SURENDRA PRASAD MISHRA versus SMT. RAMAWATI AND OTHERS on 16 August 2019

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant, a judicial officer, was holding the post of MotorAccident Claims Tribunal at the relevant time. A claim petition was filedbefore him in which vakalatnama was filed by two counsel Mr. R.M.GSingh and Mr. D.K. Saxena. The matter was settled between theclaimant and the Insurance Company and the settlement petition wasfiled and signed by Mr. D.K. Saxena. At that time, Mr. R.M. Singhraised an objection that his fees had not been paid and that thecompromise should not be recorded. The appellant here in acceptedHthe request of Mr. R.M. Singh and held that the compromise petition could only be filed through Mr. R.M. Singh and not by Mr. D.K.Saxena. He came to the conclusion that since vakalatnama bearsa sum of Rs.10/- for the Advocates Welfare Fund, one lawyer can onlybe authorized and not more.

3. This order was challenged. The High Court rightly set asidethe order. It is not for any Court to settle the dispute between thelawyers with regard to payment of fees. If there is anymisconducton the part of the lawyer in taking up the brief of another lawyer,normally it is for the Bar Council and not for the Court to settle thedispute. It was rightly held by the High Court that the claimants in theMotor Accident Claims Tribunal should not be made to suffer becauseof the dispute between the lawyers. Having held so, the High Courtmade certain observations against the appellant questioning his bonafide and casting aspersions on his integrity and also accused him offavouring Mr. R.M. Singh. The High Court also directed on the judicialside that the matter be referred on the administrative side for anappropriate action. As far as the remarks are concerned, we are clearlyof the view that all the adverse remarks in the judgment made against appellant, whereby his integrity has been questioned or wherebyaspersions have been cast on his character, judicial orders or otherwiseare bound to be expunged.

4. This Court in a number of cases has cautioned that remarksagainst judicial officers should normally not be passed in judgments. Wefollow a system where the judgment of a Court is subject to judicialscrutiny by Higher Courts. The judgment may be right or wrong, butthe Higher Courts should not pass scathing remarks against the presidingofficer of the lower courts only because they do not agree with thepoint of view of the Trial Court.

5. In Ishwari Prasad Mishra v. Mohammad Isa [(1963) 3 SCR722], this Court observed as follows:

“No doubt, if it is shown that the decision of the trial court in agiven case is a result of a corrupt motive, the High Court mustcondemn it and must takedue further steps in the matter. Butthe use of strong language and imputation of corrupt motivesshould not be made light-heartedly because the Judge againstwhom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicatehis position.

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There is no doubt that judicial administration should be fearless;judges must have full freedom to express their conclusions inrespect of the evidence given by the witnesses before themwithout any favour or fear; and so, judicial power to express itsappreciation about oral evidence is very wide. But the very widthof the said power must inevitably impose some healthy restraintsupon its exercise.”

6. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1994 SC1031], this Court observed as follows:

“The higher courts every day come across orders of the lowercourts which are not justified either in law or in fact and modifythem or set them aside. That is one of the functions of thesuperior courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility ofthe judges and hence provides for appeals and revisions. A judgetries to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. Whiledoing so, sometimes, he is likely to err.

It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistentlypassing orders creating a suspicion of judicial conduct which isnot wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Evenin such cases, the proper course for the higher court to adopt isto make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his workand to use it on proper occasions. The judges in the higher courtshave also a duty to ensure judicial discipline and respect for thejudiciary from all concerned. The respect for the judiciary is notenhanced when judges at the lower level are criticizedintemperately and castigated publicly. No greater damage canbe done to the administration of justice and to the confidence ofthe people in the judiciary than when the judges of the highercourts publicly express lack of faith in the subordinate judges forone reason or the other. It must be remembered that the officersagainst whom such strictures are publicly passed, standcondemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and ofthe members of the public. No better device can be found todestroy the judiciary from within. The judges must, therefore,exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressingdisapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributingmotives to them iscertainly not one of them. That is the surestway to take the judiciary downhill.”

SURENDRA PRASAD MISHRA v.SMT. RAMAWATI AND OTHERS

7. In Parkash Singh Teji v. Northern India Goods TransportCo. Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. [(2009) 12 SCC 577], this Court observed asfollows:

“We are not undermining the ultimate decision of the High Courtin remitting the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal.However, we are constrained to observe that the higher courtsevery day come across orders of the lower courts which are notjustified either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside.Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges, henceit provides for appeals and revisions. A Judge tries to dischargehis duties to the best of his capacity, however, sometimes is likelyto err. It has to be noted that the lower judicial officers mostlywork under a charged atmosphere and are constantly underpsychological pressure. They do not have the benefits whichare available in the higher courts. In those circumstances,remarks/observations and strictures are to be avoided particularlyif the officer has no occasion to put forth his reasonings.”

8. In ‘K’ A Judicial Officer v. Registrar General, High Courtof A.P. [AIR 2010 SC 2801], this Court held as under:-

“….the Division Bench of the High Court may be fully justifiedin setting aside the order of injunction, but there was absolutelyno justification for the Division Bench to make highlydisparaging remarks against the appellant as a judicial officercasting doubts on his ability to decide the cases objectively. Theuse of the words ‘out of sheer arrogance and disrespect to thelawful order’ and the expression ‘judicial authoritarianism’ inparagraph 10 shows that the Division Bench ignored the wordsof caution administered by this Court in several judgmentsincluding those referred to hereinabove and castigated theappellant without any justification. The observations and remarksmade by the Division Bench of the High Court are bound toadversely affect the image of the appellant in the eyes of thepublic, his credibility as a judicial officer and also affects hiscareer. We are sure that if the Division Bench of the High Courthad kept in view the judgments of this Court, it would not havemade disparaging remarks against the appellant, which, in thefacts and circumstances of the case, were not at all called for.”

In the present case, the remarks especially those in para 15 castaspersions on the integrity of the judicial officer. Even if the High Court A

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Afelt as strongly as it did that action needed to be taken, then the propercourse was to place the matter before the Chief Justice on theadministrative side with a request that action be taken against theconcerned judicial officer. In this case, the High Court did that but inaddition passed the scathing remarks which virtually meant that theappellant stood condemned even before any disciplinary proceedingsBwere initiated against him.

9. The High Court can definitely say that the order passed showstotal lack of knowledge of law. But when the High Court wentfurther and virtually castigated the judicial officer as an unworthy andcorrupt person then the High Court, in our view, over-stepped itsCboundaries and such remarks need to be expunged.

10. We, accordingly, expunge all such remarks and direct deletionof para 15 of the judgment.

11. We also set aside the order in so far as the imposition ofcosts of Rs.10,000/- on the appellant is concerned. Normally, costsDare not imposed on the presiding officer of the Court and this practiceshould not be encouraged.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant states that as far as theadministrative action is concerned, it has already been dropped and heis not pressing relief in this regard.E

13. The civil appeal is accordingly allowed and we directexpunging of all remarks made against the appellant and furtherdirectthat para 15 of the impugned judgment shall stand deleted for all intentsand purposes.

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Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

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