HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC versus STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS on 4 December 2019

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 17 S.C.R.

A

HARBHAJAN SINGH ETC.

v.

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeal No. 3674 of 2009)

BDECEMBER 04, 2019

[N. V. RAMANA, SANJIV KHANNA ANDKRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]

Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and RentRecovery) Act, 1997 – Vires of 1997 Act – Challenge to, by theCtenant on the ground that they are entitled to protection againsteviction under East Punjab Rent Act which cannot be taken awayunder the Religious Premises Act – Held: Vires of the ReligiousPremises Act, a special enactment concerning landlord and tenantrelationships, cannot be challenged on the ground that there areDalready two other enactments governing general landlord andtenant relationships-Transfer of Property Act and East Punjab RentAct – Constitution confers the power and authority on the State toenact two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek toachieve different objectives and protect and preserve different setsof rights and make necessary classification to serve such variedEends – Religious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab Rent Act andthe Public Premises Act, concerns itself with the administration ofpremises belonging to religious institutions and seeks to regulatetheir rights as landlords vis-a-vis the tenants in occupation –Furthermore, the State legislature while enacting the ReligiousFPremises Act was aware that it has enacted East Punjab Rent Act,an existing statute governing landlord and tenant relationship –However, the State legislature in its wisdom deemed it appropriateto enact a law in respect of land and buildings belonging to“religious institutions” – East Punjab Urban Rent RestrictionsAct, 1949.G

Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and RentRecovery) Act, 1997 – Eviction proceedings against the tenants bythe Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee under the East Punjab RentAct – Subsequently, enactment of Religious Premises Act andejectment proceedings against the tenant under the ReligiousH

Premises Act – Plea of tenant that Religious Premises Act createsan artificial classification as tenants of land and buildingsbelonging to or owned by religious institutions are no longerentitled to protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though suchprotection continues to be available to other tenants – Held:Charitable or religious institutions or endownments fall into aseparate category and form a class by themselves – Tenantscoming under them also form a separate class and can be treateddifferently from others – Classification of properties of religiousinstitutions as a separate and distinctive class of properties wouldnot fall foul or be violative of Art. 14 – Granting exemption tobuildings belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions,from rent control legislation, would not offend the equal protectionclause of Art. 14 as it is a reasonable classification based onintelligible differentia and also satisfies the test of nexus as suchinstitutions not only serve public purpose but disbursement of theirincome is governed by the objects for which they are created –Thus, the withdrawal of protection to the tenants of such buildingswas justified – Constitution of India – Art. 14 – East Punjab UrbanRent Restrictions Act, 1949.

Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and RentRecovery) Act, 1997 – s. 3 – “Unauthorised occupation ofreligious premises” – Meaning of – Held: A person is deemed tobe in unauthorised occupation of any religious premises if he has,before or after commencement of the Religious Premises Act,entered into possession of a land or building belonging to areligious institution otherwise than under or pursuant to anyallotment, lease or grant – A person who enters into possessionof the land or building belonging to or owned by a religiousinstitution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease or grantis clearly not an unauthorised occupant – Valid grants, leases andallotments are not construed and treated as unauthorisedoccupation – It is only when the terms of the grant, lease orallotment are not adhered to or have been determined or the periodof allotment, lease or grant as fixed has come to an end, that theperson in occupation is treated to be in unauthorised occupation– This is a pre-condition which confers the right on the religiousinstitution to seek eviction of a person in unauthorised occupationof the religious premises – Determinative factor in deciding the AB

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Aquestion of “unauthorised occupation” is the tenure of allotment,lease or the grant and terms and conditions as agreed or stated,and not payment of rent.Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction and RentRecovery) Act, 1997 – ss. 4, 5 – Eviction under – Held: UnderBSection 4, a religious institution can make an application beforethe Collector if it is of the opinion that any person is inunauthorised occupation of any religious premises, situated withinthe Collector’s jurisdiction Punjab Religious Premises and Land(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 – Collector is authorisedand is competent to pass an order of eviction when he is satisfiedCthat the religious premises are in unauthorised occupation PunjabReligious Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,1997 – Order passed by the Collector is appealable before theCommissioner Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction andRent Recovery) Act, 1997 – Tenant, if still aggrieved, can invokeDthe writ jurisdiction of the High Court – Thus, power of judicialreview is always available and can be exercised by the High Courtwhen required and necessary – Judicial review.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 There cannot be any doubt that the StateElegislature, that is, the Legislative Assembly of the State ofPunjab is entitled to enact the Punjab Religious Premises andLand (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997, despite the factthat they had enacted the East Punjab Urban Rent RestrictionsAct, 1949. It is accepted and judicial notice is taken byFacknowledging that the State legislature while enacting theReligious Premises Act was aware that it has enacted EastPunjab Rent Act, an existing statute governing landlord andtenant relationship. However, the State legislature in its wisdomhas deemed it appropriate to enact a law in respect of land andbuildings belonging to “religious institutions”. The vires of theGReligious Premises Act, a special enactment concerning landlordand tenant relationships, cannot be challenged on the ground thatthere are already two other enactments governing generallandlord and tenant relationships (Transfer of Property Act andEast Punjab Rent Act). The Constitution confers the power andHauthority on the State to enact two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek to achieve different objectives andprotect and preserve different sets of rights and make necessaryclassification to serve such varied ends. The Religious PremisesAct, unlike the East Punjab Rent Act and the Public PremisesAct, concerns itself with the administration of premisesbelonging to religious institutions and seeks to regulate theirrights as landlords vis-a-vis the tenants in occupation. [Para 8][840-B-E]

