GULF OIL CORPORATION LTD. versus THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS. on 13 September 2022

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[2022] 17 S.C.R.

AGULF OIL CORPORATION LTD.

v.

THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014)

BSEPTEMBER 13, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]

Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions andEndowments Act, 1987– ss.75, 80, 82 – Telangana Charitable andHindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable PropertiesCand other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and LicensesRules, 2003– r.15– High Court inter alia ordered the appellant-lesseeto be evicted under the 1987 Act – Whether the land in question isagricultural land to which the 1987 Act is applicable and the leasein favor of the lessee stands cancelled in terms of s.82(1) of theDAct; and whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge thatthe land in question was agricultural land in the proceedingsbetween the parties before the Endowments Tribunal – Held: Natureof land is distinct from the use of the land – Since the land isagricultural land, its use for non-agricultural purposes would notalter the nature of the land as an agricultural land – s.82 of theE1987 Act mentions “any lease of agricultural land….”, therefore,the lease has to be of agricultural land irrespective of the use towhich the lessee may put such agricultural land to – Language ofthe statute refers to nature of the land and not the use thereof –Therefore, in the present case, even in terms of the written argumentsFraised by the lessee before the Tribunal, the use of land for non-agricultural purposes would be irrelevant for statutory cancellationof the lease of agricultural lands u/s.82 of the 1987 Act – Further,1987 Act is a Code in itself providing for constitution of theEndowments Tribunal, appeal, revision and review – The strict ruleof procedure contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 inGrespect of pleadings and evidence cannot be extended to the Tribunalconstituted for specific purpose – In the instant case, since thelessees were aware of the fact that the Mutt-The lessor claims theland to be agricultural land and statutory cancellation of the leasewas being averred for the reason that the leased land was H

agricultural, therefore, the lessees cannot complain of any violationof principles of natural justice or strict rules of pleading as isrequired under the CPC – The parties were aware of the controversyabout the nature of the land – Thus, the lessee cannot be permittedto turn around to dispute the nature of land leased to them – Further,r.15 of the 2003 Rules will have no application to the agriculturalland in view of the fact that s.82(3) and (4) is applicable only to theland and property which is not agricultural – Since the land hasbeen found to be agricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not beapplicable to the land in question – Thus, the direction in CANo.7761 of 2014, to consider the request of the lessee to considerthe grant of lease u/r.15 is untenable and is set aside – AndhraPradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & EndowmentsAct, 1966 – Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908.

Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Applicability of –Held: The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for thereason that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and thereligious institutions in terms of s.1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 andthereafter in terms of first proviso to s.4(1) of the Inams AbolitionAct – Thus, any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only forthe purposes of negating the claim of Power of Attorney holderclaiming occupancy rights – It has been categorically held by theJoint Collector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt – TelanganaAbolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act,1994.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007passed by the Joint Commissioner under the Inams AbolitionAct?

Conclusion

The Inams Abolition Act abolished all inams (grants) bythe Nizam. The Act contemplates adjudication of matters inrelation to grant of occupancy rights and certificates in respect ofinam lands covered by the Act and vested with the Government,inquiry into the nature and history of such lands, determinationof compensation payable to the Inamdar and apportionment AB

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Athereto. Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams Abolition Act came intoforce on 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of grant of occupancy rights underthe Inams Act. It appears that the Mutt entered into an agreementwith one Kalyani Narsing Rao. He filed an application for grant ofoccupancy rights. Such application was allowed by the RevenueDivisional Commissioner on 27.11.2004. The Revenue DivisionalBOfficer was considering an application for issuance of occupancyrights certificate to the general power of attorney holder of theMutt. The application was allowed. In an appeal under Section24 of the Inams Abolition Act, a finding was returned that theland in question was converted into for nonagricultural use beforeC1973. The issue no. 2 therein was to the effect whether the landin question was under agriculture as on the crucial date. Thefinding on the said issue is that it was being used for non-agricultural purposes. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted toabolish the inams and to confer occupancy rights to the tiller.Since the land was an inam land given to the charitable andDreligious institutions, it was found to be exempt from the operationof the Inams Abolition Act. The Joint Collector held that the landis an inam land and in terms of proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act,the inam was held by or for the benefit of charitable and religiousinstitutions, therefore, no person shall be entitled to be registeredEas an occupant and the institution alone shall be entitled to beregistered as the occupant. It is the said order of the RevenueDivisional Officer which was set aside by the Joint Collector.[Paras 45 and 46][402-D-F; 403-B-D]

1.2 The scope of inquiry under the said Act was restricted Fto grant of occupancy rights which was negated for multiplereasons including the fact that the land was not under agricultureon the crucial date. Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special Actin respect of abolition of inams and conferment of occupancyrights, it is an order not by a Tribunal having a plenary jurisdiction.

The Tribunal under the Inams Abolition Act had limitedGjurisdiction to decide the questions arising under the InamsAbolition Act. Therefore, the findings recorded in suchproceedings neither act as estoppel, nor res judicata for any otherproceedings. The proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act wereinitiated by a Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rightsHon the basis of an agreement to sell. The Mutt was represented by a Power of Attorney holder who was claiming independentrights, therefore, the previous proceedings were not betweenthe same parties as the Mutt was not a party in its own rights butthrough an attorney who was claiming independent right inhimself. Therefore, the findings recorded therein are not relevantor binding in respect of proceedings under another statute,enacted for different objective to protect the inam land given tothe charitable and religious institutions. The Inams Abolition Actis not applicable to the Mutt for the reason that the Act itself isnot applicable to charitable and the religious institutions in termsof Section 1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and thereafter in terms of firstproviso to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. Thus, anyfinding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for the purposesof negating the claim of Power of Attorney holder claimingoccupancy rights. It has been categorically held by the JointCollector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt. [Paras 47, 49and 50][404-H; 405-A-B]

2.1 Whether the land in question is agricultural land to whichthe Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions andEndowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of thelessee stands cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the Act?

The primary argument of the learned counsel for the lesseesis that there was no pleading that the land in question wasagricultural land, therefore, the lessees were not made aware ofthe fact that the lease stands statutorily cancelled. The saidargument is not tenable for the reason that the Inspector in hisreport dated 29.1.2008 and 16.12.2008 reported that the lands inquestion are agricultural lands and that lease of such lands standscancelled. The lessee had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 24440 of2010 challenging the continuation of proceedings before theEndowments Tribunal. In the counter affidavit dated 7.12.2010filed on behalf of the Mutt, it was stated that the leases havebecome null and void under Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The writpetition was dismissed on 20.1.2011. The High Court also noticedthe argument of the Mutt that in terms of Section 82, the leasesstood cancelled. The High Court had called for the record of thefourth respondent i.e., the Assistant Commissioner (Endowment).The argument that the land is agricultural land was raised by the ABC

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AMutt and also recorded in the report of the Inspector. Thus, it isnoted that lessees were well aware of the nature of the land asagricultural land. Such order of the High Court has attained finality.The Mutt has based its arguments on the premise that the landin question is agricultural land. [Paras 51-56][406-B-D, F-G, H;407-F-G]B

2.2 A perusal of the written arguments shows that the lesseeshave submitted that the land is being used for non-agriculturalpurposes. The entire argument is based upon use of the land fornon-agricultural purposes. The nature of land is distinct from theuse of the land. Since the land is agricultural land, its use for non-Cagricultural purposes would not alter the nature of the land as anagricultural land. Section 82 of the 1987 Act mentions “any leaseof agricultural land….”, therefore, the lease has to be ofagricultural land irrespective of the use to which the lessee mayput such agricultural land to. The language of the statute refers Dto nature of the land and not the use thereof. Therefore, even interms of the written arguments raised by the lessee before theTribunal, the use of land for non-agricultural purposes would beirrelevant for statutory cancellation of the lease of agriculturallands under Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The distinction betweenagricultural and non-agricultural land sought to be drawn fromEthe reading of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Non-AgriculturalAssessments Act, 1963 repealed by the A.P Agricultural Land(Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006, is nottenable. The distinction between the categories of land leads toconsequence of higher assessment in the case of non-agriculturalFland. The lessee has not led any evidence that they are payinglevy as per the rates fixed under this statute as that of non-agricultural land. In respect of the 1987 Act, the Division Benchof the High Court in Siddhartha Academy held that use of land fornon-agricultural purpose is immaterial for the purpose of statutorycancellation of lease deed, as provided under Section 82(1) ofGthe said Act. The SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 stoodwithdrawn on 35 27.2.2017. Thus, the order passed by theDivision Bench had attained finality. [Paras 57, 58, 60, 61][408-G-H; 409-A-C; 410-B, F]

Siddartha Academy of General and TechnicalEducation v. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments2010 SCC Online AP 461 – referred to.

