MS. P versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER on 5 May 2022

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal by way of special leave arises from anCorder dated 16[th] November, 2021, passed by the learned Single Judge ofthe High Court of Judicature for Madhya Pradesh; at Jabalpur in MCRCNo. 55343 of 2021, whereby an application filed by the respondent No.2/accused under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[1]has been allowed and he has been granted bail on furnishing a personalDbond for a sum of ` 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac only) with a solventsurety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court and certainother conditions imposed therein by the learned Single Judge in connectionwith Crime No. 39/21 registered on the complaint of the appellant atP.S. Mahila Thana, Jabalpur, State of Madhya Pradesh, for the offencespunishable under Sections 376(2)(n) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,E1860[2].

3. A brief recapitulation of the facts of the instant case is necessary.The allegations levelled against the respondent No. 2/accused as recordedin FIR dated 21[st] June, 2021 are that he had induced the appellant/complainant to establish a physical relationship with him on the falseFpretext of marrying her. The appellant/ complainant has stated that therespondent No. 2 has been in physical intimacy with her since July, 2019,when on applying vermillion (sindhoor) on her forehead, he hadconvinced her that they had got married as per Hindu rituals. Subsequently,in July, 2020 when the appellant informed the respondent No. 2 that sheGwas pregnant, he along with his sister had taken her to a private hospitalat Jabalpur and had made her consume some pills to undergo abortion,without her knowledge. It has been alleged that thereafter, the respondent H

1 for short “Cr.P.C.”

2 for short the “IPC”

No.2 started avoiding the appellant and stopped returning her calls. Whenconfronted by the appellant, he categorically refused to solemnize theirmarriage. On the appellant’s complaint, the FIR was registered againstthe respondent No.2 on 21[st] June, 2021.

4. Apprehending his arrest in the aforesaid FIR, the respondentNo. 2 filed an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C., before the learnedAdditional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh seeking anticipatorybail which was dismissed vide order dated 30[th] June, 2021. A freshapplication for anticipatory bail was moved by the respondent No. 2before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpurwhich was opposed by the appellant who filed objections thereto. Videorder dated 10[th] August, 2021 the said application was also dismissed bythe High Court. Aggrieved by the rejection of his application foranticipatory bail, respondent No. 2 had approached this Court by filing aPetition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 6617 of 2021 which wasdismissed vide order dated 13[th] September, 2021.

5. On conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed bythe prosecution on 25[th] October, 2021. Within four days reckonedtherefrom, respondent No. 2 applied before the Additional Sessions Judge,Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh for regular bail under Section 439 of theCr.P.C., that was rejected by an order dated 29[th] October, 2021. Therespondent No. 2 then moved the High Court for grant of regular bail.The said application has been allowed by the High Court by the impugnedorder dated 16[th] November, 2021. Aggrieved by the relief granted to therespondent No. 2, the appellant/complainant has filed the present appealby way of special leave seeking cancellation of the regular bail grantedto him.

6. Ms. Shikha Khurana, learned counsel for the appellant hasassailed the impugned order stating that no reasons whatsoever havebeen assigned by the High Court for granting bail to the respondent No.2; that the High Court has erred in overlooking the criminal antecedentsof the respondent No. 2 and his father who are politically well connectedand are in an influential position due to which there is an apprehension ofthreat to the appellant; that the High Court has ignored the materialevidence including photographs produced by the appellant showing thatthe respondent No.2 has applied vermillion on her forehead as a symbolof having sanctified their relationship in the eyes of the society. Learned A

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Acounsel specifically drew the attention of this Court to the photographsenclosed with the petition and marked as Annexure P-2 which show abeaming appellant and the respondent No.2/accused in close proximitywith vermillion applied on her forehead. Another photograph is stated tobe that of the appellant with the mother of the respondent No. 2, inhappier times.B

7. Learned counsel for the appellant asserts that the appellanthad given her consent to the respondent No. 2 to establish a physicalrelationship with her only after he had promised her that he would marryher which turned out to be a false promise and in the process, the appellanthad conceived which pregnancy was also got forcibly terminated by theCrespondent No. 2. It was further submitted that after being released onregular bail, respondent No. 2 started threatening the appellant. Thathad compelled her father to lodge a complaint with the Superintendentof Police, Jabalpur vide letter dated 14[th] December, 2021 wherein it wassubmitted that immediately after being released from jail, respondentDNo.2 had taken out a procession and had mounted hoardings in the city,with his photographs prominently displayed, celebrating his release whichfact is stated to be borne out from the photographs annexed with thepetition and marked as Annexure P-16. Learned counsel for the appellantcontended that the said hoardings were strategically placed by therespondent No.2 and his family members at locations situated betweenEthe locality where the appellant and her family reside and the work placeof her father, thus, trying to mock at them.

