SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. on 4 July 2023

[2023] 10 S.C.R. 101 : 2023 INSC 590

SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED

v.

THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 5731 of 2009)

JULY 04, 2023

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]

Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 – TNGST (Amendment)Act, 1993 (Act No. 24 of 1993) – TNGST (Second Amendment) Act,1996 (Act No.37 of 1996) – Taxation Entry No.61 – TNGST(Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No.32 of 1994) – Exemption Entry No.8– The appellant dealt in maize starch – The State through anExemption Notification exempted the products of millets includingmaize from the tax – State Legislature imposed tax on ‘sago andstarch of any kind’ (Taxation Entry No.61) – Same caused concernsamong maize starch dealers – High Court concluded that maizestarch will not be entitled to the benefit of exemption and upheldthe validity of the circular which classified maize starch under EntryNo.61 subject to 4% tax – Held: Maize is entitled to exemption interms of Exemption Entry No.8 – Maize starch being a product ofmaize derived through mechanical process, it cannot be read as“like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by Act No. 32 of1994 – Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is covered by TaxationEntry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996 which is to theeffect “… starch of any kind” – Looking at the specific (TaxationEntry No.61) in contradistinction with the general (Exemption EntryNo.8), there can be no manner of doubt that maize starch would becovered by the taxation entry and not by the exemption entry.

Interpretation of Statutes – Law is well settled that if in anystatutory rule or statutory notification two expressions are used -one in general words and the other in special terms - under therules of interpretation, it has to be understood that the special termswere not meant to be included in the general expression;alternatively, it can be said that where a statute contains both ageneral provision as well as a specific provision, the latter mustprevail.

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ADismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. When Act No.32 of 1994 amended Schedule IIIof the Act, Exemption Entry No.8 did not include the word ‘like’which was hitherto there in the Exemption Notification [No. 88of 1970 dated 14th March, 1970]. According to English grammar,Bthe word “like” can be used as a verb, as a noun as well as apreposition depending upon its setting. It had been used in theExemption Notification as a ‘noun”. Once it becomes clear fromExemption Entry No.8, as introduced by Act No.32 of 1994, that(i) it does not include the noun “like” as the first word withinbrackets and (ii) that maize is only included along with rice, flour,Cetc. (and not maize starch), it is only those items within thebrackets which, for the purposes of exemption, qualify as productsof millets. It is, therefore, those products of millets specificallyindicated, which are entitled to exemption under Section 8 of theAct read with Schedule III as per Exemption Entry No.8. [ParaD17][113-F-H; 114-A]

2. Can maize starch be considered a millet product, as inExemption Entry No.8, for the present purpose? This Court doesnot think so. Maize is the raw product, whereas maize starch is aprocessed product. While we are bound to hold that maize isEentitled to exemption in terms of Exemption Entry No.8 as itstood prior to the relevant assessment year, maize starch beinga product of maize derived through mechanical process, it cannotbe read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excluded by ActNo. 32 of 1994. Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is coveredby Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996Fwhich is to the effect “… starch of any kind”. The dictionarymeaning of the word “any” is “one or same or all”. In Black’sLaw Dictionary, it is explained that the word ‘any’ has diversemeaning and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or ‘every’ as wellas ‘same’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a given statute dependsGupon the context and subject matter of the statute. Had thelegislature intended to exclude any starch, including maize starch,a specific provision excluding it would have been made. [Para18][114-B-D]

3. Trite to say, the Legislature may not have intended twoHentries for the self- same commodity, one under the exempted SANTHOSH MAIZE & INDUSTRIES LIMITED v. THE STATEOF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

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category and the other under the taxable entry. Therefore, maizestarch has to be either covered by Taxation Entry No.61 orExemption Entry No.8. Taxation Entry No.61 provides a morespecific description and maize starch undoubtedly being a ‘kindof starch’ would, therefore, be comprehended in it. This is moreso because what is covered by Exemption Entry No.8 is maize,which is a product of millet. The position would have beenotherwise if Exemption Entry No.8 or any other entry in ScheduleIII carried the description of product of maize instead of ‘productof millet’. [Para 23][115-B-D]

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State of Tamil Nadu vs. Lakshmi Starch (1990) SCCOnLine Mad 777; State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL. IndrasAgencies (P) Ltd. T.C.(R) 902/1999 – held inapplicable.

