MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM versus STATE OF ASSAM & ANR. on 21 January 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 3 S.C.R.

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MUSSTT REHANA BEGUM

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STATE OF ASSAM & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2022)

BJANUARY 21, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDBELA M TRIVEDI, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code,1860 – ss.494, 495 – Appellant-wife filed application u/s.482 forCquashing the complaint filed by second respondent-husband u/ss.494 and 495, IPC – Dismissed by Single Judge – On appeal,held: As between the appellant and the second respondent the issueas to whether she had a subsisting marriage on the date on whichshe entered into a marriage with him is the subject matter of aDconclusive finding of the Principal Judge of the Family Court whichhas attained finality – Appellant and the second respondent wereparties to the decision of the Family Court – No contentious materialor disputed issues of evidence arise – Thus, allowing the criminalproceeding to proceed for an offence u/ss. 494 and 495, IPC wouldconstitute an abuse of the process – Single Judge of the High CourtEwas not justified in coming to the conclusion that the issue as towhether the appellant had a subsisting prior marriage was a ‘highlycontentious matter’ which has to be tried on the basis of the evidenceon the record – Impugned judgment set aside – Criminal Petitionfiled by the appellant for quashing the complaint is allowed –FComplaint quashed – Family Courts Act, 1984 – s.7(1).

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing –Types of materials High Court can assess – Distinction betweenconsideration of materials tendered as evidence and appreciationof such evidence – Discussed.G

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Family CourtsAct, 1984 – s.7(1)– Held: Explanation (b) to s.7(1), 1984 Act confersthe Family Court with jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial statusof a person – s.7(1) grants a Family Court with the status of aDistrict Court and s.7(2) confers it with jurisdiction exercisable byHa Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX of the CrPC, thus enabling to collect evidence to make such a determination – Thus,relying on the judgement of the Family Court which has jurisdictionto decide the gravamen of the offence alleged in the criminalcomplaint, would not be same as relying on evidentiary materialsthat are due for appreciation by the Trial Court, such as theinvestigation report before it is forwarded to the Magistrate.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Conclusion

HELD: 1.1 The gravamen of the complaint which has beenlodged by the second respondent is that on 11 January 1996,when he and the appellant entered into marriage, the appellanthad a prior subsisting marriage as a consequence of which she isguilty of an offence punishable under Section 494 of IPC. Fromthe record which has been produced before the Court, it emergesthat the appellant moved the Family Court for seeking adeclaration that the divorce which was pronounced by the secondrespondent was null and void under Muslim law. In his writtenstatement, the second respondent specifically supported thepurported talaq and the divorce certificate issued by the SadarKazi under the Muslim personal law. In the additional writtenstatement, the second respondent took the plea that the appellantdid not disclose to him that she had a prior marriage with anotherperson which was solemnized on 11 June 1987. Evidence wasadduced before the Family Court. The second respondentdeposed before the Family Court. The Principal Judge of theFamily Court at Guwahati, by a judgment dated 20 July 2017,issued a declaration that the divorce which was purportedlygranted by the second respondent to her is null and void. Thesaid judgment clearly shows that whether (i) the appellant had aprior subsisting marriage with another person; and (ii) the secondrespondent had obtained a valid divorce was in issue before theFamily Court. The finding of fact as between the appellant andthe second respondent is that the appellant did not have asubsisting prior marriage when she married him. The judgmentof the Family Court was questioned in MAT Appeal No 47 of2017. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appealfor non-prosecution on 20 June 2019, having noted that on theprevious occasion on 27 May 2019, no one had appeared on behalf AB

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Aof the second respondent in those proceedings. The order of theHigh Court continues to hold the field. Yet, the impugnedjudgement has held that the factum of the subsisting marriage ofthe appellant is a contentious matter and has declined to quashthe criminal complaint against the appellant. [Paras 11-13][968-D-H; 969-B-E]B

