M. SRIKANTH versus STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR. on 21 October 2019

[2019] 13 S.C.R. 961

M. SRIKANTH

v.

STATE OF TELANGANA AND ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1586 of 2019)

OCTOBER 21, 2019

[NAVIN SINHA AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –s.482 –Exercise ofjurisdiction under – Respondent no.2-complainant filed complaintagainst nine persons including accused no.1, her brother – As perthe complainant, her father was the owner of the property in questionand after his death, the property was inherited by her, her threesisters and accused no.1 – She averred that her father had enteredinto a development agreement with a Construction Company thatassigned the rights in favour of a Company represented by accusedno.3, who after the death of her father tried to trespass into theproperty – Complaint registered – Various other complaints, suitsfiled by the complainant and her sisters against accused persons –Complaint also alleged that accused no.1 fabricated documents,Will – Direction for registration of FIR – Criminal petition of accusedno.4 (who, allegedly, was permitted by accused no.1 to sub-leasethe land in favour of accused no.5) u/s.482, dismissed – That ofaccused nos.5-9, allowed – Present appeals by the complainantand accused no.4 – Held: Complaint reveals disputed property claimbased on inheritance between the complainant, her sisters andaccused no.1 – There is no whisper in the complaint that the accusedno.4 was fully aware that accused no.1 was not the sole beneficiaryby inheritance and that the property had devolved upon thecomplainant and her sisters – Nothing to show that knowing this hecollusively entered into the lease agreement with accused no.1, bycreating fabricated Will – No suggestion with regard to manner ofconspiracy, as alleged – Complaint itself reveals that the father ofthe complainant and accused no.3 had himself entered intodevelopment agreement which was cancelled during his lifetime –Issues raised reflect a civil dispute with regard to inheritanceamongst the legal heirs – Dispute with regard to the inheritance

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962SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Acan not be decided in criminal proceeding – Same can be doneonly in an appropriate civil proceeding – Civil proceedings withthat regard are already instituted by various parties including thecomplainant– Further, Single Judge rightly found that there was nomaterial to proceed against accused nos.5-9– Original accusedBno.4’s case is covered by categories (1) & (3) carved out by SupremeCourt in the Bhajan Lal case – Also, even if the allegations are takenon face value, there is no material to proceed against him – Criminalproceedings against accused no.4, quashed – Penal Code, 1860-ss.120-B, 380, 420, 448.

CDisposing of the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

CDisposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The complaint reveals a disputed property claimbased on inheritance between the complainant, her sisters andher brother, accused No.1. The complainant also disputes withregard to the area of the property including the manner of itsDdevolution upon the parents of the complainant and her competinginterest with that of her siblings. There is not even a whisper inthe complaint that the present appellant, i.e., accused No. 4 wasfully aware that accused No.1 was not the sole beneficiary byinheritance and that the property had devolved upon thecomplainant and her sisters. Also there is nothing to show thatEknowing this he has collusively entered into the lease agreementwith accused No.1, by creating a false and fabricated will. Though,there is a mention with regard to conspiracy, but there is noteven a suggestion with regard to manner of such conspiracy. Thefather of the complainant and accused No.3 had himself enteredFinto a development agreement which subsequently came to becancelled during his lifetime. It would also reveal, that only afterthe lease in question was executed in favour of the appellant, thecomplainant has raised all these issues. The issues raised reflecta civil dispute with regard to inheritance amongst the legal heirs.It is not understood as to how a dispute with regard to theGinheritance under a will and deed of confirmation can be decidedin a criminal proceeding. The same can be done only in anappropriate civil proceeding. Not only that, the civil proceedingswith that regard are already instituted by various parties includingthe complainant. Though in the complaint, the complainant hadH

mentioned about pendency of O.S. No. 1989 of 1996 againstaccused No.3 and O.S. No. 1403 of 1999 against M/s BanjaraConstruction Pvt. Ltd., there is no reference with regard to theother proceedings. Accused No.4 has been impleaded as a party-defendant in O.S. No. 506 of 2001 only on 30.10.2009.[Paras 19-21][971-E-H; 972-A-B, E-F]

