RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. versus STATE OF U.P. & ANR. on 20 April 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 3 S.C.R.

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RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR.

v.

STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

(Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2953 of 2022)

APRIL 20, 2022

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[INDIRA BANERJEE AND A. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Saving ofinherent powers of High Court – Political animosity betweenpetitioner No.1 and Ex. MLA – Complaint u/s. 365/511 IPC and s.C3(1)(Dha) of the 1989 Act by respondent no. 2 against the petitioners– Sessions Judge took cognizance of the charges against thepetitioners and issued summons – Application u/s. 482 by thepetitioner seeking quashing of the proceedings as well as thecognizance order – High Court dismissed the application –DPetitioners case that this is a case of malicious prosecution arisendue to political rivalry – Held: Complaint may have been initiatedby reason of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashingthe criminal proceedings – Possibility of retaliation on the part ofthe petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earliercriminal case cannot be ruled out – Allegations in the complaintEconstitute offence under the Attrocities Act, which would have to bedecided in the trial – In exercise of power u/s. 482, the Court doesnot examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint exceptin exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that theallegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence – ComplaintFcase not such which should be quashed at the inception itself withoutfurther trial – Thus, the High Court rightly dismissed the applicationu/s. 482 – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 365/511 – Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 – s. 3(1)(Dha).

Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court GHELD: 1.1 Even though, the inherent power of the HighCourt under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminalproceedings is wide, such power has to be exercised withcircumspection, in exceptional cases. Jurisdiction under Section482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised for the asking.Inexceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court, theH

High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference wouldonly be justified when complaint did not disclose any offence, orwas patently frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Para 27, 29][347-G-H; 348-B-C]

1.2 The fact that the complaint may have been initiated byreason of political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashingthe criminal proceedings. It is a well established proposition oflaw that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and basedupon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account ofmala fides or political vendetta of the first informant orcomplainant. If the use of power is of fulfilment of a legitimateobject the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.[Para 30][348-C-D]

2. On facts, there was apparently political rivalry betweenthe petitioner No.1 and Ex-MLA. However, Complaint Case No.19/2018 has not been lodged against the Petitioners, by Ex-MLA,but by the respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduledcaste. It cannot be said that the allegations in the complaint donot make out offence under the Atrocities Act. It is specificallyalleged that the petitioners had abused the respondent No.2 infilthy language by reference to his caste. The allegations in theComplaint Case No.19 of 2018, if established, could result inconviction under the relevant sub-sections of Section 3(1) of theScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of AtrocitiesAct), 1989. [Para 24][347-B-C]

2.2 Respondent No.2 being an employee of Ex-MLA, it ispossible that Complaint Case No.19/2018 may have been promptedby political vendetta against the petitioner No.1. However, sincethe allegations in the complaint case make out an offence u/s.3 ofthe Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip the complaint inthe bud, more so, when there are statements recorded in Courtunder Section 200 Cr.P.C. The possibility of retaliation on thepart of the Petitioners by the acts alleged in the complaint, afterclosure of the earlier complaint No.17 of 2010 cannot be ruledout. Quashing the criminal proceedings at the very inception mightresult in injustice. [Para 25][347-D-E]

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A2.3 Criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud byexercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. onlybecause the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It ispossible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behestof a political opponent. However, such possibility would not justifyinterference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminalBproceedings. The possibility of retaliation on the part of thepetitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminalcase cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaintconstitute offence under the Attrocities Act. Whether theallegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in theCtrial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., theCourt does not examine the correctness of the allegations in acomplaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patentlyclear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose anyoffence. The Complaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case whichshould be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial.DThe High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section482 Cr.P.C.The impugned judgment and order of the High Courtis not interfered with. [Para 39, 40][354-D-H]

Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand AthabhaiChaudhari and Ors. 2021 SCC Online SC 974; MonicaEKumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P (2008) 8 SCC 781 : [2008]9 SCR 943; Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna KumarAIR 1990 SC 494 : [1989] Suppl. SCR 165;Sheonandan Paswan v. Others (1987) 1 SCC 288 :[1987] 1 SCR 702; State of Punjab v. Gurdial SinghF(1980) 2 SCC 471 : [1980] 1 SCR 1071; MunicipalCorporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Ors.(1983) 1 SCC 1 : [1983] 1 SCR 884; State of AndhraPradesh v. Gourieshetty Mahesh (2010) 6 SCC 588;Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand (2013) 11 SCC673; Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. SambhajiraoGChandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692 : [1988] 2 SCR930; Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal(2007) 12 SCC 1 : [2007] 10 SCR 847; Kapil Agarwal& Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Others (2021) 5 SCC 524;State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Suppl H

RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.