1.2 In certain circumstances, the High Court is entitled toconsider other materials before exercising its powers of quashingunder Section 482 of the CrPC. In the present case the appellantand the second respondent were parties to the decision of theFamily Court. No contentious material or disputed issues ofCevidence arise. In the above backdrop, allowing the criminalproceeding to proceed for an offence under Sections 494 and495 of IPC would constitute an abuse of the process. As betweenthe appellant and the second respondent the issue as to whethershe had a subsisting marriage on the date on which she entered Dinto a marriage with the second respondent is the subject matterof a conclusive finding of the Principal Judge of the Family Courtwhich has attained finality. Explanation (b) to Section 7(1) of theFamily Courts Act 1984 expressly confers the Family Court withjurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of a person.Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 grants a Family CourtEwith the status of a District Court and Section 7(2) confers it withjurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class underChapter IX of the CrPC, thus enabling to collect evidence tomake such a determination. Thus, relying on the judgement ofthe Family Court which has jurisdiction to decide the gravamen

Fof the offence alleged in the criminal complaint, would not besame as relying on evidentiary materials that are due forappreciation by the Trial Court, such as the investigation reportbefore it is forwarded to the Magistrate. Therefore, in this case,the Single Judge of the High Court was not justified in coming tothe conclusion that the issue as to whether the appellant had aGsubsisting prior marriage was a ‘highly contentious matter’ whichhas to be tried on the basis of the evidence on the record. Theimpugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.Criminal Petition instituted by the appellant for quashing the H

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complaint is allowed. The complaint pending in the Court ofSDJM(S) II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati is quashed. [Paras 15,16][974-F-H; 975-A-C; 976-D-E]

Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra 2021SCC OnLine SC 315; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259;State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy(2004) 6 SCC 522 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147; Pratibhav. Rameshwari Devi (2007) 12 SCC 369 : [2007] 9SCR 1038; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh KishoreGupta (2004) 1 SCC 691 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 672;P S Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1 : [1996] 2Suppl. SCR 631 – relied on.

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Case Law Reference

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.118 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2018 of the High Courtof Gauhati (The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, ArunachalPradesh) in Criminal Petition No.179 of 2016.

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Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, Ms. Kanishka Prasad, Ibad Mushtaq, Ms.Akanksha Rai, Advs. for the Appellant.

Nalin Kohli, AAG, Ms. Diksha Rai, Ankit Roy, Ankit Agarwal,Ms. Nimisha Menon, Ms. Ragini Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

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A3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a Single Judge of theGauhati High Court dated 4 April 2018 in Criminal Petition No 179 of2016. The Single Judge has dismissed an application filed by the appellantunder Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973[1] for quashinga complaint. The complaint, CR Case No 2512 of 2015, is pending in theCourt of SDJM(S) II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati for offences under SectionsB494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code 1860[2].

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4. The second respondent filed a complaint on 16 October 2015before the Chief Judicial Magistrate stating that on 11 January 1996, heand the appellant were married in accordance with the tenets of Muslimlaw. According to the complaint, the second respondent came to knowCthat the appellant was previously married to another person by the nameof Shoukat Ali. The allegation is that during the subsistence of the previousmarriage, she married the second respondent by suppressing the factthat she had a subsisting marriage. According to the complaint, theappellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 495 of the DIPC since she concealed the fact that she had a subsisting marriagewhen she married the second respondent.

5. The case of the appellant is that she and the second respondentgot married on 11 January 1996. Alleging matrimonial abuse at the handsof the second respondent on account of her failure to fulfill his demandsEfor dowry, the appellant lodged a complaint and a criminal case, namelyCase No 51/11, under Section 498A of IPC was accordingly registeredat the ‘All Women Police Station’. On 5 September 2011, the secondrespondent is alleged to have forwarded a purported divorce certificatedated 18 August 2011 through the Sadar Kazi, Kamrup, Guwahati to aneighbour of the appellant. On 17 September 2011, the appellant institutedFproceedings before the Principal Judge of Family Court – I, Kamrup,which was numbered as FC (Civil) Case No 545 of 2011 to challengethe purported divorce. By a judgment dated 20 July 2017, the PrincipalJudge of Family Court – I declared the divorce purportedly given by thesecond respondent to the appellant as null and void. In the meantime, onG11 September 2015, Complaint Case No 149/2015 was registered inregard to the allegedly forged certificate produced by the secondrespondent in collusion with the Sadar Kazi for offences punishable underSections 420, 406, 468 and 34 of IPC. On 16 October 2015, the second 1 “CrPC”H2 “IPC”

respondent lodged a complaint case, being CR Case No 2512 of 2015,alleging that the appellant had committed an offence punishable underSection 495 of IPC.

