three categories isFcontained in Section 31(3). In any of these three cases, the momentthe disability ceases i.e. that the land in question no longer belongs toa minor, as he has become major, or to a widow, as she has died ortransferred her share with permission under Section 63, or to a personwhose mental or physical disability ceases, one year is granted for such persons to apply for resumption of the land on the ground that suchGpersons wish to personally cultivate the said land, pursuant to whichan application for possession of land under Section 29 may then bemade. In case this is done within the time prescribed, the tenant’s rightto purchase does not fructify. It is only when this is not done withinthe period of one year, as aforestated, that the postponed right of theHtenant springs into being.

16. Prior to the Amendment Act of 1969, on a plain literal readingof Section 32-F(1)(a), it is true that a tenant had to exercise this rightwithin a period of one year from the expiry of the one year spoken ofin Section 31(3) of the Act. Literally speaking, therefore, even if thetenant does not know when the minor became major or when the widowdied or transferred her share, this right would cease on the expiry ofone year.

17. Realising that this would cause immense hardship for wantof knowledge of a special fact which is only within the landlord’s ken,the legislature stepped in and amended Section 32-F. The Statementof Objects and Reasons for this Amendment Act is as follows:

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

It has come to the notice of the Government that a number oftenants in the Bombay area and the Vidarbha region of the State,failed to acquire ownership right in the lands held by them onaccount of their being dispossessed from the land otherwise thanin the manner laid down in the relevant tenancy law. It is,therefore, expedient to amend the tenancy laws in force in theseregions for safeguarding the interest of these dispossessedtenants.

It is also noticed that a large number of tenants in the Bombayarea of the State holding land from landlords who were minorshave lost right to purchase land for their failure to give intimationwithin the period laid down in sub-section (1-A) of Section 32,It is, therefore, necessary to give these tenants a freshopportunity to purchase land. Section 32-F is, therefore, beingsuitably amended for that purpose.

As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, inMussamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. Rabari GobindbhaiRatnabhai [Mussamia Imam Haider Bax Razvi v. RabariGobindbhai Ratnabhai, AIR 1969 SC 439] from the judgmentof the High Court of Gujarat regarding jurisdiction of civil courtin certain matters, it has also become necessary to suitably amendcertain sections of the tenancy laws in force in the three regionsof the State.

The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”

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A18. Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasonsindicates that an amnesty scheme is necessary, in that a large numberof tenants in the Bombay area who are minors have lost the right topurchase as they have failed to give the necessary intimation withinthe period laid down by statute. Under this amnesty scheme, if a tenantheld land from a landlord who was a minor and who had obtainedBmajority before the commencement of the 1969 Amendment and nointimation had been given, two years extra was given from the date ofcommencement of that Act in which such intimation may be given. Thisstatutory object, reflected in paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objectsand Reasons, is carried out by the proviso to sub-section (1A) insertedCby the 1969 Amendment Act into Section 32-F.

19. Simultaneously, the same Amendment Act inserted into sub-section (1)(a), the following:

“and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase,the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the factDthat he has attained majority, before the expiry of the periodduring which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancyunder Section 31:”

The addition of these words into Section 32-F(1)(a) would showthat the legislature, in keeping with the object sought to be achievedEstatutorily divesting the landlord of his title and handing over the landto the cultivating tenant, cannot possibly be achieved unless a specialfact within the knowledge of the landlord alone is first intimated to thetenant, so that he may then, with knowledge that the minor landlordhas now turned major, meaningfully exercise his right of purchase underthe Act.F

20. It seems to us that the vast majority of cases which came tothe notice of the legislature were cases of landlords who were minorat the time of the 1956 Amendment Act and who turned major onlythereafter. The amnesty scheme contained in sub-section (1A), was,Gtherefore, limited only to such cases. Unfortunately, the legislature, whenit inserted words into sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32-F, appears to haveforgotten that these words will govern the right of tenants which hasbeen postponed on account of a landlord’s disability. What appears tohave been missed is the fact that, apart from minors, there are twoother categories mentioned in Section 32-F(1)(a), all of whom wouldHstand on the same footing insofar as the tenant is concerned. It would

be wholly anomalous for a tenant to be told that if his landlord happenedto be a minor who has attained majority later, he must first be intimatedof this fact before he can meaningfully exercise his right of purchase;whereas to a tenant who is similarly situate when the landlord is awidow, in which case no such intimation need be made, the tenant wouldsuffer for no fault of his as the tenant would have no knowledge ofthe date of death of the widow (which is a special fact known only toher family), such tenant’s right of purchase being extinguished by time.It seems that the draftsman of the 1969 Amendment was overwhelmedwith the amnesty scheme laid down in Section 32-F (1A), which thenspilled over to the amendment made in Section 32-F(1)(a), therebyunintentionally leaving out the two other categories of landlords, wherethe same intimation needs to be made to the tenant, as the death ofthe widow and/or the ceasing of disability are special facts known onlyto the landlord and his family, just as in the case of a minor turningmajor.

21. It has rightly been argued by learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the Appellant that an absurd situation would be created by aliteral reading of Section 32-F(1)(a). The landlord being a widow isprotected until her death. After her death, one year is given to hersuccessors in interest to exercise the right of resumption. When thisdoes not take place one year is granted from the expiry of this firstone year to the tenant to exercise his statutory right. This cannot bedone because the tenant does not know of the death of the widow.As a result, this very land which was not required by the landlord’ssuccessors in interest for personal cultivation, goes back to the landlordunder Section 32-P in cases in which the landlord either has no landwithin the ceiling limit or some land which does not exhaust the ceilinglimit. This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reformon its head. We have thus to see whether the language of Section 32-F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the absurdityaforementioned and the discrimination between persons who aresimilarly situate be obviated.

