STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus MAHENDRA ALIAS GOLU on 25 October 2021

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

v.

MAHENDRA ALIAS GOLU

(Criminal Appeal No. 1827 of 2011)

OCTOBER 25, 2021

[SURYA KANT AND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s.376(2)(f) or s.354 – Prosecution casewas that about fortnight prior to the date of registration of FIR, thetwo victim-prosecutrix (PW-1 and PW-2) aged about 9 years and 8years respectively were playing in the street near the respondent’shouse – Respondent lured them with promise to give money andtook them to his house and took off his clothes and undressed PW-1 and started rubbing his genital against her genital and repeatedsame act with PW-2 – Both the girls got scared and started cryingand he threatened them with physcial harm – After few days, victimsrevealed the incident to PW-8 and thereafter the parents came toknow about the incident – Trial Court convicted the respondentunder s. 376(2)(f) r/w s. 511 – High Court set aside the convictionunder s.376(2)(f) r/w s.511 and instead convicted him under s. 354and consequently reduced sentence from 5 years to 2 years In theinstant appeal, the State contended that High Court erred inmodifying conviction to one under s. 354; that High Court miserablyfailed to appreciate the ingredients of ‘attempt to commit rape’ andhas lightened it as a case of mere preparation in a insensitive manner– Held: The act of the respondent of luring the minor girls, takingthem inside the room, closing the doors and taking the victims to aroom with the motive of carnal knowledge, was the end of‘preparation’ to commit the offence – His following action ofstripping the prosecutrices and himself, and rubbing his genitalsagainst those of the victims was indeed an endeavour to commitsexual intercourse – These acts of the respondent were deliberatelydone with manifest intention to commit the offence aimed and werereasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence – Sincethe acts of the respondent exceeded the stage beyond preparationand preceded the actual penetration, the trial court rightly heldhim guilty of attempting to commit rape as punishable within theambit and scope of s.511 read with s.375 as it stood in force at thetime of occurrence.

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134SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ACriminal Jurisprudence: ‘Attempt’ is punishable because evenan unsuccessful commission of offence is preceded by mens rea,moral guilt, and its depraving impact on the societal values is noless than the actual commission.

Penal Code, 1860: s.375 – Distinction between ‘preparation’Band ‘attempt’ to commit an offence – There is a visible distinctionbetween ‘preparation’ and ‘attempt’ to commit an offence and it alldepends on the statutory edict coupled with the nature of evidenceproduced in a case – The stage of ‘preparation’ consists ofdeliberation, devising or arranging the means or measures, whichwould be necessary for commission of offence – Whereas, an ‘attempt’Cto commit the offence, starts immediately after the completion ofpreparation – ‘Attempt’ is the execution of mens rea after preparation– ‘Attempt’ starts where ‘preparation’ comes to an end, though itfalls short of actual commission of the crime.

Allowing the appeal, the CourtD

HELD: 1.1 It is a settled preposition of CriminalJurisprudence that in every crime, there is first, Mens Rea(intention to commit), secondly, preparation to commit it, andthirdly, attempt to commit it. If the third stage, that is, ‘attempt’is successful, then the crime is complete. If the attempt fails, theEcrime is not complete, but law still punishes the person forattempting the said act. ‘Attempt’ is punishable because even anunsuccessful commission of offence is preceded by mens rea,moral guilt, and its depraving impact on the societal values is noless than the actual commission. [Para 11][141-G-H; 142-A]F

1.2 There is a visible distinction between ‘preparation’ and‘attempt’ to commit an offence and it all depends on the statutoryedict coupled with the nature of evidence produced in a case.The stage of ‘preparation’ consists of deliberation, devising orarranging the means or measures, which would be necessary forGthe commission of the offence. Whereas, an ‘attempt’ to committhe offence, starts immediately after the completion ofpreparation. ‘Attempt’ is the execution of mens rea afterpreparation.`Attempt’ starts where `preparation’ comes to an end,though it falls short of actual commission of the crime.[Para 12][142-B-C]H

