THE ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF INDIA AND ORS. versus UNION OF INDIA & ANR on 18 May 2023

426

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

ATHE ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF INDIA AND ORS.

v.

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 23 of 2016)

BMAY 18, 2023

[K. M. JOSEPH, AJAY RASTOGI, ANIRUDDHA BOSE,HRISHIKESH ROY AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 – Prevention ofCruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 – PreventionCof Cruelty to Animals (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2017 –Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Karnataka Second Amendment)Act, 2017 – Held: The expressions Jallikattu, Kambala and BullCart Race as introduced by the Amendment Acts of the three Stateshave undergone substantial change in the manner they were usedDto be practiced or performed and the factual conditions thatprevailed at the time the A. Nagaraja judgment was delivered cannotbe equated with the present situation – The Supreme Court cannotcome to the conclusion that in the changed circumstances,absolutely no pain or suffering would be inflicted upon the bullswhile holding these sports – But the Court is satisfied that the largeEpart of pain inflicting practices, as they prevailed in the mannerthese three sports were performed in the pre-amendment period havebeen substantially diluted by the introduction of these statutoryinstruments.Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 – Prevention ofFCruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 – Is the TamilNadu Amendment Act referable, in pith and substance, to Entry 17,List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, or doesit further and perpetuate cruelty to animals; and can it, therefore,be said to be a measure of prevention of cruelty to animals? Is itGcolourable legislation which does not relate to any Entry in theState List or Entry 17 of the Concurrent List – Held: The Tamil NaduAmendment Act is not a piece of colourable legislation – It relates,in pith and substance, to Entry 17 of List III of Seventh Schedule tothe Constitution of India – It minimises cruelty to animals in theconcerned sports and once the Amendment Act, along with theirH

Rules and Notification are implemented, the bovine sports wouldnot come within the mischief sought to be remedied by Sections 3,11(1) (a) and (m) of the 1960 Act.

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 – Prevention ofCruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 – The TamilNadu Amendment Act states that it is to preserve the cultural heritageof the State of Tamil Nadu – Can the impugned Tamil NaduAmendment Act be stated to be part of the cultural heritage of thepeople of the State of Tamil Nadu so as to receive the protection ofArticle 29 of the Constitution of India – Held: Jallikattu is a type ofbovine sports – It is going on in the State of Tamil Nadu for at leastlast few centuries – But whether this has become integral part ofTamil culture or not requires religious, cultural and social analysisin greater detail, which is an exercise that cannot be undertaken bythe Judiciary – The question as to whether the Tamil NaduAmendment Act is to preserve the cultural heritage of a particularState is a debateable issue which has to be concluded in the Houseof the People – This ought not be a part of judicial inquiry – Thisquestion cannot be conclusively determined in the writ proceedings– Since legislative exercise has already been undertaken andJallikattu has been found to be part of cultural heritage of TamilNadu, the Court would not disrupt this view of the legislature.

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 – Prevention ofCruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 – Is the TamilNadu Amendment Act, in pith and substance, to ensure the survivaland well-being of the native breed of bulls? Is the Act, in pith andsubstance, relatable to Article 48 of the Constitution of India – Held:The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is not in pith and substance, toensure survival and well-being of the native breeds of bulls – Thesaid Act is also not relatable to Article 48 of the Constitution ofIndia – Incidental impact of the said Amendment Act may fall uponthe breed of a particular type of bulls and affect agriculturalactivities, but in pith and substance the Act is relatable to Entry 17of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 – Prevention ofCruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 – Does theTamil Nadu Amendment Act go contrary to Articles 51A(g) and51A(h), and could it be said, therefore, to be unreasonable and AB

C

D

E

FGH

Aviolative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India – Held:The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act does not go contrary to the Articles51-A (g) and 51-A(h) and it does not violate the provisions of Articles14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 – Prevention ofBCruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017 – Is theimpugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act directly contrary to thejudgment in A. Nagaraja, and the review judgment dated 16.11.2016in the aforesaid case, and whether the defects pointed out in theaforesaid two judgments could be said to have been overcome bythe Tamil Nadu Legislature by enacting the impugned Tamil NaduCAmendment Act – Held: The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act read alongwith the Rules framed in that behalf is not directly contrary to theratio of the judgment in the case of A. Nagaraja and judgment ofthis Court delivered on 16.11.2016 dismissing the plea for Reviewof the A. Nagaraja judgment as the defects pointed out in theDaforesaid two judgments have been overcome by the State AmendmentAct read with the Rules made in that behalf.

Constitution of India – Art. 48 – Recognising rights of animals– By virtue of Article 48 of the Constitution of India which essentiallyoperates as a national guideline for law makers, a two-way pathEhas been devised – The first is imposing duty on the State to organiseagriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines –The second is emphasising the duty of the State to take steps forpreserving and improving the breeds and prohibiting slaughter ofcows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.

FAnswering the referred questions, the Court HELD: 1. On the question of conferring fundamental righton animals there is no precedent. The Division Bench in the caseof A. Nagaraja also does not lay down that animals haveFundamental Rights. The only tool available for testing thisGproposition is interpreting the three Amendment Acts on theanvil of reasonableness in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.While the protection under Article 21 has been conferred onperson as opposed to a citizen, which is the case in Article 19 ofthe Constitution, it will not be prudent to venture into a judicialadventurism to bring bulls within the said protected mechanism.HWe have our doubt as to whether detaining a stray bull from the

street against its wish could give rise to the constitutional writ ofhabeas corpus or not. In the judgment of A. Nagaraja, the questionof elevation of the statutory rights of animals to the realm offundamental rights has been left at the advisory level or has beenframed as a judicial suggestion. This Court does not want toventure beyond that and leave this exercise to be considered bythe appropriate legislative body. This Court does not think Article14 of the Constitution can also be invoked by any animal as aperson. While we can test the provisions of an animal welfarelegislation, that would be at the instance of a human being or ajuridical person who may espouse the cause of animal welfare.[Para 24][464-B-F]

2. In order to come to a definitive conclusion on thisquestion, some kind of trial on evidence would have beennecessary. It is also not Court’s jurisdiction to decide if a particularevent or activity or ritual forms culture or tradition of a communityor region. But if a long lasting tradition goes against the law, thelaw Courts obviously would have to enforce the law. Learnedcounsel appearing for the parties, however, have cited differentancient texts and modern literature to justify their respectivestands. In Public Interest Litigations, this Court has developedthe practice of arriving at a conclusion on subjects of this naturewithout insisting on proper trial to appreciate certain social oreconomic conditions going by available reliable literature. Inparagraphs 53 and 73 in the case of Nagaraja, there is judicialdetermination about the practice being offensive to the provisionsof the Central Statute. It would be trite to repeat that provisionsof a Statute cannot be overridden by a traditional or cultural event.Thus, this Court accepts the argument of the petitioners that atthe relevant point of time when the decision in the case of A.Nagaraja was delivered, the manner in which Jallikattu wasperformed did breach the aforesaid provisions of the 1960 Actand hence conducting such sports was impermissible. [Para27][465-A-D]

3. The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act contains stipulation tothe effect that conduct of Jallikattu subject to such Rules andregulations as may be framed by the State Government shall bepermitted. Section 38-B of the Maharashtra Act provides Rule ABC

D

E

F

G

H

Amaking power of the State consistent with the Rules made by theCentral Government. Both these Statutes have become part ofthe 1960 Act in their respective States and specifically conferRule making power to the States and Rules have been framed. Insuch circumstances, as held by this Court in the case of PeerlessGeneral Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., our opinion is that theseBRules have to be read along with the Amendment Acts for theirproper interpretation. So far as the Karnataka Amendment Actis concerned, two fresh restrictions have been imposed inconducting Kambala by virtue of introduction of Section 3(2) inthe main Act after Amendment. These conditions ban unnecessaryCpain or suffering that would be caused to the animals by the personin charge of the animals conducting Kambala and make suchpractice subject to the conditions as may be specified by the StateGovernment by notification. Following the same analogy whichwe have expressed earlier while reading the Amendment Acts ofTamil Nadu and Maharashtra, in our opinion the NotificationDissued by the State of Karnataka ought to be accorded same statusas Rule and has also to be read as integral part of the Statute, asamended. These Rules and the Notification ought not to besegregated from the Amendment Acts for appreciating their truescope while examining the petitioners’ claim that the AmendmentEActs, analysed in isolation from the said Rules and the Notificationwould be contrary to the findings of this Court in the case of A.Nagaraja. [Para 29][466-F-H; 467-A-C]

4. The expressions Jallikattu, Kambala and Bull Cart Raceas introduced by the Amendment Acts of the three States haveFundergone substantial change in the manner they were used tobe practiced or performed and the factual conditions thatprevailed at the time the A. Nagaraja judgment was deliveredcannot be equated with the present situation. This Court cannotcome to the conclusion that in the changed circumstances, absolutely no pain or suffering would be inflicted upon the bullsGwhile holding these sports. But this Court is satisfied that thelarge part of pain inflicting practices, as they prevailed in themanner these three sports were performed in the pre-amendmentperiod have been substantially diluted by the introduction of thesestatutory instruments. Argument was advanced that in realityH

these welfare measures may not be practiced and the system asit prevailed could continue. This Court, however, cannot proceedin exercise of judicial power on the assumption that a law oughtto be struck down on apprehension of its abuse or disobedience.All the three bovine sports, after Amendment, assume differentcharacter in their performance and practice and for these reasonsthis Court does not accept the petitioners’ argument that theAmendment Acts were merely a piece of colourable legislationwith cosmetic change to override judicial pronouncement. Oncethe amended Statutes are read with the respective Rules orNotification, this Court does not find them to encroach upon theCentral legislation. Respondents have cited a large body ofauthorities to defend their stand that these are not cases ofcolourable legislation but this Court does not consider itnecessary to refer to all these judgments individually as this Courthas come to this conclusion after analysing various statutoryinstruments covering the field. [Para 30][467-D-H; 468-A]

