K. CHINNAMMAL (DEAD) THR. LRS. versus L. R. EKNATH & ANR. on 11 May 2023

[2023] 6 S.C.R. 831

K. CHINNAMMAL (DEAD) THR. LRS.

v.

L. R. EKNATH & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No(S).3626 of 2023)

MAY 11, 2023

[KRISHNA MURARI ANDAHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 – ss.3and 4 – Eviction under – The respondent No.1 filed T.C.T.P. No. 5of 2015 before the Revenue Court against the appellants seekingtheir eviction on account of not having paid the lease rent for Fasli1419 to Fasli 1424 (corresponding to the years 2009 to 2014) – On04.02.2019 Revenue Court, ordered the appellants to pay lease rentof 31½ bags of paddy or the amount equivalent to it, to therespondents, within two months from the receipt of the Order, failingwhich eviction proceedings would be initiated against the appellants – Lease amount was finally deposited by the appellants on18.02.2021 – Respondent no.1 then filed application before theRevenue Court, seeking eviction of the appellants – Revenue Courtallowed the same vide order dated 03.12.2021, on the ground thatthe appellants did not deposit the lease rent amount within two months– High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellantschallenging the order of Revenue Court – On appeal, held: Thesubstantive order dated 04.02.2019, passed by Revenue Court, wasnever assailed by the appellants and thus had attained finality –Further, the compliance of the order of revenue court was not madewithin two months from the date of order – S. 3 and s.4 of the 1955Act will not come to the rescue of the appellants because as per s.3,late payment of the rent as per the direction of the Revenue Court isclearly a valid ground for effecting eviction and likewise, s. 4provides for restoration of possession only in limited cases and thattoo when the default is of only one year of lease amount to be paid;whereas in the present case, the default was for three Fasli years –Appeal was without any merit.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. This Court does not find any merit in the presentappeal. To begin with, the Order dated 04.02.2019, passed by

A

B

CD

EFG

H

Athe Revenue Court, was never assailed by the appellants herein.Thus, the relationship of the tenant-landlord is not disputed.Moreover, though the respondent no.1 had filed the case forrecovery of lease rent for Fasli(s) No. 1419 to 1424 @ 10½ bagsof paddy for each year, each bag weighing 65 kgs.; ultimately theOrder passed by the Revenue Court on 04.02.2019 was in theBform of a direction to the appellants to pay 31½ bags of paddy orits equivalent amount to the respondents for Fasli(s) No. 1421,1423 and 1424. As noted above, the substantive Order dated04.02.2019, having never been assailed, has attained finality. Evenupon receiving copy of the Order dated 04.02.2019 on 10.10.2020,Ccompliance was not made within two months i.e., by 09.12.2020.[Para 20][838-B-D]

2. Merely by the appellants sending a Legal Notice on06.11.2020, calling upon the respondent no.1 to come and collectthe rent would not, ipso facto, discharge their onus, in law, to pay.DThe appellants could not have called upon the respondents via aLegal Notice to come and collect the rent as, simply stated, theywere obliged in law, having not assailed the Order dated04.02.2019, to pay and, if for any reason the respondent no.1,either due to non-availability or resistance/refusal to receive/Eaccept the same, the Order dated 04.02.2019 had clearly providedthat either 31½ bags of paddy or the amount equivalent theretocould easily have been deposited before the Revenue Court; asultimately is stated to have been done by the appellants, thoughbelatedly, on 18.02.2021. 22. [Para 21][838-D-F]

F3. The contention of the counsel for the appellants thatSections 3 & 4 of the Act would come to their rescue is, in viewof this Court, erroneous, for the reason that as per Section 3 ofthe Act, late payment of the rent as per the direction of theRevenue Court is clearly a valid ground for effecting eviction.Likewise, Section 4 of the Act provides for restoration ofGpossession only in limited cases and that too when the default isof only one year of lease amount to be paid; whereas in the presentcase, the default was for three Fasli years. [Para 23][845-D-E]

S N Sundalaimuthu Chettiar v Palaniyandavan, AIR1966 SC 469 : [1966] SCR 450 – held inapplicable.H

G Ponniah Thevar v Nellayam Perumal Pillai, (1977) 1SCC 500 : [1977] 2 SCR 446 – distinguished.