8. Notice was issued on the present petition on 11[th] April, 2022.As per postal tracking report service is complete on both the respondentsand also by way of proof of service filed by the counsel for the appellant,Fafter effecting service on the Standing Counsel for the State of MadhyaPradesh. Ms. Charu Ambwani, counsel for respondent No.2 already oncaveat, has filed a counter affidavit in opposition to the present petitionand the State is also represented today before us.

9. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Advocate appearing forGthe respondent No.2 has supported the impugned order passed by theHigh Court granting regular bail in favour of the respondent No. 2.Although it has not been disputed that the respondent No.2 and theappellant were having a consensual physical relationship, the plea takenis that respondent No.2 had not made any false promise or intentionalH

misrepresentation of marriage to the appellant. Both the parties wereknown to each other for long and had voluntarily got into a physicalrelationship that had lasted for over two years. It was pointed out thatthough the appellant refers to incidents of the year 2019 and 2020, theFIR was belatedly registered only in June, 2021, without explaining thedelay.

10. Alleging that the appellant and her father were trying toblackmail the respondent No. 2 and they had raised an illegal demand onhim for closure of the case, learned Senior Advocate appearing for therespondent No.2 submitted that the present petition is yet another attemptto pressurize the respondent No. 2 to marry the appellant. As for thephotographs of the posters annexed at Annexure P-16 of the petition, ithas been submitted that the said posters had been put up in the firstweek of February, 2022, which is almost three months after the impugnedorder was passed granting bail to the respondent No. 2 and the saidphotographs clearly show that the respondent No. 2 was sending greetingson the annual festival of “Maa Narmada Jayanti” that was celebratedthis year in the month of February.

11. On the other hand, Ms. Ankita Choudhary, Deputy AdvocateGeneral appearing for the respondent No.1/State of Madhya Pradeshhas supported the appeal and submitted that the High Court has failed totake into consideration the fact that the respondent No. 2 and his fatherare involved in five criminal cases out of which respondent No.2 is anaccused in four criminal cases and his father is an accused in one criminalcase, all registered at different police stations in Jabalpur, for the offencespunishable under Sections 294, 323, 324 and 506 IPC and this itself wassufficient ground to have rejected the bail application filed by therespondent No. 2. It was also pointed out that the appellant’s statementrecorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is consistent with her earlier statementrecorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., thus lending credence to her versionvis-à-vis the respondent No.2.

12. The short question that falls for our consideration is whetherthe High Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under Section 439(1)of the Cr.P.C. for grant of regular bail in the facts of the present case.

13. It is no doubt true that the High Court or for that matter, theSessions Court have a wide discretion in deciding an application for bailunder Section 439 Cr.P.C. However, the said discretion must be exercised A

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Aafter due application of the judicial mind and not in a routine manner. In3Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and Others, falling backon an earlier decision in the case of Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT,Delhi and Another4, this Court had observed as follows: - “4(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not onlyBthe nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment,if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence insupport of the accusations.

(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses beingtampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for theCcomplainant should also weigh with the court in the matter ofgrant of bail.

(c) While it is not expected have the entire evidenceestablishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt butthere ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court inDsupport of the charge.

(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered andit is only the element of genuineness that shall have to beconsidered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of therebeing some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in theEnormal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order ofbail.”

14. Similarly, inChaman Lal v. State of U.P. and Another5, thisCourt had noticed certain aspects relevant for consideration at the timeof granting bail, namely:F“9. ….. (1) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishmentin case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, (2)reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness orapprehension of threat to the complainant, and (3) prima faciesatisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.”

G15. We may also profitably refer to a decision of this Court inKalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav And 3 (2002) 3 SCC 598

4 (2001) 4 SCC 2805 (2004) 7 SCC 525H6 2004 (7) SCC 528

Another6, where the parameters to be taken into consideration for grantof bail by the Courts has been explained in the following words:

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“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well-settled. The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in ajudicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at thestage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence andBelaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not beundertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons forprima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularlywhere the accused is charged of having committed a seriousoffence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer fromCnon-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court grantingbail to consider among other circumstances, the following factorsalso before granting bail; they are:

(a) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment incase of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.

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(b) reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness orapprehension of threat to the complainant.

(c) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”

(See Ram Govind Upadhyay [supra] and Puran v. Rambilasand Another[7])”

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The aforesaid decision also acknowledges the fact that theconditions stipulated under Section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. ought to be takeninto consideration for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.