5. Can the Amendment Acts be struck down for beingarbitrary? There is a body of cases in which legislations havebeen invalidated on this ground. So far as the subject of the presentcontroversy is concerned, the bulls form a distinct speciesreferred to as draught or pack animals as opposed to horses,which are adapted to run. But this Court declines to hold thatjust because bulls lack the natural ability to run like a horse, thesubject-sports which are seasonally held shall be held to becontrary to the provisions of the 1960 Act. In fact, on behalf ofthe respondents it was argued that these genre of bulls arespecially bred and have natural ability to run. There are contraryviews on this point. But in opinion of this Court, no irrationalclassification as regards these bull sports have been made by thelegislature so as to attract the mischief which Article 14 of theConstitution of India seeks to prevent. The validity of a legislativeAct can also be negated on the ground of it being unreasonable.The element of unreasonableness here is that the bovine speciesinvolved herein are being subjected to unnecessary pain andsuffering mainly for entertainment purpose. But the 1960 Actitself categorizes several activities which cause pain and suffering,even to a sentient animal. [Para 31][468-A-E]

ABC

D

EF

G

H

A6. In the case of I.N Saksena -vs- State of Madhya Pradeshthis Court had laid down that legislative lists in the Constitutionought to be interpreted in a wide amplitude. The 1960 Act inwhole and the subjects of the three Amendments directly dealwith the question of prevention of cruelty to animals. There is noother entry in any of the lists to which this subject could beBconnected with. In such circumstances, this Court rejects thecontention of the petitioners that the State Legislatures inherentlylacked jurisdiction to bring these Amendments, whichsubsequently received Presidential assent. [Para 34][470-E-F]

7. Next comes the question as to whether even after theCsaid Amendments, Jallikattu and the other two activities couldbe held to be beyond legislative competence of the threelegislative bodies. This Court has already held that the threeAmendment Acts have to be read together with the consequentialRules or Notifications. In view of this Court, these Rules, once Dtreated as part of the Acts, alter the manner of conducting thesesports and once these provisions are implemented, the mischiefsought to be remedied by the aforesaid two provisions of 1960Act (i.e. Sections 3 and 11(1)(a) and (m)) would not be attractedanymore. Thus, the argument that the Amendment Acts are voidbecause they seek to override the judgment of A. NagarajaEcannot be sustained as the basis of that judgment having regardto the nature and manner in which the offending activities werecarried on has been altered. [Para 35][470-G-H; 471-A-B]

8. In the light of what had already discussed, this Courtanswered the five questions referred to them in the followingFterms:-

(i) The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is not a piece ofcolourable legislation. It relates, in pith and substance, to Entry17 of List III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Itminimises cruelty to animals in the concerned sports and onceGthe Amendment Act, along with their Rules and Notification areimplemented, the aforesaid sports would not come within themischief sought to be remedied by Sections 3, 11(1) (a) and (m)of the 1960 Act.

(ii) Jallikattu is a type of bovine sports and this Court issatisfied on the basis of materials disclosed before, that it is goingon in the State of Tamil Nadu for at least last few centuries. Thisevent essentially involves a bull which is set free in an arena andhuman participants are meant to grab the hump to score in the“game”. But whether this has become integral part of Tamilculture or not requires religious, cultural and social analysis ingreater detail, which is an exercise that cannot be undertaken bythe Judiciary. The question as to whether the Tamil NaduAmendment Act is to preserve the cultural heritage of a particularState is a debateable issue which has to be concluded in the Houseof the People. This ought not be a part of judicial inquiry andparticularly having regard to the activity in question and thematerials in the form of texts cited by both the petitioners andthe respondents, this question cannot be conclusively determinedin the writ proceedings. Since legislative exercise has alreadybeen undertaken and Jallikattu has been found to be part ofcultural heritage of Tamil Nadu, this Court would not disrupt thisview of the legislature. This Court does not accept the viewreflected in the case of A. Nagaraja that performance of Jallikattuis not a part of the cultural heritage of the people of the State ofTamil Nadu. This Court does not think there was sufficientmaterial before the Court for coming to this conclusion. In thePreamble to the Amendment Act, Jallikattu has been describedto be part of culture and tradition of Tamil Nadu. In the case of A.Nagaraja, the Division Bench found the cultural approachunsubstantiated and referring to the manner in which the bullsare inflicted pain and suffering, the Division Bench concludedthat such activities offended Sections 3 and 11(1)(a) and (m) ofthe 1960 Act. Even if this Court proceeds on the basis thatlegislature is best suited branch of the State to determine ifparticular animal-sports are part of cultural tradition of a regionor community, or not, if such cultural event or tradition offendsthe law, the penal consequence would follow. Such activities cannotbe justified on the ground of being part of cultural tradition of aState. In A. Nagaraja, the sports were held to attract the restrictionof Sections 3 and 11(1)(a) and (m) of the 1960 Act because of themanner it was practiced. The Amendment Act read with the Rules AB

C

DE

F

GH

AB

C

DE

F

GH

Aseek to substantially minimise the pain and suffering and continuewith the traditional sports. The Amendment having receivedPresidential assent, this Court does not think there is any flaw inthe State action. “Jallikattu” as bovine sports have to be isolatedfrom the manner in which they were earlier practiced andorganising the sports itself would be permissible, in terms of theBTamil Nadu Rules.

(iii) The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is not in pith andsubstance, to ensure survival and well-being of the native breedsof bulls. The said Act is also not relatable to Article 48 of theConstitution of India. Incidental impact of the said AmendmentCAct may fall upon the breed of a particular type of bulls and affectagricultural activities, but in pith and substance the Act is relatableto Entry 17 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitutionof India.

(iv) Answer to this question is in the negative. The TamilDNadu Amendment Act does not go contrary to the Articles 51-A(g) and 51-A(h) and it does not violate the provisions of Articles14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

(v) The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act read along with theRules framed in that behalf is not directly contrary to the ratio ofEthe judgment in the case of A. Nagaraja and judgment of thisCourt delivered on 16[th] November 2016 dismissing the plea forReview of the A. Nagaraja judgment as this Court is of the opinionthat the defects pointed out in the aforesaid two judgments havebeen overcome by the State Amendment Act read with the RulesFmade in that behalf. [Para 40][473-B-H]

9. Decision of this Court on the Tamil Nadu AmendmentAct would also guide the Maharashtra and the KarnatakaAmendment Acts and this Court finds all the three AmendmentActs to be valid legislations. [Para 41][475-B-C]

GAnimal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja andOthers (2014) 7 SCC 547 : [2014] 6 SCR 646; GramPanchayat of Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh andOthers (1985) 3 SCC 661 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 28;Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others v. State of H

Bihar and Others (1983) 4 SCC 45 : [1983] 3 SCR130; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Another - vs-Broach Borough Municipality and Others (1969) 2 SCC283 : [1970] 1 SCR 388; Bhubaneshwar Singh andAnother -vs- Union of India and Others (1994) 6 SCC77 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 639; Indra Sawhney -vs-Union of India and Others (2000) 1 SCC 168 : [1999]5 Suppl. SCR 229; Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra andOthers -vs- State of Orissa and others (2014) 4 SCC583 : [2014] 2 SCR 1031; State of M.P. -vs- MahalaxmiFabric Mills Ltd. and Others 1995 Supp (1) SCC 642 :[1995] 1 SCR 756; D.C. Wadhwa DR and Others -vs-State of Bihar and Others (1987) 1 SCC 378 : [1987] 1SCR 798; Sri Sri Sri K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo -vs-State of Orissa [1954] SCR 1; S.S. Bola and Others vsB.D. Sardana and Others (1997) 8 SCC 522 : [1997] 2Suppl. SCR 507; State of Tamil Nadu vs State of Keralaand Another (2014) 12 SCC 696 : [2014] 12 SCR 875;Madan Mohan Pathak and Another vs Union Of Indiaand Others (1978) 2 SCC 50 : [1978] 3 SCR 334;National Agricultural Cooperative MarketingFederation of India Ltd. and Another -vs- Union of Indiaand Others (2003) 5 SCC 23 : [2003] 3 SCR 1; In RePunjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004 [(2017) 1SCC 121 : [2016] 11 SCR 15; Mafatlal Industries Ltd.and Others vs Union of India and Others (1997) 5 SCC29 536 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 585; S. T. Sadiq vsState of Kerala and Others (2015) 4 SCC 400 : [2015]3 SCR 287; A.R. Antulay vs R.S. Nayak and Another(1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; ManekaGandhi vs Union of India and Another (1978) 1 SCC248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Chief Secretary to theGovernment, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Others -vs-Animal Welfare Board and Another (2017) 2 SCC 144 :[2016] 8 SCR 477; Rupa Ashok Hurra vs Ashok Hurraand Another (2002) 4 SCC 388 : [2002] 2 SCR 1006;State of Bihar and Others vs Indian Aluminium Companyand Others (1997) 8 SCC 360 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR222; M. Karunanidhi -vs- Union of India and Another A

B

C

D

E

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

(1979) 3 SCC 431 : [1979] 3 SCR 254; K.T. PlantationPrivate Ltd. and Another -vs- State of Karnataka (2011)9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; Director of Education(Secondary) and Another –vs Pushpendra Kumar andOthers (1998) 5 SCC 192 : [1998] 3 SCR 432; HarbilasRai Bansal -vs- State of Punjab and Another (1996) 1SCC 1 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 178; State of Gujaratand Another -vs- Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others(1983) 2 SCC 33 : [1983] 2 SCR 287; Shayara Bano -vs- Union of India and Others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017]9 SCR 797; Narayan Dutt Bhatt -vs- Union of India(2018) SCC OnLine Utt 645; Saurabh Chaudri andOthers -vs- Union of India and Others (2003) 11 SCC146 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 152; Chief Justice of AndhraPradesh and Others -vs- L.V.A. Dixitulu and Others(1979) 2 SCC 34 : [1979] 1 SCR 26; Video ElectronicsPvt. Ltd. and Another -vs- State of Punjab and Another(1990) 3 SCC 87 : [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 731; AshokKumar Gupta and Another v. State of U.P. and Others(1997) 5 SCC 201 : [1997] 3 SCR 269; State of U.P.and Others -vs- Babu Ram Upadhya (1961) 2 SCR 679;Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. andAnother -vs- Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2 SCC 343: [1992] 1 SCR 406; State of Rajasthan -vs- Shri G.Chawla and Dr Pohumal (1959) Supp (1) SCR 904;Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and Others -vs-State of U.P. and Others (1980) 4 SCC 136 : [1980] 3SCR 331; Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Associationof India, etc. -vs- Union of India and Others (1989) 3SCC 634 : [1989] 2 SCR 918; State of A.P. and Others-vs- McDowell & Co. and Others (1996) 3 SCC 709 :[1996] 3 SCR 721; State of W.B. -vs- Kesoram IndustriesLtd. and Others (2004) 10 SCC 201 : [2004] 1 SCR564; I.N Saksena -vs- State of Madhya Pradesh (1976)4 SCC 750 : [1976] 3 SCR 237; T.N. GodavarmanThirumulpad -vs- Union of India and Others (2012) 4SCC 362 : [2012] 1 SCR 923; Centre for EnvironmentalLaw, World Wide Fund-India -vs- Union of India and THE ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF INDIA AND ORS. v.UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

A

Others (2013) 8 SCC 234 : [2013] 6 SCR 757; N.R.Nair and Others -vs- Union of India and Others (2001)6 SCC 84 : [2001] 3 SCR 353; E.P. Royappa -vs- Stateof Tamil Nadu and Another (1974) 4 SCC 3 : [1974] 2SCR 348; Ajay Hasia and Others -vs- Khalid MujibSehravardi and Others (1981) 1 SCC 722 : [1981] 2SCR 79; Joseph Shine -vs- Union of India (2018) 2SCC 189 -referred to.