1.2 Section 3 defines “unauthorised occupation of religiouspremises by a person”. The expression ‘unauthorisedoccupation’ is of some importance. A person is deemed to be inunauthorised occupation of any religious premises if he has,before or after commencement of the Religious Premises Act,entered into possession of a land or building belonging to areligious institution otherwise than under or pursuant to anyallotment, lease or grant. A person who enters into possessionof the land or building belonging to or owned by a religiousinstitution and has valid and subsisting allotment, lease or grantis clearly not an unauthorised occupant. Such allottees, lesseesor persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment or leasethat entitles the person to retain possession are fully protectedand cannot be evicted. In other words, primacy to the terms ofallotment, lease or grant is not interfered, and is duly accorded.The terms of the allotment, lease or grant would be binding.Valid grants, leases and allotments are not construed and treatedas unauthorised occupation. It is only when the terms of thegrant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or have beendetermined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as fixedhas come to an end, that the person in occupation is treated tobe in unauthorised occupation. This is a pre-condition whichconfers the right on the religious institution to seek eviction ofa person in unauthorised occupation of the religious premises.Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has beendetermined or cancelled whether before or after thecommencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of theperson would be treated as unauthorised occupation. Clause (c)states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religiouspremises, before or after commencement of the ReligiousPremises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contravention AB

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Aof the terms of allotment, lease or grant, or otherwise acted incontravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall betreated as an “unauthorised occupant”. Explanation to Section3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makes the termof allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determining whethera person is in authorised or unauthorised occupation, shall notBbe affected by the mere reason or the fact that such person haspaid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have entered intopossession as an allottee, lessee or guarantee. In other words,payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant factorin deciding the issue and question of “unauthorised occupation”.CThe tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms andconditions as agreed or stated, would be the crucial anddeterminative criterion. [Para 9] [840-H; 841-A; 842-F-H; 843-A-D]

1.3 Under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, aDreligious institution can make an application before the Collectorif it is of the opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupationof any religious premises, situated within the Collector’sjurisdiction. The Collector thereupon is required to issue noticein writing calling upon the person to show-cause why the evictionorder should not be made. Sub-section (2) prescribes theErequirement of a notice and sub-section (3) to Section 4prescribes the manner in which the notice is to be served. UnderSection 5, the Collector is authorised and is competent to passan order of eviction after considering the cause, if any, shownby the person to whom notice under Section 4 has been issuedFand after examining the evidence that may be produced by suchperson. The person in occupation has to be given reasonableopportunity of being heard. The statutory requirement is thatthe Collector should be satisfied that the religious premises arein unauthorised occupation before he can make the order of eviction. The Collector must also record reasons. The CollectorGis required to pass an order within a period of 45 days from thedate of receipt of the application under Section 4 and the orderpassed has to be affixed on the outer door or on some otherconspicuous part of the religious premises. If a person fails tocomply with the order of eviction within 30 days from the dateHof the order, the Collector, or any other officer duly authorised by him, can evict the person and deliver possession of thereligious premises to the religious institution. He is entitled touse force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved, can filean appeal against the Collector’s order before theCommissioner. Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invokethe writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 227 and226 of the Constitution of India if the grievance still persists.The power of judicial review is always available and can beexercised by the High Court when required and necessary.[Paras 10, 20] [843-E-H; 844-A-B; 855-E]

1.4 The issue of whether the properties of the religiousinstitutions for the purpose of rent control legislations can betreated as a separate category is no longer res integra as thisaspect was examined in several decisions where this Court hasheld that separate classification of properties of religiousinstitutions for rent legislations will pass a challenge underArticle 14 of the Constitution. It has been held in Nallamilli RamiReddi’s case that charitable or religious institutions orendownments fall into a separate category and form a class bythemselves. Tenants coming under them also form a separateclass. Tenants can be treated differently from others.Classification of properties of religious institutions as a separateand distinctive class of properties would not fall foul or beviolative of Art. 14. [Para 11] [844-C-D; 845-D-E-H; 846-A]

State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Nallamilli RamiReddi and Others (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl.SCR 287 – relied on.

1.5 There have been number of central and statelegislations wherein religious institutions with or without othercharitable organisations have been treated as a separate anddistinct class and accorded legal treatment concomitant to suchdistinctiveness within the scope of the same enactment or otherenactments, Sections 11 and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act,1961; Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and Karnataka Hindu ReligiousInstitutions and Charitable Endowments Act, 1997; Orissa HinduReligious Endowments Act, 1951; Himachal Pradesh HinduPublic Religious Institutions and Charitable Endowments Act,1984 as amended in 2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings AB

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A(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Goa,Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) ControlAct, 1968, among others. [Para 12] [847-C-E]

1.6 Whether a notification granting exemption to buildingsbelonging to charities, religious or secular institutions wouldBviolate the equal protection mandate of Article 14, the Article14 requires that the classification must be based on rationalgrounds, that is, grounds germane to carrying out the policy orthe purpose of the Act and by way of illustration it was statedthat if such exemptions were granted in favour of all the buildingsbelonging to charities, religious or secular institutions, suchCclassification would be reasonable and proper being based onintelligible differentia having nexus to the object sought to beachieved. Rent Act would unquestionably be a piece of beneficiallegislation intended to remedy the two evils, that is, rack-rentingextraction of exorbitant rents and unreasonable eviction ordersDgenerated by a large scale influx of population to big cities andurban areas post the Second World War creating acute shortageof accommodation in such areas. Rent enactments overtlyprotect the rights of the tenants in occupation of buildings in suchareas from being charged unreasonable rents and from beingunreasonably evicted. Therefore, such enactments even protectEtenancy after determination or end of their contractual periodsby enlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’. At the same time,the rent enactments often contain other significant provisionswhich indicate that the legislature itself felt that there may beareas and cases where these two evils were neither prevalent Fnor apprehended, and as such landlords’ freedom need not becurtailed at all. It is in this context that several enactments givewider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable,educational and other public institutions if the possession isrequired for purposes of such institutions. In other words, the legislature is entitled and can make rational classification ofGbuildings belonging to government and those belonging toreligious, charitable, educational and other public institutionswhich are accorded different treatment on the well-foundedassumption that such landlords are not expected to and wouldnot indulge in rack-renting or unreasonable eviction. TheHconstitutional validity of granting exemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions, from rentcontrol legislation, would not offend the equal protection clauseof Article 14 of the Constitution as it is a reasonable classificationbased on intelligible differentia and also satisfies the test ofnexus as such institutions not only serve public purpose butdisbursement of their income is governed by the objects forwhich they are created. The income and activities are not forprivate benefit. Consequently, withdrawal of protection to thetenants of such buildings was justified. [Para 13] [848-A-H; 849-A-B]

S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu andAnother (1985) 1 SCC 290 : [1985] 2 SCR 398 ; P.J.

