M. L. SINGLA versus PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR. on 20 September 2018

[2018] 11 S.C.R. 455

M. L. SINGLA

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PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR.

(Civil Appeal No.1841 of 2010)

SEPTEMBER 20, 2018

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]

Service Law – Dismissal from service – Appellant was dismissedfrom service, on basis of a domestic enquiry, by the respondentno.1-bank on the ground of misconduct – Labour Court set asidethe order of the dismissal and granted appellant 50% back wagesalong with reinstatement – High Court set aside the award of theLabour Court – On appeal, held: Labour Court committedjurisdictional error as it failed to decide the validity and legality ofthe domestic enquiry and thereafter, if domestic enquiry was foundto be legal and proper, then it was to consider the proportionalityof the punishment given to the appellant – Furthermore, whileawarding 50% backwages, the Labour Court did not examine thequestion as to whether the appellant had pleaded and proved withaid of evidence that he was not gainfully employed after dismissalfrom service – High Court also failed to notice the jurisdictionalerrors committed by the Labour Court – However, there was noground to interfere in the conclusion arrived by the High Courtwhich resulted in upholding of the dismissal order – On perusal ofthe enquiry proceedings along with the Enquiry Report, no casewas made out to hold that the domestic enquiry suffered from anyprocedural lapse or was conducted in violation of the principle ofnatural justice thereby causing any prejudice to the rights of theappellant – Order of dismissal passed against the appellant wasneither wrong and nor disproportionate to the gravity of charges –Thus, punishment of dismissal upheld – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947– s.11-A.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The Labour Court committed more than onejurisdictional error in answering the Reference. The first errorwas that it failed to decide the validity and legality of the domestic

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Aenquiry. Since the dismissal order was based on the domesticenquiry, it was obligatory upon the Labour Court to first decidethe question as a preliminary issue as to whether the domesticenquiry was legal and proper. If the answer to the question onthe preliminary issue was that the domestic enquiry is legal andproper, the next question to be considered by the Labour CourtBwas whether the punishment of dismissal from the service iscommensurate with the gravity of the charges or isdisproportionate requiring interference in its quantum by theLabour Court. If the answer to this question was that it isdisproportionate, the Labour Court was entitled to interfere inCthe quantum of punishment by assigning reasons and substitutethe punishment in place of the one imposed by respondent No.1-Bank. This the Labour Court could do by taking recourse to thepowers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.[Paras 19, 20, 22 and 23] [462-E-H; 464-A-B]

D1.2 While deciding this question, it was not necessary forthe Labour Court to examine as to whether the charges are madeout or not. In other words, the enquiry for deciding the questionshould have been confined to the factors such as-what is the natureof the charge(s), its gravity, whether it is major or minor as perrules, the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the charges, theEemployee’s overall service record and the punishment imposedetc. [Para 24] [464-G]

2. The second error was that the Labour Court called uponthe parties to lead evidence on all the issues including the chargeof misconduct in the first instance itself. [Para 29][464-G]

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3. The third error committed by the Labour Court was thatit proceeded to examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer onthe charges like an Appellate Court, appreciated the evidenceadduced before the Enquiry Officer and the one adduced beforeit and then came to a conclusion that the findings of the EnquiryGOfficer are perverse. This the Labour Court could not do.[Para 30] [464-H; 465-A]

4. Assuming that the Labour Court had the jurisdiction todirect the parties in the first instance itself to adduce evidence H

on merits in support of the charges yet, it was obligatory uponthe Labour Court to first frame the preliminary issue on thequestion of legality and validity of the domestic enquiry and confineits discussion only for examining the legality and propriety of theenquiry proceedings. [Para 31] [465-B-C]

5. Depending upon the finding on the preliminary issue onthe legality of the enquiry proceedings, the Labour Court shouldhave proceeded to decide the next questions. The Labour Courtwhile deciding the preliminary issue could only rely upon theevidence, which was relevant for deciding the issue of legality ofenquiry proceedings but not beyond it. [Para 32] [465-C-D]

6. The fourth error was award of 50% back wages to theappellant. While awarding 50% back wages, the Labour Courtdid not examine the question as to whether the appellant hadpleaded and proved with the aid of evidence that he was notgainfully employed after his dismissal from service.[Para 34] [465-E-F]

