YAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ETC. versus SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE SOCIETY & ORS. ETC. on 19 May 2022

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 5 S.C.R.

AYAMUNA EXPRESSWAY INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY ETC.

v.

SHAKUNTLA EDUCATION AND WELFARE SOCIETY& ORS. ETC.

B

(Civil Appeal Nos. 4178-4197 of 2022)

MAY 19, 2022

[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Land acquisition – Payment ofCadditional compensation of 64.7% to farmers –State of Uttar Pradeshacquired vast area of land for the benefit of Yamuna ExpresswayIndustrial Development Authority-YEIDA – YEIDA allotted plots tovarious allottees including respondent no.1 – On the same line, theState acquired land for the benefit of NOIDA – As regards the NOIDADacquisition the High Court in Gajraj case directed payment ofadditional compensation of 64.7% to the farmers and the same wasconfirmed in Savitri Devi’s case – As a result, the YEIDA farmersraised the demand for additional compensation – On account ofthe agitation by farmers, the development work stopped on theacquired land – In view thereof, constitution of High-Level committeeEwhich recommended for the payment of 64.7% additional amountas “no litigation incentive” to the farmers and for its reimbursementfrom the allottees in the appropriate proportion – State Governmentaccepted the same and issued a Government Order – Pursuantthereto, additional demand notices issued to various allotteesFincluding respondent no.1 – Challenge to – High Court held thepolicy of the State Government asking for additional sum fromallottees as unfair and unreasonable – On appeal, held: Policydecision of the State Government and the Resolution of the Boardof YEIDA were in the larger public interest, taking care of theconcerns of the allottees as well as the farmers – Had the saidGdecision not been taken, there were chances of the acquisition beingdeclared unlawful – Development of the entire project was stalledon account of farmers’ agitation – Before taking the policy decision,the State Government, through the Committee constituted, had donea wide range of deliberations with all the stakeholders includingHthe allottees, farmers and YEIDA – Policy decision was taken after taking into consideration all relevant factors and was guided byreasons – In case of a conflict between public interest and personalinterest, public interest would outweigh the personal interest – Thus,the High Court not justified in holding that the policy decision ofthe State as unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary – Order passed bythe High Court quashed and set aside – Policy decision.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

Conclusion

HELD: 1.1 It could be seen that the recommendations ofthe Chaudhary Committee were principally intended to resolvethe issue between the farmers and the allottees, and to find out aworkable solution to the problem. The Chaudhary Committeerecommended similar treatment to be given to the farmers whoselands were acquired for YEIDA, as was given to the farmers whoselands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA.The Chaudhary Committee found that the same benefits as weregiven to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit ofNOIDA and Greater NOIDA in view of the judgment of the HighCourt in the case of Gajraj’s case, as affirmed by this Court in thecase of Savitri Devi’s case should also be given to the farmerswhose lands were acquired for the benefit of YEIDA. However,this was made conditional. Additional benefit was granted to thelandowners on the condition that they would handover thephysical possession of land to YEIDA and withdraw the writpetitions/cases filed by them pending before the High Court. TheState Government vide the said G.O. gave effect to therecommendations of the Chaudhary Committee. YEIDA too, inits Board meeting dated 15th September, 2014, resolved toimplement the decision of the State Government. Accordingly,demand notices came to be issued to the allottees. It could thusbe seen that the policy decision of the State Government ispreceded by various factors. Firstly, the farmers’ agitation, afterthey were denied the benefits which were granted to the farmerswhose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and GreaterNOIDA; the report of the Commissioner, the appointment of theChaudhary Committee, the deliberations of the ChaudharyCommittee with various stakeholders, and thereafter therecommendations of the Chaudhary Committee. [Paras 50-52][1060-E-H; 1061-A-c]

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A1.2 It has been held in Kasinka’s case that the doctrine ofpromissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and thecourts are bound to consider all aspects including the resultssought to be achieved and the public good at large; that whileconsidering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have todo equity and the fundamental principles of equity must foreverBbe present to the mind of the court, while considering theapplicability of the doctrine; that the doctrine being an equitabledoctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can beshown by the Government or Public Authority that having regardto the facts and circumstances as they have transpired, it wouldCbe inequitable to hold the Government or the Public Authority tothe promise, assurance or representation made by it. If theprinciple as laid down in the case of Kasinka Trading applied tothe facts of the instant case, it would be clear that the policydecision of the State Government was not only in the larger publicinterest but also in the interest of the respondents. The projectsDwere stalled on account of the farmers’ agitation. The farmersfelt discriminated as they found that the compensation paid tothem was much lesser than the one being paid to the equallycircumstanced farmers in NOIDA and Greater NOIDA. It wasthe allottees of the land who had approached the State GovernmentEfor redressal of the problem. In these circumstances, theGovernment took cognizance of the problem and appointed theCommissioner to look into the issue. Since the Commissionerrecommended appointment of a High-Level Committee, theChaudhary Committee was appointed. The Chaudhary Committeehad threadbare discussions with all the stakeholders. It also tookFinto consideration that on account of stay orders passed by theHigh Court in various writ petitions, the development of theproject was stalled. On account of pendency of the writ petitions,there was always a hanging sword over the entire acquisition of itbeing declared unlawful. In this premise, in order to find out aGworkable solution and that too, on the basis of the law laid downby the High Court in the case of Gajraj’s case as affirmed by thisCourt in the case of Savitri Devi’s case and followed by this Courtin the case of Savitri Mohan (Dead), recommendations were madeby the Chaudhary Committee. The Chaudhary Committeespecifically recommended that the additional compensation andH

other incentives would be paid only if the landowners agree tohandover physical possession of the land to YEIDA and withdrawall the litigations. It could be seen that the recommendations,which were accepted by the State Government and formulated inthe policy, were made taking into consideration the interests ofall the stakeholders. It is not only the interest of a small sectionof the allottees which should weigh with the Government, butthe Government should also give due weightage to the interestof the large section of farmers, whose lands were acquired. TheHigh Court fell in error in observing that no writ petitions werefiled challenging the acquisition for YEIDA. The report of theChaudhary Committee itself would clarify that YEIDA had itselfsubmitted that insofar as the residential plots are concerned,there were stay orders operating in majority of the writ petitionsdue to which the development of the project work was stalled.[Paras 54-57][1064-A-H; 1065-A-D]

1.3 The policy decision of the State Government was in thelarger public interest. It was taken considering entire materialcollected by the Chaudhary Committee after due deliberationswith all the stakeholders. The factors which were taken intoconsideration by the State Government were relevant, rationaland founded on ground realities. Thus, the finding of the HighCourt that the policy decision of the State Government wasarbitrary, irrational and unfair, is totally incorrect. [Para 58][1065-E]

1.4 An interference with the policy decision would not bewarranted unless it is found that the policy decision is palpablyarbitrary, mala fide, irrational or violative of the statutoryprovisions. The High Court was also not right in interfering withthe policy decision of the State Government, which is in the largerpublic interest. It could thus be seen that it is more than settledthat a change in policy by the Government can have an overridingeffect over private treaties between the Government and a privateparty, if the same was in the general public interest. The additionalrequirement is that such change in policy is required to be guidedby reason. [Paras 60 and 62][1068-H; 1069-A, D-E]

1.5 When a policy is changed by the State, which is in thegeneral public interest, such policy would prevail over the A

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Aindividual rights/interests. The policy of the State Governmentas reflected in the said G.O. was not only in the larger publicinterest but also in the interest of the respondents. [Para 65][1069-G-H; 1070-A]

1.6 The respondents have indulged into the conduct ofBapprobate and reprobate. They have changed their stance as pertheir convenience. When their projects were stalled on accountof the farmers’ agitation, it is they who approached the StateAuthorities for finding out a solution. When the State Governmentresponded to their representations and came up with a policywhich was equitable and in the interest of both, the farmers andCthe allottees and when the said policy paved the way fordevelopment, when called upon to pay the additionalcompensation, the respondents-allottees somersaulted andchallenged the very same policy before the High Court, whichbenefitted them. [Para 66][1070-B-D]D

