STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR. versus JAGGU & ORS. ETC. on 5 July 2019

[2019] 9 S.C.R. 65

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.

v.

JAGGU & ORS. ETC.

(Civil Appeal No. 8094 of 2011)

JULY 05, 2019

[A.M. KHANWILKAR AND AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – ss.2(e), 2(i), 3, 7, 8 and 20(1) –Scheme of the Act – Tripartite memorandum of settlement signed bythe appellant, contractor (through whom the service of the contractlabour was engaged) and the respondents-contract labour, underwhich the contract labour was to be paid Rs.11.65/- per day overand above the minimum wages notified by the appropriateGovernment under the 1948 Act – Prohibition notification dated17th March, 1993 issued by the appropriate Government, however,contract labour engaged prior to the notification was allowed tocontinue working in the captive mine of the appellant in Distt.Jabalpur upto April 1996, when their service was terminated afterthey proceeded on strike – No fresh agreement in the interregnumperiod (17[th] March, 1993 to April, 1996) was executed – Contractlabour sought parity with the wages payable to the direct/regularemployees of the appellant – Allowed by the Prescribed Authority –Confirmed by the High Court – Held: There are no pleadings onrecord and the burden was on the respondents to establish that theduties discharged by each of the employee was same/similar to thatof regular/direct employee appointed by the appellant – In absenceof the initial burden being discharged by the respondents, the onuscould not have been shifted on the appellant to counter the natureof work discharged by each of the workmen – Scheme of the Actclearly manifests that it is primarily concerned with fixing rates ofminimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment of work on a dayof rest and is not intended to be an Act for enforcement of paymentof wages for which provision has been made in other laws such asthe 1936 Act and the 1947 Act– Further, after issuance of theprohibition notification, the provisions of the CLRA Act or 1971Rules framed thereunder would not be available to either of theparty to strengthen its claim – Minimum wages as prayed by the

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Arespondents could be claimed independently under the 1948 Act,which indisputedly was Rs. 11.65/- per day over the minimum wagespayable to each of the respondent (2040 employees) and was indeedcomplied with by the appellants – Mere assertion of fact that thecontract labour which was allowed to continue after the prohibitionnotification was performing same or similar kind of work is notBsufficient to endorse their entitlement of claiming wages notifiedfor direct/regular employees of the establishment applicableuniversally to all the steel industries – Order of the prescribedauthority, confirmed by the High Court, set aside – Contract Labour(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – ss.7-9, 10(1), 12– PaymentCof Wages Act,1936 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – CLRA CentralRules, 1971 – rr.25(2)(iv) & (v), 25(2)(v)(a) – Constitution of India– Arts. 12,14, 39(d) – Principle of equal pay for equal work.

Minimum Wages Act, 1948 – s.3 – Fixation of minimum wagesunder – Considerations for – Discussed.DMinimum Wages Act, 1948 – Enquiry under – Scope of –Discussed.

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – ss.7-9, 10(1), 12 – Held: 1970 Act is a complete code in itself and regulatethe employment of contract labour in certain establishments andEprovide for its abolition in certain circumstances and for mattersconnected therewith – Act does not provide for total abolition ofthe contract labour, but only for its abolition in certaincircumstances, and to regulate the employment of contract labourin the establishments registered u/s.7 and working through theFcontractors holding licence u/s.12.

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules,1971– r.25 – When not applicable – Discussed.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

HELD: 1.1 There are no pleadings on record and primarilyGthe burden was on the respondent applicants to establish thatthe duties discharged by each of the employee was same or similarto that of a regular/direct employee appointed/employed by theestablishment and this can be discerned from the facts pleadedin the application filed by one Jaggu of which a reference hasH

been made. In absence of the initial burden being discharged inthe first instance by the respondent employees, the onus couldnot have been shifted upon the appellant SAIL to counter thenature of work discharged by each of the workmen as to whetherit was the same or similar to that of a permanent/regular employeeof the establishment and how far the principles of equal pay forequal work claimed as enshrined under Article 14 and 39(d) ofthe Constitution of India would be attracted in the facts of thecase. The objects and reasons of the scheme of the Act clearlymanifests that the main object of the Act is to provide minimumrates of wages for certain scheduled employment and alsoprovides for fixation and revision of minimum wages of theworkers, overtime rates, remuneration for the work done on aday of rest, just to ensure that the employee has enough toprovide to his family and to ensure a decent living standard thatpertains to a social comfort of the employee and the cost of livingindex. The procedure for fixing and revising minimum rate ofwages, which has to be prescribed, is supported by therecommendation of Advisory Committees/Advisory Board/Central Advisory Board being constituted under Sections 7 and8 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and the appropriateGovernment on its acceptance notified the minimum wages whichare payable to the category of employees referred to under Section2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Indisputedly, in the firstplace, the minimum wages which were notified by the appropriateGovernment from time to time under tripartite memorandum ofagreement dated 12[th] November, 1991, signed by the appellantSAIL and the respondents before the Assistant LabourCommissioner(Central), Jabalpur effective from 1[st] April, 1991,it was agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs. 11.65/-per day over and above the notified minimum wages with effectfrom 1[st] April, 1991 which has been indisputedly paid by theappellant SAIL till the employees were allowed to work in theestablishment i.e. April, 1996 when their services came to beterminated by the contractor. [Paras 30-32] [83-A-H]

1.2 The scheme of the Act clearly manifests that the Act isprimarily concerned with fixing rates of minimum wages, overtimerates, rate for payment of work on a day of rest and is not really ABCDEFG