3.1 Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledgethat the land in question was agricultural land in the proceedingsbetween the parties before the Endowments Tribunal?

The 1987 Act is a Code in itself providing for constitutionof the Endowments Tribunal, appeal, revision and review. Thestrict rule of procedure contemplated by the Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 in respect of pleadings and evidence cannot beextended to the Tribunal constituted for specific purpose. Sincethe lessees were aware of the fact that the Mutt claims the landto be agricultural land and statutory cancellation of the lease wasbeing averred for the reason that the leased land was agricultural,therefore, the lessees cannot complain of any violation ofprinciples of natural justice or strict rules of pleading as is requiredunder the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the partieswere aware of the controversy about the nature of the land. Thus,the lessee cannot be permitted to turn around to dispute thenature of land leased to them. [Paras 63, 66][411-B-D; 412-A]

Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr. (2008) 17 SCC491 : [2008] 14 SCR 621; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead)by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors. (1987) 2SCC 555 : [1987] 2 SCR 805; Union of India v. IbrahimUddin & Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 148 : [2012] 8 SCR 35;Biraji alias Brijraji & Anr. v. Surya Pratap & Ors.(2020) 10 SCC 729 – held inapplicable.

Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao AIR1963 SC 884 : [1963] SCR 208; Swamy Atmananda &Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors. (2005) 10SCC 51 : [2005] 3 SCR 556; Nareshbhai Bhagubhai v.Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 1 : [2019] 10 SCR 88 –relied on .

3.2 There is merit in the argument raised by the lesseesthat the lease executed prior to the commencement of 1987 Actwould not be annulled for the reason that there was no prior A

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Aapproval. The leases were granted prior to the commencementof the 1987 Act but even under the 1966 Act, Section 70prohibited lease of the inam land if its term exceeded six years.The lease of land measuring 143 acres vide lease deed dated23.7.1964; 257 acres 19 guntas vide lease deed dated 14.9.1966and 2 acres 32 guntas vide lease deed dated 21.3.1969 were notBpreceded with any prior approval of the competent authority.Reliance is placed upon the note dated 24.2.1964 but such noteis part of the decision-making process as no approval wascommunicated to either the lessee or the lessor or to any person.In fact, the said communication is a note of Second Secretary toCGovernment Home (Endowments-III) Department that lease fora term of 99 years cannot be construed as a transfer of ownershipof the endowed lands by outright sale and is prohibited underRule 331 of Hyderabad State Endowment Rules and Regulations.It is not a communication addressed either to the lessee or tothe lessor or to any other person or institution. The regulationD331 prohibits the possession over and transfer of the nuzli lands(tax bearing lands) from generation to generation in future. Thenote dated 24.02.1964 relied upon to argue that it leads toapproval of lease is not a decision which can be said to be effectiveand binding in view of the judgements of this Court. The onlyEapproval of land measuring 173 acres and 19 guntas is dated10.5.1976. Though there is a reference to the communication ofthe Commissioner Endowment dated 29.4.1975 in respect ofthree previous lease deeds, but there is no communication tothe Mutt either of the letter dated 10.5.1976 or of 29.4.1975.Section 82 does not make any exception of the lease grantedFwith approval. The approval is mentioned only in Section 75 ofthe 1987 Act. Even if such approval is treated to have been grantedin respect of the entire land, the lease granted with approval isrelevant only for the purposes of Section 75 of the 1987 Act andnot for the purposes of Section 82 of the said Act. [Paras 67-G69][412-B-G; 414-A-C]

3.3 Similarly, the argument that the land now falls withinthe urban agglomeration in view of the enactment of the UrbanLand (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is again not tenable.Firstly, the said Act stands repealed on 22.3.1999. Still further,Hthe mere fact that the land has come within the municipal limits would not make the land as non-agricultural land. It only meansthat the land within the municipal limits can be utilized or thebuildings be constructed in terms of the provisions of theMunicipal Laws applicable thereto. Similarly, the argument thatthe land in question falls with the Zonal Development Plan forKukatpally as per the communication of the Hyderabad UrbanDevelopment Authority is again not tenable. The ZonalDevelopment Plan is future planning of the development of thearea. Thus, in future, the land can be used only according to ZonalDevelopment Plan but that does not mean that the agriculturalnature of the land has ceased to exist. Therefore, the saidcommunication is also not tenable. [Paras 70, 71][414-C-F]

3.4 In Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014, there is a direction toconsider the request of the lessee. However, Rule 15 of theTelangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions andEndowments Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other thanAgricultural Land) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003 will haveno application to the agricultural land in view of the fact thatSection 82(3) and (4) is applicable only to the land and propertywhich is not agricultural. Since the land has been found to beagricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not be applicable tothe land in question. Thus, the direction to consider the requestof the lessee to consider the grant of lease under Rule 15 isuntenable and is set aside. [Paras 72, 73][414-F-H]

Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermadeand Anr. (1999) 5 SCC 590 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 514;Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Officer in Charge (Courtof Wards) (1976) 3 SCC 864 : [1977] 1 SCR 146;Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (SMT) v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Gujrat (1993) 4 Supp SCC 707 : [1993] 2Suppl. SCR 264; ITC Limited v. Blue Coast HotelsLimited (2018) 15 SCC 99 : [2018] 5 SCR 516; MaheshDattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11SCC 141 : [2009] 3 SCR 1122; State of A.P. v. NallamilliRami Reddy & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl.SCR 287; Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao &

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[2022] 17 S.C.R.

AOrs. AIR 1956 SC 593 : [1956] SCR 451; A.P. PunjabiSabha, Hyderabad v. Joint Collector, Hyderabad 2004SCC OnLine AP 689 – referred to.

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.03.2013 of the High Courtof Judicature at Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No. 31893 of2011 and W.P. No. 8005 of 2012.F

With

Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014.

Harish Salve, Parag P. Tripathi, Kapil Sibal, K. V. Vishwanathan,C. S. Vaidyanathan, Sr. Advs., Ms. Mumtaz Bhalla, Karan Dev Chopra,GNeeraj Malik, Lakshya Kampani, Srinivasan Ramaswamy, Shagun Ruhil,Abhay Kumar, Ms. Uttara Babbar, Manan Bansal, Ms. Shipra Jain, NizanPasha, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Amartya Sharan, M. G. Aravind Raj,Sivagnanam Karthikeyan, P. Venkat Reddy, Prashant Kumar Tyagi, P.Srinivas Reddy for M/s. Venkat Palwai Law Associates, Mahfooz AhsanHNazki, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. The challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014 is to anorder dated 7.3.2013 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in WritPetition No. 31893 of 2011 whereby the appellant herein i.e., Gulf OilCorporation Limited[1] was ordered to be evicted under the provisions ofThe Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions andEndowments Act, 1987[2]. The lessee claimed leasehold rights on theland admeasuring 540 acres and 30 guntas situated at village Kukatpally,Hyderabad.

2. Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014 has been preferred by Sri UdasinMutt[3], the lessor of the said land, arising out of Writ Petition No. 8005 of2012. The said writ petition was decided along with the writ petition filedby the lessee. The Mutt has claimed mesne profits in terms of Section83(6) of the 1987 Act. However, the writ petition was disposed of witha direction to consider the request of the lessee under Rule 15 of theTelangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and EndowmentsImmovable Properties and other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land)Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003[4], published vide Government OrderMemo No. 866 dated 8.8.2003.

3. The dry soil land measuring more than 540 acres and 30 guntaswas granted as inam land by the Nizam of Hyderabad to the Muttsomewhere in the year 1873. The Mutt entered into an agreement oflease with M/s Indian Detonators, predecessor of the lessee, on23.07.1964 in respect of 143 acres of inam lands, bearing survey no.1010/8 to 1010/10. The lessee, claiming to be the successor-in-interestof M/s Indian Detonators, relies on the permission said to be granted bythe Government to enter into lease of the inam land on 24.02.1964.

4. The lessor thereafter entered into an agreement with M/s IndianDetonators on 14.9.1966 to take on lease 257 acres and 19 guntas of theinam land. The supplementary lease deed dated 21.03.1969 was alsoexecuted for an area of 2 acres and 32 guntas of land.

1 For short, the ‘Lessee’

2 For short, the ‘1987 Act’

3 For short the ‘Lessor’ or ‘Mutt’

4 For short, the ‘2003 Rules’

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A5. The Commissioner, Endowments Department communicatedto the Secretary to Government, Revenue (Endowments) Departmenton 29.4.1975 to sanction proposed long lease of 99 years of 137 Acres19 guntas of the land. It was also communicated that since the leasewas exceeding 6 years, therefore, sanction of the Government isnecessary under Section 70 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and HinduBReligious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1966[5]. Section 70 of the 1966Act reads thus:

“70. Lease, sale, etc., of inams to be void in certain cases:-

(1) Any lease for a term exceeding six years and any gift, sale,Cexchange or mortgage of an inam land granted for thesupport or maintenance of a charitable or religious institutionor endowment or for the performance of a religious or publiccharity or service, shall be null and void unless any suchtransaction, not being a gift, is effected with the priorsanction of the Government.