1.7 Insofar as the individual plot owners are concerned, itwill be worthwhile to mention that the residential plot owners inSectors 18 and 20 of Yamuna Expressway city have formed anassociation, viz., Yamuna Expressway Residential-Plot-OwnersWelfare Association (hereinafter referred to as “the YERWA”).EThe communication addressed by the president of the YERWAto the CEO of YEIDA would reveal that 98.5% of the allottees/owners have voted in favour of paying the additional premiumdemanded by the Authority. The only request made by the YERWAis with regard to making a provision for paying additional premiumin installments. Insofar as the individual residential plot ownersFare concerned, more than 98% of the plot owners do not haveany objection to the payment of the additional compensation.[Paras 67 and 68][1070-D-F]

1.8 The policy decision of the State Government as reflectedin the said G.O. dated 29th August, 2014 and the Resolution ofGthe Board of YEIDA dated 15th September, 2014 were in thelarger public interest, taking care of the concerns of the allotteesas well as the farmers. Had the said decision not been taken,there was a hanging sword of the acquisition being declaredunlawful. The development of the entire project was stalled onHaccount of farmers’ agitation. Before taking the policy decision,

the State Government, through the Chaudhary Committee, haddone a wide range of deliberations with all the stakeholdersincluding the allottees, farmers and YEIDA. The policy decisionwas taken after taking into consideration all relevant factors andwas guided by reasons. In any case, it is a settled position of lawthat in case of a conflict between public interest and personalinterest, public interest will outweigh the personal interest. TheHigh Court was thus not justified in holding that the policy decisionof the State was unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. The HighCourt erred in allowing the writ petitions, thus, the impugnedjudgment and order passed by the High Court is quashed and setaside. [Para 70][1070-H; 1071-A-C]

Gajraj and Others v. State of U.P. and Others 2011SCC OnLine All 1711; Savitri Devi v. State of UttarPradesh and Others (2015) 7 SCC 21 : [2015] 7 SCR512; Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others v.Union of India and Others (2012) 3 SCC 1 : [2012] 3SCR 147; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of Indiaand Others (2000) 10 SCC 664 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR94; ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others(2011) 7 SCC 493 : [2011] 7 SCR 66; Greater NoidaIndustrial Development Authority v. Savitri Mohan(Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others(2016) 13 SCC 210 : [2016] 3 SCR 187; KasinkaTrading and Another v. Union of India and Another(1995) 1 SCC 274 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 448; EssarSteel Limited v. Union of India and Others (2016) 11SCC 1 : [2016] 4 SCR 326; APM Terminals B. V. v.Union of India and Another (2011) 6 SCC 756 : [2011]8 SCR 600 – referred to.

Prof. S.A. de Smith “Judicial Review of AdministrativeAction” – referred to.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4178-4197 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.05.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.28968 of 2018, 68724 of 2015,C45929 and 46993 of 2016, 17609, 23357 and 25359 of 2017, 2452 of2018, 40702, 52310 and 61882 of 2017, 7142, 9247, 14730, 20053, 20158,20217, 25994, 36669 and 28956 of 2018.

With

DCivil Appeal Nos. 4198-4217, 4218 and 4219 of 2022.

Vinod Diwakar, AAG, C. A. Sundaram, C. U. Singh, ManinderSingh, Sr. Advs., Amar Gupta, Divyam Agarwal, Kunal Mimani, AniketAggarwal, Zafar Inayat, Anuvrat Sharma, Ms. Alka Sinha, B. N. Dubey,Rakesh U. Upadhyay, Ms. Aarti U. Mishra, Rishabh Kumar Pandey,EDr. Surat Singh, Ashok K. Mahajan, Advs. for the Appellants.

Nakul Dewan, Sunil Gupta, Ravindra Srivastava, Ravi Sikri, SanjivSen, Sr. Advs., Lokesh Bhola, Kapil Bakshi, Archit Upadhyay, Ajay K.Jain, Akshat Kumar, Ms. Saroj Tripathi, Ishan Dewan, Ms. Garima Tiwari,Lokesh Malik, Ms. Priyal Bapna, Ms. Sukriti Chauhan, Nitin Singh, ShashiFKumar, Ankur Yadav, Abhisth Kumar, Anurag Rawat, Ms. Samita Mann,Raj Kamal, Mudit Sharma, Tarun Gupta, Ms. Vagisha Nandini, GauravKumar, Inderjeet Kumar, Ms. Richa Yadav, Ravi Prakash, Sandeep Malik,VIshal Mani, Alok Kumar, Vikalp Mudgal, Vishal Gupta, Tanzen TashiNegi, Santosh Kumar-I, Arjun D. Singh, Sandeep Kumar Jha, AvneeshGarg, Muddam Thirupathi Reddy, Vaibhav Manu Srivastava, PrithvirajGSingh, Umang Mahindra, Ujjal Banerjee, Akash Khurana, Advs. for theRespondents.

Ravinder Srivastava, Sr. Adv., Shekhar Gupta, Nitin Saluja,Ms. Priyanka Prasanth, Advs. for the Intervenors.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B. R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This batch of appeals challenge the judgment and order dated28[th] May, 2020, passed by the Allahabad High Court in various writpetitions filed by the allottees of plots of land. The writ petitions werefiled challenging the demand of additional amount made by the appellantherein-Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority(hereinafter referred to as “YEIDA”) in respect of plots of land leasedout to the allottees; the resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated 15[th]September, 2014, and the Government Order dated 29[th] August, 2014,vide which the State Government had permitted YEIDA to recover theadditional amount from the allottees.

3. The facts in the present case are not in dispute. For the sake ofconvenience, we will refer to the factual details as are found in WritPetition No.28968 of 2018, filed before the High Court of Allahabad byM/s Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society (the respondent No.1herein).

4. A vast area of land was acquired by the State of Uttar Pradeshin Gautam Budh Nagar district for public purposes. The said area ofland was acquired for the benefit of YEIDA. After the land was acquired,YEIDA invited applications for the allotment of plots of land in the areadeveloped by it. In response to the notice inviting applications for suchallotment, various allottees including the respondent No.1 herein appliedand were allotted plots admeasuring different sizes.

5. The respondent No.1 was informed by letter dated 14[th]September, 2009, that a plot of 50 acres of land has been reserved for it.Subsequently, a letter of allotment dated 10[th] December, 2009 was issuedto the respondent No.1, allotting plot No.2 in Sector 7-A, having an areaof 50 acres, i.e., equivalent to 2,02,350 sq. meter. In the allotment letter,it was stated that the premium of the land allotted was Rs.1,055/- per sq.meter. It was also mentioned that the respondent No.1 had deposited10% of the premium amount and the balance 90% of the premium amountwas payable in monthly installments as specified in the chart containedtherein. The allotment letter further stated that the lease deed shall beexecuted and the possession of the land shall be handed over after A

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Acompletion of the acquisition proceedings. It was stated that the landwas already in possession of YEIDA.

6. It was the contention of the respondent No.1 that on the basisof the aforesaid allotment letter, a lease deed came to be executed infavour of the respondent No.1 on 22[nd] January, 2010 for a period of 90Byears after the respondent No.1 had made substantial compliance withthe terms and conditions of the allotment and had deposited the necessaryamount. The lease deed provided that in addition to the amount payableby the respondent No.1, as mentioned in the allotment letter, a furtheramount, i.e., 2.5% of the total premium of the plot was payable as annuallease rent.C

7. It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that duringmeasurement, it was found that the plot allotted to it, had an excess areaof about 2 acres. The said excess land was also leased out to it on thesame terms and conditions. It was further the case of the respondentNo.1 that it was thereafter given possession of the aforesaid land and onDit, a University known as Galgotias University was developed.

8. It was further the case of the respondent No.1 that subsequentlyYEIDA came out with a policy and gave an option to the respondentNo.1 to deposit the entire premium amount in lump-sum rather than ininstallments. This was subject to certain rebate. It was stated that inEaccordance with the said policy, a lump-sum amount was worked out byYEIDA and the same was also paid by the respondent No.1. Anundertaking was also taken from the respondent No.1 on an affidavit on7[th] June, 2012, that in the event there was any clerical error ormiscalculation of the lump-sum amount, the respondent No.1 would makeFgood the deficiency.