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Aintended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages forwhich provision has been made in other laws such as the Paymentof Wages Act, 1936 and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is primarily enacted toresolve disputes about the rates of wages, rates of payment ofwork done on days of rest and overtime rates and to ensure thatBthe rates of wages which are notified by the appropriateGovernment for various categories of employees under theMinimum Wages Act are to be strictly complied with by theemployer in making payments and if any payment is made at therates lower than the minimum rates of wages prescribed by theCappropriate Government, the remedy has been provided to theworkmen/employee to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act and beinga self-contained Code and a beneficial legislation, it is a socialprotection to ensure and secure adequate living wage in theinterest of public and looking to the nature of enquiry postulatedunder the scheme of Minimum Wages Act, 1948, there appearsDno scope of enquiry to examine the principles of equal pay forequal work which is a dispute to be determined by a adjudicatorymechanism provided under the law. It was not the case of therespondent employees(2040 in number) that the minimum ratesof wages which were notified by the appropriate Government fromEtime to time or as agreed between the parties under the MinimumWages Act, 1948 have not been paid. But their claim in theapplication under Section 20(1) of the Act, was that, once theyhave been allowed to work after the prohibition notification dated17[th] March, 1993 has come into force, pursuant to which theirstatus as contract labour in the establishment ceasedFto operate as a result of contract of principal employerwith the contractor in regard to the contract labourhaving been statutorily extinguished, their relationship stoodautomatically converted into the employer (i.e., SAIL in the instantcase) and the employee (i.e. contract labour) making them entitledGfor wages which are notified by the NJCS as per the memorandumof agreement which is payable to direct/regular employees ofSAIL. [Paras 34-35] [87-G-H; 88-A-F]

1.3 The submission is misplaced for the reason that theContract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 is a H

complete code in itself and regulate the employment of contractlabour in certain establishments and provide for its abolition incertain circumstances and for matters connected therewith. Thetitle of the Act itself indicates that the Act does not provide fortotal abolition of the contract labour, but only for its abolition incertain circumstances, and to regulate the employment of contractlabour in the establishments which are registered under Section7 and working through the contractors who are holding licenceunder Section 12 of the Act. In the instant case, the establishmentwas duly registered under Section 7 of the Act and the contractorthrough whom the contract labour was engaged was holding itslicence under Section 12 of the Act but in the changedcircumstances, the appropriate Government took a decision toput a prohibition in making employment of contract labour inscheduled employment for various reasons which is not a subjectmatter of enquiry in the instant case and in consequence of theprohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993 published underSection 10(1) of the CLRA Act, the contract labour working inthe establishment ceased to function and the contract betweenthe principal employer and contractor stands extinguished. Tomake it further clear, Rule 25 of the Rules, 1971 of which therewas an emphasis before the High Court, may not come to therescue of the respondent employees for the reason that it was anobligation upon the contractor who are holding a licence underSection 12 of the Act and as per the terms and conditions of thelicence granted under sub-rule (1) of Rule 25 or renewed underRule 29, to comply with certain conditions enumerated undersub-rule (2) of Rule 25 of the Rules 1971 which includes clause(iv) and (v) to be complied with by the contractor and, if at all,there is any breach of the conditions of licence, complaint can bemade to the prescribed authority and its consequences areimbedded under the Scheme of the CLRA Act, 1970. At the sametime, an obligation to provide amenities conferred by the Act tothe workers has been referred to under Chapter V of the CLRAAct and the primary responsibility is of a contractor that eachworker employed by him as contract labour has to be paid hisdue wages before the expiry of such period as may be prescribedwith an exception provided under Section 21(4) of the Act, in ABCD

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Acase the contractor fails to make payment of wages within theprescribed period or makes short payment, then the principalemployer shall be liable to make payment of wages in full or theunpaid balance due, as the case may be, to the contract labouremployed by the contractor and recover the amount so paid fromthe contractor under any of the methods prescribed by law.B[Paras 37-40] [89-F-H; 90-B-H]

1.4 In the instant case, after issuance of the prohibitionnotification dated 17[th] March, 1993 under Section 10(1) of theCLRA Act having being published, the provisions of the CLRAAct or CLRA Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder would notCbe available to either of the party to strengthen its claim. Minimumwages as prayed for in the application filed by respondents beforethe prescribed authority under Section 20(1) of the MinimumWages Act, 1948 could be claimed independently under theMinimum Wages Act, 1948 which indisputedly in the instant caseDwas Rs. 11.65/- per day over the minimum wages to be paid bythe appellant to each of the respondent (2040 employees) in termsof the agreement executed between the parties and that wasindeed complied with by the appellants in its true spirit. Forfixation of Minimum Wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948,

there are number of considerations which are to be kept in mindEby the committees while prescribing the minimum rate of wagespayable to the workmen of a different category. Under Section 3of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 the appropriate Governmentmay fix minimum wages for time work, minimum rate of wagesfor piece work, minimum wages in respect of overtime workFdefined under sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the Act and theamendment made in Section 3 of the Act also take note of differentclasses/categories of employees in such employment while thenotification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 came to bepublished by the appropriate Government. In the givencircumstances, a mere assertion of fact that the contract labourGwhich was allowed to continue after the prohibition notificationcame to be published dated 17[th] March, 1993 in the establishmentof the appellant SAIL performing same or similar kind of work inthe establishment of the principal employer is not sufficient toendorse their entitlement of claiming wages notified by the NJCSH

memorandum of agreement for direct/regular employees of theestablishment applicable universally to all the steel industries.[Paras 41-43] [91-A-H]

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1.5 In addition to it, in terms of reference made by theappropriate Government dated 27[th] January, 2003 read withCorrigendum dated 9[th] April, 2003 followed with 22[nd] February,2005, the CGIT framed various issues including issue nos. V &VI and answered it accordingly. The answer thereto has beenupheld in the independent proceedings. The order of theprescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 dated2[nd] December, 2003 and confirmed by the High Court areunsustainable and deserves to be set aside. [Paras 44-48][92-C, G-H; 93-A]

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Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The PresidingOfficer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others, Etc.(1969) 1 SCC 873 : [1970] 1 SCR 51 ; HindustanSteel Works Construction Ltd. v. Commissioner ofLabour and Ors. (1996) 10 SCC 599 : [1996] 5 Suppl.SCR 447 – relied on.

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BHEL Workers Association, Hardwar and Others v.Union of India and Others (1985) 1 SCC 630 : [1985]2 SCR 611 – distinguished.

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Air India Statutory Corporation and Others v. UnitedLabour Union and Others (1997) 9 SCC 377:[1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 579 ;Steel Authority of India Ltd.and Others v. National Union Waterfront Workers andOthers (2001) 7 SCC 1 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 343– referred to.

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Case Law Reference

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ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8094of 2011

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.12.2006 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.A. Nos. 34 and 83 of 2006

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Civil Appeal No. 8334 of 2011.

