R. MUTHUKRISHNAN versus THE REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS on 28 January 2019

[2019] 1 S.C.R. 589

R. MUTHUKRISHNAN

v.

THE REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

(Writ Petition (C) No. 612 of 2016)

JANUARY 28, 2019

[ARUN MISHRA AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]

Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970:

rr. 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D (as inserted by amendment in2016) – Empowerment of High Court to debar an advocate frompracticing – Validity of – Held: High Court Rules have been framedin exercise of powers conferred u/s. 34 of Advocates Act – Section34 does not confer power to frame rules to debar a lawyer forprofessional misconduct – It is apparent from the provisions andthe scheme of the Advocates Act that the Act never intended to conferdisciplinary powers upon the High Court or Supreme Court exceptto the extent dealing with an appeal u/s. 38 of Advocates Act – It isthe Bar Councils of States and Bar Council of India which have thepower to discipline the lawyers and maintain nobility of theprofession under Advocates Act – The High Court has the power todebar the advocate under the Contempt of Courts Act – Even whenthe Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council is not as effective asit should be, the very purpose of disciplinary control by Bar Councilcannot be permitted to be frustrated – Such failure on the part ofBar Council can be supervised by the Court – Therefore, theimpugned rules could not have been framed u/s. 34 of AdvocatesAct – The impugned rules clearly impinge upon the independenceof the Bar – Exercise of disciplinary control by the High Court, byinserting the impugned rules would amount to usurpation of thepower of Bar Council conferred under Advocates Act – AdvocatesAct, 1961 – s.34 – Constitution of India – Arts. 14 and 19.

Allowing the petition, the Court

HELD: 1. The Advocates Act, 1961 has been enacted toamend and consolidate the law relating to the legal practitioners

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Aand to provide for the constitution of the Bar Council and an AllIndia Bar. The independence of the Bar and autonomy of the BarCouncil has been ensured statutorily in order to preserve thevery democracy itself and to ensure that judiciary remains strong.There cannot be existence of a strong judicial system without anindependent Bar. [Paras 13, 14] [604-C, D, E]B

2. It is basically the lawyers who bring the cause to theCourt, are supposed to protect the rights of individuals of equalityand freedom as constitutionally envisaged and to ensure that thecountry is governed by the rule of law. Considering thesignificance of the Bar in maintaining the rule of law, right to beCtreated equally and enforcement of various other fundamentalrights, and to ensure that various institutions work within theirparameters, its independence becomes imperative and cannotbe compromised. [Para 16][604-G-H; 605-A]

3. The Bar is an integral part of the judicial administration.DIn order to ensure that judiciary remains an effective tool, it isabsolutely necessary that Bar and Bench maintain dignity anddecorum of each other. The mutual reverence is absolutelynecessary. It is the joint responsibility of the Bar and the Benchto ensure that equal justice is imparted to all. Independent BarEand independent Bench form the backbone of the democracy.Equal and even-handed justice is the hallmark of the judicialsystem. The protection of the basic structure of the Constitutionand of rights is possible by the firmness of Bar and Bench and byproper discharge of their duties and responsibilities. [Paras 18,19 and 21][605-D-F, H; 606-B]F

4. For a value-driven framework, it is necessary thatperspective is corrected in an ethical and morally soundperspective. The perception of ambulance chasers, moneyguzzlers and black sheep should not be presumptive. Such publicperception about the lawyers undermines the credibility of theGlegal profession, all the evils from the system have to be totallyweeded out. [Para 27][607-E-F]

5. The legislature has reposed faith in the autonomy of theBar while enacting Advocates Act and it provides for autonomousBar Councils at the State and Central level. The ethical standardHof the legal profession and legal education has been assigned to the Bar Council. It has to maintain the dignity of the legalprofession and independence of Bar. The disciplinary controlhas been assigned to the Disciplinary Committees of the BarCouncils of various States and Bar Council of India and an appeallies to this Court under section 38 of the Act. The Bar Associationmust be self-governing is globally recognised. [Paras 31, 32][608-E-G]

6. A bar association is generally deemed to be independentwhen it is mostly free from external influence and can withstandpressure from external sources on matters such as the regulationof the profession, disbarment proceedings and the right of lawyersto join the association. Judicial independence ensures thatlawyers are able to carry out their duties in a free and secureenvironment and an independent judiciary also acts as a checkon the independence of lawyers and vice versa. [Para 36][616-B-C]

7. The Bar Council has the power to discipline lawyers andmaintain nobility of profession and that power imposes greatresponsibility. The Court has the power of contempt and thatlethal power too accompanies with greater responsibility.Contempt is a weapon like Brahmasatra to be used sparingly toremain effective. At the same time, a Judge has to guard thedignity of the Court and take action in contempt and in case ofnecessity to impose appropriate exemplary punishment too. Alawyer is supposed to be governed by professional ethics,professional etiquette and professional ethos which are a habitualmode of conduct. He has to perform himself with elegance,dignity, and decency. He has to bear himself at all times andobserve himself in a manner befitting as an officer of the Court.He is a privileged member of the community and a gentleman.He has to be honest, courageous, eloquent, industrious, wittyand judgmental. [Para 40][618-G-H; 619-A-B]

8. It is apparent from the provisions and scheme of theAdvocates Act that the Act has never intended to confer thedisciplinary powers upon the High Court or upon this Courtexcept to the extent dealing with an appeal under Section 38 ofAdvocates Act. Section 34 of Advocates Act clearly enables theHigh Courts to prescribe conditions to practice. There can be AB

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Acertain conditions on right to practice and appear in a case whichcan be imposed by the High Court under Section 34 such as filingfresh vakalatnama, superseding the previous one that has to bedone as per the High Court Rules, if any such provision has beenmade by the High Court. Section 34 contained in chapter IV ofthe Act intends to regulate the practice of the advocate in theBHigh Court and subordinate courts. It does not empower it toframe the rules for disciplinary control. Within the purview ofsection 34 of the Act, a dress can also be prescribed for anappearance in the Court. The High Court is free to frame therules for designation of the Senior Advocates and also the rulesCon similar pattern as framed by this Court for Advocates onRecord. [Paras 44, 45 and 51][627-G; 622-F-H; 623-A-B]

9. There is no room for taking out the procession in theCourt premises, slogan raising in the Courts, use ofloudspeakers, use of intemperate language with the Judges orDto create any kind of disturbance in the peaceful, respectful anddignified functioning of the Court. The instances of abjectmisbehavior of the advocates in the premises of the High Courtof Madras resulting into requisitioning of CISF to maintain safetyand majesty of the Court and rule of law. The acts complained ofare not only contemptuous but also tantamount to grossEprofessional misconduct. In case such state of affairs continueand Bar Councils fail to discharge duties the Court shall have tosupervise its functioning and to pass appropriate permissibleorders. Independence of Bar and Bench both are supreme, therehas to be balance inter se. [Paras 28, 29][608-A-B, C-D, E-G]

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10. The grave situation created in the High Court of Madrasas well as at its Madurai Bench, which compelled the High Courtto take action on the judicial side to ensure the modicum ofsecurity. The High Court had to order the security of the Courtto be undertaken by CISF. In this regard, orders were passed inGSuo Moto Writ Petition by the High Court of Madras. There is nodoubt about it that the incidents pointed out were grim and sternaction was required against the erring advocates as they beliedthe entire nobility of the lawyer’s profession. The High Courtcould have taken action under Contempt of Courts Act foraforesaid misconduct. [Paras 66, 70][664-F-G; 666-F; 665-B]H

11. The High Court has overstretched and exceeded itspower even in the situation which was so grim which appears tohave compelled it to take such a measure. In fact, its powers aremuch more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal with such situationcourt need not look for Bar Council to act. It can take action,punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconductdone in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but theautonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be takenover by the Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintainthe decorum of Court. In case power is given to the Court evenif complaints lodged by a lawyer to the higher administrativeauthorities as to the behaviour of the Judges may be correct thenalso he may be punished by initiating disciplinary proceedings aspermitted to be done in impugned Rules 14 A to D that would bemaking the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would not beconducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism ofjudgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers’ fearlessnessin court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are thevirtues which cannot be sacrificed. [Para 77][669-H; 670-A-C]

12. It is also true that the disciplinary committee of the BarCouncils has failed to deliver the good. It is seen that thedisciplinary control of the Bar Council is not as effective as itshould be. It is high time that the Bar Council, as well as variousState Bar Councils should take stock of the situation and improvethe functioning of the disciplinary side. It is absolutely necessaryto maintain the independence of the Bar and if the cleaningprocess is not done by the Bar itself, its independence is in danger.The corrupt, unwanted, unethical element has no place in Bar. Ifnobility of the profession is destroyed, Bar can never remainindependent. Independence is constituted by the observance ofcertain ideals and if those ideals are lost, the independence wouldonly remain on paper, not in real sense. [Para 71][666-G-H; 667-A-B]

13. If the repository of the faith in the Bar fails to dischargetheir statutory duties effectively, no doubt about it that the samecan be and has to be supervised by the Courts. The obligatoryduties of Bar Council have found statutory expression inAdvocates Act and the rules framed thereunder with respect to AB

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Adisciplinary control and cannot be permitted to become statutorymockery, such non-performance or delayed performance of suchduties is impermissible. The Bar Council is duty bound to protectBar itself by taking steps against black sheeps and cannot belyexpectation of Bar in general and spoil its image. The verypurpose of disciplinary control by Bar Council cannot be permittedBto be frustrated. In such an exigency, in a case where the BarCouncil is not taking appropriate action against the advocate, itwould be open to the High Court to entertain the writ petitionand to issue appropriate directions to the Bar Council to takeaction in accordance with the law in the discharge of dutiesCenjoined upon it. But at the same time, the High Court and eventhis Court cannot take upon itself the disciplinary control asenvisaged under the Advocates Act. [Para 72][667-C-E]

14. Contempt of court is a weapon which has to be usedsparingly as more is power, same requires more responsibilityDbut it does not mean that the court has fear of taking action andits repercussions. The hallmark of the court is to provide equaland even-handed justice and to give an opportunity to each ofthe system to ensure that it improves upon. Unfortunately, someadvocates feel that they are above the Bar Council due to itsinaction and they are the only champion of the causes. The hungerEfor cheap publicity is increasing which is not permitted by thenoble ideals cherished by the great doyens of the bar, they haveset by their conduct what should be in fact the professionaletiquettes and ethics which are not capable of being defined in anarrow compass. [Para 74][668-C-D]F

15. It has become very common to the members of the Barto go to the press/media to criticize the judges in person and tocommit sheer contempt by attributing political colours to thejudgments. It is nothing less than an act of contempt of gravestform. Whenever any political matter comes to the Court and isGdecided, either way, political insinuations are attributed byunscrupulous persons/advocates. Such acts are nothing, but anact of denigrating the judiciary itself and destroys the faith of thecommon man which he reposes in the judicial system. In case ofgenuine grievance against any judge, the appropriate process isto lodge a complaint to the concerned higher authorities who canH

take care of the situation and it is impermissible to malign thesystem itself by attributing political motives and by making falseallegations against the judicial system and its functionaries.Judges who are attacked are not supposed to go to press or mediato ventilate their point of view. [Para 73][667-G-H; 668-A-B]

16. The statutory rules prohibit advocates from advertisingand in fact to cater to the press/media, distorted versions of thecourt proceedings is sheer misconduct and contempt of courtwhich has become very common. It is making it more difficult torender justice in a fair, impartial and fearless manner though thesituation is demoralizing that something has to be done by allconcerned to revamp the image of Bar. It is not open to washdirty linen in public and enter in accusation/debates, which tacticsare being adopted by unscrupulous elements to influence thejudgments and even to deny justice with ulterior motives. It isfor the Bar Council and the senior members of the Bar who havenever forgotten their responsibility to rise to the occasion tomaintain the independence of the Bar which is so supreme and isabsolutely necessary for the welfare of this country and the vibrantdemocracy. [Para 74][668-E-G]

17. The separation of powers made by the forefathers, whoframed the Constitution, ensured independent functioning. Ifthings are permitted to be settled by resorting to theunscrupulous means and institution is maligned by creatingpressure of any kind, the very independence of the system wouldbe endangered. Cases cannot be decided by media trial. Bar andBench in order to protect independence have their own inbuiltmachinery for redressal of grievance if any and they are supposedto settle their grievances in accordance therewith only. Nooutside interference is permissible. Considering the nobility,independence, dignity which is enjoined and the faith which isreposed by the common man of the country in the judiciary, it isabsolutely necessary that there is no maligning of the system.Mutual respect and reverence are the only way out. For theprotection of democratic values and to ensure that the rule of lawprevails in the country, no one can be permitted to destroy theindependence of the system from within or from outside. [Para75][668-G-H; 669-A-C]

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A18. Soul searching is absolutely necessary and the blamegame and maligning must stop forthwith. Confidence andreverence and positive thinking is the only way. It is pious hopethat the Bar Council would improve upon the function of itsdisciplinary committees so as to make the system moreaccountable, publish performance audit on the disciplinary sideBof various bar councils. The same should be made public. It isbasically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the statutoryduty of Bar to make it more noble and also to protect the Judgesand the legal system, not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction andthe system which is important pillar of democracy. [Para 76][669-CE-F, G]

19. By amending the High Court Rules, 1970, the HighCourt of Madras has inserted impugned Rules 14(A) to 14(D).The rules have been framed in exercise of the power conferredunder Section 34 of the Advocates Act. Section 34 of the ActDdoes not confer such a power to frame rules to debar lawyer forprofessional misconduct. The amendment made by providing Rule14(A)(vii) to (xii) is not authorized under the Advocate Act. TheHigh Court has no power to exercise the disciplinary control. Itwould amount to usurpation of the power of Bar Council conferredunder Advocates Act. However, the High Court may punishEadvocate for contempt and then debar him from practicing forsuch specified period as may be permissible in accordance withlaw, but without exercising contempt jurisdiction by way ofdisciplinary control no punishment can be imposed. As suchimpugned rules could not have been framed within the purview Fof Section 34. Provisions clearly impinge upon the independenceof the Bar and encroach upon the exclusive power conferred uponthe Bar Council of the State and the Bar Council of India underthe Advocates Act. The amendment made to the Rules 14(A) to14(D) have to be held to be ultra vires the power of the HighCourt. [Para 52][627-H; 628-A-D]GSupreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India &Anr (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795; Bar Councilof Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors. (1975) 2SCC 702 : [1976] 1 SCR 306 – followed H

R. MUTHUKRISHNAN v. REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THEHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC45 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 186; Mahipal Singh Rana v.State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335 – distinguished.

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R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC106 : [2009] 11 SCR 1026 – relied on.

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Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC 650 :[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 675; Bar Council of India v.High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 : [2004] 1Suppl. SCR 649; Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In re,(2017) 16 SCC 78 : [2017] 8 SCR 764; In reference:Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584 : [1995]2 SCR 638; Bar Council of India v. High Court ofKerala (2004) 6 SCC 311 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 649– referred to.

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Case Law Reference

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.612 of 2016.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

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Petitioner-in-person.

Mohan Parasaran, Sr. Adv., Nikhil Nayyar, N. Sai Vinod,Dhananjay Baijal, Divyanshu Rai Naveen Hegde, Advs. for theRespondent.

AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. The petitioner, who is an Advocate, hasfiled the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, questioningthe vires of amended Rules 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D of the Rules ofHigh Court of Madras, 1970 made by the High Court of Madras underBsection 34(1) of the Advocates’ Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as,‘the Advocates’ Act’).

2. The High Court has inserted Rule 14A in the Rules of HighCourt of Madras, 1970 empowering the High Court to debar an Advocatefrom practicing. The High Court has been empowered to take actionCunder Rule 14-B where any misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A iscommitted by an Advocate before the High Court then the High Courtcan debar him from appearing before the High Court and all subordinatecourts. Under Rule 14-B(v) the Principal District Judge has beenempowered to initiate action against the Advocate concerned and debarhim from appearing before any court within such District. In caseDmisconduct is committed before any subordinate court, the concernedcourt shall submit a report to the Principal District Judge and in thatcase, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to take appropriateaction. The procedure to be followed has been provided in the newlyinserted Rule 14-C and pending inquiry, there is power conferred byEway of Rule 14-D to pass an interim order prohibiting the Advocateconcerned from appearing before the High Court or the subordinatecourts. The amended provisions of Rule 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D areextracted hereunder:

“14-A: Power to Debar:F(vii) An Advocate who is found to have accepted money in thename of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or

(viii) An Advocate who is found to have tampered with the Courtrecord or Court order; or

(ix) An Advocate who browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or JudicialGOfficer; or

(x) An Advocate who is found to have sent or spread unfoundedand unsubstantiated allegations/petitions against a Judicial Officeror a Judge to the Superior Court; or H

(xi) An Advocate who actively participates in a procession insidethe Court campus and/or involves in gherao inside the Court Hallor holds placard inside the Court Hall; or

(xii) An Advocate who appears in the Court under the influenceof liquor; shall be debarred from appearing before the High Court orSubordinate Courts permanently or for such period as the Courtmay think fit and the Registrar 28 General shall thereupon reportthe said fact to the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu.

14-B: Power to take action:-

(iv) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A iscommitted by an Advocate before the High Court, the High Courtshall have the power to initiate action against the Advocateconcerned and debar him from appearing before the High Courtand all Subordinate Courts.

