PRADEEP KUMAR versus STATE OF CHHATTISGARH on 16 March 2023

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[2023] 2 S.C.R. 682

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 2 S.C.R.

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PRADEEP KUMAR

v.

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

(Criminal Appeal No. 1304 of 2018)

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MARCH 16, 2023

[B. R. GAVAI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]

Penal Code,1860 – ss. 302,34,201 – Two accused persons(including appellant) were convicted for offence of murder by trialCCourt –The prosecution case, rested upon three circumstances (a)the alleged confessional statement of appellant;(b) prior animositybetween appellant and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of materialfrom the appellant – The High Court upheld the conviction ofappellant and acquitted co-accused – On appeal, held: TheDtestimonies of PW-12(son of the deceased) and PW-13(co-villager)negated circumstances that there was tension between the deceasedand the accused, which was, the motive of commission of crime –Recovery of materials i.e keys and the money, there is no independentcorroborated material except for the confessional statement of theEaccused, which also is not proven on record – Further, the extrajudicial confessional statement of the appellant, apart from beinghit by s.27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it not to have been supportedby PW-1 and PW-7, who as is evident, was himself a suspect, ifwitness was himself a suspect, his testimony cannot be said to bereliable and trustworthy – The testimony of star witness PW-19-Finvestigating officer was found to be unworthy of any credenceand hence unreliable – The testimonies of the other prosecutionwitnesses were found unreliable – Neither the chain of circumstancesto have been completely established nor the guilt of the accusedalone, having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyondGreasonable doubt – The presumption of the guilt of appellant byboth the courts below is based on improper and incompleteappreciation of evidence which has resulted into travesty of justice– Judgment of High Court and trial Court set aside – Appellantacquitted –Evidence Act,1872 – s.27.H

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The impugned judgement to say the least, issketchy. The presumption of the guilt of appellant-accused byboth the courts below is based on improper and incompleteappreciation of evidence which in the considered view of thisCourt, has resulted into travesty of justice. [Para 10][688-F-G]

2. When this court came to the deposition of PW-12 son ofthe deceased, unequivocally he states that “... later on the policepersonnel told me that accused persons have thrown my fatherafter committing murder...” Now this totally belies the testimonyof his grandfather (PW-10). To similar effect, it is the testimonyof PW-13 who only adds that “...Later on I came to know thatvictim has been murdered. I heard from the villagers...”.Significantly, her statement that she was not informed by herhusband (PW-7), of the deceased being murdered by the Appellantwas not recorded in her previous statement with which she wasconfronted. But what is crucial is her deposition is that herhusband himself was a suspect and that she admits it to be correct,“... that the police personnel took my husband for inquiry inconnection with the murder of deceased. The police personnelkept my husband for one day...” This negates one of thecircumstances that there was tension between the deceased andthe accused, which was, the motive of commission of crime, i.e.issue of use of the shop inter se the parties. [Para 19][690-G-H;691-A-C]

3. This Court noticed in respect of the next circumstance,which is the recovery of keys and the money, that there is noindependent corroborated material except for the confessionalstatement of the accused, which also is not proven on record.Even otherwise, the keys, the currency notes and the bloodstained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis. There is onlyan unexhibited copy of the FSL Report of the alleged bloodstained clothes of the Appellant which stands not proven byanyone. Also none has come forward to depose that the accusedhad kept the keys of the shop with himself, for after all, it is notthe case of the prosecution that the shop belonged to the accused.[Para 20][691-C-E]

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A4. The substratum of the evidence, that is the extra judicialconfessional statement of the Appellant, apart from being hit bySection 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, this Court finds itnot to have been supported by PW-1 and PW-7, who as is evident,was himself a suspect. He admits it to be “...correct to say thatthe Inspector had detained me and some villagers where the deadBbody was laying...” and “...it is correct to say that I did not disclosethe statement made by accused-appellant to any other personbefore 4 o’clock...” We have already noticed his wife (PW-13) tohave supported this statement. Now, if this witness was himself asuspect, his testimony cannot be said to be unimpeachable or Cfree from blemish. This witness, in this Court’s considered view,cannot be said to be reliable and trustworthy. [Para 21][691-E-G;692-B]