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Reliance Trading Company, Kerala vs. State of Kerala(2011) 15 SCC 762; Associated Cement Company Ltd.vs. Commissioner of Customs (2001) 4 SCC 593 : [2001]1 SCR 608; Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3SCC 398 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 131; B. Shankara RaoBadami vs. the State of Mysore (1969) 1 SCC 1 : [1969]3 SCR 1; M/s. Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Limitedvs. West Bengal Small Industries DevelopmentCorporation (2007) 3 SCC 607 : [2007] 1 SCR 174 –referred to.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5731of 2009.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2008 of the High Courtof Madras in WP No. 14283 of 1999.

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Civil Appeal No. 5732 of 2009.

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AMs. T. Archana, Rajeev Gupta, Vinay Rajput, Ms. SubasriJaganathan, K. K. Mani, Advs. for the Appellant.

C. Kranti Kumar, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Shivani Jena, NamanDwivedi, P. Shankar, Danish Saifi, Sabarish Subramanian, M. YogeshKanna, Advs. for the Respondents.

BThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

THE CHALLENGE

The present appeals before us, by special leave, have been carriedCby the appellant from orders passed by a Division Bench of the MadrasHigh Court (“High Court”, hereafter). While the judgment and orderdated 8[th] September, 2008 dismissing the writ petition[1] instituted by theappellant is challenged in C.A. No. 5731 of 2009, the order dated 10[th]February, 2009 dismissing a review application[2] seeking a review of theaforesaid judgment and order is under challenge in C.A. No. 5732 ofD2009.

RELEVANT FACTS

2. The relevant facts, leading to institution of the present appeals,are noticed hereunder:

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a)The appellant, registered under the Tamil Nadu GeneralSales Tax Act, 1959 (“the Act”, hereafter), deals in maizestarch since 1975. The classification of maize starch underthe Act is the subject of dispute in the first of the two appeals.

b)The Government of Tamil Nadu, vide a Notification[3]F(“Exemption Notification”, hereafter) exempted theproducts of millets including maize from tax payable underthe Act. The relevant extract of the Exemption Notificationreads asunder:

“[…] the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby exempts,Gwith effect on and from the 1st April 1970, all salesof products of millets (like rice, flour, brokens and bran of cholam, cumbu, ragi, thinai, varagu, samai, 1 Writ Petition No. 14283 of 1999

2 Review Application No. 135 of 2008 in W.P. No. 14283 of 1999

H3 No. 89 of 1970dated 14th March, 1970

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kudiraivali, milo and maize) from the tax payableunder the said Act.”

c)The Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu (“Legislature”,hereafter) amended[4] Schedule I to the Act, adding Part Cand including Entry No. 53 therein, which imposed a 5%tax on ‘sago and starch of any kind’ w.e.f. 12[th] March,B1993. Later, through another amendment[5], ‘sago and starchof any kind’ was moved to Entry No. 61 of Part B ofSchedule I (“Taxation Entry No. 61”, hereafter) and thetax rate was reduced to 4% effective from 17[th ]July, 1996.

d)The aforesaid amendment dated 12[th] March, 1993 sparkedconcerns among maize starch dealers. One of them, M/sLakshmi Starch, sought a clarification from the SpecialCommissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes(“Commissioner”, hereafter). Vide Circular dated 14[th]December, 1993,the Commissioner clarified that theexemption would remain in effect—a specific notificationwill prevail over a general entry in the Schedule. It wasfurther stated that the process of obtaining maize starchfrom maize involves simple processing; therefore, maizestarch will be classified as ‘maize products’ and coveredby the Exemption Notification.