7. There was no categorical finding recorded by the LabourCourt and the High Court as to whether the domestic enquirywas legal or proper. Therefore, this Court proceeded to examinethis issue in the first instance. Having perused the enquiryproceedings along with the Enquiry Report, this Court is of theview that no fault of any nature was noticed in the domestic enquiryproceedings for more than one reason. First, the appellant wasgiven full opportunity at every stage of the proceedings which heavailed; Second, he never raised any objection complainingcausing of any prejudice of any nature to him before the EnquiryOfficer; Third, he received all the papers/documents filed andrelied upon by respondent No.1-Bank in support of the charge-sheet; Fourth, he filed reply, cross examined the employer’switnesses, examined his witnesses in defense, attended theproceedings and lastly, the Enquiry Officer appreciated theevidence and submitted his reasoned report running in severalpages holding the appellant guilty of both the charges. [Paras 48,49 and 50] [468-B-E]

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A8. In short, no case is made out to hold that the domesticenquiry suffers from any procedural lapse or was conducted inviolation of the principle of natural justice thereby causing anyprejudice to the rights of the appellant. [Para 51] [468-E]

9. The charges against the appellant being serious inBnature, therefore, the order of dismissal passed against theappellant cannot be faulted with and nor it can be said to be, inany way, disproportionate to the gravity of charges. In other words,punishment of dismissal was proportionate with the gravity ofthe charges and hence deserves to be upheld. [Para 56][469-B-C]C

Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd.(1979) 3 SCC 371 : [1979] 3 SCR 1165 – relied on.

M.P. State Electricity Board v. Jarina Bee (Smt.)(2003) 6 SCC 141 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 535 ; G. M.Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh (2005) 5 SCC591: [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 569 ; U.P. State BrasswareCorporation v. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC479 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 609 ; J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v.K.P. Agrawal & Anr. (2007) 2 SCC 433 : [2007] 2 SCR60 ; Metropolitan Transport Corporation v. V.Venkatesan (2009) 9 SCC 601: [2009] 12 SCR 583 ;Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture MarketingBoard & Anr. (2009) 15 SCC 327 : [2009] 10 SCR908 ; Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti JuniorAdhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) & Ors. (2013) 10SCC 324 : [2013] 9 SCR 1 ; Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v.Jai Singh (1962) 3 SCR 684 ; Management of RitzTheater (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen [1963] 3 SCR 461;Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory Pvt. Ltd. v. MotipurSugar Factory [1965] 3 SCR 588 ; State Bank of Indiav. R.K. Jain (1972) 4 SCC 304 : [1972] 1 SCR 755 ;Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh(1972) 1 SCC 595 : [1972] 3 SCR 29 ; Workmen v.Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (1973) 1SCC 813 : [1973] 3 SCR 587 ; Cooper EngineeringLtd. v. P.P. Mundhe (1975) 2 SCC 671 : [1976] 1 SCR505 – referred to.

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M. L. SINGLA v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1841of 2010.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2007 of the HighCourt of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 16286 of2006.

Daya Krishan Sharma, Rohit Vats, Rajesh Kumar-I, AnantGautam, Aakash Sehrawat, Ms. Shruti Vats, Anmol Mehta, M/s. Mitter& Mitter Co., Advs. for the appearing parties.

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AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. This appeal is directedagainst the final judgment and order dated 23.08.2007 passed by theHigh Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No.16286of 2006 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writBpetition filed by respondent No.1-Bank and quashed the award dated30.05.2006 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central GovernmentIndustrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi in I.D. No.103/98.

2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the appeal, itis necessary to set out the relevant facts in detail infra.

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3. The appellant herein was the employee of respondent No.1-Punjab National Bank (PNB).

4. The appellant, at the relevant time, was working as Cashier inthe PNB, Branch Office at Jind (Punjab).

D5 . On 21.03.1984, the appellant while on duty was found consumingliquor in the Branch. On the same day, respondent No.1-Bank also foundshortage of Rs.35,000/- in daily cash balance on verification of the dailyaccounts.