Ranjit Kumar, Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Advs., Sunil Kumar Jain, PunyaGarg, R. C. Srivastava, Abhishek Jain, Ms. Anusha Agarwal, Ms. SaumyaJay Karan Singh, Rishi Raj Sharma, Lalltaksh Joshi, T. G. NarayananCNair, Advs. for the Appellants.

Colin Gonsalves, Ms. Indira Nair, C. N. Sreekumar, Sr. Advs.,T. G. Narayanan Nair, Rajas Pohankar, M. T. George, Ramesh Babu M.R., Amit Sharma, Ms. Malavika B. Pillai, C. N. Sree Kumar,M. T. George, Ramesh Babu M. R., Advs. for the Respondents.

DThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by RASTOGI, J. 1. The present appeals arise from the proceedingsinitiated by the workers under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 who hadbeen in employment after issuance of the prohibition notification dated17[th] March 1993 under the Contract Labour(Regulation and Abolition)EAct, 1970(hereinafter being referred to as “CLRA Act”) upto April,1996 in the captive mine of the Steel Authority of India(hereinafter calledas “SAIL”) in Kuteshwar Limestone Mines(Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt.Jabalpur.

2. The indisputed facts which has come on record are that afterFissuance of the prohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993 by theappropriate Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act,1970 nofresh agreement, in the interregnum period (17[th] March, 1993 to April,1996) was executed between the appellant and the contract labour andthe agreement in existence was extended from time to time by thecompetent authority and the contract labour was allowed to continue onGthe same terms & conditions till their services were terminated by thecontractor after they had proceeded on strike in the month of April,1996.

3. The contract labours (2040 employees) of Kuteshwar limestonemines who had worked in the establishment of SAIL after issuance ofthe prohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993 filed their claimapplications in the year 1998 on different dates under Section 20(1) ofthe Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

4. Before we advert to the question raised in the instant appeals,it may be relevant to take the brief history of the matter for properappreciation. The erstwhile contract labourers(respondents herein)worked at the captive Limestone and Dolomite mines in the establishmentof the appellant SAIL initially filed writ petitions claiming regularisationwith back wages in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench ofthis Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation and OthersVs. United Labour Union and Others1 wherein it was held that onissuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRAAct, the logical and legitimate consequences would be that the erstwhilecontract labourer covered by the sweep of such abolition for the activitiesconcerned would be entitled to be treated as direct employee of theemployer on whose establishment they were earlier working and theywould be entitled to be treated as regular employees from the day onwhich the contract labour system in the establishment for the work whichthey were doing gets abolished. The aforesaid judgment of this Courtwas subsequently overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court inSteel Authority of India Ltd. and Others Vs. National Union2Waterfront Workers and Others.

5. The Single Judge of the High Court earlier allowed the writpetitions but the matter was finally remitted back to the High Court todecide as per the law laid down in the Constitution Bench judgment ofthis Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others(supra).

6. It is to be noted that the application filed by Jaggu was consideredto be the lead application which has been placed on record (AnnexureP-1 of the paper book) and the only fact stated by him in the applicationwas that the applicant was employed in the Captive Mine of the SAIL inKuteshwar Limestone Mines(Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur on 1[st]September, 1984 and was still in that employment at the time of filing ofan application and worked as a skilled workman and was working as 11997(9) SCC 377

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ASikor/Loader/Suitor/Rake Loader and that the employment of KuteshwarLimestone Mines is a scheduled employment within the meaning ofSection 2(e ) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and rates of wages ofthe workers of SAIL are governed by various settlements/agreementsentered into between the management and the Union which are legallybinding and are the wages to which employees of SAIL are entitled onBthe basis of contract of service, agreement and/or otherwise.

7. The extract pleadings of his application on the basis of whichhe claimed wages and other benefits payable to an employee vis-à-visthose who are regular employee employed in SAIL are as under:- “1.The applicant is employed in the Captive Mine of the SteelAuthority of India (hereinafter called as SAIL’) in KuteshwarLimestone Mines (Barhi), Gairtalai, Distt. Jabalpur from01.09.1984 and is still in employment. He is a skilled workmanand is working as Sikor/Loader/Suitor/Rake Loader.

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D6. The rates of wages of workers of Steel Authority of India aregoverned by various settlements/Agreements entered into betweenthe management and the Union which are legally binding and isthe wages to which employees of Steel Authority are entitled onthe basis of contract of services, agreement and or otherwise.The Applicant is entitled to wages and all other benefits as perEsettlement. The agreement also prohibit employment of contractlabour on job of permanent and perennial nature.

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7. The management/opponent has been reusing to make paymentto the employees as per wage agreement which is their minimumwages Sri Bachchan Nayak and other office bearers of theFApplicant’s Union repeatedly represented the matter of theAssistant Labour Commissioner, Chief Labour CommissionerSecretary, Ministry of Labour, Hon’ble Minister for Steel,Chairman, Steel Authority of India and even the Prime Minister,for payment of wages as regular employees. Because of the strongGand persistent opposition of one of the opponent, Minimum Wagesis denied to the Applicant.

12. The applicant has been reporting for work on all the workingdays from 17/3/1993 onwards. However, after May, 1996 he wasrefused work even when the reports for duty. The applicant was always ready and willing to work. There was no termination ofservices of the applicant. The applicant will be deemed to be inservice and entitled to all the benefits, including wages.

16. The applicant has not been paid the wages as per MinimumWages from 17/3/1993. The exact figures of amount due i.e.difference etc. are available with the management and within theirspecial knowledge. The opponents are in possession of all therecords and details of the payment due as per wage agreementand other details. They are liable to produce the same before thisHon’ble Authority to make appropriate and proper calculation. Incase they fail to produce the documents an adverse inference isliable to be taken against them.

17. The applicant therefore pray that a direction may be issuedunder Section 20 [3] of the Act for:

[i] payment of difference of wages payable under the MinimumWages Act and the wages actually paid as per details given inAnnexure-A.

[ii] compensation of 10 times amounting to Rs. 24,86,130-00.

[iii]delay if any, in filing the petition may be condoned.”