B

Case Law Reference

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

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THE ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF INDIA AND ORS. v.UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONL: Writ Petition (Civil) No.23 of 2016.

(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)With Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 6, 10 of 2018, Civil Appeal No. 3849 of2023, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 1193 of 2017, 1152 of 2018, 24, 25, 26,27, 88 of 2016, 1011, 1059, 1188 of 2017, Transferred Case No. 60 of2021.

Tushar Mehta, SG, K. M. Nataraj, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASGs,Nikhil Goel, AAG, S. Nagamuthu, V. Giri, Mukul Rohatgi, KrishnanVenugopal, Sidharth Luthra, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Shyam Divan, AnandGrover, N. R. Elango, V. K. Khanna, Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, KapilSibal, Rakesh Dwivedi, Komal Mehta, Jayanth Muth Raj, Nagamuthu,Sr. Advs., C. Paramasivam, Y. Arunagiri, M. P. Paramasivam, RakeshK. Sharma, A. S. Vairawan Shiva, R. Sudhakaran, G. R. Vikash, Ms.Shalini Mishra, D. Subrahmanya Bhanu, P. R. Kovilan Poongkuntran,Ms. Geetha Kovilan, Ms. Jubli Momalia, Sumit Attri, Ritu AnandVishwakarma, Ms. Esha Dutta, Vivek Kumar, M/s. Cyril AmarchandMangaldas, D. Kumanan, Sheikh F. Kalia, Ms. Anusha Nagarajan Iyer,Ms. Rupali Samul, Ms. Rishabh Devan Parikh, Subodh S. Patil, AjaySingh, Lokesh Kumar Choudhary, Ram Kumar, Ms. Supriya Deshpande,Ms. Supriya Juneja, Krishnan Agarwal, Ms. Deepanshi Ishar, Ms. PallaviSrivastava, Ms. Pritha Srikumar, Asif Ahmed, Akshat Kumar, Ms.Mansvini Jain, Abhyudaya Shishodia, Karanvir Gogia, KushagraRaghuvanshi, Ayush Kaushik, Ms. Supriya Juneja, Ms. Aparna Bhat,Ms. Karishma Maria, Balendu Shekhar, Kanu Agrawal, DevashishBharuka, Shamik Sananwala, Balaji Srinivasan, Manvendra SinghRathore, Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, Ms. SamikshaAnjanwala, Padmesh Mishra, Amrish Kumar, Arvind Kumar Sharma,Gurmeet Singh Makker, Manish Sharma, Neeraj Sharma, AadityaAniruddha Pande, D.K. Devesh, Arpit Parkash, Vikalp Sharma, SachinPatil, Geo Joseph, Risvi Muhammed, Durgesh Gupta, Ms. Pritha Srikumar,Sudipto Sarkar, Ms. Ria Singh Sawhney, Saurabh Chaudhary, Ms.Arunima Kedia, Ms. Anne Mathew, P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish KumarUpadhyay, Y. Lokesh, V. Sibi Kargil, V. Kandha Prabhu, L. R.Venkatesan, Ms. Maitri Goal, Ms. Priyanka Chowdhary, Hemant KumarNiranjan, Sachin Kumar Verma, Ms. Yakeen Bishoyi, Satyam Thareja,Ms. Varnika Singh, Ms. Deeksha Aggarwal, Prateek Kundu, Rohin Bhatt,Rahul Kumar, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, Ms. Manisha T. Karia, A

BC

D

EF

G

H

A

BC

D

EF

G

H

AAdarsh Kumar, Aditya Kesar, Ms. Nidhi Nagpal, Vikram Chandravanshi,Dr. R. R. Deshpande, Amit Anand Tiwari, Ms. Shakun Sharma, Ms.Devyani Gupta, Ms. Saushriya Havelia, Ms. Tanvi Anand, Anand DilipLandge, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S. K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms.Niharika Dewivedi, Ms. Shweta Sand, Narendra Pal Sharma, AnubhavGupta, C. M. Jha, Anil Kumar Mishra-I, Anil Kumar Mishra, M. YogeshBKanna, Mayil Samy K., G. Anandaselvam, Dr. Ram Sankar, Dr. GayathiriA. S., S. J. Amith, Sanchit Maheshwari, P. Soma Sundaram, K.Kumaran, K. Muthu Ganesa Pandian, Kabilan Manoharan, K. VijayAnand, V. Pavel, A. Santhakumaran, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Ms. PuspitaBasak, Ms. Priyanka Chaudhary, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, RavindraCKeshavrao Adsure, Gopal Balwant Sathe, Yash Prashant Sonavane, Ms.Sakshi Ajit Kale, Rohan Darade, V. N. Raghupathy, Adithya Roy,Manendra Pal Gupta, Md. Apzal Ansari, C. Ravichandran Iyer, ReeganS. Bel, C. M. Sundaram Iyer, Keerthi Priyan, N. Rajaraman, VishnuSharma, Rakesh K. Sharma, Tomy Chacko, Neeleswar Pavani, Ms.Shaurya Mishra, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Narender Kumar Verma, M. Y.DDeshmukh, M. Thanga Durai, Ms. Racheeta Chwla, Eklavya Dwivedi,Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Ms. Monika Dwivedi, Ms. Divya Singh, KushalSarkar, Vinodh Kanna B., Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Mrs.Naresh Bakshi, Ajay Pal, Mayank Dahiya, Ms. Priyanka C., KupdeepSingh Kuchaliya, C. K. Sasi, Abdulla Naseeh V. T., Ms. Meena K.EPoulose, Kabir Hathi, Ms. Jesal Wahi, Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, DharmSingh, Suraj Kaushik, Nanda Kumar K. B., Shiva Swaroop, M/s. Nuli &Nuli, Ranjeth Marar, Prabhurama Subramanian, Raghunatha SethupathyB, Karuppaiah Meyyappan, Ms. Kanika K., Ms. Pariksha, BharathiMohan, Ms. Priya, S. Sabari Bala Pandian, Mrs. Malavika Jayanth, Ms.Miranda Solaman, Sudhakaran, T. Harish Kumar, Goutham Shivshankar,FP. Rajalakshmi, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Adit Jayeshbhai Shah, Rajesh KumarChaurasia, Ganga Sagar Singh, Ashish Kumar Chaurasiya,, Advs. forthe appearing parties.

Applicant-in-person

GThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (C) No.3528 of 2018.

2. In the case of Animal Welfare Board of India -vs- A.Nagaraja and Others [(2014) 7 SCC 547], a Division Bench of thisH

Court had essentially outlawed two common sports practised in the Statesof Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra popularly referred to as ‘Jallikattu’ and‘Bullock Cart Race’ respectively. These bovine sports were held to becontrary to the provisions of Sections 3, 11(1)(a) and (m) of the Preventionof Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (“1960 Act”) which is a Statute enactedby the Parliament. The two Judge Bench had construed the saidprovisions in the Constitutional backdrop of Article 51-A (g) and (h) asalso Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. This judgment wasdelivered on 7[th] May 2014. At that point of time, Jallikattu was regulatedby a State Act in Tamil Nadu, being Tamil Nadu Regulation of JallikattuAct, 2009. The Bench held that this State Act was repugnant to theprovisions of the 1960 Act and was held to be void, having regard to theprovisions of Article 254 (1) of the Constitution of India. On 7[th] January2016, a notification was issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forestand Climate Change (“MoEF&CC”) [bearing number GSR 13 (E)].This notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred bySection 22 of the 1960 Act and prohibited exhibition or training of bullsas performing animals. However, an exception was carved and it wasspecified in this notification that bulls might be continued to be trained asperforming animals at events such as Jallikattu in Tamil Nadu and BullockCart Races in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab, Haryana, Kerala andGujarat in the manner by the customs of common community or practicetraditionally under the customs or as part of culture in any part of thecountry. In the State of Karnataka, the race involved male buffaloes,known in that State as “Kambala”. This exception, however, was madesubject to certain conditions seeking to reduce the pain and suffering ofbulls while being used in such sports. A batch of writ petitions i.e. W.P.(C) Nos. 23 of 2016, 24 of 2016, 25 of 2016, 26 of 2016, 27 of 2016, 88of 2016, 1059 of 2017, 1011 of 2017, 1188 of 2017, 1193 of 2017, SLP(C)No.3528 of 2018 and SLP(C) Nos. 3526-3527 of 2018 were institutedbefore a Division Bench of this Court questioning legality of the saidnotification. The petitioners in those proceedings also sought compliancewith the directions of this Court contained in the case of A. Nagaraja(supra).