1.2 O.S. No. 239 of 2004 has already been filed by thecomplainant against her brother, accused No.1 and her threesisters inter alia for partition and separate possession which isstated to be pending. As such, the documents alleged to befraudulent in the complaint will fall for consideration in the saidsuit. A possibility of contradictory finding in civil proceeding asagainst criminal proceedings cannot be ruled out. Though, thecomplainant had filed Writ Petition Nos. 23017/2009 and23672/2009 to restrain construction on the plot in question, thesame was dismissed on 28.10.2009. However, there is no mentionwith regard to the same in the complaint. The complainant andher sisters executed an agreement of sale-cum-irrevocablespecific power of attorney on 20.03.2015. Various litigations havealso been filed with regard to the installation of the petrol pumpand grant of N.O.C. etc. The complaint was sent to the police forregistration of an FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) ofthe Cr.P.C. on 24.11.2010. In its final report dated 30.08.2017,the police has opined that no material had surfaced to show anyconspiracy during investigation. The Learned Judge himself inParagraph 8, has observed that it is nobodies case that thesignatures on the documents in question are forged or anybodyhas impersonated for the purpose of cheating. The LearnedJudge, having found that the entire allegations with regard toforgery and fabrication and accused No.1 executing the lease deedon the basis of the said forged and fabricated documents wereonly against accused No. 1, ought to have exercised hisjurisdiction to quash the proceedings qua accused No. 4 also.The Learned Judge, HC, ought to have applied the sameparameters to the present accused No. 4, which had been appliedto the other accused whose applications were allowed, the SingleJudge rightly found that there was no material to proceed againstaccused No. 5 – HPCL and its officers accused Nos. 6 and 9 as AB

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Aalso accused Nos. 7 and 8, who have been roped in, only becausethey were the attesting witnesses. The Single Judge rightlyexercised his jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Thecase of accused No. 4 is covered by categories (1) and (3) carvedout by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal. Even if the allegationsBin the complaint are taken on its face value, there is no materialto proceed further against accused No. 4. Continuation of criminalproceedings against accused No. 4, would amount to nothing elsebut an abuse of process of law. As such, his appeal deserves tobe allowed. The criminal appeal filed by accused No. 4 is allowed.

The criminal proceedings in Crime No. 311/2010 of P.S., CentralCCrime Station, Hyderabad, against accused No. 4 are quashedand set aside. The criminal appeals filed by the originalcomplainant are dismissed.[Paras 22-28][972-F-H; 973-E-G; 974-C-H; 975-A]

State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.D(1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 –relied on.

Sardool Singh v. Nasib Kaur (1987) Supp. SCC 146 –referred to.

Case Law ReferenceE

[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259relied onPara 15

(1987) Supp. SCC 146referred toPara 22

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1586 of 2019.F

From the Judgment and Order dated 01.06.2017 of the High Courtof Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State ofAndhra Pradesh in Crl. P. No. 6609 of 2013.

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Criminal Appeal Nos. 1587-1588 of 2019.

K. M. Nataraj, ASG, D. Rama Krishna Reddy, Mrs. D. BharathiReddy, Shakil Ahmed Syed, Uzmi Jamil Husain, Sanjay Kapur, Ms. MeghaKarnwal, Bharath Gangadharan, Kauser Husain, S. Udaya Kumar Sagar,Ms. Swati Bhardwaj, Advs. for the appearing parties.H

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B. R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.

2. Both these appeals arise out of the common Judgment andOrder passed by the single Judge of High Court of Judicature atHyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradeshdated 01.06.2017.

3. The criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9156 of2017 filed by M. Srikanth, the original accused No. 4, challenges thatpart of the order by which the single Judge of the High Court has rejectedhis application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing theproceedings in Crime No. 311/2010 of P.S., Central Crime Station,Hyderabad. The criminal appeals arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos.9160-9161 of 2017 at the instance of the original complainant challengethat part of the order vide which the single Judge of the High Court hasquashed the complaint qua accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are asunder:

The parties are referred to herein as they are arrayed in the originalcomplaint. The Respondent No. 2, Fatima Hasna, in the criminal appealarising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9156 of 2017 (hereinafter referred to as“the complainant”), is the sister of accused No. 1, Akramuddin Hasan.The complainant had filed a private complaint against nine personsincluding accused No. 1. The allegations in the said complaint in a nutshellis that the house bearing No. 3-5-1102 at Narayanaguda, Hyderabad,originally belonged to Afzaluddin Hassan, the father of the complainant,who died on 28.05.1996. Afzaluddin Hassan, possessed the same upondeath of his mother, Khairunnisa Begum Saheba as per the oral giftdated 12.12.1966 and deed of confirmation of the said oral gift. It wasthe case of the complainant, that upon death of her father, AfzaluddinHassan, the said property was inherited by her as well as her threesisters and accused No. 1, her brother. It is further averred in thecomplaint, that her father had entered into a development agreement on25.05.1989 with M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. However,the same was cancelled during his lifetime. It is further averred by her A

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Athat after the death of her father, accused No. 3, Abid Rassol Khan,tried to trespass into the property and for that on her complaint, CrimeNo. 159/1996 came to be registered for the offence punishable underSections 448 and 380 of the IPC on 14.06.1996.

