RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGING DIRECTOR & ANR. versus RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA on 16 January 2020

O R D E R

Civil Appeal No.7472/2011

1. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.

2. None has appeared for the respondent(s).

3. The civil suit was filed by the workmen for declaration andpermanent injunction assailing a fine imposed on them by the appellantmanagement. It is, inter alia, the plea of the respondents that what hasbeen done is in violation of Regulation 35 of the standing order (which isnon-statutory) in effect thus, the contractual obligation inter se the partiesis alleged to have been breached.

4. The appellant endeavoured to stall the suit by raising a pleaunder order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 claiming thatthe plaint is liable to be rejected and the respondents to be relegated tothe remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The plea did notfind favour with the learned Civil Judge, Jaipur City who dismissed thatapplication by order dated 16.5.2006. The revision petition preferredagainst the same was dismissed by the High Court on 27.02.2008. Twelveyears hence we are determining whether this exercise of the two forumsbelow was valid or not!

5. We may note that only notice was issued in the matter and nointerim order was granted. Logically speaking, the suit would have beentried and decided in the meantime, if not the appeal also considering thetime period which has lapsed. We are, however, informed that the suithas not even been proceeded with on the basis that matter is pendingbefore this Court. The facts pain us that the recourse to justice can bedelayed for such an ad infinitum period of time.

6. On examination, we find that the principles set out in ThePremier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay& Ors.- 1976(1) SCC 496 would govern i.e. as set out in para 9 below:

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“9. It would thus be seen that through the intervention of theappropriate government, of course not directly, a very extensivemachinery has been provided for settlement and adjudication ofindustrial disputes. But since an individual aggrieved cannotapproach the Tribunal or the Labour Court directly for the redressof his grievance without the intervention of the government, it islegitimate to take the view that the remedy provided under theAct is not such as to completely oust the jurisdiction of the civilcourt for trial of industrial disputes. If the dispute is not an industrialdispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) or within the meaningof Section 2A of the Act, it is obvious that there is no provision foradjudication of such disputes under the Act. Civil courts will bethe proper forum. But where the industrial dispute is for thepurpose of enforcing any right, obligation or liability under thegeneral law or the common law and not a right, obligation or liabilitycreated under the Act, then alternative forums are there giving anelection to the suitor to choose his remedy of either moving themachinery under the Act or to approach the civil court. It is plainthat he can’t have both. He has to choose the one or the other.But we shall presently show that the civil court will have nojurisdiction to try and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute if itconcerned enforcement of certain right or liability created onlyunder the Act. In that event civil court will have no jurisdictioneven to grant a decree of injunction to prevent the threatenedinjury on account of the alleged breach of contract if the contractis one which is recognized by and enforceable under the Actalone.”

7. Learned counsel does not dispute that the view taken in theaforesaid judgment has not been overruled but seeks to submit that thelegal position has been elucidated in the case of the appellant in RajasthanState Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Krishna Kant andOrs.-(1995) 5 SCC 75 as under:

“35. We may now summarise the principles flowing from the abovediscussion:

(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e.,where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law ofcontract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be notmaintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observanceor enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by theIndustrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forumscreated by the said Act.

(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observanceor enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactmentslike Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,1946 - whichcan be called ‘sister enactments’ to Industrial Disputes Act- andwhich do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, theonly remedy shall be to approach the forums created by theIndustrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial disputeswithin the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of IndustrialDisputes Act or where such enactment says that such disputeshall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shallbe adjudicated by any of the forums created by the IndustrialDisputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to Civil Court is open.

(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by theIndustrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reasonthat access to the forum depends upon a reference being madeby the appropriate government. The power to make a referenceconferred upon the government is to be exercised to effectuatethe object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule isto make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is atotally frivolous one ex-facie. The power conferred is the powerto refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that thegovernment is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex-faciefrivolous, not meriting an adjudication.

(5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend tothe Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provisionenabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/IndustrialTribunal directly - i.e., without the requirement of a reference bythe government - in case of industrial disputes covered by Section2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way inremoving the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of theremedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.

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A(6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordancewith the Industrial employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 arestatutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both uponthe employers and employees, though they do not amount to“statutory provisions”. Any violation of these Standing Ordersentitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forumsBcreated by the Industrial Disputes Act or the Civil Court whererecourse to Civil Court is open according to the principles indicatedherein.

(7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act andits sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolutionmechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy,inexpensive, informal and un-encumbered by the plethora ofprocedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicableto civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunalsunder the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in thesense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in C

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the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.”

8. We must keep in mind that the Industrial Dispute Act is analternative dispute resolution mechanism for the benefit of the workmento provide “speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by theEplethora of procedural laws. The object is thus, to protect the workmen.

9. It has also been observed that dispute arises from general lawof contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the generallaw of contract, a suit filed in civil court cannot be said to be notmaintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrialFdispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947. It is only when the dispute involves recognition,observance or inforcement of or obligations created by the IndustrialDisputes Act, the only remedy would be exclusively under the provisionsof the Industrial Disputes Act Act. The facts of this case involved thetermination of service of workmen and thus the remedy was inter aliaGunder the Industrial Disputes Act.

10. The present case involves recovery of certain fine amountwhich cannot be said to be covered by Section 2-A of the IndustrialDisputes Act. The workmen in their wisdom (or possibly, lack of it)approached the civil Court and have been left high and dry for the lastHfifteen years without any adjudication on merits of their claims. We RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORP. MANAGINGDIRECTOR v. RAMESH KUMAR SHARMA

may also note that the impugned orders are also, in a sense interlocutoryin character.

11. We are thus, of the view that there is no ground made out tointerfere with the impugned order and the appeal is consequentlydismissed.

12. In view of the lapse of time, we direct the Civil Judge toforthwith proceed to try the Civil Suit No.774/2005 and endeavour tocomplete the trial and pronounce the judgment, if not already pronouncedin the maximum period of six months from the date of receipt of theorder.

13. The appeal is dismissed in terms aforesaid.

C.A. No. 7475/2011, C.A. No. 7474/2011, C.A. No.7473/

2011 & C.A. No. 7476/2011

The appeals are dismissed in view of the order passed above inCivil Appeal No.7472/2011.

Divya Pandey

Appeals dismissed.

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