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(2) Such prior sanction may be accorded by the Governmentwhere they consider that the transaction is-

(i) necessary or beneficial to the institution or endowment;

(ii) consistent with the objects of the institution orEendowment and;

(iii) the consideration thereof is reasonable and proper.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any inamland in the Andhra Area of the State.”

F6. It was on 10.05.1976, the Government of Andhra Pradeshaccorded sanction for lease of land measuring 137 acres and 19 guntasto M/s. Indian Detonators Limited. Subsequently, on 20.04.1978, thelessor entered into another lease deed with M/s Indian Detonators Limitedfor a period of 99 years for land measuring 137 acres 19 guntas.

G7. A perusal of the lease deed dated 23.07.1964 in respect of 143acres and the lease deed dated 14.09.1966 in respect of 257 acres and19 guntas of land specifically mention that the lease are of inam land. Asummary of the various lease deeds executed by the lessor are producedhereinunder:

H5 For short, the ‘1966 Act’

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8. The 1987 Act came into force on 21.04.1987, repealing the1966 Act. Section 82 of the 1987 Act has a non-obstante clause so as toDoverride and cancel any lease of agricultural land other than lease to alandless poor person. Section 82 of the 1987 Act reads thus:

“82. Lease of Agricultural Lands:-

(1) Any lease of agricultural land belonging to or given orendowed for the purpose of any institution or endowmentEsubsisting on the date of commencement of this Act shall,notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time beingin force, held by a person who is not a landless poor personstands cancelled.

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(3) The authority to sanction the lease or licence in respect ofany property or any right or interest thereon belonging to orgiven or endowed for the purpose of any charitable orreligious institution or endowment, the manner in which andthe period for which such lease or licence shall be such asGmay be prescribed.

(4) Every lease or licence of any immovable property, otherthan the Agricultural land belonging to, or given or endowedfor the purpose of any charitable or religious institution orendowment subsisting on the date of the commencementH

388SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aof this Act, shall continue to be in force subject to the rulesas may be prescribed under sub-section (3).

(5)6[The provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area)Tenancy Act, 1956 (Act XVIII of 1956) and the AndhraPradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural LandsBAct, 1950 (Act XXI of 1950) shall not apply to any lease ofland belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose ofany charitable or religious institutions or endowment asdefined in this Act.]”

9. The Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Bill (Bill No. XVIII of 1954)Cwas published in Hyderabad Gazette Extraordinary No.86 on 10.04.1954.One of the objects for the enactment of such legislation was the abolitionof all inams, other than village service inams and inams held by religiousand charitable institutions. In pursuance of such Bill, the HyderabadAbolition of Inams Act, 1955[7] came to be enacted. Such Act receivedthe assent of the President on 16.07.1955 and was published in theDHyderabad Gazette Extraordinary No. 90 of 20.07.1955. The enactmentis now known as the Telangana Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. Initially,the Inams Abolition Act was not applicable to inams held by or for thebenefit of charitable and religious institutions [Section 1(2)(i)]. The saidprovision was however deleted by Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act,E1985 (Act No. 29 of 1985) with effect from 26.12.1985. The InamsAbolition Act was then subsequently amended vide Andhra Pradesh(Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994), whereby a proviso wasinserted to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act with retrospectiveeffect from 26.12.1985, the date when Section 1(2)(i) was deleted. Theinserted clause and other relevant provisions of the said Inams AbolitionFAct read thus:

8"[1(2) It extends to the whole of the Hyderabad State and shallbe applicable to all inams except –

(i) inams held by or for the benefit of charitable and religiousGinstitutions; 6 Added by Act No. 27 of 2002, w.e.f. 26-8-2002.

7 Inams Abolition Act

H8 omitted by A.P. (Amendment) Act, 1985 (Act No. 29 of 1985) w.e.f. 26.12.1985

(ii) inams held for rendering village service useful to theAGovernment or to the village community includingsethsendhi, neeradi and balutha inams.]

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3. Abolition and vesting of inams and the consequences thereof-B(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in anyusage, settlement, contract, grant, sanad, order or otherinstrument, Act, regulation, rules or order having the force oflaw and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of aCivil, Revenue or Atiyat Court, and with effect from the dateof vesting, all inams shall be deemed to have been abolishedCand shall vest in the State.

(2) Save as expressely provided by or under the provisions ofthis Act and with effect from the date of vesting, the followingconsequences shall ensue namely:- D

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(c) all such inam lands shall be liable to payment of landrevenue; (d) all rents and land revenue including cesses and royalties,accruing in respect of such inam lands, on or after the date ofvesting, shall be payable to the State and not to the Inamdar,and any payment made in contravention of this clause shallnot be valid; E

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9[Provided that where inams are held by or for the benefit ofcharitable and religious institutions no person shall be entitled tobe registered as an occupant under sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 and theinstitution alone shall be entitled to be registered as an occupantof all inam lands other than those specified in clauses (a) and (c)above without restriction of extent to four and half times the familyholding and without the condition of personal cultivation:

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Provided further that where any person other than theconcerned charitable or religious institution has been registered 9 inserted by A.P. (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act No. 19 of 1994) with retrospectiveeffect from 26.12.1985.

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as an occupant under sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 after thecommencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolitionof Inams (Amendment) Act, 1985 such registration shall and shallbe deemed always to have been null and void and no effect shallbe given to such registration]”

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9. Vesting of certain buildings and inam lands used for non-agricultural purposes.-

(1) Every private building, situated within an inam shall, with effectfrom the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned itCimmediately before that date.

(2) Where an inam land has been converted for any purposeunconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall beentitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was notvoid or illegal under any law in force.

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(3) The vesting of private buildings or lands under sub-section (1)or (2) shall be subject to the payment of non-agricultural assessmentthat may be imposed by Government from time to time.”

10. Section 82 of the 1987 Act statutorily cancelled the lease deedsif endowed for the purpose of any institution. Section 75 of the 1987 ActEdeclares that any lease and any gifts, sale, exchange or mortgage of aninam land, granted for the support or maintenance of charitable or religiousinstitution, or endowment or for the performance of a religious or publiccharity or service shall be null and void, unless such transaction, notbeing a gift, is affected with prior sanction of the Government. A perusalFof the facts would show that prior approval was only in respect of 137acres 19 guntas of land on the basis of which registered lease deed wasexecuted on 20.04.1978. However, lease deed dated 23.07.1964 in respectof 143 acres, lease deed dated 14.09.1966 in respect of 257 acres 19guntas and supplementary lease deed dated 21.3.1969 in respect of 2Acres 32 guntas were not preceded with any prior sanction. ThoughGthere is a note of the Second Secretary of the Government that lease for99 years would not amount to transfer of property, but such note is onthe file of the Government and had not been communicated to any of theinterested parties.

11. It is submitted that the lessee faced no issues till November2006 when the previous Mahant Baba Sagardas was unceremoniouslyremoved. It was on 24.08.2007, a notice on behalf of Sri Arun Das ji,Mahant of the Mutt, for delivery of vacant possession, was served treatinglessee as an encroacher. It was later on 24.12.2007, the Mutt wrote tothe Assistant Commissioner (Endowments) for eviction of the lessee,inter alia on the ground that a graveyard on a land measuring 20 acreshas come up and thus there is a violation of the terms of the lease. TheAssistant Commissioner called for an inspection report from the officeof the Inspector, Endowments Department. A report was submitted on29.01.2008, communicating to the Assistant Commissioner, EndowmentsDepartment that the three lease deeds are without prior Governmentapproval. Only the lease deed dated 20.04.1978 was with prior approval.It was communicated that the 4 lease deeds have totally become nulland void as per the 1966 Act, 1987 Act and the Rules framed under theGovernment Order No.866 dated 08.08.2003.

12. The proceedings leading to the present appeals were initiatedwhen a show cause notice dated 20.12.2008 was issued by DeputyCommissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad. The proceedingsinitiated in pursuance of show cause notice to the lessee was assignedan Original Application No.21/2008 before the Deputy Commissioner,Endowments Department, later renumbered as OA No. 579 of 2010after the constitution of the Endowments Tribunal. The lessee was askedto remove the encroachment upon the land belonging to the Mutt.