(v) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A iscommitted by an Advocate before the Court of Principal DistrictJudge, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiateaction against the Advocate concerned and debar him fromappearing before any Court within such District.

(vi) Where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A iscommitted by an Advocate before any subordinate court, the Courtconcerned shall submit a report to the Principal District Courtwithin whose jurisdiction it is situate and on receipt of such report,the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiate actionagainst the Advocate concerned and debar him from appearingbefore any Court within such District.

14-C: Procedure to be followed:-

The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge, as thecase may be, shall, before making an order under Rule 14-A,issue to such Advocate a summon returnable before it, requiringthe Advocate to appear and show cause against the mattersalleged in the summons and the summons shall if practicable, beserved personally upon him.

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A14-D: Power to pass Interim Order:-

The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge may, beforemaking the Final Order under Rule 14-C, pass an interim orderprohibiting the Advocate concerned from appearing before theHigh Court or Subordinate Courts, as the case may be, inBappropriate cases, as it may deem fit, pending inquiry.”3. Rule 14-A provides that an Advocate who is found to haveaccepted money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of influencinghim; or who has tampered with the court record or court order; orbrowbeats and/or abuses a Judge or judicial officer; or is responsible forCsending or spreading unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations/petitionsagainst a judicial officer or a Judge to the superior court; or activelyparticipates in a procession inside the court campus and/or involves ingherao inside the court hall, or holds placard inside the court hall orappears in the court under the influence of liquor, the courts have beenempowered to pass an interim order of suspension pending enquiry, andDultimately to debar him from appearing in the High Court and all othersubordinate courts, as the case may be.

4. The aforesaid amended Rule 14-A to 14-D came into forcewith effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette on 25.5.2016.Petitioner has questioned the vires of amended Rules 14A to D on theEground of being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitutionof India, as also sections 30, 34(1), 35 and 49(1)(c) of the Advocates’Act, as the power to debar for such misconduct has been conferredupon the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry and the High Courtcould not have framed such rules within ken of section 34(1) of theFAdvocates Act. The High Court could have framed rules as to the‘conditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practicein the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto’. Debarment byway of disciplinary measure is outside the purview of section 34(1) ofthe Act. The Bar Council enrolls Advocates and the power to debar formisconduct lies with the Bar Council. The effort is to confer the unbridledGpower of control over the Advocates which is against the rule of law.Misconduct has been defined under section 35 of the Advocates Act.Reliance has been placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Courtin Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4SCC 409.

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5. The High Court of Judicature at Madras in its counter affidavithas pointed out that the rules are kept in abeyance for the time being andthe Review Committee is yet to take a decision in the matter of reviewingthe rules. In the reply filed the High Court has justified the amendmentmade to the rules on the ground that they have been framed in compliancewith the directions issued by this Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar,Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106 in which this Court has directedthe High Courts to frame rules under section 34 of the Advocates Actand to frame the rules for having Advocates-on-Record based on thepattern of this Court. It has been further pointed out that the conductand appearance of an advocate inside the court premises are within thejurisdiction of a court to regulate. The High Court has relied upon thedecision in Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC 650 inwhich vires of similar rule was upheld as such the rules framed debarringthe advocates for misconduct in court are thus permissible.

6. The High Court has also relied upon the decision in Ex-Capt.Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45 to contend that courthas the power to debar advocates on being found guilty of contemptand/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from appearing beforethe courts. The High Court has referred to the decision in Bar Councilof India v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311.

7. The High Court has contended that the rules have been framedwithin the framework of the directions issued by this Court and in exerciseof the power conferred under section 34(1) of the Advocates Act.Pursuant to the directions issued in R.K. Anand’s case (supra), the matterwas placed before the High Court’s Rule Committee on 17.3.2010. TheCommittee consisting of Judges, Members of the Bar Council andmembers of the Bar was formed, and the minutes were approved by theFull Court on 23.9.2010. Thereafter the Chief Justice of the High Courtof Madras on 2.9.2014 constituted a Committee consisting of two Judges,the Chairman of Bar Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry, AdvocateGeneral of the High Court, President, Madras Bar Association, President,Madras High Court Advocates’ Association, and the President of WomenLawyers’ Association to finalise the Rules.

8. The High Court has further contended in the reply that theDirector, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs videcommunication dated 31.5.2007 enclosed a copy of the ‘Guidelines’ andinformed the Chief Secretaries of the State Governments to review and AB

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Astrengthen the security arrangements for the High Courts and District/subordinate courts in the country to avoid any untoward incident. TheHigh Court has further contended that there have been numerousinstances of abject misbehaviour by the advocates within the premisesof the High Court of Madras in the year 2015. The advocates haverendered the functioning of the court utterly impossible by resorting toBactivities like holding protests and waving placards inside the court halls,raising slogans and marching down the corridors of the court. Someadvocates had resorted to using hand-held microphones to disrupt theproceedings of the Madurai Bench and even invaded the chambers ofthe Judges. There were two incidents when there were bomb hoaxesCwhere clock-like devices were smuggled into the court premises andplaced in certain areas. The Judges of the High Court were feelingtotally insecure. Even CISF had to be employed. Thus, there was anurgent need to maintain the safety and majesty of the court and rule oflaw. After various meetings, the Rules were framed and notified. Order4 Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is similar to Rules whichDhave been framed. In Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In re, (2017) 16SCC 78, this Court had suspended the contemnor from practicing as anAdvocate on Record for a period of one month.

9. In Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P. (2016) 8 SCC 335,the court has observed that the Bar Council of India might requireErestructuring on the lines of other regulatory professional bodies, andhad requested the Law Commission to prepare a report. An AdvisoryCommittee was constituted by the Bar Council of India. A Sub-Committeeon ‘Strikes, Boycotts & Abstaining from Court Works’ was alsoconstituted. Law Commission had finalized and published Report No.266Fdated 23.3.2017 and has taken note of the rules framed by the MadrasHigh Court. Court has a right to regulate the conduct of the advocatesand the appearance inside the court. As such it is not a fit case to exerciseextraordinary jurisdiction and a prayer has been made to dismiss thewrit petition.

G10. The petitioner in person has urged that rules are ultra viresand impermissible to be framed within scope of section 34(1) of theAdvocates Act. They take away the independence of the Bar and runcontrary to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in SupremeCourt Bar Association v. Union of India (supra).

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11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing onbehalf of the High Court, has contended that the rules have been framedwithin the ambit of section 34(1) and in tune with the directions issuedby this Court in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (supra).He has also referred to various other decisions. It was submitted thatunder section 34 of the Advocates Act, the High Court is empowered toframe rules to debar the advocate in case of unprofessional and/orunbecoming conduct of an advocate. Advocates have no right to go onstrike or give a call of boycott, not even on a token strike, as has beenobserved in Ex.-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra). It was also observed thatthe court may now have to frame specific rules debarring advocates,guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, fromappearing before the courts. Advocates appear in court subject to suchconditions as are laid down by the court, and practice outside court shallbe subject to the conditions laid down by the Bar Council of India. Hehas also relied upon Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala(2004) 6 SCC 311 in which the validity of Rule 11 of the Rules framedby the High Court of Kerala came up for consideration. Learned seniorcounsel has also referred to the provisions contained in Order IV Rule10 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 framed by this Court with respectto debarring an Advocate on Record who is guilty of misconduct or ofconduct unbecoming of an Advocate-on-Record, an order may be passedto remove his name from the register of Advocates on Record eitherpermanently or for such period as the court may think fit. This Court haspunished an advocate on record and has debarred him for a period ofone month in the case of Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate (supra). TheHigh Court has framed the rules to preserve the dignity of the court andprotect rule of law. Considering the prevailing situation, it was necessaryto bring order in the premises of the High Court. Thus framing of rulesbecame necessary. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councilhave failed to fulfil the duties enjoined upon them. Therefore, it becameincumbent upon the High Court to act as observed in Mahipal SinghRana (supra) by this Court.

12. This Court has issued a notice on the petition on 9.10.2017and on 4.9.2018. The Court observed that prima facie the rules framedby the High Court appear to be encroaching on the disciplinary power ofthe Bar Council. As the time was prayed by the High Court to submitthe report of the Review Committee, time was granted. In spite of the AB

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Asame, the Review Committee has not considered the matter, consideringthe importance of the matter and the stand taken justifying the rules. Wehave heard the same on merits and have also taken into considerationthe detailed written submissions filed on behalf of the High Court.

13. The Advocates Act has been enacted pursuant to theBrecommendations of the All India Bar Committee made in 1953 aftertaking into account the recommendations of the Law Commission onthe subject of the reforms of judicial administration. The main featuresof the Bill for the enactment of the Act include the creation of autonomousBar Council, one for the whole of India and one for each State. The Acthas been enacted to amend and consolidate the law relating to the legalCpractitioners and to provide for the constitution of the Bar Council andan All India Bar.

14. The legal profession cannot be equated with any othertraditional professions. It is not commercial in nature and is a noble oneconsidering the nature of duties to be performed and its impact on theDsociety.The independence of the Bar and autonomy of the Bar Councilhas been ensured statutorily in order to preserve the very democracyitself and to ensure that judiciary remains strong. Where Bar has notperformed the duty independently and has become a sycophant thatultimately results in the denigrating of the judicial system and judiciaryEitself. There cannot be existence of a strong judicial system without anindependent Bar.

15. It cannot be gainsaid that lawyers have contributed in thestruggle for independence of the nation. They have helped in the framingof the Constitution of India and have helped the Courts in evolvingFjurisprudence by doing hard labor and research work. The nobility ofthe legal system is to be ensured at all costs so that the Constitutionremains vibrant and to expand its interpretation so as to meet newchallenges.

16. It is basically the lawyers who bring the cause to the CourtGare supposed to protect the rights of individuals of equality and freedomas constitutionally envisaged and to ensure the country is governed bythe rule of law. Considering the significance of the Bar in maintainingthe rule of law, right to be treated equally and enforcement of variousother fundamental rights, and to ensure that various institutions workwithin their parameters, its independence becomes imperative and cannotH

be compromised. The lawyers are supposed to be fearless andindependent in the protection of rights of litigants. What lawyers aresupposed to protect, is the legal system and procedure of law of decidingthe cases.

17. Role of Bar in the legal system is significant. The bar issupposed to be the spokesperson for the judiciary as Judges do not speak.People listen to the great lawyers and people are inspired by their thoughts.They are remembered and quoted with reverence. It is the duty of theBar to protect honest judges and not to ruin their reputation and at thesame time to ensure that corrupt judges are not spared. However,lawyers cannot go to the streets or go on strike except when democracyitself is in danger and the entire judicial system is at stake. In order toimprove the system, they have to take recourse to the legally availablemethods by lodging complaint against corrupt judges to the appropriateadministrative authorities and not to level such allegation in the public.The corruption is intolerable in the judiciary.

18. The Bar is an integral part of the judicial administration. Inorder to ensure that judiciary remains an effective tool, it is absolutelynecessary that Bar and Bench maintain dignity and decorum of eachother. The mutual reverence is absolutely necessary. The Judges are tobe respected by the Bar, they have in-turn equally to respect the Bar,observance of mutual dignity, decorum of both is necessary and aboveall they have to maintain self-respect too.

19. It is the joint responsibility of the Bar and the Bench to ensurethat equal justice is imparted to all and that nobody is deprived of justicedue to economic reasons or social backwardness. The judgment renderedby a Judge is based upon the dint of hard work and quality of the argumentsthat are advanced before him by the lawyers. There is no room forarrogance either for a lawyer or for a Judge.

20. There is a fine balance between the Bar and the Bench thathas to be maintained as the independence of the Judges and judiciary issupreme. The independence of the Bar is on equal footing, it cannot beignored and compromised and if lawyers have the fear of the judiciaryor from elsewhere, that is not conducive to the effectiveness of judiciaryitself, that would be self-destructive.

21. Independent Bar and independent Bench form the backboneof the democracy. In order to preserve the very independence, the A

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Aobservance of constitutional values, mutual reverence and self-respectare absolutely necessary. Bar and Bench are complementary to eachother. Without active cooperation of the Bar and the Bench, it is notpossible to preserve the rule of law and its dignity. Equal and even-handed justice is the hallmark of the judicial system. The protection ofthe basic structure of the Constitution and of rights is possible by theBfirmness of Bar and Bench and by proper discharge of their duties andresponsibilities. We cannot live in a jungle raj.

22. Bar is the mother of judiciary and consists of great jurists.The Bar has produced great Judges, they have adorned the judiciaryand rendered the real justice, which is essential for the society.C

23. The role of Lawyer is indispensable in the system of deliveryof justice. He is bound by the professional ethics and to maintain thehigh standard. His duty is to the court to his own client, to the oppositeside, and to maintain the respect of opposite party counsel also. Whatmay be proper to others in the society, may be improper for him to do asDhe belongs to a respected intellectual class of the society and a memberof the noble profession, the expectation from him is higher. Advocatesare treated with respect in society. People repose immense faith in thejudiciary and judicial system and the first person who deals with them isa lawyer. Litigants repose faith in a lawyer and share with them privilegedEinformation. They put their signatures wherever asked by a Lawyer.An advocate is supposed to protect their rights and to ensure that untaintedjustice delivered to his cause.

24. The high values of the noble profession have to be protectedby all concerned at all costs and in all the circumstances cannot beFforgotten even by the youngsters in the fight of survival in formativeyears. The nobility of legal profession requires an Advocate to rememberthat he is not over attached to any case as Advocate does not win orlose a case, real recipient of justice is behind the curtain, who is at thereceiving end. As a matter of fact, we do not give to a litigant anythingexcept recognizing his rights. A litigant has a right to be impartially advisedGby a lawyer. Advocates are not supposed to be money guzzlers orambulance chasers. A Lawyer should not expect any favour from theJudge and should not involve by any means in influencing the fair decision-making process. It is his duty to master the facts and the law and submitthe same precisely in the Court, his duty is not to waste the Courts’ time.

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25. It is said by Alexander Cockburn that “the weapon of theadvocate is the sword of a soldier, not the dagger of the assassin”. It isthe ethical duty of lawyers not to expect any favour from a Judge. Hemust rely on the precedents, read them carefully and avoid corruptionand collusion of any kind, not to make false pleadings and avoid twistingof facts. In a profession, everything cannot be said to be fair even in thestruggle for survival. The ethical standard is uncompromisable. Honesty,dedication and hard work is the only source towards perfection. AnAdvocate conduct is supposed to be exemplary. In case an Advocatecauses disrepute of the Judges or his colleagues or involves himself inmisconduct, that is the most sinister and damaging act which can bedone to the entire legal system. Such a person is definitely deadwoodand deserves to be chopped off.

26. Francis Bacon has said about the Judges that Judges ought tobe more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and moreadvised than confident. Above all thingst, integrity is their portion andproper virtue. Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part ofjustice, and an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.

27. The balancing of values, reverence between the Bar and theBench is the edifice of the independent judicial system. Time has cometo restore the glory and cherish the time-testedenduring ideals andprinciples. For a value-driven framework, it is necessary that perspectiveis corrected in an ethical and morally sound perspective. The perceptionof ambulance chasers, money guzzlers and black sheep should not bepresumptive. Such public perception as to lawyers undermines thecredibility of the legal profession, all the evils from the system have to betotally weeded out. No human institution is ever perfect. In order todrive towards more perfection, one has to just learn from the mistakesof the past and build upon the present days’ good work so as to make outa better tomorrow.

28. The background as to what has happened in the High Court atMadras as projected in reply of the High Court, has prompted us tomake the aforesaid observations. While deciding the case, we havepointed out the importance of the Bar just to remind it of its responsibilitiesand significance in a democratic setup. The atmosphere that had beencreated in Madras as projected in the counter affidavit filed by the HighCourt, would have prompted us also to take a stern view of the matterby invoking Contempt of Courts Act, but for the time gap and things ABCD

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Ahave settled by now due to herculean effort of the High Court. It is notfor this court much less for the High Court to tolerate such intemperatebehavior of the lawyers as projected in the counter affidavit of the HighCourt. The acts complained of are not only contemptuous but alsotantamount to gross professional misconduct.

B29. There is no room for taking out the procession in the Courtpremises, slogan raising in the Courts, use of loudspeakers, use ofintemperate language with the Judges or to create any kind of disturbancein the peaceful, respectful and dignified functioning of the Court. Itssanctity is not less than that of a holy place reserved for noble souls. Weare shocked to note that the instances of abject misbehavior of theCadvocates in the premises of the High Court of Madras resulting intorequisitioning of CISF to maintain safety and majesty of the Court andrule of law. It has been observed by this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana(supra) that Bar Council has failed to discharge its duties on thedisciplinary side. In our opinion, in case such state of affairs continuesDand Bar Council fail to discharge duties the Court shall have to superviseits functioning and to pass appropriate permissible orders. Independenceof Bar and Bench both are supreme, there has to be balance inter se.

30. We now advert to main question whether disciplinary powervested in the Bar Council can be taken away by the Court and theEinternational scenario in this regard.