Irani v. State of Madras [1962] SCR 169 – relied on.

1.7 The landlords have been given certain statutory rightsunder the rent enactments to seek eviction and these provisionsprovide relief. In the absence of such rent control legislations,a landlord has the right in law to evict the tenant either on thetermination of tenancy by efflux of time or other grounds aftergiving notice under the Transfer of Property Act. Such rightshave been curtailed by the rent control legislations to giveprotection to tenants having regard to the genuine and direneeds but these should not be construed to destroy the rightswhich have been given to the landlords. [Para 16] [852-E-F]

Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290 :[1980] 1 SCR 854 – relied on.

Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290 :[1980] 1 SCR 854 – relied on.

1.8 It is open to the legislature to pick out one class oflandlords out of several covered under a specific provision of arent enactment so long as they form a class by themselves andthe legislature was free to provide benefit of a special procedureto them in the matter of eviction against the tenants as long asthe legislation had the object to achieve and a special procedurehas reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved. [Para 17][853-F-G]

Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava (1984) 2 SCC75 : [1984] 2 SCR 614 - relied on.

1.9 What has been said about the Public Premises Act thatbeing a later enactment it would prevail over the provisions ofthe Rent Control Act in respect of public premises, would be AB

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Aequally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislatureof the State of Punjab in respect of the two enactments underconsideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and theReligious Premises Act. No doubt, in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Caseit has been observed that the underlying reason for exclusionof property belonging to the government from the ambit of theBRent Control Act is that the government while dealing with thecitizens in respect of property belonging to it would not act as aprivate landlord but would act in public interest, albeit thisreasoning would equally apply to “religious institutions” asdefined. The religious institutions are meant to carry out publicCpurpose and the legislature can proceed accordingly that thereligious institutions would act in public interest for which theywere established. [Paras 18, 19] [855-A-C]

Ashoka Marketing Ltd. And Another v. Punjab NationalBank and Others (1990) 4 SCC 406 : [1990] 3 SCRD649 – followed.S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu andAnother (1985) 1 SCC 290 : [1985] 2 SCR 398 ;Christ the King Cathedral v. John Ancheril and Another(2001) 6 SCC 170 : [2001] 3 SCR 1112 – relied on.

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Case Law Reference

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.07.2006 of the HighCourt of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition Nos.H14124, 14025 and 14754 of 1998.

S.N. Chopra, P. N. Puri, Jashan Chopra, Mrs. Reeta Dewan Puri,Abhishek Puri, Advs. for the Appellants.

S. Gurukrishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., Mrs. Kamaldeep Gulati,Ms. Uttara Babbar, Ms. Bhavana Duhoon, Manan Bansal, Advs. forthe Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANJIV KHANNA, J.

1. The afore-captioned Civil Appeal impugns the judgment dated6[th] July 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whichdismissed five writ petitions challenging the vires of the Punjab ReligiousPremises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1997 (‘ReligiousPremises Act’, for short).

2. The appellants before us are tenants in occupation of shopslocated in Gurudwara Singh Sabha, a gurudwara at Kukar Majra, G.T.Road, Mandi Gobindgarh, District Fatehgarh Sahib, Punjab. Theappellants claim that they were inducted as tenants during the period1965-69 by Gurudwara Singh Sabha. However, no formal lease oragreements were executed and albeit, over a period of time, rents wereprogressively increased. The appellants further claim that they are smallbusinessmen carrying on trade primarily connected with steel industry,while one of the appellants runs a dhaba. By the letter dated 2[nd]March 1978, the appellants were informed that the affairs of thegurudwara had come under the control of Shiromani GurdwaraParbandhak Committee (‘SGPC’ for short) and they should, therefore,pay the rent to SGPC. It is alleged that the appellants have been payingrent to SGPC or the manager of the gurudwara but receipts have notbeen regularly issued.

3. In the year 1997, SGPC had filed an eviction petition againstone of the appellants, Harbhajan Singh, under Section 13 of the EastPunjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (‘East Punjab Rent Act’, forshort) on two grounds, viz., (i) failure to pay rent, and (ii) SGPC neededthe property for construction of shops. Harbhajan Singh had, thereafter,deposited arrears of rent on the first date of hearing. The evictionproceedings, however, had remained pending and were not decided.

4. On 29[th] January 1998, the Religious Premises Act wasenforced, and thereby introduced a summary procedure for evicting A

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Aunauthorised occupants from the premises/property belonging to thereligious institutions. Thereafter, SGPC had filed ejectment petitionsunder the Religious Premises Act before the Collector for eviction ofthe appellants stating that the appellants were in unauthorisedoccupation. The appellants, on receipt of notices from the Collectorunder Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, had filed the writ petitionsBchallenging the vires of the enactment before the High Court, whichby the impugned judgment have been dismissed. The primary challengebefore the High Court was to the explanation to clause (a) to Section3 of the Religious Premises Act on the ground that the provision createsan unintelligible classification to the disadvantage of the tenants whoCare otherwise entitled to equal protection as other tenants under theEast Punjab Rent Act.

5. The pleas raised by the appellants were rejected by theDivision Bench of the High Court after referring to the object andpurpose behind the impugned enactment, that is, to preserve the propertyDof religious institutions, by observing that public at large has an inherentinterest in the “religious institutions” which were prone tomaladministration and mismanagement. Referring to the definition of“unauthorised occupants”, it was observed that a person who is inoccupation of the premises belonging to a “religious institution” on avalid allotment, lease or grant is not to be treated as an “unauthorisedEoccupant” for the period of allotment, lease or grant. The explanationstates that mere payment of rent by the tenant who is in unauthorisedoccupation shall not raise any presumption that such person had enteredinto possession as an allottee, lessee or under a grant. Referring tothe detailed and comprehensive procedure for eviction under SectionsF4 and 5 of the Religious Premises Act, it was held that the Collectorhas to be satisfied that the opposite party was in “unauthorisedoccupation” and only thereupon an eviction order can be passed afterfollowing the due procedure. A person aggrieved against the orderpassed by the Collector can file an appeal before the Commissionerunder Section 8 of the Act. Referring to the factual matrix, the HighGCourt has observed that all contentions on merits should be raised beforethe authorities under the Religious Premises Act, in accordance withlaw.