8. The complaint of the applicant Jaggu (annexure P-1) in hisapplication under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 beforethe prescribed authority of which a reference has been made, appearsto be that the rates of wages of SAIL which were governed by varioussettlements/agreements entered between the management and theregistered Union of regular employees of SAIL are legally enforceableand the applicant is also entitled to the wages and such other servicebenefits as per those settlements after a prohibition notification has beenpublished by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) of theCLRA Act.

9. The matter was contested between the parties and theprescribed authority after holding a summary enquiry as contemplatedunder the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 under its Order dated 2[nd] December,2003 allowed the claim petitions with five times of compensation in favourof 2040 contract employees who have been represented by Ispat KhadanJanta Mazdoor Union, Koteshwar Limestone Mine, Gairtalai, Katni.

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A10. The order of the Payment of Wages Authority dated 2[nd]December, 2003 came to be challenged by the appellant SAIL by wayof writ petition before the Single Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradeshat Jabalpur which was partly allowed vide Order dated 24[th] January,2006 holding that the justice would be met if the respondents(employees)are allowed 6% interest on the amount payable to each of them asBcompensation from the date of passing of the impugned order of theauthority till its payment. It was further challenged before the DivisionBench of the High Court that came to be dismissed vide impugnedjudgment dated 11[th] December, 2006 with a modification that instead ofgrant of 6% interest as compensation, a consolidated sum of Rs. 5 croreCbe paid towards compensation to the aggrieved employees, which is asubject matter of challenge in these appeals before us.

11. Learned senior counsel for the appellants Mr. Ranjit Kumarand Mr. Parag P. Tripathi submit that the parity of wages was one of theissue nos. 5 & 6 based on the pleadings of the parties framed by CGITDpursuant to the reference made by the appropriate Government andboth the issues have been negatively answered under its award dated16[th] September, 2009 holding that respondents are not entitled to wagesas per National Joint Committee for the Steel Industries(NJCS) vidememorandum of agreement dated 30[th] July, 1975 which is applicableonly to direct/regular employees of SAIL.E

12. The submission of the learned counsel is that at least the parallelproceedings which are summary in nature initiated under the MinimumWages Act, 1948 keeping the reference made for adjudication to theCGIT at bay were unwarranted and despite their objection being raised,it was overruled and the applications of the workmen came to be decidedFunder Order dated 2[nd] December, 2003 by the prescribed authority underthe Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which was without jurisdiction and suchapplications filed at the instance of the workmen was not maintainableunder the law.

13. Learned counsel further submits that it is nowhere pleaded byGthe respondents that the principle of equal pay for equal work wasapplicable and they were entitled for the wages payable to the regularemployees on the basis of Rule 25(2)(v)(a) of the CLRA Rules, 1971.The burden to prove was on the respondents to show that the contractlabour was discharging the same and similar nature of duties and workHas performed by the regular employees of the establishment but such facts were neither pleaded nor established by the respondents eitherbefore the prescribed authority or before the High Court in writ petition/letters patent appeal and has not adverted to any finding that therespondents were performing same or similar nature of work as that ofthe regular employees of the appellant SAIL. In the absence thereof,the contract labour was not entitled for the wages payable to theemployees who were directly employed by the SAIL for a work whichis neither same nor similar as being performed by the respondent contractlabourers.

14. Learned counsel further submits that the tripartite agreementwhich was entered between the contract labourers, contractor andappellant SAIL in presence of the labour authorities dated 12[th] November,1991 specifically takes care of the Rule 25(2)(iv) & (v) of the CLRARules, 1971 and indisputedly, each of the worker was paid Rs. 11.65/-per day over the minimum wages notified by the appropriate Government,as agreed between the parties. The tripartite agreement was effectivefrom 1[st] April 1991 although it was entered on 12[th] November, 1991 butwages were paid to each of the contract worker in terms of the tripartiteagreement.

15. Learned counsel submits that it was never the case of therespondents that the tripartite agreement dated 12[th] November, 1991has not been complied with. In fact, the arrears were paid over theminimum wages notified by the appropriate Government in terms ofRule 25(2)(v)(a) of the CLRA Rules, 1971 and appellant became liableto pay the minimum wages agreed in terms of the agreement afterissuance of the prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRAAct, since the contract stood automatically extinct, it became the liabilityof the employer to see that every workmen who is working thereaftermust have been paid his due wages in terms of the agreement which hasbeen signed in presence of the concerned labour authorities dated 12[th]November, 1991 and binding upon the parties.

16. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that in sequelto the notification dated 12[th] November, 1991, the Ministry of Labour,Government of India, vide its notification dated 12[th] July, 1994 revisedthe minimum rate of wages payable to the workers employed in themines appended Clause 5 to the explanation that in case the existingrates of wages of any employee as per agreement are more than theminimum notified rates shall be protected and be treated as the minimum AB

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Arates of wages and that according to the appellants have been paid toeach of the workmen who had served the establishment of the appellantsafter issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993 tilltheir services came to be terminated by the contractor in April 1996.

17. Learned counsel further submits that the State of MadhyaBPradesh under its Act No. 23 of 1961 has made certain amendments tothe Minimum Wages Act, 1948. These amendments as explained in itsobject and reasons was enacted as validating legislation. The validationarose in the context of the High Court of Rajasthan quashing itsnotifications pertaining to fixing of minimum rates of wages. The saidamendment Act is merely to validate fixation and has no applicability toCthe dispute having raised by the respondents in the proceedings initiatedunder the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and in support thereof, learnedcounsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in TownMunicipal Council,Athani Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Courts,Hubli and Others, Etc.3;BHELWorkers Association, Hardwar and4DOthers Vs. Union of India and Othersand Hindustan Steel Works5Construction Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Labour and Ors..