9. The State of Uttar Pradesh had also made large-scale acquisitionof lands for the benefit of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority(“NOIDA” for short) and Greater NOIDA. A number of writ petitionscame to be filed by farmers challenging the said acquisition on variousGgrounds before the Allahabad High Court. The main ground of challengewas that there was no urgency for acquiring the land and as such, invokingSection 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as“the L.A. Act”) was not warranted. It was contended that on accountof invoking of Section 17 of the L.A. Act, a valuable right available tothe writ petitioners under Section 5A of the L.A. Act was taken away.H

All the said writ petitions came to be decided vide the judgment andorder dated 21[st] October, 2011. In the leading case, i.e., Gajraj andothers vs. State of U.P. and others[1], the Full Bench of the AllahabadHigh Court came to a finding that the urgency clause ought not to havebeen invoked and the farmers were unlawfully denied the benefit ofSection 5A of the L.A. Act, wherein they could raise objections to theacquisition of the land. However, taking into consideration the subsequentdevelopments that the lands had already been developed and third partyrights had accrued, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in thecase of Gajraj (supra) considered it appropriate not to disturb theacquisition. In order to balance the equities, the Full Bench of theAllahabad High Court directed payment of additional compensation of64.7% plus some other benefits to certain class of farmers. It also directedcertain other benefits to be given to the farmers. The aforesaid additionalcompensation of 64.7% was worked out by the Court taking intoconsideration the fact that in respect of one of the villages, i.e., Patwari,NOIDA itself had entered into negotiations with the farmers and hadextended the benefit of additional compensation at the aforesaid rateover and above the compensation awarded.

10. The aforesaid judgment and order of the Full Bench of theAllahabad High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) came to be confirmedby this Court in the case of Savitri Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradeshand others[2].

11. Since the farmers, whose lands were acquired for the benefitof NOIDA and Greater NOIDA, were being paid additionalcompensation of 64.7%, there was unrest amongst the farmers whoselands were acquired for YEIDA. It appears that on account of agitationby the farmers, vast stretches of lands could not be developed. As such,the Chief Executive Officer (hereinafter referred to as “CEO”) ofYEIDA addressed a letter dated 10[th] April, 2013, to the State Government,requesting to find a solution. The State Government, acting on the saidletter, instructed the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, vide itsletter of the same day, i.e., dated 10[th] April, 2013, to meet various groupsof farmers and submit a report.

12. Accordingly, the Commissioner held a meeting with variousgroups of farmers and the concerned District Magistrates, and submitted 1 2011 SCC OnLine All 1711

2 (2015) 7 SCC 21

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Aa report to the State Government on 16[th] July, 2013, recommendingconstitution of a High-Level Committee.

13. The State Government vide Office Memo dated 3[rd] September,2013, constituted a High-Level Committee under the Chairmanship ofSri Rajendra Chaudhary, Minister of Prison, State of Uttar PradeshB(hereinafter referred to as “the Chaudhary Committee”). The ChaudharyCommittee also consisted of the Divisional Commissioner of theconcerned Division and the Collector of concerned District. TheChaudhary Committee submitted its recommendations to the StateGovernment, inter alia, recommending for the payment of 64.7%additional amount as “no litigation incentive” to the farmers and for itsCreimbursement from the allottees in the appropriate proportion.

14. The State Government accepted the recommendations of theChaudhary Committee and issued a Government Order dated 29[th] August,2014 (hereinafter referred to as “the said G.O.”). The said G.O. providedthat the farmers should be offered 64.7% additional amount on theDcondition that they withdraw their petitions challenging the acquisitionproceedings and undertake not to institute any litigation and create anyhindrance in the development work of YEIDA. It was clarified in thesaid G.O. that the Government would not bear the burden of the additionalamount.

E15. The said G.O. was placed before the Board of YEIDA in itsmeeting, held on 15[th] September, 2014, and the same was approved inthe said meeting on the very same day, vide Resolution dated 15[th]September, 2014.

16. In pursuance to the said G.O. and the Resolution datedF15[th] September, 2014 of the Board of YEIDA, additional demand noticeswere issued to various allottees. In case of the respondent No.1, anadditional premium at the rate of Rs.600/- per sq. meter, for the landallotted and leased out, came to be demanded, totaling toRs.12,14,10,000/-.

G17. It was in this background that various writ petitions came tobe filed before the Allahabad High Court, including Writ Petition No.28968of 2018, filed by the respondent No.1.

18. By the impugned judgment and order dated 28[th] May, 2020,the Allahabad High Court allowed the said writ petitions holding that:- H

(i) the decision in the case of Gajraj (supra), as approved bythis Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra), was not ajudgment in rem and could not have been applied toproceedings for acquiring the land under differentnotifications or for YEIDA;

(ii) the said G.O. and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDAdated 15[th] September, 2014 were violative of the provisionsof the L.A. Act; and

(iii) the policy of the State Government was unfair, unreasonable,arbitrary and in violation of the provisions of the Transferof Property Act, 1882.

19. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals by way of specialleave have been filed on behalf of YEIDA, State of Uttar Pradesh andfarmers whose lands were acquired.

20. We have heard Shri C.A. Sundaram, Shri C.U. Singh and ShriManinder Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of YEIDA,Shri Vinod Diwakar, learned Additional Advocate General appearing onbehalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh, Shri Rakesh U. Upadhyay andDr. Surat Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmerswhose lands were acquired, Shri Nakul Dewan, Shri Sunil Gupta, ShriRavindra Srivastava and Shri Sanjiv Sen, learned Senior Counsel appearingon behalf of the respondents-original allottees of land.

21. The main contention of the appellants in the present appeals isthat the said G.O. was a policy decision of the State Government, takenin public interest. It is submitted that the said policy decision was takenafter taking into consideration the farmers’ agitation, the report of theChaudhary Committee and all other relevant factors. It is submitted thatin order to avoid acquisitions from being declared illegal, the Cabinet ofMinisters of the State Government had taken a considered decision toadopt a formula, which was carved out by the judgment of the Full Benchof the Allahabad High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) and approvedby this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra).

22. It is also the contention on behalf of the appellants that thepolicy of the State Government was in consonance with the decision ofthis Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation andothers vs. Union of India and others[3], wherein this Court has held that3 (2012) 3 SCC 1

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Ait is obligatory on the State to ensure that people are adequatelycompensated for the transfer of resource to the private domain. Relyingon the judgment of this Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolanvs. Union of India and others[4], it is submitted that the policy of theState Government was formulated by looking at the welfare of the peopleat large rather than restricting the benefit to a small section of the society.BRelying on various judgments of this Court, it is submitted that when thechange in the policy of the State is in public interest, it will override allprivate agreements entered into by the State.

23. It is further submitted on behalf of the appellants that, as amatter of fact, on account of agitation of the farmers, development couldCnot take place in the concerned area. It is submitted that various plotowners had approached the State Government and its authorities forfinding out a solution to these problems, so that the development couldproceed further. It is submitted that the proceedings of the ChaudharyCommittee would itself reveal that all the stakeholders including the Drepresentatives of allottees were heard by the Chaudhary Committee.Not only that, but various allottees had, in writing, agreed that they arewilling to pay the additional compensation so that the hindrance in thedevelopment is removed. It is therefore submitted that it does not lie inthe mouth of the respondents to question the said G.O. and oppose thepayment of additional compensation.E

24. Relying on various judgments of this Court, it is further submittedon behalf of the appellants that the lease deed itself permitted additions,alterations or modifications in the terms and conditions of the lease. Assuch, even as per the lease deed, the appellants were entitled to modifyor alter the terms and conditions of the lease. It is submitted that theFword “modify” has to be used in a broader sense and not in a narrowersense.

25. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that theHigh Court fell in great error in holding that no writ petitions were pending.It is submitted that, as a matter of fact, more than 600 writ petitionsGwere pending when the policy decision was taken by the StateGovernment. It is submitted that the policy decision was taken so as tosave the acquisition, which was otherwise liable to be quashed and setaside. It is submitted that it is, in fact, the respondents, who are thebeneficiaries of the said measure and as such, having taken benefit ofH4 (2000) 10 SCC 664

the said measure, they cannot be permitted to refuse to pay the additionalcompensation.

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26. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the alloteeshad an option, either to make additional payment or to take refund withinterest. Having opted not to seek refund with interest, it does not lie inthe mouth of the respondents to refuse to pay the additional compensation.