16. In the case of Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis ChatterjeeAnd Another8 after referring to several precedents, this Court held thus:

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“9. …However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court toexercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly incompliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora ofdecisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, amongother circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind whileconsidering an application for bail are:

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7 (2001) 6 SCC 338

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[2022] 3 S.C.R.

A(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believethat the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; B(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released onbail;

(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of theaccused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; C(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced;and

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

17. The aforesaid principles have been restated in several decisionsDrendered by this Court including Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. RajeshRanjan alias Pappu Yadav and Another9, Narendra K. Amin (Dr.)v. State of Gujarat and Another10, Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehtav. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another11, Abdul Basit alias12Raju and Others v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary and Another, Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another13, Anil KumarE14Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, Mahipal v. RajeshKumar alias Polia and Another15, and as recently as in Jagjeet Singhand Others v. Ashish Mishra alias Monu and Another16

18. Courts have placed the liberty of an individual at a high pedestaland extended protection to such rights, whenever and wherever required.FAt the same time, emphasis has also been laid on furnishing reasons forgranting bail even though they may be brief. In Masroor v. State of 9 (2004) 7 SCC 528G10 (2008) 13 SCC 58411 (2012) 4 SCC 13412 (2014) 10 SCC 75413 (2014) 16 SCC 50814 (2018) 12 SCC 12915 (2020) 2 SCC 11816 (2022) SCC online SC 453H17 (2009) 14 SCC 286

Uttar Pradesh And Another17, it has been observed by this Court asfollows:

“15. There is no denying the fact that the liberty of an individual isprecious and is to be zealously protected by the courts.Nonetheless, such a protection cannot be absolute in everysituation. The valuable right of liberty of an individual and theinterest of the society in general has to be balanced. Liberty of aperson accused of an offence would depend upon the exigenciesof the case.”

19. In the same strain as expressed above, this Court has held in18Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu And Another,as follows :

“17. We are absolutely conscious that liberty of a person shouldnot be lightly dealt with, for deprivation of liberty of a person hasimmense impact on the mind of a person. Incarceration creates aconcavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causesa sense of vacuum. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity ofliberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democraticbody polity which is wedded to the rule of law an individual isexpected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law.The individual liberty is restricted by larger social interest and itsdeprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly societyan individual is expected to live with dignity having respect forlaw and also giving due respect to others’ rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm ofabsolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective forjustice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity forsecurity cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individualliving in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulatedand such regulations which are the source in law subserve thesocial balance and function as a significant instrument forprotection of human rights and security of the collective. It isbecause fundamentally laws are made for their obedience so thatevery member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achievehis individual as well as social interest. That is why Edmond Burkewhile discussing about liberty opined, “it is regulated freedom”.

18 (2012) 9 SCC 446

19 (1995) 1 SCC 349

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A20. It is true that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled. InDolat Ram And Others v. State of Haryana19, this Court has held thatvery cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary forcancellation of bail and bail once granted, should not be cancelled in amechanical manner. It is equally true that an unjustified or perverseorder of bail is vulnerable to interference by the superior Court. So is anBorder where irrelevant material has been taken into consideration [Refer: Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) (Supra)]. The factors that are paramountfor cancellation of bail have been succinctly stated in Prakash Kadamand Others v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta and Another20 in thefollowing words:C

“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has alsoto consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima faciecase against the accused, the position and standing of the accused,etc. If there are very serious allegations against the accused hisbail may be cancelled even if he has not misused the bail grantedDto him. Moreover, the above principle applies when the same courtwhich granted bail is approached for cancelling the bail. It will notapply when the order granting bail is appealed against before anappellate/Revisional Court.

19. In our opinion, there is no absolute rule that once bail is grantedEto the accused then it can only be cancelled if there is likelihoodof misuse of the bail. That factor, though no doubt important, isnot the only factor. There are several other factors also whichmay be seen while deciding to cancel the bail.”

21. Echoing the above principle, in Ranjit Singh v. State ofFMadhya Pradesh And Others21, it has been held thus:

“19. …….There is also a distinction between the concept of settingaside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation ofan order of bail on the ground that the accused has misconductedhimself or certain supervening circumstances warrant suchGcancellation. If the order granting bail is a perverse one or passedon irrelevant materials, it can be annulled by the superiorcourt……..”