6. The primary contention raised by the appellants before us isthat as tenants they are entitled to protection against eviction under theHEast Punjab Rent Act, which protection it is submitted cannot be

withdrawn and taken away under the Religious Premises Act. Further,the definition of “unauthorised occupants”, as a result of explanationto clause (a) of Section 3, is highly unjust and unfair as a tenant whohas been paying rent over a long period is deemed to be in “unauthorisedoccupation” because of the termination of the lease, licence or grant,or the time stipulated in the lease, license or grant has come to an end.This it is submitted is unjust and unfair. The Religious Premises Actcreates an artificial classification as tenants of land and buildingsbelonging to or owned by “religious institutions” are no longer entitledto protection under the East Punjab Rent Act though such protectioncontinues to be available to other tenants. Expansion or constructionof a new building by a religious institution as was pleaded by SGPC intheir eviction petition under the East Punjab Rent Act would not justifyeviction. There is no public purpose or objective in enacting the law,that is, the Religious Premises Act, which has become a calculabledevice and means to increase income of the religious institutions. ThisCourt in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Another v. Punjab NationalBank and Others[1] had examined and rejected the challenge to the viresof the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971(‘Public Premises Act’, for short) after recording that the propertybelonging to the government would fall under a separate class and thatthe government, while dealing with the citizens in respect of the propertybelonging to it, would not act for its own purpose as a private landlordbut would act in public interest. This is a crucial distinction betweenthe government and private landlords and, therefore, for the samereasoning in inverse, the present appeal should be allowed as theReligious Premises Act creates an artificial distinction and discriminatesagainst the tenants of “religious institutions”, though “religiousinstitutions” as landlords are not a separate class. Thus, the ReligiousPremises Act should be declared unconstitutional and illegal as it violatesArticle 14 of the Constitution.

7. The respondents, namely, the State of Punjab and also SGPC,have contested the said submissions and contentions. Their submissionsand contentions would be noticed in the subsequent portion and in ourreasoning below.

8. The East Punjab Rent Act was enacted in the year 1949, soonafter the Partition, with a view to protect tenants and to curtail the right AB

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Aof the landlords to seek eviction notwithstanding the contract under theprovisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (“Transfer of PropertyAct”, for short) which is a general enactment regulating landlord andtenant relationships. There cannot be any doubt that the State legislature,that is, the Legislative Assembly of the State of Punjab is entitled toenact the Religious Premises Act, despite the fact that they had enactedBthe East Punjab Rent Act. We must accept and take judicial notice byacknowledging that the State legislature while enacting the ReligiousPremises Act was aware that it has enacted East Punjab Rent Act, anexisting statute governing landlord and tenant relationship. However, theState legislature in its wisdom has deemed it appropriate to enact a lawCin respect of land and buildings belonging to “religious institutions”. Thevires of the Religious Premises Act, a special enactment concerninglandlord and tenant relationships, cannot be challenged on the groundthat there are already two other enactments governing general landlordand tenant relationships (Transfer of Property Act and East Punjab Rent

Act). The Constitution confers the power and authority on the State toDenact two separate enactments on a similar subject if they seek toachieve different objectives and protect and preserve different sets ofrights and make necessary classification to serve such varied ends. TheReligious Premises Act, unlike the East Punjab Rent Act and the PublicPremises Act, concerns itself with the administration of premisesEbelonging to religious institutions and seeks to regulate their rights aslandlords vis-à-vis the tenants in occupation. In this regard, referencecan be made to the object and purpose behind enacting the ReligiousPremises Act, which is as follows:

“Since long various religious institutions have been representingFto the Government for vacation of their premises underunauthorised occupation. On careful thought being given by theGovernment, the State Government is of the opinion that thereligious institutions are facing a lot of difficulties in this behalf.It is, therefore, expedient for the State Government to help theGreligious institutions in getting their premises which are underunauthorised occupation vacated through summary proceedings.Hence, the Punjab Religious Premises and Land (Eviction andRent Recovery) Bill, 1996.”

9. Section 2(d) of the Religious Premises Act defines “religiousHinstitution”. Section 2(e) defines ‘religious premises’ and Section 3

defines “unauthorised occupation of religious premises by a person”.These provisions read as under:

“(d) “Religious Institution’ means any gurudwara, temple, church,mosque, temple of Jains or Budhas - which is registered underthe provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (CentralAct No. XXI of 1860) or is established under any statute andincludes any other place of worship by whatever name, it maybe called, which is registered as aforesaid or is established underany statute; (e) “religious premises”, means any land whether used foragricultural or non-agricultural purposes, or any building or partof a building belonging to a Religious Institution and includes, -

(i) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appertainingto such building or part of a building; and

(ii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a buildingfor the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;”

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3. Unauthorised occupation of religious premises. - For thepurposes of this Act, a person shall be deemed to be inunauthorised occupation of any religious premises- (a) where he has, whether before or after thecommencement of this Act, entered into possessionthereof otherwise than under and in pursuance of anyallotment, lease or grant; or (b) where he, being an allottee, lessee or grantee has, byreason of the determination or cancellation of hisallotment, lease or grant in accordance with the termsin that behalf therein contained, ceased, whether beforeor after the commencement of this Act, to be entitledto occupy or hold such religious premises; or

(c) where any person authorised to occupy any religiouspremises has, whether before or after thecommencement of this Act, -

(i) sub-let, in contravention of the terms of allotment,lease or grant, without the permission of the Religious A

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Institution, the whole or any part of such religiouspremises; or

(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms,express or implied, under which he is authorised tooccupy such religious premises.

Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (a), a person shall notmerely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be deemedto have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or grantee.”

“Religious institution” means any gurudwara, temple, church,mosque or temple of Jains or Buddhists which is registered underthe provisions of the Societies Registration Act or establishedunder any statute. It also includes any place of worship bywhatever name called which is registered as aforesaid orestablished under any statute. The definition is clear and nocontention or issue is raised that the definition of the term“religious institution” is vague or incomprehensible. Similarly, theexpression “religious premises” has been defined in clear termsto mean land used for agricultural or non-agricultural purposesor any building or part of the building belonging to a religiousinstitution. The definition clarifies that the expression “religiouspremises” would include garden, ground and out-house or anyfittings in the building or part of the building for more beneficialenjoyment. The expression “unauthorised occupation” is of someimportance in view of the challenge and the contentions raised.A person is deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of anyreligious premises if he has, before or after commencement ofthe Religious Premises Act, entered into possession of a land orbuilding belonging to a religious institution otherwise than underor pursuant to any allotment, lease or grant. A person who entersinto possession of the land or building belonging to or owned bya religious institution and has valid and subsisting allotment, leaseor grant is clearly not an unauthorised occupant. Such allottees,lessees or persons in whose favour there is a grant, allotment orlease that entitles the person to retain possession are fullyprotected and cannot be evicted. In other words, primacy to theterms of allotment, lease or grant is not interfered, and is dulyaccorded. The terms of the allotment, lease or grant would bebinding. Clause (b) states that if the allotment, lease or grant has been determined or cancelled whether before or after thecommencement of the Religious Premises Act, occupation of theperson would be treated as unauthorised occupation. Clause (c)states that where a person is authorised to occupy any religiouspremises, before or after commencement of the ReligiousPremises Act, has sublet the religious premises in contraventionof the terms of allotment, lease or grant, or otherwise acted incontravention of the terms, express or implied, he shall be treatedas an “unauthorised occupant”. No contention, issue or objectionhas been raised viz. clause (c) to Section 3. Explanation toSection 3 states that for the purpose of clause (a), which makesthe term of allotment, lease or grant as a basis for determiningwhether a person is in authorised or unauthorised occupation,shall not be affected by the mere reason or the fact that suchperson has paid rent and, therefore, is deemed to have enteredinto possession as an allottee, lessee or guarantee. In other words,payment of rent would not be a determinative and relevant factorin deciding the issue and question of “unauthorised occupation”.The tenure of allotment, lease or the grant and terms andconditions as agreed or stated, and not mere payment of rentwould be the crucial and determinative criterion.

10. Under Section 4 of the Religious Premises Act, a religiousinstitution can make an application before the Collector if it is of theopinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation of any religiouspremises, situated within the Collector’s jurisdiction. The Collectorthereupon is required to issue notice in writing calling upon the personto show-cause why the eviction order should not be made. Sub-section(2) prescribes the requirement of a notice and sub-section (3) to Section4 prescribes the manner in which the notice is to be served. UnderSection 5, the Collector is authorised and is competent to pass an orderof eviction after considering the cause, if any, shown by the person towhom notice under Section 4 has been issued and after examining the evidence that may be produced by such person. The person inoccupation has to be given reasonable opportunity of being heard. Thestatutory requirement is that the Collector should be satisfied that thereligious premises are in unauthorised occupation before he can makethe order of eviction. The Collector must also record reasons. TheCollector is required to pass an order within a period of 45 days fromthe date of receipt of the application under Section 4 and the order AB

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Apassed has to be affixed on the outer door or on some other conspicuouspart of the religious premises. If a person fails to comply with the orderof eviction within 30 days from the date of the order, the Collector, orany other officer duly authorised by him, can evict the person and deliverpossession of the religious premises to the religious institution. He isentitled to use force as may be necessary. The tenant, if aggrieved,Bcan file an appeal against the Collector’s order before the Commissioner.Thereafter, the tenant is entitled to also invoke the writ jurisdiction ofthe High Court under Articles 227 and 226 of the Constitution of Indiaif the grievance still persists.

11. The issue of whether the properties of the religious institutionsCfor the purpose of rent control legislations can be treated as a separatecategory is no longer res integra as this aspect was examined in severaldecisions where this Court has held that separate classification ofproperties of religious institutions for rent legislations will pass a challengeunder Article 14 of the Constitution. In State of Andhra Pradesh andDOthers v. Nallamilli Rami Reddi and Others[2], this Court was facedwith a challenge to the validity of Section 82 of the Andhra PradeshCharitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987which had cancelled the leases of tenants of properties belonging to orgiven or endowed for the purpose of any charitable or any religiousinstitution or endowment falling under the enactment, notwithstandingEthe prevailing tenancy laws in the State of Andhra Pradesh, in order toaugment the rents payable for such properties which stood frozen onaccount of the tenancy laws and since sale of such lands was notfeasible. While examining the question of religious institutions as aseparate and distinguishable class, this Court had expounded on theFscope of Article 14 of the Constitution and the kind of classificationthat would stand the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, as under:

“8. What Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is “classlegislation” and not “classification for purpose of legislation”. Ifthe legislature reasonably classifies persons for legislativeGpurposes so as to bring them under a well-defined class, it is notopen to challenge on the ground of denial of equal treatment thatthe law does not apply to other persons. The test of permissibleclassification is twofold: (i) that the classification must be foundedon intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped

together from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) thatdifferentia must have a rational connection to the object soughtto be achieved. Article 14 does not insist upon classification,which is scientifically perfect or logically complete. A classificationwould be justified unless it is patently arbitrary. If there is equalityand uniformity in each group, the law will not becomediscriminatory, though due to some fortuitous circumstance arisingout of peculiar situation some included in a class get an advantageover others so long as they are not singled out for specialtreatment. In substance, the differentia required is that it mustbe real and substantial, bearing some just and reasonable relationto the object of the legislation.”