31. The legislature has reposed faith in the autonomy of the Barwhile enacting Advocates Act and it provides for autonomous BarCouncils at the State and Central level. The ethical standard of the legalprofession and legal education has been assigned to the Bar Council. ItFhas to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and independence ofBar. The disciplinary control has been assigned to the DisciplinaryCommittees of the Bar Councils of various States and Bar Council ofIndia and an appeal lies to this Court under section 38 of the Act.

32. The bar association must be self-governing is globallyGrecognised. Same is a resolution of the United Nations also. Even SpecialRapporteur on the independence of Judges and lawyers finds that barassociations play a vital role in safeguarding the independence andintegrity of the legal profession and its members. The UN’s basicprinciples on the role of lawyers published in 1990 noted that suchinstitutions must possess independence and its self-governing nature.H

The bar association has a crucial role to play in a democratic society toensure the protection of human rights in particular due process and fair-trial guarantees. Following is the extract of the report of the UnitedNations:

“Mandate

In the report, Special Rapporteur Diego García-Sayán finds that-associations should be independent and selfgoverning becausethey hold a general mandate to protect the independence of thelegal profession and the interests of its members.

They should also be recognized under the law, the UN says.

“Bar associations have a crucial role to play in a democratic societyto enable the free and independent exercise of the legal profession,and to ensure access to justice and the protection of human rights,in particular, due process and fair trial guarantees,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres says.

Self-governing

The UN’s Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (published in1990) recognize that lawyers, like other citizens, have the right tofreedom of association and assembly, which includes the right to-form and join selfgoverning professional associations to representtheir interests.Since its publication, this universal document hasbeen referenced in wrangles between lawyers and governments.

Requirements

Existing legal standards do not provide a definition of whatconstitutes a professional association of lawyers. They simply focuson the necessary requirements that such institutions must possess,such as independence and a self-governing nature.

The report recommends that: “In order to ensure the integrity ofthe entire profession and the quality of legal services, it is preferableto establish a single professional association regulating the legalprofession.”

Elected by peers

Another principle of the UN report is that: “In order to guaranteethe independence of the legal profession, the majority of members A

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of the executive body of the bar association should be lawyerselected by their peers.”

It says that state control of bar associations or governing bodies is“incompatible with the principle of the independence of the legalprofession”.”

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33. In the conference of Presidents of Law Association in Asia,Law Council of Australia held 20[th] March, 2005 at Queensland, Australia,Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG presented his papers on ‘Independenceof the Legal Profession: Global and Regional Challenges’ and pointedCout the importance of the independence of the bar in his papers thus:

“One of the features of the law that tends to irritate other sourcesof power is the demand of the law’s practitioners - judges andlawyers - for independence. The irritation is often true ofpoliticians, wealthy and powerful people, government officials andmedia editors and their columnists. Those who are used to beingobeyed and feared commonly find it intensely annoying that thereis a source of power that they cannot control or buy the law andthe courts. Yet the essence of a modern democracy is observanceof the rule of law. The rule of law will not prevail without assuringthe law’s principal actors - judges and practicing lawyers and alsolegal academics - a very high measure of independence of mindand action.

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An independent legal profession also requires that lawyers befree to carry out their work without interference or fear of reprisal.Lawyers have a duty, within the law, to advance the interests oftheir clients fearlessly and to assist the courts in upholding thelaw. To enable them to perform these duties it is necessary thatlawyers enjoy professional independence. Challenges to suchindependence may arise where lawyers are not able to formindependent professional organizations; are limited in the clientswhom they may represent; are threatened with disciplinary action,prosecution or sanctions for undertaking their professional duties;are in any other way intimidated or harassed because of theirclients or the work that they undertake; or are subjected tounreasonable interference in the way they perform their duties.

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Independence is not provided for the benefit or protection of judgesor lawyers as such. Nor is it intended to shield them from beingheld accountable in the performance of their professional dutiesand to the general law. Instead, its purpose is the protection of thepeople, affording them an independent legal profession as “... thebulwark of a free and democratic society.”

Justice Kirby also pointed out in his papers that principle ofindependence of the legal profession is recognized internationally. Thepursuit of the independence of the Judges and the lawyers are not,therefore, merely an aspirational principle. It is a central tenet ofinternational human rights law of great practical importance. He hasfurther observed thus:

“…If all people are entitled to equal protection under the law,without exception, lawyers must be able to represent unpopularclients fearlesslyand to advocate on behalf of unpopular causes,so as to uphold legal rights. To ensure the supremacy of the lawover the arbitrary exercise of power a strong and independentlegal profession is therefore essential.

In this way, an independent legal profession is an essentialguardian of human and other rights. By ensuring that no person isbeyond the reach of the law, the legal profession can operate as acheck upon the arbitrary or excessive exercise of power by thegovernment and its agents or by other powerful parties.”

He also emphasized in his papers to promote access to law, reformof the law and its rules and the engagement of lawyers with ordinarypeople and litigants to whom, ultimately, the law clearly belongs.

34. The independence of the Bar came to be discussed in 28[th]Annual Convention Banquet of the National Lawyers Guild held at SanFrancisco, California on 13[th] November 1965 in which Robert F. Drinan,S.J., Dean, Boston College Law School, Brighton, Massachusetts pointedout the independence of the Bar and its facets. He has pointed out thatlawyers have to be loyal to their client’s interests and faithful to themaintenance of the integrity and independence of the courts. It requiresa commitment to many moral and spiritual values. Lawyers boldly A

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Achallenge the inequality in every form. He also pointed out thatindependence of mind and heart is necessary. The Bar cannot be aprisoner of passions and prejudices and independence of judgment needto be construed and from an unreasonable fear of the power of thejudiciary is necessary and has observed that lawyer should feel free tocriticize judicial decisions of every Tribunal. At the same time, he said toBimpugn the motives to Judges undermine the very essence of everycivilized society. A lawyer has to be detached from financialconsiderations. If lawyers are appreciated and embraced with thesesentiments, we would witness the full flowering of the indispensableelement of a truly free society – an independent Bench and an independentCBar. He has observed:

“Members of the legal profession under the Anglo-Americansystem of justice have been entrusted with dual and conflictingloyalties. They must be simultaneously both loyal to their client’sinterests and faithful to the maintenance of the integrity andDindependence of the courts of which they are officers. Thecomplex dualism inherent in being both an advocate and an officerof the Court requires that the lawyer have a unique independence,- a detachment from any excessive adherence to his client’sinterests as well as a freedom from being inordinately attached tothe rulings and interests of the judicial system.E

The independence of the bar does not mean, let us make it clearimmediately, a state of non-commitment to truths or values. Indeedthe independence of the bar presupposes and requires acommitment to many moral and spiritual values which must beserved in whole or in part by America’s legal institutions. TheFspiritual value indispensable for an independent bar to which the:National Lawyers’ Guild in a particular way has lent its powerand prestige is the basic injustice of permitting false accusationsto be made by public bodies in the name of patriotism or loyalty tothe nation.

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The lawyer whose mind is independent of the passions andprejudices of his own generation or his own century transcendsthe collective compromises of his own age and boldly challengesinequality in every form. The lawyers who formed and fashionedthe American Republic had the independence of mind and heartHunparalleled by any subsequent generation of attorneys in America; their vision and their courage are the legacies of every lawyer inAmerica. So few members of the bar recognize that legacybecause, being the prisoners of the passions and prejudices oftheir own age, they have lost that independence of judgmentwithout which a lawyer cannot really identify himself or the nobleprofession of which he is a member.

II. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BAR FROM JUDICIALPRECEDENT AND FROM FEAR OF THE JUDICIARY

If a lawyer cannot really fulfill his self-identity or carry out hismoral mission unless he is independent of the prejudices andpassions of his age he is similarly impeded unless he can discoverand maintain an attitude of respectful independence from thejudiciary. This independence from the judiciary should promptlawyers to feel free to criticize judicial decisions consistently andcourageously. This criticism should not be confined to the highercourts but should be applicable to every tribunal whose opinionsare deficient in inherent logic and a clear consistency.

Does constitutionally protected freedom of speech or freedom ofthe press give immunity for slander and public defamation of thenation’s highest tribunal? And by what principle can an independentbar justify its inaction towards those who, by calumny and libel,impugn the motives of judges and undermine the very essence ofevery civilized society - the rule of law?

The bench generally speaking cannot be expected to rise abovethe level of the bar. A bar that is subservient and servile to thebench will tend to corrupt both the bench and the bar.

The independence of the legal profession, therefore, requires thatlawyers attain such an attitude of detachment both from theirduties as advocatesand their role as officers of the court thatthey can act objectively and dispassionately, - as neither solelythe servants of their clients nor as exclusively the ministers of thecourts.”

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A35. In an article ‘the Importance of an Independent Bar’ byStephen A. Salzburg published in Scholarly Commons, GW Law FacultyPublications and other works, referring to the Shakespeare it was pointedout that when Dick the Butcher met to discuss the plan of attack andhow they should go about gaining the political control of England. It isduring this meeting that the sentence involving “kill all the lawyers”Boccurred. The exact sentence in the play was “The first thing we do,let’s kill all the lawyers”. Governments need fear lawyers and Judgesonly when they fear the truth. This is true here and it is true throughoutthe world. The relevant portion of the article is extracted hereunder:

“Attack on lawyersC

It is from this perspective that I wish to express my concern as torecent attacks on the legal profession that have occurred here inthe United States and elsewhere in the world. Attacks on theprivate bar often are accompanied by attacks on the independenceof the judiciary, and these attacks are a frontal assault on the veryDnotion of the rule of law.

One law journal that views the play as I do concisely summarizeit as follows:

.…Before the plan was executed, Cade and his followers,Eamong whom was Dick the Butcher, met to discuss the plan ofattack and how they should go about gaining the political controlof England. It is during this meeting that the sentence involving“kill all the lawyers” occurs. The exact sentence in the play’was, “The first thing we do, lets kill all the lawyers.” We see,then, that this sentence was uttered by a riotous anarchist whoseFintent was to overthrow the lawful government of England.Shakespeare knew that lawyers were the primary guardiansof individual liberty in democratic England. Shakespeare alsoknew that an anarchical uprising from within was doomed tofail unless the country’s lawyers were killed.

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The government has strained to keep lawyers away fromGuantanamo as much as possible because it knows that theirpresence means challenges to unfair proceedings, to secretevidence, and to prolonged detentions. Lawyers have volunteeredto represent the detainees, but their ability to do so is greatlyrestricted by the congressional elimination of both habeas corpus H

and the right of detainees to bring actions challenging theirdetentions or the conditions of their detentions.

I regret deeply what has happened in Guantanamo. After all,governments need fear lawyers and judges only when they fearthe truth. This is true here and it is true throughout the world.

…..These lawyers and judges remind us that preserving the ruleof law is something never to be taken for granted. It often is achallenge requiring self-sacrifice and risk-taking.

The Supreme Court of Canada wrote eloquently in Canada(Attorney General) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2S.C.R. 307 at 335-36:

The independence of the Bar from the state in all of itspervasive manifestations is one of the hallmarks of a freesociety. Consequently, regulation of these members of the lawprofession by the state must, so far as by human ingenuity itcan be so designed, be free from state interference, in thepolitical sense, with the delivery of services to the individualcitizens in the state, particularly in fields of public and criminallaw. The public interest in a free society knows no area moresensitive than the independence, impartiality, and availability tothe general public of the members of the Bar and through thosemembers, legal advice and services generally.

In another Canadian case, Andrews v. Law Society of BritishColumbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at pp. 187-88: Justice McIntyrewrote:

“I would observe that in the absence of an independent legalprofession, skilled and qualified to play its part in theadministration of justice and the judicial process, the wholelegal system would be in a parlous state. In the performanceof what may be called his or her private function, that is, inadvising on legal matters and in representing clients before thecourts and other tribunals, the lawyer is accorded great powersnot permitted to other professionals…... By any standard, thesepowers and duties are vital to the maintenance of order in oursociety and the due administration of the law in the interest of”the whole community.

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A36. The International Bar Associations Presidential Task Forcewas constituted to examine the question of independence of the legalprofession. In the report while discussing the indicators of independence,it has been pointed out that a bar association is generally deemed to beindependent when it is mostly free from external influence and canwithstand pressure from external sources on matters such as the regulationBof the profession, disbarment proceedings and the right of lawyers tojoin the association. Judicial independence ensures that lawyers areable to carry out their duties in a free and secure environment and anindependent judiciary also acts as a check on the independence of lawyersand vice versa. The relevant portion of the report of task force is extractedChereunder:

“Judicial independence ensures that lawyers are able to carry outtheir duties in a free and secure environment, where they are ableto ensure access to justice and provide their clients with intelligent,impartial and objective advice. An impartial and independentDjudiciary is more likely to be tolerant and responsive to criticism,which means that lawyers are able to freely criticize the judiciary,without fear of retaliation, whether in the form of prosecution bythe government or unfavorable judicial decisions. An independentjudiciary also acts as a check on the independence of lawyersand vice versa. Thus, the relationship between judicial independenceEand the independence of lawyers is one of mutual reliance andco-dependence.”

There have to be clear and transparent rules on admission to theBar, disciplinary proceedings and disbarment. In this regard, the followingobservation has been made by the IBA Task Force:F

“4.2.2.2. Clear and transparent rules on admission to the Bar,disciplinary proceedings and disbarment Clear and transparentrules on admission, disciplinary proceedings and disbarment refersto rules that are comprehensible and accessible, so that thosewho are subject to the rules are able to easily access them,Gunderstand their meaning and appreciate the implications ofviolating them. The existence of comprehensible, clear andtransparent rules on admission to the Bar ensures that thoseseeking admission are well-informed of the requirements and areassessed on the basis of objective criteria that apply equally to allHcandidates. Clear and transparent rules reduce the risk of arbitrary disciplinary proceedings and disbarment and also guarantee thatlawyers are held accountable and responsible for their actions.Lawyers, those they represent and the general public should haveaccess to efficient, fair and functional mechanisms that allow forthe resolution of disputes between the profession and the public,an imposition of disciplinary measures (where appropriate) andan effective appeals system. This ensures that the rights of allparties are protected in accordance with the rule of law.”

37. Complete lack of self-regulation can have a negative effecton the independence of the lawyers and lawyers have to be free fromfear of prosecution in controversial or unpopular cases. Political, societaland, in some circumstances, media pressure in times of war, terror, andemergency can have a profound impact on the independence of theprofession. They can be attacked by unscrupulous persons fordischarging their duties in a fearless manner. That is why independenceof the bar is imperative. There is a need to organize seminars, trainingsessions on the current development of law so as to maintainindependence. It has also been observed in the report of IBA TaskForce that public often associates lawyers with corruption, lying, deceit,excessive wealth and a lavish lifestyle. The report has concluded thus:

“There is no greater issue affecting the legal profession worldwidethan the manifold threats to its independence. Withoutindependence, lawyers are left exposed to disciplinary proceedings,arbitrary disbarment, physical violence, persecution, and evendeath. Lawyers around the world have been targeted bygovernments and by private actors simply for acting in the publicinterest or for undertaking cases or causes that some, includingthe government, find objectionable.”

38. The emphasis on the disciplinary control by the independentbodies so as to maintain the purity, efficacy, and intellect of the judicialsystem itself. The resolution of IBA standards for the independence ofthe legal profession with respect to disciplinary proceedings is extractedhereunder:

“Disciplinary proceedings

21. Lawyers’ associations shall adopt and enforce a code ofprofessional conduct of lawyers.

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A22. There shall be established rules for the commencement andconduct of disciplinary proceedings that incorporate the rules ofnatural justice.

23. The appropriate lawyers’ association will be responsible foror be entitled to participate in the conduct of disciplinaryBproceedings.

24. Disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in the first instancebefore a disciplinary committee of the appropriate lawyers’association. The lawyer shall have the right to appeal from thedisciplinary committee to an appropriate and independent appellateCbody.”

The IBA resolution emphasises on the disciplinary committee ofthe Bar is necessary so as to maintain the independence of the Bar.

D39. The members of the Bar are recognized as intellectual of thesociety. They enjoy respect in the society being the protector of law asthey fight for equality. The advocate has to fearlessly uphold the interestsof his clients by all fair and honourable means without regard to anyunpleasant consequences to himself or any other. An advocate issupposed to find a solution to the very real problem as ‘justice hurried isEjustice buried’ and ‘slow justice is no justice’. It has become professionallyembarrassing and personally demoralizing for an advocate to give ananswer to his client as to the outcome of the matter and why it is pendingand when it is to come up for hearing. When a member of Bar is elevatedto bench first relief which is felt is of answerability to the client onaforesaid aspects which is in fact too inconvenient and embarrassingFbut still problem subsists and is writ large, it has to be solved every day.In such circumstances too, the tool of adjournment is used to kill justice.Adjournment poses a question mark whether such kind of advocacy isacceptable?

40. The Bar Council has the power to discipline lawyers andGmaintain nobility of profession and that power imposes great responsibility.The Court has the power of contempt and that lethal power tooaccompanies with greater responsibility. Contempt is a weapon likeBrahmasatra to be used sparingly to remain effective. At the sametime, a Judge has to guard the dignity of the Court and take action inH

contempt and in case of necessity to impose appropriate exemplarypunishment too. A lawyer is supposed to be governed by professionalethics, professional etiquette and professional ethos which are a habitualmode of conduct. He has to perform himself with elegance, dignity, anddecency. He has to bear himself at all times and observe himself in amanner befitting as an officer of the Court. He is a privileged memberof the community and a gentleman. He has to mainsail with honesty andsail with the oar of hard work, then his boat is bound to reach to thebank. He has to be honest, courageous, eloquent, industrious, witty andjudgmental.