18. Per contra, Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsel forthe respondents in support of the judgment of the High Court submitsthat after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993,Eit is an admitted position that the contract labourers had continued towork in the same capacity in the establishment of SAIL and that wouldmake them entitled for the wages which are being notified by the SAILfrom time to time payable to its regular employees for the period thecontract labour had worked after the issuance of prohibition notificationdated 17[th] March, 1993 till April, 1996 and clause(v) of the notificationFprescribing minimum wages dated 6[th] March, 1990 and 12[th] July, 1994clearly stipulates that the existing rate of wages to any employee basedon contract or agreement or otherwise if higher than the rates notifiedherein, the higher rate shall be protected and be treated as rate of wagespayable for the purpose of its notification and once this fact has beenGadmitted that there was an agreement entered into between union ofregular employees and the management of the establishment, at leastthe lowest rate of wages in the establishment of the appellant payable to 31969(1) SCC 8734 1985(1) SCC 630H51996(10) SCC 599

a regular and permanent employee became the benchmark of minimumwages payable to the contract labour who had worked in the establishmentof the appellant SAIL as an employee after issuance of notification dated17[th] March, 1993 until termination of service and this what the prescribedauthority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 has computed towardsarrears of each of the 2040 employee who have, inter alia, filedapplications for legitimate wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

19. Learned counsel further submits that as regards their absorptionand regularisation of service, it was indeed a subject matter of adjudicationin a reference made by the appropriate Government under its notificationdated 27[th] January, 2003 followed with 22[nd] February, 2005 but so far astheir minimum wages payable to the employees are concerned, it wasan independent issue having no relationship to the terms of referencepending before the CGIT at the relevant point of time and after issuanceof prohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993 under CLRA Act,such of the contract workers who had served thereafter in theestablishment of the appellants became their employee and can no longerbe treated as contract workers.

20. Learned counsel submits that after the contract of serviceagreement stands extinguished indisputedly the work discharged by theemployees(earlier contract workers) is same and similar as of the regularemployees and it is not open for the appellant to have two differentwage structures for the employees of the establishment of SAIL and itwas indeed arbitrary and violative of Article 14 & 39(d) of the Constitutionof India and the wage structure applicable to the employees of SAILhas rightly been extended by the prescribed authority under the mandateof the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and since the respondents havedemanded lowest rate of wages in terms of settlements dated 6[th] March,1990 and 12[th] July, 1994, no further finding was required to be recordedwith respect to the same or similar nature of work being discharged andat least those rates of wages are applicable to the presentemployees(earlier casual labourers) and this what has been computedby the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act and confirmedby the High Court under the impugned judgment and in support ofsubmission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of thisCourt in BHELWorkers Association, Hardwar and Others(supra).

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A21. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with theirassistance perused the material available on record.

22. To appreciate the rival submissions made by the respectivecounsels, it is considered appropriate to first take note of the indisputedfacts and the scheme of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 & CLRA ActBemerged from the records are that the appellant SAIL is a Governmentof India Undertaking and is a State within the meaning of Article 12 ofthe Constitution of India having its steel plants in different parts of Indiaand was a registered establishment under Section 7 of the CLRA Actand the contractor through whom the service of the contract labour wasengaged was holding its licence as envisaged under Section 12 of theCCLRA Act. The tripartite memorandum of settlement dated 12[th]November, 1991 which became effective from 1[st] April, 1991, was signedby the appellant, contractor and the respondent through Union beforethe Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur. Under the saidsettlement, it was agreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs.D11.65/- per day over and above the minimum wages notified by theappropriate Government under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.Indisputedly, each of the member of the union was paid his wages interms of the memorandum of settlement dated 12[th] November, 1991. Atthe later stage, the appropriate Government issued a prohibitionnotification of employment of contract labour dated 17[th] March, 1993Eand the fact remains that the contract labour which was engaged priorto the prohibition notification was allowed to continue in the establishmentof the appellant(SAIL) on the same terms and conditions with no changein their service conditions under the agreement which was executedprior to the prohibition notification dated 17[th] March, 1993, was extendedFfrom time to time by the competent authority and the services of thecontract labour came to be terminated by the respective contractor inthe month of April, 1996 after they went on strike.

23. After discontinuance of the service of the contract labour bythe respective contractor in April, 1996, 2040 employees/contract labourGthrough their union filed their respective applications in the year 1998under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before theprescribed authority to claim parity with the wages payable to theemployees who were direct/regular employees of the establishment ofSAIL under the Minimum Wages Act.

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24. After issuance of a prohibition notification under the CLRAAct dated 17[th] March, 1993, the erstwhile contract labourers/respondentsherein filed writ petitions to claim regularisation of service and backwagesin view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of this Court in AirIndia Statutory Corporation and Others case(supra) wherein it washeld that on issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) ofthe CLRA Act, the logical and legitimate consequences were that theerstwhile regulated contract labourer covered by the sweep of suchabolition for the activities concerned would be entitled to be treated asdirect employee of the employer on the day on which the contract laboursystem in the establishment has been abolished. But the theory ofautomatic absorption of contract labour by the principal employer in theestablishment on issuance of a notification by the appropriate Governmentunder Section 10(1) of the Act was later overruled by the ConstitutionBench of this Court in SteelAuthority of India Ltd. and Others(supra).

25. It is necessary to point out that Ministry of Labour, Governmentof India vide its notification dated 12[th] July, 1994, while revising minimumrate of wages payable to the employees employed in the mines had alsospecifically mentioned in clause 5 to the explanation that in case theexisting rate of wages of any employee as per the agreement are higherthan the minimum rates, the higher rates shall be protected and treatedas minimum rates of wages. Relevant para of the said notification isquoted herein as under:-

“Where the existing rates of wages of any employee, based oncontract or agreement or otherwise are higher than the ratesnotified herein, the higher rates shall be protected and treated asthe minimum rates of wages applicable for the purpose of thisnotification to such employees.”

26. Such rate of wages as agreed in its tripartite agreement dated12[th] November, 1991 were paid at Rs. 11.65/- per day over and abovethe minimum wages with effect from 1[st] April, 1991 and that wasindisputedly complied with and each of the employee (contract labour)who had served/worked in the establishment had been paid his due wagesuntil their services came to be terminated by the respective contractorsin April, 1996.

27. The claim of the respondents in their application filed underSection 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was that as they had A

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Adischarged the same or similar nature of work as that of direct employeeof the establishment, it makes them entitled for the wages which arepayable to an employee who is directly/regularly appointed in theestablishment to whom wages are paid in terms of NJCS memorandumof Agreement dated 30th July, 1975.