6. Respondent No.1-Bank, therefore, decided to hold adepartmental inquiry to probe the aforementioned two charges againstEthe appellant as per the service rules.7. A charge-sheet was accordingly served on the appellant on11.10.1985. The charges read as under:

“1. That on 21.03.84 while you were working as CashierFIncharge at BO, Jind City, at about 01.30 p.m. you had askedShri Hakikat Rai, Peon-cum-Guard to bring a glass of waterand one Mathi which were provided to you by him and youtook out a bottle of liquor from your drawer and consumedthe same.

G2. That on 21.03.84 while you were working as CashierIncharge, you withdrew a sum of Rs.4,28,124.74 on differentoccasions leaving Rs.1,40,900/- in the cash safe of the Bankafter the said withdrawals. Besides this during normalbusiness hours, you had also received Rs.16,473.98 as directreceipt from customers and Rs.1,08,690/- from the Asst.

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Cashier to meet the payment. In all, you made totalpayment of Rs.3,31,417.68 during the day and at the closeof the day, there should have been a cash balance ofRs.2,21,871.04 with you. Besides this at closing of the day,you received Rs.95,448.35 on account of the balance ofreceipt made by the Assistant Cashier. Thus, including thecash in the cash safe total receipt made by Asstt. Cashierduring the day of the closing balance should have beenRs.4,58,219.39 with you whereas the actual balance wasonly Rs.423,219.39 with you showing a shortage ofRs.35,000/- and thus you acted in a manner which isprejudicial to the interest of the Bank or gross negligenceinvolving the Bank in serious loss. Further, on your requestyou were advance Rs.35,000/- from the suspense accountto meet the shortage of Rs.35,000/- occurred on that daydue to your gross negligence.”

8. Respondent No.1-Bank on 06.12.1985 appointed an EnquiryOfficer and the Presenting Officer. The appellant on being served withthe charge-sheet submitted his reply on 29.10.1985. Respondent No.1-Bank and the appellant then participated in the enquiry and adducedevidence in support of their respective stands.

9. On 12.02.1987, the Enquiry Officer submitted his EnquiryReport. He held that both the charges are proved against the delinquentemployee (appellant herein). The eventual conclusion on the two chargesreads as under:

“CHARGE-I The charge that on 21.03.84, while workingas Cashier Incharge, BO Jind City at about 01.30 p.m., ShriSingla asked Shri Hakikat Rai, Peon-cum,-Guard to bringa glass of water and one ‘Mathi’, which were provided tohim and he took out a bottle of liquor from the drawerconsumed the same, stands fully substantiated and hence,proved.

CHARGE-II The charge that on 21.03.84 at BO Jind, ashortage of Rs.35,000/- occurred in the cash handled byShri M.L. Singla while working as Cashier Incharge due togross negligence on his part, thus, causing bank a seriousloss, also stands fully substantiated, hence, proved.”

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A10. Respondent No.1 then sent a show cause notice along withthe Enquiry Report on 25.07.1987 to the appellant proposing therein toinflict the punishment of dismissal from service. The appellant filed hisreply. On 29.08.1987, the Competent Authority, on perusal of the EnquiryReport and the reply, concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officerand accordingly passed a dismissal order dated 29.08.1987.B

11. The appellant, felt aggrieved by his dismissal order, filed appealbefore the Appellate Authority as provided in service rules. The AppellateAuthority, by order dated 26.02.1988, dismissed the appeal finding nomerit therein.

C12. The appellant then approached the State Government prayingfor making an Industrial Reference to the Labour Court to decide thelegality and correctness of his dismissal order under the Industrial DisputeAct, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the ID Act”. The StateGovernment acceded to the request of the appellant and accordinglymade the following Reference on 16.08.1989 to the Labour Court underDSection 10 of the ID Act:

“Whether the action of the management of Punjab NationalBank in dismissing from service Shri M.L. Singla isjustified? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled?”

E13. The Labour Court, on receipt of the Reference, issued noticesto the parties. The parties filed their statements. The Labour Court thenasked both the parties to adduce their evidence. Both the partiesaccordingly adduced their evidence.