41. In a keynote address to the 1992 Conference of the English,Scottish and Australian Bar Association held in London on 4[th] July, 1992on the ‘Independence of the Bench; the Independence of the Bar andthe Bar’s Role in the Judicial System’, Sir Anthony Mason, AC, KBE,Chief Justice of Australia has pointed out that for its independence theCourt should be responsible for its own administration and the expenditureof funds appropriated to it by Parliament. He has also referred to one ofthe recommendations made by an economist that financial incentivesshould be offered to judges to expedite the disposition of cases, in thatregard he has observed that incentive-based remuneration, no matterhow well adapted it is to the football stadium and the production line hasno place in the courtroom. Judicial independence is a privilege of andprotection for the people. The appointment of the judges should be fromthe dedicated advocates. With respect to the independence of the Bar,he has mentioned that lawyers stand between the subject and the Crown,and between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak. It isnecessary that while the Bar occupies an essential part in theadministration of justice, the lawyer should be completely independentand work entirely as an individual, drawing on his own resources oflearning, ability, and intelligence. Next, he has referred to Sir OwenDixon when he became the Chief Justice of Australia, said:

“Because it is the duty of the barrister to stand between the subjectand the Crown, and between the rich and the poor, the powerfuland the weak, it is necessary that, while the Bar occupies anessential part in the administration of justice, the barrister shouldbe completely independent and work entirely as an individual,drawing on his own resources of learning, ability, and intelligence.”

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A lawyer has to balance between the duty to the court and interestsof his clients. A lawyer has to be independent. He has observed thus:

“An important element in the relationship between the court andthe barrister is the special duty which the barrister owes to thecourt over and above the duty which the barrister owes to theclient. The performance of that duty contributes to the efficientdisposition of litigation. In the performance of that duty theindependence of the barrister, allied to his familiarity with thejudicial process, gives him a particular advantage. In balancinghis duty to the court and that owed to the client, the barrister isfree from the allegiances and interests and the closer and continuingassociation which the solicitor has with the client. The significanceof the barrister’s special duty to the court and the expectationthat it will be performed played a part in the recognition of thecommon law’s immunity of the barrister from in-court liability fornegligence. That immunity is founded partly on the existence ofthe duty and its performance with beneficial consequences forthe curial process. So much is clear from the speeches in theHouse of Lords in Rondel v Worsley and Saif Ali v. SydneyMitchell & Co. and the majority judgments in the High Court ofAustralia in Gianarelli v. Wraith.

The Bar’s best response to the new challenge which confronts itis to re-affirm its traditional professional ideals and aspire toexcellence. The professional ideal is not the pursuit of wealth butpublic service. That is the vital difference between professionalismand commercialism.

It is timely to repeat what O’Connor J (with whom RehnquistCJ and Scalia J agreed) said in Shapero v. Kentucky BarAssociation :

One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike otheroccupations that may be equally respectable, is that membershipentails an ethical obligation to temper one’s selfish pursuit ofeconomic success by adhering to standards of conduct that couldnot be enforced either by legal fiat or through the discipline of themarket. There are sound reasons to continue pursuing the goalthat is implicit in the traditional view of processional life. Both thespecial privileges incident to membership in the professional and the advantages those privileges give in the necessary task of earninga living are means to a goal that transcends the accumulation ofwealth.

Unless the Bar dedicates itself to the ideal of public service, itforfeits its claim to treatment as a profession in the true sense ofthe term. Dedication to public service demands not only attainmentof a high standard of professional skill but also faithful performance of duty to client and court and a willingness to make theprofessional service available to the public.”

42. Before dilating further on the issue, we take note of theprovisions contained in the Advocates Act. Section 9 provides for theconstitution of Disciplinary Committee by the Bar Council. A DisciplinaryCommittee consists of three members, two of them are elected membersof the Bar Council and the third member has to be co-opted by theCouncil amongst Advocates. Section 9 is reproduced hereunder:

“9. Disciplinary Committees.- (1) A Bar Council shall constituteone or more disciplinary committees, each of which shall consistof three persons of whom two shall be persons elected by theCouncil from amongst its members and the other shall be personco-opted by the Council from amongst advocates who possessthe qualifications specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) ofsection 3 and who are not members of the Council, and theseniormost advocate amongst the members of a disciplinarycommittee shall be the Chairman thereof.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), anydisciplinary committee constituted prior to the commencement ofthe Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1964 may dispose of theproceedings pending before it as if this section had not beenamended by the said Act.”

43. Section 15 confers the power on the Bar Council to makerules for carrying out the purposes of the Chapter II inter alia relatingto disciplinary committees. Chapter III deals with the provisions regardingenrolment of advocates contained in Sections 16 to 28. Right to practiceis conferred in Section 29, which provides that advocates be the onlyrecognized class of persons entitled to practice law. Section 30 of theAdvocates Act gives right of advocates to practice throughout the territoryin all Courts including the Supreme Court before any Tribunal or person A

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Alegally authorize to take evidence and before any other authority or personbefore whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being inforce entitled to practice. Now with the enforcement of Section 30 onJune 15, 2011, after five decades, right to practice is available as providedunder Section 30. Section 32 contains a non-obstante clause that anyCourt, authority or person may permit any person, not enrolled as anBadvocate to appear before it or him in any particular case. The advocatehas to enroll himself with the State Bar Council in order to practice lawas provided in Section 33 of the Advocates Act.

44. Section 34 empowers the High Court to frame rules and provideconditions subject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice inCthe High Court and the courts subordinate thereto. Section 34 is extractedhereunder:

“34. Power of High Courts to make rules.—

(1) The High Court may make rules laying down the conditionsDsubject to which an advocate shall be permitted to practice in theHigh Court and the courts subordinate thereto.

(1A) The High Court shall make rules for fixing and regulating bytaxation or otherwise the fees payable as costs by any party inrespect of the fees of his adversary’s advocate upon allEproceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto.

(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section(1), the High Court at Calcutta may make rules providing for theholding of the Intermediate and the Financial examinations forarticled clerks to be passed by the persons referred to in section58AG for the purpose of being admitted as advocates on the StateFroll and any other matter connected therewith.”

Section 34 clearly enables the High Courts to prescribe conditionsto practice. The provisions contained in Section 34(1A) empowers theHigh Court to make rules regarding the fees payable as costs.

G45. There can be certain conditions on right to practice and appearin a case which can be imposed by the High Court under Section 34such as filing fresh vakalatnama, superseding the previous one that hasto be done as per the High Court rules, if any such provision has beenmade by the High Court. Section 34 contained in chapter IV of the Actintends to regulate the practice of the advocate in the High Court andH

subordinate courts. It does not empower it to frame the rules fordisciplinary control. Within the purview of section 34 of the Act, adresscan also be prescribed for an appearance in the Court. The HighCourt is free to frame the rules for designation of the Senior Advocatesand also the rules on similar pattern as framed by this Court for Advocateson Record.

46. Chapter V deals with the conduct of advocates and disciplinarycontrol. Section 35 deals with the punishment of advocates formisconduct. Section 35 is extracted hereunder:

“35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.—(1) Where onreceipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reasonto believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty ofprofessional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposalto its disciplinary committee.

(1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or onapplication made to it by any person interested, withdraw aproceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and directthe inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of thatState Bar Council.

(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix adate for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereofto be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-Generalof the State.

(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after givingthe advocate concerned and the Advocate-General an opportunityof being heard may make any of the following orders, namely:—

(a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiatedat the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedingsbe filed; (b) reprimand the advocate;

(c) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it maydeem fit; (d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll ofadvocates.

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(4) Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause(c) of sub-section (3), he shall, during the period of suspension, bedebarred from practicing in any court or before any authority orperson in India.

(5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General underBsub-section (2), the Advocate-General may appear before thedisciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in personor through any advocate appearing on his behalf.

[Explanation.—In this section, [section 37 and section 38], theexpressions “Advocate-General” and Advocate-General of theCState” shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean theAdditional Solicitor General of India.]”

47. Section 36 deals with disciplinary powers of Bar Council ofIndia. Where a lawyer whose name is not on any State roll and a complaintis received that he is guilty of professional misconduct, the Bar CouncilDof India shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.Bar Council of India can withdraw any pending inquiry before itself anddecide it. Section 36 is extracted hereunder:

“36. Disciplinary powers of Bar Council of India.—(1) Where onreceipt of a complaint or otherwise the Bar Council of India hasEreason to believe that any advocate whose name is not enteredon any State roll has been guilty of professional or othermisconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinarycommittee.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, thedisciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may, either ofits own motion or on a report by any State Bar Council or on anapplication made to it by any person interested, withdraw for inquirybefore itself any proceedings for disciplinary action against anyadvocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any StateBar Council and dispose of the same.

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(3) The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India, indisposing of any case under this section, shall observe, so far asmay be, the procedure laid down in section 35, the references tothe Advocate-General in that section being construed as referencesto the Attorney-General of India.

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(4) In disposing of any proceedings under this section thedisciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may make anyorder which the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Councilcan make under sub-section (3) of section 35, and where anyproceedings have been withdrawn for inquiry before thedisciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India the State BarCouncil concerned shall give effect to any such order.”

48. Section 36A provides for the procedure on the change in theconstitution of disciplinary committees. In case of change, the succeedingcommittee may continue the proceedings from the stage at which theproceedings were so left by its predecessor committee. Section 36B ofthe Advocates Act deals with disposal of the disciplinary committee. Adisciplinary committee of the State Bar Council has to decide the casewithin a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaintor the date of institution of proceedings failing which the proceedingsshall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India. Section 37 of the Actprovides that any person aggrieved by an order of the disciplinarycommittee of the State Bar Council may prefer an appeal to the BarCouncil of India. Section 38 provides for an appeal to the SupremeCourt against the order made by the disciplinary committee of the BarCouncil of India.

49. Section 42 deals with powers of the disciplinary committee.The Presiding Officer of the Court can be summoned with permissionof the High Court to prove misconduct against advocate and proceedingsare deemed to be judicial one as provided in Section 42(2), which isextracted hereunder:

“42. Powers of disciplinary committee.— (1) The disciplinarycommittee of a Bar Council shall have the same powers as vestedin a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respectof the following matters, namely:—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person andexamining him on oath; (b) requiring discovery and production of any documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from anycourt or office; AB

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(e) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses ordocuments; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed:

Provided that no such disciplinary committee have the right torequire the attendance of—

(a) any presiding officer of a Court except with the previoussanction of the High Court to which such court is subordinate; (b)any officer of a revenue court except with the previous sanctionof the State Government.

(2) All proceedings before a disciplinary committee of a Bar Councilshall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning ofsections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and every suchdisciplinary committee shall be deemed to be a civil court for thepurposes of sections 480, 482 and 485 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1898.

(3) For the purposes of exercising any of the powers conferredby sub-section (1), a disciplinary committee may send to any civilcourt in the territories to which this Act extends, any summons orother process, for the committee or any commission which itdesires to issue, and the civil court shall cause such process to beserved or such commission to be issued, as the case may be, andmay enforce any such process as if it were a process forattendance or production before itself.

(4) Notwithstanding the absence of the Chairman or any memberof a disciplinary committee on a date fixed for the hearing of acase before it, the disciplinary committee may, if it so thinks fit,hold or continue the proceedings on the date so fixed and no suchproceedings and no order made by the disciplinary committee inany such proceedings shall be invalid merely by reason of theabsence of the Chairman or member thereof on any such date:

Provided that no final orders of the nature referred to in sub-section (3) of section 35 shall be made in any proceeding unlessthe Chairman and other members of the disciplinary committeeare present.

(5) Where no final orders of the nature referred to in sub-section(3) of section 35 can be made in any proceedings in accordancewith the opinion of the Chairman and the members of a disciplinarycommittee either for want of majority opinion amongst themselvesor otherwise, the case, with their opinion thereon, shall be laidbefore the Chairman of the Bar Council concerned or if theChairman of the Bar Council is acting as the Chairman or a memberof the disciplinary committee, before the Vice-Chairman of theBar Council, as the case may be, after such hearing as he thinksfit, shall deliver his opinion and the final order of the disciplinarycommittee shall follow such opinion.”

50. The order of the cost of proceedings before the DisciplinaryCommittee is executable as provided in Section 43. Section 44 dealswith the review of orders of the disciplinary committee. Sections 43 and44 are extracted hereunder:

“43. Cost of proceedings before a disciplinary committee.— Thedisciplinary committee of a Bar Council may make such order asto the cost of any proceedings before it as it may deem fit and anysuch order shall be executable as if it were an order—

(a) in the case of an order of the disciplinary committee of theBar Council of India, of the Supreme Court; (b) in the case of an order of the disciplinary committee of a StateBar Council, of the High Court.

44. Review of orders of disciplinary committee.—The disciplinarycommittee of a Bar Council may of its own motion or otherwisereview any order within sixty days of the date of that order passedby it under this Chapter.

Provided that no such order of review of the disciplinary committeeof a State Bar Council shall have effect unless it has been approvedby the Bar Council of India.”

51. It is apparent from the aforesaid provisions and scheme of theAct that Advocates Act has never intended to confer the disciplinarypowers upon the High Court or upon this Court except to the extentdealing with an appeal under Section 38.

52. By amending the High Court Rules, 1970, the High Court ofMadras has inserted impugned Rules 14(A) to 14(D). The rules have A

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Abeen framed in exercise of the power conferred under Section 34 of theAdvocates Act. Section 34 of the Act does not confer such a power toframe rules to debar lawyer for professional misconduct. The amendmentmade by providing Rule 14(A)(vii) to (xii) is not authorized under theAdvocate Act. The High Court has no power to exercise the disciplinarycontrol. It would amount to usurpation of the power of Bar CouncilBconferred under Advocates Act. However, the High Court may punishadvocate for contempt and then debar him from practicing for suchspecified period as may be permissible in accordance with law, but withoutexercising contempt jurisdiction by way of disciplinary control nopunishment can be imposed. As such impugned rules could not haveCbeen framed within the purview of Section 34. Provisions clearly impingeupon the independence of the Bar and encroach upon the exclusivepower conferred upon the Bar Council of the State and the Bar Councilof India under the Advocates Act. The amendment made to the Rules14(A) to 14(D) have to be held to be ultra vires of the power of the HighCourt.D

53. We now analyze the proposition laid down by this Court invarious decisions relating to the aforesaid aspect. In reference: VinayChandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, this Court rejected the argumentthat the powers of suspending and removing the advocate from practiceis vested exclusively in the disciplinary committee of the State Bar CouncilEand the Bar Council of India and the Supreme Court is denuded of itspower to impose such punishment both under Articles 129 and 142. TheCourt observed that the power of the Supreme Court under Article 129cannot be trammeled in any way by any statutory provision including theprovisions of the Advocates Act or the Contempt of Courts Act. ThisFCourt imposed the punishment on the then Chairman of the Bar Councilsuspended sentence of imprisonment for a period of six weeks. Thesentence was suspended for four years which may be activated in casethe contemnor is convicted for any other offense of contempt of courtwithin the said period. The contemnor was also suspended frompracticing as an advocate for a period of three years with the consequenceGthat all elective and nominated offices/posts held by him in his capacityas an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith.

54. However, the decision was held not to be laying down a goodlaw in a writ petition filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association v.Union of India and another, (supra). Supreme Court Bar AssociationH

filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India aggrieved bythe direction in V.C. Mishra’s case that the contemnor shall standsuspended from practicing as an advocate for a period of three yearsissued by this Court while invoking powers under Articles 129 and 142of the Constitution. A prayer was made to hold that the disciplinarycommittee of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act alonehave exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend or debar anadvocate from practicing law for professional or other misconduct. Thequestion posed for consideration in Supreme Court Bar Association v.Union of India (supra) before this Court is extracted hereunder:

“5. The only question which we are called upon to decide in thispetition is whether the punishment for established contempt ofcourt committed by an advocate can include punishment to debarthe advocates concerned from practice by suspending his license(sanad) for a specified period, in exercise of its power under Article129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”

The Constitution Bench of Court has observed:

37. The nature and types of punishment which a court of recordcan impose, in a case of established contempt, under the commonlaw have now been specifically incorporated in the contempt ofCourts Act, 1971 in so far as the High Courts are concerned andtherefore to the extent the contempt of Courts Act 1971 identifiesthe nature of types of punishments which can be awarded in thecase of established contempt, it does not impinge upon the inherentpowers of the High Court under Article 215 either. No new typeof punishment can be created or assumed.

39. Suspending the license to practice of any professional like alawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. When such a professionalis found guilty of committing contempt of court, for any specifiedperiod, is not a recognized or accepted punishment which a courtof record either under the common law or under the statutory lawcan impose, on a contemner, in addition to any of the otherrecognized punishments.