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27. It is also submitted on behalf of appellant-YEIDA that it hadspecifically submitted that stay orders passed by the High Court were inforce in most of the cases related to residential plots, due to which thedevelopment work could not be completed.

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28. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the farmers alsosupport the stand of YEIDA. It is submitted that the builders had alreadyrecovered additional compensation from the homebuyers. As such, theadditional compensation was already passed on by the builders to thehomebuyers. It is submitted that if the contention of the respondents isaccepted, it will amount to nothing else but allowing of unjust enrichment.

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29. It is further submitted that the respondents were not entitledto the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.The writ petitions filed by them before the Allahabad High Court werefiled without impleading the farmers who were necessary parties asrespondents to the writ petitions.

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30. Elaborate arguments have been advanced on behalf of therespondents. To summarize, they are as under:

(i) The respondents had not given any undertaking to payadditional compensation, as stated; F

(ii) The term “modification/addition” with regard to paymentwas restricted only to any clerical or technical error;

(iii) The High Court has rightly held that Gajraj (supra) andSavitri Devi (supra) applied only to the peculiar facts andcircumstances of those cases. In the case of Gajraj (supra),Gthe High Court had done elaborate exercise of categorizingthe cases into three types. In any case, it is submitted thatthe State itself was aggrieved by the decision in Gajraj(supra), which has been challenged by it before this Court; H

A(iv)In the present case, many of the acquisitions were by privatenegotiations and as such, there is no question of applicabilityof either Section 17 or Section 5A of the L.A. Act;

(v) There were concluded contracts entered between theallottees and YEIDA. As such, it was not open for YEIDABto unilaterally change the terms and conditions of thecontract and enhance the lease premium;

(vi) The High Court has rightly held that the so-called policy ofthe State Government was arbitrary, irrational and thereforenot sustainable in law; C

(vii) On behalf of the respondent No.19-Supertech Limited, anadditional submission was made that the appropriateauthority has already passed an order admitting the petitionfiled under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,2016; D(viii) On behalf of the individual plot owners, it is submitted thatthe said plot owners, who belong to the middle class sectionof the society cannot be burdened with the additional amount.

(ix) The respondents also placed reliance on the judgment ofthis Court in the case of ITC Limited vs. State of UttarEPradesh and others[5] to support the proposition thatconcluded contracts cannot be interfered with or reopened.

31. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, wehave perused the material on record.

32. The main reasons that weighed with the High Court whileFallowing the writ petitions are thus:

(i) That the lands which were acquired for YEIDA in thepresent case were under different notification than thenotification which fell for consideration in the case of Gajraj(supra); G

(ii) That this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) hascategorically held that the directions given in the case ofGajraj (supra) were issued by the High Court in the peculiar H5 (2011) 7 SCC 493

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facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, the samecould not have been applied to the facts of the present case;

(iii) That some other petitions filed before the High Courtclaiming the benefit on the basis of Gajraj (supra) wereultimately rejected by the High Court;

(iv) That the State Government has to strictly act in accordancewith the law or statutory provisions. It cannot act arbitrarilyor in an unfair manner in breach of specific provisions oflaw;

(v) That it is only for the Courts to grant equitable relief andthe Government is not entitled to pass order on equitableground of law.

33. We are called upon to examine the correctness of these findings.

34. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Full Bench of theHigh Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) is reproduced by this Court inthe case of Savitri Devi (supra). It will be apposite to refer to followingobservations in the case of Savitri Devi (supra):

“20. In a nutshell, relief was categorised in three compartments.In the first instance, those writ petitions which were filed belatedlywere dismissed. In the second category, three villages, namely,Devala (Group 40), Village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38)and Village Asdullapur (Group 42) the acquisition was set aside.Land acquisition in respect of remaining 61 villages is concerned,the acquisition was allowed to remain but the additionalcompensation was increased to 64.7%with further entitlement forallotment of development abadi plot to the extent of 10%of theacquired land of those landowners subject to maximum of 2500sq m.

21. We now reproduce the exact nature of direction [2011 SCCOnLine All 1711] given by the High Court, which reads as follows:(Gajraj case [2011 SCC OnLine All 1711] , SCC OnLine All)

“In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows:

1. Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011, Writ Petition No.47545 of 2011 relating to Village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522of 2011 relating to Village Sadarpur, Writ Petition No. 45196 of A

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2011, Writ Petition No. 45208 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45211of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45213 of 2011, Writ Petition No.45216 of 2011, Writ Petitions Nos. 45223-24 of 2011, WritPetition No. 45226 of 2011, Writ Petitions Nos. 45229-30 of2011, Writ Petition No. 45235 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45238of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45283 of 2011 relating to VillageKhoda, Writ Petition No. 46764 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 46785of 2011 relating to Village Sultanpur, Writ Petition No. 46407of 2011 relating to Village Chaura Sadatpur and Writ PetitionNo. 46470 of 2011 relating to Village Alaverdipur which havebeen filed with inordinate delay and laches are dismissed.

2. (i) The writ petitions of Group 40 (Village Devla)being Writ Petition No. 31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131of 2009, Writ Petition No. 22800 of 2010, Writ Petition No.37118 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 42812 of 2009, Writ PetitionNo. 50417 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 54424 of 2009, WritPetition No. 54652 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 55650 of 2009,Writ Petition No. 57032 of 2009, Writ Petition No. 58318 of2009, Writ Petition No. 22798 of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37784of 2010, Writ Petition No. 37787 of 2010, Writ Petitions Nos.31124-25 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 32234 of 2011, Writ PetitionNo. 32987 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 35648 of 2011, Writ PetitionNo. 38059 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 41339 of 2011, Writ PetitionNo. 47427 of 2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of 2011 areallowed and Notifications dated 26-5-2009 and 22-6-2009 andall consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall beentitled for restoration of their land subject to deposit ofcompensation which they had received under agreement/awardbefore the Authority/Collector.

(ii) Writ Petition No. 17725 of 2010 Omveer v. State ofU.P. (Group 38) relating to Village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi isallowed. Notifications dated 10-4-2006 and 6-9-2007 and allconsequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall beentitled for restoration of their land subject to return ofcompensation received by them under agreement/award to theCollector.

(iii) Writ Petition No. 47486 of 2011 (Rajee v. State ofU.P.) of Group 42 relating to Village Asdullapur is allowed.

Notifications dated 27-1-2010 and 4-2-2010 as well as allsubsequent proceedings are quashed. The petitioners shall beentitled to restoration of their land.

3. All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at

(1) and (2) are disposed of with the following directions:

(a) The petitioners shall be entitled for payment ofadditional compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e.64.70%) as paid for Village Patwari in addition to thecompensation received by them under the 1997 Rules/awardwhich payment shall be ensured by the Authority at an earlydate. It may be open for the Authority to take a decision as towhat proportion of additional compensation be asked to be paidby the allottees. Those petitioners who have not yet been paidcompensation may be paid the compensation as well asadditional compensation as ordered above. The payment ofadditional compensation shall be without any prejudice to rightsof landowners under Section 18 of the Act, if any.

(b) All the petitioners shall be entitled for allotment ofdeveloped abadi plot to the extent of 10%of their acquiredland subject to maximum of 2500 sq m. We however, leave itopen to the Authority in cases where allotment of abadi plotto the extent of 6%or 8%has already been made either to makeallotment of the balance of the area or may compensate thelandowners by payment of the amount equivalent to balancearea as per average rate of allotment made of developedresidential plots.

4. The Authority may also take a decision as to whetherbenefit of additional compensation and allotment of abadi plotto the extent of 10%be also given to:

(a) those landholders whose earlier writ petitionchallenging the notifications has been dismissed upholding thenotifications; and (b) those landholders who have not come to the Court,relating to the notifications which are the subject-matter ofchallenge in the writ petitions mentioned at Direction 3.

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5. Greater Noida and its allottees are directed not tocarry on development and not to implement the Master Plan2021 till the observations and directions of the National CapitalRegional Planning Board are incorporated in Master Plan 2021to the satisfaction of the National Capital Regional PlanningBoard. We make it clear that this direction shall not be applicablein those cases where the development is being carried on inaccordance with the earlier Master Plan of Greater Noida dulyapproved by the National Capital Regional Planning Board.