The Golden Rule of Interpretation

22. In Grey v. Pearson (1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61, what isreferred to as the Golden rule of literal interpretation was stated asfollows:

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“… I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom ofthe rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courtsof Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeedstatutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinarysense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would leadto some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency withthe rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical andordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoidthat absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This is laiddown by Mr Justice Burton, in a very excellent opinion, which isto be found in Warburton v. Loveland [Warburton v. Loveland,(1831) 2 Dow & Cl 480 : 6 ER 806] (see ante, p. 76. n.)”

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(Emphasis supplied)

23. In an early Privy Council judgment in Salmon v. Duncombe(1886) 11 AC 627, Ordinance No. 1 of 1856 as it applied to Natal wasup for construction. In order to make sense of the provision, the PrivyDCouncil found it necessary to cross out certain words of the Ordinance.This they did by stating:

“It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the mainobject of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by thedraftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of law. It may beEnecessary for a Court of Justice to come to such a conclusion,but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify it except necessityor the absolute intractability of the language used. And they haveset themselves to consider, first, whether any substantial doubtcan be suggested as to the main object of the legislature; and,Fsecondly, whether the last nine words of sect. 1 are so cogentand so limit the rest of the statute as to nullify its effect eitherentirely or in a very important particular.

As to the broad intention of those who framed the Ordinance,their Lordships cannot find that anybody has ever intimated aGdoubt, nor do they find it possible to entertain one, that it wasintended to give to all the Queen’s subjects, resident or settledin Natal, the option of disposing by will according to English law,of property both real and personal which otherwise would devolveaccording to Natal law. The title may be looked at for aid infinding out the object. The preamble is of great importance inHfinding out the object. They have been quoted above, and nobody who reads to the end of the preamble and there stops, can doubtthat the object is to provide a substantial measure substitutingEnglish law for Natal law in the cases mentioned.

That object is carried into effect by sect. 1, on which thesubsequent sections turn. Now suppose that sect. 1 ended withthe words “in this district” or with the words “intents andpurposes.” Though it would then be very inartificially drawn, itwould not be difficult to construe it so as to give effect to thebefore declared object. The conditional words “could or mightexercise” would require the implication of an unexpressedcondition; otherwise the sentence would result in a nullity. Butthe implication would be by no means a difficult one. By implyingafter the words “customs of England” the addition “over propertysubject to those laws and customs,” the enactment would becomesensible and harmonious.

The difficulty is, and their Lordships quite agree that it is a greatdifficulty, that a condition which is apparently and at first sightthe correlative condition of the conditional words “could or mightexercise” is expressed by the last nine words of the section. Andthe question is whether that expression excludes all otherimplications. If such a construction left a substantial operativeeffect to the enactment, it might be necessary to answer thatquestion in the affirmative; but, as it destroys the expressedobjects altogether unless the word “resident” be construed tomean “domiciled,” and in that case destroys the expressedobjects so far as regards real property, their Lordships answer itin the negative. It is true that they cannot find a sensible meaningfor the nine words in question. Very likely the draftsman, whosewant of skill is shown by other expressions in the Ordinance,attributed to residence a legal effect which it does not possess.But he does not make the legislature say that the powersconferred are not to be any greater powers than would beconferred by a residence in England. He makes it in the rest ofthe section use terms which, with the easy implication that isnecessary to give them meaning and to harmonize with thedeclared objects, confer the power of escaping from Natal lawand coming under English law; and he then adds words whichmay add nothing to what has gone before, but which ought not ABC

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Awithout necessity to be construed so as to destroy all that hasgone before. A man exercising the powers conferred does notin any way violate or contravene the nine words in question. Hedoes exercise these powers as if he resided in England, becauseit is perfectly immaterial for their exercise whether he is supposedto reside in England or not, and because wherever he is supposedBto reside he exercises them in the same way. It is veryunsatisfactory to be compelled to construe a statute in this way,but it is much more unsatisfactory to deprive it altogether ofmeaning. Their Lordships chose the lesser of two difficulties.”

C24. In an early judgment of our Court, Tirath Singh v. BachittarSingh & Ors (1955) 2 SCR 457, this Court had to construe the provisoto Section 99(1)(a)(ii) of the Representation of People Act, 1951. TheCourt held:

“…But it is a rule of interpretation well-established that, “WhereDthe language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammaticalconstruction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparentpurpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity,hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction maybe put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and evenEthe structure of the sentence”. (Maxwell’s Interpretation ofStatutes, 10th Edn., p. 229). Reading the proviso along withclause (b) thereto, and construing it in its setting in the section,we are of opinion that notwithstanding the wideness of thelanguage used, the proviso contemplates notice only to personswho are not parties to the petition.”F

The Court, therefore, restricted the word “person” appearing inthe said proviso to mean only persons who are not parties to the electionpetition. This was done, given the fact that the object of the provisowas to give notice to persons who had hitherto not been given noticeGof the election petition. Obviously, the parties to the election petitionwere persons who knew of the existence of such petition.

25. In Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras (1958) SCR 739,this Court found it necessary to supply words which were not found inSection 423(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. This the Court didHas follows:

“…But this argument is wholly ineffective because in either viewof the matter the court has to supply some words in answer tothe question “find him guilty of what?” According to the appellant,those additional words should be “of such offence as has beencharged and of which he had been acquitted”, and according tothe other view, “of the offence disclosed”. If, in construing thesection, the court has to supply some words in order to makethe meaning of the statute clear, it will naturally prefer the latterconstruction which is more in consonance with reason andjustice.”

26. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Finance Co.& Anr. (1966) Supp. SCR 473, Section 11 of the Opium (MadhyaBharat Amendment) Act, 1955 was construed as being permissive andnot obligatory as follows:

“...It is well recognised that if a statute leads to absurdity, hardshipor injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be putupon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even thestructure of the sentence, (vide Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh[(1955) 2 SCR 457 at 464] ).