B28. It is to be noted that National Joint Committee for the SteelIndustry (NJCS) started its functioning initially in the name of JWNC(JointWage Negotiating Committee) in October 1969 and was primarilyestablished in pursuance of the decision taken by the industrial committeeon iron & steel in October, 1969. The Committee has now changed itsname as National Joint Committee for the Steel Industry (NJCS). TheCscope of the NJCS presently covers :-

i) Negotiations for wage agreement and its implementation.

ii) Matters pertaining to and steps to be taken for increase inproduction, productivity, improvement in quality, reduction of costDand wastage etc.

iii) Review of welfare amenities and facilities.

iv) Matters on which it is necessary to draw the attention of thegovernment; and E

v) Any other matter pertaining to steel industry and its employeesas may be agreed to in the NJCS, from time to time.

29. The membership of NJCS comprises 21 union leaders- threeeach from four national centres of trade unions: INTUC, AITUC, CITUand HMS, one each from recognized unions of the steel plants like Bhilai,FDurgapur, Rourkela, Bokaro, TISCO, IISCO, Alloy Steels, Salem andVISL, and 12 management staff managing directors of the steel plantsof Bhillai, Rourkela, Durgapur, Bokar and IISCO, Bumpur; executivedirectors of Alloy Steels Plant, Salem Steel Plant and VISL; Vice-President(HRM), TISCO; Vice-Chairman and Directors(Finance) ofGSAIL. The Director(Personnel) of SAIL is the Convenor-Member ofthe Committee. It is a permanent bipartite committee whose scopeextends beyond wage negotiations to implementation aspects and othermatters of concern to the industries and its employees. It is applicableto the wage structure across the steel industries in the country.

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30. It may be noticed that there are no pleadings on record andprimarily the burden was on the respondent applicants to establish thatthe duties discharged by each of the employee was same or similar tothat of a regular/direct employee appointed/employed by the establishmentand this can be discerned from the facts pleaded in the application filedby one Jaggu of which a reference has been made. In absence of theinitial burden being discharged in the first instance by the respondentemployees, the onus could not have been shifted upon the appellant SAILto counter the nature of work discharged by each of the workmen as towhether it was the same or similar to that of a permanent/regularemployee of the establishment and how far the principles of equal payfor equal work claimed as enshrined under Article 14 and 39(d) of theConstitution of India would be attracted in the facts of the case.

31. In this backdrop of the matter, it would be apposite to firsttake note of the scheme of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. If we lookinto the objects and reasons of the scheme of the Act, it clearly manifeststhat the main object of the Act is to provide minimum rates of wages forcertain scheduled employment and also provides for fixation and revisionof minimum wages of the workers, overtime rates, remuneration for thework done on a day of rest, just to ensure that the employee has enoughto provide to his family and to ensure a decent living standard that pertainsto a social comfort of the employee and the cost of living index. Theprocedure for fixing and revising minimum rate of wages, which has tobe prescribed, is supported by the recommendation of AdvisoryCommittees/Advisory Board/ Central Advisory Board being constitutedunder Sections 7 and 8 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and theappropriate Government on its acceptance notified the minimum wageswhich are payable to the category of employees referred to under Section2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.

32. Indisputedly, in the first place, the minimum wages which werenotified by the appropriate Government from time to time under tripartitememorandum of agreement dated 12[th] November, 1991, signed by theappellant SAIL and the respondents before the Assistant LabourCommissioner(Central), Jabalpur effective from 1[st] April, 1991, it wasagreed that the contract labour would be paid Rs. 11.65/- per day overand above the notified minimum wages with effect from 1[st] April, 1991which has been indisputedly paid by the appellant SAIL till the employeeswere allowed to work in the establishment i.e. April, 1996 when theirservices came to be terminated by the contractor.

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84SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A33. The exposition of scheme of the minimum wages Act, 1948and its jurisdiction to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act has been examinedby this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani Vs. The PresidingOfficer, Labour Courts, Hubli and Others, Etc.(supra).

“7. The long title and the preamble to the Minimum Wages Actshow that this Act was passed with the object of making provisionfor fixing minimum rates of wages in certain employments. Theword “wages” has been given a wide meaning in its definition inSection 2(h) of that Act and, quite clearly, includes payment inrespect of overtime and for work done on weekly off-days whichare required to be given by any employer to the workmen underthe provisions of that Act itself. Section 13(1), which deals withweekly off-days, and Section 14(1), which deals with overtime,are as follows:

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13. (1) In regard to any scheduled employment minimum rates ofwages in respect of which have been fixed under this Act, theDappropriate Government may—

(a) fix the number of hours of work which shall constitute anormal working day, inclusive of one or more specified inter-vals; (b) provide for a day of rest in every period of seven dayswhich shall be allowed to all employees or to any specifiedclass of employees and for the payment of remuneration inrespect of such days of rest; E

(c) provide for payment for work on a day of rest at a rate notless than the overtime rate.

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14. (1) Where an employee, whose minimum rate of wages isfixed under this Act by the hour, by the day or by such a longerwage-period as may be prescribed, works on any day in excessof the number of hours constituting a normal working day, theemployer shall pay him for every hour or for part of an hour soworked in excess at the overtime rate fixed under this Act orunder any law of the appropriate Government for the time beingin force, whichever is higher.

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In order to provide a remedy against breach of orders madeunder Sections 13(1) and 14(1), that Act provides a forum and H

the manner of seeking the remedy in Section 20 which is asfollows:

20. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in theOfficial Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen’sCompensation or any officer of the Central Governmentexercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region,or any officer of the State Government not below the rank ofLabour Commissioner or any other officer with experience asa Judge of a civil court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be theAuthority to hear and decide for any specified area all claimsarising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wagesor in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of restor for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c)of sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtimerate under Section 14, to employees employed or paid in thatarea.

(2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature referredto in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legalpractitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorisedin writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any personacting with the permission of the Authority appointed undersub-section (1), may apply to such Authority for a directionunder sub-section (2):

Provided that every such application shall be presentedwithin six months from the date on which the minimum wagesor other amount became payable:

Provided further that any application may be admittedafter the said period of six months when the applicant satisfiesthe Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making theapplication within such period.

(3) ….

(4) ….

(5) ….

(6) ….

(7) ….