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6. We direct the Chief Secretary of the State to appointofficers not below the level of Principal Secretary (except theofficers of Industrial Development Department who have dealtwith the relevant files) to conduct a thorough inquiry regardingthe acts of Greater Noida (a) in proceeding to implement MasterPlan 2021 without approval of NCRP Board, (b) decisions takento change the land use, (c) allotment made to the builders, and(d) indiscriminate proposals for acquisition of land, andthereafter the State Government shall take appropriate actionin the matter.”

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22. We may point out at this stage that in respect of all thesethree categories, the High Court has provided its justification forgranting relief in the aforesaid nature. We shall be referring to thesame while discussing the cases of the appellants belonging toone or the other category.”

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35. After considering various judgments, this Court in the case ofFSavitri Devi (supra) observed thus:

“46. Thus, we have a scenario where, on the one hand, invocationof urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act and dispensingwith the right to file objection under Section 5-A of the Act, isfound to be illegal. On the other hand, we have a situation wherebecause of delay in challenging these acquisitions by thelandowners, developments have taken place in these villages andin most of the cases, third-party rights have been created. Facedwith this situation, the High Court going by the spirit behind thejudgment of this Court in Bondu Ramaswamy [(2010) 7 SCC 129: (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] came out with the solution which is G

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equitable to both sides. We are, thus, of the view that the HighCourt considered the ground realities of the matter and arrived ata more practical and workable solution by adequately compensatingthe landowners in the form of compensation as well as allotmentof developed abadi land at a higher rate i.e. 10%of the landacquired of each of the landowners against the eligibility and to(sic under) the policy to the extent of 5%and 6%of Noida andGreater Noida land respectively.

36. It could thus be seen that this Court in the said case has foundthat a peculiar situation arose, where on one hand invocation of urgencyprovisions under Section 17 of the L.A. Act and dispensing with theright to file objections under Section 5A of the L.A. Act, were found tobe illegal, while on the other hand, the developments had already takenplace in the villages and in most of the cases, third-party rights werecreated. Faced with this situation, the High Court came out with thesolution which was equitable to both sides. This Court found that theHigh Court considered the ground realities of the matter and arrived at amore practical and workable solution by adequately compensating thelandowners in the form of compensation as well as allotment ofdeveloped abadi land at a higher rate.

37. No doubt that this Court in paragraph 50 of the judgment inthe case of Savitri Devi (supra) makes it clear that the directions of theHigh Court were given in the unique and peculiar/specific backgroundand therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases.

38. It is to be noted that in the case of Greater Noida IndustrialDevelopment Authority vs. Savitri Mohan (Dead) Through LegalRepresentatives and others[6], this Court was considering the judgmentof the Allahabad High Court, wherein it had quashed and set aside theNotification under Section 4(1) and Section 17(4) of the L.A. Act aswell as the Notification under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of theL.A. Act. A specific question was framed by this Court in the said casein paragraph 10, which reads thus:

“10. The only question for consideration is whether the matter iscovered by the judgment of this Court in Savitri Devi [SavitriDevi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ)473], as claimed by the appellant in which case the respondents 6 (2016) 13 SCC 210

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Awill be entitled to relief of higher compensation and allotment ofland instead of quashing of acquisition proceedings.”39. Answering the aforesaid question, this Court in the said caseobserved thus:

“13. A perusal of the above shows that compensation had alreadyBbeen disbursed to the extent of 76%. Thereafter, for the entireland of Village Chhapraula falling in Group 18, the relief grantedis payment of additional compensation and allotment of land. Asalready noted, the part of the order where relief of quashing ofnotification has been given is not of the category of the presentCcase. In these circumstances, we find merit in the contention raisedon behalf of the appellant that the Division Bench was in error indistinguishing the present case from the judgment in Gajraj[Gajraj v. State of U.P., (2011) 11 ADJ 1 : 2011 SCC OnLine All1711] .

D14. As observed by this Court in Savitri Devi [SavitriDevi v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 21 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ)473], in spite of the finding that invocation of urgency clause wasuncalled for, the relief of setting aside the acquisition was notgranted having regard to the development that had already beenundertaken on substantial part of the land. However, to balanceEthe equities higher compensation and allotment of land was orderedto meet the ends of justice. [Savitri Devi v. State of U.P., (2015)7 SCC 21, para 17]”

40. It could thus clearly be seen that though this Court in the caseof Savitri Devi (supra) observed that the judgment in the case of GajrajF(supra) has to be construed particularly in the unique and peculiar/specificbackground, in the case of Savitri Mohan (Dead) (supra), this Courthad followed the principle laid down in the cases of Gajraj (supra) andSavitri Devi (supra) and held that to balance the equities, it wasappropriate to issue directions for payment of higher compensation andGallotment of additional land. It was observed that it was necessary to doso to meet the ends of justice.

41. At this juncture, we will have to consider the policy decisionof the State Government as formulated in the said G.O. in the peculiarfacts and circumstances of the present case.

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42. After the decision of this Court in the cases of Gajraj (supra)and Savitri Devi (supra), 64.7% additional compensation and 10% ofthe land acquired of each of the land owners, instead of 5% and 6% wasmade available to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefitof NOIDA as well as Greater NOIDA. The lands acquired for the benefitof YEIDA were also for the development of adjoining areas. Feelingdiscriminated that they were being paid compensation at much lesserrate as compared to the farmers whose lands were acquired for NOIDAand Greater NOIDA, various farmers’ organizations started agitations.It is some of the allottees who made representations to the CEO ofYEIDA. One of such representations was made by the respondent No.19-Supertech Private Limited to the CEO of YEIDA on 22[nd] November,2013, stating therein that on account of agitation by the Bhartiya KisanUnion, they had to stop their work with effect from 20[th] November,2013. The said letter/representation stated that that the main grievanceof the office-holders of the Bhartiya Kisan Union was that they wantincreased compensation and for compensating the same, the Authoritywants money from the Builders. The said representation states that:

“‘‘the Authority is not resolving the problems of the Farmers. Themain issue of farmers is that they want increased compensation,and for compensating the same, the Authority wants money fromthe Builders. Builders are not ready to pay this amount, due towhich, we are stopping the construction works of Builders.” Duringthe discussion, it was said by the Company that “We are not againstthe farmers or against their rights and company gives it’s consenton this fact that whatever the consent would be made out betweenthe Authority and Government on the compensation amount offarmers, that would be accepted by the company.”

43. The said letter/representation categorically states that theCompany was not against the farmers or against their rights and that itwas willing to abide by whatever decision was arrived at between theAuthority and the Government on the compensation amount of farmers.

44. Similar representations were made by Orris Greenbay GolfVillage on the same day, by Sunworld City Pvt. Ltd. on 26[th] November,2013, and by Gaursons Realtech Pvt. Ltd. on 4[th] December, 2013.

45. It could thus be seen that on account of farmers’ resistanceand their agitation, the development work of the projects was stalled.

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AWhen this was brought to the notice of the State Government, the StateGovernment nominated the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut videorder dated 10[th] April, 2013, for looking into the issue. The Commissionerafter holding various meetings with the farmers’ organization/representatives submitted his report on 16[th] July, 2013, stating thereinthat the lands have been acquired by YEIDA at large scale and takingBinto consideration the nature of demands having wide implications, itwas necessary that a High-Level Committee at the State Governmentlevel for examining the demands of farmers be constituted. In thisbackground, the State Government vide order dated 3[rd] September, 2013constituted a Committee under the Chairmanship of Shri RajendraCChaudhary, Minister of Prison, State of Uttar Pradesh. The DivisionalCommissioner of the concerned Division and the Collector of theconcerned District were also the members of the Chaudhary Committee.The Chaudhary Committee was constituted for the purpose of resolvingthe problems of the villagers/farmers and the problems related to theindustries. The Chaudhary Committee considered the following issues:D

“a. Demands raised by the Farmers/ Farmers’ Organizations/Representatives and Memorandums/ Demand Lettersproduced by them and the favour put forth by them duringthe personal hearing.

Eb.Favour put forth by the Industrialists/ Builders/ Allottees duringpersonal hearing.

c.Favour and opinion of Yamuna Expressway Authority.”