Secondly, it is a penal statute and it should, if possible, beconstrued in such a way that a person who has not committedor abetted any offence should not be visited with a penalty.

Thirdly, if the meaning suggested by Mr Shroff is given, Section11(d) of the Madhya Bharat Act may have to be struck downas imposing unreasonable restrictions under Article 19 of theConstitution. Bearing all these considerations in mind, we considerthat Section 11 of the Madhya Bharat Act is not obligatory andit is for the court to consider in each case whether the vehiclein which the contraband opium is found or is being transportedshould be confiscated or not, having regard to all thecircumstances of the case.”

27. In Budhan Singh v. Nabi Bux (1970) 2 SCR 10, this Courtheld that the expression “held” occurring in Section 9 of the U.P.Zamindari Abolition and Reforms Act, 1950 must mean “lawfully held”thereby adding the word “lawfully”. The Court held: - “…Before considering the meaning of the word “held” in Section9, it is necessary to mention that it is proper to assume that the A

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lawmakers who are the representatives of the people enact lawswhich the society considers as honest, fair and equitable.

The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. Inother words as observed by Crawford in his book on StatutoryConstructions the entire legislative process is influenced byconsiderations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitutethe great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation.Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly,ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailingconceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it wouldseem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, wasnot the one intended by the law-makers. In the absence of someother indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actuallyintended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that itrepresents the legislative intent.”

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28. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta v.DNational Taj Traders (1980) 1 SCC 370, this Court construed Section33-B of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in order to avoid a manifestlyabsurd result as follows:

“…According to the construction contended for by the assesseeand which found favour with the High Court the answer was inthe affirmative because sub-section (2)(b), on its literalconstruction, was absolute. In our view such literal constructionwould lead to a manifestly absurd result, because in a given case,like the present one, where the Appellate Authority (Tribunal) hasfound (a) the Income Tax Officer’s order to be clearly erroneousas being prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and (b) theCommissioner’s order unsustainable as being in violation ofprinciples of natural justice, how should the Appellate Authorityexercise its appellate powers? Obviously it could not withholdits hands and refuse to interfere with Commissioner’s orderaltogether, for, that would amount to perpetuating theCommissioner’s erroneous order, nor could it merely cancel orset aside the Commissioner’s wrong order without doing anythingabout the Income Tax Officer’s order, for, that would result inperpetuating the Income Tax Officer’s order which had beenfound to be manifestly erroneous as being prejudicial to therevenue. But such result would flow from the view taken by the E

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High Court which has held that the Tribunal acted properly invacating the Commissioner’s order but did not act properly indirecting him to dispose of the proceedings afresh after givingopportunity to the assessee. Such manifestly absurd result couldnever have been intended by the Legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

A literal construction placed on sub-section (2)(b) would lead tosuch manifestly absurd and anomalous results, which, we do notthink, were intended by the Legislature. These considerationscompel us to construe the words of sub-section (2)(b) as beingapplicable to suo motu orders of the Commissioner in revisionand not to orders made by him pursuant to a direction or orderpassed by the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (4) or by anyother higher authority. Such construction will be in consonancewith the principle that all parts of the section should be construedtogether and every clause thereof should be construed withreference to the context and other clauses thereof so that theconstruction put on that particular provision makes a consistentenactment of the whole statute.”

29. In K.P. Verghese v. ITO (1981) 4 SCC 173, this Court dealtwith the correct interpretation of Section 52 of the Income Tax Act,1961. Read literally, the moment there is transfer of a capital asset byan amount less than the fair market value, the fair market value is tobe taken instead of the stated consideration. This Court read into Section52 the fact that it would have no application in case of a bona fidetransaction where the full value of the consideration for the transfer iscorrectly declared by the assessee. The Court held:

“5. …The task of interpretation of a statutory enactment is nota mechanical task. It is more than a mere reading ofmathematical formulae because few words possess the precisionof mathematical symbols. It is an attempt to discover the intentof the legislature from the language used by it and it must alwaysbe remembered that language is at best an imperfect instrumentfor the expression of human thought and as pointed out by LordDenning, it would be idle to expect every statutory provision tobe “drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity”. We cando no better than repeat the famous words of Judge LearnedHand when he laid:

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“... it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense,are the primary and ordinarily the most reliable, source ofinterpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, acontract or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexesof a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make afortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutesalways have some purpose or object to accomplish, whosesympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide totheir meaning.”

We must not adopt a strictly literal interpretation of Section 52sub-section (2) but we must construe its language having regardto the object and purpose which the legislature had in view inenacting that provision and in the context of the setting in whichit occurs. We cannot ignore the context and the collocation ofthe provisions in which Section 52 sub-section (2) appears,because, as pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in most felicitouslanguage:

“... the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of theseparate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and nodegree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the settingin which all appear, and which all collectively create.”

Keeping these observations in mind we may now approach theconstruction of Section 52 sub-section (2).