1.3 However, if the attributes are unambiguously beyondthe stage of preparation, then the misdemeanours shall qualify tobe termed as an ‘attempt’ to commit the principal offence andsuch ‘attempt’ in itself is a punishable offence in view of Section511 IPC. The ‘preparation’ or ‘attempt’ to commit the offencewill be predominantly determined on evaluation of the act andconduct of an accused; and as to whether or not the incidenttantamounts to transgressing the thin space between `preparation’and ‘attempt’. If no overt act is attributed to the accused to committhe offence and only elementary exercise was undertaken and ifsuch preparatory acts cause a strong inference of the likelihoodof commission of the actual offence, the accused will be guilty ofpreparation to commit the crime, which may or may not bepunishable, depending upon the intent and import of the penallaws. [Para 13][142-C-E]

2. Section 511 IPC is a general provision dealing withattempts to commit offences which are not made punishable byother specific sections of the Code and it provides, inter alia,that,”whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by thisCode with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to causesuch an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does anyact towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no expressprovision is made by this Code for the punishment of suchattempt, be punished with imprisonment of any descriptionprovided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-halfof the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of thelongest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or withsuch fine as is provided for the offence, or with both”. A plainreading of Section 375 IPC before the 2013 Amendment spellsout that sexual intercourse with a woman below sixteen years,with or without her consent, amounted to ‘Rape’ and merepenetration was sufficient to prove such offence. The expression‘penetration’ denotes ingress of male organ into the female parts,however slight it may be. This Court has on numerous occasionsexplained what ‘penetration’ conveys under the unamended PenalCode which was in force at the relevant time. [Paras 14, 16][142-F-H; 143-E-F]

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136SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 10 S.C.R.

AAman Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2004) 4 SCC 379 :[2004] 2 SCR 237; Madan Lal vs. State of J&K (1997)7 SCC 677 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 337; Koppula VenkatRao vs. State of A.P. (2004) 3 SCC 602 : [2004] 2SCR 944 – relied on.

B3.1 What constitutes an ‘attempt’ is a mixed question oflaw and facts. ‘Attempt’ is the direct movement towards thecommission after the preparations are over. It is essential to provethat the attempt was with an intent to commit the offence. Anattempt is possible even when the accused is unsuccessful incommitting the principal offence. Similarly, if the attempt toCcommit a crime is accomplished, then the crime stands committedfor all intents and purposes. [Para 20][145-D-E]

3.2 There is overwhelming evidence on record to provethe respondent’s deliberate overt steps to take the minor girlsinside his house; closing the door(s); undressing the victims andDrubbing his genitals on those of the prosecutrices. As the victimsstarted crying, the respondent could not succeed in hispenultimate act and there was a sheer providential escape fromactual penetration. Had the respondent succeeded in penetration,even partially, his act would have fallen within the contours of‘Rape’ as it stood conservatively defined under Section 375 IPC

Eat that time. [Para 21][145-E-G]

3.3 The deposition by the victims (PW-1 and PW-2) areimpeccable. Both have unequivocally stated as to how therespondent allured them and indulged in all those traumatic actswhich have already been narrated in the preceding paragraphs.FThe statements of both the victim-children inspire full confidence,establish their innocence and evince a natural version withoutany remote possibility of tutoring. [Para 22][145-G-H]

3.4 Since the acts of the respondent exceeded the stagebeyond preparation and preceded the actual penetration, the TrialGCourt rightly held him guilty of attempting to commit rape aspunishable within the ambit and scope of Section 511 read withSection 375 IPC as it stood in force at the time of occurrence.The findings given contrarily by the High Court in ignorance ofthe material evidence on record, are perverse and untenable inthe eyes of law. [Paras 24, 25][146-E-F]H

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNo.1827 of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2009 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.1089 of 2007.

Mukul Singh, Dy. AG, Upendra Mishra, Sunny Choudhary, Advs.for the Appellant.

Anil K. Sharma, Praveen Chaturvedi, Advs. for the Respondent.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SURYA KANT, J.

1. State of Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as“Appellant”) is in appeal against the impugned judgment dated 08.10.2009passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Bench at Jabalpurwhereby the respondent’s conviction under Section 376(2)(f) read withSection 511 of Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) has been set asideand instead he has been held guilty under Section 354 IPC andconsequently his sentence has been reduced from 5 years to 2 yearsRigorous imprisonment.