6. The appellant instituted a proceeding under Section 482 of CrPC.The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the petition by a judgmentdated 4 April 2018. The High Court has held that “it is highly disputed”whether the appellant had entered into a marital tie with another personprior to the marriage with the complainant and whether the earliermarriage had ended in a valid divorce. Moreover, the High Court heldthat the appellant had not come up with a specific case that she wasneither married earlier or that there was a divorce. Hence, in the viewof the High Court, the allegation in the complaint involves matter of trialand a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not be entertained. Thepetition was consequently dismissed.

7. Mr Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, counsel appearing on behalf of theappellant, submitted that the complaint which was lodged by the secondrespondent was essentially a counter blast to the complaint which waslodged by the appellant that the purported certificate of divorce which isobtained by the second respondent in collusion with the Sadar Kazi wasforged. Counsel submitted that the complaint alleging that the appellanthad entered into a wedlock with the second respondent during thesubsistence of an earlier marriage was lodged on 16 October 2015, soonafter the appellant had lodged a complaint against the second respondenton 11 September 2015. That apart, it was submitted that the finding in thejudgment of the Family Court that the appellant did not have a subsistingmarriage with Shoukat Ali has attained finality and is binding inter partes.In this backdrop, it was urged that the continuance of the criminalproceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the court.

8. Notice was issued in these proceedings by an order dated 2August 2019, which reads as follows:

“Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has reliedupon the finding which was recorded by the Principal Judge, FamilyCourt-I, Kamrup, Guwahati on 20 July 2017 (Annexure P-4) thatthe second respondent had failed to prove that the petitioner hada subsisting marriage when she married him.

Issue notice on the application for condonation of delay and onthe Special Leave Petition, returnable in eight weeks.

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968SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 3 S.C.R.

AUntil the next date of listing, there shall be a stay of furtherproceedings in CR Case No 2512/2015 pending in the Court ofSDJM (S)II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati.”

Issues

9. The office report indicates that the second respondent has beenserved. Yet, no appearance has been entered on his behalf.B

10. Mr Nalin Kohli, AAG, appears on behalf of the State of Assamwith Ms Diksha Rai. Opposing the submissions which have been urgedon behalf of the appellant, the AAG submitted that the issue as to whetherthe appellant had a prior marriage with Shoukat Ali is contentious andthat this would emerge from the judgment of the Family Court. Hence,Cthe AAG submitted that the allegation in the complaint would raise mattersof trial and, hence, the High Court was not justified in declining to exercisethe jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC.

11. The gravamen of the complaint which has been lodged by thesecond respondent is that on 11 January 1996, when he and the appellantDentered into marriage, the appellant had a prior subsisting marriage as aconsequence of which she is guilty of an offence punishable under Section494 of IPC. Now, from the record which has been produced before theCourt, it emerges that the appellant moved the Family Court for seekinga declaration that the divorce which was pronounced by the secondrespondent was null and void under Muslim law. In his written statement,Ethe second respondent specifically supported the purported talaq andthe divorce certificate issued by the Sadar Kazi under the Muslim personallaw. In the additional written statement, the second respondent took theplea that the appellant did not disclose to him that she had a prior marriagewith another person which was solemnized on 11 June 1987. Among theFissues which were framed by the Family Court, the second issue read asfollows:

“(2) Whether the petitioner was already married to Shoukat Ali,s/o Raja Ali @ Bhaiya Ali when getting married to the respondent?”

G12. Evidence was adduced before the Family Court. The secondrespondent deposed before the Family Court. The Principal Judge of theFamily Court at Guwahati, by a judgment dated 20 July 2017, issued adeclaration that the divorce which was purportedly granted by the secondrespondent to her is null and void. The conclusion which has been arrivedat by the Principal Judge is extracted below:H

“In view of the above discussions it is clear that the talaqpronounced by the respondent No.1 is not as per due procedure,as no reconciliation took place between the parties and as suchthe talaq is not valid one. It is also found that the respondent hasfailed to prove that the petitioner was already married to ShoukatAli, s/o Raja Ali @ Bhaiya Ali when getting married to therespondent.”