6. The primary objection against the literal construction of Section52 sub-section (2) is that it leads to manifestly unreasonable andabsurd consequences. It is true that the consequences of asuggested construction cannot alter the meaning of a statutoryprovision but they can certainly help to fix its meaning. It is awell-recognised rule of construction that a statutory provision mustbe so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may beavoided. There are many situations where the constructionsuggested on behalf of the Revenue would lead to a whollyunreasonable result which could never have been intended bythe legislature. Take, for example, a case where A agrees to sellhis property to B for a certain price and before the sale iscompleted pursuant to the agreement — and it is quite well-known that sometimes the completion of the sale may take place

even a couple of years after the date of the agreement — themarket price shoots up with the result that the market priceprevailing on the date of the sale exceeds the agreed price atwhich the property is sold by more than 15 per cent of suchagreed price. This is not at all an uncommon case in an economyof rising prices and in fact we would find in a large number ofcases where the sale is completed more than a year or two afterthe date of the agreement that the market price prevailing onthe date of the sale is very much more than the price at whichthe property is sold under the agreement. Can it be contendedwith any degree of fairness and justice that in such cases, wherethere is clearly no under-statement of consideration in respectof the transfer and the transaction is perfectly honest and bonafide and, in fact, in fulfilment of a contractual obligation, theassessee who has sold the property should be liable to pay taxon capital gains which have not accrued or arisen to him. Itwould indeed be most harsh and inequitable to tax the assesseeon income which has neither arisen to him nor is received byhim, merely because he has carried out the contractual obligationundertaken by him. It is difficult to conceive of any rational reasonwhy the legislature should have thought it fit to impose liabilityto tax on an assessee who is bound by law to carry out hiscontractual obligation to sell the property at the agreed price andhonestly carries out such contractual obligation. It would indeedbe strange if obedience to the law should attract the levy of taxon income which has neither arisen to the assessee nor has beenreceived by him. If we may take another illustration, let usconsider a case where A sells his property to B with a stipulationthat after some time which may be a couple of years or more,he shall re-sell the property to A for the same price. Could it becontended in such a case that when B transfers the property toA for the same price at which he originally purchased it, he shouldbe liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has received the marketvalue of the property as on the date of re-sale, if, in themeanwhile, the market price has shot up and exceeds the agreedprice by more than 15 per cent? Many other similar situationscan be contemplated where it would be absurd and unreasonableto apply Section 52 sub-section (2) according to its strict literal AB

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Aconstruction. We must therefore eschew literalness in theinterpretation of Section 52 sub-section (2) and try to arrive atan interpretation which avoids this absurdity and mischief andmakes the provision rational and sensible, unless of course, ourhands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyrannyBof the literal interpretation. It is now a well-settled rule ofconstruction that where the plain literal interpretation of astatutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust resultwhich could never have been intended by the legislature, thecourt may modify the language used by the legislature or even“do some violence” to it, so as to achieve the obvious intentionCof the legislature and produce a rational construction (vide Lukev. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1963) AC 557] ). The Courtmay also in such a case read into the statutory provision acondition which, though not expressed, is implicit as constitutingthe basic assumption underlying the statutory provision. We thinkDthat, having regard to this well-recognised rule of interpretation,a fair and reasonable construction of Section 52 sub-section (2)would be to read into it a condition that it would apply only wherethe consideration for the transfer is understated or in other words,the assessee has actually received a larger consideration for thetransfer than what is declared in the instrument of transfer andEit would have no application in case of a bona fide transactionwhere the full value of the consideration for the transfer iscorrectly declared by the assessee. There are several importantconsiderations which incline us to accept this construction ofSection 52 sub-section (2).”

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30. In CIT v. J.H. Gotla (1985) 4 SCC 343, the trueconstruction of Section 24(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 was beforethe Court. Following Verghese’s case (supra), the Court held:

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“44. Our attention was also drawn to the decision in the caseof Manickam and Co. v. State of T.N. [(1977) 1 SCC 199 :1977 SCC (Tax) 165 : (1977) 39 STC 12, 18] as well as Craieson Statute Law (6th Edn), p. 147.

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45. In the case of K.P. Varghese v. IT0 [(1981) 4 SCC 173 :1981 SCC (Tax) 293 : (1981) 131 ITR 597] this Court emphasised that a statutory provision must be so construed, if possible, thatabsurdity and mischief may be avoided.

46. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provisionproduces a manifestly unjust result which could never have beenintended by the Legislature, the Court might modify the languageused by the Legislature so as to achieve the intention of theLegislature and produce a rational construction. The task ofinterpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discoverthe intention of the Legislature from the language used. It isnecessary to remember that language is at best an imperfectinstrument for the expression of human intention. It is well toremember the warning administered by Judge Learned Hand thatone should not make a fortress out of dictionary but rememberthat statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplishand sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide totheir meaning.

47. We have noted the object of Section 16(3) of the Act whichhas to be read in conjunction with Section 24(2) in this case forthe present purpose. If the purpose of a particular provision iseasily discernible from the whole scheme of the Act which inthis case is, to counteract the effect of the transfer of assets sofar as computation of income of the assessee is concerned thenbearing that purpose in mind, we should find out the intentionfrom the language used by the Legislature and if strict literalconstruction leads to an absurd result i.e. result not intended tobe subserved by the object of the legislation found in the mannerindicated before, and if another construction is possible apart fromstrict literal construction then that construction should bepreferred to the strict literal construction.

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48. In view of the aforesaid and in view of the attitude of thelaw-makers in dealing with this problem as evidenced by theamendment and in the circular originally issued prior thereto andbearing in mind that under the scheme of the Act where the wifeor minor child carries on a running business, the right to carryforward the loss in the running business would be available tothe wife or minor child if they themselves were assessed but the A

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right would be completely lost if the individual in whose totalincome the loss is to be included is not permitted to carry forwardthe loss under Section 24(2); since that would be the result ofthe strict literal construction it is apparent that that could not havebeen the intent of the Parliament. Therefore, where Section 16(3)of the Act operates, the profits or loss from a business of thewife or minor child included in the total income of the assesseeshould be treated as the profit or loss from a “business carriedon by him” for the purpose of carrying forward and set-off ofsuch loss under Section 24(2) of the Act.”