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We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages Act,because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to theclear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with fixing ofrates — rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for paymentfor work on a day of rest — and is not really intended to be anAct for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision ismade in other laws, such as the Payment of Wages Act, 4 of1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947. In Section 20(1)of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made for seekingremedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less thanthe minimum rates of wages or in respect of payment ofremuneration for days of rest or for work done on such daysunder clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 orof wages at the overtime rate under Section 14. This languageused in Section 20(1) shows that the Authority appointedunder that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction fordeciding claims which relate to rates of wages, rates forpayment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates.If there be no dispute as to rates between the employer and theemployees, Section 20(1) would not be attracted. The purposeof Section 20(1) seems to be to ensure that the ratesprescribed under the Minimum Wages Act are compliedwith by the employer in making payments and, if any attemptis made to make payments at lower rates, the workmen aregiven the right to invoke the aid of the Authority appointedunder Section 20(1). In cases where there is no dispute as torates of wages, and the only question is whether a particularpayment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtimeor work on off-days is due to a workman or not, the appropriateremedy is provided in the Payment of Wages Act. If the paymentis withheld beyond the time permitted by the Payment of WagesAct even on the ground that the amount claimed by the workmanis not due, or if the amount claimed by the workman is not paid onthe ground that deductions are to be made by the employer, theemployee can seek his remedy by an application under Section15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. In cases where Section 15of the Payment of Wages Act may not provide adequate remedy,the remedy can be sought either under Section 33-C of the Act or

by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having it decidedunder the various provisions of that Act. In these circumstances,we are unable to accept the submission made by Mr Sen on behalfof the appellant that Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Actshould be interpreted as intended to cover all claims in respect ofminimum wages or overtime payment or payment for days of resteven though there may be no dispute as to the rates at whichthose payments are to be claimed. It is true that, under Section20(3), power is given to the Authority dealing with an applicationunder Section 20(1) to direct payment of the actual amount founddue; but this, it appears to us, is only an incidental power grantedto that Authority, so that the directions made by the Authorityunder Section 20(1) may be effectively carried out and there maynot be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. The power to makeorders for payment of actual amount due to an employee underSection 20(3) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as indicating thatthe jurisdiction to the Authority under Section 20(1) has been givenfor the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts and notfor the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with thevarious rates fixed under that Act. This interpretation; in our opinion,also harmonises the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act withthe provisions of the payment of Wages Act which was already inexistence when the Minimum Wages Act was passed. In thepresent appeals, therefore, we have to see whether the claimswhich were made by the workmen in the various applicationsunder Section 33-C(2) of the Act were of such a nature that theycould have been brought before the Authority under Section 20(1)of the Minimum Wages Act inasmuch as they raised disputesrelating to the rates for payment of overtime and for work doneon weekly off-days.”

(Emphasis supplied)

34. The scheme of the Act of which reference has been made bythis Court clearly manifests that the Act is primarily concerned withfixing rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment of workon a day of rest and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcementof payment of wages for which provision has been made in other lawssuch as the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and the Industrial Disputes ABC

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AAct, 1947. Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is primarilyenacted to resolve disputes about the rates of wages, rates of paymentof work done on days of rest and overtime rates and to ensure that therates of wages which are notified by the appropriate Government forvarious categories of employees under the Minimum Wages Act are tobe strictly complied with by the employer in making payments and if anyBpayment is made at the rates lower than the minimum rates of wagesprescribed by the appropriate Government, the remedy has been providedto the workmen/employee to invoke Section 20(1) of the Act and beinga self-contained Code and a beneficial legislation, it is a social protectionto ensure and secure adequate living wage in the interest of public andClooking to the nature of enquiry postulated under the scheme of MinimumWages Act, 1948, there appears no scope of enquiry to examine theprinciples of equal pay for equal work which is a dispute to be determinedby a adjudicatory mechanism provided under the law.

35. It was not the case of the respondent employees(2040 inDnumber) that the minimum rates of wages which were notified by theappropriate Government from time to time or as agreed between theparties under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 have not been paid. Buttheir claim in the application under Section 20(1) of the Act, was that,once they have been allowed to work after the prohibition notification

dated 17[th] March, 1993 has come into force, pursuant toEwhich their status as contract labour in the establishment ceased to operateas a result of contract of principal employer with thecontractor in regard to the contract labourhaving been statutorily extinguished, their relationship stood automaticallyconverted into the employer (i.e., SAIL in the instant case) and theFemployee (i.e. contract labour) making them entitled for wages whichare notified by the NJCS as per the memorandum of agreement whichis payable to direct/regular employees of SAIL.

36. The Division Bench of the High Court has also relied on thescheme of CLRA Rules, 1971 and Rules 25(iv) and (v) in particularGwhile arriving to a conclusion that the workmen since were allowed tocontinue to work by the principal employer after the prohibition notificationdated 17[th] March, 1993 has come into force, and they were dischargingsame or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by theprincipal employer in the establishment, makes them entitled for similar H

wages admissible to the regular employees appointed/engaged by SAIL.Rules 25(iv) and (v) of Rules, 1971 are extracted hereunder:-

(iv) the rates of wages payable to the workmen by the contractorshall not be less than the rates prescribed under the MinimumWages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948), for such employment whereapplicable and where the rates have been fixed by agreement,settlement or award, not less than the rates so fixed;

(v) (a) in cases where the workman employed by the contractorperform the same or similar kind of work as the workmen directlyemployed by the principal employer of the establishment, the wagerates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service ofthe workmen of the contractor shall be the same as applicable tothe workmen directly employed by the principal employer of theestablishment on the same or similar kind of work:

Provided that in the case of any disagreement with regard to thetype of work the same shall be decided by 1 [the Deputy ChiefLabour Commissioner (Central)]; (b) in other cases the wage rates, holidays, hours of work andconditions of service of the workmen of the contractor shall besuch as may be specified in this behalf by 1 [the Deputy ChiefLabour Commissioner (Central)]; Explanation. —While determining the wage rates, holidays, hoursof work and other conditions of services under (b) above, theDeputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) shall have dueregard to the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and otherconditions of service obtaining in similar employments;

37. The submission, in our view, is misplaced for the reason thatthe CLRA Act is a complete code in itself and regulate the employmentof contract labour in certain establishments and provide for its abolitionin certain circumstances and for matters connected therewith. The titleof the Act itself indicates that the Act does not provide for total abolitionof the contract labour, but only for its abolition in certain circumstances,and to regulate the employment of contract labour in the establishmentswhich are registered under Section 7 and working through the contractorswho are holding licence under Section 12 of the Act. Section 8 providesfor the revocation of registration in certain cases and Section 9 provides A

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Athe effect of non-registration. Section 10 is one of the back bone of theAct which provides for prohibition of employment of contract labour inany establishment and we are fortified in our view supported by theJudgment of this Court in Hindustan Steel Works ConstructionLtd.(supra).

