AMRIT PAUL SINGH & ANR. versus TATA AIG GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS. on 17 May 2018

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2018] 6 S.C.R.

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AMRIT PAUL SINGH & ANR.

v.

TATA AIG GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No.2253 of 2018)

BMAY 17, 2018

[DIPAK MISRA, CJI AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – s.166 – Fatal accident – Truck ofappellant No.2 hit the motorcycle of the victim as a result of whichvictim sustained multiple injuries and died – Claim for compensationCbefore the MACT – Tribunal held that the insurer was not liable,however, directed the amount of compensation with interest to bepaid by the insurer with direction to recover the same from the ownerand driver of the vehicle – Held: It is clear from the materials broughton record that the vehicle at the time of accident did not have aDpermit – Use of a vehicle in a place without a permit is a fundamentalstatutory infraction – Nothing was brought on record by the insuredto prove that he had permit of the vehicle – In such a situation, theonus cannot be cast on the insurer – Therefore, the tribunal as wellas the High Court had rightly directed the insurer to pay thecompensation amount to the claimants with interest with stipulationEthat the insurer shall be entitled to recover the same from the ownerand the driver – Doctrines/Principles – Pay and recover principle.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: The insurer had taken the plea that the vehicle inFquestion had no permit. The existence of a permit of any natureis a matter of documentary evidence. Nothing has been broughton record by the insured to prove that he had a permit of thevehicle. In such a situation, the onus cannot be cast on the insurer.Therefore, the tribunal as well as the High Court had directedthe insurer to pay the compensation amount to the claimants withGinterest with the stipulation that the insurer shall be entitled torecover the same from the owner and the driver. The saiddirections are in consonance with the principles stated in SwaranSingh and other cases pertaining to pay and recover principle.[Para 23] [851-F-H]

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National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh and Others(2004) 3 SCC 297 : [2004] 1 SCR 180 – relied on.

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma andOthers (2004) 8 SCC 517 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR587 ; Ashok Kumar Khemaka v. Oriental InsuranceCompany Ltd. and Others 2014 (3) RCR (Civil) 1018 ;National Insurance Company Limited v. Kamlesh Kaurand Others 2006 (3) RCR (Civil) 634 ; Moti Ram v.ICICI Lombard and Others 2015 ACJ 1793 ; UnitedIndia Insurance Co. Limited v. Lehru (2003) 3 SCC338 : [2003] 2 SCR 495 ; Lakhmi Chand v. RelianceGeneral Insurance (2016) 3 SCC 100 ; OrientalInsurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and Others (2007)5 SCC 428 : [2007] 4 SCR 641 ; HDFC Bank Limitedv. Reshma and Others (2015) 3 SCC 679 ; Purnya KalaDevi v. State of Assam and Others (2014) 14 SCC 142– referred to.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2253of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.08.2016 of the High Courtof Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO No.1702/2016.

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ASudhir Walia, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Abhishek Atrey, Advs. forthe Appellants.

Amit Kumar Singh, Mrs. K. Enatoli Sema, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byB

DIPAK MISRA, CJI 1. The legal representatives of thedeceased, Jagir Singh, the husband of the second respondent, preferreda claim petition being MACT Case No. 70 of 2013 under Section 166 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) before the MotorAccident Claims Tribunal, Pathankot (for short, ‘the tribunal’) claimingCcompensation to the tune of Rs. 36,00,000/-. The claim petition was filedon the basis that on 19.02.2013, Jagir Singh was travelling to Pathankoton his motor cycle and at that juncture, the offending truck bearingtemporary registration No. PB-06-6894 belonging to the appellant No. 2driven in a rash and negligent manner hit the motor cycle of the deceased

Das a result of which he sustained multiple injuries, and eventually,succumbed to the same when being taken to the hospital. The claim putforth was sought to be sustained on many a basis which need not beadverted to.