5. It is further averred by her that, thereafter, she came to knowBabout the existence of a document thereby assigning the rights by M/sBanjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. in favour of M/s NRI HousingCompany Pvt. Ltd., represented through accused No. 3, Abid RasoolKhan. For the said incident another complaint vide Crime No. 177/1996,came to be registered for the offence punishable under Sections 418and 420 read with Section 120-B of the IPC against seven personsCincluding M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and accusedNo. 3 in the present case. With regard to the said cause of action, thecomplainant had also filed Original Suit No. 1989/1996 against accusedNo. 3 and others for permanent injunction. The complainant’s sistershad filed O.S. No. 1403/1999 against M/s Banjara Construction CompanyDPvt. Ltd. of which accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan, was the ManagingDirector. According to the complainant, certain interim orders were alsopassed in the said original suits.

6. It is further the case of the complainant in the complaint, thather brother accused No. 1, Akramuddin Hasan, who had falsely createdEa will in Urdu purported to be executed by their paternal grandmother,Khairunnisa Begum Saheba, in favour of their parents Afzaluddin Hassanand Liaquathunnisa Begum for their lifetime and vested remainder toaccused No. 1. It is the case of the complainant, that the said will isregistered and said to have been executed on 02.04.1950. Further, it isthe case, that accused No. 1 had also created another forged andFfabricated document styled as deed of confirmation (Hiba Bil Musha)dated 08.03.1990 vide which the property is orally gifted to accused No.1 on 29.08.1989 and also handed over physical possession thereof.

7. It is further the case of the complainant, that accused No. 1,posing himself to be the owner of the premises, on the basis of theGalleged oral will and deed of confirmation, created a registered lease on01.12.2008, bearing document No. 3107/2008 permitting accused No. 4to sub-lease the said land in favour of accused No. 5, HindustanPetroleum Corporation Ltd. (“HPCL”). Accused No. 6 and accusedNo. 9 are the employees/officers of accused No. 5 - HPCL whereas, H

accused Nos. 7 and 8 are the attesting witnesses. On the basis of thesaid complaint, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directed the registrationof an FIR on 24.11.2010.

8. It appears, that various criminal petitions came to be filed beforethe High Court. Criminal Petition No. 6047/2013 was filed by accusedNo. 7, Khaja Mohiuddin and accused No. 8, G. V. Prasad. CriminalPetition No. 6064/2013 came to be filed by accused No. 3, Abid RasoolKhan. Criminal Petition No. 6609/2013 came to be filed by accused No.4, M. Srikanth, who is the appellant in the criminal appeal arising out ofSLP (Crl.) No. 9156/2017. Criminal Petition No. 8743/2013 was filed byaccused No. 5 - HPCL and its officers, accused No. 6, S.K. Srui andaccused No. 9, R. Umapathi. By the impugned Order, the High Courtallowed the Criminal Petitions of all the applicants except accused Nos.3 and 4.

9. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of his petition, accused No. 4,so also the original complainant, being aggrieved by the impugned Orderby which the petitions of accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 have been allowed,have approached this Court.

10. We have heard Mr. D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counselappearing on behalf of the appellant, M. Srikanth, and Mr. Shakil AhmedSyed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant. We havealso heard Mr. K. M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General,appearing on behalf of the original accused No. 5 - HPCL and its officers/employees, accused Nos. 6 and 9.