A

Estralla Rubber v Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC97 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 68;Garment Craft v PrakashChand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181 – relied on.

B

Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In Re,(2022)2 SCC 117; S Kasi v State, (2021) 12 SCC 1 – referredto.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3626of 2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2022 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras at Madurai in CRP (NPD) (MD) No.271 of2022.

E

S. Gowthaman, Sandeep Rana, Ms. M. Venmani, Advs. for theAppellants.

F

S. D. Dwarakanath, Chand Qureshi, Rama Kant Sharma, SukeshGhosh, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

G

2. Leave granted.

3. The present appeal is directed against the Final Judgment andOrder dated 25.04.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the “ImpugnedJudgment”) in Civil Revision Petition (NPD) (MD) No. 271 of 2022(hereinafter referred to as the “Civil Revision Petition”), passed by a H

Alearned Single Bench of the Madras High Court Bench at Madurai(hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”). The High Court dismissedthe Civil Revision Petition filed by the appellants taking recourse to Article227 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the“Constitution”).

BTHE FACTUAL PRISM:

4. The respondent No.1 had filed T.C.T.P. No. 5 of 2015 beforethe Revenue Court, Madurai (hereinafter referred to as the “RevenueCourt”), on 08.12.2014, against the appellants seeking their eviction onaccount of not having paid the lease rent for Fasli 1419 to Fasli 1424C(corresponding to the years 2009 to 2014) @ 10½ bags of paddy eachweighing 65kgs.

5. On 04.02.2019 in I.A. No. 29 of 2015 in T.C.T.P. No. 5 of 2015,the Special Deputy Collector, Revenue Court, ordered the appellants topay lease rent of 31½ bags of paddy or the amount equivalent to it, to theDrespondents, within two months from the receipt of the Order, failingwhich eviction proceedings would be initiated against the appellants. Itwould be relevant to note that the said Order was concerned with thelease rent(s) for Fasli(s) 1421, 1423 and 1424. Though legal noticesbetween the parties were exchanged thereafter, but the lease amount isEsaid to have been finally deposited by the appellants on 18.02.2021. AMemo dated 22.02.2021 was filed in the Revenue Court.

6. The respondent no.1 then filed I.A. No. 15 of 2021 in T.C.T.P.No. 5 of 2015 before the Revenue Court, seeking eviction of the appellantsas they had failed to deliver the 31½ bags of paddy, or the amountFequivalent, towards lease rent, which was allowed vide Order dated03.12.2021, on the ground that the appellants did not deposit the leaserent amount within two months.

7. The appellants challenged the Order dated 03.12.2021 by wayof Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 271 of 2022 at the Madurai BenchGof the Madras High Court. The same was dismissed by the ImpugnedJudgement, confirming the Order dated 03.12.2021 passed by the SpecialDeputy Collector, Revenue Court, in I.A. No. 15 of 2021 in T.C.T.P. No.5 of 2015, thus giving rise to the present appeal. We deem it apposite toextract the short order hereunder in toto:

H

“To set aside the order the order passed by the SpecialSub Collector, Revenue Court, Madurai in I.A.No.15 of 2021in T.C.T.P.No.5 of 2015 dated 03.12.2021, the revisionpetitioners have filed this Civil Revision Petition before thisCourt.

2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sidesand perused the materials available on record.

3. As per order dated 04.02.2019, in I.A. No.29 of 2015in T.C.T.P.No.5 of 2015, the Revenue Court, Madurai hasdirected the revision petitioners to deposit the lease amountfor three Faslis viz., 1421, 1423 and 1424, within two months,from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The revisionpetitioners had received the order copy on 10.10.2020. So,the revision petitioners have to pay the lease amount withintrhee months from 10.10.2020, but they had deposited leaseamopunt only on 18.02.2021, ie., beyond the time limit. Therevision petitioners have stated that they have issued noticeto the respondent, but they have not deposited the lease amountwithin three months from the date of receiving the order copy.Hence, on that basis the Revenue Court has rightly directedthe revision petitioners to vacate the land. This Court finds novalid reason to allow this revision petition.

4. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition standsdismissed and order passed by the Special Sub Collector,Revenue Court, Madurai in I.A. No.15 of 2021 in T.C.T.P.No.5of 2015 dated 03.12.2021 is hereby confirmed. No costs.Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.”