13. The above judgment clearly shows that whether (i) theappellant had a prior subsisting marriage with another person; and (ii)the second respondent had obtained a valid divorce was in issue beforethe Family Court. The finding of fact as between the appellant and thesecond respondent is that the appellant did not have a subsisting priormarriage when she married him. The judgment of the Family Court wasquestioned in MAT Appeal No 47 of 2017. A Division Bench of the HighCourt dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution on 20 June 2019, havingnoted that on the previous occasion on 27 May 2019, no one had appearedon behalf of the second respondent in those proceedings. The order ofthe High Court continues to hold the field. Yet, the impugned judgementhas held that the factum of the subsisting marriage of the appellant is acontentious matter and has declined to quash the criminal complaintagainst the appellant.

14. In Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra[3], athree-judge Bench of this Courtanalysed the precedent of this Court andculled out the relevant principles that govern the law on quashing of afirst information report[4] under Section 482 of the CrPC. The Court held:

“57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from thedecision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja NazirAhmad(supra), the following principles of law emerge:

i)Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained inChapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizableoffences;

ii)Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizableoffences; 4 “FIR”

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970SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aiii)However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offenceof any kind is disclosed in the first information report theCourt will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv)The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly withcircumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest ofBrare cases standard in its application for quashing underSection 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the normwhich has been formulated in the context of the deathpenalty, as explained previously by this Court);

v)While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which isCsought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to thereliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegationsmade in the FIR/complaint;

vi)Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initialstage; Dvii)Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and ararity than an ordinary rule;

viii)Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping thejurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the Stateoperate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherentEpower of the court is, however, recognised to secure theends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section482 Cr.P.C.

ix)The functions of the judiciary and the police arecomplementary, not overlapping;F

x)Save in exceptional cases where non-interference wouldresult in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicialprocess should not interfere at the stage of investigation ofoffences;

xi)Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not conferGan arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to itswhims or caprice; xii)The first information report is not an encyclopaedia whichmust disclose all facts and details relating to the offencereported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police isH

in progress, the court should not go into the merits of theallegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to completethe investigation. It would be premature to pronounce theconclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR doesnot deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuseof process of law. During or after investigation, if theinvestigating officer finds that there is no substance in theapplication made by the complainant, the investigating officermay file an appropriate report/summary before the learnedMagistrate which may be considered by the learnedMagistrate in accordance with the known procedure; A

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xiii)The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, butconferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious.It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv)However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,regard being had to the parameters of quashing andDthe self-restraint imposed by law, more particularlythe parameters laid down by this Court in the casesof R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal(supra), has thejurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and

xv)When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the allegedaccused, the court when it exercises the power underESection 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or notthe allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of acognizable offence and is not required to consider on meritswhether the allegations make out a cognizable offence ornot and the court has to permit the investigating agency/Fpolice to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”

The parameters for quashing an FIR have been laid down in Stateof Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[5]by a two-judge Bench of this Court. TheCourt has held:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the variousrelevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions 5 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 [“Bhajan Lal”]

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relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code whichwe have extracted and reproduced above, we give the followingcategories of cases by way of illustration wherein such powercould be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of anycourt or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may notbe possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficientlychannelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to givean exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such powershould be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information reportor the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value andaccepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute anyoffence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information reportand other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do notdisclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigationby police officers under Section 156(1) of the Codeexcept under an order of a Magistrate within the purviewof Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in theFIR or complaint and the evidence collected in supportof the same do not disclose the commission of anyoffence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an orderof a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of theCode.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint areso absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which noprudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there issufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any ofthe provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under whicha criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution andcontinuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficaciousredress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attendedwith mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance onthe accused and with a view to spite him due to private andpersonal grudge.”