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e)The Legislature next amended[6 ]the Act w.e.f. 1[st] April, 1994.Entry No. 8 of Part B of Schedule III (“Exemption EntryNo. 8”, hereafter) was inserted exempting “products ofmillets (rice, flour, brokens and bran of cholam, cumbu,ragi, thinai, varagu, samai, kudiraivali, milo and maize)”from taxation under the Act. The amendment retained thelanguage of the Exemption Notification except that the word‘like’ was omitted. Although, in effect, the ExemptionNotification lost force with the amendment of the Schedule,nevertheless, the exemption on maize starch remainedunchanged based on subsequent clarifications issued by theCommissioner on 31[st] December, 1996 and 6[th] May, 1997.

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4 The TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1993(Act No. 24 of 1993)

5 The TNGST (Second Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act No. 37 of 1996)

6 The TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1994(Act No. 32 of 1994)

Af)However, this position was followed by two subsequentdevelopments - the latter being crucial for the presentpurpose. Firstly, Section 28-A was inserted w.e.f. 6[th]November, 1997 by way of an amendment[7] to the Act whichempowered, by way of a statutory provision, theCommissioner to issue clarifications concerning the rate ofBtax under the Act. Secondly, after the insertion of Section28-A, the Commissioner issued a Circular dated 23[rd] June,1998, clarifying that Exemption Entry No. 8 does notencompass maize starch; the said entry only applies toproducts listed within the brackets and excludes maize starchCwhich is distinct from maize flour and not commonlyunderstood as such by ordinary people or even dealers.Being covered by Entry 67 of Part D of Schedule I, it willbe taxed at 11%. However, a request having been receivedfrom the appellant for withdrawal of the Circular dated 23[rd]DJune, 1998, the Commissioner vide a subsequent Circulardated 8[th] October, 1998 cancelled the earlier Circular dated23[rd] June, 1998 and clarified that maize starch is taxablefrom 1[st] April, 1994, since Item 8 of Part B of Schedule IIIdoes not include maize starch. In view of specific EntryNo. 61 of Part D of Schedule I, i.e., “sago and starch ofEany kind”, it covers maize starch also, subject to a 4% taxto be levied w.e.f. 17[th ]July, 1996 and not tax at 11%.

g)Questioning the aforesaid clarification, the appellant madea representation before the Commissioner which came tobe rejected on 28[th] June, 1999. The appellant was servedFwith notices[8 ]for recovery of general sales tax to the tuneof Rs 7,69,729/- for FY 1998-1999, followed by a provisionalassessment notice[9] issued by the Commissioner. Thistriggered litigation between the parties.

THE HISTORY OF LITIGATIONG

3. The judicial trajectory of the case leading to the present stageis set out hereunder:

7 The TNGST (Amendment) Act, 1997 (Act No. 60 of 1997)

8 Dated 25th June, 1999 and 6th July, 1999

H9 Dated 27th July, 1999

a)Assessment proceedings having been initiated, the appellantAapproached the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal(“Tribunal”, hereafter) questioning the provisionalassessment notices and challenging the validity of theCircular dated 8[th] October, 1998. The petitions[10] came tobe dismissed, vide judgment dated 29[th] July, 1999, with theBobservation that it was not proper for the appellant toindependently challenge the said Circular and also contestthe assessment proceedings at the same time; the questionsregarding the validity of the Circular, therefore, could becontested in the assessment proceedings.

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b)It was, at this stage, that the appellant resorted to the writjurisdiction of the High Court seeking quashing of the orderof the Tribunal dated 29[th ]July, 1999 as well as praying thatthe Circular dated 08[th] October, 1998 be declared as ultravires Section 28-A, Exemption Entry No. 8, and Articles14, 19(1)(g) and 265 of the Constitution of India; alternatively,it was prayed that the said Circular should only applyprospectively from 08[th] October, 1998 rather than retroactivelyfrom 17[th ]July, 1996.