(1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; Hamida v.Rashid @ Rasheed and Others (2008) 1 SCC474:[2007] 5 SCR 937 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special LeavePetition (Crl.) No.2953 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.03.2022 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Application U/s 482 No.27904 of 2021.

Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., Dr. Rajeev Sharma, Prashant Sharma,Raghuvir Sharma, Vipin Kumar Sharma, Dharmendra Sharma, Ms.Diksha Sharma, Akhilesh Mishra, Advs. for the Petitioners.

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Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Swetashwa Agarwal, Sanchit Garga,Nikunj Jain, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G

INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

1. This special leave petition is against a final judgment and orderdated 7[th] March 2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner under Section 482 of theCriminal Procedure Code, 1973 being case No.29704 of 2021, whereby H

Athe Petitioner had challenged the order dated 17[th] September 2021 passedby the 4[th ] Additional District and Sessions Judge, Hathras takingcognizance of the complaint filed by the Respondent No.2 under Section365 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) andSection 3(1)(Dha) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Preventionof Atrocities Act), 1989, hereinafter referred to as “the Atrocities Act”.B

2. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of thePetitioners opened his arguments contending that this case is a classicexample of malicious prosecution of the petitioners, who have beenembroiled in a false criminal case, due to political animosity. The complaintin the Court of the 2nd Additional District and Sessions Judge/SpecialCJudge under the Atrocities Act, under section 156 (3) of the CrPC ,which has given rise to these proceedings, has been filed by theRespondent No. 2 at the instance of Devendra Agarwal, Ex-MLA , apolitical opponent of the Petitioner No. 1. The Petitioner No. 1 and thesaid Devendra Aggarwal had fought elections against each other severalDtimes.

3. Earlier, on or about 1st January 2010, Smt. Meera Devi, wifeof the Respondent No.2 had filed a complaint before the DistrictMagistrate, Mahamaya Nagar District (now Hathras District) statingthat the Respondent No.2 had been abducted by the brothers of theEPetitioner No. 1, to forcibly make him vote in favour of their party, in theMLC election of 2010. In the said complaint it was alleged that thePetitioner had abused the Respondent No.2 by his caste, using filthylanguage.

4. On the same day, that is, 1st January 2010, Devendra AggarwalFwrote a letter to the District Magistrate for release of the RespondentNo.2. In the aforesaid letter, it was stated that the Petitioners had abusedthe Respondent No.2 in filthy language by reference to his caste.

5. On 2[nd] January 2010, Meera Devi filed an application in theCourt of the Judicial Magistrate, Sadabad, Hathras under Section 156(3)Gof the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C ), being Complaint No. 412of 2010 for directions on the Station House Officer (SHO) at ChandappaPolice Station to register her Complaint of abduction of her husband.

6. A complaint was thereafter registered, pursuant to which CrimeCase No. 17/2010 was started. The case was investigated by the CircleInspector Sadabad, Hathras. After investigation, the Police filed a finalH

report of closure of the case, opining that no incident of abduction, asalleged had taken place, and the complaint had been filed out of politicalanimosity.

7. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition which was dismissed. TheHigh Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal of her ProtestPetition. Meera Devi approached this Court. Pursuant to the orders ofthis court, further investigation was held by the CB CID. TheInvestigating Officer filed a final report dated 17.10.2018 in favour ofthe Petitioners. Meera Devi filed a Protest Petition. By an order dated5th September 2020, the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act, Hathrasrejected the Protest Petition filed by Meera Devi in Case No. 17/2010.

8. In February 2017, the Petitioner had contested the Assemblyelections from Sadabad Constituency. Mr. Devendra Aggarwal alsocontested the election from the same constituency as a candidate of arival political party. It is alleged that, on 8th February 2017, when thePetitioner No 1’s son was campaigning for the Petitioner No 1, DevendraAggarwal, who was then a sitting MLA of the ruling party, attacked thePetitioner No 1’s son and his supporters and opened fire indiscriminately.