3. The first of these writ petitions have been brought by AnimalWelfare Board of India and others including one Anjali Sharma, but incourse of hearing, the Animal Welfare Board changed its stance andsought to support the stand of the State and Union of India mainly on theground that the 1960 Act and certain State Amendments which were AB

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Aenacted in the year 2017 were not repugnant and the Board had framedguidelines to prevent suffering of the bovine species during holding ofthe aforesaid events. We shall refer to the three State Amendment Actslater in this judgment. However, the second writ petitioner- Anjali Sharma,a practicing advocate of this Court and also a member of the Boardprosecuted the aforesaid writ petition as a single writ petitioner.B

4. In connection with W.P.(C) No.1188 of 2017, an InterlocutoryApplication (170346 of 2022) has been filed by one Vikramsinh NivruttiBhosale on the strength of his being an agriculturalist in Maharashtra.He has argued that the challenge to the Maharashtra Amendment Act,if sustained, could hamper lives of farmers still associated with BullockCCart Race. It is also his argument that the Amendment Act of Maharashtrais also relatable to entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of theConstitution of India which stipulates:- “Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and preventionof animal diseases; veterinary training and practice”.D

5. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment)Act, 2017,(“Tamil Nadu Amendment Act”), The Prevention of Crueltyto Animals (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 2017 (“MaharashtraAmendment Act”) and The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (KarnatakaSecond Amendment) Act, 2017 (“Karnataka Amendment Act”) wereEenacted by the respective State Legislatures and had received Presidentialassent. We shall refer to these Acts in greater details in this judgment.These Amendment Acts in substance seek to legitimise various types ofbovine sports including Jallikattu in Tamil Nadu, Bullock Cart Race inMaharashtra and Kambala in Karnataka. The term Jallikattu as definedin the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is as follows:-F

“(dd) “Jallikattu” means an event involving bulls conductedwith a view to follow tradition and culture on such days fromthe months of January to May of a calendar year and in suchplaces, as may be notified by the State Government, and includesG“manjuviratu”, “vadamadu” and “erudhuvidumvizha”.”

In the Karnataka Amendment Act, the term Kambala has beendefined, upon Amendment of the parent Statute as:- “(aa) “Bulls race or Bullock cart race” means any form ofbulls race including race of Bullock cart as a traditional sportsHinvolving Bulls whether tied to cart with the help of wooden yoke or not (in whatever name called) normally held as apart of tradition and culture in the state on such days andplaces, as may be notified by the State Government.”; and

(ii) after clause (d), the following shall be inserted, namely:-(dd) “Kambala” means the traditional sports event involvingBuffalo’s (male) race normally held as a part of tradition andculture in the state on such days and places, as may be notifiedby the State Government.”

Bullock Cart Race as held in Maharashtra has been defined underSection 2 of the Amendment Act as:- “(bb) “bullock cart race” means an event involving bulls orbullocks to conduct a race, whether tied to cart with the helpof wooden yoke or not (by whatever name called), with orwithout a cartman with a view to follow tradition and cultureon such days and in any District where it is being traditionallyheld at such places, as may be previously approved by theDistrict Collector, and also known as “Bailgada Sharyat”,“Chhakadi” and “Shankarpat” in the State of Maharashtra.”

6. A Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”) was brought before theHigh Court of Judicature at Bombay, registered as PIL (stamp) number23132 of 2017 (Ajay Marathe vs. The State of Maharashtra andOthers) challenging certain proposed Rules brought by the State ofMaharashtra under the heading “The Maharashtra Prevention of Crueltyto Animals (Conduct of Bullock Cart Race) Rules, 2017” permittingBullock Cart Race and on 11[th] October 2017, the High Court restrainedconducting of Bullock Cart Races within the State of Maharashtra. Theaforesaid Rules sought to regulate organisation of Bullock Cart Races.

7. A farmer from that State, Vikramsinh Nivrutti Bhosale fromthe District of Sanghli, has instituted Special Leave Petition (Civil) 3528of 2018 assailing that order passed by the Bombay High Court and inthis reference, we shall deal with certain points raised in the said specialleave petition as well.

8. A Division Bench of this Court by an order passed on 2[nd]February 2018 formulated five questions to be answered by a ConstitutionBench and the papers were directed to be placed before the Hon’bleChief Justice of India. The Division Bench had formulated the following5 questions which we have to answer in this judgment:- A

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Ai.“Is the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act referable, in pithand substance, to Entry 17, List III of the SeventhSchedule to the Constitution of India, or does it furtherand perpetuate cruelty to animals; and can it, therefore,be said to be a measure of prevention of cruelty toanimals? Is it colourable legislation which does notBrelate to any Entry in the State List or Entry 17 of theConcurrent List?

ii.The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act states that it is topreserve the cultural heritage of the State of Tamil Nadu.Can the impugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act be statedCto be part of the cultural heritage of the people of theState of Tamil Nadu so as to receive the protection ofArticle 29 of the Constitution of India?

iii.Is the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act, in pith andsubstance, to ensure the survival and well-being of theDnative breed of bulls? Is the Act, in pith and substance,relatable to Article 48 of the Constitution of India?

iv.Does the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act go contrary toArticles 51A(g) and 51A(h), and could it be said,therefore, to be unreasonable and violative of ArticlesE14 and 21 of the Constitution of India?

v.Is the impugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act directlycontrary to the judgment in A. Nagaraja (supra), andthe review judgment dated 16th November, 2016 in theaforesaid case, and whether the defects pointed out inFthe aforesaid two judgments could be said to have beenovercome by the Tamil Nadu Legislature by enactingthe impugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act?”

9. The Presidential assent was sought for by the three States interms of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. On behalf of theGpetitioners, the very act of assent of the President has been questionedand citing the judgment of this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat ofVillage Jamalpur -vs- Malwinder Singhand Others [(1985) 3 SCC661] it has been argued that for obtaining such assent, complete detailswere not disclosed before the President. The judgment of this Court inHoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others-vs- State of Bihar andH

Others [(1983) 4 SCC 45] was also cited by the petitioners to contendthat such assent of the President is relevant only if the legislation isrelatable to an Entry in List III of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.But in our view, the Amendment Statutes are relatable to Entry 17 ofList III of Seventh Schedule and hence we do not consider it necessaryto deal with the ratio laid down in the case of HoechstPharmaceuticals (supra). Certain other judgments were also cited insupport of this proposition. We shall express our opinion on this point insubsequent part of this judgment.

10. In W.P. (C) No.1152 of 2018, the legality of the KarnatakaAmendment Act has been challenged. This petition was tagged withW.P.(C) No.1059 of 2017 by an order dated 7.12.2018. W.P.(C) No.1059of 2017 was heard along with T.C. (C) No.60 of 2021, a three-JudgeBench of this Court took cognizance of the Karnataka and MaharashtraAmendment Acts and in an order passed by the said Bench on 16.12.2021,it was observed:- “The entire matter in relation to similar amendments made bythe State of Tamil Nadu and State of Karnataka is now referredto the Constitution Bench, including to consider the questionwhether these amendment Acts (of State of Tamil Nadu)overcome the defects pointed out in the two judgments of thisCourt. Similar question would arise in these writ petitionsand transferred case from Maharashtra concerning theprovisions of State of Maharashtra. Hence, these writ petitionsbe heard along with writ petitions pertaining to the State ofTamil Nadu and State of Karnataka.”

11. In the judgment of A. Nagaraja (supra), dealing with Jallikattuand Bullock Cart Race in Maharashtra, the Division Bench of this Courtfound bulls to be non-suitable for being involved in any sports. The Benchfound that the bulls were not performing animals having no naturalinclination for running like a horse. The reasoning of the Bench in thecase of A. Nagaraja (supra) would appear, inter-alia, from paragraphs33, 37, 41, 44, 53 and 73. It has been held by the Court in these paragraphs:- “33. The PCA Act is a welfare legislation which has to beconstrued bearing in mind the purpose and object of the Actand the directive principles of State policy. It is trite law that,in the matters of welfare legislation, the provisions of lawshould be liberally construed in favour of the weak and infirm.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

The court also should be vigilant to see that benefits conferredby such remedial and welfare legislation are not defeated bysubtle devices. The court has got the duty that, in every case,where ingenuity is expanded to avoid welfare legislations, toget behind the smokescreen and discover the true state ofaffairs. The court can go behind the form and see thesubstance of the devise for which it has to pierce the veil andexamine whether the guidelines or the regulations are framedso as to achieve some other purpose than the welfare of theanimals. Regulations or guidelines, whether statutory orotherwise, if they purport to dilute or defeat the welfarelegislation and the constitutional principles, the court shouldnot hesitate to strike them down so as to achieve the ultimateobject and purpose of the welfare legislation. The court hasalso a duty under the doctrine of parens patriae to take careof the rights of animals, since they are unable to take care ofthemselves as against human beings.”

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“37. Section 11 generally deals with the cruelty to animals.Section 11 confers no right on the organisers to conductJallikattu/bullock cart race. Section 11 is a beneficialprovision enacted for the welfare and protection of the animalsand it is penal in nature. Being penal in nature, it confersrights on the animals and obligations on all persons, includingthose who are in charge or care of the animals, AWBI, etc. tolook after their well-being and welfare.”

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“41. Section 11(3) carves out exceptions in five categoriesof cases mentioned in Sections 11(3)(a) to (e), which are asfollows:

“11. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to—

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(a) the dehorning of cattle, or the castration or brandingor nose-roping of any animal, in the prescribed manner;or (b) the destruction of stray dogs in lethal chambers or bysuch other methods as may be prescribed; or H

(c) the extermination or destruction of any animal underthe authority of any law for the time being in force; or (d) any matter dealt with in Chapter IV; or (e) the commission or omission of any act in the course ofthe destruction or the preparation for destruction of anyanimal as food for mankind unless such destruction orpreparation was accompanied by the infliction ofunnecessary pain or suffering.”

Exceptions are incorporated based on the “doctrine ofnecessity”. Clause (b) to Section 11(3) deals with thedestruction of stray dogs, out of necessity, otherwise, itwould be harmful to human beings. Clause (d) to Section11(3) deals with matters dealt with in Chapter IV,incorporated out of necessity, which deals with theexperimentation on animals, which is for the purposeof advancement by new discovery of physiologicalknowledge or of knowledge which would be useful forsaving or for prolonging life or alleviating sufferingor for combating any disease, whether of human beings,animals or plants, which is not prohibited and is lawful.Clause (e) to Section 11(3) permits killing of animalsas food for mankind, of course, without inflictingunnecessary pain or suffering, which clause is alsoincorporated “out of necessity”. Experimenting onanimals and eating their flesh are stated to be two majorforms of speciesism in our society. Over and above, thelegislature, by virtue of Section 28, has favoured killingof animals in a manner required by the religion of anycommunity. Entertainment, exhibition or amusement donot fall under these exempted categories and cannotbe claimed as a matter of right under the doctrine ofnecessity.”

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“44. Bulls, therefore, in our view, cannot be performinganimals, anatomically not designed for that, but are forced toperform, inflicting pain and suffering, in total violation of A

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Section 3 and Section 11(1) of the PCA Act. Chapter V of thePCA Act deals with the performing animals. Section 22 of thePCA Act places restriction on exhibition and training ofperforming animals, which reads as under:

“22.Restriction on exhibition and training of performinganimals.—No person shall exhibit or train—

(i) any performing animal unless he is registered inaccordance with the provisions of this Chapter;

(ii) as a performing animal, any animal which the CentralGovernment may, by notification in the Official Gazette,specify as an animal which shall not be exhibited or trainedas a performing animal.”