BRIEF FACTS:

2. The prosecution case is that, about a fortnight prior to 20.12.2005(date of registration of FIR), the two victim-prosecutrix who are namedas ‘X’ (PW-1) and ‘Y’ (PW-2), aged about 9 years and 8 yearsrespectively, were playing ‘gilli-danda’ in the street located near therespondent’s house. The respondent who was known to both the victimsby virtue of living in the same locality, called them with the inducementthat he will give them money. Lured by the promise of getting money,both victims went along with the respondent to his house which wastotally empty at the time of the incident. Taking advantage of thisopportune moment, the respondent closed all the doors of the housefrom inside. He then led the victims to one of the rooms in the house anddeclared that he would marry them. It is stated that the respondentthereafter undressed PW-1 and made her lie down on the cotton cotwhich was kept in the room. Meanwhile, he also took off his clothes and A

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Astarted rubbing his genitals against the genitals of PW-1. Further, in thesame identical manner, the above-mentioned act was repeated withPW-2.

3. Both the minor victims, as an obvious reaction to therespondent’s acts must have felt scared and shocked because of whichBthey allegedly started crying. The respondent apprehending that theneighbours could possibly hear the victims’ voices, told them not to discloseanything about this incident and silenced them by threatening them withphysical harm. However, after a few days, both victims revealed thedetails of the incident to their friend who is named as ‘Z’ (PW-8).Fortunately, the incident which could have remained buried forever,Csurfaced because of the fateful and inadvertent intervention of PW-8. Itis stated that on the occasion of a religious gathering at PW-2’s house,PW-8 started teasing PW-2 by calling her as ‘respondent’s wife’, whichled to PW-6 (PW-2’s mother) inquiring the reasons behind the same.This chance probe spiralled into the victims revealing the incident’s detailsDto their mothers. On the same day of the gathering, PW-2 confided inPW-6 when the latter prodded her to share the details of the incident.Similarly, PW-1 confided in PW-3 (PW1’s mother) on the same day inthe evening. The mothers (PW-3 and PW-6) then communicated thesame to their respective husbands. After a lapse of 15 days of the incident,the present FIR was thus filed.E

4. The Trial Court convicted the respondent for the offence underSection 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC though acquitted him underSections 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Preventionof Atrocities) Act, 1989. The respondent was sentenced to undergorigorous imprisonment of 5 years and fine of Rs. 5000/-.F

5. The respondent laid challenge to his conviction before thePrincipal Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court and vide impugnedjudgment dated 08.10.2009, the High Court modified the judgment of theTrial Court; set aside the conviction under Section 376(2)(f) read withSection 511 IPC and convicted the respondent under Section 354 IPCGand sentenced him to undergo 2 years of rigorous imprisonment and fineof Rs. 5000/-. The High Court was of the opinion that:

“17. On going through the evidence on record particularlyallegations in FIR Ex.P/1, I am of the view that the appellantdid not make all efforts to attempt to commit rape with bothHprosecutrix, he had not gone beyond the stage of preparation and he did not intend to do so at all events. It is well settledprinciple of law that preparation of any offence cannot betermed as attempt to commit the same offence, I am of theconsidered view that the strength of evidence on record theoffence of indecent assault by the appellant on both theprosecutrix u/s 354 IPC is made out beyond reasonabledoubt……… Consequently the appellant is acquitted of charge376 (2)-(f) read with Section 511 IPC two counts. TheAppellant is convicted u/s 354 of IPC.”

[Emphasis applied]

6. The aforestated modification and resultant reduction in sentenceare assailed before us at the instance of the Prosecution.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES:

7. Mr. Mukul Singh, learned Counsel for the State vehementlycontended that there are explicit allegations of ‘attempt to commit rape’against the respondent. Both the prosecutrices have deposed as ‘X’(PW-1) and ‘Y’ (PW-2) and supported the prosecution case. Theyunshakably faced the grilling cross-examination and have minutelyexplained how the diabolic offence was committed. Both the victimshave admirably withstood the pressure of a humiliating and unnervingcross-examination. Their depositions have been duly corroborated by‘Z’ (PW-8)—a chance witness of the circumstances. He urged that theTrial Court had rightly convicted the respondent for the commission ofoffence under Section 376 (2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC which hasbeen unjustifiably modified by the High Court overlooking the soul of theStatute or the settled principles attracted to the facts and circumstancesof the case. Learned Counsel further argued that the High Court miserablyfailed to appreciate the ingredients of ‘attempt’ to commit rape and haslightened it as a case of mere ‘preparation’ in a cavalier and insensitivemanner.