Holding the above, this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddi (supra)had reversed the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra PradeshHigh Court observing that religious institutions fall into a separatecategory and land or property held by them have a special character.Clearly, the tenants under a religious institution would form a separateclass by themselves and such classification, if made, would achieve theobject of promoting the interests of the religious institutions. Therefore,classification of properties of “religious institutions” as a separate anddistinctive class of properties would not fall foul or be violative of Article14 of the Constitution. It was elucidated that whether a tenancy actshould be applicable to religious institutions or should be kept out is notan aspect which the Court would decide. It is instead for the legislatureto determine the extent of applicability of such tenancy laws to religiousinstitutions and the extent of protection that should be made available.This Court has, therefore, rejected the argument that religious institutionsas landlords or tenants of religious institutions cannot be treated andregarded as a separate category in respect of whom protection asavailable to other tenants under the rent law would not be available.Such classification cannot be a ground or the basis to interfere withthe validity of an act or provision. However, the Courts can interferewhen the policy is irrational. Summing up the ratio, this court inNallamilli Rami Reddi (supra) had held:

“15. We may sum up the upshot of our discussion:

1. That charitable or religious institutions or endowmentsfall into a separate category and form a class bythemselves. If that is so, tenants coming under them AB

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also form a separate class. Therefore, they can betreated differently from others.

2. In operation of the Act it is possible that it may resultin hardship to some of the tenants but that by itself willnot be a consideration to condemn the Act.

3. The manner in which the charitable or religious institutionor endowment would deal with the properties that areresumed after the provisions of Section 82 of the Actcome into force by cancelling the existing leases, is inthe region of speculation.

4. Fresh tenancy can be entered into and there is nomaterial before the court as to what was the rent paidby tenants at the time when the Act came into force, interms of Section 18(2) of the Act or as provided underthe Andhra Act or under the Telangana Act. In theabsence of such a material, it would be hazardous forthe court to reach any conclusion, one way or the other,to state that the tenants would be frozen and, therefore,there is no likelihood of charitable or religious institutionor endowment getting higher rents. If there is nomaterial one way or the other, the presumption that theAct is good should prevail.

5. It is a matter of policy with the legislature as to whetherall provisions of the Tenancy Acts should be exempt inits application to the charitable or religious institution orendowment in their entirety.

6. The identification of “landless poor persons” andprotection given to them is justified as enunciated earlier.

7. It will be very difficult to predict at this stage that theresult of Section 82 of the Act would be so hazardousas not to achieve the object for which it was enacted.It would not only result in displacing the old tenants bynew tenants, it may also achieve other social objectivesin another manner. If appropriate provisions are madeunder the Rules and if the leases are given to smallholders of land, another social objective could beachieved.

8. In what manner charitable or religious institution orendowment would deal with matters of this nature ismere guesswork at this stage. On some hypotheticalapproach the High Court could not have declared a lawto be invalid.”

Therefore, it was clearly held that tenants of religious institutionsfall in a separate class which is identifiable. Further, on the question,whether cancellation of a “lease” in their favour would achieve theobjectives of the act in question, it was observed, that there was nomaterial before the Court to show that such cancellation would not carryout the purposes of the “religious institutions”.

12. There have been number of central and state legislationswherein religious institutions with or without other charitableorganisations have been treated as a separate and distinct class andaccorded legal treatment concomitant to such distinctiveness within thescope of the same enactment or other enactments. {See – Sections 11and 115BBC, the Income Tax Act, 1961; Karnataka Rent Act, 1999and Karnataka Hindu Religious Institutions and Charitable EndowmentsAct, 1997; Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951; HimachalPradesh Hindu Public Religious Institutions and Charitable EndowmentsAct, 1984 as amended in 2018; Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Goa, Damanand Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968, amongothers}.

13. We would like to refer to a decision of this Court in S.Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another[3]whereinchallenge was made to the exemption granted to buildings owned byHindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitabletrusts from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and RentControl) Act, 1960, by delegated legislation, in the form of an exemptionnotification issued under Section 29 of the above Act. A three JudgeBench of this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) referred tothe judgment of a five Judge Bench of this Court in P.J. Irani v. Stateof Madras[4]wherein identical provisions contained in earlier enactment,namely, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959 wereupheld in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the 3 AIR 1985 SC 257

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Abasis that the Preamble and operative provisions of that Act gavesufficient guidance for exercise of discretionary power vested with theState Government. Whether a notification granting exemption tobuildings belonging to charities, religious or secular institutions wouldviolate the equal protection mandate of Article 14, it was observed, thatArticle 14 requires that the classification must be based on rationalBgrounds, that is, grounds germane to carrying out the policy or thepurpose of the Act and by way of illustration it was stated that if suchexemptions were granted in favour of all the buildings belonging tocharities, religious or secular institutions, such classification would bereasonable and proper being based on intelligible differentia having nexusCto the object sought to be achieved. Rent Act, it was observed, wouldunquestionably be a piece of beneficial legislation intended to remedythe two evils, that is, rack-renting extraction of exorbitant rents andunreasonable eviction orders generated by a largescale influx ofpopulation to big cities and urban areas post the Second World Warcreating acute shortage of accommodation in such areas. RentDenactments overtly protect the rights of the tenants in occupation ofbuildings in such areas from being charged unreasonable rents and frombeing unreasonably evicted. Therefore, such enactments even protecttenancy after determination or end of their contractual periods byenlarging the definition of the term ‘tenant’. At the same time, the rentEenactments often contain other significant provisions which indicate thatthe legislature itself felt that there may be areas and cases where thesetwo evils were neither prevalent nor apprehended, and as such landlords’freedom need not be curtailed at all. It is in this context that severalenactments give wider latitude to the landlords of religious, charitable,educational and other public institutions if the possession is required forFpurposes of such institutions. In other words, the legislature is entitledand can make rational classification of buildings belonging to governmentand those belonging to religious, charitable, educational and other publicinstitutions which are accorded different treatment on the well-foundedassumption that such landlords are not expected to and would not indulgeGin rack-renting or unreasonable eviction. Relying upon the observationsin P.J. Irani (supra), it was held that constitutional validity of grantingexemption to buildings belonging to charities, religious or secularinstitutions, from rent control legislation, would not offend the equalprotection clause of Article 14 of the Constitution as it is a reasonableclassification based on intelligible differentia and also satisfies the testH

of nexus as such institutions not only serve public purpose butdisbursement of their income is governed by the objects for which theyare created. The income and activities are not for private benefit.Reference in this regard was made to the counter affidavit whereinthe government had explained that they were satisfied that the rentsreceived by exempted religious institutions were very low, meagre andthat the provisions of fixation of fair rent under the rent act would notmeet the ends of justice and would in fact result in the tenant exploitingthe situation. Consequently, withdrawal of protection to the tenants ofsuch buildings was justified. It was observed in S. KandaswamyChettiar (supra) as under:

“11... In our view, the aforesaid material clearly shows thatbuildings belonging to such public religious and charitableendowments or trusts clearly fell into a class where unduehardship and injustice resulting to them from the uniformapplication of the beneficial provisions of the Act needed to berelieved and the exemption granted will have to be regarded asbeing germane to the policy and purposes of the Act. In otherwords the classification made has a clear nexus with the objectwith which the power to grant exemption has been conferredupon the State Government under S.29 of the Act.

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14... It is obvious that if the trustees of the public religious trustsand public charities are to be given freedom to charge the normalmarket rent then to make that freedom effective it will benecessary to arm the trustees with the right to evict the tenantsfor non-payment of such market rent. The State Governmenton materials before it came to the conclusion that the ‘fair rent’fixed under the Act was unjust in case of such buildings and itwas necessary to permit the trustees of such buildings to recoverfrom their tenants reasonable market rent and if that be so non-eviction when reasonable market rent is not paid would beunreasonable and if the market rent is paid by the tenants notrustee is going to evict them. It is, therefore, clear that grantingtotal exemption cannot be regarded as excessive or unwarranted.

15. Apart from this aspect of the matter it is conceivable thattrustees of buildings belonging to such public religious institutionsor public charities may desire eviction of their tenants for the AB

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Apurpose of carrying out major or substantial repairs or for thepurpose of demolition and reconstruction and the StateGovernment may have felt that the trustees of such buildingsshould be able to effect evictions without being required to fulfilother onerous conditions which must be complied with by privatelandlords when they seek evictions for such purposes. In ourBview, therefore, the total exemption granted to such buildingsunder the impugned notification is perfectly justified.”

14. These two judgments were followed by the two Judge Benchdecision of this Court in Christ the King Cathedral v. John Ancheriland Another[5]wherein similar exemption notification under the KeralaCBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 granting exemption inpublic interest to the buildings of all churches/mosques of all minorityreligions and of all Dioceses, Archdioceses, Monasteries, etc. waschallenged. One of the contentions raised was that no data or materialwas produced by the State and hence the decision and ratio in S.DKandaswamy Chettiar (supra) would not be applicable. Rejecting thesaid contention, it was observed:

“6.The law had been stated by this Court to the effect that publicreligious or charitable endowments or trusts constitute a well-recognised group which serves not only public purposes, butEdisbursement of their income is governed by the objects withwhich they are created and buildings belonging to suchendowments or trusts clearly fall into a class distinct from thebuildings owned by private landlords. It is in respect of three areasa regulation would be made under the Act, as has been done inother similar enactments and these areas are: (i) with respect toFregulation of lease of buildings (residential or non-residential); (ii)control of rent of such buildings; and (iii) control of eviction oftenants from such buildings. A public trust, as has been held inS. Kandaswamy Chettiar case is not likely to act unreasonablyeither in the matter of enhancement of rent or eviction of tenantsGbeing institutions of religion or charity. On that basis, this Courtupheld the validity of the exemption granted under the Tamil NaduAct in favour of such trust or endowment. In the present case,the contention has been specifically put forth that the appellantsfall into that very category which came up for consideration H5 (2001) 6 SCC 170

before this Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case. Therefore,no distinction can be made between that class of owners of thebuildings in that case and in the present case. We do notunderstand as to what other material was required by the Courtin a matter of this nature if the contention put forth before thisCourt is not that churches or mosques, dioceses, archdioceses,monasteries, convents, wakfs and madarsas are not religious andcharitable in nature.

7. Shri Nageswara Rao, the learned counsel appearing for thecontesting respondents submitted that there is total non-application of mind by the Government in the matter of grant ofexemption and the guidelines indicated in S. KandaswamyChettiar case have not been followed in the present case and,therefore, the exemption should not have been granted in thepresent case. In S. Kandaswamy Chettiar case an affidavit hadbeen filed as to the lower rents that were being paid and thatthe tenants were exploiting the situation and had brought thecharitable institutions to a situation of helplessness and that positionnot having been challenged the Court made those orders. If webear in mind the fact that the purpose of the Act is apparentlyto prevent unreasonable eviction and also to control rent and ifthe trustees of religious and public charities are given freedomto charge normal market rent with the further freedom to evictthe tenants for not paying such market rent, the result would beunjust and cause hardship to them. But apprehension, by itself,is not sufficient. There is no material on record to show that inany of these cases the landlords would resort to such a courseof action. On the other hand, if the building belonging to suchpublic trust or religious institution is exempt from the Act, thepurpose of the trust could be carried out much better, is quiteclear. If that is the object with which the Government has grantedexemption, we do not think there is any reason to quash thenotifications impugned before the High Court.

9. An argument is sought to be raised on the basis of ownershipof property that there should not have been a distinction as isbeing made in the present case. That was the very basis ofdistinction made in case of statutory bodies like the Housing A

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ABoard, local authorities which was noticed in Jayakaran v.Kerala Health R & W Society case or registered wakfs whichwas considered in Lakshmanan v. Mohamood. When suchbodies or institutions fall into a distinct class by themselves andexemption granted to them would serve a public purpose, namely,to carry out the objects of the trust or the endowment or religiousBactivity in a broad sense, we do not think that the fine distinctionsought to be made by the High Court in this regard is justified.

15. Appropriate at this stage would also be reference to twoearlier decisions of this Court which had examined the provisions ofthe rent control legislations, namely, Kewal Singh v. Smt. Lajwanti[6]Cand Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava[7].