46. The Chaudhary Committee conducted its proceedings on30[th] September, 2013 with the representatives of the farmers. The saidFCommittee thereafter held deliberations with the representatives of theallottees on 29[th] October, 2013. It will be apposite to refer to the relevantpart of the discussion that took place in the meeting held with therepresentatives of the allottees on 29[th] October,2013, which reads thus:

“2. It was informed by the representative of M/s. SDIL that dueGto the agitation of local farmers on the issues of their problems/demands, at present, we are not available to carry out anywork on the spot, therefore, whatever the decision will betaken by the Committee/ Government for disposal of theproblems of farmers, we will cooperate in the same.

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3. It was informed by the representative of M/s. Supertech Pvt.Ltd. that the farmers are agitating in the entire area and theyare interrupting the development work. It is necessary to solvethe problems of farmers. It was also informed by him that hewill cooperate in the decision to be taken by the Government/Committee for disposal of the problems.

4. It was informed by the representatives of M/s. Silverline andother Units/Institutions that due to interrupting theirdevelopment works as a result of the demands being raisedby the farmers of the area, the project cost is gettingescalated. Due to solving the problems of farmers, theinvestment will be increased in the area and in disposal of thesame, they will provide their assistance.

5. Regarding the demand of giving 10% abadi land in place of7% abadi land to be given to the ancestral farmers, it wassaid by the representative of M/s. J.P. Infratech Pvt. Ltd.namely Sh. Sameer Gaur that earlier, they have been paidvalue of 7% abadi land and development charges, now, if anyother cost is imposed, then, company is not in position to bearthe same.”

47. It could thus be seen that even the representatives of theallottees were of the opinion that on account of the agitation of the localfarmers, the developers were not in a position to carry out any work onthe spot. It was also impressed upon that on account of this, the cost ofthe project was getting escalated. As such, it was urged to solve theproblem.

48. The Chaudhary Committee also considered the submissionsmade on behalf of the appellant-YEIDA. It was submitted on behalf ofthe appellant-YEIDA that on account of the judgment delivered in asimilar case, i.e., in the case of Gajraj (supra), the farmers, whoselands were acquired, were also demanding the compensation on similarlines.

49. After considering the rival submissions, the ChaudharyCommittee gave its recommendation as under:

“Recommendation of Committee:-

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AThe opinion of Authority as well as the demands of the Farmers’Organizations were carefully considered by the Committee. Inthe common order passed in the different Writ Petitions filed byNoida and Greater Noida Authorities, the Hon’ble High Court bynot finding the proceedings conducted under Section 17 of LandAcquisition Act, 1894 to be proper, had directed that the AuthorityBshall pay 64.7% additional compensation to the farmers and returnthem 10% developed land. Also in the Yamuna ExpresswayAuthority, around 700 Writ Petitions have been filed by the farmersby challenging the different notifications, wherein, stay orders havebeen passed in the most of the Petitions, the circumstances whichCwere existing in the acquisition made by Noida and Greater NoidaAuthority, same circumstances are also existed in the most of thecases of acquisition of Yamuna Expressway. The lands acquiredby the Authority, have been allotted to the different allottees fordifferent projects, due to which, the third party rights have beencreated in this acquired land and if order is passed against theDAuthority in the Petitioners filed against the AcquisitionProceedings, then, many difficulties would arise. Therefore,keeping in view the legal expected legal complications, it is requiredto do the out of court settlement with the affected farmers. At thetime of discussion, it was assured by the farmers’ representativesEthat if the Government/ Authority agrees to give 64.7% additionalcompensation, then, the farmers will withdraw the Petitions filedin the Court. Therefore, Committee recommends that:-

I.(a) If, all the farmers/ Petitioners of a village related to theland acquired/ purchased by the Yamuna ExpresswayAuthority, withdraw their Petitions filed in the Hon’ble HighCourt or in any other Court and if they give writtenassurance for future that they will not file any claim againstthe Authority or it’s allottees in any Court and will not causeany obstruction in the Development Works, then, like theGreater Noida Authority, the Authority may consider to giveamount equivalent to 64.7% additional compensation in theform of No Litigation Incentive/ Additional Compensation,which may be compensated proportionally from theconcerned allottees and same may also be imposedproportionally in the costing of allotment of land availablewith the Authority.

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These benefits shall be allowed also to those farmers, whose’lands have been purchased by the Authority vide Sale Deedon mutual consent basis.

(b) The process of payment of additional compensation, becompleted villagewise in accordance with the Schemes/Priorities of Authority after obtaining physical possessionof on the spot and after withdrawal of all the Writ petitions/Cases of concerned village after doing settlement with thefarmers. In view of the financial condition of Authority, ifthe payment of additional compensation is not possible inlumpsum, then, the consideration could also be maderegarding payment in installments or in the form of developedland.

2. Regarding allotment of 10% developed land in place of 7%developed land, the proceedings be conducted according tothe order of Appeal/SLP filed by the Noida/Greater NoidaAuthorities.

3. The proceedings of amendment proposed by the Authorityin Abadi Rules, are at final stage of approval, theproceedings be conducted as per the decision ofGovernment.

4. Regarding abolishing the distinction between ancestral andnon-ancestral, this decision has been taken in the 48thmeeting dated 08.01.2014 of Yamuna Expressway AuthorityBoard, that such land owners of the lands acquired or to beacquired/purchased by the Authority, whose’ names haveremained recorded in Six Yearly Register/ Khatauni on theacquired land prior to the date of establishment of Authorityi.e. 24.04.2001, and the landowners are residents of anyvillage related to any District lying within the notified areaof Yamuna Expressway Authority, then, the benefit of 7%abadi land be granted to him against his acquired land. Inthe decision of Authority Board, this facility has also beenallowed to the successors of eligible land owners, who fulfillthe aforesaid conditions. The further proceedings beconducted as per the decision of Authority Board.

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A5. In view of the demands of farmers organizations and localpublic of District Mathura, after taking into considerationthe proposal submitted by Concessionaire namely M/s. J.P.Infratech Ltd., in the 48th meeting dated 08.01.2014 ofYamuna Expressway Authority Board, a decision in principlehas been taken for construction of Exist & Entry Ramps atBBajna-Nauhjheel Road at Yamuna Expressway and bymaking necessary amendments in DPR accordingly, a letterhas been sent to the Concessionaire namely M/s. J,P.Infratech for necessary action. The further proceedings beconducted as per the decision of Authority Board.CIt is recommended by the Committee that the aforementionedadditional benefits be granted to the landowners only in that casewhen they will handover the physical possession of land to theAuthority and withdraw Writ Petition/Case pending in Hon’bleHigh Court or any other Court and agreement for not causing anyDobstruction in future in the development works of allottees andfor not filing any claim in any Court against the acquisition of landin future. Regarding the other demands, the Committee will giveit’s recommendation after further consideration.”

50. It could thus be seen that the recommendations of theEChaudhary Committee were principally intended to resolve the issuebetween the farmers and the allottees, and to find out a workable solutionto the problem. The Chaudhary Committee recommended similartreatment to be given to the farmers whose lands were acquired forYEIDA, as was given to the farmers whose lands were acquired for thebenefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA. The Chaudhary CommitteeFfound that the same benefits as were given to the farmers whose landswere acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and Greater NOIDA in viewof the judgment of the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra), asaffirmed by this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) should also begiven to the farmers whose lands were acquired for the benefit ofGYEIDA. However, this was made conditional. Additional benefit wasgranted to the landowners on the condition that they would handover thephysical possession of land to YEIDA and withdraw the writ petitions/cases filed by them pending before the High Court.

51. The State Government vide the said G.O. gave effect to theHrecommendations of the Chaudhary Committee. YEIDA too, in its Board meeting dated 15[th] September, 2014, resolved to implement the decisionof the State Government. Accordingly, demand notices came to be issuedto the allottees.

52. It could thus be seen that the policy decision of the StateGovernment is preceded by various factors. Firstly, the farmers’ agitation,after they were denied the benefits which were granted to the farmerswhose lands were acquired for the benefit of NOIDA and GreaterNOIDA; the report of the Commissioner, the appointment of theChaudhary Committee, the deliberations of the Chaudhary Committeewith various stakeholders, and thereafter the recommendations of theChaudhary Committee.