40. The suspension of an Advocate from practice and his removalfrom the State roll of advocates are both punishments specificallyprovided for under the Advocates Act, 1961, for proven“professional misconduct’ of an advocate.While exercising its A

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contempt jurisdiction under Article 129, the only cause or matterbefore this Court is regarding commission of contempt of court.There is no cause of professional misconduct, properly so called,pending before the Court. This Court, therefore, in exercise of itsjurisdiction under Article 129 cannot take over the jurisdiction ofthe disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State or theBar Council of India to punish an advocate by suspending hislicence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of‘professional misconduct’ is recorded in the manner prescribedunder the Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

41. When this Court is seized of a matter of contempt of court byan advocate, there is no “case, cause or matter” before theSupreme Court regarding his “professional misconduct” eventhough, in a given case, the contempt committed by an advocatemay also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocateby virtue of the license to practice law but no issue relating to hissuspension from practice is the subject matter of the case. Thepowers of this Court, under Article 129 read with Article 142 ofthe Constitution, being supplementary powers have “to be used inexercise of its jurisdiction” in the case under consideration by thisCourt. Moreover, a case of contempt of court is not stricto sensua cause or a matter between the parties inter se. It is a matterbetween the court and the contemner. It is not, strictly speaking,tried as an adversarial litigation. The party, which brings thecontumacious conduct of the contemner to the notice of the court,whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only aninformant and does not have the status of a litigant in the contemptof Court case.

42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercisedsparingly and with caution, whenever an act adversely effectsthe administration of justice or which tends to impede its courseor tends to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions. Thisjurisdiction may also be exercised when the act complained ofadversely effects the Majesty of Law or dignity of the courts.The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty anddignity of the Courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdictioncombining “the jury, the judge and the hangman” and it is sobecause the court is not adjudicating upon any claim betweenlitigating parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the dignity of an individual judge but to protect the administration ofjustice from being maligned. In the general interest of thecommunity, it is imperative that the authority of courts should notbe imperiled and there should be no unjustifiable interference inthe administration of justice. It is a matter between the court andthe contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It is exercisedin a summary manner in aid of the administration of justice, themajesty of law and the dignity of the courts. No such act can bepermitted which may have the tendency to shake the publicconfidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration ofjustice.

43. The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt ofcourt, though quite wide, is yet limited and cannot be expanded toinclude the power to determine whether an advocate is also guiltyof “Professional misconduct” in a summary manner, giving a gobye to the procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act.Thepower to do complete justice under Article 142 is in a way,corrective power, which gives preference to equity over law butit cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the dueprocess contained in the Advocates Act 1961 by suspending hislicense to practice in a summary manner, while dealing with acase of contempt of court.

44. In Re, V.C. Mishra case, while imposing the punishment ofsuspended simple imprisonment, the Bench, as already noticed,punished the contemner also by suspending his license to practiceas an advocate for a specified period. The Bench dealing withthat aspect opined: (SCC p.624, para 51)

“It is not disputed that suspension of the advocate from practiceand his removal from the State roll of advocates are bothpunishments. There is no restriction or limitation on the natureof punishment that this Court may award while exercising itscontempt jurisdiction and the said punishments can be thepunishments the Court may impose while exercising the saidjurisdiction.”

45. In taking this view, the Bench relied upon Articles 129 and142 of the Constitution besides Section 38 of the Advocates Act,1961. The Bench observed: (SCC p.624, paras 49-50)

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“Secondly, it would also mean that for any act of contempt ofcourt, if it also happens to be an act of professional misconductunder the Bar Council of India Rules, the courts including thisCourt, will have no power to take action since the AdvocatesAct confers exclusive power for taking action for such conducton the disciplinary committees of the State Bar Council andthe Bar Council of India, as the case may be. Such a propositionof law on the face of it observes rejection for the simple reasonthat the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar council andthe Bar Council of India to take action for professionalmisconduct is different from the jurisdiction of the Courts totake action against the advocates for the contempt of Court.The said jurisdiction co-exist independently of each other. Theaction taken under one jurisdiction does not bar an action underthe other jurisdiction.”

The contention is also misplaced for yet another and equally, ifnot more, important reason. In the matter of disciplinaryjurisdiction under the Advocates Act, this Court is constitutedas the final Appellate authority under Section 38 of the act aspointed out earlier. In that capacity, this court can impose anyof the punishments mentioned in Section 35(3) of the Actincluding that of removal of the name of the Advocate from the State roll and of suspending him from practice. If that beso, there is no reason why this court while exercising itscontempt jurisdiction under Article 129 read with Article 142cannot impose any of the said punishments. The punishmentso imposed will not only be not against the provisions of anystatute but in conformity with the substantive provisions of theadvocates Act and for conduct which is both a professionalmisconduct as well as the contempt of Court. The argumenthas, therefore, to be rejected.”

46. These observations, as we shall presently demonstrate andwe say so with utmost respect, are too widely stated and do notbear closer scrutiny. After recognising that the disciplinaryjurisdiction of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of Indiato take action for professional misconduct is different from thejurisdiction of the courts to take action against the advocates forthe contempt of court, how could the court invest itself with the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council topunish the advocate concerned for “professional misconduct” inaddition to imposing the punishment of suspended sentence ofimprisonment for committing contempt of court.

57. In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committingcontempt of court may also be guilty of committing “professionalmisconduct” depending upon the gravity or nature of hiscontumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate anddistinct and exercisable by different forums by following separateand distinct procedures. The power to punish an Advocate, bysuspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll ofthe State Bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vestsexclusively in the statutory authorities created under the AdvocatesAct, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committingcontempt of court vests exclusively in the courts.

58. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961,exclusive power for punishing an advocate for “professionalmisconduct “has been conferred on the State Bar Councilconcerned and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains adetailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking thelicense of an advocate for his “professional misconduct’. Since,the suspension or revocation of license of an advocate has notonly civil consequences but also penal consequences, thepunishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions have tobe strictly construed. Punishment by way of suspending the licenseof an advocate can only be imposed by the competent statutorybody after the charge is established against the Advocate in amanner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

70. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors.,(1975) 2 SCC 702, a Seven Judge Bench of this Court analyzedthe scheme of the Advocates Act 1961 and inter alia observed:(SCC p.709, para 24)

“24. The scheme and the provisions of the Act indicate thatthe Constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of Indiais for one of the principal purposes to see that the standards ofprofessional conduct and etiquette laid down by the Bar Councilof India are observed and preserved. The Bar Councils, A

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therefore, entertain cases of misconduct against advocates.The Bar Councils are to safeguard the rights, privilege, andinterests of advocates. The Bar Council is a body corporate.The disciplinary committees are constituted by the Bar Council.The Bar Council is not the same body as its disciplinarycommittee. One of the principal functions of the Bar Councilin regard to standards of professional conduct and etiquette ofadvocates is to receive complaints against advocates and ifthe Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate hasbeen guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall referthe case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. The BarCouncils of a State may also of its own motion if it has reasonto believe that any advocate has been guilty of professional orother misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to itsdisciplinary committee. It is apparent that a state Bar Councilnot only receives a complaint but is required to apply its mindto find out whether there is any reason to believe that anyadvocate has been guilty of professional or other misconduct.The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned belief. TheBar Council has a very important part to play, first in thereception of complaints, second, informing reasonable beliefof guilt of professional or other misconduct and finally in makingreference of the case to its disciplinary committee. The initiationof the proceeding before the disciplinary committee is by theBar Council of a State. A most significant feature is that nolitigant and no member of the public can straightway commencedisciplinary proceedings against an advocate. It is the BarCouncil of a State which initiates the disciplinary proceedings.

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71. Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961with effect from 19-5-1961, matters connected with the enrolmentof advocates as also their punishment for professional misconductis governed by the provisions of that Act only. Since, the jurisdictionto grant license to a law graduate to practice as an advocate vestGexclusively in the Bar Councils of the State concerned, thejurisdiction to suspend his license for a specified term or to revokeit also vests in the same body.

72. The letters patent of the Chartered High Courts as well of theother High Courts earlier did vest power in those High Courts to H

admit an advocate to practice.The power of suspending frompractice being incidental to that of admitting to practice also vestedin the High Courts. However, by virtue of Section 50 of theAdvocates Act, with effect from the date when a State Bar Councilis constituted under the Act, the provisions of the Letters patentof any High Court and “of any other law” in so far as they relateto the admission and enrolment of a legal practitioner or confer onthe legal practitioner the right to practice in any court or beforeany authority or a person as also the provisions relating to the“suspension or removal” of legal practitioners, whether under theletters patent of any High Court or of any other law. have beenrepealed. These powers now vest exclusively, under the AdvocatesAct, in the Bar Council of the State concerned.Even in England,the courts of justice are now relieved from disbarring advocatesfrom practice after the power of calling to the Bar has beendelegated to the Inns of Court. The power to disbar the advocatealso now vests exclusively in the Inns of Court and a detailedprocedure has been laid therefor.

76. This Court is indeed the final appellate authority under Section38 of the Act but we are not persuaded to agree with the viewthat this Court can in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, underSection 38 of the Act, impose one of the punishments, prescribedunder that Act, while punishing a contemner advocate in a contemptcase. ‘Professional misconduct’ of the advocate concerned is nota matter directly in issue in the contempt of court case. Whiledealing with the contempt of court case, this court is obliged toexamine whether the conduct complained of amounts to contemptof court and if the answer is in the affirmative, then to sentencethe contemner for contempt of court by imposing any of therecognised and accepted punishments for committing contemptof court. Keeping in view the elaborate procedure prescribed underthe Advocates Act 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder it followsthat a complaint of professional misconduct is required to be triedby the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council, like the trial of acriminal case by a court of law and an advocate may be punishedon the basis of evidence led before the disciplinary committee ofthe Bar Council after being afforded an opportunity of hearing.The delinquent advocate may be suspended from practice for a ABCD

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Aspecified period or even removed from the rolls of the advocatesor imposed any other punishment as provided under the Act. Theinquiry is a detailed and elaborate one and is not of a summarynature. It is, therefore, not permissible for this court to punish anadvocate for “professional misconduct” in exercise of the appellatejurisdiction by converting itself as the statutory body exercisingB“original jurisdiction”. Indeed, if in a given case the Bar Councilconcerned on being apprised of the contumacious andblameworthy conduct of the advocate by the High Court or thisCourt does not take any action against the said advocate, thiscourt may well have the jurisdiction in exercise of its appellateCpowers under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of theConstitution to proceed suo moto and send for the records fromthe Bar Council and pass appropriate orders against the advocateconcerned. In an appropriate case, this Court may consider theexercise of appellate jurisdiction even suo moto provided there issome cause pending before the Bar Council concerned, and theDBar Council does “not act” or fails to act, by sending for therecord of that cause and pass appropriate orders.

77. However, the exercise of powers under the contemptjurisdiction cannot be confused with the appellate jurisdiction underSection 38 of the Act. The two jurisdictions are separate andEdistinct.We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves tosubscribe to the contrary view expressed by the Bench in V.C.Mishra case because in that case, the Bar Council had not declinedto deal with the matter and take appropriate action against theadvocate concerned. Since there was no cause pending beforeFthe Bar Council, this court could not exercise its appellatejurisdiction in respect of a matter which was never underconsideration of the Bar Council.

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78. Thus, to conclude we are of the opinion that this Court cannotin exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 read with Article129 of the Constitution, while punishing a contemner for committingcontempt of court, also impose a punishment of suspending hislicense to practice, where the contemner happens to be anAdvocate. Such a punishment cannot even be imposed by takingrecourse to the appellate powers under Section 38 of the Actwhile dealing with a case of contempt of court (and not an appeal G

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relating to professional misconduct as such). To that extent, thelaw laid down in Vinay Chandra Mishra, Re is not good law andwe overrule it.

79. An Advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court mayalso, as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in agiven case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Councilof India to punish that Advocate by either debarring him frompractice or suspending his license, as may be warranted, in thefacts and circumstances of each case. The learned SolicitorGeneral informed us that there have been cases where the BarCouncil of India taking note of the contumacious and objectionableconduct of an advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedingsagainst him and even punished him for “professional misconduct”,on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing contemptof court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council ofthe State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be when apprisedof the established contumacious conduct of an advocate by theHigh Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion, and takeappropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article 144of the Constitution “all authorities civil and judicial, in the territoryof India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court”. The Bar Councilwhich performs a public duty and is charged with the obligation toprotect the dignity of the profession and maintain professionalstandards and etiquette is also obliged to act “in aid of the SupremeCourt”. It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the occasion anddischarge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the contemneradvocate. It must act in accordance with the prescribed procedure,whenever its attention is drawn by this Court to the contumaciousand unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the tendencyto interfere with due administration of justice. It is possible for theHigh Courts also to draw the attention of the Bar Council of theState to a case of professional misconduct of a contemneradvocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the mannerprescribed by the Act and the rules framed thereunder. There isno justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise tothe occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the dignityof the courts and the majesty of law and prevent any interferencein the administration of justice. Learned counsel for the parties ABC

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Apresent before us do not dispute and rightly so that whenever acourt of record, records its findings about the conduct of anAdvocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of courtand desires or refers the matter to be considered by the Bar Councilconcerned, appropriate action should be initiated by the Bar Councilconcerned in accordance with law with a view to maintain theBdignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty of law andprofessional standards and etiquette. Nothing is more destructiveof public confidence in the administration of justice than incivility,rudeness or disrespectful conduct on the part of a counsel towardsthe court or disregard by the court of the privileges of the bar. InCcase the Bar Council, even after receiving ‘reference’ from thecourt, fails to take action against the advocate concerned, thiscourt might consider invoking its powers under Section 38 of theAct by sending for the record of the proceedings from the BarCouncil and passing appropriate orders. Of Course, the appellatepowers under Section 38 would be available to this Court onlyDand not to the High Courts. We, however, hope that such a situationwould not arise.

80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the HighCourt, the prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it tillhe purges himself of the contempt but that is much different fromsuspending or revoking his license or debarring him to practice asan advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious,unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record,this court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rulesitself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-an-Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and thepower to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke orsuspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does notamount to suspending or revoking his license to practice as anadvocate in other courts or Tribunals.”

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The Court has observed that in a given case an Advocate foundguilty of committing contempt of court may at the same time be guilty ofcommitting “professional misconduct” but the two jurisdictions areseparate, distinct and exercisable by different forums by followingHdifferent procedures. Exclusive power for punishing an Advocate for professional misconduct is with Bar Councils. Punishment for suspendingthe license of an Advocate can only be imposed by a competent statutorybody. Relying upon the Seven-Judges Bench decision in Bar Councilof Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors. (supra) that underAdvocates Act the power to grant licenses is with Bar Council, thejurisdiction to suspend the licence or to debar him vests in the samebody. Though appeal lies to this Court under Section 38, it cannot convertit to statutory body exercising “original jurisdiction”. This Court, in theexercise of jurisdiction under Articles 142 and 129 while punishing in thecontempt of court, cannot suspend a licence to practice. The Courtfurther held that it is possible for this Court or the High Court to preventcontemnor Advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of contemptbut that is different from suspending or revoking his licence to practiceor debarring him from practice for misconduct. This Court also held incase of Advocate on Record that the Supreme Court possessesjurisdiction under its rules to withdraw the privilege to practice asAdvocate on record as that privilege is conferred by this Court. Thewithdrawal of that privilege does not tantamount to suspending or revokingthe licence.

55. Shri Mohan Parasaran learned senior counsel has relied onthe matter of Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr. (supra) inwhich the question was whether an Advocate found guilty of contemptof court can appear in court until and unless he purges himself of contempt,the court held that an Advocate found guilty of contempt of court mustpurge himself before being permitted to appear. Rule 11 of the Rulesframed by the High Court of Kerala under section 34 (1) of AdvocatesAct reads thus:

“11. No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Courtshall be permitted to appear, act or plead in any Court unless hehas purged himself of the contempt.”

This Court has relied upon in Supreme Court Bar Association v.Union of India (supra) in Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr.(supra) and observed thus:

16. Rule 11 of the Rules is not a provision intended for theDisciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State r the BarCouncil of India. It is a matter entirely concerning the dignity andthe orderly functioning of the courts. The right of the advocate to AB

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practice envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in thedischarge of his professional duties. Apart form appearing in thecourts he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legalopinion whenever sought for, he can draft instruments, pleadings,affidavits or any other documents, he can participate in anyconference involving legal discussions etc. Rule 11 has nothing todo with all the acts done by an advocate during his practice excepthis performance insides the court. Conduct in court is a matterconcerning the court and hence the Bar Council cannot claim thatwhat should happen inside the court could also be regulated bythe Bar Council in exercise of its disciplinary powers.The right topractice, no doubt, is the genus of which the right to appear andconduct cases in the court may be a specie. But the right to appearand conduct cases in the court is a matter on which the courtmust have the major supervisory power. Hence the court cannotbe divested of the control or supervision of the court merelybecause it may involve the right of an advocate.

17. When the rules stipulate that a person who committed contemptof court cannot have the unreserved right to continue to appearand plead and conduct cases in the courts without any qualm orremorse, the Bar Council cannot overrule such a regulationconcerning the orderly conduct of court proceedings.Courts oflaw are structured in such a design as to evoke respect andreverence for the majesty of law and justice. The machinery fordispensation of justice according to law is operated by the court.Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be held in adignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an advocate, whowas found guilty of contempt of court on the previous hour, standingin the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness onthe same day, unaffected by the contemptuous behavior he hurledat the court, would erode the dignity of the court and even corrodethe majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public inthe efficacy of the institution of the courts. This necessitates vestingof power with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating theproceeding inside the court including the conduct of advocatesduring such proceedings. That power should not be confused withthe right to practice law. While the Bar Council can exercise controlover the latter the High Court should be in control of the former.

