Supreme Court of India
SARDAR MEENA versus THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS. on 22 February 2022
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 2 S.C.R.
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SARDAR MEENA
v.
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 1558/2022)
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FEBRUARY 22, 2022
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M SUNDRESH, JJ.]
Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 – s.38(1) – Removal andSuspension of a member of Panchayati Raj Institution – FIR wasCregistered against the appellant-Sarpanch – Allegations thatappellant along with others committed the offence of house trespassand even started indiscriminate firing that has resulted in the injurieson several parts of the body of the complainant – High Court grantedbail to appellant – Preliminary enquiry initiated u/s.38(1) of theDRajasthan Panchayati Raj Act read with r.22(2) of the RajasthanPanchayati Raj Rules – Appellant suspended pending the enquiry– Held : The proceedings in the criminal case would not weigh atthe stage in determining the conduct of the appellant – Suspensionof the appellant cannot continue in ad infinitum manner when ithas not to await any criminal proceedings – Necessity to bring anEend to proceedings initiated u/s.38(1) of the Rajasthan PanchayatiRaj Act, 1994 at the earliest – It will be for the respondent(s) toestablish the charge against the appellant de hors the registrationof the FIR on the principles of such proceedings and not on theprinciples of criminal proceedings of proof beyond reasonableFdoubts – Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules – r.22(2).
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. The grant of bail is only as a result of investigationsbeing complete and if one takes the bail order as a reason for noGprima facie case, it would put the law on its head more. [Para4][117-A-B]
2. The own stand of the respondent is that the action isbased on the enquiry held by the concerned officer in pursuanceto the FIR. The sequiter would be that the proceedings in the H
criminal case would not weigh at the stage in determining theconduct of the appellant but would be dependent on the materialpresented before the competent authority against the appellant.The suspension can also not continue in an ad infinitum manner,more so, when it has not to await any criminal proceedings.[Para 11][118-E-F]
3. It is necessary to bring an end to the proceedings initiatedunder Section 38(1) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 atthe earliest and it is stated that the pleadings are complete. Thus,Respondent should conclude the proceedings on or before 30thApril, 2022 and it will be the bounden duty of the appellant tocooperate with those proceedings so as not to delay the same.The suspension order would continue to be operational till 30thApril, 2022 alone. It will be for the respondent(s) to establish thecharge against the appellant de hors the registration of the FIRon the principles of such proceedings and not on the principlesof criminal proceedings of proof beyond reasonable doubts [Paras12 and 13][118-G-H; 119-A]
Ajit Singh & Anr. v. Financial Commissioner andSecretary to Government and Anr., (2009) 16 SCC 308– held inapplicable.
Case Law Reference
(2009) 16 SCC 308Para 9held inapplicable CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1558of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.09.2021 of the High Courtof Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal(Writ) No.633 of 2021.
Shekhar Prit Jha, Sunil Kr. Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.
Amitabh Kumar Chaubey, AAG, Ketan Paul, Adv. for theRespondents.
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116SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2022] 2 S.C.R.
AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered bySANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
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1. Leave granted.
2. An FIR was registered on 12.05.2021 by the complainant RaviBKumar Meena against the appellant who is a Sarpanch of Gola ka Basalleging that the said Sarpanch along with 8-10 other associates, withthe intention of committing the offence of robbery, loot and murder cameon a vehicle in the night armed with weapons. They committed offenceof house trespass and with intention to cause fatal injury even startedindiscriminate firing. This has allegedly caused injuries on several partsCof the body of the complainant. On the registration of the FIR, the policestarted investigation and took the appellant into custody. The endeavourof the appellant to procure bail from the trial Court did not succeed butultimately the High Court granted bail. The charge sheet is stated tohave been filed post investigation and is awaiting the application of theDmind by the trial Court concerned on whether there is sufficient materialto frame charges.
3. The aforesaid proceedings resulted in the Development Officer,Panchayat Samiti, Rajgarh seeking information about the FIR and furthermaterials. Successive reports were sent by the police. The DevelopmentEOfficer wrote a letter on 24.05.2021 to the Chief Executive Officer,District Parishad, Alwar intimating the latest factual scenario. He in turnshared the findings of his enquiry along with factual reports receivedfrom the Police Station, Tahla with the Governing Secretary andCommissioner, Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department,Government of Rajasthan on 24.05.2021. A preliminary enquiry wasFinitiated under Section 38(1) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994read with Rule 22(2) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 and acharge sheet was issued on 16.06.2021. The appellant was suspendedon 16.06.2021 pending the enquiry.
4. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant in substanceGis that this is an endeavour by the opponent who lost the elections to theappellant as the complainant is the son of this opponent. He also seeksto rely on the bail order to show that there was no case found out againstthe appellant. We may note that the learned counsel for the respondent,on the other hand, has referred to the order of the trial Court refusingbail. We have dealt with this aspect at the inception because we doH
believe that this line of submission from either side is really not germaneto the controversy in question. We may add that the grant of bail is onlyas a result of investigations being complete and if we take the bail orderas a reason for no prima facie case, it would put the law on its headmore so, as we have been emphasizing that there is no reason to keeppeople in custody once investigation is complete unless there are heinousoffences and propensity of the accused to indulge in further crime orinfluence witnesses.
5. We now come to the meat of the matter which is Section 38which refers to the removal and suspension. We reproduce the relevantportion as under:
“38. Removal and Suspension.(1) The State Government may, byorder in writing and after giving him and opportunity of being heardand making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, removefrom office any member including a Chairperson or a DeputyChairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution, who- (a) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting as such; or (b) is guilty of misconduct in the discharge of duties or anydisgraceful conduct:
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(4) The State Government may suspend any member including aChairperson or a Deputy Chairperson of a Panchayati RajInstitution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under Sub-sec.(1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to anoffense involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of lawand such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any actor proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned whilebeing under such suspension.”
6. It is respondents’ own case that they had made their preliminaryinquiry not solely based on the police report (as set out in the counteraffidavit) and found out a prima facie case of “disgraceful conduct”.
7. The State Government has power to suspend a person in termsof Clause (4) of Section 38. The said provision has two limbs: a) againstwhom an inquiry had been initiated under Sub-Section (1) and; b) oragainst whom criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involvingmoral turpitude is pending trial in the Court of law.
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A8. It is the say of the respondent that the action is being takenagainst appellant under the first part of the said provision.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant sought to contend that areading of the order of suspension dated 16.06.2021 only refers to theinitiation of the criminal proceedings in pursuance to the FIR but then onBa bare reading of it, it does show that what is attributed for suspension isa conduct in terms of Clause (1). We may add that the suspension ordercannot be said to be the most happily worded one. It is in thesecircumstances that we find that the ratio of the judgment in Ajit Singh& Anr. v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Governmentand Anr.[1] - would not apply as in that case, the formation of opinion ofCthe Deputy Commissioner was found to be absent.
10. We do recognize an aspect of the submission of the learnedcounsel for the appellant that in cases of political rivalry, the processshould not be permitted to be misused, more so, as the principles ofservice jurisprudence would not apply, as there is no question of restitutionDto the aggrieved party post determination of his conduct as the periodfor which the Sarpanch had to act, will not be restored to him. It is thissubmission which has weighed with us in considering what would be theappropriate direction to be passed in the present case.
11. We, at the cost of repetition, emphasize that the own stand ofEthe respondent is that the action is based on the enquiry held by theconcerned officer in pursuance to the FIR. The sequiter would be thatthe proceedings in the criminal case would not weigh at this stage indetermining the conduct of the appellant but would be dependent on thematerial presented before the competent authority against the appellant.That being the position, the suspension can also not continue in an adFinfinitum manner, more so, when it has not to await any criminalproceedings.
12. We thus are of the view that it is necessary to bring an end tothe proceedings initiated under Section 38(1) of the said Act at the earliestand it is stated that the pleadings are complete. We are thus, of the viewGthat the respondent should conclude the proceedings on or before 30[th]April, 2022 and it will be the bounden duty of the appellant to cooperatewith those proceedings so as not to delay the same. The result would bethat the suspension order would continue to be operational till 30[th] April,2022 alone.
H1 (2009) 16 SCC 308
H1 (2009) 16 SCC 308
13. Needless to say that it will be for the respondent(s) to establishthe charge against the appellant de hors the registration of the FIR onthe principles of such proceedings and not on the principles of criminalproceedings of proof beyond reasonable doubts.
14. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms leaving partiesto bear their own costs.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose
Appeal disposed of.
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