Supreme Court of India

MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION versus MANISH BAKAWALE & ORS. on 17 December 2021

2021 INSC 914[2021] 9 S.C.R. 978

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 9 S.C.R.

AMADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

v.

MANISH BAKAWALE & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 7721 of 2021)

BDECEMBER 17, 2021

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDA. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]

M.P. State Civil Services Rules, 2015 – r.4(3)(c)(1),(2) –Appellant issued advertisement inviting applications for StateCService Examination for various posts in different departments –Respondent no.1 (SC category candidate) gave his order ofpreference as- Deputy District Collector, Deputy Superintendent ofPolice (DSP) and Chief Municipal Officer (CMO) – 892 marksobtained by the respondent no.1 were not sufficient for the post ofDhis first preference – Considered for the post of DSP, his secondpreference – However, was found ineligible as he did not meet theadditional eligibility criteria of minimum physical measurement forthe said post – Respondent no.1 filed writ petition claiming that acandidate belonging to SC category who had also secured 892marks was appointed to the post of CMO, thus he is also entitled toEbe appointed to the post of CMO – Allowed by Single Judge –Affirmed by Division Bench – Held: Advertisement indicated therequirement of the Rule that a candidate who had preferred thehigher of the posts advertised would be selected against such postdepending on the merit – Clause (2) of sub-rule (3) clarifies that ifFa candidate is selected in the main list on the basis of the higherpriority of the post given by him in the preference sheet, he will notbe considered for the remaining post indicated therein – Rule is notunder challenge – Apart from indicating that his second preferenceis the post of DSP, respondent no.1 also signed a declaration –Declaration was explicit that the choice of preference to the postGwas made by him since according to him he fulfilled the prescribedeligibility criteria, including physical measurement– Respondent no.1who made declaration about the correctness of his eligibility andwas included in the main list for the said post, has to blame himselfif found ineligible since his height was admittedly 162 cms whichwas within his knowledge – He ought not to have exercised theH

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preference – But having acted so at that stage, if respondent no.1’srequest for appointment to the next preferred post is accepted, itwill displace a candidate who having made a truthful declarationindicated the appropriate preference, and is selected and placed inthe main list – Writ petition dismissed – Service Law.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD 1.1 Though several posts were advertised andthe applications were sought from the eligible candidates, thepreliminary and written examination was common and the marksas obtained in the said examination was taken into considerationto include the candidates based on merit to the post for whichthe candidate concerned had given his preference. Theadvertisement had indicated the requirement of the Rule that acandidate who had preferred the higher of the posts which hasbeen advertised would be selected against such post dependingon the merit in the examination. To that extent Rule 4(3)(c)(2) ofRules 2015 is clear and specific that the category-wiserecommendation of the candidates will be made according to themarks obtained by them and the preference sheet submitted bythe candidate. Clause (2) of Sub-Rule (3) further clarifies that if acandidate is selected in the main list on the basis of the higherpriority of the post given by him in the preference sheet, thecandidate will not be considered for the remaining post indicatedin the preference sheet. [Para 14][988-B-E]

1.2 The additional eligibility criteria for the post of DSPwhich had been clearly depicted in the advertisement calling forapplications was within the knowledge of respondent No.1. Theminimum height prescribed for the said post was 168 cms. Theapplication submitted by the respondent No.1 apart from indicatingthat his second preference is to the post of Deputy Superintendentof Police, he had further signed in acknowledgment of thedeclaration made in the application declaring that all theinformation given by him are true and correct and that it is withinhis knowledge that in the event of furnishing incorrect and falseinformation, proceedings can be initiated against him. It is furtherdeclared that the choice for the posts which have been given byhim, he has fulfilled all the prescribed eligibility i.e. age limit,educational qualifications, experience, physical measurement etc.