13. It has been argued that the Endowments Tribunal passed apatently perverse order of eviction on the ground that the leased landwas agricultural in nature and therefore, the lease deed was void as perSection 82 of the 1987 Act. The writ petition against the order passed bythe Endowments Tribunal remained unsuccessful. It is the said orderpassed in the writ petition which is the subject matter of challenge in thepresent appeals.

14. The argument of Mr. Harish Salve, appearing for the lessee,is that it was neither asserted by the Mutt, nor any issue was framedregarding treating the land as agricultural land. Therefore, in the absenceof any evidence of the land being an agriculture land, the finding recordedby the Endowments Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court suffersfrom patent illegality as without any plea or evidence, a finding has been AB

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Areturned to declare the lease deed executed in favor of the appellant ascancelled on the ground that the lease was of an agricultural land.

15. Mr. Salve referred to an order passed by the Joint Collector inan appeal under Section 24 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area)Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, wherein a finding was returned that theBland in question was converted into for non-agricultural use before 1973.The order under challenge in appeal was an order passed by the RevenueDivisional Officer dated 27.11.2004.

16. It is argued that the order of the Joint Collector is final and actas an estoppel to the effect that the leased inam lands are non-agriculturalCin nature and the factum of the Endowments Tribunal having delved intothe same by giving a perverse finding is impermissible. Reliance is placedupon the judgment of this Court reported as Hope Plantations Ltd. v.Taluk Land Board, Peermade and Anr.[10] that if an issue has beenfinally determined, parties cannot dispute such finding.

D17. The issue as to whether the land is agricultural land was raisedfor the first time in the written arguments submitted by the Mutt beforethe Endowments Tribunal relying upon a report of the AssistantCommissioner (Endowments). It is submitted that the argument raisedby the Mutt was dealt with in the written arguments raised by the lesseespecifically contending that a new plea was raised for the first time inEthe written arguments that the land was agricultural land. Reliance isplaced upon judgment of this Court reported as Bachhaj Nahar v. NilimaMandal & Anr.[11] wherein it was held that once a particular plea is notraised and the defendants had no opportunity to resist or oppose such arelief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice. Reliance was also placedFupon a judgment of this Court reported as Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead)by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors.[12] .

18. It is argued that the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land is evident from the reading of Section 3 of the AndhraPradesh Non-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963, which provides forGassessment of non-agricultural land. The A.P Agricultural Land(Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006 repealed the 1963Act by keeping the distinction between the agricultural and non-agricultural 10 (1999) 5 SCC 59011 (2008) 17 SCC 491H12 (1987) 2 SCC 555

land. Reference was made to Section 28 of the Andhra Pradesh(Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli that the land in Section1(b) includes all kinds of benefits pertaining to land and that land revenueis paid for non-agricultural land as well. It has been argued that Section82 would be applicable only if lease of land is used for agricultural purposealone. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of this Court reportedas Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Officer in Charge (Court ofWards)[13], Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (SMT) v. Commissioner ofIncome Tax, Gujrat[14] and ITC Limited v. Blue Coast Hotels Limited[15]dealing with the agricultural land in the taxation laws such as wealth taxand income tax. It is further contended that the lease deeds executedfor a period of 99 years could not be terminated in violation of the termsof a notice period of 5 years, as well as on a non-existing ground oftermination of lease. It is also argued that the report of the AssistantCollector, Endowments is on inquiry and not evidence before the Tribunalwhich can be made basis of terminating the lease in favor of the lessee.

19. It is contended that the notice for termination of lease wasissued on 11.10.2007 on the ground that Mutt had entered into leaseagreements with IDL and IDL Chemicals Limited and not with theappellant; the appellant abandoned most of the land, thereby allowingencroachers to occupy the land and that the land of Mutt is being convertedinto burial grounds.

20. It was averred that eviction proceedings can only be inconsonance with the terms of the eviction notice which allows no roomfor vagueness and ambiguity. In the notice, no issue qua the nature ofthe leased inam lands was raised but was surreptitiously supplanted bythe Mutt in its written arguments. The same is erroneously consideredand decided by the Tribunal and upheld by the High Court. It is onlySection 75 of the 1987 Act that would be applicable which contemplatesprior permission of the Government in the case of inam lands.

21. It is argued that evidence can be led in support of the plearaised. Since there is no plea raised by the Mutt that the land is agriculturalland, therefore, no amount of evidence in absence of plea can beconsidered by the Court. Reliance is placed upon Union of India v.

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AIbrahim Uddin & Anr.[16], and Biraji alias Brijraji & Anr. v. SuryaPratap & Ors.[17].

22. The appellants further argued that any finding of a court oflaw in the absence of evidence cannot be sustained. Such finding basedon a document which is not placed on record is violation of principles ofBnatural justice, fair play and fairness. Reliance is placed upon MaheshDattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra[18]. It is argued that sincethe report of the Inspector dated 29.1.2008 was not placed on record,therefore, the lessee was not given a chance to rebut the assertion thatthe land is an agricultural land.

C23. It has been further argued that the impugned order of theHigh Court is perverse and that the judgment of the High Court inSiddartha Academy of General and Technical Education v. DeputyCommissioner of Endowments[19]has been wrongly relied upon. In fact,in the said judgment, the land was agricultural land. This Court in SLP(Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 has permitted Siddartha Academy toDwithdraw the SLP after the Government passed the necessary orders,i.e., granting permission to continue with the lease. It was contendedthat Section 82 does not annul governmental permissions granted priorto the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the same could not bedeemed to be cancelled in terms of the provisions of Section 82(1) of theE1987 Act. It is stated that the lease deeds dated 23.7.1964 and 20.4.1978make it abundantly clear that the said lease deeds were entered into bythe appellant and Mutt with prior permission of the Government. It isfurther argued that the lease deeds were for the purpose of constructionand running a factory, therefore, the land cannot be said to be anagricultural land.F

24. Mr. Salve further relied upon the communication dated17.11.1994 from Hyderabad Urban Development Authority to contendthat the land falls within the Zonal Development Plan for KukatpallyZone approved on 25.04.1986 and is earmarked as an industrial area asper the said Plan. Thus, it was argued that Endowments Tribunal wronglyGheld the land to be agricultural despite the reason that no issue wasframed. The finding is based on the basis of an observation in the order 16 (2012) 8 SCC 14817 (2020) 10 SCC 72918 (2009) 11 SCC 141H19 2010 SCC Online AP 461

passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 filed by thelessee. It is also argued that the judgment of the High Court in SiddarthaAcademy that the land is agricultural and lease stands terminated islegally untenable. The said order was affirmed in appeal on 1.3.2013[20],holding that the use of the land for non-agriculture purpose is immaterialfor the purpose of Section 82 of the 1987 Act.

25. It has been argued that Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)Act, 1976 was passed in the year 1976 w.e.f. 17.2.1976 and that thelands at Kukatpally became urban lands. Therefore, the urban lands arethe lands situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referredto as such in the master plan and where there is no master plan, any landwithin the limits of an urban agglomeration and situated in any areaincluded within the local limits of a municipality (by whatever name called),a notified area committee, a town area committee, a city and towncommittee, a small-town committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat.Therefore, with the enactment of the aforesaid Act, the agricultural landchanged to non-agricultural urban land.

26. It is contended that the term of payment of land revenue arestandard boiler plate clauses and no land revenue has ever been paid bythe lessee for the leased inam lands.

27. The arguments raised by the lessee has been controverted bythe Mutt that nature of land was agriculture and by operation of Section82 of the 1987 Act, the lease stands statutorily cancelled. It is arguedthat the nature of land is important to be considered and not the purposeto which the land is to put to use by the lessee. It is further pointed outthat validity of Section 82 has been upheld by this Court in a judgmentreported as State of A.P. v. Nallamilli Rami Reddy & Ors.[21], whereinit was held that the object of Section 82 of the 1987 Act is to protect theinterests of the religious institutions and to safeguard such institutionsfrom the “grip of rich and powerful persons”.

28. It is also pointed out that the 1987 Act was preceded by areport made by a Commission headed by Justice C. Kondaiah, formerChief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para 1.18.1 of thereport reads thus:

20 Writ Appeal Nos. 488, 489 and 490 of 2011

21 (2001) 7 SCC 708

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A“It is stated that all concerned who are interested in the charitableor religious institutions have stated that the temple authorities arefacing innumerable difficulties in the management of the landedproperties of the institutions, the income is very meagre, not worth-mentioning, and in some cases it is nil, although the institutionowns large extent of lands. Reasons thereof is the provisions ofBthe Tenancy Act, attitude of the persons in possession andenjoyment for several years, the lands belonging to these institutionsare mostly in the hands of the rich and powerful sections againstwhom the concerned authorities are experiencing difficulties todispossess them from the lands. The trustees or archakas are inCenjoyment of the lands kept Benami in the names of their relations,etc. The authorities also are in the collusion with them. The rentspaid by the tenants are nominal fixed decades back. The EstimatesCommittee also expressed the same opinion.”