14. By award dated 30.05.2006, the Labour Court answered theReference in appellant’s favour. It was held that the finding of the EnquiryFOfficer on Charge-I and II is perverse and, therefore, it was set aside.It was further held that since no evidence was adduced by respondentNo.1-Bank to prove that the appellant (employee) was gainfully employedelsewhere after his dismissal, he was entitled to claim 50% back wagesalong with the relief of reinstatement. With these findings, the LabourGCourt set aside the dismissal order dated 29.08.1987 and answered theReference in appellant’s favour. The Labour Court, however, did notdecide the question as to whether the domestic enquiry is legaland proper.

15. Respondent No.1-Bank felt aggrieved and filed writ petitionin the High Court. The High Court, by impugned order, allowed the writpetition and set aside the award of the Labour Court. As a consequencethereof, the dismissal order dated 29.08.1987 was held legal and properand was accordingly upheld.

16. It is against this order, the employee has felt aggrieved andfiled the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court.

17. Heard Mr. Daya Krishna Sharma, learned counsel for theappellant and Mr. Rajesh Kumar, leaned counsel for respondent No.1-Bank.

18. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusalof the record of the case, we find no good ground to interfere in the“conclusion” arrived at by the High Court, but on our reasoning mentionedinfra.

It is necessary to examine the legality and correctness of theaward of the Labour Court in the first instance and then the impugnedorder.

19. When we examine the award in the light of detailed facts setout above, we find that the Labour Court committed more than onejurisdictional error in answering the Reference.

20. The first error was that it failed to decide the validity andlegality of the domestic enquiry. Since the dismissal order was based onthe domestic enquiry, it was obligatory upon the Labour Court to firstdecide the question as a preliminary issue as to whether the domesticenquiry was legal and proper.

21. Depending upon the answer to this question, the Labour Courtshould have proceeded further to decide the next question.

22. If the answer to the question on the preliminary issue was thatthe domestic enquiry is legal and proper, the next question to be consideredby the Labour Court was whether the punishment of dismissal from theservice is commensurate with the gravity of the charges or isdisproportionate requiring interference in its quantum by theLabour Court.

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23. If the answer to this question was that it is disproportionate,the Labour Court was entitled to interfere in the quantum of punishmentby assigning reasons and substitute the punishment in place of the oneimposed by respondent No.1-Bank. This the Labour Court could do bytaking recourse to the powers under Section 11-A of the ID Act.

B24. While deciding this question, it was not necessary for the LabourCourt to examine as to whether the charges are made out or not. Inother words, the enquiry for deciding the question should have beenconfined to the factors such as-what is the nature of the charge(s), itsgravity, whether it is major or minor as per rules, the findings of theEnquiry Officer on the charges, the employee’s overall service recordCand the punishment imposed etc.

25. If the Labour Court had come to a conclusion that the domesticenquiry is illegal because it was conducted in violation of the principlesof natural justice thereby causing prejudice to the rights of the employee,respondent No.1-Bank was under legal obligation to prove the misconductD(charges) alleged against the appellant (employee) before the LabourCourt provided he had sought such opportunity to prove the charges onmerits.

26. The Labour Court was then under legal obligation to givesuch opportunity and then decide the question as to whether respondentENo.1-Bank was able to prove the charges against the appellant on meritsor not.

27. If the charges against the appellant were held proved, thenext question to be examined was in relation to the proportionality of thepunishment given to the appellant.F

28. If the charges against the appellant were held not proved, theappellant was entitled to claim reinstatement with back wages either fullor partial depending upon the case made out by the parties on the issueof back wages.

29. The second error was that the Labour Court called upon theGparties to lead evidence on all the issues including the charge ofmisconduct in the first instance itself.

30. The third error committed by the Labour Court was that itproceeded to examine the findings of the Enquiry Officer on the charges H

like an Appellate Court, appreciated the evidence adduced before theEnquiry Officer and the one adduced before it and then came to aconclusion that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse. Thisthe Labour Court could not do.

31. Assuming that the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to directthe parties in the first instance itself to adduce evidence on merits insupport of the charges yet, in our opinion, it was obligatory upon theLabour Court to first frame the preliminary issue on the question oflegality and validity of the domestic enquiry and confined its discussiononly for examining the legality and propriety of the enquiry proceedings.