53. It will be relevant to refer to the judgment of this Court in thecase of the Kasinka Trading and another vs. Union of India andanother[7], wherein this Court has referred to various earlierpronouncements and the treatise of Prof. S.A. de Smith on “JudicialReview of Administrative Action”. The relevant paragraphs of the saidjudgment read thus:

“12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissoryestoppel is applicable against the Government also particularlywhere it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. Thedoctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel theGovernment or the public authority “to carry out a representationor promise which is contrary to law or which was outside theauthority or power of the officer of the Government or of thepublic authority to make”. There is preponderance of judicialopinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear,sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself bythe party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, withoutany supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attractedbecause the party invoking the doctrine has altered its positionrelying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficientto press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine ofpromissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and thecourts are bound to consider all aspects including the results soughtto be achieved and the public good at large, because whileconsidering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to doequity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be A

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present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicabilityof the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity sodemands if it can be shown having regard to the facts andcircumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold theGovernment or the public authority to its promise, assurance orrepresentation.

13. The ambit, scope and amplitude of the doctrine of promissoryestoppel has been evolved in this country over the last quarter ofa century through successive decisions of this Court startingwith Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. [(1968) 2SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718] Reference in this connection maybe made with advantage to Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council [(1970) 1 SCC 582 :(1970) 3 SCR 854] ; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144 :(1979) 2 SCR 641] ; Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State ofHaryana [(1981) 1 SCC 11 : (1980) 3 SCR 689] ; Union ofIndia v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC 369 : 1986SCC (Tax) 11]; Indian Express Newspapers (Bom) (P)Ltd. v. Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax)121] ; Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1986 Supp SCC728 : 1987 SCC (Tax) 134] ; Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. Stateof Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 31 : 1987 SCC (Tax) 74 : (1987) 1SCR 185] ; Asstt. CCT v. Dharmendra Trading Co. [(1988) 3SCC 570 : 1988 SCC (Tax) 432] ; Amrit Banaspati Co.Ltd. v. State of Punjab [(1992) 2 SCC 411] and Union ofIndia v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499 :JT (1993) 3 SC 15] In Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [(1985) 4 SCC369 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 11] this Court opined: (SCC p. 388, para13)

“We may also point out that the doctrine of promissoryestoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when theequity so requires; if it can be shown by the Government orpublic authority that having regard to the facts as they havetranspired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government orpublic authority to the promise or representation made by it,the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person towhom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or publicauthority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would bedisplaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity wouldnot require that the Government or public authority should beheld bound by the promise or representation made by it.”

14. In Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram Kumar [(1976) 3 SCC540 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 360 : AIR 1976 SC 2237] four learnedJudges of this Court observed: (SCC p. 545, para 19)

“The fact that sales of country liquor had been exemptedfrom sales tax vide Notification No. ST-1149/X-802 (33)-51dated 6-4-1959 could not operate as an estoppel against theState Government and preclude it from subjecting the sales totax if it felt impelled to do so in the interest of the revenues ofthe State which are required for execution of the plans designedto meet the ever-increasing pressing needs of the developingsociety. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions thatthere can be no question of estoppel against the Governmentin the exercise of its legislative, sovereign or executive powers.”

15. Prof. S.A. de Smith in his celebrated treatise Judicial Reviewof Administrative Action, 3rd Edn., at p. 279 sums up the positionthus:

“Contracts and covenants entered into by the Crown arenot to be construed as being subject to implied terms that wouldexclude the exercise of general discretionary powers for the publicgood. On the contrary they are to be construed as incorporatingan implied term that such powers remain exercisable. This isbroadly true of other public authorities also. But the status andfunctions of the Crown in this regard are of a higher order. TheCrown cannot be allowed to tie its hands completely by priorundertakings is as clear as the proposition that the Courts cannotallow the Crown to evade compliance with ostensibly bindingobligations whenever it thinks fit. If a public authority lawfullyrepudiates or departs from the terms of a binding contract in orderto have been bound in law by an ostensibly binding contractbecause the undertakings would improperly fetter its generaldiscretionary powers the other party to the agreement has noright whatsoever to damages or compensation under the general A

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Alaw, no matter how serious the damages that party may havesuffered.”

54. It has been held by this Court that the doctrine of promissoryestoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound toconsider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and theBpublic good at large. It has been held that while considering the applicabilityof the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the court, whileconsidering the applicability of the doctrine. It has been held that thedoctrine being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity sorequires, if it can be shown by the Government or Public Authority thatChaving regard to the facts and circumstances as they have transpired, itwould be inequitable to hold the Government or the Public Authority tothe promise, assurance or representation made by it. The judgment ofthis Court in the case of Kasinka Trading (supra) has been consistentlyfollowed.

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55. If we apply the principle as laid down in the case of KasinkaTrading (supra) to the facts of the present case, it will be clear that thepolicy decision of the State Government was not only in the larger publicinterest but also in the interest of the respondents. The projects werestalled on account of the farmers’ agitation. The farmers felt discriminatedEas they found that the compensation paid to them was much lesser thanthe one being paid to the equally circumstanced farmers in NOIDA andGreater NOIDA. It was the allottees of the land who had approachedthe State Government for redressal of the problem. In thesecircumstances, the Government took cognizance of the problem andappointed the Commissioner to look into the issue. Since the CommissionerFrecommended appointment of a High-Level Committee, the ChaudharyCommittee was appointed. The Chaudhary Committee had threadbarediscussions with all the stakeholders. It also took into consideration thaton account of stay orders passed by the High Court in various writpetitions, the development of the project was stalled. On account ofGpendency of the writ petitions, there was always a hanging sword overthe entire acquisition of it being declared unlawful. In this premise, inorder to find out a workable solution and that too, on the basis of the lawlaid down by the High Court in the case of Gajraj (supra) as affirmedby this Court in the case of Savitri Devi (supra) and followed by thisCourt in the case of Savitri Mohan (Dead) (supra), recommendationsH

were made by the Chaudhary Committee. The Chaudhary Committeespecifically recommended that the additional compensation and otherincentives would be paid only if the landowners agree to handover physicalpossession of the land to YEIDA and withdraw all the litigations.

56. It could thus be seen that the recommendations, which wereaccepted by the State Government and formulated in the policy, weremade taking into consideration the interests of all the stakeholders. Asheld by this Court, it is not only the interest of a small section of theallottees which should weigh with the Government, but the Governmentshould also give due weightage to the interest of the large section offarmers, whose lands were acquired.

57. We further find that the High Court fell in error in observingthat no writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition for YEIDA.The report of the Chaudhary Committee itself would clarify that YEIDAhad itself submitted that insofar as the residential plots are concerned,there were stay orders operating in majority of the writ petitions due towhich the development of the project work was stalled.

58. We are therefore of the considered view that the policy decisionof the State Government was in the larger public interest. It was takenconsidering entire material collected by the Chaudhary Committee afterdue deliberations with all the stakeholders. The factors which were takeninto consideration by the State Government were relevant, rational andfounded on ground realities. In this view of the matter, the finding of theHigh Court that the policy decision of the State Government was arbitrary,irrational and unfair, is totally incorrect.

59. The law with regard to interference in the policy decision ofthe State is by now very well crystalized. This Court in the case ofEssar Steel Limited vs Union of India and others[8] had an occasion toconsider the scope of interference in the policy decision of the State.After referring to various decisions of this Court, the Court observedthus:

“43. Before we can examine the validity of the impugned policydecision dated 6-3-2007, it is crucial to understand the extent ofthe power vested with this Court to review policy decisions.

44. In DDA [DDA v. Allottee of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672 :(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 684] on issue of judicial review of policy 8 (2016) 11 SCC 1

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decisions, the power of the Court is examined and observed asunder: (SCC pp. 697-98, paras 64-65)

“64. An executive order termed as a policy decision is notbeyond the pale of judicial review. Whereas the superior courtsmay not interfere with the nitty-gritty of the policy, or substituteone by the other but it will not be correct to contend that the courtshall lay its judicial hands off, when a plea is raised that the impugneddecision is a policy decision. Interference therewith on the part ofthe superior court would not be without jurisdiction as it is subjectto judicial review.

65. Broadly, a policy decision is subject to judicial reviewon the following grounds:

(a) if it is unconstitutional;

(b) if it is dehors the provisions of the Act and theRegulations;

(c) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation; (d) if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or alarger policy.”