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:

8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that they hadreceived the Order dated 04.02.2019 only on 10.10.2020 and had sentLegal Notice to the respondent No.1 on 06.11.2020 i.e., well within twomonths from the date of receipt of the Order dated 04.02.2019, (a)expressing their readiness and willingness to pay the lease rent of 31½bags of paddy, and (b) asking them to come with all the legal heirs of theoriginal lessor and collect the lease rent.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

A9. It was further submitted that on 11.11.2020, the respondent no.1replied that the appellants should come with all the five legal heirs of thecultivating tenants together and deliver the lease rent arrears of 31½bags of paddy to him, who would accept it after obtaining consent fromthe heirs of the original lessor. Learned counsel submitted that thereafterReplication Notice dated 07.12.2020 was issued by appellant no.1.B

10. Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the respondents havingfailed to come and accept the lease rent arrears, the same was depositedin court on 18.02.2021 for Rs.28,563/- in the State Bank of India Treasuryof the Special Deputy Collector, Revenue Court, and a Memo datedC22.02.2021 was filed by the appellants, with the receipt of such depositbefore the said Revenue Court.

11. It was submitted that only thereafter the respondents filed I.A.No. 15 of 2021 in T.C.T.P. No. 5 of 2015 before the Revenue Court, foreviction of the appellants on the ground that the lease rent of 31½ bagsDof paddy were not paid within the two months, as directed by Orderdated 04.02.2019.

12. Learned counsel submitted that even after the appellants fileda Reply to I.A. No. 15 of 2015 explaining the entire position and denyingany delay in paying the lease rent amount, the Special Deputy Collector,ERevenue Court, by Order dated 03.12.2021 in I.A. No. 15 of 2012 inT.C.T.P. No. 5 of 2015, directed that the appellants be evicted from theconcerned land.

13. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court vide theImpugned Judgment dated 25.04.2022 had wrongly rejected the CivilFRevision Petition and confirmed the Order dated 03.12.2021 passed bythe Special Deputy Collector, Revenue Court. It was submitted thatSection 3 of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955(hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) does not provide for eviction afterthe deposit of the due amount(s) and in the present case, the delay, notbeing inordinate, such order(s) ought not to have been passed. It was theGfurther contention of the learned counsel that Section 3 of the Act alsodoes not specify delay in deposit of rent as a ground for eviction.

14. It was next urged that the Order dated 04.02.2019 was receivedby the Appellants only on 10.10.2020 and payment was eventually made H

on 18.02.2021, the said period falling during the COVID-19 pandemic,the delay was required to be condoned.

15. Learned counsel submitted that Section 4 of the Act alsoprovides for restoration of possession of the land on payment of anyarrears of rent.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NO.1:

16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submittedthat even as per the contention of the appellants themselves, the copy ofthe Order dated 04.02.2019 was received by them on 10.10.2020 andthus, they had to comply with the same latest by 09.12.2020 i.e., within 2months, which, admittedly, had not been done. Further, it was submittedthat the appellants, only to delay, had sent a frivolous Legal Notice statingthat all the legal heirs of the original lessor should come together andreceive rent and issue receipt, which was appropriately responded to bythe respondent no.1 on 21.12.2020, highlighting that no steps were takenby the appellants to pay the lease amount.

17. It was submitted that even on 18.02.2021, only an amount ofRs.28,563/- was deposited instead of the total accrued amount ofRs.37,820/- and till date the remaining amount had not been deposited. Itwas submitted that the appellants suppressed the factum that therespondent No.1 had, after the passing of the Impugned Judgment,instituted Execution Proceedings No. 1 of 2022 and E.A. No. 5 of 2022for police protection and delivery, which was finally effected on13.10.2022.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

18. Though this Court had verbally permitted filing writtensubmissions, however, the appellants filed written submissions totalling16-pages (including extracts from the Act), that too without forwarding acopy thereof to the respondents. Further, belatedly, the appellants alsofiled a list of judgments, again without serving the other side.