32. Depending upon the finding on the preliminary issue on thelegality of the enquiry proceedings, the Labour Court should haveproceeded to decide the next questions. The Labour Court while decidingthe preliminary issue could only rely upon the evidence, which wasrelevant for deciding the issue of legality of enquiry proceedings but notbeyond it.

33. In other words, the Labour Court failed to see that it wouldhave assumed the jurisdiction to examine the charges on the merits onlyafter the domestic enquiry had been held illegal and secondly, the employerhad sought permission to adduce evidence on merits to prove the chargesand on permission being granted he had led the evidence.

34. The fourth error was award of 50% back wages to theappellant. While awarding 50% back wages, the Labour Court did notexamine the question as to whether the appellant had pleaded and provedwith the aid of evidence that he was not gainfully employed after hisdismissal from service.

35. In order to claim back wages, it was necessary for the appellantto plead and prove that he was not gainfully employed after his dismissalwith the aid of evidence. Respondent No.1-Bank too was entitled toadduce evidence to prove otherwise. (See- M.P. State ElectricityBoard vs. Jarina Bee(Smt.), (2003) 6 SCC 141, G.M. HaryanaRoadways vs. Rudhan Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 591, U.P. StateBrassware Corporation vs. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC479, J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. K.P. Agrawal & Anr., (2007) 2 SCC433, Metropolitan Transport Corporation vs. V. Venkatesan, (2009)9 SCC 601, Jagbir Singh vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing A

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ABoard & Anr., (2009) 15 SCC 327) and Deepali Gundu Surwase vs.Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya(D.Ed.) & Ors., (2013) 10SCC 324.

36. The aforementioned four errors, in our opinion, go to the rootof the matter and being jurisdictional in nature and against the law laidBdown by this Court in a number of decisions, as detailed infra, renderthe award in question unsustainable.

37. Now coming to the reasoning of the High Court, we find thatthe High Court having referred to few decisions of this Court on thesubject, which were mostly on the powers of the Court under SectionC11A of the ID Act, failed to notice the aforementioned jurisdictional errorscommitted by the Labour Court. Indeed, in our view, these errors wereapparent in the award of the Labour Court and, therefore, should havebeen noticed for being corrected by clarifying the legal position keepingin view the law laid down by this Court in several decisions and thematter should have been remanded to the Labour Court for deciding itDafresh.

38. The High Court instead proceeded to examine the findings ofthe Labour Court and the Enquiry Officer on two charges on merits inits writ jurisdiction by entering into the factual arena which, in our opinion,was not permissible and on its appreciation came to a conclusion thatEthe reasoning of the Labour Court on Charge-I is perverse whereas thefinding of the Enquiry Officer on the said charge is proper.

39. The High Court accordingly reversed the finding of the LabourCourt on Charge-I and restored that of the Enquiry Officer. The HighCourt then held that since the Charge-I is proved, it is enough to sustainFthe dismissal order and, therefore, it is not necessary to examine themerits and demerits of Charge-II.

40. We cannot concur with the approach and the reasoning of theLabour Court or/and the High Court detailed above which, in our view,does not appear to be in conformity with the law laid down by this CourtGin a number of decisions.

41. The law on this subject was examined by this Court in severaldecisions beginning from Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Jai Singh (1962)3 SCR 684, Management of Ritz Theater (P) Ltd. vs. Its Workmen(1963) 3 SCR 461, Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory Pvt. Ltd. vs.

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Motipur Sugar Factory (1965) 3 SCR 588, State Bank of India vs.R.K. Jain (1972) 4 SCC 304, Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. vs.Ludh Budh Singh (1972) 1 SCC 595, Workmen vs. Firestone Tyre &Rubber Company of India (1973) 1 SCC 813 and Cooper EngineeringLtd. vs. P.P. Mundhe (1975) 2 SCC 671.

42. All the aforementioned decisions were examined in detail by aBench of Three Judges of this Court in Shankar Chakravarti vs.Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. (1979) 3 SCC 371.