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Afor those posts. It is also indicated that if he was found ineligibleat any stage of selection, his candidature can be cancelled. Thedeclaration is explicit that the choice of preference to the posthas been made by him since according to him he has fulfilled theprescribed eligibility criteria, including physical measurement.If that be the position, the positive declaration made by theBrespondent No.1 is that he satisfies the minimum eligibility of168 cms. height required for the post he has preferred which isthe higher post than the next preference. In such event, theauthority concerned on perusal of the application wouldpresuppose that such physical eligibility criteria is possessed byCthe candidate concerned and he therefore has made his choicefor the post. In such event if the marks required for the said postis obtained by the candidate, he would be included in the mainselection list. Though, the appointment is a subsequent act whichwould take place on verifying the details and the candidate beingfound to be eligible, the right of a candidate for selection willDstand exhausted once he is in the main list as per the Rule. Clause(c)(2) of the Rule4 (3) concerned employs the phrase “selectedin the main list” and “not appointed to the post”. [Para 16][989-A-G]

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1.3 The selection for all the posts in the instant case wereEthrough a single advertisement and common examination. Theselection process conducted by the appellant for the benefit ofthe departments under the government was not one post afterthe other on completing the entire process to the higher post.Since, a common examination was held and the common meritFlist was prepared, the adjustment of the candidates were basedon their preference according to their order in the merit list. Therespondent No.1 having declared that he possessed the physicaleligibility for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police andsince he had obtained the requisite marks he was selected and placed in the main selection list. It is true as indicated from theGrecords that another Scheduled Caste candidates who hadsecured 892 marks had been given the post of CMO as per thepreference indicated by him. When such is the process of selection,if the respondent No.1 who had made declaration about thecorrectness of his eligibility and secured the selection to be placedH

in the main list for the said post, he has to blame himself if foundineligible since his height was admittedly 162 cms. which was infact within his knowledge. He ought not to have exercised thepreference. But having acted so at that stage, if he seeksappointment to the next preferred post and such request isaccepted, it will result in displacing a candidate who having madea truthful declaration had indicated the appropriate preference,who is selected and placed in the main list. Therefore, in suchcircumstance, if any interference is made in the process ofselection, apart from the fact that it could interfere with theadministrative process would also cause hardship to thecandidates who have already been appointed and are not beforethis Court. In the present facts and circumstances, the Ruleconcerned provides for a definite process, which was also depictedin the advertisement calling for applications. The Rule is not underchallenge. The order dated 03.01.2019 and 08.11.2019 are setaside. The writ petition is dismissed. [Paras 19, 20][991-B-H;992-A]

R.L. Arora vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1964SC 1230, Surjit vs. Mahanagar Telephone NigamLimited 2009 16 SCC 722 : [2008] 6 SCR 683; Unionof India and Ors.vs. Major General Madan Lal Yadav(Retd.) (1996) 4 SCC 127 : [1996] 3 SCR 785; D.G.Dalal vs. State of Gujarat (2002) 2GLR 1011 – heldinapplicable.

Case Law Reference

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[2008] 6 SCR 683held inapplicablePara 17[1996] 3 SCR 785held inapplicablePara 17

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.7721of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.11.2019 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in W.A. No.474 of 2019.

Dr. Harsh Pathak, Ms. Shaveta Mahajan, Mohit Choubey,Siddhartha Shukla, Advs. for the Appellant.

Pawan Reley, Ankit Mishra, Akshay Lodhi, Sajal Awasthi, MohanSingh, Ankit Chaudhary, Ms. Vishakha Deshwal, Ms. Lara Siddiqui, ArunSingh, Vinod Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

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[2021] 9 S.C.R.

AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. S. BOPANNA, J.

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1. The appellant-Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission isassailing the order dated 08.11.2019 passed by the High Court of MadhyaPradesh in W.A. No.474 of 2019. Through the said order the learnedBDivision Bench of the High Court has dismissed the intra-court appealfiled by the appellant herein. In doing so, the learned Division Bench hasaffirmed the order dated 03.01.2019 passed by the learned Single Judgeof that Court in W.P. No.20855 of 2017. The learned Single Judge, hadthereby allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents in the writCpetition, which included the appellant herein to consider the case ofrespondent No.1 herein for appointment on the post of the Chief MunicipalOfficer (‘CMO’ for short) Grade-Kh, Assistant Director or any otherpost mentioned by the respondent No.1 in his preference letter.

2. The facts in a nutshell are that the appellant issued anDadvertisement No.2 dated 17.03.2016 inviting online application fromeligible candidates for the State Service Examination 2016 for the variouscategory of posts under the State of Madhya Pradesh in differentdepartments. The advertisement was exhaustive providing detailedinformation and it clearly indicated the eligibility criteria. The last datefor submitting the application was shown as 14.04.2016 and the preliminaryEexamination was scheduled to be held on 29.05.2016. The educationalqualification and other criteria were the same for all the posts advertisedexcept the age limit being different as specified. That apart, for theposts of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Assistant Jail Superintendentand Deputy Transport Inspector, specific Physical Measurement wasFindicated as the minimum eligibility criteria. Therefore, the candidatessatisfying the eligibility criteria could choose their order of preference tothe various posts that were advertised.