9. One Pushpendra Singh, a supporter of the Petitioner No 1, waskilled in the incident. Pushpendra’s father, Ramhari Sharma lodged anFIR, arraigning Devendra Aggarwal as Accused No.1, pursuant to whicha criminal case was started against Devendra Aggarwal and others,inter alia, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

10. It is stated that since Devendra Aggarwal was the sitting MLAof the ruling party, the police did not take action to arrest him. The fatherof the deceased Pushpendra, Ramhari Sharma filed a Criminal Misc.Writ Petition No.2739/2017 in the High Court praying for action againstDevendra Aggarwal.

11. On 26[th] October 2017, the Respondent No.2 filed an applicationin the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge SC/ST Act,Hathras under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C alleging that the PetitionerNo.1 along with his Personal Assistant, Ranu Pandit, being the PetitionerNo.2 and 6-7 other persons had abused him in filthy language and askedhis associates to drag him into the car which they could not do, as acrowd had gathered, and there was resistance put up. The RespondentNo.2 prayed for direction on the SHO, Chandappa Police Station toregister the case against the Petitioners.

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A12. The relevant averments in the said complaint are extractedhereinbelow for convenience:- “1. The applicant belongs to “Dhobi’ caste – a scheduledcaste and is former BDC Member.

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3. That on 01.09.2017, at about 2.45 or 3 P.M. in theafternoon, the opposite party no.1 Ramveer Upadhyay cameto Village-Bisana along with his convoy of vehicles and afterseeing the Complainant started abusing of his caste and onthe road, he said that Saley dhobi you had forgotten yourCposition and your wings have come out and you are runningup to Supreme Court. You will be sent at a place from whereyou will never come back. When the Complainant said youare doing your work and I am doing my work, RamveerUpadhyay said to his associates that pull him and put him inDthe car, then opposite party no.2 Ranu Pandit and 6-7 otherunknown persons, who can be identified by face, draggedthe Complainant and with the intention to kill tried to kidnaphim but due to gathering of people on the road and due toresistance shown by Annu R/o Jindpatti, Bisana, Pradeep R/o Gambhirpatti, Bisana, they were not successful and wentEtowards Hathras in their vehicles. Due to this incident anenvironment of fear and terror was created in the village.”

13. Pursuant to the aforesaid application, a case was registeredand numbered Complaint Case No.19/2018. The Respondent No.2 wasexamined under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. The statement of theFRespondent No. 2 being the complainant was recorded under Section200 of the Cr.P.C. in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge/SpecialJudge, SC/ST Act, Hathras. The statements of one Annu son of Rukamaland one Yogesh Gupta, son of Dhaniram Gupta were also recorded inthe same Court under Section 200 Cr.P.C.

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G14. In the meanwhile, in Writ Petition (Civil) No.699/2016 titledAshwini Kumar Upadhayay v. Union of India, a three-Judge Benchof this Court presided over by the Chief Justice, passed an order dated4.12.2018, taking notice of the fact that there were 4122 cases pendingagainst legislators including former legislators, out of which 2324 caseswere against sitting legislators. A chart, presented in Court by the learnedH

Amicus Curiae, showed that there were 430 cases involving life sentencepending against sitting as well as former legislators.

15. To expedite the disposal of the cases, this Court requestedeach High Court to assign/allocate criminal cases involving former andsitting legislators to as many as Sessions Courts and Magisterial Courtsas each High Court might consider fit and expedient. Pursuant toadministrative directions issued by the High Court, and pursuant to thedirections of this Court, Complaint Case No.19/2018 was transferred tothe Additional District and Sessions Judge Court No.4, Hathras, as thePetitioner No.1 was a legislator/former legislator.

16. On being prima facie satisfied that the complaint case No.19/2018 made out a prime facie case against the Petitioners, the AdditionalDistrict and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras passed an order dated17[th] September 2021, taking cognizance of the charges against thePetitioners and issuing summons to the Petitioners.

17. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 17[th] September 2021,the Petitioners filed an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in theHigh Court and prayed that entire proceedings in Complaint Case No.19/2018 as well as the cognizance order dated 17[th] September 2021 bequashed.

18. By an order dated 5[th] January 2022, the High Court admittedthe application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and stayed furtherproceedings in Complaint Case No.19/2018 pending in the Court ofAdditional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras.

19. However, on 7[th] March 2022, the High Court passed theimpugned judgment and order rejecting the application filed by thePetitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

20. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalfof the Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Additional Districtand Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras, to take cognizance of theoffence in Complaint Case No.19/2018.