2. The insurer, the first respondent herein, opposed the claim onEthe ground that the vehicle in question was driven in violation of theterms of the insurance policy and further the driver was not having avalid and effective driving license and, therefore, it was not obliged toindemnify the insured. That apart, a stand was taken that the vehicle didnot have the permit on the date of the accident. On behalf of the ownerof the vehicle and driver, assertions were made that the vehicle wasFinsured with the first respondent as per the insurance policy, that thevehicle was registered and the driver had the requisite driving licence.Additionally, copy of the route permit of the offending truck was broughton record.

3. The tribunal noted that the vehicle was purchased in SeptemberG2012 and insured on 20.12.2012. It was registered on 26.02.2013. Theaccident, as stated earlier, occurred on 19.02.2013. The tribunal, placingreliance on the decision rendered by this Court in National InsuranceCo. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma and others[1], held that the insurer 1(2004) 8 SCC 517H

was not liable and proceeded to quantify the amount of compensationand determined the same at Rs. 15,63,120/-. The tribunal directed theamount to be paid by the insurer along with interest at the rate of 9%from the date of award till its realisation and recover the same from theowner and driver of the vehicle. A further direction was given forattachment of the truck in question till the award was satisfied.

4. The award dated 20.11.2014 passed by the tribunal waschallenged in FAO No. 1702 of 2016 before the High Court of Punjaband Haryana at Chandigarh. It was contended in appeal that the appellantNo. 2, the owner of the offending vehicle, had deposited the necessaryfees along with application on 19.02.2013 for issue of route permit andthe same was issued on 27.02.2013. It was further urged that when theowner of the vehicle had already submitted the documents in the transportoffice for grant of permit along with the requisite fees, the tribunal wasin error in holding that the vehicle was being plied without a valid permit.In support of the submissions, reliance was placed upon Ashok KumarKhemaka v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and other[2], NationalInsurance Company Limited v. Kamlesh Kaur and others[3] and MotiRam v. ICICI Lombard and others[4].

5. The High Court scrutinized Annexure A-1 which was filed tojustify the stand that the application for issue of the route permit wasmade to the competent authority and, on a scrutiny of the same, came tohold that the owner had not been able to establish that he had submittedthe application for issue of permit before the accident. Referring toSection 66 of the Act and placing reliance on Challa Bharathammacase, the High Court opined that even assuming that the owner hadalready applied for grant of the permit before the accident, the samewould not entitle the owner to ply the vehicle. It is worthy to note thatthe learned single Judge distinguished the decisions cited before himand, resultantly, confirmed the award of the tribunal.

6. We have heard Mr. Sudhir Walia, learned counsel for theappellants, and Mr. Amit Kumar Singh, learned counsel for therespondent-insurer.

7. The conclusions recorded by the tribunal and further confirmedby the High Court clearly show that the accident occurred on 19.02.2013

2 2014 (3) RCR (Civil) 1018

3 2006 (3) RCR (Civil) 634

4 2015 ACJ 1793

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Aand the competent authority issued the permit on 27.02.2013. In thisregard, Sections 2(28) and 2(31) of the Act that define “motor vehicle”or “vehicle” and “permit” are reproduced below:-

“(28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanicallypropelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the powerBof propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internalsource and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attachedand a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixedrails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factoryor in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less thanfour wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding twenty-Cfive cubic centimetres;

(31) “permit” means a permit issued by a State or RegionalTransport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf underthis Act authorising the use of a motor vehicle as a transportvehicle;”D

On a perusal of both the definitions, it is quite clear that a permithas to be issued by the competent authority under the Act for use of amotor vehicle as a transport vehicle. The emphasis is on the words “use”as well as “transport vehicle”.