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“53. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the TNRJ Actrefers to ancient culture and tradition and does not statethat it has any religious significance. Even the ancient cultureand tradition do not support the conduct of Jallikattu orbullock cart race, in the form in which they are beingconducted at present. Welfare and the well-being of the bullis Tamil culture and tradition, they do not approve ofinfliction of any pain or suffering on the bulls, on the otherhand, Tamil tradition and culture are to worship the bulland the bull is always considered as the vehicle of LordShiva. Yeru Thazhuvu, in Tamil tradition, is to embrace bullsand not overpowering the bull, to show human bravery.Jallikattu means, silver or gold coins tied to the bull’s hornsand in olden days those who got at the money to the bull’shorns would marry the daughter of the owner. Jallikattu orthe bullock cart race, as practised now, has never been thetradition or culture of Tamil Nadu.”

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“73. Jallikattu and other forms of bulls race, as the variousreports indicate, cause considerable pain, stress and strainon the bulls. Bulls, in such events, not only do move their

head showing that they do not want to go to the arena but, aspain inflicted in the vadi vasal is so much, they have no othergo but to flee to a situation which is adverse to them. Bulls, inthat situation, are stressed, exhausted, injured and humiliated.Frustration of the bulls is noticeable in their vocalisation and,looking at the facial expression of the bulls, ethologist or anordinary man can easily sense their suffering. Bulls, otherwiseare very peaceful animals dedicating their life for human useand requirement, but they are subjected to such an ordealthat not only inflicts serious suffering on them but also forcesthem to behave in ways, namely, they do not behave, forcethem into the event which does not like and, in that process,they are being tortured to the hilt. Bulls cannot carry the so-called performance without being exhausted, injured, torturedor humiliated. Bulls are also intentionally subjected to fear,injury—both mentally and physically—and put to unnecessarystress and strain for human pleasure and enjoyment, that too,a species which has totally dedicated its life for human benefit,out of necessity.”

12. The 1960 Act has been enacted in pursuance of legislativepower contained in Entry 17 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to theConstitution of India. The impact of the Amendment Acts on the mainStatute would be revealed from the comparative table given below:- AB

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450SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2023] 7 S.C.R.ABCDEFGH

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454SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2023] 7 S.C.R.ABCDEFGH

THE ANIMAL WELFARE BOARD OF INDIA AND ORS. v.UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.]

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456SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2023] 7 S.C.R.ABCDEF

13. After the aforesaid three Amendment Acts receivedPresidential assent, the States of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra formulatedRules for conducting the aforesaid bovine sports. The Tamil Nadu Ruleswere titled “The Tamil Nadu Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ConductGof Jallikattu) Rules, 2017” and for the State of Maharashtra, “TheMaharashtra Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Conduct of Bullock CartRace) Rules, 2017” was formulated. So far as the State of Karnataka isconcerned, a Notification was issued on similar lines by a MemorandumNo. PSM 257 SLV-2014 dated 17[th] December 2015. These Rules/Notification seek to rigidly regulate conducting the aforesaid bovineH

sports. They postulate provisions for application for permission of holdingthe sports, for participating in the race. For organising of Bullock CartRace, Rules stipulate for the manner in which such races could beconducted with specifications for length of the track, rest period andisolation of the track from general public. The Tamil Nadu Rulesspecifically provides for examination of bulls, with specifications for thearena, bull collection yard as also setting up of spectators’ gallery. Theseinstruments in substance prohibit causing any physical disturbance tothe bulls like beating and poking them with sharp objects, sticks, pouringchilli powder in their eyes, twisting their tails amongst other such paininflicting acts.

14. The main theme of the submissions of the petitioners/partieswho are assailing the Amendment Acts are founded on two planks. Mr.Shyam Divan, Mr. Anand Grover, Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Mr. KrishnanVenugopal and Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Advocates have appeared forthe parties assailing continued performance of these sports which areconsidered to be cruel. The Respondents’ cases supporting thecontinuation of these sports have been mainly argued by Mr. TusharMehta, ld. Solicitor General, Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr.Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocates. For the petitioners, theirmain case is that even after the State Amendments, the activities soughtto be legitimised still remain destructive and contrary to the provisions ofSections 3, 11(1) (a) and (m) of the 1960 Act. It is their contention thatthe Amendment Acts do not cure the defects or deficiencies broughtabout by the judgment of A.Nagaraja (supra). The ratio of the saidjudgment is sought to be bypassed through these Amendment Acts, whichis impermissible in law. It has also been argued that the expression“person” as used in Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes sentientanimals and their liberty is sought to be curtailed by legitimising theaforesaid bovine sports and the instrument of such legitimisation beingthe three Amendment Acts is unreasonable and arbitrary, thereby notmeeting the standard of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In fact,that is the fourth point of question of reference which we shall beaddressing in this judgment. The petitioners seek to inter-weave Articles14, 21, 48, 51-A (h) and (g) to set up a rights-regime for the animals.Their contention is that the Fundamental Duty of Indian citizens to havecompassion for living creatures and to develop humanism result incorresponding rights for sentient animals to be protected for distress andpain inflicting activities only having entertainment value for human beings.

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A15. The other argument advanced is that these sports cannot beheld to be part of cultural heritage of the State of Tamil Nadu which is soprovided in the Preamble of the Amendment Act of that State. Preambleof the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act provides that the object of the saidStatute is to preserve the cultural heritage of the State of Tamil Naduand to ensure the survival and wellbeing of native breeds of bulls. TheBsaid Act inserted [clause 2(d)] in the definition clause of the 1960 Actand amended Section 11(3) of the same Statute, adding sub-clause (f)thereto. There are two more Amendments which would appear fromthe table we have given above, but those are primarily to exempt Jallikattufrom the restrictive provisions of the 1960 Act. In the judgment of A.CNagaraja (supra) it was inter-alia held on the point of tradition and cultureof Jallikattu:- A

“54. The PCA Act, a welfare legislation, in our view,overshadows or overrides the so-called tradition and culture.Jallikattu and bullock cart races, the manner in which theyare conducted, have no support of Tamil tradition or culture.

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Assuming, it has been in vogue for quite some time, in ourview, the same should give way to the welfare legislation, likethe PCA Act which has been enacted to prevent infliction ofunnecessary pain or suffering on animals and confer dutiesand obligations on persons in charge of animals. Of late,Ethere are some attempts at certain quarters, to reap maximumgains and the animals are being exploited by the human beingsby using coercive methods and inflicting unnecessary painfor pleasure, amusement and enjoyment. We have a historyof doing away with such evil practices in society, assumingFsuch practices have the support of culture and tradition, astried to be projected in the TNRJ Act. Professor Salmond statesthat custom is the embodiment of those principles which havecommended themselves to the national conscience as theprinciples of justice and public utility. This Court, in N.Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board [(2002) 8 SCCG106] (2002) 8 SCC 106, while examining the scope of Articles25(1), 26(a), 26(b), 17, 14 and 21, held as follows: (SCC p.125, para 18)

“18. … Any custom or usage irrespective of even any proofof their existence in pre-constitutional days cannot be H

countenanced as a source of law to claim any rights whenit is found to violate human rights, dignity, social equalityand the specific mandate of the Constitution and law madeby Parliament. No usage which is found to be perniciousand considered to be in derogation of the law of the landor opposed to public policy or social decency can beaccepted or upheld by courts in the country.”

55. As early as 1500-600 BC in Isha-Upanishads, it isprofessed as follows:

“The universe along with its creatures belongs to the land.No creature is superior to any other. Human beings shouldnot be above nature. Let no one species encroach over therights and privileges of other species.”

In our view, this is the culture and tradition of the country,particularly the States of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra.

56. The PCA Act has been enacted with an object to safeguardthe welfare of the animals and evidently to cure some mischiefand age old practices, so as to bring into effect some type ofreform, based on eco-centric principles, recognising theintrinsic value and worth of animals. All the same, the Acthas taken care of the religious practices of the community,while killing an animal vide Section 28 of the Act.”

16. On this basis, arguments have been advanced on behalf of thepetitioners that the Amendment Act of Tamil Nadu having regard to itsPreamble seeks to invalidate conclusive judicial opinion without curingthe defects specified in that decision in the conduct of Jallikattu. So faras the Karnataka Amendment Act is concerned, in the definition clausesof “Bulls Race or Bullock Cart Race” and “Kambala”, they have beendescribed as part of tradition and culture of the State. In the MaharashtraAct also the source of Bullock Cart Race has been identified to be thetradition and culture of specified parts of that State in the definition clauseof Bullock Cart Race.

17. The argument of the petitioners and the interveners supportingin substance the ban on performance of these sports have been that theStatutes seek to validate the provisions that were held to be illegal bythis Court without curing the defects outlined in the judgment of A.Nagaraja (supra). In such circumstances, the Amendment Acts could AB

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Anot be held to be in exercise of legitimate legislative power in the light ofthe constitutional provisions and these enactments are colourablelegislations. The authorities in support of this proposition cited by thepetitioners are Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Another -vs-Broach Borough Municipality and Others [(1969) 2 SCC 283],Bhubaneshwar Singh and Another -vs- Union of India and OthersB[(1994) 6 SCC 77], Indra Sawhney -vs- Union of India and Others[(2000) 1 SCC 168], Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra and Others -vs- State of Orissa and others [(2014) 4 SCC 583], State of M.P. -vs- Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. and Others [1995 Supp (1) SCC642], D.C. Wadhwa DR and Others -vs- State of Biharand OthersC[(1987) 1 SCC 378], Sri Sri Sri K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo -vs-State of Orissa [1954 SCR 1], S.S. Bola and Others -vs- B.D.Sardana and Others [(1997) 8 SCC 522], State of Tamil Nadu -vs-State of Kerala and Another [(2014) 12 SCC 696], Madan MohanPathak and Another -vs- Union Of India and Others [(1978) 2 SCC50], National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation ofDIndia Ltd. and Another -vs- Union of India and Others [(2003) 5SCC 23], In Re Punjab Termination of Agreement Act, 2004 [(2017)1 SCC 121], Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others -vs- Union ofIndia and Others [(1997) 5 SCC 536], S. T. Sadiq -vs- State ofKeralaand Others [(2015) 4 SCC 400], A.R. Antulay -vs- R.S. NayakEand Another [(1988) 2 SCC 602] and Maneka Gandhi -vs- Union ofIndia and Another [(1978) 1 SCC 248]. The judgment of the ManekaGandhi (supra) was also relied upon to contend that in order to protectFundamental Rights, the effect of the law has to be looked at and notjust theories and provisions of law.