5. Dealing with the star witness of the prosecution which isthe Investigation Officer, (PW-19), this Court finds his testimonyto be wholly unworthy of any credence: unbelievable; and theDwitness to be unreliable. This we say so for the reasons that hedid not record the statement of PW-10 or PW-7 in respect anyprior animosity between the deceased and the accused. Theevidence pertaining to the genesis of the crime was not collectedby him. He also does not state as to what made him detainEaccused-appellant on 3.10.2023. Be that as it may, he did notexamine witnesses, who in considered view of this Court, perhapsmay have thrown some light about regard to the actual occurrenceof the incident. He admits that houses of few co-villagers are justat a distance of 30 to 70 meters from the spot of the crime. Yet,he did not examine any of them. Why so? No explanation isFforthcoming. Crucially, he admits that, “the investigationconcluded having no direct evidence” indicating the time andthe manner in which the crime took place. He admits to haveprepared some document in relation to the keys recovered fromthe accused however no such fact is recorded in his diary. In fact,Gsuch fact is not found recorded in the Panchnama prepared byhim. The basis for the Investigation Officer (PW-19) to havearrived at the guilt of co-accused is missing in his statement. Infact, he does not even state to have suspected co-accused ofhaving committed any crime. The sole basis for the InvestigationOfficer (PW-19) to have arrested the Appellant for havingHcommitted the crime is his extra judicial confession (Ex. P.11)

which, apart from becoming inadmissible, is of no use as it hasnot led to recovery of any new fact – be it the place of the groceryshop; prevailing tension between the accused and the deceased;recovery of the body of the deceased near the Dodki drain: Allthese facts were known to the police from before and as far asrecovery of money and keychain is concerned we have alreadydiscussed issue. [Para 22][692-C-H; 693-A-B]

6. In the present case, the circumstances present, takentogether, do not establish conclusively only one hypothesis, thatbeing the guilt of the accused-appellant. The presumption ofinnocence remains in favour of the accused unless his guilt isproven beyond all reasonable doubts against him. [Babu v. StateKerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189]. The cherished principles or goldenthreads of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs throughthe web of our law should not be stretched morbidly which wasdone by the Courts below. In the present case, this Court findsneither the chain of circumstances to have been completelyestablished nor the guilt of the accused alone, having committedthe crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable doubt. [Paras25, 26][693-F-H; 694-A]

Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Another v. State ofMaharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : [1974] 1 SCR 489;Hari Charan Kurmi vs State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC1184 : [1964] SCR 623; Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam,(2013) 12 SCC 406 : [2013] 3 SCR 830; HanumantGovind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR 1952 SC 343: [1952] SCR 1091; State v. Mahender Singh Dahiya,(2011) 3 SCC 109 : [2011] 1 SCR 1104; Sahadevan v.State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 : [2012] 4 SCR 366;Kali Ram v. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808 : [1974] 1SCR 722; Babu v. State Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 :[2010] 9 SCR 1039; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. Stateof Mahrashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88;Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1970)3 SCC 474; Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC219 : [1975] 1 SCR 753; Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. Stateof Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 : [1983] 3 SCR 280 –referred to.

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1304 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.07.2017 of the High Courtof Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 940 of 2004.

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Rahul Kaushik, Sudhir Kulshreshtha, Sameer Kulshreshtha, Advs.for the Appellant.

Gautam Narayan, Ms. Asmita Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FSANJAY KAROL, J.

1. On 01.10.2003, Umesh Chowdhary, a resident of villageChitarpur falling within the territorial limits of Police Station DhaurpurDistrict was allegedly murdered by accused Pradeep Kumar (AppellantNo. 2 in CRA No.940 of 2004) before the High Court Chhattisgarh,GBilaspur and Bhainsaalias Nandlal (Appellant No.1. before the HighCourt in the very same appeal) in relation to which FIR No.126/03 (Ex.P-6) was registered at Police Station Dhaurpur.