3. The respondent No.1 submitted his application and had shownhis order of preference. The second preference shown was for the postGof Deputy Superintendent of Police, which could have been opted by acandidate if the candidate satisfied the minimum required physicalmeasurement. Pursuant to such applications, the preliminary examinationand the written examination was conducted. The respondent who hadapplied under the Scheduled Caste (‘SC’ for short) category had secured892 marks out of 1575 marks. The marks obtained by the respondentH

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No.1 was not sufficient in the order of merit to be selected for the postas per his first preference, namely Deputy District Collector. However,the marks secured was sufficient to be placed in the merit list for thepost of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Accordingly, the respondentNo.1 was included in the main list for the post of Deputy Superintendentof Police by the appellant. In compliance with the remaining formalitiesfor appointment the respondent No.1 appeared before the Medical Boardwhen it was found that his height was only 162 cms. as against theprescribed minimum height of 168 cms. The respondent No.1 wastherefore not eligible to be appointed to the post of Deputy Superintendentof Police.

4. It is in the above backdrop the respondent No.1 approachedthe High Court since as per the appointment made to the other posts itrevealed that a schedule caste candidate who had secured 892 markswas appointed to the post of CMO. The respondent No.1 having shownhis subsequent preference for CMO in his application form claimed thatin such event he having obtained 892 marks was entitled to be appointedin the post of CMO. The learned Single Judge having accepted suchcontention had allowed the writ petition and directed consideration. Thelearned Division Bench approved the same. It is in that circumstancethe appellant, which is the authority saddled with the responsibility ofundertaking the selection process is before this Court in this appeal.

5. We have heard Dr. Harsh Pathak, learned counsel for theappellant, Mr. Pawan Reley, learned counsel for the contesting respondentand perused the appeal papers.

6. At the outset, a perusal of the order passed by the learnedDivision Bench would indicate that it has merely taken note of theconsideration made by the learned Single Judge by extracting the orderpassed in the writ proceedings before affirming the same. In that light,on adverting to the order passed by the learned Single Judge it wouldreveal that the learned Judge on taking note of Rule 4(3)(c)(2) of M.P.State Civil Services Rules, 2015 has arrived at the conclusion that theRule is clear that if the candidate is selected in the main list, then he/shewill not be considered for the remaining post of preference made.However, the learned Single Judge has thereafter arrived at the conclusionthat though the respondent No.1 was selected in the main list on thebasis of the higher priority of post, he could not be appointed on the said AB

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Apost as he had not qualified on the benchmark regarding his height andas such he should be considered in the next preferred post.

7. Dr. Harsh Pathak, learned counsel for the appellant whileassailing such conclusion reached by the High Court has made detailedreference to the Rules, more particularly Rule 4(3)(c)(1) and (2) of theBRules. It would be appropriate to take note of Rule 4(3)(c)(1) and (2)which read as hereunder: - “Category wise recommendation of the candidates, for any specificservice/post will be made according to the marks obtained bythem and preference sheet (if any) submitted by them.

CIf a candidate is selected in the main list on the basis of thehigher priority of post given by him in the preference sheet,he/she will not be considered for the remaining post(s) ofpreference sheet.”

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8. In that light, the learned counsel has also referred to theDadvertisement which contains the details of the requirement and thequalification for the post. Since the respondent No.1 had indicated hissecond preference to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police andthe issue presently is with regard to the wrong preference made by himand in that light, the claim for next preference to the post of CMO, theErequirement of the physical measurement for the post of DeputySuperintendent of Police explicitly stated in the advertisement needs tobe noted, which is as hereunder: - Physical Measurement:

The physical measurement prescribed for the posts of DeputyFSuperintendent of Police, Assistant Jail Superintendent and DeputyTransport Inspector are as under:

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9. In that background reference is made to the applicationsubmitted by the respondent No.1(Annexure P2) wherein the order ofpreference is given. The preference for Deputy Superintendent of Policeis at No.2 while the preference for the post of CMO is at No.16, but thefact remains that the preferences are indicated. However, what isrelevant to be noted is the declaration which is required to be made bythe candidate in the application, which reads as hereunder: - B

“DECLARATION

*I, hereby declare that all the aforesaid information given byme are true and correct to the best of my belief, and nothingCmaterial is concealed. It is well within my knowledge thatin the event of furnishing of incorrect and false informationthe criminal proceedings can be initiated against me. Alongwith this the benefits received and granted by theCommission can be declared null and void at any stage/time.D

*I had read over and understood the instructions ofCommission word to word and I hereby undertake tocomply the same.