18. In the above context, it is useful to quote the followingobservations made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad HighCourt in Prayag Das vs. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr and ors. AIR1974 All 133 : (AIR p.136, para 9)

“The High Court has a power to regulate the appearance ofadvocates in courts.The right to practise and the right to appearin courts are not synonymous. An advocate may carry onchamber practice or even practise in courts in various otherways, e.g. drafting and filing of pleadings and Vakalatnamafor performing those acts. For that purpose, his physicalappearance in courts may not at all be necessary. For thepurpose of regulating his appearance in courts the High Courtshould be the appropriate authority to make rules and on aproper construction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act itmust be inferred that the High Court has the power to makerules for regulating the appearance of Advocates andproceedings inside the courts. Obviously, the High Court is theonly appropriate authority to be entrusted with thisresponsibility.”

19. In our view, the legal position has been correctly delineated inthe above statements made by the Allahabad High Court. Thecontext for making those statements was that an advocatequestioned the powers of the High Court in making dressregulations for the advocates while appearing in courts.

20. Lord Denning had observed as follows in Hadkinson vs.-Hadkinson 1952 (2) All ER 567: (All ER p.575BC)

“…I am of the opinion that the fact that a party to a cause hasdisobeyed an order of the courtis not of itself a bar to his beingheard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues,it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it moredifficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce theorders which it may make, then the court may in its discretionrefuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or goodreason is shown why it should not be removed.”

21. The observations can apply to the courts in India without anydoubt and at the same time without impeding the disciplinarypowers vested in the Bar Councils under the Advocate Act.

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A35. It is still open to the respondent Advocate to purge himself ofthe contempt in the manner indicated above.But until that processis completed respondent Advocate cannot act or plead in any courtsituated within the domain of the Kerala High Court, including thesubordinate courts thereunder. The Registrar of the High Courtof Kerala shall intimate all the courts about this interdict as againstBthe respondent-advocates.”

56. The decision in Pravin C. Shah (supra) operates when anAdvocate is found guilty of committing contempt of court and then heCcan be debarred from appearing in court until he purges himself ofcontempt as per guidelines laid down therein, however, the power tosuspend enrolment and debarring from appearance are different fromeach other. In case of debarment, enrolment continues but a personcannot appear in court once he is guilty of contempt of court until hepurges himself as provided in the rule. Debarment due to having beenDfound guilty of contempt of court is not punishment of suspending thelicense for a specified period or permanently removing him from the rollof Advocates. While guilty of contempt his name still continuous on theroll of concerned Bar Council unless removed or suspended by BarCouncil by taking appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The observationsEmade by Lord Denning in Hadkinson v. Hadkindon (supra) was also acase of disobedience of court order and the Court may refuse to hearhim until impediment is removed or good reason to remove impedimentexist.

57. In Ex- Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India & Anr. (supra)Fwhile holding that advocates have no right to go on ‘strike’, the Courtobserved:

“20. Thus the law is already well settled. It is the duty of everyAdvocate who has accepted a brief to attend the trial, even thoughit may go on day to day and for a prolonged period. It is alsoGsettled law that a lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot refuseto attend Court because a boycott call is given by the BarAssociation. It is settled law that it is unprofessional as well asunbecoming for a lawyer who has accepted a brief to refuse toattend Court even in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott bythe Bar Association or the Bar Council. It is settled law that Courts H

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are under an obligation to hear and decide cases brought beforethem and cannot adjourn matters merely because lawyers are onstrike. The law is that it is the duty and obligation of Courts to goon with matters or otherwise it would tantamount to becomingprivy to the strike. It is also settled law that if a resolution is passedby Bar Associations expressing want of confidence in judicialofficers, it would amount to scandalizing the Courts to undermineits authority and thereby the advocates will have committedcontempt of Court. Lawyers have known, at least since MahabirSingh case (supra) that if they participate in a boycott or a strike,their action is ex-facie bad in view of the declaration of law bythis Court. A lawyer’s duty is to boldly ignore a call for strike orboycott of Court/s. Lawyers have also known, at least sinceRamon Services case, that the advocates would be answerablefor the consequences suffered by their clients if the non-appearance was solely on grounds of a strike call.

22. It was expected that having known the well-settled law andhaving seen that repeated strikes and boycotts have shaken theconfidence of the public in the legal profession and affected theadministration of justice, there would be self-regulation. Theabovementioned interim order was passed in the hope that withself-restraint and self-regulation the lawyers would retrieve theirprofession from lost social respect. The hope has not fructified.Unfortunately, strikes and boycott calls are becoming a frequentspectacle. Strikes, boycott calls, and even unruly and unbecomingconduct are becoming a frequent spectacle.On the slightestpretense strikes and/or boycott calls are resorted to. The judicialsystem is being held to ransom. Administration of law and justiceis threatened. The rule of law is undermined.

33. The only exception to the general rule set out above appearsto be the item (III). We accept that in such cases a strong protestmust be lodged. We remain of the view that strikes are illegal andthat courts must now take a very serious view of strikes and callsfor boycott. However, as stated above, lawyers are part and parcelof the system of administration of justice. A protest on an issueinvolving dignity, integrity, and independence of the Bar andjudiciary, provided it does not exceed one day, may be overlookedby courts, who may turn a blind eye for that one day.

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34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the right ofappearance in courts is still within the control and jurisdiction ofcourts. Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not been brought intoforce and rightly so. Control of conduct in Court can only be withinthe domain of courts. Thus Article 145 of the Constitution of Indiagives to the Supreme Court and Section 34 of the Advocates Actgives to the High Court power to frame rules including rulesregarding condition on which a person (including an advocate)can practice in the Supreme Court and/or in the High Court andcourts subordinate thereto. Many courts have framed rules in thisbehalf.Such a rule would be valid and binding on all. Let the Bartake note that unless self-restraint is exercised, courts may nowhave to consider framing specific rules debarring advocates, guiltyof contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, fromappearing before the courts. Such a rule if framed would not haveanything to do with the disciplinary jurisdiction of Bar Councils. Itwould be concerning the dignity and orderly functioning of thecourts. The right of the advocate to practice envelopes a lot ofacts to be performed by him in the discharge of his professionalduties. Apart from appearing in the courts he can be consulted byhis clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for, hecan draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents,he can participate in any conference involving legal discussions,he can work in any office or firm as a legal officer, he can appearfor clients before an arbitrator or arbitrators etc. Such a rulewould have nothing to do with all the acts done by an advocateduring his practice. He may even file vakalat on behalf of a clienteven though his appearance inside the court is not permitted.Conduct in court is a matter concerning the court and hence theBar Council cannot claim that what should happen inside the courtcould also be regulated by them in the exercise of their disciplinarypowers. The right to practice, no doubt, is the genus of which theright to appear and conduct cases in the court may be a specie.But the right to appear and conduct cases in the court is a matteron which the court must and does have major supervisory andcontrolling power. Hence courts cannot be and are not divestedof control or supervision of conduct in court merely because itmay involve the right of an advocate. A rule can stipulate that aperson who has committed contempt of court or has behaved

unprofessionally and in an unbecoming manner will not have theright to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in courts.The Bar Councils cannot overrule such a regulation concerningthe orderly conduct of court proceedings. On the contrary, it willbe their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts oflaw are structured in such a design as to evoke respect andreverence to the majesty of law and justice. The machinery fordispensation of justice according to the law is operated by thecourt. Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to beheld in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of anadvocate, who is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming orunprofessional conduct, standing in the court would erode thedignity of the court and even corrode its majesty besides impairingthe confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of thecourts.The power to frame such rules should not be confusedwith the right to practice law. While the Bar Council can exercisecontrol over the latter, the courts are in control of the former. Thisdistinction is clearly brought out by the difference in language inSection 49 of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145of the Constitution of India and Section 34(1) of the AdvocatesAct on the other. Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council toframe rules laying down conditions subject to which an advocateshall have a right to practise i.e. do all the other acts set out above.However, Article 145 of the Constitution of India empowers theSupreme Court to make rules for regulating this practice andprocedure of the court including inter-alia rules as to personspracticing before this Court. Similarly, Section 34 of the AdvocatesAct empowers High Courts to frame rules, inter-alia to lay downconditions on which an advocate shall be permitted to practice incourts. Article 145 of the Constitution of India and Section 34 ofthe Advocates Act clearly show that there is no absolute right toan advocate to appear in a court. An advocate appears in a courtsubject to such conditions as are laid down by the court. It mustbe remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into forceand this also shows that there is no absolute right to appear in acourt. Even if Section 30 were to be brought into force control ofproceedings in Court will always remain with the Court. Thuseven then the right to appear in Court will be subject to complyingwith conditions laid down by Courts just as practice outside Courts ABCDEF

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Awould be subject to conditions laid down by the Bar Council ofIndia. There is thus no conflict or clash between other provisionsof the Advocates Act on the one hand and Section 34 or Article145 of the Constitution of India on the other.

45. Further, appropriate rules are required to be framed by theBHigh Courts under Section 34 of the Advocates Act by making itclear that strike by advocate/advocates would be consideredinterference with the administration of justice and advocate/advocates concerned may be barred from practicing before courtsin a district or in the High Court.”

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The question involved in the aforesaid case was as to strike andboycott of Courts by Lawyers. In that context argument was raised thatsuch an act tantamounts to contempt of court and the court must punishthe party coercing others also to desist from appearance. The CourtDcannot be privy to boycott or strike. The decision in Supreme CourtBar Association v. Union of India (supra) has been reiterated. TheCourt pointed out that let bar take notice of the fact that unless self-restraint is exercised, the court may have to frame rules under Section34 of the Advocates Act debarring advocates guilty of contempt of court/unprofessional or unbecoming conduct from appearing in Courts. TheECourt observed that in case of Bar Council fail to act, Court may becompelled to frame appropriate Rules under Section 34 of the Act. TheCourt has observed about the rules that may be framed but not on thevalidity of rules that actually have been framed and takes away disciplinarycontrol of Bar Council. The power to debar due to contempt of court isFa different aspect than suspension of enrolment or debarment by way ofdisciplinary measure. This Court did not observe that decision in SupremeCourt Bar Association v. Union of India (supra) is bad in law for anyreason at the same time Court has relied upon the same in Ex-Capt.Harish Uppal (supra), and laid down that Bar Council can exercisecontrol on right to practice. The Court also observed that power toGcontrol proceedings within the Court cannot be affected by enforcementof Section 30.

58. In our opinion, the decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v.Union of India & Anr. (supra) does not lend support to vires of Rule14A to 14D as amended by the High Court of Madras. The decisionH

follows the logic of the Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union ofIndia as contempt of court may involve professional misconduct ifcommitted inside Court Room and takes it further with respect to thedebarring appearance in Court, which power is distinct from suspendingenrolment that lies with Bar Council as observed in Ex-Capt. HarishUppal (supra) also in aforesaid para 34, the decision is of no utility tosustain the vires of impugned rules.

59. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (supra)vires of Rule 11 of the rules framed by the High Court of Kerala undersection 34(1) of Advocates Act came to be impinged which debarredAdvocate found guilty of contempt of court from appearing, acting orpleading in court till he got purged himself of the contempt. The courtconsidered the Contempt of Courts Act, Advocates Act, Code of CriminalProcedure, and significantly distinction between Contempt of Court andmisconduct by an Advocate and observed:

“29. Punishment for commission of contempt and punishmentfor misconduct, professional or other misconduct, stand on differentfootings.A person does not have a fundamental right to practicein any court. Such a right is conferred upon him under the provisionsof the Advocates Act which necessarily would mean that theconditions laid down therein would be applicable in relation thereto.Section 30 of the Act uses the expressions “subject to”, whichwould include Section 34 of the Act.

30. In Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.(2004) 3 SCC 1 this Court noticed:

“Subject to” is an expression whereby limitation is expressed.The order is conclusive for all purposes.”

31. This Court further noticed the dictionary meaning of “subjectto” stating (SCC p. 38, paras 92-93):

“92. Furthermore, the expression ‘subject to’ must be giveneffect to.

93. In Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition at page 1278 theexpression “subject to” has been defined as under :

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for. (Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo. 650,136 SW 2d 289, 302)’”

Case-law

32. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court BarAssn.,(1998) 4 SCC 409 no doubt overruled its earlier decision inVinay Chandra Mishra, Re (1995) 2 SCC 584 so as to hold thatthis Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of theConstitution of India is only empowered to proceed suo motuagainst an advocate for his misconduct and send for the recordsand pass an appropriate orders against the advocate concerned.

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33. But it is one thing to say that the court can take suo motucognizance of professional or other misconduct and direct theBar Council of India to proceed against the advocate but it isanother thing to say that it may not allow an advocate to practicein his court unless he purges himself of contempt.

D34. Although in a case of professional misconduct, this Court cannotpunish an advocate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 129of the Constitution of India which can be imposed on a finding ofprofessional misconduct recorded in the manner prescribed underthe Advocates Act and the rules framed thereunder but as hasEbeen noticed in the Supreme Court Bar Assn. professionalmisconduct of the advocate concerned is not a matter directly in”issue in the matter of contempt case.

The Court referred to the observation in Supreme Court BarFAssociation v. Union of India, Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra) andheld that in a case of professional misconduct Court cannot punish anadvocate under Article 129 which has to be done under Advocates Actby the Bar Council. In Contempt of Court Act, misconduct is directlynot in issue. After considering principles of natural justice the courtobserved that it cannot be stretched too far and Rule 11 cannot be saidGto be violative of provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution ofIndia.

60. In R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (supra) reliedon by the respondents, the witnesses were tampered with by the appellant.A sting operation was conducted by the T.V. Channel in connection with H

BMW hit and run case. Advocate - R.K. Anand was found to be guiltyof contempt of Court. He was debarred from appearing in Court for acertain period. The Court also dealt with a motivated application filedfor recusal. The Court expressed concern and sharp deprecation ofsuch tendencies and practices of Members of Bar and held that suchprayer for recusal ordinarily should be viewed as interference in the duecourse of justice leading to penal consequences. The submission wasraised that professional misconduct is dealt with under Advocates Act.The Delhi High Court Rules do not provide that Advocate on convictionfor Contempt of Court would be barred from appearing in Court. ThisCourt noted decisions in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union ofIndia (supra), upheld the order of the High Court and directed the HighCourts to frame the Rules under Section 34 without further delay. ThisCourt has observed:

“237. In both Pravin C. Shahv. K.A. Mohammed Ali, (2001) 8SCC 650 and Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003)2 SCC 45, the earlier Constitution Bench decision in SupremeCourt Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 wasextensively considered. The decision in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppalwas later followed in a three-judge Bench decision in Bar Councilof India v. The High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311.

238. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. the direction prohibiting anadvocate from appearing in court for a specified period was viewedas a total and complete denial of his right to practice law and thebar was considered as a punishment inflicted on him. In Ex. Capt.Harish Uppal it was seen not as punishment for professionalmisconduct but as a measure necessary to regulate the court’sproceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning ofthe courts. We may respectfully add that in a given case a directiondisallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contemptfrom appearing in court may not only be a measure to maintainthe dignity andorderly functioning of the courts but may becomenecessary for the self-protection of the court and for preservationof the purity of court proceedings. Let us, for example, take thecase where an advocate is shown to have accepted money in thename of a judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or where anadvocate is found tampering with the court’s record; or where anadvocate is found actively taking part in faking court orders (fake AB

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bail orders are not unknown in several High Courts!); or wherean advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and abusejudges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a casetransferred from an “inconvenient” court; or where an advocateis found to be in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiatedallegation petitions against judicial officers and judges to thesuperior courts. Unfortunately, these examples are not fromimagination. These things are happening more frequently than wecare to acknowledge.

239. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustivebut there may be other ways in which a malefactor’s conduct andactions may pose a real and imminent threat to the purity of courtproceedings, cardinal to any court’s functioning, apart fromconstituting a substantive offense and contempt of court andprofessional misconduct.In such a situation the court does notonly have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon it toprotect itself and save the purity of its proceedings from beingpolluted in any way and to that end bar the malefactor fromappearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.

240. It is already explained in Ex. Captain Harish Uppal that adirection of this kind by the Court cannot be equated withpunishment for professional misconduct. Further, the prohibitionagainst appearance in courts does not affect the right of the lawyerconcerned to carry on his legal practice in other ways as indicatedin the decision.We respectfully submit that the decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India places the issue in correctperspective and must be followed to answer the question at issuebefore us.