2. On 02.10.2003, Investigation Officer, I. Tirkey (PW-19)commenced investigation and after verifying the place of occurrencesent the dead body for post-mortem analysis which was conducted byH

Dr. Kamlesh Kumar (PW-14) in terms of his report (Ex.P-10).Investigation revealed that the crime was committed on account ofanimosity which the Appellant was harbouring against the deceased.The motive being the former’s desire to use the shop in possession ofthe deceased in village Chitarpur.

3. The Trial Court, based on the extra judicial confessionalstatement (Ex.P-11) of accused Pradeep Kumar made in the presenceof Ramkripal Soni (PW-1) and Gopal Yadav (PW-7), the depositions ofGajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) father of the deceased, co-villagers Sirodh(PW-6), Radhika (PW-13) wife of (PW-7), all establishing the factum ofprior animosity/“tension” inter se the parties; and with the addition ofthe police recovered keys of the shop of the deceased and his currencynotes amounting to Rs.300/- from the possession of the Appellant. TheCourt convicted both the accused in relation to offences punishable underSection 302/34 IPC and 201/34 IPC and sentenced them to serveimprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.500/- in relation to the offenceunder Section 302/34 as also suffer imprisonment for seven years andpay fine of Rs.500/- in respect of the offence punishable under Section201 IPC.

4. The Trial Court found the testimonies of both PW-1 and PW-7reliable (despite PW-1 not supporting the prosecution) and the prosecutionto have established the factum of accused Pradeep Kumar havingconfessed his guilt before the Investigation Officer (PW-19). The Ld.Trial Court also found the recovery of articles seized as a result of thedisclosure of statement, to be an additional link, as a chain of events, insupport of the case set up by the prosecution.

5. However in an appeal preferred by both the accused, the HighCourt upheld the conviction of accused Pradeep Kumar in relation to allthe offences and the sentences in terms thereunder, but acquitted accusedBhainsa alias Nandlal on all counts.

6. Hence, the present appeal filed by the Appellant – accusedPradeep Kumar. Significantly, none of the Courts below have returnedfinding to the effect that the guilt of the accused stands proven by theprosecution, beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, howsoever grave orprobable it may be, cannot substitute the evidence, be it circumstantialor direct in nature, in establishing the guilt of the accused beyondreasonable doubt, the onus of which, at the first instance, is to bedischarged by the prosecution. The distance between “may be” and A

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A“must be” is quite large and it divides vague conjectures from solidconclusions. [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Another v. State ofMaharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.]

7. The High Court, by relying upon the principles of law enunciatedby the Apex Court in Hari Charan Kurmi vs State Of Bihar, AIRB1964 SC 1184, to the effect that confession of a co-accused beinginculpatory in nature, cannot be used against the accused, acquittedBhainsa alias Nandlal.

8. However, in so far as accused Pradeep Kumar is concernedthe Court found testimonies of (PW-1) and (PW-7) to be absolutelyCinspiring in confidence and that the witnesses “being independent anddisinterested”, having no reason to “manufacture evidence”, “falselyimplicating” the accused. Further, the High Court held that the defencewas not able to show that the extra-judicial confession made by PradeepKumar (Appellant No.2) before the said witnesses was “involuntary” or“made on account of any coercion”, “inducement”, “promise” or “favour”.DThe Court below also held that there is no reason “whatsoever” todisbelieve the testimonies of PW-1 & PW-7 qua the issue of extra judicialconfession.

9. The accused cannot be convicted on the principles ofpreponderance of probability. It is the duty of this Court to ensureEavoidance of miscarriage of justice at all costs and the benefit of doubt,if any, given to the accused. [Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013)12 SCC 406, Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. (AIR1952 SC 343) and State v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC109].F10. The impugned judgement to say the least, is sketchy. Thepresumption of the guilt of accused Pradeep Kumar by both the courtsbelow is based on improper and incomplete appreciation of evidencewhich in the considered view of this Court, has resulted into travesty ofjustice.G11. The prosecution case, at best, rests upon three circumstances(a) the alleged confessional statement of accused Pradeep Kumar madebefore PW-1 and PW-7; (b) prior animosity/“tension” between PradeepKumar and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of the keys of the shopof the deceased and his currency notes amounting to Rs.300/-on theasking of the accused.H

12. Since both the Courts below have placed paramount significanceand reliance to the extra judicial confession made by the Appellant, it isimportant to take note of the principles enunciated by this Court in thecase of Sahadevan v. State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 as under:

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(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself.It has to be examined by the court with greater care andcaution.