19. Thus, this Court, ordinarily, would have rejected even consideringthe same, but nonetheless, in the interest of justice, has surveyed boththe written submissions and the judgments submitted, more so for thereason that in view of the order eventually being passed by us, no prejudice A

B

CD

E

F

G

H

Ais going to be caused to the other side due to such non-supply. We shallrefer to the judgments relied on by the appellants at the appropriate placeinfra.

20. Having considered the matter, this Court does not find anymerit in the present appeal. To begin with, the Order dated 04.02.2019,Bpassed by the Revenue Court, was never assailed by the appellants herein.Thus, the relationship of the tenant-landlord is not disputed. Moreover,though the respondent no.1 had filed the case for recovery of lease rentfor Fasli(s) No. 1419 to 1424 @ 10½ bags of paddy for each year, eachbag weighing 65 kgs.; ultimately the Order passed by the Revenue CourtCon 04.02.2019 was in the form of a direction to the appellants to pay 31½bags of paddy or its equivalent amount to the respondents for Fasli(s)No. 1421, 1423 and 1424. As noted above, the substantive Order dated04.02.2019, having never been assailed, has attained finality. Even uponreceiving copy of the Order dated 04.02.2019 on 10.10.2020, compliancewas not made within two months i.e., by 09.12.2020.

D

21. At this juncture, the Court would pause to indicate that merelyby the appellants sending a Legal Notice on 06.11.2020, calling upon therespondent no.1 to come and collect the rent would not, ipso facto,discharge their onus, in law, to pay. The appellants could not have calledupon the respondents via a Legal Notice to come and collect the rent as,Esimply stated, they were obliged in law, having not assailed the Orderdated 04.02.2019, to pay and, if for any reason the respondent no.1,either due to non-availability or resistance/refusal to receive/accept thesame, the Order dated 04.02.2019 had clearly provided that either 31½bags of paddy or the amount equivalent thereto could easily have beenFdeposited before the Revenue Court; as ultimately is stated to have beendone by the appellants, though belatedly, on 18.02.2021.

22. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act read as under:

“3. Landlords not to evict cultivating tenants G

(1) Subject to the next succeeding sub-sections, no culti-vating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any parttherof, by or at the instance of his landlore, whether inexecution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise.

(2) Subject to the next succeeding sub-section, sub-section(1) shall not apply to a cultivating tenant- H

(a) who, in the areas where the Tanjore Tenants andPannaiyal Protection Act, 1952 (Tamil Nadu Act XIV of1952), was in force immediately before the dale of cominginto force of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protec-tion (Amendment) Act, 1956, if in arrear at the commence-ment of this Act, with respect to the rent payable to thelandlord does not pay such rent within six weeks after suchcommencement or who in respect of rent payable to thelandlord after the commencement of this Act, does not paysuch rent within a month after such rent becomes due; or (aa) who, in the other areas of the State of Tamil Nadu, ifin arrear at the commencement of this Act, with respect tothe rent payable to the landlord and accrued due subse-quent to the 31st March, 1954, does not pay such rent withina month alter such commencement, or who in respect ofrent payable to the landlord after such commencement, doesnot pay such rent within a month after such rent becomesdue; or]

(b) who has done any act or has been guilty of any negli-gence which is destructive of, or injurious to, the land orany crop thereon or has altogether ceased to cultivate theland; or

(c) who has used the land for any purpose not being anagricultural or horticultural purpose; or (d) who has willfully denied the title of the landlord to theland.

Explanation I. - A denial of the landlord’s title under abona fide mistake of fact is not wilful within the meaning ofthis clause.

Explanation II. - In relation to areas where the TanjorePanniyal Protection Act, 1952 ([Tamil Nadu] Act XIV of 1952)[was in force] immediately before the dale of coming into forceof the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment)Act, 1956, the expression “commencement of this Act”wherever it occurs in this Act shall be construed as referringto the date aforesaid.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Explanation III. - In relation to the added territories,clause (aa) of this subsection shall have effect as if thefollowing clause had been substituted, namely:- “(aa) who, if in arrear on the date on which the Tamil NaduCultivating Tenants Protection and Payment of Fair Rent (Ex-tension to Added Territories) Act, 1963, is first published in the[Fort St. George Gazette], with respect to the rent payable tothe landlord and accrued due during a period of one monthbefore such date does not pay such rent within a month aftersuch date, or who in respect oi rent payable to the landlordafter such date, does not pay such rent within a month aftersuch rent becomes due; or”