E8. Section 2(47) states that “transport vehicle” means a publicservice vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a privateservice vehicle. Section 66 stipulates necessity for permits. Sub-section(1) thereof provides that no owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permitthe use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place, whetheror not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save inFaccordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned bya Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority.Various provisos have been appended to the main provision stipulatingconditions for use of the vehicle and purpose of carriage of goods vehicle.Sub-section (2) states that the holder of a goods carriage permit mayGuse the vehicle for the drawing of any trailer or semi-trailer not ownedby him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. It is necessaryto mention here that a proviso has been added by Act 54 of 1994 witheffect from 14.11.1994 allowing the holder of a permit of any articulatedvehicle to use the prime-mover of that articulated vehicle for any othersemi-trailer. Section 2(2) defines “articulated vehicle” to mean a motorHvehicle to which a semi-trailer is attached.

9. It is apt to note here that sub-section (3) of Section 66 carvesout certain exceptions to sub-section (1). The relevant part of sub-section(3) is extracted below:- “(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply—

(a) to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government ora State Government and used for Government purposesunconnected with any commercial enterprise; (b) to any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by aperson acting under contract with a local authority and used solelyfor road cleansing, road watering or conservancy purposes;

(c) to any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade orambulance purposes; (d) to any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance ofcorpses and the mourners accompanying the corpses; (e) to any transport vehicle used for towing a disabled vehicle orfor removing goods from a disabled vehicle to a place of safety; (f) to any transport vehicle used for any other public purpose asmay be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf; (g) to any transport vehicle used by a person who manufacturesor deals in motor vehicles or builds bodies for attachment to chassis,solely for such purposes and in accordance with such conditionsas the Central Government may, by notification in the OfficialGazette, specify in this behalf; (h)xx xx

(i) to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which doesnot exceed 3,000 kilograms; (j) subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, bynotification in the Official Gazette, specify, to any transport vehiclepurchased in one State and proceeding to a place, situated in thatState or in any other State, without carrying any passenger orgoods; (k) to any transport vehicle which has been temporarily registeredunder section 43 while proceeding empty to any place for thepurpose of registration of the vehicle; A

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(m) to any transport vehicle which, owing to flood, earthquake orany other natural calamity, obstruction on road, or unforeseencircumstances, is required to be diverted through any other route,whether within or outside the State, with a view to enabling it toBreach its destination; (n) to any transport vehicle used for such purposes as the Centralor State Government may, by order, specify; (o) to any transport vehicle which is subject to a hire-purchase,lease or hypothecation agreement and which owing to the defaultof the owner has been taken possession of by or on behalf of theperson with whom the owner has entered into such agreement, toenable such motor vehicle to reach its destination; or C

(p) to any transport vehicle while proceeding empty to any placefor purpose of repair.”

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10. In the case at hand, the findings would show that the appellantNo. 2 did not have a permit for the vehicle. There is no dispute that thevehicle initially had a temporary registration and eventually the permanentregistration. It is the stand of the appellants that the tribunal and theHigh Court did not appreciate that the chasis of the vehicle was sent toEthe body where the body of the truck was fabricated and when thevehicle was driven out of the work shop at which point of time it metwith an accident. A contention has been made that the insurance policywas in force at the relevant time and, hence, the insurer is legally obligedto indemnify the insured. A distinction has to be made between “routepermit” and “permit” in the context of Section 149 of the Act. SectionF149(2) provides the grounds that can be taken as defence by the insurer.It enables the insurer to defend on the ground that there has been breachof a specific condition of the policy, namely, (i) a condition that excludesthe use of the vehicle, - (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is, onthe date of the contract of insurance, a vehicle not covered by a permitGto ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or(c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle isused, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-carbeing attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle. That apart, it alsoentitles the insurer to raise the issue pertaining to a condition that excludes H

driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not dulylicensed or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaininga driving licence during the period of disqualification or that excludesliability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war,riot or civil commotion. A further defence that can be availed of by theinsurer is that the policy is void on the ground that it has been obtainedby non-disclosure of the material fact or by representation of act whichis false in the material particular.