29. It is averred that the Endowments Tribunal and the High CourtDhave concluded that the lease stands statutorily terminated in terms ofSection 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The Khasra Pahanis are prepared only inrespect of agricultural land under Rule 8 of Andhra Pradesh (TelanganaArea) of Land Census Rules, 1954. Such Rules have been framed underAndhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,1950. The Khasra Pahanis show the land as dry agricultural land and asEcultivable and uncultivable. The nature of the land is described as “sandsoil”, “irrigability”, “trees” and “kharif”. The Khasra Pahanis for theyear 1954-55 and 2003-04 show that the land is dry agricultural land andalso shows as cultivable and uncultivable land. The land is described as“sand soil”, “irrigability”, “trees”, “kharif”, which shows that referenceFis made to agricultural lands apart from the fact that the lands wereinam lands. It is further pointed out that land revenue of Rs.714-27 wasdemanded from the lessee on 04-08-1980 by the Mutt in terms of thelease deeds dated 23.07.1964, 14.09.1966, supplementary lease deeddated 21.03.1969 and lease deed dated 20.04.1978.

G30. The Mutt also relied upon notifications dated 25.04.1963 and27.05.1975 published under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894intending to acquire the land for the purpose of Andhra Pradesh HousingBoard. The land therein is described as a dry land. It is further pointedout that the acquisition has not been concluded but the notification hasbeen referred to for pointing out the nature of the land. The order datedH

30.11.1976 passed by the A.P. Land Reforms Tribunal under Section8(1) of the A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act,1973 shows that the land was considered to be within the ambit of thestatute dealing with the ceiling of the agricultural land, though the landwas exempt from the surplus area proceedings under Section 23 of theaforesaid Act.

31. The lease deeds further contemplate payment of land revenueat the enhanced rate for use of land for non-agricultural purpose. Theuse of land for non-agricultural purposes leads to enhance land revenue.It is contended that the Assistant Commissioner has submitted a reporton 16.12.2008 wherein the land in question was found to be agriculturaland was the basis to proceed under the 1987 Act.

32. It is also argued that the Competent Authority, the then DeputyCommissioner could initiate suo moto proceedings under Section 82(1)of the 1987 Act. It is also argued that no application was submitted bythe lessee to convert the land to non-agricultural use under Rule 70 ofthe Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules, 1951. It isalso argued that the argument of the lessee before the EndowmentsTribunal was that the leased land in question, though registered asagricultural land, but has been used for non-agricultural purposes. TheTribunal thus held that even if land is being used for non-agriculturalpurposes, it is still an agricultural land. The relevant extract from theorder reads thus:

“6). (ii). (b). (i). (a). ……….On the other hand, the contest of theRespondents is that the lease lands in question are though registeredas agricultural lands, from purpose of lease and in use by thelessees for than agricultural as observed in Ex.83 order point-2 atpages 8 and 9, it is only a non-agricultural immovable propertylease to govern by Sec.82(4) of the Act, that there is no finding bythe High Court to hold the lands in question as agricultural in thewrit petition 24440/2010 order dated 20.1.2011 and in the absenceof which an observation even between the parties inter se is notRes-Judicata or obiter or estoppel from disputing now the natureof the lease lands….

6). (ii). (b). (i). (d). In fact, the petition schedule lands of the 2[nd]Applicant Math is recorded as per the Ex.A17 pahanies and A18G.Os as Inam and Agricultural lands. Since the petition schedule AB

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Alands are in use after Ex.A1-4 lease deeds by Respondents fornon-agricultural (commercial/industrial) purposes as observed inEx.83 order point-2 for consideration at pages 8 and 9, whether itchanges the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural……..Thus, the subject matter of the leases coveredby Ex.A1-4 are the agricultural lands though in other thanBagricultural purposes in use by any of the Respondents and theleases stand terminated by statutory operation of law from theabove as per Sec.82(1 and 2) of the Act from the time the Act,30/87 came in to force for none of the Respondents are within themeaning of landless poor agriculturists.”

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33. It is contended that Section 160 of the 1987 Act gives it anover-riding effect and that the provisions of 1987 Act shall applynotwithstanding any compromise agreement, scheme, judgment, decreeor order of a Court, Tribunal or other authority. Thus, by necessaryimplication, the leases would be governed by the statute.

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34. It is argued that the lessees were fully aware of the issuebefore the Tribunal that it is a statutory cancellation of lease of agriculturalland. The Mahant of the Mutt was confronted with the document Ex.R-3, subsequently named Ex.B-3, which was an order passed by the JointCollector in appellate proceedings on the issue of grant of occupancyErights wherein the finding was returned that the use of land was for non-agricultural purposes. In the evidence affidavit, no document wasproduced showing that the nature of the land was non-agricultural. InWrit Petition No. 24440 of 2010 filed by the lessee challenging thejurisdiction of the Tribunal, the High Court dealt with the argumentsraised by the Mutt, respondent No. 5 in the said proceedings, that theFlease is of agricultural land. The argument recorded is as under:

“9. …..The counsel would place reliance on Section 82 and contendthat in any event the lease stood cancelled by virtue of sub-section(1) thereof, which provides that a lease of agricultural land heldby other than a landless poor person on the date of commencementGof the Act shall notwithstanding any other law for the time beingin force stands cancelled……

10. The Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner in reply wouldsubmit that the previous W.P. No.9681 of 2008 was not concernedwith the issue relating to formation of opinion and if it is accepted H

that the subject land is agricultural land, then the Rules issued inG.O.Ms. No.866 upon which earlier reference was placed haveno application to the subject lands……..”

35. Still further, the High Court had called for the record of theTribunal in the abovesaid writ petition (WP No. 24440 of 2010). It quotedfrom the reports dated 29.1.2008 of the Inspector and dated 24.1.2008of the Assistant Director and recorded as under:

“The lands and in question are agriculture lands. As per Section82(1) any lease of the Agriculture land belong into any institutionare held by a person who is not a landless poor person standscancelled. This Section is upheld by the Honourable SupremeCourt.”

Further I submit that during the scrutiny of the proposals submittedu/s 83 the Amended Act 33/2007 has come into force and thepowers vested in the Deputy Commissioner U/s 83 of the Act 30/87 are conferred to the Endowments Tribunal. Since it has notbeen constituted, the proposals have not been submitted to theDeputy Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad forinitiating Action U/s 83.”

36. The order passed by the High Court on 20.1.2011 has attainedfinality. The fact that the land is agricultural land was recorded in theorder passed, therefore, the lessee cannot plead ignorance of the factthat the land in question was not an agricultural land.

37. It is averred that in the written submissions submitted beforethe Tribunal, the stand of the lessee is not that it was not aware of thereport of the Assistant Commissioner or that no issue was framed on theland being agricultural in nature, therefore, not covered under Section82(1) of the 1987 Act. The specific issue framed by the Tribunal waswhether the leases are not in subsistence by virtue of Section 82 of the1987 Act. It is further contended that the parties have gone to trial fullyaware of the real issues involved, then even assuming that the issue wasnot framed, it is not open to the parties to challenge the procedure. Relianceis placed upon Swamy Atmananda & Ors. v. Sri RamakrishnaTapovanam & Ors.[22], Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati SubbaRao[23], Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors.[24].

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A38. It is argued that the Tribunal has rightly held that the letterdated 24.2.1964 (Ex.B-40) or the order dated 10.5.1976 (Ex.A-16) doesnot amount to valid sanction as there is no application of mind to showhow it is necessary or beneficial for the Mutt. The letter dated 24.2.1964(Ex.B-40) is not addressed to either of the parties and that in terms ofRule 331 of the Hyderabad Endowment Rules, lease for 99 years couldBnot be granted. Moreover, it is stated that the order of the Joint Collectorunder the Inams Abolition Act dated 25.7.2007 is erroneously relied uponby the lessee. The finding that the land was being used for non-agriculturalpurpose is an incidental finding in the context of a different legislationand therefore cannot be applied to interpret Section 82 of the 1987 Act.CIt is also contended that the Inams Abolition Act has no application tothe land in question in view of Section 1(2)(i) of the said Act till 26.12.1985,and thereafter by virtue of proviso to Section 4(1) of the said Act whichexempts the charitable and religious institutions from the operation ofthe Inams Abolition Act.D39. It is also argued that the lessee has not made any applicationfor use of the land for non-agricultural purpose without prior permissionunder Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Rules, 1951and that no document has been produced to prove the nature of the landas non-agricultural.E40. The argument of the State is that the term ‘agricultural land’as mentioned in Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act has nothing to do with thepurpose of which the leased lands were being used. Therefore, whetherthe lands were being used for agricultural purpose or not is irrelevant forthe application of Section 82(1) of the 1987 Act. The object and purposeof the 1987 Act is to safeguard the interests of the charitable and religiousFinstitutions and to revert and resume the agricultural lands of the religiousinstitutions to them for their own benefit and well-being. Therefore, thelegislature has sought to statutorily cancel all leases of ‘agricultural land’belonging to charitable and religious institutions. Reliance was placedupon judgment of the High Court in Siddartha Academy. It is also arguedGthat Section 82(4) of the 1987 Act deals with lease of any immovableproperty other than agricultural land belonging to or given or endowedfor the purpose of any charitable or religious institution subsisting on thedate of commencement of the 1987 Act and states that the same shallcontinue to be in force subject to the rules as may be prescribed undersub-section (3). Rule 15 of the 2003 Rules is to the following effect:H