20 (2011) 6 SCC 18921 (2013) 16 SCC 797H22 (2014) 10 SCC 754

22. InAbdul Basit alias Raju And Others v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir22Chaudhary And Another, this Court has opined that :

“19. Therefore, the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegalor perverse order is different from the concept of cancellation ofa bail on the ground of accused’s misconduct or new adversefacts having surfaced after the grant of bail which require suchcancellation and a perusal of the aforesaid decisions would presentbefore us that an order granting bail can only be set aside ongrounds of being illegal or contrary to law by the court superior tothe court which granted the bail and not by the same court.”

23. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court inImran v. Mohammed Bhava and Another[23]it has been held as follows:

23. Indeed, it is a well-established principle that once bail hasbeen granted it would require overwhelming circumstances forits cancellation. However, this Court in its judgment in Vipan KumarDhir Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 3 has also reiterated, that whileconventionally, certain supervening circumstances impeding fairtrial must develop after granting bail to an accused, for itscancellation by a superior court, bail, can also be revoked by asuperior court, when the previous court granting bail has ignoredrelevant material available on record, gravity of the offence or itssocietal impact. It was thus observed:- “9. …… Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstanceswhich may develop post the grant of bail and are non conduciveto fair trial, making it necessary to cancel the bail. This Court inDaulat Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana observed that:

“Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage andthe cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered anddealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelmingcircumstances are necessary for an order directing thecancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking,the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative andnot exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere withthe due course of administration of Justice or evasion or attemptto evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession A

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granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of thecourt, on the basis of material placed on the record of thepossibility of the accused absconding is yet another reasonjustifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once grantedshould not be cancelled in a mechanical manner withoutconsidering whether any supervening circumstances haverendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow theaccused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession ofbail during the trial.”

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10. These principles have been reiterated time and again, morerecently by a 3 Judge Bench of this Court in X Vs. State ofTelengana and Another.

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11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bailcan also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevantfactors or has ignored relevant material available on record whichrenders the order granting bail legally untenable. The gravity ofthe offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of anundue indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold,are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court caninterfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justiceand to bolster the administration of criminal justice system…”

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26. Thus, while considering cancellation of bail already grantedby a lower court, would indeed require significant scrutiny at theinstance of superior court, however, bail when granted can alwaysFbe revoked if the relevant material on record, gravity of the offenceor its societal impact have not been considered by the lower court.In such instances, where bail is granted in a mechanical manner,the order granting bail is liable to be set aside. Moreover, thedecisions cited herein above, enumerate certain basic principlesGwhich must be borne in mind when deciding upon an applicationfor grant of bail. Thus, while each case has its own unique factualmatrix, which assumes a significant role in determination of bailmatters, grant of bail must also be exercised by having regard tothe above-mentioned well-settled principles.

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24 Refer 1995 (1) SCC 349 (Daulat Ram and Others vs. State of Haryana)

24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancellingbail once granted, the Court must consider whether any superveningcircumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant ofbail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permithim to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial[24].To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathto interfere with an order passed by the Court below granting bail but ifsuch an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on materialthat is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny andinterference by the Appellate Court. Some of the circumstances wherebail granted to the accused under Section 439 (1) of the Cr.P.C. can becancelled are enumerated below: -

a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminalactivity;

b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smoothinvestigation;

g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going undergroundand/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency;

i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety.

j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which areconsidered unconducive to a fair trial.

We may clarify that the aforesaid list is only illustrative in natureand not exhaustive.

25. Keeping the aforesaid parameters to be borne in mind whendealing with a petition where not only has the order granting bail beenassailed on the ground of perversity and illegality, superveningcircumstances have been pleaded by the appellant that justify interferenceby this Court, we may now proceed to deal with the instant case.

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A26. A perusal of the impugned order goes to show that the soleground on which the concession of bail has been extended by the HighCourt to the respondent No.2 is the delay on the part of the appellant/complainant in lodging the FIR, without offering any plausible explanationfor the same. Absence of cogent reasons and failure to refer to therelevant factors that weighed with the Court to grant bail is also anBimportant factor that can persuade the Appellate Court to interfere withthe order passed. In this context, this Court has referred to theconsequences of failure to give reasons for granting bail in Ms. Y v.State of Rajasthan And Another.[25] and speaking for the Bench, Hon’bleChief Justice N.V. Ramana has observed that:-C“17. Apart from the general observation that the facts andcircumstances of the case have been taken into account, nowherehave the actual facts of the case been adverted to. There appearsto be no reference to the factors that ultimately led the High Courtto grant bail. In fact, no reasoning is apparent from the impugnedDorder.