8. Contrarily, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted thateven if the prosecution case is accepted as gospel truth, nothing beyondthe ‘preparation’ to commit rape has been proved. He emphasised thatthe Trial Court failed to draw the distinction between ‘attempt’ to commitan offence or mere ‘preparation’ thereof and erringly convicted therespondent for the offence of ‘attempt’ to commit rape. He passionatelyargued that the High Court has rightly rectified the patent error and A

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Amodified the conviction from ‘attempt to commit rape’ to an offence of‘outraging the modesty’ of a woman, as defined under Section 354 ofIPC. Further, learned Counsel for the respondent has also urged thatthere was a material contradiction in the testimony of PW-8 vis-à-visboth the victims regarding the former’s presence near the place ofoccurrence which makes the prosecution story highly doubtful.B

9. In all fairness, Mr. Praveen Chaturvedi, learned Counsel forthe respondent has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in AmanKumar vs. State of Haryana[1]to buttress his contention of distinctfeatures of mere ‘preparation’ to commit an offence, as compared to anactual ‘attempt’ to commit it. He, in specific, relied upon the followingCparagraphs of the cited decision:

“9. A culprit first intends to commit the offence, then makespreparation for committing it and thereafter attempts to committhe offence. If the attempt succeeds, he has committed theoffence; if it fails due to reasons beyond his control, he isDsaid to have attempted to commit the offence. Attempt to commitan offence can be said to begin when the preparations arecomplete and the culprit commences to do something with theintention of committing the offence and which is a step towardsthe commission of the offence. The moment he commences toEdo an act with the necessary intention, he commences hisattempt to commit the offence. The word “attempt” is not itselfdefined, and must, therefore, be taken in its ordinary meaning.This is exactly what the provisions of Section 511 require. Anattempt to commit a crime is to be distinguished from anintention to commit it; and from preparation made for itsFcommission. Mere intention to commit an offence, not followedby any act, cannot constitute an offence. The will is not to betaken for the deed unless there be some external act whichshows that progress has been made in the direction of it, ortowards maturing and effecting it. Intention is the directionGof conduct towards the object chosen upon considering themotives which suggest the choice. Preparation consists indevising or arranging the means or measures necessary forthe commission of the offence. It differs widely from attemptwhich is the direct movement towards the commission after D

preparations are made. Preparation to commit an offence ispunishable only when the preparation is to commit offencesunder Section 122 (waging war against the Government ofIndia) and Section 399 (preparation to commit dacoity). Thedividing line between a mere preparation and an attempt issometimes thin and has to be decided on the facts of eachcase. There is a greater degree of determination in attempt ascompared with preparation.

10. An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or a series ofacts, which leads inevitably to the commission of the offence,unless something, which the doer of the act neither foresawnor intended, happens to prevent this. An attempt may bedescribed to be an act done in part-execution of a criminaldesign, amounting to more than mere preparation, but fallingshort of actual consummation, and, possessing, except forfailure to consummate, all the elements of the substantivecrime. In other words, an attempt consists in it the intent tocommit a crime, falling short of, its actual commission. It mayconsequently be defined as that which if not prevented wouldhave resulted in the full consummation of the act attempted.The illustrations given in Section 511 clearly show thelegislative intention to make a difference between the casesof a mere preparation and an attempt.”

QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION:

10. In this factual backdrop, the question which falls for ourconsideration is whether the offence proved to have been committed bythe respondent amounts to ‘ attempt’ to commit rape within the meaningof Section 376(2)(f) read with Section 511 IPC or was it a mere‘preparation’ which led to outraging the modesty of the victims?

ANALYSIS:

Distinction between ‘Preparation’ and ‘Attempt’ to commit rape

11. It is a settled preposition of Criminal Jurisprudence that inevery crime, there is first, Mens Rea (intention to commit), secondly,preparation to commit it, and thirdly, attempt to commit it. If the thirdstage, that is, ‘attempt’ is successful, then the crime is complete. If theattempt fails, the crime is not complete, but law still punishes the personfor attempting the said act. ‘Attempt’ is punishable because even an AB

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Aunsuccessful commission of offence is preceded by mens rea, moralguilt, and its depraving impact on the societal values is no less than theactual commission.