38. In the instant case, the establishment was duly registered underSection 7 of the Act and the contractor through whom the contract labourwas engaged was holding its licence under Section 12 of the Act but inthe changed circumstances, the appropriate Government took a decisionto put a prohibition in making employment of contract labour in scheduledemployment for various reasons which is not a subject matter of enquiryin the instant case and in consequence of the prohibition notificationdated 17[th] March, 1993 published under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act,the contract labour working in the establishment ceased to function andthe contract between the principal employer and contractor standsextinguished.

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39. To make it further clear, Rule 25 of the Rules, 1971 of whichthere was an emphasis before the High Court, may not come to therescue of the respondent employees for the reason that it was an obligationupon the contractor who are holding a licence under Section 12 of theAct and as per the terms and conditions of the licence granted underEsub-rule (1) of Rule 25 or renewed under Rule 29, to comply with certainconditions enumerated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 25 of the Rules 1971which includes clause (iv) and (v) to be complied with by the contractorand, if at all, there is any breach of the conditions of licence, complaintcan be made to the prescribed authority and its consequences areimbedded under the Scheme of the CLRA Act, 1970.

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40. At the same time, an obligation to provide amenities conferredby the Act to the workers has been referred to under Chapter V of theCLRA Act and the primary responsibility is of a contractor that eachworker employed by him as contract labour has to be paid his due wagesbefore the expiry of such period as may be prescribed with an exceptionGprovided under Section 21(4) of the Act, in case the contractor fails tomake payment of wages within the prescribed period or makes shortpayment, then the principal employer shall be liable to make payment ofwages in full or the unpaid balance due, as the case may be, to thecontract labour employed by the contractor and recover the amount soHpaid from the contractor under any of the methods prescribed by law.

41. In the instant case, after issuance of the prohibition notificationdated 17[th] March, 1993 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act havingbeing published, in our considered view, the provisions of the CLRA Actor CLRA Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder would not be availableto either of the party to strengthen its claim. As stated earlier, minimumwages as prayed for in the application filed by respondents before theprescribed authority under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act,1948 could be claimed independently under the Minimum Wages Act,1948 which indisputedly in the instant case was Rs. 11.65/- per day overthe minimum wages to be paid by the appellant to each of the respondent(2040 employees) in terms of the agreement executed between the partiesand that was indeed complied with by the appellants in its true spirit.

42. The submission made by the learned counsel for therespondents that the respondent workmen were doing the jobs ofperennial in nature and the contract labour was banned under agreementsentered between SAIL and the workers union from 1970 onwards andtheir performance of same or similar kind of work as the workmen directlyemployed by the principal employer make them entitled for wages interms of NJCS Memorandum of agreement is without substance for thereason that for fixation of Minimum Wages under the Minimum WagesAct, 1948, there are number of considerations which are to be kept inmind by the committees while prescribing the minimum rate of wagespayable to the workmen of a different category. Under Section 3 of theMinimum Wages Act, 1948 the appropriate Government may fix minimumwages for time work, minimum rate of wages for piece work, minimumwages in respect of overtime work defined under sub-Section 2 of Section3 of the Act and the amendment made in Section 3 of the Act also takenote of different classes/categories of employees in such employmentwhile the notification under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 came to bepublished by the appropriate Government.

43. In the given circumstances, a mere assertion of fact that thecontract labour which was allowed to continue after the prohibitionnotification came to be published dated 17[th] March, 1993 in theestablishment of the appellant SAIL performing same or similar kind ofwork in the establishment of the principal employer is not sufficient toendorse their entitlement of claiming wages notified by the NJCSmemorandum of agreement for direct/regular employees of theestablishment applicable universally to all the steel industries. The A

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AJudgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in BHELWorkersAssociation, Hardwar and Others (supra) may not be of anyassistance in the facts of the instant case for the reason that it was awrit petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by theworkers union seeking declaration from this Court for abolition of contractlabour and be treated as direct employees of the establishment and entitledBto equal pay as workmen of the BHEL but that being a matter of enquiryby the competent authority, their petition came to be dismissed with thedirection to the Union of India to examine their grievance in accordancewith law.

44. In addition to it, in terms of reference made by the appropriateCGovernment dated 27[th] January, 2003 read with Corrigendum dated 9[th]April, 2003 followed with 22[nd] February, 2005, the CGIT framed variousissues including issue nos. V & VI and answered it accordingly.

Issue nos. V & VI are reproduced as under:- D“V. Whether lime stone mines violated the provision of Clause-8 of the memorandum of agreement signed between the SAIL,New Delhi and their Unions and employing workers throughcontractors on jobs of permanent and perennial nature wasjustified, legal and fair?

EVI. Whether the workmen/heirs are entitled to the wages tothe post in which they were engaged with parity of wages withthat of regular employees of the management with all consequentialbenefits?”

It has been answered as under:-

F“It is evident that it is not established that the alleged contractlabours were the employees of the SAIL, as such they were notentitled to any wages as per the agreement. Moreover they werenot regular employees of the management and the said agreementappears to be for the regular employees of the management. Thusthese issues are also decided against the Union and in favour ofGthe management.”

45. The answer thereto has been upheld by us in the independentproceedings.

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STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. & ANR.v. JAGGU & ORS.[RASTOGI, J.]

46. In our considered view, the order of the prescribed authorityunder the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 dated 2[nd] December, 2003 andconfirmed by the High Court under the impugned judgment dated11[th] December, 2006 are unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.

47. Consequently, Civil Appeal No. 8094 of 2011 filed by SteelAuthority of India Ltd. is accordingly allowed and order of the prescribedBauthority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1948 and Judgment of theHigh Court are hereby set aside.

48. Civil Appeal No. 8334 of 2011 filed by the employees(Jaggu& Others) is dismissed. No costs.

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49. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Divya Pandey

Appeals disposed of.

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