*I also hereby declare that the choice for which postshave been given by me, I fulfilled all the prescribedeligibility i.e. age limit, educational qualification,experience, physical measurement etc. for thoseposts.

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*On being found ineligible at any stage of selection,before selection or thereafter my candidature can becancelled at any time for which I will be solelyresponsible.

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10. The learned counsel has also referred to the online precedence/priority form with reference to the instructions contained therein concerningto eligibility and the warning, to which the applicant i.e., respondent No.1herein has declared as having understood all the stipulations and hasundertaken to abide by the same. The relevant instructions and thewarning, as also the undertaking read as hereunder:- G

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A“INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TO ELIGIBILITY:

•It may be ensured at the time of filling of precedence/priorityform the priority for which posts have been given thecandidate is having all the eligibility criteria for those posts.

•While giving preference for the uniform posts, applicantBshould ensure that he fulfils all the terms and conditions ofphysical criteria’s.

WARNING:

•If the precedence/priority form is submitted for the selectionof uniform post by the candidate/applicant then the applicantChis/her own may ensure that he/she is fulfilling all the termsprescribed for age limit, educational qualification andprescribed physical measurement for the advertised postsapplied by him/her. If any error/mistake in the informationprovided by the applicant shall be found then the Commissionshall be having the right to cancel the candidature becauseDof submitting erroneous information the candidate/eligibilityof such candidate/applicant prior to selection or thereafterat any stage can be cancelled for which the applicant shallbe solely responsible for the same.

•On furnishing/submitting erroneous information by theEcandidate/applicant, it will be considered as grave error andon being found erroneous selection of applicant the samecan be cancelled for which the applicant himself/herselfshall be responsible.

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I, Agree – I hereby declare that, I have read and understood allFthe stipulations given in the advertisement, corrigendum’s andhereby undertake to abide by them.

Sd/- IllegibleManish Bakawale02.06.2017"

G11. In that view, it is contended that the respondent No.1 havingunderstood the instructions and also having taken note of the eligibilityand requirements has indicated his second preference to the post ofDeputy Superintendent of Police. Such preference exercised would beto the effect that the respondent No.1 satisfies the eligibility requirementof physical measurement as declared by him and has therefore optedH

for the said post. In that background, the appellant while taking note ofthe preference and the marks obtained in the examination had includedhis name in the main list as the candidate who had obtained 892 marks inthe order of merit was eligible to be considered under the schedule castecategory for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police. On suchinclusion in the main list, the candidate; in this case the respondent No.1would stand excluded from further consideration for any other post evenif shown as next preference.

12. Thereafter, the remaining candidates would be considered forthe post that they have preferred based on the eligibility criteria and themarks obtained by such candidates. In that manner the list would befinalised simultaneously for all the different posts advertised in thedifferent departments. From such list, on verification of the testimonialsand the relevant criteria which is the eligibility for the post would betaken note and the appointment orders will be issued. In that circumstancewhen the respondent No.1 had preferred the post of DeputySuperintendent of Police and had secured the marks required but wasfound ineligible to be appointed in that post cannot thereafter turn aroundto seek appointment in the next preferred post when already the personseligible are considered for such post and the main list is finalised. In suchcircumstance, it is contended that the order passed by the High Court isnot sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside.