11. The learned counsel for the original accused No. 4 submitted,that the only role attributed to the said accused in the complaint is that alease deed was executed in his favour by accused No. 1, showing himselfto be the absolute owner of the property in question; whereas, the propertywas owned by the complainant and her three sisters along with accusedNo. 1. It is further submitted, that the entire allegations of fabrication soas to show that the property belongs to accused No. 1 are against accusedno. 1. It is submitted that accused No. 4, on the basis of the advertisementissued by accused No. 5 – HPCL for installation of a petrol pump, hadapplied and after being successful in the competition had obtained theland in question on lease from accused No. 1. He submitted, that as perthe terms and conditions for grant of the said outlet, he was required toget the land on long term lease and sub-lease the same to accused No.5 – HPCL. It is submitted, that even taking the complaint at its face A

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Avalue, there are no averments which would show that accused No. 4had any role to play in fabrication of the document which bestowed thetitle on accused No. 1. It is further submitted, that there are various civilproceedings pending amongst the complainant, accused No. 1 and theirsisters so also the other parties. Accused No. 4 is not at all concernedwith the same.B

12. It is further submitted, that as a matter of fact, the case ofaccused No. 4 could not have been distinguished from the case as againstaccused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. It is submitted, that applying the samelogic, which the learned Judge of the High Court had applied whilequashing the case against the said accused, the case against the presentCaccused No. 4 also ought to have been quashed. It is submitted that thecontinuation of criminal proceedings against accused No. 4, the appellantherein, would be nothing else but an abuse of the process of law.

13. Per contra, Mr. Shakil Ahmed Syed, learned counsel appearingon behalf of the private complainant, submitted that the High Court hasDrightly dismissed the petition of accused No. 4. It is submitted, that accusedNo. 4 in order to deprive the benefits of the property to the complainanthad got the lease deed executed in his favour from accused No. 1 knowingvery well that the claim of accused No. 1 was based on fabricateddocument(s). He further submitted, that the High Court had also erredin allowing the petitions of accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 and, therefore,Ethe order to the extent that it quashes the criminal proceedings qua themalso needs to be set aside.

14. Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General,submitted that accused Nos. 5, 6 and 9 have been unnecessarily draggedin the said criminal litigation. It is submitted that accused No. 5 - HPCLFis a public undertaking and accused Nos. 6 and 9 are its officers. It issubmitted that the High Court has rightly arrived at a finding that therewas no material against them and quashed the criminal proceedings quathem.

15. This Court, in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs.Bhajan Lal and Ors.[1]after considering all its earlier judgments, hasGlaid down principles which are required to be taken into consideration bythe High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of theCr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to thefollowing observations of this Court in Bhajan Lal (supra):

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevantprovisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principlesof law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating tothe exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or theinherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we haveextracted and reproduced above, we give the following categoriesof cases by way of illustration wherein such power could beexercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court orotherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not bepossible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficientlychannelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to givean exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such powershould be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information reportor the complaint, even if they are taken at their face valueand accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constituteany offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report andother materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclosea cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by policeofficers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under anorder of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR orcomplaint and the evidence collected in support of the samedo not disclose the commission of any offence and makeout a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizableoffence, no investigation is permitted by a police officerwithout an order of a Magistrate as contemplated underSection 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are soabsurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which noprudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that thereis sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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A(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of theprovisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under whicha criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution andcontinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is aspecific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,Bproviding efficacious redress for the grievance of theaggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeanceon the accused and with a view to spite him due to privateCand personal grudge.”

16. It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that where theallegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken attheir face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitutea case against the accused, the High Court would be justified in quashingDthe proceedings. Further, it has been held that where the uncontrovertedallegations in the FIR and the evidence collected in support of the samedo not disclose any offence and make out a case against the accused,the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings.

17. Let us consider the case of the complainant on its face valueEwithout going into the truthfulness or otherwise thereof. It is the case ofthe complainant, that the property originally belonged to her grandmother.After her death, it devolved upon her father, Afzaluddin Hassan andafter his death on 28.05.1996, it devolved upon accused No. 1 and histhree sisters, namely, Karima Siddiqua, Saleha Asmatunnisa and SadikaFKhairunnisa. Their father had entered into a development agreementwith M/s Banjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd., however, the samewas cancelled during his lifetime. After the death of their father on28.05.1996, accused No. 3 tried to trespass into the property for which,on the basis of her complaint a crime was registered. That the said M/sBanjara Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. had executed some documentGalleging assignment of its rights in favour of M/s NRI Housing CompanyPvt. Ltd. of which accused No. 3, Abid Rasool Khan was the ManagingDirector. In respect of the same action, Crime No. 177/1996 had beenregistered at the instance of the complainant. With respect to the saidtransaction, two original suits were already filed, one by the complainantHand another by her sisters.