Statutes

In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy[6], atwo-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials theHigh Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a distinctionbetween consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence andappreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly failsto prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing anFIR. The Court held:

“5…..Authority of the court exists for advancement of justiceand if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produceinjustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would bean abuse of the process of the court to allow any action whichwould result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. Inexercise of the powers court would be justified to quash anyproceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts toabuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedingswould otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence isdisclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question offact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it ispermissible to look into the materials to assess what thecomplainant has alleged and whether any offence is madeout even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960Cri LJ 1239] this Court summarised some categories of caseswhere inherent power can and should be exercised to quash theproceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal baragainst the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; AB

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(ii) where the allegations in the first information report orcomplaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entiretydo not constitute the offence alleged; A

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, butthere is no legal evidence adduced or the evidenceBadduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bearin mind the distinction between a case where there is nolegal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearlyinconsistent with the accusations made, and a case whereCthere is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or maynot support the accusations. When exercising jurisdictionunder Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would notordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidencein question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonableappreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. ThatDis the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubtshould not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment.Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretionand should take all relevant facts and circumstances intoconsideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrumentEin the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not aninstrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecutionand bring about its sudden death…..”

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15. The precedent of this Court clarifies that in certaincircumstances, the High Court is entitled to consider other materialsbefore exercising its powers of quashing under Section 482 of the CrPC.In the present case the appellant and the second respondent were partiesto the decision of the Family Court. No contentious material or disputedGissues of evidence arise. In the above backdrop, allowing the criminalproceeding to proceed for an offence under Sections 494 and 495 ofIPC would constitute an abuse of the process. As between the appellantand the second respondent the issue as to whether she had a subsistingmarriage on the date on which she entered into a marriage with thesecond respondent is the subject matter of a conclusive finding of theH

Principal Judge of the Family Court which has attained finality.Explanation (b) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 expresslyconfers the Family Court with jurisdiction to determine the matrimonialstatus of a person. Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984 grants aFamily Court with the status of a District Court and Section 7(2) confersit with jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class underChapter IX of the CrPC, thus enabling to collect evidence to make sucha determination. Thus, relying on the judgement of the Family Courtwhich has jurisdiction to decide the gravamen of the offence alleged inthe criminal complaint, would not be same as relying on evidentiarymaterials that are due for appreciation by the Trial Court, such as theinvestigation report before it is forwarded to the Magistrate[7]. An analogousfactual matrix came up for determination before this Court in P S Rajyav. State of Bihar[8]. This Court quashed an FIR against an accused underthe Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 by noticing that the accused hadbeen exonerated on an identical charge in the relevant departmentalproceedings in light of a report submitted by the Central VigilanceCommission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission. Atwo-judge Bench of this Court relied on the principles laid down in BhajanLal (supra) and quashed the FIR by holding:

“17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel forthe respondent could not but accept the position that the standardof proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is farhigher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt inthe departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the presentcase, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminalproceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findingsrendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate resultof it. On these premises, if we proceed further then there isno difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant. For ifthe charge which is identical could not be established in adepartmental proceedings and in view of the admitteddiscrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers onewonders what is there further to proceed against theappellant in criminal proceedings…..

7 Pratibha v. Rameshwari Devi, (2007) 12 SCC 369, paras 17-21; State of MadhyaPradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691, para 13

8 (1996) 9 SCC 1

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A23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the CentralVigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the HighCourt, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issuesraised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Reportof the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellantof the same charge in departmental proceedings would notBconclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have alreadyheld that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case,the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot bepursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by theHigh Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our orderCdated 27-3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugnedcriminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.”

Therefore, in this case, the Single Judge of the High Court wasnot justified in coming to the conclusion that the issue as to whether theDappellant had a subsisting prior marriage was a ‘highly contentious matter’which has to be tried on the basis of the evidence on the record.

16. For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside theimpugned judgment and order of the Gauhati High Court dated 4 April2018. Criminal Petition No 179 of 2016 instituted by the appellant forEquashing the complaint is allowed. The complaint, CR Case No 2512 of2015, pending in the Court of SDJM(S) II, Kamrup (M), Guwahati isquashed.

17. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

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Appeal allowed.

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