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13. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other handcontended that the Rule cannot be taken note in such narrow perspective.Though the physical requirement is indicated, the Rule 9 providesregarding the physical fitness. It is contended that the physical criteriacannot be a bar merely because at the time of medical examination thebenchmark is not reached. It is contended that there is a likelihood thatthe chest measurement could be as per requirement at the time ofapplication and therefore the preference would be indicated in suchmanner. Subsequently if there is a change in the physical measurement,the same should not be treated as a bar. In that view, it is contended thatthe rule 4(3)(c)(2) which has been referred ought not to be interpretednarrowly. In that light, the learned counsel for the respondent sought tojustify the order passed by the High Court by contending that the learnedSingle Judge having noted the Rule and on taking note that the respondentNo.1 although selected in the main list for the higher post for whichpreference was given, he could not be appointed as he had not obtained A

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Athe benchmark regarding his choice and in that view has to be consideredfor the next preferred post. It is in that circumstance, the learned SingleJudge held that the Rule would not be applicable in the present case.The learned counsel has further relied on the precedents to contend thatthe Rule is to be interpreted in a beneficial manner and not in a literalsense.B

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14. From the facts narrated above and the contentions put-forthby the learned counsel for the parties, it is evident that though severalposts were advertised and the applications were sought from the eligiblecandidates, the preliminary and written examination was common andthe marks as obtained in the said examination was taken into considerationCto include the candidates based on merit to the post for which thecandidate concerned had given his preference. The advertisement hadindicated the requirement of the Rule that a candidate who had preferredthe higher of the posts which has been advertised would be selectedagainst such post depending on the merit in the examination. To thatDextent Rule 4(3)(c)(2) of Rules 2015 noted above is clear and specificthat the category-wise recommendation of the candidates will be madeaccording to the marks obtained by them and the preference sheetsubmitted by the candidate. Clause (2) of Sub-Rule (3) further clarifiesthat if a candidate is selected in the main list on the basis of the higherpriority of the post given by him in the preference sheet, the candidateEwill not be considered for the remaining post indicated in the preferencesheet.

15. In the instant case, the fact that the respondent No.1 hadgiven his preference to the post of Deputy District Collector, DeputySuperintendent of Police and thereafter to the other posts including CMOFin that order of preference is not in dispute. The further fact that therespondent No.1 had secured 892 marks out of 1575 marks is the commoncase of the parties. Though the respondent No.1 had given firstpreference to the post of Deputy District Collector, the marks obtainedby him was not sufficient to be included in the main list based on meritGfor that post. In that light, the second preference given by respondentNo.1 to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police was taken intoconsideration. For the said post eight vacancies had been notified asreserved for the Scheduled Castes candidates. In that view, the said 892marks obtained by respondent No.1 was sufficient to accept thepreference and include the name of the respondent No.1 in the main listHfor the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police.

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16. While taking note of this position, what is also to be kept inview is the additional eligibility criteria for the said post which had beenclearly depicted in the advertisement calling for applications and waswithin the knowledge of respondent No.1. Clause 9 thereof, which hasbeen extracted and taken note supra in the course of this order indicatesthat the minimum height prescribed for the said post was 168 cms. Theapplication submitted by the respondent No.1 apart from indicating thathis second preference is to the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police,he had further signed in acknowledgment of the declaration made in theapplication which has also been extracted above in the course of thisorder. The same would indicate that a declaration is made to the effectthat all the information given by him are true and correct and that it iswithin his knowledge that in the event of furnishing incorrect and falseinformation, proceedings can be initiated against him. It is further declaredthat the choice for the posts which have been given by him, he hasfulfilled all the prescribed eligibility i.e. age limit, educational qualifications,experience, physical measurement etc. for those posts. It is alsoindicated that if he was found ineligible at any stage of selection, hiscandidature can be cancelled. The declaration is explicit that the choiceof preference to the post has been made by him since according to himhe has fulfilled the prescribed eligibility criteria, including physicalmeasurement. If that be the position, the positive declaration made bythe respondent No.1 is that he satisfies the minimum eligibility of 168cms. height required for the post he has preferred which is the higherpost than the next preference. In such event, the authority concerned onperusal of the application would presuppose that such physical eligibilitycriteria is possessed by the candidate concerned and he therefore hasmade his choice for the post. In such event if the marks required for thesaid post is obtained by the candidate, he would be included in the mainselection list. Though, the appointment is a subsequent act which wouldtake place on verifying the details and the candidate being found to beeligible, the right of a candidate for selection will stand exhausted oncehe is in the main list as per the Rule. While taking note of this aspect,what is to be kept in view is that Clause (c)(2) of the Rule4 (3) concernedemploys the phrase “selected in the main list” and “not appointed to thepost”.