18. Reasoning is the life blood of the judicial system. That everyorder must be reasoned is one of the fundamental tenets of oursystem. An unreasoned order suffers the vice of arbitrariness. InPuran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 this Court held as under:

E“8. …Giving reasons is different from discussing merits ordemerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examinationof evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of thecase has not to be undertaken. What the Additional SessionsJudge had done in the order dated 11-9-2000 was to discussthe merits and demerits of the evidence. That was what wasFdeprecated. That did not mean that whilst granting bailsome reasons for prima facie concluding why bail wasbeing granted did not have to be indicated.” (emphasissupplied)

G19. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC528 this Court indicated the importance of reasoning in thematter concerning bail and held as follows:

25 Order in Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2022 @ SLP(Crl) No. 7893 of 2021 dated 19thHApril 2022

“11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very wellsettled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion ina judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though atthe stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidenceand elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need notbe undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such ordersreasons for prima facie concluding why bail was beinggranted particularly where the accused is charged ofhaving committed a serious offence. Any order devoidof such reasons would suffer from non-application ofmind… (emphasis supplied)

20. In Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna, (2009) 1 SCC 678, whichconcerned a challenge to grant of bail in a serious offence, thisCourt has reiterated the same position as was observed in KalyanChandra Sarkar (supra). This Court has held as under:

“12… However, we find from the order that no reasons weregiven by the learned Judge while granting the bail and it seemsto have been granted almost mechanically without consideringthe pros and cons of the matter. While granting bail,particularly in serious cases like murder some reasonsjustifying the grant are necessary.””

(emphasis supplied)

27. The impugned order reveals that the High Court has madeshort shrift of the submissions made by the prosecution counsel to theeffect that in her statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C.,the appellant/complainant has not waivered and stuck to her version andthe fact that the respondent No. 2 has previous criminal history. It isworthwhile to note that the criminal antecedents of the respondent No.2were brought to the notice of the High Court by the appellant/complainantand learned counsel for the respondent No.1/State has also confirmedthat he is involved in at least four criminal cases as detailed below:

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28. It has been vehemently urged on behalf of the appellant/complainant that the respondent No.2’s bail order deserves to be setaside not only on the grounds stated above, but also in the light of hisDblatant conduct subsequent to being released for which reference hasbeen made to his photographs appearing in the social media with hissnapshots prominently displayed on posters/hoarding in the forefront withthe faces of some influential persons of the society in the backdrop,welcoming him with captions like “Bhaiyaa is back”, “Back toBhaiyaa”, and “Welcome to Role Janeman”.E

29. The explanation sought to be offered for the above by thelearned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that he is a student leaderwho belongs to a community that celebrates the festival “Maa NarmadaJayanti” and the posters in question have nothing to do with his beingreleased on bail. However, the captions referred to above with emojis ofFcrowns and hearts thrown in for good measure, belie this version.

30. Even if it is assumed that the posters in question were notcontemporaneous to the release of the respondent No.2 from detention,the captions tagged to his photographs on the social media highlight thesuperior position and power wielded by the respondent No.2 and hisGfamily in the society and its deleterious impact on the appellant/complainant. The emojis of crowns and hearts tagged with the captionsquoted above are devoid of any religious sentiments sought to be portrayedby the respondent No.2. On the other hand, they amplify the celebratorymood of the respondent No.2 and his supporters on his having been

released from detention in less than two months of being taken intocustody for a grave offence that entails sentence of not less than tenyears that may even extend to life. The brazen conduct of the respondentNo.2 has evoked a bona fide fear in the mind of the appellant/complainantthat she would not get a free and fair trial if he remains enlarged on bailand that there is a likelihood of his influencing the material witnesses. Itis noteworthy that a representation has also been submitted by theappellant’s father to the Superintendent of Police, District Jabalpurexpressing the very same apprehension.

31. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are ofthe considered opinion that the respondent No. 2 does not deserve theconcession of bail. Relevant material brought on record has beenoverlooked by the High Court while granting him bail. The superveningadverse circumstances referred to above, also warrant cancellation ofbail. Accordingly, the impugned order is quashed and set aside and therespondent No. 2 is directed to surrender within one week from the dateof passing of this order.

32. It is however clarified that the observations made above areconfined to examining the infirmity in the impugned order granting bail tothe respondent No.2 and his conduct thereafter and shall not be treatedas an opinion on the merits of the case which shall be decided on thebasis of the evidence that shall be placed before the trial Court. Thisorder shall also not preclude the respondent No.2 from applying afreshfor bail at a later stage, if any, new circumstances are brought to light.

33. The appeal is allowed and disposed of on the above terms.

Nidhi Jain

Appeal allowed.

(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)

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