In another tax case, this Court, in State of Tamil Nadu v.Kodaikanal Motor Union (P) Ltd. (1986) 3 SCC 91, whileconstruing Section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, held:

“17. The courts must always seek to find out the intention ofthe legislature. Though the courts must find out the intention ofthe statute from the language used, but language more often thannot is an imperfect instrument of expression of human thought.As Lord Denning said it would be idle to expect every statutoryprovision to be drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity.As Judge Learned Hand said, we must not make a fortress outof dictionary but remember that statutes must have some purposeor object, whose imaginative discovery is judicial craftsmanship.We need not always cling to literalness and should seek toendeavour to avoid an unjust or absurd result. We should not makea mockery of legislation. To make sense out of an unhappilyworded provision, where the purpose is apparent to the judicialeve “some” violence to language is permissible. (See K.P.Varghese v. ITO [(1981) 4 SCC 173, 180-82 : 1981 SCC (Tax)293, 300-302 : (1981) 131 ITR 597, 604-606] and Luke v. InlandRevenue Commissioner [(1964) 54 ITR 692 (HL)] .)

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19. … The presumption canvassed to be raised that the trueeffect of the words “if the offence had not been committed” wasto presume a situation in which the undertaking given by theassessee had been carried out even though in fact the same hadnot been carried out. That would be an absurd result. In ouropinion the use of the expression “if” simpliciter, was meant toindicate a condition, the condition being that at the time of assessing the penalty, that situation should be visualised whereinthere was no scope of committing any offence. Such a situationcould arise only if the tax liability fell under sub-section (2) ofSection 8 of the Act. The scheme of Section 8 indicated thatconcessional rates contemplated by sub-section (1) thereof wouldbe available only with reference to those goods which arecovered by the declarations in Form ‘C’. The moment it is foundthat in respect of particular quantity of goods the undertakinggiven by the assessee in Form ‘C’ declaration has not been carriedout, the goods were presumed to be such in respect of which noundertaking was existing. Therefore such goods would be liableto normal tax contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 8.Therefore, the penalty should be worked out only on the basisof the normal rates prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section8. That would make sense. That is a reasonably possibleconstruction. That would avoid absurd result.”

31. In Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohanlal (1988) 2SCC 513, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease andRent Control) Act, 1960 was read harmoniously with the other provisionsof the Act, as a result of which the words “if the landlord required itfor his own use or for the use of any member of his family” were readinto sub-clause (iii). This was done for the reason:

“10. …If the two sub-clauses are not so read, it would lead toan absurd result. The non-residential building referred to in sub-clause (ii) is a building which is used for the purpose of keepinga vehicle or adapted for such use and all other non-residentialbuildings fall under sub-clause (iii). The State Legislature cannotbe attributed with the intention that it required a more stringentproof by insisting upon proof of bona fides of his requirement orneed also when a landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant from agarage than in the case of a non-residential building which isoccupied by large commercial house for carrying on business.The learned counsel for the respondent was not able to explainas to why the State Legislature gave greater protection to tenantsoccupying premises used for keeping vehicles or adapted for suchuse than to tenants occupying other types of non-residentialbuildings. It is no doubt true that the court while construing aprovision should not easily read into it words which have not ABC

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been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in whicha provision appears and the object of the statute in which thesaid provision is enacted the court should construe it in aharmonious way to make it meaningful.”

32. This judgment was followed in Surjit Singh Kalra v. UnionBof India (1991) 2 SCC 87 as follows:

“19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute whichare not there, but “where the alternative lies between eithersupplying by implication words which appear to have beenaccidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprivescertain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supplythe words” (Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar arethe observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. MohanLal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC 513, 524-25] where it was observedthat the court construing a provision should not easily read intoit words which have not been expressly enacted but having regardto the context in which a provision appears and the object of thestatute in which the said provision is enacted the court shouldconstrue it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. Anattempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevantprovisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See:Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf [1959 SCR1287, 1299 : AIR 1959 SC 198] .)

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20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevantcontentions as against the claim of the classified landlords. Thefact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirementin Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord fromproving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant fromshowing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for evictionagainst a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enoughindication in support of this construction from the title of Section25-B which states “special procedure for the disposal ofapplications for eviction on the ground of bona fiderequirement”.”

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33. In C.W.S. (India) Limited v. Commissioner of IncomeTax (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 296, Section 40(c)(iii) of the Income Tax Act,H1961 came up for discussion. The Court held:

“10. Now, it may be noticed that Section 40(a)(v) is only anexpanded version of Section 40(c)(iii). The idea was to bring theallowances in respect of the assets owned by the assessee, whichassets are used by its employee for his own purposes or benefit,within the net of ceiling. Section 40(c)(iii) did not cover suchallowances and this was sought to be remedied. The idea wascertainly not to bring about a different treatment of two situationsin Section 40(a)(v) referred to as clauses (i) and (ii) in thisjudgment. The consequence of accepting the assessee’sinterpretation would be that while the ceiling on expenditure wouldapply to a case falling under clause (i), no such ceiling wouldapply to a case falling under clause (ii) unless the employeegoverned by clause (ii) is also provided a benefit, amenity orperquisite falling under clause (i). The consequence would notonly be discriminatory but also very incongruous, almost absurd.In principle, there is no distinction between the two cases or twosituations, as they may be called. We are satisfied that the mereuse of the word “such” in clause (ii) should not have the effectof driving the court to place an interpretation upon the said clausewhich is not only discriminatory but is highly incongruous…In thisconnection, we may refer to the well-recognised rule ofinterpretation of statutes that where a literal interpretation leadsto absurd or unintended result, the language of the statute canbe modified to accord with the intention of Parliament and toavoid absurdity. The following passage from Maxwell’sInterpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) may usefully be quoted:

“1. Modification of the language to meet the intention.—Where the language of the statute, in its ordinary meaning andgrammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction ofthe apparent purpose of the enactment, or to someinconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have beenintended, a construction may be put upon it which modifiesthe meaning of the words and even the structure of thesentence. This may be done by departing from the rules ofgrammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words,or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that thelegislature could not possibly have intended what its wordssignify, and that the modifications made are mere correctionsof careless language and really give the true meaning. Where ABC

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the main object and the intention of a statute are clear, it mustnot be reduced to a nullity by the draftman’s unskilfulness orignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or theabsolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has saidthat he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsmanin doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt tointroduce an irrational rule: ‘The canons of construction arenot so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution.’”