Explanation IV. - In relation to Kanyakumari district,clauses (aa) of this sub-section shall have effect as if the fol-lowing clause had been substituted, namely:- (aa) who, if in arrear on the dale on which the Tamil NaduCultivating Tenants Protection and Payment of Fair Rent (Ex-tension to Kanyakumari District) Act, 1972, is first published inthe Tamil Nadu Government Gazette with respect to the rentpayable to the landlord and accrued due during a period of onemoot Is before such date does not pay such rent within a monthafter such date, or who in respect of rent payable to the land-lord after such date, does not pay such rent within a monthafter such rent becomes due; or]

(3) (a) A cultivating tenant may deposit in Court the rent or, if therent be payable in kind, its market value on the date of deposit, tothe account of the landlord-

(i) in the case of rent accrued due subsequent to the 31st March1954, within a month after the commencement of this Act;

(ii) in the case of rent accrued due after the commencement ofthis Act, within a month after the date on which the rent ac-crued due; (b) The Court shall cause* notice of the deposit to be issued to thelandlord and determine, after a summary enquiry, whether theamount deposited represents the correct amount of rent due from the cultivating tenant. If the Court finds that any further sum isdue, it shall allow the cultivating tenant such time as it may con-sider just and reasonable having regard to the relative circum-stances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant for depositingsuch further sum inclusive of such costs as the Court may allow.If the Court adjudges that no further sum is due, or if the cultivat-ing tenant deposits within the time allowed such further sum as isordered by the Court, the cultivating tenant shall be deemed tohave paid the rent within the period specified in the last foregoingsub-section. If, having to deposit a further sum, the cultivatingtenant fails to do so within the time allowed by the Court, thelandlord may evict the cultivating tenant as provided in sub-sec-tion (4).

(c) The expression “Court” in this sub-section means the Courtwhich passed the decree or order for eviction, or where there isno such decree or order, the Revenue Divisional Officer.

Explanation I. - In relation to the Shencottah taluk of theTirunelveli district, the expression ‘commencement of this Act’wherever it occurs in clause (a) of this sub-section shall be con-strued as referring to the date on which the Tamil Nadu Cultivat-ing Tenants Protection and Payment of Fair Rent (Amendment)Act, 1961, is first published in the Fort St. George Gazette.

Explanation II. - In relation to the added territories, the ex-pression ‘rent accrued due subsequent to the 31st March 1954’occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of this sub-section shall beconstrued as referring to rent accrued due during a period of onemonth before the date on which the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Ten-ants Protection and Payment of Fair Rent (Extension to AddedTerritories) Act, 1963 is first published in the Fort St. George Ga-zette.

Explanation III. - In relation to the Kanyakumari district,the expression rent accrued due subject to the 31st March 1954'occurring in sub-clause .(i) of clause (a) of this of this sub-sectionshall be construed as referring to rent accrued due during a periodof one month before the date on which the [Tamil Nadu] Cultivat-ing Tenants, Protection and Payment of Fair Rent (Extension to A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Kanyakumari district) Act, 1972, is first published in the TamilNadu Government Gazette.

(4) (a) Every landlord seeking to evict a cultivating tenant fallingunder subsection (2) shall, whether or not there is an order ordecree of a Court for the eviction of such cultivating tenant, makean application to the Revenue Divisional Officer and such appli-cation shall bear a Court-fee stamp of one rupee.

(b) On receipt of such application, the Revenue DivisionalOfficer shall, alter giving a reasonable opportunity to the landlordand the cultivating tenant to make their representations, hold asummary enquiry into the matter and pass an order either allowingthe application or dismissing it and in a case falling under clause(a) or clause (aa) of sub-section (2) in which the tenant had notavailed oi the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the RevenueDivisional Officer may allow the cultivating tenant such time ashe considers just and reasonable having regard to the relative cir-cumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant for deposit-ing the arrears of rent payable under this Act inclusive of suchcosts as he may direct. If the cultivating tenant deposits the sumas directed, he shall be deemed to have paid the rent under sub-section (3)(b). If the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the sum asdirected, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass an order foreviction.