F18. Corollary submissions of the petitioners are that afterPresidential assent was given to the three Statutes, they legitimisedthe three aforesaid events but the manner in which they are conductedis contrary to the provisions of Sections 3, 11(1)(a) and (m) as washeld in the A. Nagaraja (supra) case. Hence, the attempt of theAmendment Acts is to override a judicial verdict without addressingGthe grounds on which this Court had found Jallikattu and Bullock CartRace in the States of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra respectively to bein violation of the 1960 Act. This legislative exercise, as argued by thepetitioners, go contrary to Constitutional scheme. The authorities citedon this point are State of Tamil Nadu -vs- State of Kerala (supra),HChief Secretary to the Government, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and Others -vs- Animal Welfare Board and Another [(2017) 2 SCC144] and Rupa Ashok Hurra -vs- Ashok Hurra and Another[(2002) 4 SCC 388].

19. In the case of A. Nagaraja (supra), the two Judge Bench, onthe basis of affidavit of the Animal Welfare Board of India andMoEF&CC described the manner in which Jallikattu was beingperformed. The preparation of the bulls for these sports entail, but notlimited to, ear cutting/mutilation, twisting of tail, resulting in fracture anddislocation of tail bones. It was also stated that 95% of the bulls thatwere used in the process of participation in these sports were soiledwith faeces from below the base of their tails and across the large partof their hindquarters. Additionally, bovine species were forced to standtogether in accumulated waste for hours. At one of the locations of theevents, the Animal Welfare Board found that in the “collection area”, abull died due to injuries caused as a result of head-on collision with amoving passenger bus. Injuries were caused to muscle bones, nervesand blood vessels also as the bulls were subjected to tail-biting, pokingthem with sharp objects to excite them, use of irritants in the eyes andnose. Vadi vassal (the cattle bull entry place in Jallikattu) were narrowentry corridors which had cramping conditions and bulls were made tomove sideways which is an unnatural movement for them. There wasalso lack of food and water at the respective locations and instances ofspectators beating, biting and agitating the bulls. Such abhorrent practisessurfaced from investigation reports relied on by the petitioners. Inparagraph 67 of A. Nagaraja (supra), as reported in the aforesaid journal,substantial emphasis has been laid on Article 48 of the Constitution ofIndia read with Fundamental Duties enshrined in Article 51-A (g) and(h). On that basis, argument was advanced that sentient species shouldbe accorded the protective umbrella of Article 21 of the Constitution.We shall deal with that aspect later in this judgment. In fact, argument inthis line has been advanced on the basis that sentient animals have naturalrights to live a life with dignity without any infliction of cruelty. The otherline of submission on behalf of the petitioners is that the subject dealtwith by the three Amendment Acts does not relate to List III. On thiscount the authorities cited were State of Bihar and Others -vs- IndianAluminium Companyand Others [(1997) 8 SCC 360], HoechstPharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), M. Karunanidhi -vs- Union of Indiaand Another [(1979) 3 SCC 431] and K.T. Plantation Private Ltd.and Another -vs- State of Karnataka [(2011) 9 SCC 1].

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A20. It has also been the argument of the petitioners that makingexception for bulls to carve them out of the protective mechanism of the1960 Act was not based on any intelligible criteria but on an arbitraryselection. Learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on Director ofEducation (Secondary) and Another -vs- Pushpendra KumarandOthers [(1998) 5 SCC 192], Harbilas Rai Bansal -vs- State ofBPunjaband Another [(1996) 1 SCC 1], State of Gujarat and Another-vs- Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soniand Others [(1983) 2 SCC 33] andShayara Bano -vs- Union of India and Others [(2017) 9 SCC 1] tosubstantiate this argument.

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21. We shall first deal with the argument advanced on behalf ofCthe petitioners that animals have rights. In fact, what has been urgedbefore us is that animals have Fundamental Rights as also legal rights. Ithas been held in A. Nagaraja (supra) case at paragraph 66 (in theReport):- “66. Rights guaranteed to the animals under Sections 3, 11,Detc. are only statutory rights. The same have to be elevated tothe status of fundamental rights, as has been done by fewcountries around the world, so as to secure their honour anddignity. Rights and freedoms guaranteed to the animals underSections 3 and 11 have to be read along with Article 51-A(g)Eand (h) of the Constitution, which is the magna carta of animalrights.”

22. The concept of animal rights has been anchored by thepetitioners on dual foundation. It has been submitted that our jurisprudencedoes not recognise rights only for human beings and Narayan Dutt BhattF-vs- Union of India [(2018) SCC OnLine Utt 645] has been cited todemonstrate that animals are legal entities having a distinct persona withcorresponding rights, duties and liabilities as that of a legal person. Inorder to put emphasis on this concept of evolving rights, petitioners havesubmitted that our legal system is both organic and dynamic in natureand with passage of time law must change. (Saurabh Chaudri andGOthers -vs- Union of India and Others [(2003) 11 SCC 146], ChiefJustice of Andhra Pradesh and Others -vs- L.V.A. Dixitulu andOthers [(1979) 2 SCC 34], Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and Another-vs- State of Punjab and Another [(1990) 3 SCC 87] and AshokKumar Gupta and Another v. State of U.P. and Others, [(1997) 5HSCC 201]). In this regard, certain international authorities being Argentina, Case No.P-72.254/2015 has been cited. Further, our attention has beendrawn to the Animal Wellbeing (Sentience) Act, 2022 recognising animalsas sentient beings in the United Kingdom. It has also been asserted thatrights of sentient animals have been recognised by the ConstitutionalCourt of Ecuador. On behalf of the respondents, the factum of existenceof animal rights has not been directly contested but the stand of therespondents on this point is that the rights which the sentient animalwould have enjoyed ought to be subject to the legislative provisions andin a case of this nature, which is likely to have seminal impact not onlyon our jurisprudence but our society as well, legislature would be a betterjudge to determine what would be the nature, contours and limitations ofsuch rights. The effect of this argument is that the rights of sentientanimals can be recognised by law but such rights would be in a nature asdetermined by the appropriate law-making body and not by judicialinterpretation.

23. On the point of recognizing rights of animals, the legislativeapproach appears to us to be two-fold. Of course, the animals cannotdemand their right in the same way human beings can assert for bringinga legislation, but as part of the social and cultural policy the law makershave recognised the rights of animals by essentially imposing restrictionon human beings on the manner in which they deal with animals. Byvirtue of Article 48 of the Constitution of India which essentially operatesas a national guideline for law makers, a two-way path has been devised.The first is imposing duty on the State to organise agriculture and animalhusbandry on modern and scientific lines. The second is emphasisingthe duty of the State to take steps for preserving and improving thebreeds and prohibiting slaughter of cows and calves and other milch anddraught cattle. Under the chapter on Fundamental Duties, a citizen isrequired to protect and improve the natural environment including forests,lakes, rivers and wildlife ought to have compassion for living creatures.The petitioners want us to interpret the Amendment Acts in light ofthese two constitutional provisions and want us to scrutinise the threeStatutes taking into cognizance pain and suffering that would be causedto them, so that the bovine species are not compelled to participate in theaforesaid sports organised by human beings for the latter’sown pleasure.It is the petitioners’ stand that wherever the 1960 Act enjoins humanbeings from performing certain acts vis-à-vis animals, the obligationsought to be translated jurisprudentially into rights of the animals not to besubjected to such prohibited acts. The line of reasoning in this regard on AB

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Abehalf the petitioners is that the very manner in which these sportsactivities are undertaken directly offend the aforesaid two provisions ofthe 1960 Act. Merely by introducing these three Amendment Acts, theorganisers of these events cannot be saved from the offences specifiedin the 1960 Act, which aspect has been dealt with in detail in the judgmentof this Court in the case of A. Nagaraja (supra).B

24. On the question of conferring fundamental right on animalswe do not have any precedent. The Division Bench in the case of A.Nagaraja (supra) also does not lay down that animals have FundamentalRights. The only tool available for testing this proposition is interpretingthe three Amendment Acts on the anvil of reasonableness in Article 14Cof the Constitution of India. While the protection under Article 21 hasbeen conferred on person as opposed to a citizen, which is the case inArticle 19 of the Constitution, we do not think it will be prudent for us toventure into a judicial adventurism to bring bulls within the said protectedmechanism. We have our doubt as to whether detaining a stray bullDfrom the street against its wish could give rise to the constitutional writof habeas corpus or not. In the judgment of A. Nagaraja (supra), thequestion of elevation of the statutory rights of animals to the realm offundamental rights has been left at the advisory level or has been framedas a judicial suggestion. We do not want to venture beyond that andleave this exercise to be considered by the appropriate legislative body.EWe do not think Article 14 of the Constitution can also be invoked by anyanimal as a person. While we can test the provisions of an animal welfarelegislation, that would be at the instance of a human being or a juridicalperson who may espouse the cause of animal welfare.

25. We shall next test the argument of the authorities, i.e., theFUnion, the three States as also the Animal Welfare Board (in their changedstance) that bovine sports are part of the culture and tradition of therespective States. We have already referred to the relevant provisionsof the three Amendment Acts which carries expression to this effect.

26. Ordinarily, whether a particular practice or event is part ofGculture or tradition is to be decided by the custom and usage of a particularcommunity or a geographical region which can be translated into anenactment by the appropriate legislature. But here the continuance ofthe subject sports have been found to be in breach of a Central Statuteby a Division Bench of this Court and these three Amendment ActsHseek to revive the earlier position. That is the petitioners’ argument.

