ASAR MOHAMMAD AND ORS. versus THE STATE OF U.P. on 24 October 2018

248

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2018] 13 S.C.R.

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ASAR MOHAMMAD AND ORS.

v.

THE STATE OF U.P.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1617 of 2011)

BOCTOBER 24, 2018

[A. M. KHANWILKAR AND L. NAGESWARA RAO, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860:

ss. 302 and 201 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence –CProsecution of three accused – Confessional statement of oneaccused (appellant No.1) – Recovery of dead bodies at his instance– FIR lodged on the basis of missing report filed by PW7 – Convictionby trial court awarding death sentence to all the three accused –High Court affirmed the conviction, but reduced the death sentenceto imprisonment for life – On appeal, held: In view of the entireDevidence and totality of the proved circumstances, courts below wereright in holding appellant No.1 guilty of the offences u/ss. 302 and201 – Except the confession of appellant No.1 there is no otherindependent substantive evidence to show involvement of other twoaccused (Appellant Nos.2 and 3) for having caused murder – It isEnot permissible to proceed against them solely on the confessionalstatement – Therefore, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are acquitted of theoffence punishable u/s. 302 – However, from the provedcircumstantials it is apparent that they had the knowledge of themurder and whereabout of the dead bodies and despite that theydid not disclose the same with an intention to screen appellant No.1F– Therefore, they are liable to be convicted for offence punishableu/s.201 – Evidence Act, 1872 - s.27.

Evidence Act, 1872:

s.27 – Scope of – The word ‘fact’ as contemplated in s. 27 isnot limited to ‘actual physical material object’ - It includes discoveryGof an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledgeof the accused as to its existence.

Evidence:

Confession – Of co-accused – If can be used against otherco-accused – Held: Confession of co-accused by itself cannot be H

the basis to proceed against the other accused unless somethingmore is produced to indicate their involvement in the commission ofcrime.

Dismissing the appeal of appellant No.1 and partly allowingthe appeal of appellant Nos. 2 and 3, the Court HELD: 1. No direct evidence has been produced by theprosecution regarding the involvement of the appellants in thecommission of the crime. The prosecution rests its case solelyon circumstantial evidence. The fact that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3became hostile and the prosecution could not establish the factumof motive cannot be the basis to doubt the correctness of thefinding of guilt recorded by the two courts against the accused onthe basis of other proved circumstances including the confessionof the accused No.1 about the murder of the deceased personsand more importantly, having dumped the dead bodies in the septictank in the backyard of their house and to have led the police tothat place from where the two dead bodies, whose identity alsohas not been disputed, came to be recovered, coupled with themedical evidence that the cause of death of the two deadpersons was due to the ante-mortem injury caused on the neckresulting in their death due to asphyxia and is a homicidal death.[Paras 8 and 11][257-F]

Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh andOrs. (1989) Supp. (2) SCC 706; Mulakh Raj & Ors. v.Satish Kumar & Ors. (1992) 3 SCC 43 : [1992] 2 SCR484; Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1972) 2SCC 80 : [1973] 1 SCR 428 – relied on.

2. After perusing the entire evidence and taking the totalityof the proved circumstances into account, the Court is inagreement with the conclusion reached by the trial court, whichcame to be affirmed by the High Court, regarding finding of guiltagainst appellant No.1, who had confessed to the police and alsoled the police party to the place where the dead bodies weredumped. [Para 12][261-H; 262-A]

3. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a housewhere the accused have all the opportunity to plan and committhe offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it A

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Awill be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence toestablish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle ofcircumstantial evidence, is insisted upon. [Para 12][262-C-D]

Trimukh Moroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006)10 SCC 681 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 156 – relied on.

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4. The facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact”as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limitedto “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arisesby reason of the fact that the information given by the accusedexhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informantCas to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery ofan object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledgeof the accused as to its existence. Applying this principle theCourt has no hesitation in affirming the finding of guilt recordedagainst appellant No.1.[Paras 13 and 14][265-C-D; 270-F]

DVasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra (2015)1 SCC 253 – relied on.

5. Except the confession of the co-accused appellant No.1,the prosecution has not produced any independent substantiveevidence to even remotely suggest that appellant Nos.2 and 3Ewere involved in committing the murder. It is well settled thatconfession of the co-accused by itself cannot be the basis toproceed against the other accused unless something more isproduced to indicate their involvement in the commission of thecrime. [Para 15][270-G-H]

Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCRF526; Bhuboni Sahu v. R. (1948-49) 76 IA 147;Periaswami Moopan, In re ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75;Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty ILR (1911) 38Cal 559 – relied on.

Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [1964] 6 SCR 623G– followed.

6. It is not permissible to proceed against appellant nos.2and 3 solely on the basis of the confession of appellant No.1 madebefore the police, even if the relevant part of the confession isadmissible and has been duly proved. As no substantive evidenceH

is forthcoming to show the involvement of appellant nos.2 and 3for having caused the murder, it is not open to convict them foroffence punishable under Section 302, IPC. This is also becausethe charge, as has been framed, is simpliciter for offence underSection 302 and not for offence punishable under Section 302read with Section 34 of IPC or Section 302 read with Section120-B of IPC. No evidence has been produced by the prosecutionin this regard. These appellants, therefore, will have to beacquitted in connection with offence punishable under Section302 IPC. [Para 16][272-H; 273-A-C]