Provided that the Revenue Divisional Officer shall not di-rect the cultivating tenant to deposit such arrears of rent as havebecome Time barred under any law of limitation for the time beingin force.

4. Right to restoration of possession.

(1) Every cultivating tenant who was in possession of any land onthe 1st December 1953 and who is not in possession thereof at thecommencement of this Act shall, on application to the Revenue’Divisional Officer, be entitled to be restored to such possession onthe same terms as those applicable to the possession of the landon the 1st December 1953.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to entitle anysuch cultivating tenant to restoration of possession-

(i) if, on the day this Act comes into force, he is in possession,either as owner or as tenant or as both, of land exceeding theextent specified in the Explanation below or if he has beenassessed to any sales-tax, profession-tax or income-tax underthe respective laws relating to the levy of such taxes during1953-54 or 1954-55; or

(ii) if the landlord, after evicting such cultivating tenant fromthe land [has been carrying on personal cultivation on the land],provided as follows:

(a) the total extent of land held by such landlord inclusive ofthe land, if any, held by him as tenant does not exceed theextent specified in the Explanation below; and (b) the landlord has not been assessed to any sales tax,profession-tax or income-tax under the respective laws re-lating to the levy of such taxes during 1953-54 or 1954-55;or

(iii) if subsequent to the 1st December, 1953, the landlord has bonafide admitted some other cultivating tenant to the possession ofland and such other tenant has cultivated the land before the com-mencement of this Act; Provided that where such other tenant is in possession, ei-ther as owner or as tenant or as both of any other land whichexceeds the extent specified in the Explanation below and, thecultivating tenant who was evicted is not in possession of any landor is in possession of any other land which is less than the extentspecified in the said Explanation, the cultivating tenant shall beentitled to restoration of possession.

Explanation. - The extent referred to in clauses (i) to (iii)above is 6-23 acres of wet land.

(3) Every application to a Revenue Divisional Officer un-der sub-section (1) shall be made within thirty days from the com-mencement of this Act, and shall bear a court-fee stamp of onerupee; A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Provided that the application maybe received after the pe-riod of thirty days aforesaid, if the applicant satisfies the RevenueDivisional Officer that he had sufficient cause for not making theapplication within that period.

(4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (3), theRevenue Divisional Officer shall, after giving a reasonable oppor-tunity to the landlord and the cultivating tenant, if any, in posses-sion of the land, to make their representations, hold a summaryinquiry into the matter and pass an order either allowing the appli-cation, or dismissing it the Revenue Divisional Officer may im-pose such conditions as he may consider just and equitable includ-ing in regard to-

(i) the payment by the applicant of any arrear of rent alreadydue from him to the landlord, but not exceeding in amount oneyear’s rent, and

(ii) the reimbursement by the applicant of the landlord or theother cultivating tenant in respect of the expenses incurred orthe labour done by him during the period when the applicantwas not in possession, on any crop which has not been har-vested, if an agreement is not reached between the parties asregards is not reached between the parties as regards the ratesand manner of such reimbursement.

Explanation. - In lieu of imposing any condition relating toreimbursement as provided in clause (ii), the Revenue DivisionalOfficer may, in his discretion, postpone the restoration of the ap-plicant to possession of the land, until any crop which is beinggrown thereon at the lime when the order is passed, has beenharvested.

(5) Any cultivating tenant who after the commencement ofthis Act has been evicted except under the provisions of sub-sec-tion (4) of section 3 shall be entitled to apply to the Revenue Divi-sional Officer within two months from the dale of such eviction orwithin two months from the date of coming into force of the TamilNadu Cultivating Tenants Protection ( Amendment) Act, 1956(Tamil Nadu Act XIV of 1956) for the restoration to him of thepossession of the lands from which he was evicted and to hold them with all the rights and subject to all the liabilities of a cultivat-ing tenant. The provisions of sub-section (4) shall, so far as maybe, apply to such an application.

Explanation I. - In relation to the Shencottah taluk of theTirunelveli district, the expressions ‘1st December, 1953’ and‘1953-54 or 1954-55 wherever they occur in this section shall beconstrued respectively as referring to ‘1st March, 1958’ and ‘1957-58 or 1958-59’.

Explanation II. - Nothing in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)shall apply to the added territories.