“15. Any lease or license granted, continued or allowed to becontinued otherwise than in accordance with rules shall be nulland void:

Provided that, any lease or license subsisting by the date ofnotification of these rules of any immovable property or right maybe continued according to such terms and conditions and also onthe rent payable thereto, till the expiry of the period of the lease orlicense as may be decided upon by the Additional Commissioneron a proposal received from the Executive Officer or Chairmanor the Person-in-Management as the case may be.”

41. It is thus sought to be contended that in respect of agriculturalland, the lease stands cancelled whereas in respect of land other thanagricultural land, the property can be used only in terms of Rule 15 ofthe 2003 Rules.

42. The order of Joint Collector dated 25.8.2007 was argued tonot operate as estoppel as the issues are different. The issues before theJoint Collector were in respect of nature of lands as inam lands and ifthe said lands were used as agricultural lands on the crucial date. Theissue was not whether the lands are agricultural lands on the appointeddate that is 1.11.1973.

43. It is therefore contended that the lessee had sufficientknowledge, awareness and opportunity to deal with and makerepresentations in respect of the issue relating to leased lands being‘agricultural lands’ and hence, the leases stand statutorily cancelled. Thereport of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowment referred to by theHigh Court in Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 is relied upon. Even in thewritten arguments, the issue was raised that the lands in question areagricultural lands. In fact, the lessee has referred to evidence with respectto agricultural lands without ever attempting to lead evidence on thisissue. It is also argued that the Endowments Tribunal has framed anissue as to whether the lease deeds are in subsistence owing to theprovisions of Section 82 of the 1987 Act.

44. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Thequestion required to be examined is whether in terms of Section 82 ofthe 1987 Act, lease of agricultural land stands statutorily cancelled. It isnot required to be examined at this stage as to whether the lessee is thepresent lessee on account of change of the name of original lessee M/s AB

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AIndian Detonators Limited or IDL Chemicals Limited. To determine theprimary question, the following aspects need to be examined:

(a) What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed bythe Joint Collector under the Inams Abolition Act?

(b) Whether the land in question is agricultural land to whichBthe Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutionsand Endowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease infavor of the lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section82(1) of the Act?

(c) Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge thatCthe land in question was agricultural land in the proceedingsbefore the Endowments Tribunal?

(a) What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed bythe Joint Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act?

D45. The Inams Abolition Act abolished all inams (grants) by theNizam. The Act contemplates adjudication of matters in relation to grantof occupancy rights and certificates in respect of inam lands covered bythe Act and vested with the Government, inquiry into the nature andhistory of such lands, determination of compensation payable to theInamdar and apportionment thereto. Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams AbolitionEAct came into force on 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of grant of occupancyrights under the Inams Act. It appears that the Mutt entered into anagreement with one Kalyani Narsing Rao. He filed an application forgrant of occupancy rights. Such application was allowed by the RevenueDivisional Commissioner on 27.11.2004. The Revenue Divisional OfficerFwas considering an application for issuance of occupancy rights certificateto the general power of attorney holder of the Mutt. The application wasallowed and it was concluded as under:

“In view of the aforesaid findings the case has been examinedwith reference to the Act and Rules in force. It is revealed that asper the material on record, the lands in question are inam landsGand the applicants are owners. In view of the aforesaid theapplication seeking the issuance of Occupancy Rights Certificateis allowed as prayer for.

In view of the above and also as per the Judgment of HonourableHigh Court of Andhra Pradesh, in WP No. 9497 of 2003, dated H

29-7-2004, the land in question, falls under section 9(2) of the AP(T.A) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955. Therefore, the applicants aredeclared as owners of the land in question under section 9(2) ofthe AP (T.A) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955.”

46. In an appeal under Section 24 of the Inams Abolition Act, afinding was returned that the land in question was converted into fornon-agricultural use before 1973. The issue no. 2 therein was to theeffect whether the land in question was under agriculture as on thecrucial date. The finding on the said issue is that it was being used fornon-agricultural purposes. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted to abolishthe inams and to confer occupancy rights to the tiller. Since the land wasan inam land given to the charitable and religious institutions, it wasfound to be exempt from the operation of the Inams Abolition Act. TheJoint Collector held that the land is an inam land and in terms of provisoto Section 4(1) of the Act, the inam was held by or for the benefit ofcharitable and religious institutions, therefore, no person shall be entitledto be registered as an occupant and the institution alone shall be entitledto be registered as the occupant. It is the said order of the RevenueDivisional Officer which was set aside by the Joint Collector. It washeld as under:

“The property was given by Nizam for the Mutt but not to SagarDas. It is clear that Mutt only can sell the property after takingprior permission from the Endowment Department but not theMahanth in his individual capacity. Baba Sagar Das is not aninstitution and he is only a Mahanth appointed by EndowmentDepartment. The Revenue Divisional Officer has consideredirrevocable G.P.A. and the decree obtained by Kalayani NarsingaRao and concluded that Sagar Das is entitled to 60% and K.Narsinga Rao is entitled for 40% share in the properties of Muttand further held that the G.P.A. holder can maintain the case beforehim under Rule 5 of the Rules under A.P. (T.A.) Abolition ofInam Rules, 1955 declared the applicants K. Narsinga Rao andBaba Sagar Das as owners of the properties belonged to Mutt.The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is based onassumption and presumption and the orders speaks that there areno documents marked and no evidence was adduced on eitherside.

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Therefore in respect of Inams claimed by charitable and religiousinstitutions, no individual in entitled to maintain a claim and religiousinstitution alone is entitled to have locus standi. Therefore, theorder of the Revenue Divisional Officer, declaring the GPA holderof Mahanth as owner of the land U/s 9(2) of the Act, to say theleast, is mischievous, perverse and totally illegal.

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In view of the above facts, the Revenue Divisional Officer has noDjurisdiction to exercise powers U/s 9 of A.P. (T.A.) Abolition ofInams Act, 1955 and declare a person as owner of inam lands,much less a person who has no locus standi at all. Further inamlands in question are being claimed by a religious institution andwill be covered by appropriate provisions of the Act. The impugnedProceedings of Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella in CaseENo.L/76/2000 dated 27-11-2004 wherein the respondent No.1 isdeclared as owner of the land in question U/s 9(2) of the A.P.(T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 is perverse, without jurisdiction,abinitio void, and hereby declared as a nullity.

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The land in question being inam lands vest with the State uponFabolition of Inams as per the Section 3 of the Act. Further as thelands were converted to non-agricultural use as on the crucialdate and continue to remain so as on date, proceedings need to beinitiated before competent court, and not revenue authorities, underthe appropriate provisions of the Act. As the lands are claimed byGreligious institution a claim under inam abolition Act can bemaintained only in the name of the institution and not by individuals.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.”

47. The scope of inquiry under the said Act was restricted togrant of occupancy rights which was negated for multiple reasonsHincluding the fact that the land was not under agriculture on the crucial date. Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special Act in respect of abolitionof inams and conferment of occupancy rights, it is an order not by aTribunal having a plenary jurisdiction. The Tribunal under the InamsAbolition Act had limited jurisdiction to decide the questions arising underthe Inams Abolition Act. Therefore, the findings recorded in suchproceedings neither act as estoppel, nor res judicata for any otherproceedings.

48. In Hope Plantations Ltd., it was held that estoppel works inthe same proceedings, and also in subsequent suits between the sameparties in which the same issue arises. Reliance has been placed uponthe following part of the order, which reads thus:

“26. …….These two aspects are “cause of action estoppel” and“issue estoppel”. These two terms are of common law origin.Again, once an issue has been finally determined, parties cannotsubsequently in the same suit advance arguments or adducefurther evidence directed to showing that the issue was wronglydetermined. Their only remedy is to approach the higher forum ifavailable. The determination of the issue between the parties givesrise to, as noted above, an issue estoppel. It operates in anysubsequent proceedings in the same suit in which the issue hadbeen determined. It also operates in subsequent suits betweenthe same parties in which the same issue arises…..”