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c)The Division Bench of the High Court initially dismissedthe appellant’s writ petition on 25[th] August, 1999, statingEthat the appellant could agitate all the points before theassessing authority, who would proceed according to law.Dissatisfied with this ruling, the appellant approached thisCourt[11]. By an order dated 3[rd ]November, 2000, the appealwas allowed, and the writ petition restored to file to beFdecided by the High Court. This Court directed that sincethe validity of the Circular dated 8[th] October, 1998 issuedunder Section 28A was under challenge, it would be moreappropriate for the High Court to decide this legal pointrather than remanding the case to the lower authorities.

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d)Upon hearing the parties, the Division Bench of the HighCourt dismissed the writ petition on merits vide judgmentdated 8[th] September, 2008. The High Court was of the view 10 Original Petition Nos. 881 and 883 of 1999

11 Civil Appeal Nos. 6176 of 2000

Athat the Exemption Notification and subsequent circularsissued by the Commissioner, which sought to exempt maizestarch from taxation, do not hold binding authority as theylack statutory backing. This is because Section 28-A, whichempowers the Commissioner to issue clarifications, onlybecame effective from 6[th ]November, 1997. Circular datedB8[th ]October, 1998 carries legal validity as it was issuedsubsequent to the insertion of Section 28-A. Havingconcluded that maize starch will not be entitled to the benefitof exemption, the High Court upheld the validity of theCircular dated 8[th] October, 1998 which classified maizeCstarch under Entry No. 61 subject to a 4% tax.

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e)Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant preferred a reviewapplication. Observing that no case for interference hadbeen set up by the appellant, the High Court dismissed thereview application vide its order dated 10[th] February, 2009.

DSUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

4. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. K.K. Mani, learnedcounsel, advanced the following submissions:

a)The High Court failed to consider the correct entry pertainingEto the assessment year 1998-99. Exemption Entry No. 8clearly outlined an exemption in favour of products of millet,including maize, because maize starch is in the form of flour,though the flour is not obtained by mere grinding of thegrains, but rather through the treatment of maize by soakingit in water, subjecting it to various processes, and ultimatelyFobtaining starch, which is sold as flour, and this processwould certainly result in the sole product of millet retainingthe flour form. This is distinct from Taxation Entry No. 61,which pertains to ‘sago and starch of any kind’ and sagobeing derived from tapioca, a combined interpretation ofGthe phrase ‘sago and starch of any kind’ would excludemaize starch and encompass only tapioca starch.

b)The decision in Reliance Trading Company, Kerala vs.State of Kerala[12]was referred to in support of the contention that an exemption will only arise when there is aliability to pay tax. Section 3(2) read with Schedule I createsa tax liability on ‘sago and starch of any kind’. However,Section 8 read with Schedule III creates an exemption infavour of maize starch, Exemption Entry No. 8 will,therefore, over ride Taxation Entry No. 61.

c)The decisions of the High Court in State of Tamil Naduvs. Lakshmi Starch[13]and State of Tamil Nadu vs. TVL.Indras Agencies (P) Ltd.[14]were also placed to supportthe contention that Exemption Entry No. 8 derives its originfrom the Exemption Notification, the validity of which wasupheld in the aforesaid former judgment and maize starchwas accordingly exempted from tax. Exemption Entry No.8, therefore, is nothing but a re-enactment of the languageof the Exemption Notification in the form of a statutoryprovision and reflects the intention of the Legislature toexempt maize starch from tax.

d)As regards the omission of the word ‘like’, it was contendedthat the amendment having retained the language of theExemption Notification, the omission of the word ‘like’would, therefore, not make any difference to the scope ofthe entry in the light of the consistent practice to exemptmaize starch from taxation under Exemption Entry No. 8.

e)It was also contended that the High Court made anerroneous assessment in both the writ petition and the reviewapplication by considering Entry No. 44 of Part B ofSchedule III for the assessment year 1998-1999 which, asper the Court, excludes maize. However, the aforesaid entrywas introduced only in 2002 vide an amendment[15], whereinthe reference to maize was explicitly removed. Prior to thatamendment, Exemption Entry No. 8 which included maizewas applicable.