Explanation III. - Nothing in sub-section (1), (2) and (3)shall apply to the Kanyakumari District.”

23. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants thatSections 3 & 4 of the Act would come to their rescue is, in our view,erroneous, for the reason that as per Section 3 of the Act, late paymentof the rent as per the direction of the Revenue Court is clearly a validground for effecting eviction. Likewise, Section 4 of the Act provides forrestoration of possession only in limited cases and that too when thedefault is of only one year of lease amount to be paid; whereas in thepresent case, the default was for three Fasli years.

24. Reliance placed by the appellants on the judgment of this Courtin S N Sundalaimuthu ChettiarvPalaniyandavan, AIR 1966 SC469 is misplaced, as it has no applicability to the facts of the presentcase. It related to an order made under Section 3(3)(a) of the Act bywhich the respondents of the said case were permitted to deposit thearrears of rent holding them to be ‘cultivating tenant’ under Section 2(a)of the Act being covered under Section 2(ee) of the Act which definesthe meaning of the expression ‘carry on personal cultivation’. The RevenueCourt’s finding of the respondents being ‘landlord’ and the appellantsbeing ‘cultivating tenant’ was never assailed by the appellants. Notably,the challenge by filing the Civil Revision Petition was confined to onlythe Order of eviction dated 03.12.2021 and not against the original Orderi.e., the Revenue Court’s Order dated 04.02.2019, wherein it wascategorically held that the appellants are cultivating tenants and therespondents are landlords and which directed for their eviction in theevent of failure to pay the lease rent within two months.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

A25. Similarly, apropos the decision in G Ponniah ThevarvNellayam Perumal Pillai, (1977) 1 SCC 500, we note that the Courthad only held that cultivating tenant inducted by the person holding lifeestate in that land was also entitled for protection as per the provisions ofthe Act, even against the heirs of the inductor and they can only beevicted by following the procedure laid down in the Act for reasons thereinBmentioned. In fact, in Paragraph No. 4, it has been noted that Section3(2) of the Act deals with exceptional circumstances, such as default inpayment of rent in which the statutory protection from eviction of thetenant has been lifted. In the case at hand, in fact, the procedurecontemplated under the Act has been followed. Thus, in our view, theCaforesaid decision equally is not relevant in the facts and circumstancesof the present case.

26. We are afraid we cannot accord any benefit to the appellants,as sought to be taken on the basis of the various orders passed in SuoMotu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020, starting from Order datedD23.03.2020 [(2020) 19 SCC 10] leading up toCognizance for Extensionof Limitation, In Re, (2022) 2 SCC 117, for the reason that the samerelates to extension of the limitation period for filing Petitions/ Applications/Suits/ Appeals/ all other judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings within theperiod of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or underEany special laws (both Central and/or State), and has absolutely no bearinginsofar as the present matter is concerned.

27. The question of extension of time for compliance of the ordersof court does not, in any manner, relate to limitation. In any event, in theorders, starting from (2020) 19 SCC 10 and till (2022) 2 SCC 117F(supra) this Court was not extending, by way of overarching and/oromnibus directions, time to comply with and/or obey judicial/court orders.Order dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020[(2020) 19 SCC 10] has been commented upon in S Kasi v State,(2021) 12 SCC 1, where this Court was pleased to opine as under:

G“19. The limitation for filing petitions/ applications/ suits/appeals/ all other proceedings was extended to obviate lawyers/litigants to come physically to file such proceedings inrespective courts/tribunals. The order was passed to protectthe litigants/lawyers whose petitions/ applications/ suits/-appeals/ all other proceedings would become timebarred they H

being not able to physically come to file such proceedings.The order was for the benefit of the litigants who have to takeremedy in law as per the applicable statute for a right. Thelaw of limitation bars the remedy but not the right. When thisCourt passed the above order for extending the limitation forfiling petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals /all otherproceedings, the order was for the benefit of those who haveto take remedy, whose remedy may be barred by time becausethey were unable to come physically to file such proceedings.