21. Emphasizing Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, Mr. Ranjit Kumarargued that only the Special Judge under the Atrocities Act was competentto pass an order for issuance of summons. He argued that the order ofthe Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Hathras beingwithout jurisdiction the High Court should have quashed the same in AB

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Aexercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Mr. Ranjt Kumaralso argued that Complaint Case No.19/2018 patently a case of maliciousprosecution which stemmed from political rivalry and was in gross abuseof the process of Court.

22. In Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya v. Anand AthabhaiBChaudhari and Ors.[1], Cited by Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned seniorcounsel, appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2, this Court rejectedthe contention that only Special Court could take cognizance of offencesunder the Atrocities Act and held:

23. Therefore, the issue/question posed for the considerationCof this Court is, whether in a case where cognizance is takenby the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is committedto the learned Special Court, whether entire criminalproceedings can be said to have been vitiated consideringthe second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act whichwas inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?D24. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, legislativehistory of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castesand Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,more particularly, Section 14 pre-amendment and postamendment is required to be considered. Section 14 as stoodEpre-amendment and post amendment reads as under:

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Provided that in Districts where less number of cases underthis Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with theFconcurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, bynotification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Districts,the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offencesunder this Act; Provided further that the Courts so established orspecified shall have power to directly take cognizance ofGoffences under this Act.”

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28. Considering the aforesaid legislative history whichbroughttoinsertionofprovisotoSection 14ofthe AtrocitiesH1 2021 SCC Online SC 974

Act, by which, even the Special Court so established orspecified for the purpose of providing for speedy trial thepower to directly to take cognizance of offences under theAtrocities Act, 1989, the issue/question posed whether in acase where for the offences under Atrocities Act, thecognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate and thereafterthe case is committed to the Court of Sessions/Special Courtand cognizance is not straightway taken up by the learnedSpecial Court/Court of Session, whether entire criminalproceedings for the offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989can be said to have been vitiated, as so observed by the HighCourt in the impugned judgment and order ?

29. On fair reading of Sections 207, 209 and 193 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure and insertion of proviso to Section 14of the Atrocities Act by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016, weare of the opinion that on the aforesaid ground the entirecriminal proceedings cannot be said to have been vitiated.Second proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which hasbeen inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016 confers powerupon the Special Court so established or specified for thepurpose of providing for speedy trial also shall have thepower to directly take cognizance of the offences under theAtrocities Act. Considering the object and purpose of insertionof proviso to Section 14, it cannot be said that it is not inconflict with the Sections 193, 207 and 209 of the CriminalProcedure Code, 1973. It cannot be said that it takes awayjurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance andthereafter to commit the case to the Special Court for trial forthe offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely because, learnedMagistrate has taken cognizance of the offences andthereafter the trial/case has been committed to Special Courtestablished for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, itcannot be said that entire criminal proceedings including FIRand charge-sheet etc. are vitiated and on the aforesaid groundentire criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections452, 323, 325, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Penal Code, 1860and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act are to bequashed and set aside. It may be noted that in view of insertion ABC

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of proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act and consideringthe object and purpose, for which, the proviso to Section 14of the Atrocities Act has been inserted i.e. for the purpose ofproviding for speedy trial and the object and purpose statedherein above, it is advisable that the Court so established orspecified in exercise of powers under Section14, for thepurpose of providing for speedy trial directly take cognizanceof the offences under the Atrocities Act. But at the same time,as observed herein above, merely on the ground thatcognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act is not takendirectly by the Special Court constituted under Section 14 ofthe Atrocities Act, the entire criminal proceedings cannot besaid to have been vitiated and cannot be quashed and setaside solely on the ground that cognizance has been takenby the learned Magistrate after insertion of second provisoto Section 14 which confers powers upon the Special Courtalso to directly take cognizance of the offences under theAtrocities Act and thereafter case is committed to the SpecialCourt/Court of Session.

30. In support of the above conclusion, the words used insecond proviso to Section 14 are required to be consideredminutely. The words used are “Court so established or specifiedshall have power to directly take cognizance of the offencesunder this Court”. The word “only” is conspicuously missing.If the intention of the legislature would have to confer thejurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under theAtrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case,the wording should have been “that the Court so establishedor specified only shall have power to directly take cognizanceof offences under this Act”. Therefore, merely because nowfurther and additional powers have been given to the SpecialCourt also to take cognizance of the offences under theAtrocities Act and in the present case merely because thecognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate for the offencesunder the Atrocities Act and thereafter the case has beencommitted to the learned Special Court, it cannot be said thatentire criminal proceedings have been vitiated and same arerequired to be quashed and set aside.”

