Supreme Court of India
SAVATRAM RAMPRATAP MILLS versus RADHEYSHYAM S/O LAXMINARAYAN GOENKA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. on 20 August 2018
SAVATRAM RAMPRATAP MILLS
v.
RADHEYSHYAM S/O LAXMINARAYAN GOENKA (D) THR.LRS. & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 751 of 2008)
AUGUST 20, 2018
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE ANDSANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act,1971: s.3(b) – Public Premises situated at Akola – Notice issuedunder the Act to attend proceedings at Mumbai – Whether theproceedings in relation to such public premises can be initiated underthe Act at Mumbai or it has to be initiated at Akola – Held: TheEstate Officer has to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to the publicpremises falling in the local limits in the notification – In the instantcase, the proceedings in relation to such public premises could onlybe initiated at Akola, that being the area falling in the local limitsspecified in the notification for exercise of powers byEstate Officer.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: Construing the expression “local limits withinwhich” occurring in Section 3(b) of the Act, the High Court rightlyheld that the Estate Officer has to exercise its jurisdiction inrelation to the public premises falling in the local limits specifiedin the notification. Since in this case, the notification in clear terms,specified that the Mill is situated at Akola, a fortiori, theproceedings in relation to such public premises under the Actcould only be initiated at Akola-that being the area falling in thelocal limits specified in the notification for exercise of powers bythe Estate Officer. The High Court was, therefore, right ininterpreting Section 3(b) of the Act and, in consequence, waslegally justified in quashing the notices impugned in the writpetition as being without jurisdiction. [Paras 15, 16] [932-E-G]
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ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 751 of
2008.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.01.2007 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Letters PatentAppeal No. 46 of 2004.
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WITH
C.A. Nos. 9700/2014 and 9704/2014
Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., D. M. Nargolkar, Ms. Sujata Kurdukar,Gagan Sanghi, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byCABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.
In Civil Appeal No. 751 of 2008
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1. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated16.01.2007 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of JudicatureDat Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in L.P.A. No.46 of 2004 wherebythe Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by theappellant herein and upheld the order dated 25.11.2003 passed by theSingle Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No.1795 of 2003 bywhich the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 herein was allowed andthe order passed by the Estate Officer of the National Textile CorporationELtd. (respondent No.2 herein) was set aside.
2. Few facts need to be mentioned infra for disposal of the appeal,which involves a short question.
3. The appellant was originally a privately owned Companysituated at Akola (Maharashtra). It was engaged in the business ofFmanufacture of cotton. This Mill was later taken over by the NationalTextile Corporation (Maharashtra) Ltd., which is a subsidiary of NTC-aGovernment of India Undertaking.
4. Since the appellant became the Government of IndiaUndertaking, the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of UnauthorizedGOccupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) becameapplicable to the appellant’s Mills.
5. On 25.06.1993 and 04.04.2003, the Estate Officer of theappellant issued the notices under Sections 4 and 7 (3) of the Act torespondent No.1’s predecessor, who was alleged to be in an unauthorized H
SAVATRAM RAMPRATAP MILLS v. RADHEYSHYAM S/OLAXMINARAYAN GOENKA (D) [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. ]
occupation of the appellant’s premises, and called upon him to vacatethe premises specified in the notices. He was, however, asked to attendthe proceedings, pursuant to the notices, at Mumbai.
6. Respondent No.1’s predecessor felt aggrieved by the issuanceof the notices, particularly, that part of the notices, which had directedhim to attend the proceedings at Mumbai, and filed a writ petition inHigh Court of Bombay at Nagpur questioning the legality and validity ofthe notices.
7. The challenge to the notices was essentially on the groundthat when the public premises in question is situated at Akola then theproceedings in relation to such public premises has to be held only atAkola rather than at Mumbai where no part of the cause of action hadarisen.
8. In other words, the contention was that when admittedly theentire cause of action to initiate the proceedings under the Act had arisenat Akola within the local limits specified in notification issued underSection 3 where the public premises in question is situated, the respondentNo.1’s predecessor cannot be asked to attend the proceedings at Mumbaiand the proceedings under the Act can only be validly initiated at Akolathat being within the local limits specified in the notification issued underSection 3 of the Act.
9. The Single Judge of the High Court accepted the ground raisedby the respondents herein (writ petitioners) and by his order dated25.11.2003 allowed the writ petition, in consequence, quashed theimpugned notices. It was held that the appellant would be free to initiatethe proceedings under the Act in relation to public premises in questionat Akola. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed Letters Patent Appealbefore the Division Bench.
10. By impugned order, the Division Bench upheld the order passedby the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal, which has given rise tofiling of the present appeal by way of special leave by the appellant-Mills in this Court.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusalof the record of the case, we are inclined to dismiss the appeal findingno merit therein.
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A12. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench in the impugnedorder rightly upheld the view taken by the Single Judge calling for nointerference in this appeal.
13. The short question, which arose for consideration before theHigh Court, was that when the public premises in question is situated atBAkola, whether the proceedings in relation to such public premises canbe initiated under the Act at Mumbai or it has to be initiated at Akola,that being the place falling in the local limits specified in the notificationissued under Section 3 of the Act for exercise of jurisdiction by theEstate Officer.
C14. Section 3(b) of the Act, which is relevant for this case, readsas under:
“3. Appointment of estate officers- The CentralGovernment may, by notification in the Official Gazette- (a)……………………………D
(b) define the local limits within which, or the categoriesof public premises in respect of which, the estate officersshall exercise the powers conferred, and perform theduties imposed, on estate officers by or under this Act.”
15. Construing the expression “local limits within which”Eoccurring in Section 3(b) of the Act, the High Court held and, in ouropinion, rightly that the Estate Officer has to exercise its jurisdiction inrelation to the public premises falling in the local limits specified in thenotification.
16. Since in this case, the notification (Annexure P-1), in clearFterms, specified that the Mill is situated at Akola [see Item 5(15)], afortiori, the proceedings in relation to such public premises under theAct could only be initiated at Akola-that being the area falling in the locallimits specified in the notification for exercise of powers by the EstateOfficer. The High Court was, therefore, right in interpreting SectionG3(b) of the Act and, in consequence, was legally justified in quashing thenotices impugned in the writ petition as being without jurisdiction.
17. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state that theappellant would be free to issue fresh notices to respondent No.1 underthe Act and initiate the proceedings for their eviction from the publicHpremises at Akola.
SAVATRAM RAMPRATAP MILLS v. RADHEYSHYAM S/OLAXMINARAYAN GOENKA (D) [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. ]
18. If the respondents are dispossessed on the strength of anyorder passed by the Estate Officer, the possession will remain with theappellant but it will be subject to final adjudication of the proceedingsonce initiated by the appellant.
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19. Let fresh notices be issued by the appellant within one monthfrom the date of this order to respondent No.1 or/and to any person(s),Bwho claim(s) to be in possession in relation to specified public premisesunder the Act.
20. The proceedings be held at Akola-that being the proper placefor deciding the proceedings under the Act, as specified in the notificationissued under Section 3 referred supra.
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21. The proceedings, once initiated, be completed expeditiouslystrictly in accordance with law.
22. With these directions, the appeal fails and is accordinglydismissed.
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In Civil Appeal Nos. 9700 & 9704 of 2014
In view of the above order passed in C.A. No.751 of 2008, theseappeals are also dismissed with the same directions.
Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed.
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