(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.

(iii) It should inspire confidence.

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(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility andevidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogentcircumstances and is further corroborated by otherprosecution evidence.

(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction,Dit should not suffer from any material discrepancies andinherent improbabilities.

(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any otherfact and in accordance with law.”

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13. Before we deal with each of the aforesaid circumstances, wemust place on record certain undisputed facts. Those being (a) thehomicidal death of deceased Umesh Chowdhary S/o GajadharChowdhary, (b) the identity of the deceased, (c) the recovery of thedead body of the deceased from the Dodki Nala of village Chitarpur,(d)the post-mortem of the dead body conducted by PW-14 affirming thedeceased to have died as a result of asphyxia due to throttling and (e)the cause of the death being homicidal in nature. The ante-mortem analysisreflects multiple abrasions present on the front portion of the neck of thedeceased caused by a hard and blunt object. There was a fracture ofthehyoid bone, congestion in both the lungs and the trachea rings.

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14. Proceeding further, examining the testimonies of the prosecutionwitnesses we find that it is the case of Manorama Devi (PW-11), w/othe deceased to have deposed that on 1.10.2003 finding her husband notto have returned home at night, asked her elder son Vinay Kumar (PW-12) to visit the shop and makes enquiries. Soon, he returned informing H

Athat his father’s dead body was lying besides the road at Dodki Nalawith marks of injuries. On the basis of suspicion, Gajadhar Chowdhary(PW-10) father of the deceased lodged a complaint with the police bearingFIR No.126/03 (Ex.P-6) dated 2.10.2003.

15. Significantly, at this point in time, neither PW-11 nor PW-12Bhad suspected any person to have committed the crime.

16. Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) states that it was he who madeinquiries about the death of the deceased and as disclosed to him bySirodh (PW-6), owner of the shop, deceased was lastly seen by himclosing the shop around 8:00 PM. We note that there is a significant timeCgap between when the deceased was lastly seen by him and the time ofthe crime. Also he was not seen in the company of the accused. In histestimony he states that accused Bhainsa and Pradeep Kumar killedUmesh Chowdhary but then this fact is based on “his suspicion” for thereason that accused had “harboured animosity” in connection with theshop. Well that is about all and without any further elaboration.D

17. Significantly, even this limited fact is not disclosed in thecomplaint. Also to this effect, wefind there is material improvement inhis testimony. That apart, we do not find this witness to be reliable or histestimony worthy of credence. He failed to make inquiries about thecause of the incident from any of the villagers. He is not a spot witness.EHe is also not the witness who had lastly seen the Appellant with thedeceased or the Appellant having gone either towards the shop of thedeceased or the place of occurrence of the incident, both being twoseparate places. However, what is crucial,rendering his version to beself belied, in his unequivocal admission that, “no quarrel ever took placeFprior to the fatal incident between the deceased and the accussed” andthat he “never lodged any report in connection with any quarrel.”

18. To this very effect, we may also take note of the deposition ofSirodh (PW-6) who, in any event, has not supported the prosecution inCourt.G19. When we come to the deposition of Vinay Kumar (PW-12)

G19. When we come to the deposition of Vinay Kumar (PW-12)son of the deceased, unequivocally he states that “... later on the policepersonnel told me that accused persons have thrown my father aftercommitting murder...” Now this totally belies the testimony of hisgrandfather Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10). To similar effect, it is thetestimony of Radhika (PW-13) who only adds that “...Later on I cameH

to know that Umesh has been murdered. I heard from the villagers...”.Significantly, her statement that she was not informed by her husband(PW-7), of the deceased being murdered by the Appellant was notrecorded in her previous statement with which she was confronted. Butwhat is crucial is her deposition is that her husband himself was a suspectand that she admits it to be correct, “...that the police personnel took myhusband for inquiry in connection with the murder of deceased. Thepolice personnel kept my husband for one day...” This negates one ofthe circumstances that there was tension between the deceased and theaccused, which was, the motive of commission of crime, i.e. issue ofuse of the shop inter se the parties.