27. In order to come to a definitive conclusion on this question,some kind of trial on evidence would have been necessary. It is also notCourt’s jurisdiction to decide if a particular event or activity or ritualforms culture or tradition of a community or region. But if a long lastingtradition goes against the law, the law Courts obviously would have toenforce the law. Learned counsel appearing for the parties, however,have cited different ancient texts and modern literature to justify theirrespective stands. In Public Interest Litigations, this Court has developedthe practice of arriving at a conclusion on subjects of this nature withoutinsisting on proper trial to appreciate certain social or economic conditionsgoing by available reliable literature. In paragraphs 53 and 73 in the caseof A. Nagaraja (supra), there is judicial determination about the practicebeing offensive to the provisions of the Central Statute. It would be triteto repeat that provisions of a Statute cannot be overridden by a traditionalor cultural event. Thus, we accept the argument of the petitioners that atthe relevant point of time when the decision in the case of A. Nagaraja(supra) was delivered, the manner in which Jallikattu was performed didbreach the aforesaid provisions of the 1960 Act and hence conductingsuch sports was impermissible.

28. But that position of law has changed now and the AmendmentActs have introduced a new regime for conducting these events. It is afact that the Amendment Acts per se seeks to legitimize the aforesaidthree bovine sports by including them by their respective names and thebody of the Statute themselves do not refer to any procedure by whichthese sports shall be held. If that was the position these AmendmentActs would have fallen foul of the ratio of the decisions of this Court inthe cases of S.S. Bola and Others (supra), State of Tamil Nadu -vs-State of Kerala (supra), Madan Mohan Pathak (supra), NationalAgricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd.(supra), In Re Punjab Agreement Act (supra), Mafatlal (supra), S.T.Sadiq (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra). The stand of the respondentshowever is that many of the offending elements of Jallikattu, Kambalaor Bullock Cart Race have been eliminated by the Rules made under theTamil Nadu and Maharashtra Amendment Acts and the State ofKarnataka has issued statutory notification laying down rigid regulatorymeasures for conducting these sports. These Rules specify isolated arenafor the sports or events to be conducted including setting up of both bullrun and bull collection area, galleries separating spectators from directlycoming into contact with bulls. The learned counsel for the respondents AB

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Awant us to read the Statutes and the Rules together to counter theargument of the petitioners that the Amendment Acts merely reintroducethe offending sports into the main Statute for their respective Stateswithout correcting or removing the defects pointed out by this Court inthe case of A. Nagaraja (supra). In the case of State of U.P. andOthers -vs- Babu Ram Upadhya [(1961) 2 SCR 679], it was inter aliaBobserved that the fundamental principle of construction was that theRules made under the Statute must be treated as a part and parcel thereofas if they were contained in the parent Act. In the case of PeerlessGeneral Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Another -vs-Reserve Bank of India [(1992) 2 SCC 343], it was held:-C“52. In State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [(1961) 2 SCR679 : AIR 1961 SC 751 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 773] this Court heldthat rules made under a statute must be treated, for allpurposes of construction or obligations, exactly as if theywere in that Act and are to the same effect as if they wereDcontained in the Act and are to be judicially noticed for allpurposes of construction or obligations. The statutory rulescannot be described or equated with administrative directions.In D.K.V. Prasada Rao v. Government of A.P. [AIR 1984 AP75 : (1983) 2 Andh WR 344] the same view was laid down.Therefore, the directions are incorporated and become partEof the Act itself. They must be governed by the same principlesas the statute itself. The statutory presumption that thelegislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and thelegislative intention should be given effect to, would beapplicable to the impugned directions.”F29. The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act contains stipulation to theeffect that conduct of Jallikattu subject to such Rules and regulations asmay be framed by the State Government shall be permitted. Section 38-B of the Maharashtra Act provides Rule making power of the Stateconsistent with the Rules made by the Central Government. Both theseGStatutes have become part of the 1960 Act in their respective States andspecifically confer Rule making power to the States and Rules havebeen framed. In such circumstances, as held by this Court in the case ofPeerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. (supra), ouropinion is that these Rules have to be read along with the AmendmentActs for their proper interpretation. So far as the Karnataka AmendmentH

Act is concerned, two fresh restrictions have been imposed in conductingKambala by virtue of introduction of Section 3(2) in the main Act afterAmendment. These conditions ban unnecessary pain or suffering thatwould be caused to the animals by the person in charge of the animalsconducting Kambala and make such practice subject to the conditionsas may be specified by the State Government by notification. Followingthe same analogy which we have expressed earlier while reading theAmendment Acts of Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra, in our opinion theNotification issued by the State of Karnataka ought to be accorded samestatus as Rule and has also to be read as integral part of the Statute, asamended. These Rules and the Notification ought not to be segregatedfrom the Amendment Acts for appreciating their true scope whileexamining the petitioners’ claim that the Amendment Acts, analysed inisolation from the said Rules and the Notification would be contrary tothe findings of this Court in the case of A. Nagaraja (supra).

30. In our opinion, the expressions Jallikattu, Kambala and BullCart Race as introduced by the Amendment Acts of the three Stateshave undergone substantial change in the manner they were used to bepracticed or performed and the factual conditions that prevailed at thetime the A. Nagaraja (supra) judgment was delivered cannot be equatedwith the present situation. We cannot come to the conclusion that in thechanged circumstances, absolutely no pain or suffering would be inflictedupon the bulls while holding these sports. But we are satisfied that thelarge part of pain inflicting practices, as they prevailed in the mannerthese three sports were performed in the pre-amendment period havebeen substantially diluted by the introduction of these statutory instruments.Argument was advanced that in reality these welfare measures may notbe practiced and the system as it prevailed could continue. We, however,cannot proceed in exercise of our judicial power on the assumption thata law ought to be struck down on apprehension of its abuse ordisobedience. All the three bovine sports, after Amendment, assumedifferent character in their performance and practice and for thesereasons we do not accept the petitioners’ argument that the AmendmentActs were merely a piece of colourable legislation with cosmetic changeto override judicial pronouncement. Once we read the amended Statuteswith the respective Rules or Notification, we do not find them to encroachupon the Central legislation. Respondents have cited a large body ofauthorities to defend their stand that these are not cases of colourablelegislation but we do not consider it necessary to refer to all these AB

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Ajudgments individually as we have come to this conclusion after analysingvarious statutory instruments covering the field.

31. Can the Amendment Acts be struck down for beingarbitrary? There is a body of cases in which legislations have beeninvalidated on this ground. So far as the subject of the presentBcontroversy is concerned, the bulls form a distinct species referred toas draught or pack animals as opposed to horses, which are adapted torun. But we decline to hold that just because bulls lack the naturalability to run like a horse, the subject-sports which are seasonally heldshall be held to be contrary to the provisions of the 1960 Act. In fact,on behalf of the respondents it was argued that these genre of bullsCare specially bred and have natural ability to run. There are contraryviews on this point. But in our opinion, no irrational classification asregards these bull sports have been made by the legislature so as toattract the mischief which Article 14 of the Constitution of India seeksto prevent. The validity of a legislative Act can also be negated on theDground of it being unreasonable. The element of unreasonableness hereis that the bovine species involved herein are being subjected tounnecessary pain and suffering mainly for entertainment purpose. Butthe 1960 Act itself categorizes several activities which cause pain andsuffering, even to a sentient animal. The judgment in the case of A.Nagaraja (supra) was largely founded on factual basis that bulls wereEsentient animals, and the sports involved were unnecessary, as opposedto being necessary for human survival. But the 1960 Act, on which thepetitioners’ case largely rests, proceeds on the basis of perceivedhuman necessity to employ animals in certain load carrying andentertainment activities. For instance, while other means of carriage Fof goods are available, why should bulls be permitted to undertakesuch activities - which are apparently involuntary and subject thesesentient bovine species to pain and suffering? Horse racing is allowedunder Performing Animals (Registration) Rules, 2001. Horse is also asentient animal. But the fact remains that by making them perform in

races, some element of pain and suffering must be caused to horses.GHere, the focus shifts from causing pain and suffering to the degree ofpain and suffering to which a sentient animal is subjected to whilebeing compelled to undertake certain activities for the benefit of humanbeings. Similarly, proponents of vegetarianism may argue thatslaughtering animals is not necessary as human beings can surviveHwithout animal protein. In our opinion, we should not take up this balancing exercise which has societal impact in discharge of our judicialduties. This kind of exercise ought to be left for the legislature to decideupon.

32. We shall now turn to the petitioners’ case assailing the legalityof the State Amendments by invoking the “Doctrine of Pith andSubstance”. On that count, their submission is based on two principles.First, it has been urged that even after the Amendment, the performanceof these sports continue to inflict pain and injury on the participating bullsand secondly, it was found by this Court in A. Nagaraja (supra), thatthese sports are in violation of the aforesaid provisions of the 1960 Actat the time when the three State Amendments were not enacted. On theface of it, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argued, that theAmendment Acts does not in any way provide remedial measures whichcould have rendered the three sports cured of the legal failing as ispostulated in the said provisions. According to the petitioners, these Actsseek to only introduce the Jallikattu, Kambala and Bullock Cart Race aspermissible activities within the provisions of the 1960 Act. Even if certainsports by their names are included within the ambit of permissible activity,the provisions of Sections 3, 11(1) (a) and (m) of the 1960 Act are notrendered otiose. The other point raised by the petitioners is that thesubject of Jallikattu does not come within the ambit of Entry 17 of ListIII of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and hence theState Assemblies lacked the legislative competence to enact theAmendment Acts. Presidential assent would not cure the saidincompetency, it is urged by the petitioners. We have found no flaw inthe process of obtaining Presidential assent having regard to the provisionsof Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India.

33. The “Doctrine of Pith and Substance” has been explained inthe well-known text, “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by G.P. Singh.We quote below the extract from 14[th] Edition of that text:- “The question whether the Legislature has kept itself withinthe jurisdiction assigned to it or has encroached upon aforbidden filed is determined by finding out the true natureand character or pith and substance of the legislation whichmay be different from its consequential effects. If the pith andsubstance of the legislation is covered by an entry within thepermitted jurisdiction of the Legislature any incidentalencroachment in the rival field is to disregarded. There is a AB

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Apresumption of constitutionality of statutes and hence, priorto determining whether there is any repugnancy between aCentral Act and a State Act, it has to determined whether bothActs relate to the same entry in List III, and whether there is a‘direct’ and ‘irreconcilable’ conflict between the two, applyingthe doctrine of ‘pith and substance’.B

The petitioners have relied on a several authorities explaining thisdoctrine. These are State of Rajasthan -vs- Shri G. Chawla and DrPohumal [(1959) Supp (1) SCR 904], Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills(P) Ltd. and Others -vs- State of U.P. and Others [(1980) 4 SCC136], Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India, etc.C-vs- Union of Indiaand Others [(1989) 3 SCC 634],State of A.P. andOthers -vs- McDowell & Co.and Others [(1996) 3 SCC 709], Stateof W.B. -vs- Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Others [(2004) 10 SCC201] and Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra).