”…

(emphasis supplied)

28. More importantly, when the appellants themselves admit thatthey had given a Legal Notice on 06.11.2020 showing their readinessand willingness to pay the lease rent amount, then they cannot take pleathat they were handicapped due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally,they deposited Rs.28,563/- on 18.02.2021. Ergo, it is manifest that in theinstant case, there was no such special handicap, effectuated by thepandemic, on the appellants in complying with the direction to pay 31½bags of paddy or an amount equal thereto, which could have compelledus, if at all, to lean in favour of the appellants.

29. Another aspect this Court would not lose sight of is the factthat the Act confers a privilege on the cultivating tenant vis-a-vis thelandlord, by which the cultivating tenant is protected from eviction by thelandlord. In order to grant such privilege, the scope of eviction of thecultivating tenant at the behest of the landlord is circumscribed, by theAct. Hence, the court is required to ensure that even the said limitedground(s) for eviction by the landlord of the cultivating tenant, are notfrustrated by granting some extra benefit or indulgence to the cultivatingtenant.

30. In the present factual set-up, the default is of at least threeyears, and the time given of two months was not per se inadequate. It isa matter of record that whatever payment was made/deposited, withoutgoing into whether it satisfied the Order dated 04.02.2019 or not, wasmade after over four months had elapsed, from the date of knowledge ofthe Order dated 04.02.2019, as admitted by the appellants.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

31. As far as the width and amplitude of powers of the High Courtunder Article 227 of the Constitution is concerned, we need only takenote of, in praesenti, Estralla Rubber v Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001)8 SCC 97, and Garment Craft v Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4SCC 181. In Estralla Rubber(supra), it was stated:

“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdictionby a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indiais examined and explained in a number of decisions of thisCourt. The exercise of power under this article involves a dutyon the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals withinthe bounds of their authority and to see that they do the dutyexpected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Courtis not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kindsof hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of thejurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exerciseof this power and interfering with the orders of the courts ortribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of dutyand flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law orjustice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a graveinjustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that theHigh Court while acting under this article cannot exercise itspower as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment inplace of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, whichis not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court canset aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court ortribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the findingis so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly cometo such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.

7. This Court in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co.Ltd. v. Ram Tahel Ramnand [(1972) 1 SCC 898 : AIR 1972SC 1598] in AIR para 12 has stated that the power underArticle 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparinglyand only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping thesubordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of theirauthority and, not for correcting mere errors. Reference alsohas been made in this regard to the case WaryamSingh v. Amarnath [AIR 1954 SC 215 : 1954 SCR 565] . ThisCourt in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R.

K. CHINNAMMAL (DEAD) THR. LRS. v. L. R. EKNATH[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.]

Tarte [(1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297] has observedthat the power of superintendence under Article 227 cannotbe invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superiorcourt can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court ofappeal and that the High Court in exercising its jurisdictionunder Article 227 cannot convert itself into a court of appealwhen the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal.Judged by these pronounced principles, the High Court clearlyexceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 in passing theimpugned order.”

32. In the more recent Garment Craft (supra), this Court put itthus:

32. In the more recent Garment Craft (supra), this Court put itthus:

“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearlyof the view that the impugned order [Prakash ChandGoel v. Garment Craft, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943] iscontrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons,but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdictionexercised by the High Court under Article 227 of theConstitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisoryjurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal toreappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which thedetermination under challenge is based. Supervisoryjurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even alegal flaw when the final finding is justified or can besupported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decisionon facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court ortribunal. [Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas MahabaleshwarKholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 69] Thejurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctionaljurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrantabuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice.The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly inappropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all tojustify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable personcan possibly come to such a conclusion that the court ortribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionaryrelief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage ofjustice.”

AB

C

D

EFG

H

850SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 6 S.C.R.

A33. Although the Impugned Judgment is a short one, for theadditional reasons afore-enumerated, and keeping in view the principlesenunciated in the preceding paragraphs, we do not deem it appropriate totinker therewith.

34. On an overall circumspection of the facts and circumstances,Bthis Court does not find any infirmity in Impugned Judgment, and theOrders dated 04.02.2019 and 03.12.2021 passed by the Revenue Court.Interim order dated 31.10.2022 is vacated.

35. Accordingly, this appeal stands dismissed.

C36. Any pending application(s) is/are closed.

37. Costs made easy.

D

Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

Appeal dismissed.

E

F

G

H