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Full Bench of the KeralaHigh Court was right in taking the view it did on this aspect andwe agree with it.”

34. In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. (2000) 4 SCC285, this Court construed a provision of the Haryana Urban (Controlof Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 by interpreting the proviso to Section13(3) of the said Act by adding certain words as follows:

“12. …We agree with this contention of the landlord that normallythe courts will have to follow the rule of literal construction whichrule enjoins the court to take the words as used by the legislatureand to give it the meaning which naturally implies. But, there isan exception to this rule. That exception comes into play whenapplication of literal construction of the words in the statute leadsto absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legalcontext in which the words are used or by reading the statuteas a whole, it requires a different meaning. In our opinion, if theexpression “entitled to apply again” is given its literal meaning, itwould defeat the very object for which the legislature hasincorporated that proviso in the Act inasmuch as the object ofthat proviso can be defeated by a landlord who has more thanone tenanted premises by filing multiple applicationssimultaneously for eviction and thereafter obtain possession ofall those premises without the bar of the proviso being applicableto him. We are of the opinion that this could not have been thepurpose for which the proviso is included in the Act. If such aninterpretation is given then the various provisos found in sub-section (3) of Section 13 would become otiose and the very objectof the enactment would be defeated. Any such interpretation, inour opinion, would lead to absurdity. Therefore, we have nohesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the restrictioncontemplated under that proviso extends even up to the stage when the court or the tribunal is considering the case of thelandlord for actual eviction and is not confined to the stage offiling of eviction petition only.”

35. In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273, thisCourt construed Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 byeschewing a literal interpretation thereof, and reading into the Sectionthe words “and that reference is entertained and answered”. The Courtstated:

“9. …It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of theAct was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one)who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference underSection 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, hewould not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land AcquisitionAct when some other person makes a reference and thereference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice ifa literal interpretation is given to the expression “had not madean application to the Collector under Section 18” in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if thelandowner has made an application for reference under Section18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In otherwords, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make areference and get it answered and then subsequently makeanother application when some other person gets the referenceanswered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in PradeepKumari case [(1995) 2 SCC 736] the three learned Judges, whileenumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter anapplication under Section 28-A can be moved, had categoricallystated (SCC p. 743, para 10) “the person moving the applicationdid not make an application to the Collector under Section 18”.The expression “did not make an application”, as observed bythis Court, would mean, did not make an effective applicationwhich had been entertained by making the reference and thereference was answered. When an application under Section 18is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same notfructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount toan effective application and consequently the rights of such A

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Aapplicant emanating from some other reference being answeredto move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We,accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding that the dismissalof an application seeking reference under Section 18 on theground of delay would tantamount to not filing an applicationBwithin the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act,1894.”

36. Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment, whichis an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tiller of the soilstatutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and, given the factthat the literal interpretation of Section 32-F(1)(a) would be contraryCto justice and reason and would lead to great hardship qua persons whoare similarly circumstanced; as also to the absurdity of land going backto an absentee landlord when he has lost the right of personal cultivation,in the teeth of the object of the 1956 Amendment as mentionedhereinabove, we delete the words “.. of the fact that he has attainedDmajority..”. Without these words, therefore, the landlord belonging toall three categories has to send an intimation to the tenant, before theexpiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminatethe tenancy under Section 31.

Section 32-F to be read in conformity with Article 14 of theConstitution of IndiaE

37. In R.L. Arora v. Union of India (1964) 6 SCR 784, thisCourt laid down that:

“It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed inone way will be consistent with the constitution, and if anotherFinterpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Courtwould lean in favour of the former construction: (see Kedar NathSingh v. State of Bihar) [(1962) Supp 2 SCR 769].”

38. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R.Tendolkar (1959) SCR 279, this Court summarised the case law underGArticle 14 in the form of six propositions. We are concerned here withproposition (d), which reads as follows:

“… The principle enunciated above has been consistentlyadopted and applied in subsequent cases. The decisions of thisCourt further establish—

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(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm andmay confine its restrictions to those cases where the need isdeemed to be the clearest;”

Based on this proposition, Shri Bhasme has argued that thelegislature in the present case has recognised a certain degree of harm,namely, to tenants of minor landlords and may, therefore, confine itselfto such cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.

39. Proposition (d) has been later clarified in the seminal judgmentof this Court, In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979)1 SCC 380.A Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 72 of the aforesaidjudgment, after referring to Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case (supra) andother judgments, stated 13 propositions insofar as Article 14 isconcerned. We are directly concerned with propositions (1), (3), (6)and (8) which are set out as follows:

“72. As long back as in 1960, it was said by this Court inKangsari Haldar that the propositions applicable to cases arisingunder Article 14 “have been repeated so many times during thepast few years that they now sound almost platitudinous”. Whatwas considered to be platitudinous some 18 years ago has, inthe natural course of events, become even more platitudinoustoday, especially in view of the avalanche of cases which haveflooded this Court. Many a learned Judge of this Court has saidthat it is not in the formulation of principles under Article 14 butin their application to concrete cases that difficulties generallyarise. But, considering that we are sitting in a larger Bench thansome which decided similar cases under Article 14, and in viewof the peculiar importance of the questions arising in thisreference, though the questions themselves are not without aprecedent, we propose, though undoubtedly at the cost of somerepetition, to state the propositions which emerge from thejudgments of this Court insofar as they are relevant to thedecision of the points which arise for our consideration. Thosepropositions may be stated thus:

“(1) The first part of Article 14, which was adopted from theIrish Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the civil rightsof all persons within the territories of India. It enshrines a basicprinciple of republicanism. The second part, which is a corollaryof the first and is based on the last clause of the first section of A

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the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, enjoinsthat equal protection shall be secured to all such persons in theenjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination offavouritism. It is a pledge of the protection of equal laws, thatis, laws that operate alike on all persons under like circumstances.