f)It is settled law that the power under Section 28-A of theAct cannot be exercised contrary to the statutory scheme 13 (1990) SCC OnLine Mad 777

14 T.C.(R) 902/1999

15 The TNGST (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2002

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Aof the Act, more particularly when the issue of classificationhas been settled by a court of law. This is evident from theState’s consistent practice to treat maize starch as exemptfrom tax, as confirmed by way of a series of circulars issuedover time categorically exempting maize starch from taxliability. Having regard to the clarifications issued in favourBof exemption, the Circular dated 8[th] October, 1998 requiringthe recovery of taxes retrospectively is a mere change ofopinion without cogent reason and, therefore, is liable to bequashed.

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g)In any event, the aforesaid Circular cannot have aCretrospective effect and will take effect only from the dateof issue, i.e., on and from 8[th] October, 1998.

5. Finally, submitting that for the assessment year 1998-1999 theappellant is entitled to exemption from tax on maize starch in accordancewith Exemption Entry No. 8, Mr. Mani prayed that the orders underDchallenge be set aside by declaring the appellant’s entitlement toexemption; consequently, the appeals be allowed.

6. Mr. C. Kranthi Kumar, learned counsel appearing for therespondents while supporting the impugned judgment, contended asfollows:E

a)Firstly, in the Assessment Year 1998-1999, maize starchwill fall under Taxation Entry No. 61, categorized as ‘sagoand starch of any kind’, and will be subject to a 4% taxrate. The term ‘starch of any kind’, encompasses all typesof starch, including maize starch. The decision inFAssociated Cement Company Ltd. vs. Commissionerof Customs[16]was relied on to support the contention thatthe words ‘any kind’ ought to be interpreted in an inclusivemanner to include all kinds of goods within its ambit.

b)Secondly, the Exemption Notification gained statutory supportstarting only from 1[st] April, 1994, through an amendmentGthat introduced Exemption Entry No. 8 exempting productsof millets. However, Taxation Entry ‘sago and starch ofany kind’ had already existed since 1993 and hence, wasthe applicable entry.

H16 (2001) 4 SCC 593

c)Thirdly, Exemption Entry No.8 modified the exemptingprovision as provided under the Notification and omittedthe word ‘like’ which restricted the benefit of theexemption only to the items specified therein. The decisionsof this Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel[17] andB. Shankara Rao Badami vs. the State of Mysore[18]were placed in support of the maxim expressum facitcessare tacitum. The contention put forth is that whenspecific matters are expressly mentioned, anything notmentioned should be deemed to have been excluded.

d)Fourthly, Exemption Entry No. 8 envisages maize which isa raw product and not maize starch which is a processedproduct. This proposition is further emphasized by themention of items like ‘flour’ and ‘bran of cholam’ in theexempting entry which are processed products.

e)Finally, the legislative intent is clearly discernible from the2002 amendment, wherein Exemption Entry No. 8 wasrepositioned as Entry No. 44, and the specific reference to‘maize’ was eliminated, thereby denying exemption to allthe maize products.

7. Mr. Kumar, thus, submitted that the appeals being devoid ofany merit are liable to be dismissed. Heprayed for an order to that effect.

STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER THE ACT

8. The entries under Schedule I are taxed under Section 3(2) ofthe Act while the entries under Schedule III are exempted under Section8 thereof.

9. Exemption Notification dated 14[th] March, 1970 held the field inexcess of two decades. While the Exemption Notification was in force,the Act was amended by Act No.24 of 1993. The existing Schedule Iwas replaced with a new Schedule, and ‘sago and starch of any kind’came to be inserted at Entry 53 of Part C of Schedule I with tax rate of5%.

10. Act No. 32 of 1994, i.e., the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax(Amendment) Act, 1994, further amended the Act. Entry 8 in Part B of 17 (1985) 3 SCC 39818 (1969) 1 SCC 1

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ASchedule III included the item which was hitherto covered by theExemption Notification and, thus, the same ceased to be operative withsuch amendment.