20. We notice in respect of the next circumstance, which is therecovery of keys and the money, that there is no independent corroboratedmaterial except for the confessional statement of the accused, whichalso is not proven on record. Even otherwise, the keys, the currencynotes and the blood stained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis.There is only an unexhibited copy of the FSL Report of the alleged bloodstained clothes of the Appellant which stands not proven by anyone.Also none has come forward to depose that the accused had kept thekeys of the shop with himself, for afterall, it is not the case of theprosecution that the shop belonged to the accused.

21. The substratum of the evidence, that is the extra judicialconfessional statement of the Appellant, apart from being hit by Section27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, we find it not to have been supportedby Ramkripal Soni (PW-1) and Gopal Yadav (PW-7), who as is evident,was himself a suspect. He admits it to be “...correct to say that theInspector had detained me and some villagers where the dead body waslaying...” and “...it is correct to say that I did not disclose the statementmade by accused Pradeep to any other person before 4 o’clock...” Wehave already noticed his wife Radhika (PW-13) to have supported thisstatement. Now, if this witness was himself a suspect, his testimonycannot be said to be unimpeachable or free from blemish. Still further,deposition of PW-7 reveals the witness not to have deposed truthfullyand the prosecution to have introduced another theory as according tohim the accused had immediately, after the incident confessed the crimewith him. This was in the night intervening first and second October,2003. But then, he does not disclose such fact to anyone. We may remindthe prosecution that he is a co-villager. His version also appears to be AB

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Afalse for he admits voices and noises were audible from the place of theoccurrence of the incident and that he heard none on the fateful day. Headmits that there are houses of other persons including Ramsanehi, closerto the spot of crime. He did not bother to make inquiries for ascertainingthe truth from any of the co-villagers, including all those named by him.This witness, in our considered view, cannot be said to be reliable andBtrustworthy and this we say so for the reason, that as according to hisdeposition, he received information of the death of deceased at 7:00-8:00 AM, the following morning and yet he did not visit the spot of thecrime until the police reached, which was at 10:00 AM and only muchlater, got his statement recorded at about 4:00 PM. His stoic silence, inCnot informing or meeting any of the family members of the deceased,neighbours or Police is unexplainable.

22. Dealing with the star witness of the prosecution which is theInvestigation Officer, I. Tirkey (PW-19), we find his testimony to bewholly unworthy of any credence: unbelievable; and the witness to beDunreliable. This we say so for the reasons that he did not record thestatement of Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) or Gopal Yadav (PW-7) inrespect any prior animosity between the deceased and the accused.The evidence pertaining to the genesis of the crime was not collected byhim. He also does not state as to what made him detain accused PradeepKumar on 3.10.2023. Be that as it may, he did not examine witnesses,Ewho in our considered view, perhaps may have thrown some light aboutregard to the actual occurrence of the incident. He admits that housesof Ramsevak, Gopal and Rashriare just at a distance of 30 to 70 metersfrom the spot of the crime. Yet, he did not examine any of them. Whyso? No explanation is forthcoming. Crucially, he admits that, “theFinvestigation concluded having no direct evidence” indicating the timeand the manner in which the crime took place. He admits to have preparedsome document in relation to the keys recovered from the accusedhowever no such fact is recorded in his diary. In fact, such fact is notfound recorded in the Panchnama prepared by him. The basis for theInvestigation Officer (PW-19) to have arrived at the guilt of co-accusedGBhainsa is missing in his statement. In fact, he does not even state tohave suspected Bhainsa of having committed any crime. The sole basisfor the Investigation Officer (PW-19) to have arrested the Appellant forhaving committed the crime is his extra judicial confession (Ex. P.11)which in our considered view, apart from becoming in admissible, is ofHno use as it has not led to recovery of any new fact– be it the place of

the grocery shop; prevailing tension between the accused and thedeceased; recovery of the body of the deceased near the Dodki drain:All these facts were known to the police from before and as far asrecovery of money and keychain is concerned we have already discussedissue.