45. Thus, we will test the impugned policy on the above groundsto determine whether it warrants our interference under Article136 or not. Further, this Court neither has the jurisdiction nor thecompetence to judge the viability of such policy decisions of theGovernment in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Article136 of the Constitution of India. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Unionof India [Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC1], this Court has further held as under: (SCC p. 17, para 41)

“41. … This Court sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit injudgment over the commercial or business decision taken by partiesto the agreement, after evaluating and assessing its monetary andfinancial implications, unless the decision is in clear violation ofany statutory provisions or perverse or taken for extraneousconsiderations or improper motives. States and its instrumentalitiescan enter into various contracts which may involve complexeconomic factors. State or the State undertaking being a party toa contract, have to make various decisions which they deem justand proper. There is always an element of risk in such decisions, ultimately it may turn out to be a correct decision or a wrongone. But if the decision is taken bona fide and in public interest,the mere fact that decision has ultimately proved to be wrong,that itself is not a ground to hold that the decision was malafide or taken with ulterior motives.”

46. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union ofIndia [Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union ofIndia, (2009) 7 SCC 561] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 605,para 169)

“169. It is neither within the domain of the courts nor thescope of judicial review to embark upon an enquiry as to whethera particular public policy is wise or whether better public policycan be evolved. Nor are the courts inclined to strike down a policyat the behest of a petitioner merely because it has been urged thata different policy would have been fairer or wiser or more scientificor more logical. Wisdom and advisability of economic policyare ordinarily not amenable to judicial review. In mattersrelating to economic issues the Government has, while takinga decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial anderror are bona fide and within the limits of the authority. Fortesting the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum isParliament and not the courts.”

47. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Narmada BachaoAndolan v. Union of India [Narmada Bachao Andolan v.Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664] cautioned against courtssitting in appeal against policy decisions. It was held as under:(SCC p. 763, para 234)

“234. In respect of public projects and policies which areinitiated by the Government the courts should not become anapproval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by theGovernment after due care and consideration. In a democracywelfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small sectionof the society, has to be the concern of a responsibleGovernment. If a considered policy decision has been taken, A

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which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it willnot be in public interest to require the court to go into andinvestigate those areas which are the function of the executive.For any project which is approved after due deliberation the courtshould refrain from being asked to review the decision just becausea petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should nothave been taken because an opposite view against the undertakingof the project, which view may have been considered by theGovernment, is possible. When two or more options or views arepossible and after considering them the Government takes a policydecision it is then not the function of the court to go into the matterafresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.”

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48. A similar sentiment was echoed by a Constitution Bench ofthis Court in Peerless General Finance & Investment Co.Ltd. v. RBI [Peerless General Finance & Investment Co.Ltd. v. RBI, (1992) 2 SCC 343] , wherein it was observed as under:(SCC p. 375, para 31)

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“31. … Courts are not to interfere with economic policywhich is the function of experts. It is not the function of the courtsto sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it mustEnecessarily be left to the expert bodies. In such matters evenexperts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot beexpected to decide them without even the aid of experts.”

49. A perusal of the abovementioned judgments of this Courtwould show that this Court should exercise great caution andFrestraint when confronted with matters related to the policyregarding commercial matters of the country. Executive policiesare usually enacted after much deliberation by the Government.Therefore, it would not be appropriate for this Court to questionthe wisdom of the same, unless it is demonstrated by the aggrievedGpersons that the said policy has been enacted in an arbitrary,unreasonable or mala fide manner, or that it offends the provisionsof the Constitution of India.”

60. It is trite law that an interference with the policy decisionwould not be warranted unless it is found that the policy decision ispalpably arbitrary, mala fide, irrational or violative of the statutoryH

provisions. We are therefore of the considered view that the High Courtwas also not right in interfering with the policy decision of the StateGovernment, which is in the larger public interest.

61. It will also be apposite to refer to the following observationsof this Court in the case of APM Terminals B.V. vs. Union of Indiaand another[9]:

“67. It has been the consistent view of this Court that a change inpolicy by the Government can have an overriding effect overprivate treaties between the Government and a private party, ifthe same was in the general public interest and provided suchchange in policy was guided by reason. Several decisions havebeen cited by the parties in this regard in the context of preventingprivate monopolisation of port activities to an extent where suchprivate player would assume a dominant position which wouldenable them to control not only the berthing of ships but the tarifffor use of the port facilities.”

62. It could thus be seen that it is more than settled that a changein policy by the Government can have an overriding effect over privatetreaties between the Government and a private party, if the same was inthe general public interest. The additional requirement is that such changein policy is required to be guided by reason.

63. Insofar as the reliance placed by the respondents on thejudgment of this Court in the case of ITC Limited (supra) is concerned,in our considered view, the said judgment would not be of any assistanceto the case of the respondents. This Court in the said case in paragraph107.1 has clearly observed that in the case of conflict between publicinterest and personal interest, public interest should prevail.

64. A number of judgments of this Court have been cited at theBar by the respondents in support of the proposition that in view ofconcluded contracts, it was not permissible for the appellants to unilaterallyincrease the premium by framing a policy.

65. We have hereinabove elaborately discussed that when a policyis changed by the State, which is in the general public interest, suchpolicy would prevail over the individual rights/interests. In that view ofthe matter, we do not find it necessary to refer to the said judgments.

9 (2011) 6 SCC 756

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AThe policy of the State Government as reflected in the said G.O. wasnot only in the larger public interest but also in the interest of therespondents.

66. We further find that the respondents have indulged into theconduct of approbate and reprobate. They have changed their stance asBper their convenience. When their projects were stalled on account ofthe farmers’ agitation, it is they who approached the State Authoritiesfor finding out a solution. When the State Government responded totheir representations and came up with a policy which was equitableand in the interest of both, the farmers and the allottees and when thesaid policy paved the way for development, when called upon to pay theCadditional compensation, the respondents-allottees somersaulted andchallenged the very same policy before the High Court, which benefittedthem. We have already hereinabove made reference to the variouscommunications made by the allottees of the land for intervention of theState Government.D

67. Insofar as the individual plot owners are concerned, it will beworthwhile to mention that the residential plot owners in Sectors 18 and20 of Yamuna Expressway city have formed an association, viz., YamunaExpressway Residential-Plot-Owners Welfare Association (hereinafterreferred to as “the YERWA”). The communication addressed by theEpresident of the YERWA to the CEO of YEIDA would reveal that 98.5%of the allottees/owners have voted in favour of paying the additionalpremium demanded by the Authority. The only request made by theYERWA is with regard to making a provision for paying additionalpremium in installments.68. It can thus be seen that even insofar as the individual residentialFplot owners are concerned, more than 98% of the plot owners do nothave any objection to the payment of the additional compensation.

69. With respect to the contention of the respondent No.19-Supertech with regard to initiation of CIRP, we are not concerned withGthe said issue in the present proceedings. The law will take its owncourse.

70. In conclusion, we are of the considered view that the policydecision of the State Government as reflected in the said G.O. dated29[th] August, 2014 and the Resolution of the Board of YEIDA dated15[th] September, 2014 were in the larger public interest, taking care ofH

the concerns of the allottees as well as the farmers. As already discussedhereinabove, had the said decision not been taken, there was a hangingsword of the acquisition being declared unlawful. The development ofthe entire project was stalled on account of farmers’ agitation. Beforetaking the policy decision, the State Government, through the ChaudharyCommittee, had done a wide range of deliberations with all thestakeholders including the allottees, farmers and YEIDA. The policydecision was taken after taking into consideration all relevant factorsand was guided by reasons. In any case, it is a settled position of lawthat in case of a conflict between public interest and personal interest,public interest will outweigh the personal interest. The High Court wastherefore not justified in holding that the policy decision of the State wasunfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. We are of the considered view thatthe High Court has erred in allowing the writ petitions. The presentappeals, therefore, deserve to be allowed.

71. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeals are allowed;

(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 28[th] May, 2020,passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 28968of 2018 and companion matters is quashed and set aside;

(iii) The writ petitions filed by the respondents covered by theimpugned judgment and order dated 28[th] May, 2020 passedby the Allahabad High Court are dismissed;

72. Applications for Intervention are allowed. Pending applications,including the applications for directions, shall stand disposed of in theabove terms. There shall be no order as to costs.

Nidhi Jain(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.

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