11. By Act No. 37 of 1996, the rate of tax was reduced from 5%to 4% in respect of ‘sago and starch of any kind’.

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12. Considering that the statutory scheme as regards theclassification of ‘maize’ underwent several changes over time, we deemit appropriate to provide a comprehensive overview of the applicabletaxing and exempting entries at relevant time periods. To facilitate clarity,the following table enumerates the applicability of these entries:

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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

13. We have considered the submissions advanced by learnedcounsel for the parties and have also perused the materials on record.

14. While we are not ad idem with all the reasons assigned by theHigh Court in the impugned judgment, we see no reason to differ withthe ultimate conclusion reached by it. We would, therefore, proceed toassign our own reasons for agreeing with the High Court that the appellantis not entitled to any relief.

15. The Exemption Notification was erroneously held by the HighCourt not to have statutory backing. Recital thereof shows the source ofpower. Exercise of power was in terms of Section 17 of the Act, whichappears to be the repository of the State Government’s power to exemptpayment of tax. However, nothing really turns on it in view of the severalAmendment Acts by which the Schedules were amended from time totime. Decision on C.A. No.5731 of 2009 has to be rendered not basedon the Exemption Notification but on the terms of the Act read with theSchedules thereto as it stood on 17[th] July, 1996, when Act No.37 of1996, i.e., the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act,1996 came into force. Indeed, the Act was amended further with effectfrom 27[th] March, 2002 by Act No.18 of 2002, i.e., the Tamil Nadu GeneralSales Tax (Fourth Amendment) Act, 2002, but the same being a post-millennium event is admittedly beyond the period under consideration,i.e., 1998-99; hence, we need not be too concerned with the latteramendment.

16. It would appear from the conspectus of the statutory provisionsas delineated above that there were two entries in the field at or aboutthe period of the relevant assessment year, i.e., “sago and starch of anykind” in Schedule I, referred by us as Taxation Entry No.61, and “productsof millets (rice, flour, brokens and brans of cholam, cumbu, ragi, thinai,varagu, samai, kudiraivali, milo and maize)” in Schedule III which weare referring to as Exemption Entry No.8.

17. When Act No.32 of 1994 amended Schedule III of the Act,Exemption Entry No.8 did not include the word ‘like’ which was hithertothere in the Exemption Notification [No. 88 of 1970 dated 14[th] March,1970]. According to English grammar, the word “like” can be used as averb, as a noun as well as a preposition depending upon its setting. It hadbeen used in the Exemption Notification as a ‘noun”. Once it becomesclear from Exemption Entry No.8, as introduced by Act No.32 of 1994,that (i) it does not include the noun “like” as the first word within bracketsand (ii) that maize is only included along with rice, flour, etc. (and notmaize starch), it is only those items within the brackets which, for the A

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Apurposes of exemption, qualify as products of millets. It is, therefore,those products of millets specifically indicated, which are entitled toexemption under Section 8 of the Act read with Schedule III as perExemption Entry No.8.

18. Can maize starch be considered a millet product, as inBExemption Entry No.8, for the present purpose? We do not think so.Maize is the raw product, whereas maize starch is a processed product.While we are bound to hold that maize is entitled to exemption in termsof Exemption Entry No.8 as it stood prior to the relevant assessmentyear, maize starch being a product of maize derived through mechanicalprocess, it cannot be read as “like maize”, the “like” having been excludedCby Act No. 32 of 1994. Maize starch being a kind of starch, it is coveredby Taxation Entry No. 61 as introduced by Act No.37 of 1996which is tothe effect “… starch of any kind”. The dictionary meaning of the word“any” is “one or same or all”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, it is explainedthat the word ‘any’ has diverse meaning and may be employed to indicateD‘all’ or ‘every’ as well as ‘same’ or ‘one’ and its meaning in a givenstatute depends upon the context and subject matter of the statute. Hadthe legislature intended to exclude any starch, including maize starch, aspecific provision excluding it would have been made.