43. Though in Shankar Chakravarti’s case (supra), the questionwas when the domestic enquiry is held illegal and improper by the LabourCourt, whether the Labour Court is duty bound to afford an opportunityto the employer to lead evidence to prove the charge against the workmanon merits before the Labour Court.

44. This Court while answering the aforesaid question held that itis for the employer to ask for such opportunity to lead evidence to provethe charge of misconduct and once such prayer is made in any form,i.e., orally or by application or in the pleading, the same cannot be deniedto the employer. It has to be granted to enable him to prove themisconduct. This Court further held that no duty is cast upon the Courtto offer such opportunity to the employer suo motu, if he does not askfor it. In other words, he has to ask for from the Court by any of thethree modes mentioned above.

45. While examining the aforementioned question, this Court alsotook note of several decision of this Court wherein this Court examinedthe questions in extenso, namely, where dismissal is based on enquiry,or no enquiry or illegal enquiry, how the Court should decide the legalityof dismissal. We have mentioned these cases in Para 41.

46. In our view, the reasoning, which we have given while dealingwith the first three errors committed by the Labour Court in Paras 20 to33, are based on the law laid down in aforementioned cases, which areapproved in Shankar Chakravarti’s case (supra).

Having examined the approach, reasoning and the conclusionarrived at by the Labour Court and the High Court which is not legallysustainable, the next question which arises for consideration is whatcourse should be adopted to decide the case.

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A47. We are, however, not inclined to remand the case to the LabourCourt after lapse of a long period of more than a decade. It is more sowhen we have examined the entire case on merits also.

48. As mentioned above, there was no categorical finding recordedby the Labour Court and the High Court as to whether the domesticBenquiry was legal or proper. We, therefore, proceed to examine thisissue in the first instance.

49. Having perused the enquiry proceedings along with the EnquiryReport, we are of the view that no fault of any nature can be noticed inthe domestic enquiry proceedings for more than one reason.C

50. First, the appellant was given full opportunity at every stageof the proceedings which he availed; Second, he never raised anyobjection complaining causing of any prejudice of any nature to himbefore the Enquiry Officer; Third, he received all the papers/documentsfiled and relied upon by respondent No.1-Bank in support of the charge-Dsheet; Fourth, he filed reply, cross examined the employer’s witnesses,examined his witnesses in defense, attended the proceedings and lastly,the Enquiry Officer appreciated the evidence and submitted his reasonedreport running in several pages holding the appellant guilty of both thecharges.

E51. In short, in our opinion, no case is made out to hold that thedomestic enquiry suffers from any procedural lapse or was conductedin violation of the principle of natural justice thereby causing any prejudiceto the rights of the appellant.

52. Once it is held that the domestic enquiry is legal and proper,the next question arises for consideration is as to whether the punishmentFimposed on the appellant is just and legal or it is disproportionate to thegravity of the charges.

53. It is not in dispute that both the charges were held proved indomestic enquiry. One cannot possibly argue that the charges were simplein nature. In other words, both the charges were of a serious nature.G

54. So far as Charge-I is concerned, it was proved in the enquirythat the appellant had consumed liquor while on duty. No employerwould ever allow or tolerate such behavior of his employee while onduty. The employer had, therefore, every right to initiate domestic enquiryagainst such employee for such reprehensible conduct and behavior.H

M. L. SINGLA v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ANR.[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

55. So far as Charge-II is concerned, that a shortage ofRs.35,000/- cash was found in cash balance on the particular day wasalso held proved. It is not in dispute that the appellant was working asCashier. He was on duty on that day. He was, therefore, directlyresponsible for the shortage found in the cash.

56. In our opinion, both the charges being serious in nature,therefore, the order of dismissal passed against the appellant cannot befaulted with and nor it can be said to be, in any way, disproportionate tothe gravity of charges. In other words, punishment of dismissal wasproportionate with the gravity of the charges and hence deserves to beupheld.

57. In view of the foregoing discussion, though we agree with theconclusion arrived at by the High Court, which also resulted in upholdingof the dismissal order, but this we do so on our reasoning detailed above.

58. The appeal thus found to be devoid of any merit. It fails and isaccordingly dismissed.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal dismissed.

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