12. There is a visible distinction between ‘preparation’ and‘attempt’ to commit an offence and it all depends on the statutory edictBcoupled with the nature of evidence produced in a case. The stage of‘preparation’ consists of deliberation, devising or arranging the means ormeasures, which would be necessary for the commission o f the offence.Whereas, an ‘attempt’ to commit the offence, starts immediately afterthe completion of preparation. ‘Attempt’ is the execution of mens reaafter preparation. ‘Attempt’ starts where ‘preparation’ comes to an end,Cthough it falls short of actual commission of the crime.

13. However, if the attributes are unambiguously beyond the stageof preparation, then the misdemeanours shall qualify to be termed as an‘attempt’ to commit the principal offence and such ‘attempt’ in itself is apunishable offence in view of Section 511 IPC. The ‘preparation’ orD‘attempt’ to commit the offence will be predominantly determined onevaluation of the act and conduct of an accused; and as to whether ornot the incident tantamounts to transgressing the thin space between`preparation’ and ‘attempt’. If no overt act is attributed to the accusedto commit the offence and only elementary exercise was undertakenEand if such preparatory acts cause a strong inference of the likelihood ofcommission of the actual offence, the accused will be guilty of preparationto commit the crime, which may or may not be punishable, dependingupon the intent and import of the penal laws.

14. Section 511 IPC is a general provision dealing with attemptsFto commit offences which are not made punishable by other specificsections of the Code and it provides, inter alia, that, “whoever attemptsto commit an offence punishable by this Code with imprisonmentfor life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to becommitted, and in such attempt does any act towards thecommission of the offence, shall, where no express provision isGmade by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, bepunished with imprisonment of any description provided for theoffence, for a term which may extend to one- half of theimprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half of thelongest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or withHsuch fine as is provided for the offence, or with both”.

15. It is extremely relevant at this stage to brush up the elementarycomponents of the offence of ‘Rape’ under Section 375 IPC, as was inforce at the time when the occurrence took place in the instant case.The definition of ‘Rape’, before the 2013 Amendment, used to providethat “A man is said to commit “rape” who, except in the casehereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman undercircumstances falling under any of the six followingdescriptions:—

First.—Against her will.

Secondly.—Without her consent.

Thirdly.—xxx xxx xxx

Fourthly.— xxx xxx xxx

Fifthly.— xxx xxx xxx

Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is undersixteen years of age.

Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute thesexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.

Exception.—Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife,the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

16. A plain reading of the above provision spells out that sexualintercourse with a woman below sixteen years, with or without herconsent, amounted to ‘Rape’ and mere penetration was sufficient toprove such offence. The expression ‘penetration’ denotes ingress ofmale organ into the female parts, however slight it may be. This Courthas on numerous occasions explained what ‘penetration’ conveys underthe unamended Penal Code which was in force at the relevant time. InAman Kumar (supra), it was summarised that:- “7. Penetration is the sine qua non for an offence of rape. Inorder to constitute penetration, there must be evidence clearand cogent to prove that some part of the virile member of theaccused was within the labia of the pudendum of the woman,no matter how little (see Joseph Lines, IC&K 893).”

17. Even prior thereto, this Court in Madan Lal vs. State of J&K[2]opined that the degree of the act of an accused is notably decisive to A

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Adifferentiate between ‘preparation’ and ‘attempt’ to commit rape. It washeld thus:

“12. The difference between preparation and an attempt tocommit an offence consists chiefly in the greater degree ofdetermination and what is necessary to prove for an offenceBof an attempt to commit rape has been committed is that theaccused has gone beyond the stage of preparation. If anaccused strips a girl naked and then making her lie flat onthe ground undresses himself and then forcibly rubs his erectedpenis on the private parts of the girl but fails to penetrate thesame into the vagina and on such rubbing ejaculates himselfCthen it is difficult for us to hold that it was a case of merelyassault under Section 354 IPC and not an attempt to commitrape under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC. In thefacts and circumstances of the present case the offence of anattempt to commit rape by the accused has been clearlyDestablished and the High Court rightly convicted him underSection 376 read with Section 511 IPC.”