23. Apart from sending the dead body for post-mortem, theInvestigation Officer (PW-19) does not state what investigation heconducted on the crime spot. It is the case of the prosecution that onlythis person conducted the investigation and that he was not engaged inany other crime or had to attend to other urgent work, resulting into thedelay thereof. Perusal of the First Information Report (Ex.P-6) doesreveal Gajadhar Chowdhary (PW-10) to have disclosed the name ofaccused Pradeep Kumar as a suspect in the crime. Whether such reportwas lodged in time or not, itself is in doubt. That apart if the InvestigationOfficer (PW-19) was himself aware of the suspect then what preventedhim from immediately detaining or examining him. In fact, it has comeon record that other persons were detained as suspects. The investigationconducted is absolutely shady and has been done in a casual manner. Inthis backdrop it cannot be said that the prosecution witnesses, morespecifically (PW-19), (PW-10) and (PW-7) have deposed truthfully.

24. It is important to note that the cardinal principles in theadministration of criminal justice in cases where heavy reliance is placedon circumstantial evidence, is that where two views are possible, onepointing to the guilt of the accused and the other towards his innocence,the one which is favourable to the accused must be adopted. [Kali Ramv. State of H.P. (1973) 2 SCC 808].

25. In the present case, we state that the circumstances presentbefore us, taken together, do not establish conclusively only one hypothesis,that being the guilt of the accused, Pradeep Kumar. The presumption ofinnocence remains in favour of the accused unless his guilt is provenbeyond all reasonable doubts against him. [Babu v. State Kerala, (2010)9 SCC 189]. The cherished principles or golden threads of proof beyondreasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not bestretched morbidly which was done by the Courts below.

26. In the present case, we find neither the chain of circumstancesto have been completely established nor the guilt of the accused alone,having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable A

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Adoubt. This Court has stated essential conditions that must be fulfilledbefore an accused can be convicted in a case revolving aroundcircumstantial evidence in the landmark case of Sharad BirdhichandSarda v. State of Mahrashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116:

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that theBfollowing conditions must be fulfilled before a case against anaccused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to bedrawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that theCcircumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinctionbetween “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” aswas held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State ofMaharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 CrlDLJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p.807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be andnot merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mentaldistance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vagueEconjectures from sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with thehypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they shouldnot be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accusedis guilty, F(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature andtendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the oneto be proved, and

G(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leaveany reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with theinnocence of the accused and must show that in all humanprobability the act must have been done by the accused.”

27. Normally, we do not interfere with the concurrent findings offact of the Courts below. We step in only in exceptional cases or whereH

gross errors are committed, overlooking crying circumstances and wellestablished principles of criminal jurisprudence leading to miscarriage ofjustice. Hence it becomes our bounden duty to correct such findings inview of the principles enunciated in Ramaphupala Reddy v. State ofAndhra Pradesh, (1970) 3 SCC 474, Balak Ram v. State of U.P.,(1975) 3 SCC 219 and Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai V. State of Gujarat,(1983) 3 SCC 217.

28. To conclude, we state that both the courts below, erred infinding the Appellant guilty of having committed the crime, charged for,under Section 302/34 IPC read with 201/34 IPC. Hence we set asidethe findings of guilt and sentence arrived at vide judgment dated28.08.2004 by the Ld. Trial Court as subsequently affirmed by the HighCourt in its judgement dated 21.07.2017 in CRA No.940 of 2004 titled asBhainsa @ Nandlal and Anr. vs. The State of Chhattisgarh.

29. The appeal is allowed and the Appellant stands acquitted ofall the charges framed against him.

We direct the Appellant Pradeep Kumar be released forthwithunless required in any other case.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal allowed.

(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

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