18. It is further the case of the complainant, that accused No.1created a will in Urdu purported to be executed by her grandmotherbequeathing the property in favour of her parents, namely, AfzaluddinHassan and Liaquathunnisa Begum for their lifetime and vesting theremainder to accused No. 1. The said will is created on a non-judicialstamp paper of Nizamat Jung and has been allegedly executed on02.04.1950. According to the complainant, accused No. 1, her brother,had created another forged and fabricated document styled as deed ofconfirmation (Hiba Bil Musha) dated 08.03.1990 confirming the oral giftto accused No. 1 and also recording handing over of physical possession.It is her case, that on the basis of these fabricated documents, accusedNo. 1, posing himself to be an absolute owner of the property, executeda lease deed in favour of accused No. 4 (the appellant herein in one ofthe appeals) on 01.12.2008. It is further the case of the complainant,that thereafter accused No. 4 executed a sub-lease in favour of accusedNo. 5 - HPCL represented by accused Nos. 6 and 9 within a period oftwo months i.e. on 30.01.2009 and that accused Nos. 7 and 8 are theattesting witnesses. That is all the case of the complainant.

19. The complaint filed by respondent No. 2 runs into 26 pagesand 26 paragraphs. As already discussed hereinabove, it reveals a disputedproperty claim based on inheritance between the complainant, her sistersand her brother, accused No. 1. A perusal of the complaint would furtherreveal, that the complainant also disputes with regard to the area of theproperty including the manner of its devolution upon the parents of thecomplainant and her competing interest with that of her siblings. Thereis not even a whisper in the complaint that the present appellant, i.e.,accused No. 4 was fully aware that accused No. 1 was not the solebeneficiary by inheritance and that the property had devolved upon thecomplainant and her sisters. Also there is nothing to show that knowingthis he has collusively entered into the lease agreement with accusedNo. 1, by creating a false and fabricated will. Though, there is a mentionwith regard to conspiracy, but there is not even a suggestion with regardto manner of such conspiracy.

20. Upon perusal of the complaint itself, it would reveal that thefather of the complainant and accused No. 3 had himself entered into adevelopment agreement which subsequently came to be cancelled duringhis lifetime. It would also reveal, that only after the lease in question wasexecuted in favour of the appellant, the complainant has raised all these AB

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Aissues. We are of the considered view, that the issues raised reflect acivil dispute with regard to inheritance amongst the legal heirs. We failto understand as to how a dispute with regard to the inheritance under awill and deed of confirmation can be decided in a criminal proceeding.We find, that the same can be done only in an appropriate civil proceeding.Not only that, the civil proceedings with that regard are already institutedBby various parties including the complainant. These proceedings are asfollows:

(i) O.S. No. 239 of 2004 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,CCC, Hyderabad.

C(ii)O.S. No. 337 of 2002 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,CCC, Hyderabad.

(iii) O.S. No. 58 of 2001 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,CCC, Hyderabad.

(iv) O.S. No. 277 of 2000 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,DCCC, Hyderabad.

(v) O.S. No. 506 of 2001 on the file of the Hon’ble XI ACJ,CCC, Hyderabad.

(vi) Writ Petition (C) No. 685 of 2010.

21. It will be relevant to refer that though in the complaint, theEcomplainant had mentioned about pendency of O.S. No. 1989 of 1996against accused No. 3 and O.S. No. 1403 of 1999 against M/s BanjaraConstruction Pvt. Ltd., there is no reference with regard to the otherproceedings. Accused No. 4 has been impleaded as a party-defendantin O.S. No. 506 of 2001 only on 30.10.2009.F

22. O.S. No. 239 of 2004 has already been filed by the complainantagainst her brother, accused No. 1 and her three sisters inter alia forpartition and separate possession which is stated to be pending. As such,the documents alleged to be fraudulent in the complaint will fall forconsideration in the said suit. A possibility of contradictory finding in civilGproceeding as against criminal proceedings cannot be ruled out. Though,the complainant had filed Writ Petition Nos. 23017/2009 and 23672/2009to restrain construction on the plot in question, the same was dismissedon 28.10.2009. However, there is no mention with regard to the same inthe complaint. This Court in Sardool Singh vs. Nasib Kaur[2] observedas follows:

[B. R. GAVAI, J.]