16. In Kewal Singh (supra), the challenge made was to theprovisions of summary eviction in case of bona fide requirement underthe Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It was observed that the rent controllegislations are a piece of social legislations and are meant mainly toDprotect tenants from frivolous evictions but, at the same time, they mustdo justice to the landlord and to this extent the enactment should avoidplacing such restrictions on their right to evict the tenants so as todestroy the legal right to property. Therefore, the landlords have beengiven certain statutory rights under the rent enactments to seek evictionEand these provisions provide relief. In the absence of such rent controllegislations, a landlord has the right in law to evict the tenant either onthe termination of tenancy by efflux of time or other grounds after givingnotice under the Transfer of Property Act. Such rights have beencurtailed by the rent control legislations to give protection to tenantshaving regard to the genuine and dire needs but these should not beFconstrued to destroy the rights which have been given to the landlords.It was observed:

“21. There is yet another important aspect of the matter whichmay be mentioned here. Prior to the enactment of the rent controllegislation in our country, the relationship of landlord and tenantGwas governed by our common law viz. the Transfer of PropertyAct (Sections 107 to 111). The tenant was inducted with his tacitagreement to be regulated by the conditions embodied in thecontract and could not be allowed to repudiate the agreement 6 AIR 1980 SC 161H7 AIR 1984 SC 967

reached between him and the landlord during that period. Thetenant was, therefore, bound in law to vacate the premises eithervoluntarily or through a suit after he was given a notice asrequired by the Transfer of Property Act under the terms andconditions of the lease. However, as a piece of social reform inorder to protect the tenants from capricious and frivolous eviction,the legislature stepped in and afforded special protection to thetenant by conferring on him the status of a statutory tenant whocould not be evicted except under the conditions specified andthe procedure prescribed by the Rent Control Acts. Thus to thisextent, the agreement of lease and the provisions of the Transferof Property Act stood superseded. At the same time, the RentControl Acts provided the facilities of eviction to the landlord oncertain specified grounds like bona fide personal necessity ordefault in payment of rent, etc. Thus any right that the tenantpossessed after the expiry of the lease was conferred on himonly by virtue of the Rent Control Act. It is, therefore, manifestthat if the legislature considered in its wisdom to confer certainrights or facilities on the tenants, it could due to changedcircumstances curtail, modify, alter or even take away such rightsor the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction and leavethe tenants to seek their remedy under the common law.

22. Thus, we do not see how can the tenant challenge the validityof such a provision enacted by the legislature from which thetenant itself derived such rights.”

17. Similar are the observations of this Court in Ravi DuttSharma (supra) which had quoted several passages from Kewal Singh(supra) to observe that it is open to the legislature to pick out one classof landlords out of several covered under a specific provision of a rentenactment so long as they form a class by themselves and thelegislature was free to provide benefit of a special procedure to themin the matter of eviction against the tenants as long as the legislationhad the object to achieve and a special procedure has reasonable nexusto the object to be achieved.

18. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra), the five JudgeConstitution Bench of this Court had upheld applicability of the PublicPremises Act to a corporation established by a Central Act that is ownedand controlled by the Central Government, therein a nationalised bank.

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AAfter referring to several judgments, this Court had explained the effectof Article 14 of the Constitution observing that the two statutes, namely,the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act were enacted bythe same legislature, that is, the Parliament, in exercise of powers formatters enumerated in the Concurrent List. The Public Premises Actbeing a later enactment would prevail over the provisions of the RentBControl Act in respect of public premises. Referring to the provisionsof the Rent Control Act, it was observed:

“55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the generallaw regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant containedCin the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provisionfor determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds onwhich a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribesthe forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords andtenants and the procedure which has to be followed in suchproceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to beDa special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenantin the Union territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makesprovision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction ofunauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to thegeneral law which provides for filing of a regular suit forErecovery of possession of property in a competent court and fortrial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid downin the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confersthe power to pass an order of eviction of an unauthorisedoccupant in a public premises on a designated officer andFprescribes the procedure to be followed by the said officer beforepassing such an order. Therefore, the Public Premises Act is alsoa special statute relating to eviction of unauthorised occupantsfrom public premises. In other words, both the enactments,namely, the Rent Control Act and the Public Premises Act, arespecial statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein. Since,Gthe Public Premises Act is a special statute and not a generalenactment the exception contained in the principle that asubsequent general law cannot derogate from an earlier speciallaw cannot be invoked and in accordance with the principle thatthe later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public PremisesHAct must prevail over the Rent Control Act.”

19. What has been said about the Public Premises Act wouldbe equally applicable to the legislations made by the State legislatureof the State of Punjab in respect of the two enactments underconsideration, that is, the East Punjab Rent Act and the ReligiousPremises Act. No doubt, in this decision it has been observed that theunderlying reason for exclusion of property belonging to the governmentfrom the ambit of the Rent Control Act is that the government whiledealing with the citizens in respect of property belonging to it wouldnot act as a private landlord but would act in public interest, albeit thisreasoning would equally apply to “religious institutions” as defined. Thereligious institutions as held are meant to carry out public purpose andthe legislature can proceed accordingly that the religious institutionswould act in public interest for which they were established. {See aboveS. Kandaswamy Chettiar (supra) and Christ the King Cathedral(supra)}

20. As noticed above, valid grants, leases and allotments are notconstrued and treated as unauthorised occupation. It is only when theterms of the grant, lease or allotment are not adhered to or have beendetermined or the period of allotment, lease or grant as fixed has cometo an end, that the person in occupation is treated to be in unauthorisedoccupation. This is a pre-condition which confers the right on thereligious institution to seek eviction of a person in unauthorisedoccupation of the religious premises. Further, an order passed by theCollector is appealable before the Commissioner and if still aggrieved,a tenant can invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as mentionedabove. Therefore, power of judicial review is always available and canbe exercised by the High Court when required and necessary.

21. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present appealand the same is dismissed. However, in the facts of this case, therewould be no order as to costs.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal dismissed.

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