19. The decision in Associated Cement Company Ltd. (supra)Ehas taken the view that the words ‘any other kind of moveable property’in clause (e) of Section 2(22) of the Customs Act defining ‘goods’ wouldinclude all tangible movable articles as goods for the purposes thereof.

20. We may also in this connection refer to the decision in M/s.Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Limited vs. West Bengal SmallFIndustries Development Corporation[19]where, while construing ‘anypremises’ contained in the provisions of the West Bengal PremisesTenancy Act, 1956, it has been held by this Court that ‘any’ is a word ofvery wide meaning and prima facie the use of it excludes limitation.

21. We hold that ‘any kind’ in the context the same has been usedGin the taxation entry clearly indicates that it has been used in a widesense extending from one to all and admits of no exception.

22. That in Taxation Entry No.61 ‘starch of any kind’ is precededby ‘sago’ does not, in our opinion, make any material difference. Sago isa starch extracted from the pith, or spongy core tissue of various tropicalH19 (2007) 3 SCC 607

palm stems. Therefore, what is taxable under Taxation Entry No.61 is‘sago’, which itself is a starch, as well as starch of any kind whichwould obviously include maize starch.

23. Trite to say, the Legislature may not have intended two entriesfor the self-same commodity, one under the exempted category and theother under the taxable entry. Therefore, maize starch has to be eithercovered by Taxation EntryNo.61 or Exemption Entry No.8. For thepurpose of ascertaining which of the two is the applicable entry, weneed not labour much having regard to the language in which the twoentries are expressed. Taxation Entry No.61 provides a more specificdescription and maize starch undoubtedly being a ‘kind of starch’ would,therefore, be comprehended in it. This is more so because what is coveredby Exemption Entry No.8 is maize, which is a product of millet. Theposition would have been otherwise if Exemption Entry No.8 or anyother entry in Schedule III carried the description of product of maizeinstead of ‘product of millet’.

24. Law is well settled that if in any statutory rule or statutorynotification two expressions are used - one in general words and theother in special terms - under the rules of interpretation, it has to beunderstood that the special terms were not meant to be included in thegeneral expression; alternatively, it can be said that where a statutecontains both a general provision as well as a specific provision, thelatter must prevail.

25. What emerges from the above discussion is that TaxationEntry No.61 is relatable to ‘starch’ of any kind whereas Exemption EntryNo.8 relates to products of ‘millet’.

26. Looking at the specific (Taxation Entry No.61) incontradistinction with the general (Exemption Entry No.8), there can beno manner of doubt that maize starch would be covered by the taxationentry and not by the exemption entry.

27. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant thatclarification provided by the Commissioner could not have been madeapplicable with retrospective effect is, in our considered opinion, withoutsubstance. The clarification vide Circular dated 8[th] October, 1998 wasissued in exercise of power conferred by the statute (i.e., Section 28-Aof the Act). Whenever a clarification pursuant to an application made bya registered dealer as to the applicable rate of tax is issued under sub- ABC

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Asection (1), or the Commissioner on his own clarifies any point concerningthe rate of tax under the Act, or the procedure relating to assessmentand collection of tax as provided for under the Act is issued under sub-section (2), the object is to make the rate of tax explicit what is otherwiseimplicit. The contention as raised, if accepted, would defeat the objectof issuing the clarification unless it were construed to have retrospectiveBeffect. What the clarification provided by the Commissioner does is toclear the meaning of the two entries which was already implicit but hadgiven rise to a confusion. A clarification of this nature, therefore, is boundto be retrospective.

28. Also, having regard to the nature of clarification issued, weChold that Circular dated 8[th] October, 1998 does not run counter to theprovisions of the Act.

29. We have considered the decisions cited by Mr. Mani inLakshmi Starch Limited (supra) and TVL. Indras Agencies (P)Limited (supra). For the reasons that we have assigned above, we holdDthat the said decisions do not aid the petitioner.

CONCLUSIONS

30. The impugned judgment is upheld albeit for reasons not assignedby the High Court. Finding no merit in the appeals, we dismiss the same.EParties shall, however, bear their own costs.

Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Appeals dismissed.

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