“2. A civil suit between the parties is pending wherein thecontention of the respondent is that no will was executed whereasthe contention of the appellants is that a will has been executedby the testator. A case for grant of probate is also pending in thecourt of learned District Judge, Rampur. The civil court is thereforeseized of the question as regards the validity of the will. The matteris sub judice in the aforesaid two cases in civil courts. At thisjuncture the respondent cannot therefore be permitted to institutea criminal prosecution on the allegation that the will is a forgedone. That question will have to be decided by the civil court afterrecording the evidence and hearing the parties in accordance withlaw. It would not be proper to permit the respondent to prosecutethe appellants on this allegation when the validity of the will isbeing tested before a civil court. We, therefore, allow the appeal,set aside the order of the High Court, and quash the criminalproceedings pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, FirstClass, Chandigarh in the case entitled Smt Nasib Kaur v. SardoolSingh. This will not come in the way of instituting appropriateproceedings in future in case the civil court comes to the conclusionthat the will is a forged one. We of course refrain from expressingany opinion as regards genuineness or otherwise of the Will inquestion as there is no occasion to do so and the question is wideopen before the lower courts.”

23. It is further to be noted, that the complainant and her sistersexecuted an agreement of sale-cum-irrevocable specific power ofattorney on 20.03.2015 in favour of one Mohd. Khalid Shareef. Variouslitigations have also been filed with regard to the installation of the petrolpump and grant of N.O.C. etc. The complaint was sent to the police forregistration of an FIR and investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.on 24.11.2010. In its final report dated 30.08.2017, the police has opinedthat no material had surfaced to show any conspiracy during investigation.

24. The learned Judge himself in Paragraph 8, after observingthat it is nobodies case that the signatures on the documents in questionare forged or anybody has impersonated for the purpose of cheating,goes on to observe thus:

“8…..The allegation in nutshell in this regard is that accused No.1 is not the absolute owner of the properties, but for one of theco-owner or co-sharer along with the de facto complainant andother sisters of them and he falsely claimed as if he is the owner AB

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for purpose of cheating by using as if genuine forged and fabricateddocuments of so called will and so called deed of confirmation.The so called will is of the year 1950 and the so called deed ofconfirmation is of year 1989-1990 and the alleged oral gift prior tothat is of 1966….”

B25. We fail to understand, as to how after observing the aforesaid,the learned Judge could have refused to quash the proceedings againstaccused No. 4. Not only that, but on the basis of the said observations,the learned Judge himself has observed that it will not be in the interestof justice to permit the Police authorities to arrest the accused for thepurposes of investigation. We are of the considered view, that the learnedCJudge, having found that the entire allegations with regard to forgeryand fabrication and accused No. 1 executing the lease deed on the basisof the said forged and fabricated documents were only against accusedNo. 1, ought to have exercised his jurisdiction to quash the proceedingsqua accused No. 4 also. We find that the learned Judge ought to haveDapplied the same parameters to the present accused No. 4, which hadbeen applied to the other accused whose applications were allowed.

26. Insofar as the criminal appeals arising out of the special leavepetitions filed by the original complainant is concerned, we absolutelyfind no merit in the appeals. The learned single Judge has rightly foundEthat there was no material to proceed against accused No. 5 – HPCLand its officers accused Nos. 6 and 9 as also accused Nos. 7 and 8, whohave been roped in, only because they were the attesting witnesses.The learned single Judge has rightly exercised his jurisdiction under Section482 of the Cr.P.C.F27. Insofar as original accused No. 4 is concerned, we have no F27. Insofar as original accused No. 4 is concerned, we have nohesitation to hold, that his case is covered by categories (1) and (3)carved out by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). As alreadydiscussed hereinabove, even if the allegations in the complaint are takenon its face value, there is no material to proceed further against accusedNo. 4. We are of the considered view, that continuation of criminalGproceedings against accused No. 4, M. Srikanth, would amount to nothingelse but an abuse of process of law. As such, his appeal deserves to beallowed.

28. In the result, the criminal appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)No. 9156/2017 filed by accused No. 4 is allowed. The criminal proceedings H

in Crime No. 311/2010 of P.S., Central Crime Station, Hyderabad, againstaccused No. 4 are quashed and set aside. The criminal appeals arisingout of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 9160-61/2017 filed by the original complainantare dismissed.

Divya Pandey

Appeals disposed of.

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