242. Ideally, every High Court should have rules framed underSection 34 of the Advocates Act in order to meet with sucheventualities but even in the absence of the rules, the High Courtcannot be held to be helpless against such threats. In a matter asfundamental and grave as preserving the purity of judicialproceedings, the High Court would be free to exercise the powersvested in it under Section 34 of the Advocates Act notwithstandingthe fact that Rules prescribing the manner of exercise of powerhave not been framed. But in the absence of statutory Rulesproviding for such a course an advocate facing the charge of

contempt would normally think of only the punishments specifiedunder Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. He may noteven imagine that at the end of the proceeding he might end upbeing debarred from appearing before the court. The rules ofnatural justice, therefore, demand that before passing an orderdebarring an advocate from appearing in courts he must be clearlytold that his alleged conduct or actions are such that if found guiltyhe might be debarred from appearing in courts for a specific period.The warning may be given in the initial notice of contempt issuedunder Section 14 or Section 17 (as the case may be) of theContempt of Courts Act. Or such a notice may be given after theproceedee is held guilty of criminal contempt before dealing withthe question of punishment.

243. In order to avoid any such controversies in future, all theHigh Courts that have so far not framed rules under Section 34 ofthe Advocates Act are directed to frame the rules without anyfurther delay. It is earnestly hoped that all the High Courts shallframe the rules within four months from today. The High Courtsmay also consider framing rules for having Advocates on Recordon the pattern of the Supreme Court of India.”

61. The decision in R.K. Anand (supra) is not a departure fromaforesaid other decisions but rather affirms them. It was a case ofdebarring advocate for a particular period from the appearance on beingfound guilty of contempt of court, not a case of suspension of enrolmentby way of disciplinary proceedings which power lies with the Bar Council.

62. The provisions contained in Order IV Rule 10 of the SupremeCourt Rules have been pressed into service so as to sustain the amendedrules. Rule 10 reads as follows:

“10. When, on the complaint of any person or otherwise, theCourt is of the opinion that an advocate-on record has been guiltyof misconduct or of conduct unbecoming of an advocate-on-record,the Court may make an order removing his name from the registerof Advocates on record either permanently or for such period asthe Court may think fit and the Registrar shall thereupon reportthe said fact to the Bar Council of India and to State Bar Councilconcerned:

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AProvided that the Court shall, before making such order, issue tosuch advocate-on-record a summons returnable before the Courtor before a Special Bench to be constituted by the Chief Justice,requiring the Advocate-on-Record to show cause against thematters alleged in the summons, and the summons shall, ifpracticable, be served personally upon him with copies of anyBaffidavit or statement before the Court at the time of the issue ofthe summons.

Explanation: - For the purpose of these Rules, misconduct orconduct unbecoming of an Advocate on Record shall include -

a) Mere name lending by an Advocate-on-Record without anyfurther participation in the proceedings of the case; C

b) Absence of the Advocate-on-Record from the Court withoutany justifiable cause when the case is taken up for hearing; and; D

c) Failure to submit appearance slip duly signed by theAdvocate-on-Record of actual appearances in the Court.”

The aforesaid rule has been considered in Supreme Court BarAssociation v. Union of India (supra) and it is observed that as thisCourt enrolls Advocate on Record it has the power to remove his nameEfrom the register of Advocate on Record either permanently or for aspecific period. That does not tantamount to the suspension of enrolmentmade by Bar Council under Advocates Act which can be ordered byBar Council only.

63. The decision in Mohit Chowdhary, Advocate, IN RE, (supra)Fhas also been relied upon in which this Court considered Rule 10 anddebarred advocate to practice as Advocate on Record for a period ofone month from the date of order. At the same time, this Court hasobserved that lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall detractfrom the dignity of the Court. Contempt jurisdiction is for the purpose ofGupholding honor or dignity of the court, to avoid sharp or unfair practices.An Advocate shall not to be immersed in a blind quest of relief for hisclient. “Law is not trade, briefs no merchandise”. His duty is tolegitimately present his side of the case to assist in the administration ofjustice. The Judges are selected from Bar and purity of Bench dependson the purity of the Bar. Degraded Bar result degraded bench. TheH

Court has referred to Articles and standard of processional conduct andetiquettes thus:

20. Warvelle’s Legal Ethics, 2nd Edn. at p.182 sets out theobligation of a lawyer as:

“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall detractfrom the dignity of the court, of which he is himself a swornofficer and assistant. He should at all times pay deferentialrespect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe the decorum ofthe courtroom”.

21. The contempt jurisdiction is not only to protect the reputationof the Judge concerned so that he can administer justice fearlesslyand fairly but also to protect “the fair name of the judiciary”. Theprotection in a manner of speaking, extends even to the Registryin the performance of its task and false and unfair allegationswhich seek to impede the working of the Registry and thus theadministration of justice, made with oblique motives cannot betolerated. In such a situation in order to uphold the honor anddignity of the institution, the Court has to perform the painful dutieswhich we are faced with in the present proceedings. Not to do soin the words of P.B. Sawant, J. in Ministry of Information &Broadcasting, In re, (1995) 3 SCC 619 would: (SCC p.635, para20) - “20. …. The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to astage when the system will be found wrecked from withinbefore it is wrecked from outside. It is for the members of theprofession to introspect and take the corrective steps in timeand also spare the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more.”

22. Now turning to the “Standards of Professional Conduct andEtiquette” of the Bar Council of India Rules contained in SectionI of Chapter II, Part VI, the duties of an advocate towards theCourt have been specified. We extract the 4th duty set out asunder:

“4. An advocate shall use his best efforts to restrain and preventhis client from resorting to sharp or unfair practices or fromdoing anything in relation to the court, opposing counsel orparties which the advocate himself ought not to do. An advocate A

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shall refuse to represent the client who persists in such improperconduct. He shall not consider himself a mere mouthpiece ofthe client, and shall exercise his own judgment in the use ofrestrained language in correspondence, avoiding scurrilousattacks in pleadings, and using intemperate language duringarguments in court.”

23. In the aforesaid context the aforesaid principle in differentwords was set out by Crampton, J. in R. v. O’ Connell, 7 IrishLaw Reports 313 as under:

“The advocate is a representative but not a delegate. He givesto his client the benefit of his learning, his talents and hisjudgment; but all through he never forgets what he owes tohimself and to others. He will not knowingly misstate the law,he will not willfully misstate the facts, though it be to gain thecase for his client. He will ever bear in mind that if he be anadvocate of an individual and retained and remunerated ofteninadequately, for valuable services, yet he has a prior andperpetual retainer on behalf of truth and justice and there is noCrown or other licenses which in any case or for any party orpurpose can discharge him from that primary and paramountretainer.”

24. The fundamentals of the profession thus require an advocatenot to be immersed in a blind quest of relief for his client. Thedignity of the institution cannot be violated in this quest as “law isno trade, briefs no merchandise” as per Krishna Iyer, J in BarCouncil of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar (1976) 2 SCC 291.

25. It is also pertinent to note at this point, the illuminating wordsof Vivian Bose, J. in ‘G’ a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court,In re AIR 1954 SC 557, who elucidated:

“10. …To use the language of the Army, an Advocate of thisCourt is expected at all times to comport himself in a mannerbefitting his status as an “officer and a gentleman”.

26. It is as far back as in 1925 that an Article titled ‘The Lawyeras an Officer of the Court’ Virginia Law Review, Vol.11, No.4(Feb 1925) pp.263-77 published in the Virginia Law Review, lucidlyset down what is expected from the lawyer which is best set outin its own words:

“The duties of the lawyer to the Court spring directly from therelation that he sustains to the Court as an officer in theadministration of justice. The law is not a mere private calling butis a profession which has the distinction of being an integral partof the State’s judicial system. As an officer of the Court the lawyeris, therefore, bound to uphold the dignity and integrity of the Court;to exercise at all times respect for the Court in both words andactions; to present all matters relating to his client’s case openly,being careful to avoid any attempt to exert private influence uponeither the judge or the jury; and to be frank and candid in alldealings with the Court, “using no deceit, imposition or evasion,”as by misreciting witnesses or misquoting precedents. “It mustalways be understood,” says Mr. Christian Doerfler, in an addressbefore the Milwaukee County Bar Association, in December, 1911,“that the profession of law is instituted among men for the purposeof aiding the administration of justice. A proper administration ofjustice does not mean that a lawyer should succeed in winning alawsuit. It means that he should properly bring to the attention ofthe Court everything by way of fact and law that is available andlegitimate for the purpose of properly presenting his client’s case.

His duty as far as his client is concerned is simply to legitimatelypresent his side of the case. His duty as far as the public isconcerned and as far as he is an officer of the Court is to aid andassist in the administration of justice.”

In this connection, the timely words of Mr. Warvelle may alsowell be remembered:

“But the lawyer is not alone a gentleman; he is a sworn ministerof justice. His office imposes high moral duties and graveresponsibilities, and he is held to a strict fulfillment of all thatthese matters imply. Interests of vast magnitude are entrustedto him; confidence is imposed in him; life, liberty, and propertyare committed to his care. He must be equal to theresponsibilities which they create, and if he betrays his trust,neglects his duties, practices deceit, or panders to vice, thenthe most severe penalty should be inflicted and his name strickenfrom the roll.”

That the lawyer owes a high duty to his profession and to his ABCDE

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fellow members of the Bar is an obvious truth. His professionshould be his pride, and to preserve its honor pure and unsulliedshould be among his chief concerns. “Nothing should be higher inthe estimation of the advocate,” declares Mr. Alexander H.Robbins, “next after those sacred relations of home and countrythan his profession. She should be to him the ‘fairest of tenthousand’ among the institutions of the earth. He must stand forher in all places and resent any attack on her honor - as he wouldif the same attack were to be made against his own fair name andreputation. He should enthrone her in the sacred places of hisheart, and to her, he should offer the incense of constant devotion.For she is a jealous mistress.

Again, it is to be borne in mind that the judges are selectedfrom the ranks of lawyers. The purity of the Bench depends uponthe purity of the Bar.

“The very fact, then, that one of the co-ordinate departmentsof the Government is administered by men selected only fromone profession gives to that profession a certain pre-eminencewhich calls for a high standard of morals as well as intellectualattainments. The integrity of the judiciary is the safeguard of thenation, but the character of the judges is practically but thecharacter of the lawyers. Like begets like. A degraded Bar willinevitably produce a degraded Bench, and just as certainly maywe expect to find the highest excellence in a judiciary drawn fromthe ranks of an enlightened, learned and moral Bar.”

27. He ends his Article in the following words:

“No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor anycause civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive,nor should any lawyer render, any service or advice involvingdisloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect ofthe judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruptionof any person or persons exercising a public office or privatetrust, or deception or betrayal of the public. When renderingany such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites andmerits stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, headvances the honor of his profession and the best interests ofhis client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliancewith the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observeand advise his client to observe the statute law, though until astatute shall have been construed and interpreted by competentadjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validityand as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaningand extent. But, above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor ina deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to publicduty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”

28. On examination of the legal principles, an important issueemerges: what should be the end of what the contemnor had startedbut has culminated in an impassioned plea of Mr. K.K. Venugopal,learned senior advocate supported by the representatives of theBar present in Court, marking their appearance for the contemnor.We are inclined to give due consideration to such a plea but areunable to persuade ourselves to let the contemnor go scot-free,without any consequences. We are thus not inclined to proceedfurther in the contempt jurisdiction except to caution the contemnorthat this should be the first and the last time of such a misadventure.But the matter cannot rest only at that.

30. We are of the view that the privilege of being an Advocate-on-Record under the Rules has clearly been abused by thecontemnor. The conduct was not becoming of an advocate muchless an Advocate-on-Record in the Supreme Court.

32. The aforesaid Rule makes it clear, that whether on the complaintof any person or otherwise, in case of misconduct or a conductunbecoming of an Advocate-on-Record, the Court may make anorder removing his name from the register of Advocate-on-Recordpermanently, or for a specified period. We are not referring to theright to practice as an advocate, and the name entered on the rollsof any State Bar Council, which is a necessary requirement beforea person takes the examination of Advocate-on-Record. Thepresent case is clearly one where this Court is of the opinion thatthe conduct of the contemnor is unbecoming of an Advocate-on-Record. The pre-requisites of the proviso are met by the reasonof the Bench being constituted itself by the Chief Justice, and thecontemnor being aware of the far more serious consequences,which could have flowed to him. The learned Senior Counsel AB

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Arepresenting the petitioner has thrown him at the mercy of theCourt. We have substantively accepted the request but lesserconsequences have been imposed on the contemnor.”

64. Reliance was placed on the decision Mahipal Singh Rana v.State of Uttar Pradesh, (supra) by the respondents. This Court dealtBwith the question when advocate has been convicted for criminalcontempt as to the sanctions/punishment that may be imposed in additionto punishments that may be imposed for criminal contempt under theContempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Court held that regulation of rightof appearance in courts is within jurisdiction of courts and not Bar Councils,thus, Court can bar Advocate convicted for contempt from appearing/Cpleading before any court for an appropriate period of time, till convictedadvocate purges himself of the contempt, even in absence of suspensionor termination of enrolment/right to practice/licence to practice. Secondly,this Court also held that bar on appearance/ pleadings in any court tillcontempt is purged can be imposed by the Court in terms of the HighDCourt Rules framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act, if suchRules exist. However, even if there is no such rule framed under saidSection 34, unless convicted advocate purges himself of contempt or ispermitted by Court, Court may debar an Advocate as conviction resultsin debarring such advocate from appearing/pleading in court, even inabsence of suspension or termination of enrolment/right to practise/licenceEto practise. This Court held thus:

“4.1. (i) Whether a case has been made out for interference withthe order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant forcriminal contempt and sentencing him to simple imprisonment fortwo months with a fine of Rs 2000 and further imprisonment forFtwo weeks in default and debarring him from appearing in courtsin Judgeship at Etah; and 4.2. (ii) Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellantcan be allowed to practice.

G32. In Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650,this Court held that an advocate found guilty of contempt cannotbe allowed to act or plead in any court until he purges himself ofcontempt. This direction was issued having regard to Rule 11 ofthe Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section 34(1)of the Advocates Act and also referring to the observations inH

para 80 of the judgment of this Court in Supreme Court BarAssn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409. It was explainedthat debarring a person from appearing in court was within thepurview of the jurisdiction of the Court and was different fromsuspending or terminating the license which could be done by theBar Council and on the failure of the Bar Council, in exercise ofappellate jurisdiction of this Court. The observations are: (PravinC. Shah case, SCC pp. 658-62, paras 16-18, 24 & 27-28)

“16. Rule 11 of the Rules is not a provision intended for theDisciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State or theBar Council of India. It is a matter entirely concerning thedignity and the orderly functioning of the courts. The right ofthe advocate to practice envelops a lot of acts to be performedby him in the discharge of his professional duties. Apart fromappearing in the courts, he can be consulted by his clients, hecan give his legal opinion whenever sought for, he can draftinstruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents, hecan participate in any conference involving legal discussions,etc. Rule 11 has nothing to do with all the acts done by anadvocate during his practice except his performance insidethe court. Conduct in court is a matter concerning the courtand hence the Bar Council cannot claim that what should happeninside the court could also be regulated by the Bar Council inexercise of its disciplinary powers. The right to practice, nodoubt, is the genus of which the right to appear and conductcases in the court may be a specie. But the right to appear andconduct cases in the court is a matter on which the court musthave the major supervisory power. Hence the court cannot bedivested of the control or supervision of the court merely becauseit may involve the right of an advocate.

17. When the Rules stipulate that a person who committedcontempt of court cannot have the unreserved right to continueto appear and plead and conduct cases in the courts withoutany qualm or remorse, the Bar Council cannot overrule such aregulation concerning the orderly conduct of court proceedings.Courts of law are structured in such a design as to evoke respectand reverence for the majesty of law and justice. The machineryfor the dispensation of justice according to law is operated by ABC

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the court. Proceedings inside the courts are always expectedto be held in a dignified and orderly manner. The very sight ofan advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of court on theprevious hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness on the same day, unaffected by thecontemptuous behaviour he hurled at the court, would erodethe dignity of the court and even corrode the majesty of itbesides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacyof the institution of the courts. This necessitates vesting ofpower with the High Court to formulate rules for regulatingthe proceedings inside the court including the conduct ofadvocates during such proceedings. That power should not beconfused with the right to practice law. While the Bar Councilcan exercise control over the latter, the High Court should bein control of the former.

18. In the above context it is useful to quote the followingobservations made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad HighCourt in Prayag Das v. Civil Judge, Bulandshahr, AIR 1974All 133 (AIR p. 136, para 9)

‘[T]he High Court has the power to regulate the appearanceof advocates in courts. The right to practice and the right toappear in courts are not synonymous. An advocate may carryon chamber practice or even practice in courts in various otherways e.g. drafting and filing of pleadings and vakalatnama forperforming those acts. For that purpose, his physical appearancein courts may not at all be necessary. For the purpose ofregulating his appearance in courts the High Court should bethe appropriate authority to make rules and on a properconstruction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act it must beinferred that the High Court has the power to make rules forregulating the appearance of advocates and proceedings insidethe courts. Obviously, the High Court is the only appropriateauthority to be entrusted with this responsibility.’

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24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable element isexpelledeither from one’s own self or from society. It is acleaning process. Purge is a word which acquired implications first in theological connotations. In the case of a sin, purging ofsuch sin is made through the expression of sincere remorsecoupled with doing the penance required.In the case of a guilt,purging means to get himself cleared of the guilt. The conceptof purgatory was evolved from the word “purge”, which is astate of suffering after this life in which those souls, who departthis life with their deadly sins, are purified and rendered fit toenter into heaven where nothing defiled enters (vide Wordsand Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 307). In Black’sLaw Dictionary the word “purge” is given the followingmeaning: ‘To cleanse; to clear. To clear or exonerate fromsome charge or imputation of guilt, or from a contempt.’ It ispreposterous to suggest that if the convicted person undergoespunishment or if he tenders the fine amount imposed on himthe purge would be completed.