11. On a perusal of the written statement filed by the owner andthe driver, it is evident that the factum of accident having been causedby the vehicle in question had been denied. That apart, there is also adenial of liability that relates to the manner in which the accident hadoccurred as alleged in the claim petition. It was the specific assertion ofthe insurer before the tribunal that the vehicle was running in contraventionof the provisions of the Act, for it did not possess a route permit. Thetribunal, on the basis of the materials brought on record to the effect thatthe route permit was issued on 27.02.2013 and the accident occurred on19.02.2013, returned a finding that the vehicle in question did not havethe permit. As stated earlier, the High Court has affirmed the same.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that in theobtaining factual matrix, the breach would not exonerate the insurerfrom satisfying the judgment and an award in terms of Section 149 ofthe Act. He has drawn inspiration from the decision of a three-JudgeBench in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Swaran Singh and others[5].In the said case, the Court was dealing with the interpretation of Section149(2)(a)(ii) vis-à-vis the proviso appended to sub-sections (4) and (5)of Section 149 of the Act. The issue centrally pertained to the necessityof having a driving licence. After adverting to various provisions, theCourt also delved into the fundamental concept of third party right. Regardbeing had to the nature of the beneficial legislation, the Court observed:- “39. The question as to whether an insurer can avoid its liability inthe event it raises a defence as envisaged in sub-section (2) ofSection 149 of the Act corresponding to sub-section (2) of Section96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 had been the subject-matterof decisions in a large number of cases.”

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A13. The Court posed the question as to whether an insurer canavoid its liability in the event it raised the defence as envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act corresponding to sub-section (2) ofSection 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Court analysed thelanguage employed in sub-section (2) of Section 149, specifically clause(a), and, after scrutinizing the same and referring to various authorities,Bopined:- “69. The proposition of law is no longer res integra that the personwho alleges breach must prove the same. The insurance companyis, thus, required to establish the said breach by cogent evidence.In the event the insurance company fails to prove that there hasbeen breach of conditions of policy on the part of the insured, theinsurance company cannot be absolved of its liability. (See SohanLal Passi[6])

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70. Apart from the above, we do not intend to lay down anythingfurther i.e. degree of proof which would satisfy the aforementionedrequirement inasmuch as the same would indisputably depend uponthe facts and circumstances of each case. It will also dependupon the terms of contract of insurance. Each case may pose adifferent problem which must be resolved having regard to a largenumber of factors governing the case including conduct of partiesas regards duty to inform, correct disclosure, suppression, fraudon the insurer etc. It will also depend upon the fact as to who isthe owner of the vehicle and the circumstances in which the vehiclewas being driven by a person having no valid and effective licence.No hard-and-fast rule can, therefor, be laid down. If in a givencase there exists sufficient material to draw an adverse inferenceagainst either the insurer or the insured, the Tribunal may do so.The parties alleging breach must be held to have succeeded inestablishing the breach of conditions of the contract of insurance,on the part of the insurer by discharging its burden of proof. TheTribunal, there cannot be any doubt, must arrive at a finding onthe basis of the materials available on records.

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71. In the aforementioned backdrop, the provisions of sub-sections(4) and (5) of Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 maybe considered as to the liability of the insurer to satisfy the decreeat the first instance.

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83. Sub-section (5) of Section 149 which imposes a liability on theinsurer must also be given its full effect. The insurance companymay not be liable to satisfy the decree and, therefore, its liabilitymay be zero but it does not mean that it did not have initial liabilityat all. Thus, if the insurance company is made liable to pay anyamount, it can recover the entire amount paid to the third party onbehalf of the assured. If this interpretation is not given to thebeneficent provisions of the Act having regard to its purport andobject, we fail to see a situation where beneficent provisions canbe given effect to. Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the Act, towhich pointed attention of the Court has been drawn by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner, which is in negative language may nowbe noticed. The said provision must be read with sub-section (1)thereof. The right to avoid liability in terms of sub-section (2) ofSection 149 is restricted as has been discussed hereinbefore. It isone thing to say that the insurance companies are entitled to raisea defence but it is another thing to say that despite the fact that itsdefence has been accepted having regard to the facts andcircumstances of the case, the Tribunal has power to direct themto satisfy the decree at the first instance and then direct recoveryof the same from the owner. These two matters stand apart and”require contextual reading.