34. First we shall examine as to whether conducting these bovineDsports is relatable to Item 17 of the concurrent list. It stipulates:- “Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.”

In the case of I.N Saksena -vs- State of Madhya Pradesh[(1976) 4 SCC 750], this Court had laid down that legislative lists in theEConstitution ought to be interpreted in a wide amplitude. The 1960 Act inwhole and the subjects of the three Amendments directly deal with thequestion of prevention of cruelty to animals. There is no other entry inany of the lists to which this subject could be connected with. In suchcircumstances, we reject the contention of the petitioners that the StateLegislatures inherently lacked jurisdiction to bring these Amendments,Fwhich subsequently received Presidential assent. On behalf of therespondents, several decisions have been relied upon in support of thisargument. Having regard to the view that we have already taken, we donot consider it necessary to reproduce all these decisions.

35. Next comes the question as to whether even after the saidGAmendments, Jallikattu and the other two activities could be held to bebeyond legislative competence of the three legislative bodies. We havealready held that the three Amendment Acts have to be read togetherwith the consequential Rules or Notifications. In our view, these Rules,once treated as part of the Acts, alter the manner of conducting thesesports and once these provisions are implemented, the mischief soughtH

to be remedied by the aforesaid two provisions of 1960 Act (i.e. Sections3 and 11(1)(a) and (m)) would not be attracted anymore. Thus, theargument that the Amendment Acts are void because they seek tooverride the judgment of A. Nagaraja (supra) cannot be sustained asthe basis of that judgment having regard to the nature and manner inwhich the offending activities were carried on has been altered.

36. Petitioners contend that even after changed procedurecontemplated by the three statutory instruments, the very participationof the bulls in these sports involve a strong element of involuntariness aswell as some element of pain and suffering. In the cases of T.N.Godavarman Thirumulpad -vs- Union of India and Others [(2012)4 SCC 362], Centre for Environmental Law, World Wide Fund-India -vs- Union of India and Others [(2013) 8 SCC 234]and N.R.Nair and Others -vs- Union of India and Others [(2001) 6 SCC 84],it has been broadly held that animals have inherent right in natural law tolive a dignified life without infliction of cruelty and this principle is soughtto extended to proscribe Jallikattu, Kambala and Bullock Cart Race. Inthe case of N.R. Nair (supra), it was held that animals have capabilityto bear pain and suffering and that they have a fear from restrictions ontheir spaces and bodies and other forms of physical discomfort. But weneed not refer to these authorities as we accept the obligation of humanbeings to ensure that animals do not suffer from pain and injury. Ourjurisdiction, however, does not extend to provide an absolute protectionto the animals from any manner of infliction of pain and suffering. Whatthe broad theme of 1960 Act is that the animals must be protected fromunnecessary pain and suffering. This aspect has been dealt with in thecase of A. Nagaraja (supra). This approach would be apparent from aplain reading of Section 11 of the 1960 Act itself even before the threeAmendments where the legislature appears to have undertaken abalancing exercise without disturbing the concept of ownership of animalby an individual and such individual’s right to employ these animals in theaforesaid sports. We have already expressed our views on the pointearlier in this judgment.

37. As we proceed on the basis that the Constitution does notrecognise any Fundamental Right for animals, we shall have to test thelegality of the three Statutes against the provisions of 1960 Act alongwith the constitutional provisions of Articles 48, 51-A (g) and (h). Thethree Statutes will also have to meet the test of arbitrariness, which has AB

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Abecome the foundation of our constitutional jurisprudence after this Courtdelivered the judgment in the cases of E.P. Royappa -vs- State ofTamil Nadu and Another [(1974) 4 SCC 3], Ajay Hasia and Others-vs- Khalid MujibSehravardi and Others [(1981) 1 SCC 722] andJoseph Shine -vs- Union of India [(2018) 2 SCC 189].

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B38. Factual arguments have been advanced that prohibition onthe practice of particularly Bullock Cart Race could result in ultimatecollapse of a particular genre of cattle which are useful for agriculturalpurpose and hence the aforesaid Amendment Acts to be treated to berelatable to Entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the ConstitutionCof India. But having regard to the nature of challenge, we are of theview that in pith and substance, the Amendment Acts seek to addressthe question of prevention of cruelty to animals. The tenor of theMaharashtra Amendment Act and its Preamble point to that interpretationand the object of the Amendments primarily is relatable to Item 17 of theConcurrent List. Hence, we reject the argument that the MaharashtraDAmendment Act has been legislated for the preservation, protection andimprovement of stock and prevention of animal diseases, veterinarytraining and practice. So far as the argument that livelihood of farmersand people associated with Bullock Cart Race could be adversely affectedif the prohibition which the writ petitioners want us to impose by strikingEdown the aforesaid Amendment Statute is concerned, we do not need toaddress this argument. We have, in this judgment dealt with the questionas to whether provisions of 1960 Act are being violated or not, as washeld in the case of A. Nagaraja (supra), decided prior to the threeAmendment Statutes. The effect of the said prohibition upon the livelihoodFof the people of that State is said to be espoused in I.A. No.170346 of2022. If we were to hold that these bovine sports offended the provisionsof the 1960 Act, the deprivation apprehended would have come withinthe reasonable restriction clause enshrined in Article 19(6) of theConstitution of India. In such a situation, a law made in that regardwould also be protected in relation to the challenge on the basis of ArticleG21 of the Constitution of India being procedure established by law.

39. In the judgment of A. Nagaraja (supra),the Division Bench ofthis Court, while examining the claim of the petitioners therein held thatJallikattu is dangerous not only to bulls but also to human and manyparticipants and spectators sustained injury in course of such events. SoH

far as human beings are concerned, their injuries would attract theprinciple of Tort known in common law as “volenti non fit injuria”.

40. In the light of what we have already discussed, we answerthe five questions referred to us in the following terms:-

(i) The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is not a piece of colourablelegislation. It relates, in pith and substance, to Entry 17 ofList III of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. Itminimises cruelty to animals in the concerned sports andonce the Amendment Act, along with their Rules andNotification are implemented, the aforesaid sports wouldnot come within the mischief sought to be remedied bySections 3, 11(1) (a) and (m) of the 1960 Act.

(ii) Jallikattu is a type of bovine sports and we are satisfied onthe basis of materials disclosed before us, that it is going onin the State of Tamil Nadu for at least last few centuries.This event essentially involves a bull which is set free in anarena and human participants are meant to grab the humpto score in the “game”. But whether this has become integralpart of Tamil culture or not requires religious, cultural andsocial analysis in greater detail, which in our opinion, is anexercise that cannot be undertaken by the Judiciary. Thequestion as to whether the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act isto preserve the cultural heritage of a particular State is adebateable issue which has to be concluded in the Houseof the People. This ought not be a part of judicial inquiryand particularly having regard to the activity in questionand the materials in the form of texts cited before us byboth the petitioners and the respondents, this question cannotbe conclusively determined in the writ proceedings. Sincelegislative exercise has already been undertaken andJallikattu has been found to be part of cultural heritage ofTamil Nadu, we would not disrupt this view of thelegislature. We do not accept the view reflected in the caseof A. Nagaraja that performance of Jallikattu is not a partof the cultural heritage of the people of the State of TamilNadu. We do not think there was sufficient material beforethe Court for coming to this conclusion. In the Preamble tothe Amendment Act, Jallikattu has been described to be A

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Apart of culture and tradition of Tamil Nadu. In the case ofA. Nagaraja (supra), the Division Bench found the culturalapproach unsubstantiated and referring to the manner inwhich the bulls are inflicted pain and suffering, the DivisionBench concluded that such activities offended Sections 3and 11(1)(a) and (m) of the 1960 Act. Even if we proceedBon the basis that legislature is best suited branch of theState to determine if particular animal-sports are part ofcultural tradition of a region or community, or not, if suchcultural event or tradition offends the law, the penalconsequence would follow. Such activities cannot be justifiedCon the ground of being part of cultural tradition of a State.In A. Nagaraja (supra), the sports were held to attract therestriction of Sections 3 and 11(1)(a) and (m) of the 1960Act because of the manner it was practiced. TheAmendment Act read with the Rules seek to substantiallyminimise the pain and suffering and continue with theDtraditional sports. The Amendment having receivedPresidential assent, we do not think there is any flaw in theState action. “Jallikattu” as bovine sports have to be isolatedfrom the manner in which they were earlier practiced andorganising the sports itself would be permissible, in termsEof the Tamil Nadu Rules.

(iii) The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act is not in pith and substance,to ensure survival and well-being of the native breeds ofbulls. The said Act is also not relatable to Article 48 of theConstitution of India. Incidental impact of the saidFAmendment Act may fall upon the breed of a particulartype of bulls and affect agricultural activities, but in pithand substance the Act is relatable to Entry 17 of List III ofthe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.

(iv) Our answer to this question is in the negative. In our opinion,Gthe Tamil Nadu Amendment Act does not go contrary tothe Articles 51-A (g) and 51-A(h) and it does not violatethe provisions of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution ofIndia.

(v) The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act read along with the RulesHframed in that behalf is not directly contrary to the ratio of

the judgment in the case of A. Nagaraja (supra) andjudgment of this Court delivered on 16[th] November 2016dismissing the plea for Review of the A. Nagaraja (supra)judgment as we are of the opinion that the defects pointedout in the aforesaid two judgments have been overcome bythe State Amendment Act read with the Rules made in thatbehalf.

41. Our decision on the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act would alsoguide the Maharashtra and the Karnataka Amendment Acts and wefind all the three Amendment Acts to be valid legislations.

42. However, we direct that the law contained in the Act/Rules/Notification shall be strictly enforced by the authorities. In particular, wedirect that the District Magistrates/competent authorities shall beresponsible for ensuring strict compliance of the law, as amended alongwith its Rules/Notifications.

43. All the I.As. for Intervention are allowed in the above terms.As we have answered the referred questions, we do not think any purposewould be served in keeping the writ petitions pending. All the writ petitionsshall stand dismissed. The appeal and the Transferred Case shall alsostand disposed of in the above terms.

44. Other pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.

45. There shall be no order as to costs.

Ankit Gyan(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

Referred questions answered.

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