18. The difference between ‘attempt’ and ‘preparation’ in a rapecase was again elicited by this Court in Koppula Venkat Rao vs. Stateof A.P.[3], laying down that:-E

“10. An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or a series ofacts, which leads inevitably to the commission of the offence,unless something, which the doer of the act neither foresawnor intended, happens to prevent this. An attempt may bedescribed to be an act done in part-execution of a criminalFdesign, amounting to more than mere preparation, but fallingshort of actual consummation, and, possessing, except forfailure to consummate, all the elements of the substantivecrime. In other words, an attempt consists in it the intent tocommit a crime, falling short of, its actual commission orconsummation/completion. It may consequently be defined asGthat which if not prevented would have resulted in the fullconsummation of the act attempted. The illustrations given inSection 511 clearly show the legislative intention to make adifference between the cases of a mere preparation and anattempt.

11. In order to find an accused guilty of an attempt with intentto commit rape, court has to be satisfied that the accused,when he laid hold of the prosecutrix, not only desired to gratifyhis passions upon her person, but that he intended to do so atall events, and notwithstanding any resistance on her part.Indecent assaults are often magnified into attempts at rape.In order to come to a conclusion that the conduct of theaccused was indicative of a determination to gratify hispassion at all events, and in spite of all resistance, materialsmust exist. Surrounding circumstances many times throwbeacon light on that aspect.”

[Emphasis applied]

19. In light of the statutory provisions as construed by this Courtfrom time to time in the cited decisions, let us examine whether therespondent attempted to commit rape of the prosecutrices or there wasonly preparation on his behalf?

20. We may at the outset explain that what constitutes an ‘attempt’is a mixed question of law and facts. ‘Attempt’ is the direct movementtowards the commission after the preparations are over. It is essential toprove that the attempt was with an intent to commit the offence. Anattempt is possible even when the accused is unsuccessful in committingthe principal offence. Similarly, if the attempt to commit a crime isaccomplished, then the crime stands committed for all intents andpurposes.

21. There is overwhelming evidence on record to prove therespondent’s deliberate overt steps to take the minor girls inside his house;closing the door(s); undressing the victims and rubbing his genitals onthose of the prosecutrices. As the victims started crying, the respondentcould not succeed in his penultimate act and there was a sheer providentialescape from actual penetration. Had the respondent succeeded inpenetration, even partially, his act would have fallen within the contoursof ‘Rape’ as it stood conservatively defined under Section 375 IPC atthat time.

22. The deposition by the victims (PW-1 and PW-2) areimpeccable. Both have unequivocally stated as to how the respondentallured them and indulged in all those traumatic acts which have alreadybeen narrated in the preceding paragraphs. The statements of both thevictim-children inspire full confidence, establish their innocence and evincea natural version without any remote possibility of tutoring.

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A23. Additionally, the feeble contention regarding the contradictionbetween the testimonies of PW-8 vis-à-vis both the victims is equallyuntenable. The perceived contradiction is not adequate to unsettle thenarrative on which the case of the prosecution is based. Even otherwise,this contradiction can at best be seen as a mere ‘exaggeration’ on behalfof a child witness whose remaining testimony completely supports theBprosecution. As correctly pointed out by the Trial Court, the pivotal factthat the details of the incident were shared by the victims with PW-8remains undisputed and as such the Courts are obliged not to discard theentire testimony on the basis of a minor exaggeration. Furthermore, thisCourt has time and again reiterated that the victim’s deposition even onCa standalone basis is sufficient for conviction unless cogent reasons forcorroboration exist.

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24. In our considered opinion, the act of the respondent of luringthe minor girls, taking them inside the room, closing the doors and takingthe victims to a room with the motive of carnal knowledge, was the end

Dof ‘preparation’ to commit the offence. His following action of strippingthe prosecutrices and himself, and rubbing his genitals against those ofthe victims was indeed an endeavour to commit sexual intercourse. Theseacts of the respondent were deliberately done with manifest intention tocommit the offence aimed and were reasonably proximate to theconsummation of the offence. Since the acts of the respondent exceededEthe stage beyond preparation and preceded the actual penetration, theTrial Court rightly held him guilty of attempting to commit rape aspunishable within the ambit and scope of Section 511 read with Section375 IPC as it stood in force at the time of occurrence.

CONCLUSION:F

F25. The findings given contrarily by the High Court in ignoranceof the material evidence on record, are perverse and untenable in theeyes of law. We, thus, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of theHigh Court and restore that of the Trial Court. The respondent is directedto surrender within two weeks and serve the remainder of his sentenceas awarded by the Trial Court. In case the respondent fails to surrender,Gthe Police Authorities are directed to arrest him and send a compliancereport.

26. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.

HDevika Gujral