[Emphasis supplied]

14. We may fruitfully note that the three-Judge Bench advertedto situations where the driver does not have a licence and the same hasbeen allowed to be driven by the owner of the vehicle by such person,the insurer would be entitled to succeed in defence and avoid liability,but the position would be different where the disputed question of factarises as to whether the driver had a valid licence and where the ownerof the vehicle committed a breach of the terms of the contract of insuranceas also the provisions of the Act by consciously allowing any person todrive a vehicle who did not have a valid driving licence.

15. The Court held that if, on facts, it is found that the accidentwas caused solely because of some other unforeseen or interveningcauses like mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexuswith the driver not possessing the requisite type of licence, the insurer AB

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Awill not be allowed to avoid its liability merely for technical breach ofconditions concerning driving licence. That apart, minor andinconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would notconstitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insuranceto third parties. The other category of cases that the Court addressed toincluded cases where the licence of the driver is found to be fake. InBthat context, the Court expressed its general agreement with UnitedIndia Insurance Co. Limited v. Lehru[7] and stated thus:- “92. … In Lehru case the matter has been considered in somedetail. We are in general agreement with the approach of theBench but we intend to point out that the observations made thereinCmust be understood to have been made in the light of therequirements of the law in terms whereof the insurer is to establishwilful breach on the part of the insured and not for the purpose ofits disentitlement from raising any defence or for the owners tobe absolved from any liability whatsoever ..”

D16. The three-Judge Bench summed up its conclusions and wethink it appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of the same:-

“110. (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification ofthe driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained insub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to haveEbeen committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer.Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualificationof the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselvesdefences available to the insurer against either the insured or thethird parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurerFhas to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failedto exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the conditionof the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver orone who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time.

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(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part ofthe insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of avalid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during therelevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liabilitytowards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the G

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condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found tohave contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals ininterpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of mainpurpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allowdefences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.

(vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonablecare to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by thedriver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirementsof law or not will have to be determined in each case.”

17. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that therehas been no fundamental breach of the policy conditions. In this context,we may profitably refer to the decision in Challa Bharathamma (supra)wherein a two-Judge Bench squarely dealt with the absence of a permitand ruled that plying a vehicle without a permit is an infraction and insureris not liable.

18. In Lakhmi Chand v. Reliance General Insurance[8], theCourt was concerned with an order passed by the National ConsumerDisputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) that had declined the reliefto the petitioner therein. The insurer in the said case had taken the pleathat the complainant had violated the terms and conditions of the policy,for five passengers were travelling in the goods carrying vehicle at thetime of the accident, whereas the permitted seating capacity of the motorvehicle of the appellant was only 1 + 1. The two-Judge Bench referredto Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and others[9] andexpressed the view that in order to avoid liability, the insurer must establishthat there was breach on the part of the insured.

19. The obtaining fact situation is sought to be equated with thefactual score in the said case. In this regard, it is useful to refer to theBench decision in HDFC Bank Limited v. Reshma and others[10]. Theissue that arose before the Court was whether the financier was liableto pay the compensation or it was the liability of the borrower. Thetribunal had returned the finding that the duty of the financier was to seethat the borrower did not neglect to get the vehicle insured and, therefore,it was jointly and severally liable along with the owner. The High Court 8 (2016) 3 SCC 100

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Ahad concurred with the said conclusion. The Court referred to PurnyaKala Devi v. State of Assam and other1[11] that has dealt with thedefinition of the term “owner” as contained in Section 2(30) of the Act.In the said case, the vehicle in question was under the requisition of theState of Assam under the provisions of law. In that context, the Courthas expressed that:-B