49. The proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act were initiatedby a Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights on the basis ofan agreement to sell. The Mutt was represented by a Power of Attorneyholder who was claiming independent rights, therefore, the previousproceedings were not between the same parties as the Mutt was not aparty in its own rights but through an attorney who was claimingindependent right in himself. Therefore, the findings recorded thereinare not relevant or binding in respect of proceedings under another statute,enacted for different objective to protect the inam land given to thecharitable and religious institutions.

50. The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for thereason that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and the religiousinstitutions in terms of Section 1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and thereafter interms of first proviso to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. Thus,any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for the purposes ofnegating the claim of Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy AB

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Arights. It has been categorically held by the Joint Collector that the Act isnot applicable to the Mutt.

(b) Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which theTelangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and EndowmentsAct, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of the lessee standsBcancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the Act?

51. The primary argument of the learned counsel for the lesseesis that there was no pleading that the land in question was agriculturalland, therefore, the lessees were not made aware of the fact that thelease stands statutorily cancelled. The said argument is not tenable forCthe reason that the Inspector in his report dated 29.1.2008 and 16.12.2008reported that the lands in question are agricultural lands and that lease ofsuch lands stands cancelled. It was also mentioned that the validity ofSection 82 has been upheld by this Court in Nallamilli Rami Reddiwherein this Court held as under:

D“12. It is plain that religious institutions fall into a separate classand lands held by them have a special character in respect ofwhich tenancies had been created and these tenancies are soughtto be put to an end to for resumption of lands for bettermanagement thereof. It is clear that the tenants under the religiousinstitutions form a special class by themselves and suchEclassification is made, so far as tenants are concerned, to achievethe object of protecting the interests of the religious institutions.Therefore, we do not think, any of the principles which result inhostile discrimination would be applicable to the present case.”

52. The lessee had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010Fchallenging the continuation of proceedings before the EndowmentsTribunal. In the counter affidavit dated 7.12.2010 filed on behalf of theMutt, it was stated that the leases have become null and void underSection 82 of the 1987 Act.

“2. …It is our case that the leases have been null and void underGsection 82 of Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu ReligiousInstitutions & Endowments Act, 1987 …”

53. The writ petition was dismissed on 20.1.2011. The High Courtalso noticed the argument of the Mutt that in terms of Section 82, theleases stood cancelled.H

“The counsel would place reliance on Section 82 and contendthat in any event the lease stood cancelled by virtue of sub-section(1) thereof, which provides that a lease of agricultural land heldby other than a landless poor person on the date of commencementof the Act shall notwithstanding any other law for the time beingin force stands cancelled.”

54. The High Court had called for the record of the fourthrespondent i.e., the Assistant Commissioner (Endowment) wherein, thefollowing statement was made:

“The lands and in question are agricultural lands. As per Section82(1) any lease of the agriculture land belong into any institutionare held by a person who is not a landless poor person standscancelled. This Section is upheld by the Honourable SupremeCourt.”

55. The argument that the land is agricultural land was raised bythe Mutt and also recorded in the report of the Inspector. Thus, it isnoted that lessees were well aware of the nature of the land as agriculturalland. Such order of the High Court has attained finality. The followingpoint for consideration was culled down by the Endowments Tribunal:

“(1) Whether the leases for 99 years covered respectively, byEx.A1-3 in favour of R1 and by Ex.A4 in favour of R2, executedby the 2nd Applicant Math for the entire petition schedule propertyare not in subsistence by virtue of the provisions of theEndowments Act 30/87 (Sec.82 r/w. the rules made there undervide GOMS. Nos. 866 & 379 of 2003 with amendments to it inGOMS No. 160 of 2010)?”

56. The Mutt has based its arguments on the premise that theland in question is agricultural land. The precise argument raised by thelessee in the written arguments submitted before the Endowments Tribunalis as under:

“14. The contention of the Applicant No. 2 Mutt is that the landcovered by Ex.P1 to P4 are agricultural lands. It is submitted thatthe said contention is incorrect since the lands were taken by theRespondents for non-agricultural purpose and for industrial use.The Applicant No. 2 Mutt is aware of this fact. In page 2 of thelegal notice dated 24.08.2007 (Ex.P11) issued by the Counsel forthe Applicant No. 2 Mutt to Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. (R3), it was AB

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Astated that the lease agreements were permitted to be enteredbetween my client Sri Udasin Mutt, Hussaini Alam, Hyderabadand M/s. Indian Detonators Limited/IDL Chemicals Limited. Theabove said companies were entitled to use the lands totallyadmeasuring an extent of Acs 539-38 guntas in terms of the leaseagreement which was more the less to be used as safety, testingBzone etc., as amended by the Government under the provisions ofthe Explosives Act and Rules. The Pahanies for the year 2003-2004 filed by the Applicant No. 2 Mutt vide Ex.P17 (A-D) saythat the lands covered by Ex.P1 to P4 are “dry” lands. There isno mention in these documents to suggest that the said lands areC“dry agricultural lands”. The Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55filed by the Applicant No. 2 Mutt vide Ex.P20 say that the saidlands are “Isuka Nela”, which means sandy soil. It is commonknowledge that on “sandy soil”, it is not possible to do agriculture.Except these two documents, the Applicant No. 2 Mutt has notfiled any other document(s) to establish that the lands covered byDEx.P1 to P4 are agricultural lands. On the other hand, theRespondents have filed Ex.R33 which is a letter written by Dy.Commissioner of Endowments to the Commissioner ofEndowments. In the said letter, it was stated that “…the proposedland is neither cultivable nor useful for even grazing purpose, as itEis covered by rocks…”. Apart from Ex.R33, the order dated25.08.2007 of the Joint Collector, R.R. District has stated that“…the land in question is used for non-agricultural purpose…It is,therefore, submitted that the lands covered by Ex.P1 to P4 arenon-agricultural lands right from the commencement of the leaseand therefore, the contention of the Applicant No. 2 that the landsFare agricultural lands is devoid of merit.”

57. A perusal of the written arguments, as reproduced above,shows that the lessees have submitted that the land is being used fornon-agricultural purposes. The entire argument is based upon use of theland for non-agricultural purposes. The nature of land is distinct fromGthe use of the land. Since the land is agricultural land, its use for non-agricultural purposes would not alter the nature of the land as anagricultural land. Section 82 of the 1987 Act mentions “any lease ofagricultural land….”, therefore, the lease has to be of agricultural landirrespective of the use to which the lessee may put such agriculturalHland to. The language of the statute refers to nature of the land and not the use thereof. Therefore, even in terms of the written arguments raisedby the lessee before the Tribunal, the use of land for non-agriculturalpurposes would be irrelevant for statutory cancellation of the lease ofagricultural lands under Section 82 of the 1987 Act.

58. The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural landsought to be drawn from the reading of Section 3 of the Andhra PradeshNon-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963 repealed by the A.P AgriculturalLand (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006, is nottenable. The distinction between the categories of land leads toconsequence of higher assessment in the case of non-agricultural land.The lessee has not led any evidence that they are paying levy as per therates fixed under this statute as that of non-agricultural land.

59. A learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ina judgment reported as A.P. Punjabi Sabha, Hyderabad v. JointCollector, Hyderabad[25] while considering the provisions of InamsAbolition Act held that for the purpose of this Act, if the land is put tonon-agricultural purposes, it is not covered by the Act in question. TheCollector would assume jurisdiction to decide the claims under Section10 only if the lands were put to agricultural use. It was held as under:

“19. The term ‘agricultural or non-agricultural purposes’ is notdefined under the Act. However, for the purpose of Section 9, it issufficient if the land is put to non-agricultural purposes. The reasonor justification is outside the scope of enquiry under the provisionsof the Act. The Collector will assume jurisdiction to decide theclaims under Section 10 only, if the lands were put to agriculturaluse. Though in Form I, the relevant date is mentioned as 20.7.1955,in view of subsequent legislative changes and judicialpronouncements, the crucial date now stands as 1.11.1973. InSections 4 and 5, the expression ‘cultivates personally’ is used,whereas in Sections 6, 7 and 8, the expression ‘under his personalcultivation’ is employed. They constitute the jurisdictional facts,for exercise of power under Section 10. An inamdar, Kazim-e-kadim or tenant may have an excellent ground or justification, fornot undertaking activities of cultivation in the inam lands. But oncesuch land is found to be not under cultivation, the Collector ceasesto have power to deal with the same under Section 10. Further, A

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Athe contesting respondents clearly stated that the land is put tonon-agricultural purposes.”