23. In view of the judgment of this Court in Shantaben BhurabhaiBhuriya (supra), the Argument of Mr. Ranjit Kumar that the AdditionalDistrict Judge and Sessions Judge, Court No.4 Hathras had no jurisdictionto take cognizance or issue summons/orders cannot be sustained.

24. There was apparently political rivalry between the PetitionerNo.1 and Devendra Aggarwal. However, Complaint Case No. 19/2018has not been lodged against the Petitioners, by Devendra Aggarwal, butby the Respondent No.2, a Dhobi by caste, which is a scheduled caste.It cannot be said that the allegations in the complaint do not make outoffence under the Atrocities Act. It is specifically alleged that thePetitioners had abused the Respondent No.2 in filthy language byreference to his caste. The allegations in the Complaint Case No.19 of2018, if established, could result in conviction under the relevant sub-sections of Section 3(1) of the Atrocities Act.

25. Respondent No.2 being an employee of Devendra Aggarwal,it is possible that Complaint Case No.19/2018 may have been promptedby political vendetta against the Petitioner No.1. However, since asobserved above, the allegations in the complaint case make out an offenceunder Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, it would not be proper to nip thecomplaint in the bud, more so, when there are statements recorded inCourt under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The possibility of retaliation onthe part of the Petitioners by the acts alleged in the complaint, afterclosure of the earlier complaint No.17 of 2010 cannot be ruled out.Quashing the criminal proceedings at the very inception might result ininjustice.

26. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C provides:- “482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing inthis Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powersof the High Court to make such orders as may be necessaryto give effect to any order under this Code, or to preventabuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure theends of justice.”

27. Even though, the inherent power of the High Court underSection 482 of the Cr.P.C., to interfere with criminal proceedings is wide,such power has to be exercised with circumspection, in exceptional cases.Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C is not to be exercised forthe asking.

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A28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P[2]., this Court heldthat inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C has to beexercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when suchexercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the sectionitself.B29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the process of Court,the High Court might in exercise of its inherent powers under Section482 quash criminal proceedings. However, interference would only bejustified when complaint did not disclose any offence, or was patentlyfrivolous, vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in Mrs.CDhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar[3].

30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reasonof political vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the criminalproceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v.State of Bihar and Others[4]. It is a well established proposition of lawthat a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequateDevidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or politicalvendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view ofBhagawti, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view,there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quoteKrishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh[5], “if the use ofEpower is of fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysationby malice is not legicidal.”

31. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagiand Ors.[6] A three-Judge Bench of this Court held:

“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present Code isFthe ad verbatim copy of Section 561-A of the old Code. Thisprovision confers a separate and independent power on theHigh Court alone to pass orders ex debito justitiae in caseswhere grave and substantial injustice has been done or wherethe process of the court has been seriously abused. It is notGmerely a revisional power meant to be exercised against theorders passed by subordinate courts. It was under this section 2 (2008) 8 SCC 7813 AIR 1990 SC 4944 (1987) 1 SCC 288

5 (1980) 2 SCC 471H6 (1983) 1 SCC 1

that in the old Code, the High Courts used to quash theproceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks againstwitnesses or other persons or subordinate courts. Thus, thescope, ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now Section482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the presentCode under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that insome cases there may be overlapping but such cases wouldbe few and far between. It is well settled that the inherentpowers under Section 482 of the present Code can beexercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigantand not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute.Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to beexercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind,there will be no inconsistency between Sections 482 and397(2) of the present Code.

7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were clearlydefined by this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State [(1980) 1 SCC43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna Iyer, J. observed asfollows: [SCC para 10, p. 47: SCC (Cri) p. 76]

“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of lawwhen a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherentpower is not right except under compelling circumstances.Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent powershould not invade areas set apart for specific power underthe same Code.”

. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mindis as to when the High Court acting under the provisions ofSection 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar asquashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matterwas gone into in greater detail in Smt Nagawwa v. VeerannaShivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri)507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ 1533] where thescope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code wasconsidered and while laying down the guidelines and thegrounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Courtobserved as follows: [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp.511-12]

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“Thus it may be safely held that in the following casesan order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accusedcan be quashed or set aside:

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(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or thestatements of the witnesses recorded in support of the sametaken at their face value make out absolutely no case againstthe accused or the complaint does not disclose the essentialingredients of an offence which is alleged against theaccused; B

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint arepatently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudentperson can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficientground for proceeding against the accused; C

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate inissuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been basedeither on no evidence or on materials which are whollyirrelevant or inadmissible; and D

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legaldefects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaintby legally competent authority and the like.

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The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and providesufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the HighCourt can quash proceedings.”

9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this Courtin Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar [(1977) 1 SCC 505F: 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2 SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146]where Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed asfollows: [SCC para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]

“It is now settled law that where the allegations set out in thecomplaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence,it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherentjurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate takingcognizance of the offence.

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10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings againstan accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the H

face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same,no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that takingthe allegations and the complaint as they are, without addingor subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then theHigh Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings inexercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

32. As held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v.Gourieshetty Mahesh[7], the High Court, while exercising jurisdictionunder Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon anenquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not or whether there isreasonable possibility that the accusation would not be sustained.

33. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand[8], this Court held:- “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power isto be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventingabuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure endsof justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offenceor not depends 14 upon the nature of facts alleged therein.Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are presentor not has to be judged by the High Court. …”

34. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. SambhajiraoChandrojirao Angre[9], a three-Judge Bench of this Court summarizedthe law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:- “The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution atthe initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be appliedby the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegationsas made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for thecourt to take into consideration any special features whichappear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedientand in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution tocontinue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot beutilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion ofthe court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, 7 (2010) 6 SCC 588

8 (2013) 11 SCC 673

9 (1988) 1 SCC 692

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8 (2013) 11 SCC 673

9 (1988) 1 SCC 692

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Atherefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowinga criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while takinginto consideration the special facts of a case also quash theproceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

35. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal[10], thisBCourt observed:- “46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution isnot used as an instrument of harassment or for seekingprivate vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurisethe accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, weCare of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirableto lay down an inflexible rule that would govern theexercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction ofthe High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide hasto be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution andonly when it is justified by the tests specifically laid downDin the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. Inview of the settled legal position, the impugned judgmentcannot be sustained.”

36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. V. Sanjay Sharma & Others[11],this Court observed that Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieveEthe purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted togenerate into weapons of harassment.

37. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.[12],this Court held:F“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the variousrelevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and ofthe principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series ofdecisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary powerunder Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above,Gwe give the following categories of cases by way of illustrationwherein such power could be exercised either to preventabuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the 10 (2007) 12 SCC 111 (2021) 5 SCC 524H12 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335

ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down anyprecise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised andinflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give anexhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such powershould be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information reportor the complaint, even if they are taken at their face valueand accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constituteany offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report andother materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclosea cogizable offence, justifying an investigation by policeofficers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under anorder of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) ofthe Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR orcomplaint and the evidence collected in support of the samedo not disclose the commission of any offence and make outa case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizableoffence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer withoutan order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are soabsurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which noprudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there issufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any ofthe provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under whicha criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution andcontinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is aspecific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providingefficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted A

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Awith an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accusedand with a view to spite him due to private and personalgrudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the powerof quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised veryBsparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarestof rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarkingupon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness orotherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaintand that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not conferan arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its Cwhim or caprice.

37. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of theCourt is spent on hearing appeals rather than entertaining petitions underSection 482 at an interlocutory stage which might ultimately result inmiscarriage of justice as held in Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed andDOthers[13].

39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nippedin the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It ispossible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of apolitical opponent. However, such possibility would not justify interferenceEunder Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. Asobserved above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitionersby the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot beruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute offence under theAttrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would haveFto be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations ina complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clearthat the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. TheComplaint Case No.19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashedat the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightlyGdismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

40. For the reasons discussed above, we are not inclined to interferewith the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The specialleave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

H13 (2008) 1 SCC 474

RAMVEER UPADHYAY & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR.[INDIRA BANERJEE, J. ]

41. Documents have been brought on record by the Petitionerswhich show that the Petitioner No.1 is a patient of lung cancer of anadvanced stage. He is on strong medication. Considering the conditionof the health of the Petitioner No.1, the Trial Court may considerexempting the personal appearance of the Petitioner No.1, if such anapplication is made to the Trial Court.

Nidhi Jain

SLP dismissed.

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