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17. The precedents relied on by the learned counsel for respondentNo.1 may now be noted. In R.L. Arora vs. State of Uttar Pradesh andOrs. AIR 1964 SC 1230, the question arose relating to the new clause A

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Aincluded in Section 40(1) relating to acquisition of property for thecompany and in that context while considering the same it has beenobserved by this Court that literal interpretation is not always the onlyinterpretation of a provision in a statute. In Surjit vs. MahanagarTelephone Nigam Limited 2009 16 SCC 722, the issue consideredwas with regard to the scope and extent of Rule 443 and 2 (pp) of theBTelegraph Rules to consider where the telephone standing in the nameof one spouse could be dis-connected for non-payment of the bill by theother. In those circumstances, it was observed that in order to interpreta statute one has to consider the context in which it has been made andthe purpose and object it seeks to achieve. In Union of India and Ors.vs.CMajor General Madan Lal Yadav(Retd.) (1996) 4 SCC 127, the issuerelates to the provisions under the Army Act. The claim put-forth by theOfficer was taken into consideration. The observation contained therein,relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 herein to theeffect that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain the favourable interpretation of law stated in the said decision, in fact wouldDgo against the respondent No.1 himself.

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18. None of the referred decisions would be of assistance torespondent No.1 though on the principle of law laid down in the saiddecisions there can be no quarrel whatsoever. The learned counsel forrespondent No.1 has also placed before us the decision of the GujaratEHigh Court in the case relating to recruitment process which wasconsidered in D.G. Dalal vs. State of Gujarat (2002) 2GLR 1011. No-doubt in the said case, Rule 9 of Rules 1969 which was consideredtherein provided with regard to single application for all posts and indicationof the preference to be provided as in the present case, but the questionFarose therein since the posts had fallen vacant. The issue therein waswith regard to the appointments being made on merit, based on preferenceand also a waiting list being maintained against such posts. Since, certaincandidates selected for the higher posts had not reported, vacancy hadarisen and to such vacant posts the candidates in the waiting list were considered. In that view, a grievance was raised by the candidates whoGwere selected for the second preferred posts since they had higher meritthan the persons who were in the waiting list for the higher post whichhad not been given to them at the first instance as there was no vacancyand the next post based on preference was given. It is in thatcircumstances where the vacancies had arisen, the Rule had beenHconsidered to indicate the manner in which the Rule is to be operated. In fact, the Rule was under challenge in that case. It has no application tothe facts herein so as to persuade us to accept the same in the presentmatter.

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19. As noted, the selection for all the posts in the instant casewere through a single advertisement and common examination. Theselection process conducted by the appellant for the benefit of thedepartments under the government was not one post after the other oncompleting the entire process to the higher post. Since, a commonexamination was held and the common merit list was prepared, theadjustment of the candidates were based on their preference accordingto their order in the merit list. The respondent No.1 having declared thathe possessed the physical eligibility for the post of Deputy Superintendentof Police and since he had obtained the requisite marks he was selectedand placed in the main selection list. It is true as indicated from therecords that another Scheduled Caste candidates who had secured 892marks had been given the post of CMO as per the preference indicatedby him. When such is the process of selection, if the respondent No.1who had made declaration about the correctness of his eligibility andsecured the selection to be placed in the main list for the said post, hehas to blame himself if found ineligible since his height was admittedly162 cms. which was in fact within his knowledge. He ought not to haveexercised the preference. But having acted so at that stage, if he seeksappointment to the next preferred post and such request is accepted, itwill result in displacing a candidate who having made a truthful declarationhad indicated the appropriate preference, who is selected and placed inthe main list. Therefore, in such circumstance, if any interference ismade in the process of selection, apart from the fact that it could interferewith the administrative process would also cause hardship to thecandidates who have already been appointed and are not before thisCourt. In the present facts and circumstances, the Rule concernedprovides for a definite process, which was also depicted in theadvertisement calling for applications. The Rule is not under challenge.The candidate concerned had applied without demur and also furnisheda declaration with regard to correctness of details provided. He cannotthereafter turn around to seek alteration of the position to the detrimentof others.

20. In that view, the High Court was not justified in its conclusion.We accordingly, set aside the order dated 03.01.2019 passed in W.P.

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992SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANo.20855/2017 and the order dated 08.11.2019 passed in W.A. No.474/2019. Consequently, the Writ Petition in W.P. No.20855/2017 before theHigh Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore stands dismissed.

21. The above appeal, is accordingly, allowed with no order as tocosts.

B22. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Divya Pandey

Appeal allowed.

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