60. On the other hand, in respect of the 1987 Act, the DivisionBench of the High Court in Siddhartha Academy held that use of landfor non-agricultural purpose is immaterial for the purpose of statutoryBcancellation of lease deed, as provided under Section 82(1) of the saidAct. It was held as under:

“A reading of the above provision would show that the essentialobject and purpose of the provision is with regard to regulatingthe leases of agricultural lands and all such leases except thoseCheld by landless poor persons stand cancelled. Explanation I alsodefines the expression ‘landless poor person’. For applying Section82, the test therefore is whether the lease is that of agriculturallands. On the facts of the present case, it cannot be disputed thatthe lease in favour of the appellant is that of agricultural land. Themere fact that the appellant/lessee has put the said land for non-Dagricultural use therefore does not make any difference as thepurpose for which the leased property is used is immaterial forthe purpose of Section 82 of the Act. The leases thereforestatutorily stand cancelled with regard to all agricultural lands andare only saved to the extent of leases in favour of landless poorEpersons. The learned Single Judge therefore has rightly held againstthe writ petitioner and the orders of eviction passed against them by applying Section 82(1) of the Act requires no interference.”

61. The SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 stood withdrawnon 27.2.2017. Thus, the order passed by the Division Bench had attainedFfinality.

(c) Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge that theland in question was agricultural land in the proceedings between theparties before the Endowments Tribunal?

62. The judgments in Bachhaj Nahar and Ram Sarup GuptaGare not applicable to the facts of the present case wherein, it has beenheld that it is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence, ifany, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equallysettled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadingand that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party H

in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of pleading isto enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet.

63. The judgments relied upon by Shri Salve such as IbrahimUddin, and Biraji alias Brijraji are not helpful to the arguments raised.In fact, the lessees were aware of the controversy in respect of natureof land and its statutory cancellation, therefore, the lack of pleadings orthe evidence loses its significance. The 1987 Act is a Code in itselfproviding for constitution of the Endowments Tribunal, appeal, revisionand review. The strict rule of procedure contemplated by the Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908 in respect of pleadings and evidence cannot beextended to the Tribunal constituted for specific purpose. Since the lesseeswere aware of the fact that the Mutt claims the land to be agriculturalland and statutory cancellation of the lease was being averred for thereason that the leased land was agricultural, therefore, the lessees cannotcomplain of any violation of principles of natural justice or strict rules ofpleading as is required under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

64. In fact, this Court in Nedunuri Kameswaramma held thatsince parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all theevidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation ofthose of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue wasfatal to the case. It was held as under:

“5. No doubt, no issue was framed, and the one, which was framed,could have been more elaborate; but since the parties went totrial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not onlyin support of their contentions but in refutation of those of theother side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatalto the case, or that there was that mistrial which vitiatesproceedings. We are, therefore, of opinion that the suit could notbe dismissed on this narrow ground, and also that there is no needfor a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case issufficient to reach the right conclusion. Neither party claimed beforeus that it had any further evidence to offer.”

65. In Swamy Atmananda, it was held that if the parties went tothe trial knowing fully well the real issues involved and adduced evidencein such a case, without establishing prejudice, it would not be open to aparty to raise the question of non-framing of a particular issue.

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A66. Therefore, the parties were aware of the controversy aboutthe nature of the land. Thus, the lessee cannot be permitted to turnaround to dispute the nature of land leased to them.

67. We find merit in the argument raised by the lessees that thelease executed prior to the commencement of 1987 Act would not beBannulled for the reason that there was no prior approval. The leaseswere granted prior to the commencement of the 1987 Act but evenunder the 1966 Act, Section 70 prohibited lease of the inam land if itsterm exceeded six years. The lease of land measuring 143 acres videlease deed dated 23.7.1964; 257 acres 19 guntas vide lease deed dated14.9.1966 and 2 acres 32 guntas vide lease deed dated 21.3.1969 wereCnot preceded with any prior approval of the competent authority. Relianceis placed upon the note dated 24.2.1964 but such note is part of thedecision-making process as no approval was communicated to eitherthe lessee or the lessor or to any person. In fact, the said communicationis a note of Second Secretary to Government Home (Endowments-III)DDepartment that lease for a term of 99 years cannot be construed as atransfer of ownership of the endowed lands by outright sale and isprohibited under Rule 331 of Hyderabad State Endowment Rules andRegulations. It is not a communication addressed either to the lessee orto the lessor or to any other person or institution. The regulation 331prohibits the possession over and transfer of the nuzli lands (tax bearingElands) from generation to generation in future. The Regulation 331 is asfollows:

“331. In the light of experience regarding the possession over andtransfer of the nuzli lands (tax bearing lands) from generation togeneration in future endowed lands will not be let out on nuzul soFthat endowments may be safeguarded.”

68. The note dated 24.02.1964 relied upon to argue that it leads toapproval of lease is not a decision which can be said to be effective andbinding in view of the judgements of this Court. Recently, this Court inNareshbhai Bhagubhai v. Union of India[26], held as under:G

“27. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [BachhittarSingh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395] a Constitution Benchheld that merely writing something on the file does not amount toan order. For a file noting to amount to a decision of the H26 (2019) 15 SCC 1

Government, it must be communicated to the person so affected,before that person can be bound by that order. Until the order iscommunicated to the person affected by it, it cannot be regardedas anything more than being provisional in character.

28. Similarly, in Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India [ShantiSports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705 : (2009) 5SCC (Civ) 707] this Court held that notings recorded in the officialfiles, by the officers of the Government at different levels, andeven the Ministers, do not become a decision of the Government,unless the same are sanctified and acted upon, by issuing an orderin the name of the President or Governor, as the case may be, andare communicated to the affected persons.

29. In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [Sethi Auto ServiceStation v. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180] , this Court held that: (SCCpp. 185-86, paras 14 & 16)

“14. It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file do nothave the sanction of law to be an effective order. A noting byan officer is an expression of his viewpoint on the subject. It isno more than an opinion by an officer for internal use andconsideration of the other officials of the department and forthe benefit of the final decision-making authority. Needless toadd that internal notings are not meant for outsideexposure. Notings in the file culminate into an executableorder, affecting the rights of the parties, only when itreaches the final decision-making authority in thedepartment, gets his approval and the final order is [Ed.:The word between two asterisks has been emphasised inoriginal as well.] communicated [Ed.: The word betweentwo asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] tothe person concerned.

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16. To the like effect are the observations of this Court inLaxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra[Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 5SCC 413] , wherein it was said that a right created under anorder of a statutory authority must be communicated to theperson concerned so as to confer an enforceable right.”

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A69. The only approval of land measuring 173 acres and 19 guntasis dated 10.5.1976. Though there is a reference to the communication ofthe Commissioner Endowment dated 29.4.1975 in respect of threeprevious lease deeds, but there is no communication to the Mutt eitherof the letter dated 10.5.1976 or of 29.4.1975. Section 82 does not makeany exception of the lease granted with approval. The approval isBmentioned only in Section 75 of the 1987 Act. Even if such approval istreated to have been granted in respect of the entire land, the leasegranted with approval is relevant only for the purposes of Section 75 ofthe 1987 Act and not for the purposes of Section 82 of the said Act.

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70. Similarly, the argument that the land now falls within the urbanCagglomeration in view of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling andRegulation) Act, 1976 is again not tenable. Firstly, the said Act standsrepealed on 22.3.1999. Still further, the mere fact that the land has comewithin the municipal limits would not make the land as non-agriculturalland. It only means that the land within the municipal limits can be utilizedDor the buildings be constructed in terms of the provisions of the MunicipalLaws applicable thereto.

71. Similarly, the argument that the land in question falls with theZonal Development Plan for Kukatpally as per the communication ofthe Hyderabad Urban Development Authority is again not tenable. TheEZonal Development Plan is future planning of the development of thearea. Thus, in future, the land can be used only according to ZonalDevelopment Plan but that does not mean that the agricultural nature ofthe land has ceased to exist. Therefore, the said communication is alsonot tenable.F72. In Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014, there is a direction to considerthe request of the lessee. However, Rule 15 of the Telangana Charitableand Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable Propertiesand other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and LicensesRules, 2003 will have no application to the agricultural land in view ofthe fact that Section 82(3) and (4) is applicable only to the land andGproperty which is not agricultural. Since the land has been found to beagricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not be applicable to the land inquestion. Thus, the direction to consider the request of the lessee toconsider the grant of lease under Rule 15 is untenable.

73. Consequently, Civil Appeal Nos. 7759-7760 of 2014 areHdismissed whereas Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014 is allowed, setting aside the direction to consider the request of the lessee under Rule 15 ofthe Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions andEndowments Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other thanAgricultural Land) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003.

Divya Pandey and Anurag Bhaskar(Assisted by : Ajay, LCRA)

Appeals disposed of.

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