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27. We cannot, therefore, approve the view that merelyundergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient tocomplete the process of purging himself of the contempt,particularly in a case where the contemnor is convicted ofcriminal contempt. The danger in giving accord to the saidview of the learned Single Judge in the aforecited decision isthat if a contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediatelypay it and continue to commit contempt in the same court, andthen again pay the fine and persist with his contemptuousconduct. There must be something more to be done to getoneself purged of the contempt when it is a case of criminalcontempt.

28. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of Indiahighlighted the absence of any mode of purging oneself of theguilt in any of the Rules as a reason for not following the interdictcontained in Rule 11. Merely because the Rules did notprescribe the mode of purging oneself of the guilt it does notmean that one cannot purge the guilt at all. The first thing to bedone in that direction when a contemnor is found guilty ofcriminal contempt is to implant or infuse in his own mind realremorse about his conduct which the court found to haveamounted to contempt of court. Next step is to seek pardon ABC

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from the court concerned for what he did on the ground thathe really and genuinely repented and that he has resolved notto commit any such act in future. It is not enough that he tendersan apology. The apology tendered should impress the court tobe genuine and sincere. If the court, on being impressed of hisgenuineness, accepts the apology then it could be said that thecontemnor has purged himself of the guilt.”

33. In Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6SCC 311, constitutionality of Rule 11 of the Rules framed by theHigh Court of Kerala for barring a lawyer from appearing in anycourt till he got himself purged of contempt by an appropriateorder of the court, was examined. This Court held that the ruledid not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution noramounted to usurpation of power of adjudication and punishmentconferred on the Bar Councils and the result intended by theapplication of the Rule was automatic. It was further held that theRule was not in conflict with the law laid down in Supreme CourtBar Assn. judgment. Referring to the Constitution Bench judgmentin Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45, it washeld that regulation of right of appearance in courts was withinthe jurisdiction of the courts. It was observed, following PravinC. Shah, that the court must have major supervisory power onthe right to appear and conduct in the court. The observationsare: (Bar Council of India case, SCC p. 323, para 46)

“46. Before a contemnor is punished for contempt, the courtis bound to give an opportunity of hearing to him. Even such anopportunity of hearing is necessary in a proceeding underSection 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But if a lawwhich is otherwise valid provides for the consequences of sucha finding, the same by itself would not be violative of Article 14of the Constitution of India inasmuch as only because anotheropportunity of hearing to a person, where a penalty is providedfor as a logical consequence thereof, has been provided for.Even under the penal laws, some offenses carry minimumsentence. The gravity of such offenses, thus, is recognized bythe legislature. The courts do not have any role to play in sucha matter.”

35. In R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 itwas held that even if there was no rule framed under Section 34of the Advocates Act disallowing an advocate who is convictedof criminal contempt, is not only a measure to maintain dignityand orderly function of courts, it may become necessary for theprotection of the court and for preservation of the purity of courtproceedings. Thus, the court not only has a right but also anobligation to protect itself and save the purity of its proceedingsfrom being polluted, by barring the advocate concerned fromappearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.This Court noticed the observations about the decline of ethicaland professional standards of the Bar, and the need to arrest suchtrend in the interests of administration of justice. It was observedthat in the absence of unqualified trust and confidence of peoplein the Bar, the judicial system could not work satisfactorily. Furtherobservations are that the performance of the Bar Councils inmaintaining professional standards and enforcing discipline did notmatch its achievements in other areas. This Court expressed hopeand expected that the Bar Council will take appropriate action forthe restoration of high professional standards among the lawyers,working of their position in the judicial system and the society.

42. We may also refer to certain articles on the subject. In “Raisingthe Bar for the Legal Profession”, published in The Hindunewspaper dated 15-9-2012, Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon wrote:

“… Being a private monopoly, the profession is organised likea pyramid in which the top 20 per cent command 80 per centof paying work, the middle 30 per cent managing to survive bycatering to the needs of the middle class and governmentlitigation, while the bottom 50 percent barely survive with legalaid cases and cases managed through undesirable andexploitative methods! Given the poor quality of legal educationin the majority of the so-called law colleges (over a thousandof them working in small towns and panchayats withoutinfrastructure and competent faculty), what happened withuncontrolled expansion was the overcrowding of ill-equippedlawyers in the bottom 50 per cent of the profession fighting fora piece of the cake. In the process, being too numerous, themiddle and the bottom segments got elected to professional ABCD

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Abodies which controlled the management of the entireprofession. The so-called leaders of the profession who haveabundant work, unlimited money, respect, and influence didnot bother to look into what was happening to the professionand allowed it to go its way—of inefficiency, strikes, boycotts,and public ridicule. This is the tragedy of the Indian Bar todayBwhich had otherwise a noble tradition of being in the forefrontof the freedom struggle and maintaining the rule of law andcivil liberties even in difficult times.”

54. Further, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 38of the Advocates Act, we direct that the license of the appellantCwill stand suspended for a further period of five years. He willalso remain debarred from appearing in any court in District Etaheven after five years unless he purges himself of contempt in themanner laid down by this Court in Bar Council of India andR.K. Anandand as directed by the High Court. Question (ii) standsDdecided accordingly.”

65. In Mahipal Singh Rana (supra) the advocate was foundguilty of criminal contempt as such punishment for debarring from theCourtwas first passed and reliance has been placed for that purpose onEthe decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court BarAssociation (supra). Thus, the decision has no application to sustainvires of Rules 14(A) to 14(D) as amended by the High Court of Madras.

66. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel supported theRules pointing out that grave situation has been created in the HighFCourt of Madras as well as at its Madurai Bench, which compelled theCourt to take action on the judicial side to ensure the modicum of security.The High Court had to order the security of the Court to be undertakenby CISF. In this regard, orders were passed in Suo Moto Writ PetitionNo.29197 of 2015 by the High Court of Madras on 14.9.2015, 12.10.2015Gand 30.10.2015. The following incidents were noticed in the judicialorders:

i. Holding protests and waving placards within the Court premises;ii. Raising slogans and marching down the corridors of the Court.

iii. The use of hand-held microphones to disrupt Court proceedings.

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iv. Attempting to and in some cases successfully entering theChambers of the Puisne Judges of the Madurai Bench of theHigh Court.

v. Two instances of hoax bombs in the form of broken mechanicalclocks being placed at areas in the Court to ensure disruptions.

The High Court, in our opinion, could have taken action underContempt of Courts Act for aforesaid misconduct.

67. Rule 14A provides for power to debar an advocate fromappearing before the High Court and the subordinate courts in case anadvocate who is found to have accepted money in the name of a Judgeor on the pretext of influencing him; or an advocate who is found tohave tampered with the Court record or Court order; or an advocatewho browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or Judicial Officer; or an advocatewho is found to have sent or spread unfounded and unsubstantiatedallegations/petitions against a judicial officer or a Judge to the SuperiorCourt; or an advocate who actively participates in a procession insidethe Court campus and/or involves in gherao inside the Court Hall orholds placard inside the Court Hall; or an advocate who appears in theCourt under the influence of liquor may be debarred by Court. However,it is not provided that Court would do so in exercising ContemptJurisdiction. The debarment is sought to be done by way of disciplinarycontrol, which is not permissible.

68. Rule 14-B as amended provides for power to take action.Rule 14-B(iv) states that where any such misconduct referred to underRule 14-A is committed by an advocate before the High Court, the HighCourt shall have the power to initiate action against the advocateconcerned and debar him from appearing before the High Court and allsubordinate courts; or where any such misconduct is committed beforethe Court of Principal District Judge, the Principal District Judge shallhave the power to initiate action against the advocate concerned anddebar him from appearing before any Court within such district; or whereany such misconduct referred to under Rule 14-A is committed beforeany subordinate court, the Court concerned shall submit a report to thePrincipal District Court and the Principal District Judge shall have thepower to initiate action against the advocate concerned and debar himfrom appearing before any Court within such district. Rule 14-Cprescribes the procedure to be followed and Rule 14-D authorizes the A

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AHigh Court or Principal District Judge to pass an interim order prohibitingthe advocate concerned from appearing before the High Court orsubordinate Courts, as the case may be, pending inquiry.

69. The High Court is not authorized by the provisions of theAdvocates Act to frame such rules. Section 34 does not confer suchBpower of debarment by way of disciplinary methods or disciplinary inquiryas against an advocate as that has to be dealt with by the Bar Council asprovided in other sections in a different chapter of the Act. It is onlywhen the advocate is found guilty of contempt of court, as provided inRule 14 as existed in the Madras High Court Rules, 1970 takes care ofsituation until and unless an advocate who has committed contempt ofCcourt purges himself of contempt shall not be entitled to appear or act orplead in the Court.

Rule 14 is extracted hereunder:

“14. No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of CourtDshall be permitted to appear, Act or plead in any Court unless hehas purged himself of contempt.”

70. The debarment cannot be ordered by the High Court until andunless advocate is prosecuted under the Contempt of Courts Act. Itcannot be resorted to by undertaking disciplinary proceedings asEcontemplated under the Rules 14-A to 14-D as amended in 2016. Thatis a clear usurpation of the power of the Bar Council and is whollyimpermissible in view of the decision of this Court in Supreme CourtBar Association vs. Union of India (supra) that has been followed inall the subsequent decisions as already discussed. There is no doubtabout it that the incidents pointed out were grim and stern action wasFrequired against the erring advocates as they belied the entire nobility ofthe lawyer’s profession.

71. It is also true that the disciplinary committee of the Bar Councils,as observed by this Court in Mahipal Singh Rana and MohitChowdhary (supra), has failed to deliver the good. It is seen that theGdisciplinary control of the Bar Council is not as effective as it should be.The cases are kept pending for a long time, then after one year theystand transferred to the Bar Council of India, as provided under theAdvocates Act and thereafter again the matters are kept pending foryears together. It is high time that the Bar Council, as well as the variousState Bar Councils, should take stock of the situation and improve theH

functioning of the disciplinary side. It is absolutely necessary to maintainthe independence of the Bar and if the cleaning process is not done bythe Bar itself, its independence is in danger. The corrupt, unwanted,unethical element has no place in Bar. If nobility of the profession isdestroyed, Bar can never remain independent. Independence isconstituted by the observance of certain ideals and if those ideals arelost, the independence would only remain on paper, not in real sense.

72. The situation is really frustrating if the repository of the faithin the Bar fails to discharge their statutory duties effectively, no doubtabout it that the same can be and has to be supervised by the Courts.The obligatory duties of Bar Council have found statutory expression inAdvocates Act and the rules framed thereunder with respect todisciplinary control and cannot be permitted to become statutory mockery,such non-performance or delayed performance of such duties isimpermissible. The Bar Council is duty bound to protect Bar itself bytaking steps against black sheeps and cannot bely expectation of Bar ingeneral and spoil its image. The very purpose of disciplinary control byBar Council cannot be permitted to be frustrated. In such an exigency,in a case where the Bar Council is not taking appropriate action againstthe advocate, it would be open to the High Court to entertain the writpetition and to issue appropriate directions to the Bar Council to takeaction in accordance with the law in the discharge of duties enjoinedupon it. But at the same time, the High Court and even this Courtcannot take upon itself the disciplinary control as envisaged under theAdvocates Act. No doubt about it that the Court has the duty to maintainits decorum within the Court premises, but that can be achieved by takingappropriate steps under Contempt of Courts Act in accordance with lawas permitted under the decisions of this Court and even by rule makingpower under Section 34 of the Advocates Act. An advocate can bedebarred from practicing in the Court until and unless he purges himselfof contempt.

73. It has been seen from time to time that various attacks havebeen made on the judicial system. It has become very common to themembers of the Bar to go to the press/media to criticize the judges inperson and to commit sheer contempt by attributing political colours tothe judgments. It is nothing less than an act of contempt of gravestform. Whenever any political matter comes to the Court and is decided,either way, political insinuations are attributed by unscrupulous persons/

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Aadvocates. Such acts are nothing, but an act of denigrating the judiciaryitself and destroys the faith of the common man which he reposes in thejudicial system. In case of genuine grievance against any judge, theappropriate process is to lodge a complaint to the concerned higherauthorities who can take care of the situation and it is impermissible tomalign the system itself by attributing political motives and by makingBfalse allegations against the judicial system and its functionaries. Judgeswho are attacked are not supposed to go to press or media to ventilatetheir point of view.

74. Contempt of court is a weapon which has to be used sparinglyas more is power, same requires more responsibility but it does not meanCthat the court has fear of taking action and its repercussions. The hallmarkof the court is to provide equal and even-handed justice and to give anopportunity to each of the system to ensure that it improves upon.Unfortunately, some advocates feel that they are above the Bar Councildue to its inaction and they are the only champion of the causes. TheDhunger for cheap publicity is increasing which is not permitted by thenoble ideals cherished by the great doyens of the bar, they have set bytheir conduct what should be in fact the professional etiquettes and ethicswhich are not capable of being defined in a narrow compass. The statutoryrules prohibit advocates from advertising and in fact to cater to the press/media, distorted versions of the court proceedings is sheer misconductEand contempt of court which has become very common. It is making itmore difficult to render justice in a fair, impartial and fearless mannerthough the situation is demoralizing that something has to be done by allconcerned to revamp the image of Bar. It is not open to wash dirty linenin public and enter in accusation/debates, which tactics are being adoptedFby unscrupulous elements to influence the judgments and even to denyjustice with ulterior motives. It is for the Bar Council and the seniormembers of the Bar who have never forgotten their responsibility to riseto the occasion to maintain the independence of the Bar which is sosupreme and is absolutely necessary for the welfare of this country andthe vibrant democracy.G

75. The separation of powers made by the forefathers, who framedthe Constitution, ensured independent functioning. It is unfortunate withoutany rationale basis the independence of the system is being sought to beprotected by those who should keep aloof from it. Independence ofeach system is to come from within. If things are permitted to be settledH

by resorting to the unscrupulous means and institution is maligned bycreating pressure of any kind, the very independence of the system wouldbe endangered. Cases cannot be decided by media trial. Bar and Benchin order to protect independence have their own inbuilt machinery forredressal of grievance if any and they are supposed to settle theirgrievances in accordance therewith only. No outside interference ispermissible. Considering the nobility, independence, dignity which isenjoined and the faith which is reposed by the common man of the countryin the judiciary, it is absolutely necessary that there is no maligning of thesystem. Mutual respect and reverence are the only way out. A lot ofsacrifices are made to serve the judiciary for which one cannot regretas it is with a purpose and to serve judiciary is not less than call ofmilitary service. For the protection of democratic values and to ensurethat the rule of law prevails in the country, no one can be permitted todestroy the independence of the system from within or from outside.We have to watch on Bar independence. Let each of us ensure our owninstitution is not jeopardized by the blame game and make an endeavorto improve upon its own functioning and independence and howindividually and collectively we can deliver the good to the citizen of thisgreat country and deal with every tear in the eye of poor and down-trodden as per constitutional obligation enjoined on us.

76. Soul searching is absolutely necessary and the blame gameand maligning must stop forthwith. Confidence and reverence and positivethinking is the only way. It is pious hope that the Bar Council wouldimprove upon the function of its disciplinary committees so as to makethe system more accountable, publish performance audit on the disciplinaryside of various bar councils. The same should be made public. The Bar Council of India under its supervisory control can implement good ideasas always done by it and would not lag behind in cleaning process sobadly required. It is to make the profession more noble and it is absolutelynecessary to remove the black sheeps from the profession to preservethe rich ideals of Bar and on which it struggled for the values of freedom.It is basically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the statutory dutyof Bar to make it more noble and also to protect the Judges and the legalsystem, not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction and the system which isimportant pillar of democracy.

77. We have no hesitation to hold that the High Court hasoverstretched and exceeded its power even in the situation which was ABCD

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Aso grim which appears to have compelled it to take such a measure. Infact, its powers are much more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal withsuch situation court need not look for Bar Council to act. It can takeaction, punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconductdone in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but theautonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over byBthe Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintain the decorum ofCourt. In case power is given to the Court even if complaints lodged bya lawyer to the higher administrative authorities as to the behaviour ofthe Judges may be correct then also he may be punished by initiatingdisciplinary proceedings as permitted to be done in impugned Rules 14 ACto D that would be making the Bar too sycophant and fearful whichwould not be conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticismof judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers’ fearlessness incourt, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the virtues whichcannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned authorities as observed by this Court in VinayDChandra Mishra (supra), which right cannot be totally curtailed,however, making such allegation publicly tantamounts to contempt ofcourt and may also be a professional misconduct that can be taken careof either by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act and by the Courtunder the Contempt of Courts Act. The misconduct as specified inERule 14-A may also in appropriate cases tantamount to contempt ofcourt and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contemptjurisdiction.

78. Resultantly, we have no hesitation to strike down impugnedRules 14-A to 14-D as framed in May, 2016 by the High Court of MadrasFas they are ultra vires to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and arehereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Writ Petition allowed.

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