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(3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equalprotection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the inventionand application of a precise formula. Therefore, classification neednot be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusionof persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusiveexactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validityof classification in any given case. Classification is justified if itis not palpably arbitrary.

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(6) The law can make and set apart the classes according tothe needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested byexperience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but theclassification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.

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(8) The differentia which is the basis of the classification andthe object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary isthat there must be a nexus between them. In short, while Article14 forbids class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposingliabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large numberof other persons similarly situated in relation to the privilegessought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed to be imposed,it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation,provided such classification is not arbitrary in the senseabovementioned.”

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To proposition (d) in Ram Krishna Dalmia’s case (supra) anexception has been engrafted in proposition (6) contained hereinabove.The law may recognise degrees of harm, but in so doing theclassification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. This isrepeated by way of a proviso to proposition (8) as well. We haveHreferred to the Statement of the Objects and Reasons for the 1969

Amendment. Paragraph 2 thereof stated that a large number of casesinvolving minor landlords had come to the notice of the legislature, forwhich reason the amnesty scheme mentioned in sub-section (1A) ofSection 32-F was enacted. However, what was forgotten by thedraftsman when the addition to Section 32-F(1)(a) was made was thefact that Section 32F(1)(a) referred to three categories of landlords andnot only one. The words added by the 1969 amendment thus gave reliefto tenants only qua minor landlords and not the other two categories.Obviously, the classification made in favour of tenants of minor landlordsas opposed to tenants of landlords of the other two categories is aclassification which is arbitrary in nature. This being the case, suchclassification would ordinarily have to be struck down as being violativeof Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

40. However, instead of striking down such classification as awhole, what can be done is to strike down the words “..of the factthat he has attained majority..”, as a result of which, what is added bythe 1969 Amendment to Section 32-F(1)(a) now ceases to bediscriminatory, as it is applicable to tenants of all three categories oflandlords.

41. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1, thisCourt referred to the positive aspect of the fundamental right containedin Article 14 thus:

“62. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of equalityof status and opportunity spoken of in the Preamble to theConstitution. The Article naturally divides itself into two parts—(1) equality before the law, and (2) the equal protection of thelaw. Judgments of this Court have referred to the fact that theequality before law concept has been derived from the law inthe UK, and the equal protection of the laws has been borrowedfrom the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United Statesof America. In a revealing judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting,in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v.Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 :1960 Cri LJ 1504] , AIR p. 1134 para 26 : SCR at p. 34 furtherwent on to state that whereas equality before law is a negativeconcept, the equal protection of the law has positive content. Theearly judgments of this Court referred to the “discrimination”aspect of Article 14, and evolved a rule by which subjects could AB

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be classified. If the classification was “intelligible” having regardto the object sought to be achieved, it would pass muster underArticle 14’s anti-discrimination aspect. Again, Subba Rao, J.,dissenting, in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab [LachhmanDass v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC222], SCR at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50)

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“50. … Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or ananxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis forclassification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive theArticle of its glorious content.”

He referred to the doctrine of classification as a “subsidiary rule”evolved by courts to give practical content to the said Article.

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63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer tothe “rule of law” or “positive” aspect of Article 14, theconcomitant of which is that if an action is found to be arbitraryDand, therefore, unreasonable, it would negate the equal protectionof the law contained in Article 14 and would be struck down onthis ground.”

42. Hiralal P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora(2016) 10 SCC 165, is a case in point. In this judgment, this Court struckEdown a portion of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women fromDomestic Violence Act, 2005. Section 2(q) of the said Act defined“Respondent” as meaning any adult male person who is, or has beenin a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whomthe aggrieved person has sought any relief. This Court having regardto the object sought to be achieved by the Act, struck down theFexpression “adult male” as follows:

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“39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the resultthat the microscopic difference between male and female, adultand non-adult, regard being had to the object sought to beachieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real or substantial nor doesit have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. Infact, as per the principle settled in Subramanian Swamy[Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC(Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36] judgment, the words “adultmale person” are contrary to the object of affording protectionto women who have suffered from domestic violence “of any G

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kind”. We, therefore, strike down the words “adult male” beforethe word “person” in Section 2(q), as these words discriminatebetween persons similarly situate, and far from being in tune with,are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act.

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44. An application of the aforesaid severability principle wouldmake it clear that having struck down the expression “adult male”in Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act, the rest of the Section is leftintact and can be enforced to achieve the object of the legislationwithout the offending words. Under Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act,while defining “respondent”, a proviso is provided only to carveout an exception to a situation of “respondent” not being an adultmale. Once we strike down “adult male”, the proviso has noindependent existence, having been rendered otiose.”

43. In Secretary, Mahatama Gandhi Mission v. BhartiyaKamgar Sena (2017) 4 SCC 449, this Court referred copiously to thejudgment in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, andthen held:

“88. What is the remedy open to the citizen and thecorresponding obligation of the judiciary to deal with such asituation, where the inequalities are created either by thelegislation or executive action? Traditionally, this Court and theHigh Courts have been declaring any law, which createdinequalities to be unconstitutional, but in Nakara case [D.S.Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S)145] this Court realised that such a course of action would notmeet with the obligations emanating from a combined readingof the directive principles and Article 14. Therefore, this Courtemphatically laid down in Nakara case [D.S. Nakara v. Unionof India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] that it ispossible to give an appropriate inductive relief by eliminating thefactors, which creates the artificial classification leading to adiscriminatory application of law.”