“16. … The High Court failed to appreciate that at the relevanttime the offending vehicle was under the requisition of Respondent1 State of Assam under the provisions of the Assam Act.Therefore, Respondent 1 was squarely covered under the definitionof ‘owner’ as contained in Section 2(30) of the 1988 Act. TheCHigh Court failed to appreciate the underlying legislative intentionin including in the definition of ‘owner’ a person in possession ofa vehicle either under an agreement of lease or agreement ofhypothecation or under a hire-purchase agreement to the effectthat a person in control and possession of the vehicle should beDconstrued as the ‘owner’ and not alone the registered owner. TheHigh Court further failed to appreciate the legislative intentionthat the registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable ifthe vehicle was not in his possession and control. The High Courtalso failed to appreciate that Section 146 of the 1988 Act requiresthat no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to useEa motor vehicle in a public place without an insurance policymeeting the requirements of Chapter XI of the 1988 Act and theState Government has violated the statutory provisions of the 1988Act.”

20. Be it noted, in the said case, the liability was fixed on the StateFkeeping in view the legislative intention behind Section 146 of the Act,no person shall use or cause or allow any other person to use a motorvehicle in a public place without an insurance policy as that is themandatory statutory requirement under the Act. Emphasis was laid onpossession and control of the vehicle and accordingly liability was fixedGon the State of Assam.

21. In HDFC Bank Limited (supra), the three-Judge Benchopined that the hypothecation agreement did not convey that the appellantfinancier had become the owner and was in control and possession of 11(2014) 14 SCC 142H

the vehicle. It was the absolute fault of the respondent No. 2 to take thevehicle from the dealer without full payment of the insurance, more sowhen nothing had been brought on record that the said fact was knownto the appellant financier or that it was done in collusion with the financier.

22. The Court held that when the intention of the legislature isquite clear to the effect that a registered owner of the vehicle should notbe held liable if the vehicle is not in his possession and control and therewas evidence on record that the respondent No. 2, plied the vehiclewithout the insurance in violation of the statutory provision contained inSection 146 of the Act, the High Court could not have mulcted the liabilityon the financier and finally, the financer was absolved of the liability.

23. In the case at hand, it is clearly demonstrable from the materialsbrought on record that the vehicle at the time of the accident did nothave a permit. The appellants had taken the stand that the vehicle wasnot involved in the accident. That apart, they had not stated whether thevehicle had temporary permit or any other kind of permit. The exceptionsthat have been carved out under Section 66 of the Act, needless toemphasise, are to be pleaded and proved. The exceptions cannot betaken aid of in the course of an argument to seek absolution from liability.Use of a vehicle in a public place without a permit is a fundamentalstatutory infraction. We are disposed to think so in view of the series ofexceptions carved out in Section 66. The said situations cannot be equatedwith absence of licence or a fake licence or a licence for different kindof vehicle, or, for that matter, violation of a condition of carrying morenumber of passengers. Therefore, the principles laid down in SwaranSingh (supra) and Lakhmi Chand (supra) in that regard would not beapplicable to the case at hand. That apart, the insurer had taken the pleathat the vehicle in question had no permit. It does not require the wisdomof the “Tripitaka”, that the existence of a permit of any nature is a matterof documentary evidence. Nothing has been brought on record by theinsured to prove that he had a permit of the vehicle. In such a situation,the onus cannot be cast on the insurer. Therefore, the tribunal as well asthe High Court had directed the insurer was required to pay thecompensation amount to the claimants with interest with the stipulationthat the insurer shall be entitled to recover the same from the owner andthe driver. The said directions are in consonance with the principlesstated in Swaran Singh (supra) and other cases pertaining to pay andrecover principle.

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852SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2018] 6 S.C.R.

A24. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not perceive anymerit in the appeal and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed withoutany order as to costs.

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Appeal dismissed.

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