44. Respectfully following the law laid down in these judgments,and in order to read Section 32-F(1)(a) in conformity with Article 14,we eliminate the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..”so that the intimation that is to be made by the landlord has to be made A

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45. It now remains to deal with some of the judgments of thisCourt on the interpretation of Section 32-F. In Anna Bhau Magdumv. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai (1995) 5 SCC 243, a minor landlordBattained majority in 1965 i.e. before the 1969 Amendment Act cameinto force. After adverting to the amendments made in 1969, this Courtheld that for this reason the amendment did not apply to the facts ofthat case. It was also found, as a matter of fact, that despite knowingthat the Respondent landlord would attain majority on 17.1.1965, thetenant gave no intimation as required by sub-section (1A) to SectionC32-F even within the amnesty period of two years granted by the saidsub-section. The only argument made on behalf of the tenant in thatcase was that since there is an automatic purchase, the provisions ofsub-section (1A) are directory in nature. This was turned down statingthat the consequences of non-compliance of Section 32-F (1A) are laidDdown in Section 32-P(1) and that, therefore, the time period containedin sub-section (1A) of Section 32-F is mandatory in nature. This caseis wholly distinguishable on its facts and lays down the law on Section32-F(1A) with which we are not immediately concerned.

46. However, in Appa Narsappa v. Akubai Ganapati (1999) 4ESCC 443, this Court referred to the landlady widow on the facts ofthat case who had died in 1965, prior to the coming into force of theAmendment Act of 1969. In this factual scenario, since the tenant didnot comply with the timeline of one year given to him, the right topurchase of the tenant was stated to have come to an end. Theargument that one year should be from the date of knowledge wasFturned down in the following terms:

“4. It was submitted by the learned counsel that this being awelfare legislation enacted for the benefit of tenants should beconstrued in a liberal manner. He also submitted that the heirsof the landlady had not given any intimation to the appellant aboutGher death and therefore he could not have known who were theheirs of the landlady and given intimation to them. He submittedthat the period of one year should be counted from the date ofthe knowledge of the tenant. We cannot accept this submissionbecause the language of Sections 32-F and 31 is quite clear andHthe period of one year will have to be counted in accordance with the said provisions and not from the date of the knowledgeof the tenant. The provision of law being clear, we cannot in sucha case grant relief on the basis of equity.”

Since this judgment does not square with object sought to beachieved by the 1956 Amendment to the 1948 Act or to the declarationof law in this judgment, it does not state the law correctly and is,therefore, overruled.

47. The next judgment that was cited before us is Sudam GanpatKutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram (2006) 7 SCC 200. After settingout the relevant provisions of the Act, this Court held that on the factsof that case since Section 31(3) had ceased to apply, Section 32-F(1)did not apply at all, as a result of which there was no need for thetenant to issue any notice of intimation to the landlord. The otherjudgments that were cited were distinguished in paragraph 27 statingthat they were all judgments in which Section 32-F(1A) would apply.The facts of this case again are far removed from the facts of thepresent case and the judgment has, therefore, no application to the lawlaid down in the present case.

48. The next judgment cited before us is Tukaram MarutiChavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358. This judgmentfollowed the law laid down in Appa Narsappa (supra) and on factsheld that the Appellant tenant had complete knowledge of the death ofthe widow in that case, as a result of which the Appellant’s contentionthat he was confused as to who was the true owner was turned down.To the extent that this judgment follows the law laid down in AppaNarsappa (supra), this judgment also does not lay down the lawcorrectly and is overruled to this extent.

49. It now only remains to consider some of Shri Bhasme’s otherarguments. The argument made based on Section 14(1)(a) that sincea tenant is bound to pay the rent every year before the 31[st] May thereof,the tenant is bound to know that the person to whom he is paying renthas since died and that, therefore, knowledge cannot be brought in tothe construction of Section 32-F need not detain us. On facts in thepresent case, the landlady was actually at Mumbai, whereas the tenantwas at Ratnagiri. Also, Section 14(1)(b) makes it clear that in case thetenant fails to pay rent before the 31[st] May of every year, the landlordmust first give a three months’ notice in writing informing the tenantthat he has not so paid the rent, within which period the tenant is given A

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Atime to remedy the breach. On facts, there is nothing to show that anysuch notice was given. The other emotive argument that in theagricultural village world everyone knows about everybody else andthat, therefore, it may be assumed that a villager at Ratnagiri will knowabout his landlord’s death equally cannot apply on the facts of this caseas the landlord lived and died in Mumbai. The other emotive argumentBabout the reverse situation obtaining today as opposed to the situationobtaining in 1956, namely, that it is tenants who are now well off andlandlords who are poor is again a perception of learned counsel whichhas no bearing either on the facts of this case or the law that needs tobe laid down.C50. The questions referred to us are now answered as follows:

(i) The object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevantand applicable in deciding the scope of the right topurchase by a tenant of a landlord who was a widowor suffering from mental or physical disability on Tillers’day.

D

(ii) The successor-in-interest of a widow is obliged to sendan intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of thewidow to enable the tenant to exercise his right ofpurchase.

E

(iii) The decision in Appa Narsappa (supra) standsoverruled. The decision in Sudam Ganpat (supra)stands distinguished as stated in paragraph 47 of thejudgment. The decision in Tukaram Maruti (supra), tothe extent that it follows the law laid down in AppaFNarsappa (supra), stands overruled.

We, therefore, allow the appeals and set aside the judgment ofthe High Court dated 1[st] August, 2014. As a result, the tenant’s intimationof purchase of 2008 will now be taken on record by the authoritiesunder the Act, who may now proceed under the Act to determineGpurchase price and its payment consequent upon which the postponedright of the tenant in this case to own the land will then come into beingupon the statutory conditions being met. The appeals are disposed ofaccordingly.

HAnkit Gyan