7. However, the fact that appellant Nos.2 and 3 cannot beconvicted for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC doesnot extricate them from the offence under Section 201 IPC. Theproved circumstances discerned from the record leave no mannerof doubt that the deceased were residing along with the appellantsin the same house. Further deceased was the second wife ofappellant No.3 and deceased ‘I’ was none other than the son ofappellant No.3 born in wedlock with deceased ‘Z’. Deceased ‘Z’was the step mother of appellant Nos.1 and 2 and deceased ‘I’was their step brother. This relationship has not been disputed.It is also an established fact that the deceased persons hadsuddenly gone missing for over two months. Obviously, no effortswere made by appellant nos.2 and 3 to trace them nor did theythink it necessary to report that fact to the local police. Thisindeed cannot be a natural behavior or conduct of appellant No.3,the husband of deceased ‘Z’ and father of minor son deceased‘I’. Further, appellant nos.2 and 3 have not challenged the identityof two dead bodies found from the septic tank in the backyard oftheir house at the instance of appellant No.1. No explanationwhatsoever has been offered by them as to why they did not reportabout the sudden disappearance of the deceased persons (untiltheir bodies were recovered from the septic tank in the backyardof their house after two months). The concomitant is that appellantNos.2 and 3 had knowledge that the deceased persons had beenmurdered and their dead bodies were dumped in the septic tankin the backyard of their house and yet, they did not disclose thatfact with an intention to screen appellant No.1, the offender, fromlegal punishment. In other words, even though they cannot be AB

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Amade liable for the murder for want of legal evidence in that regard,they would certainly be guilty of having committed offence underSection 201 IPC as established from the proved circumstancescoupled with their abject failure to offer any explanation, muchless cogent explanation, about their conduct. The inevitable andlegitimate conclusion to be deduced is that they are guilty ofBoffence punishable under Section 201 IPC. [Para 17][273-D-H;274-A]

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1617 of 2011

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2009 of the High CourtFof Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 1631 of 2008.

S. K. Bhattacharya, L. K. Paonam, Niraj Bobby Paonam,Mrs. Tomthinnganbi Koijam, Advs. for the Appellants.

Rajesh K. Singh, Pradeep Misra, Advs. for the Respondent.

GThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1.This appeal emanates from thejudgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabaddated 30[th] July, 2009 in Criminal Appeal No.1631 of 2008, whereby theHigh Court upheld the conviction recorded against the appellants for anH

offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)but converted the sentence of death into imprisonment for life with fine,and confirmed the conviction under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenceof 2 years’ imprisonment and fine, as awarded by the Additional SessionsJudge/Special Judge, J.P. Nagar in Sessions Trial No.155/2004.

2. Briefly stated, one Shababul (PW-7) gave information to thePolice Station, Dedoli on 24[th] January, 2004 about one Zahida Begum,the second wife of appellant No.3, Akhtar Mohammad, son of Munshi,and their son Ishlam (aged about 11 years) who had gone missing fromthe village for the last two months, despite which their family membershad not reported the matter to the police. The appellant Nos.1 and 2,Asar Mohammad and Asraf Mohammad respectively, are the two sonsof appellant No.3 Akhtar Mohammad, from his first wife. Thus, deceasedZahida Begum is the step mother of appellant Nos.1 & 2, AsarMohammad and Asraf Mohammad. On the basis of the aforementionedreport, the Head Constable Surendra Singh (PW-10), who was postedas Head Moharrar, made an entry in GD No.32 (Ext. Ka-17). Acting onthat report, PW-9 Virendra Kumar Tyagi, Station House Officer of PoliceStation, Dedoli, visited the village along with SI Doonger Singh Verma(PW-6), Mangey Ram Tomar, Nath Prakash Gupta, Constable AsqarAli and SSI Harendra Singh (PW-4). On enquiries with Asar Mohammad(appellant No.1/accused No.1), he disclosed that Zahida was his stepmother and her son Ishlam was his step brother. He confessed that he,along with the other two appellants committed the murder of both Zahidaand Ishlam and thereafter, dumped their dead bodies into the septic tankin the backyard of their house. He then led the police party to the septictank and removed the lid with the help of Mangat and Jagadish Valmiki(PW-8), wherefrom the dead bodies were taken out. The dead bodieswere highly decomposed and virtually reduced to skeletons. The bodyof Zahida Begum was found tied with nylon cord (Ext. Ka-18).Thereafter, the memo of recovery of the dead bodies was prepared byHarendra Singh (PW-4). SI Doongar Singh Verma (PW-6) conductedthe inquest and gave the inquest report. He also prepared the necessarypapers concerning the dead bodies and drew a site plan of the place ofrecovery (Ext.Ka-19). The dead bodies were then dispatched for post-mortem examination on the next day, i.e. 25[th] January, 2004. TheInvestigating Officer then recorded the statement of the inquest witnessesand proceeded to arrest Asraf Mohammad (appellant No.2/accused No.2), A

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Awhose statement was recorded on the same day. The statements ofBegum Banu (PW-1) and Akram were recorded on 26[th] January, 2004.The appellant No.3 Akhtar came to be arrested on 10[th] February, 2004.The post-mortem of the dead bodies was conducted by Dr. KuldeepSingh (PW-5) who noted that the body of Zahida Begum inter alia hadfracture of Hyoid bone and Hyoid Cartilage which, in his opinion, wasBthe cause of death due to asphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone and ThyroidCartilage) and that the death had occurred more than one month back.With regard to the dead body of Ishlam, he inter alia noted that thecause of death was due to asphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone). Aftercompletion of the investigation, charge-sheet (Ext. Ka-21) was submittedCbefore the jurisdictional Court on 11[th] February, 2004. The said Courtcommitted the case to the Sessions Court at J.P. Nagar where it wasregistered as Sessions Trial No.155/2004. The Sessions Court on 5[th]August, 2004 framed charges against the appellants as under:

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I, Mushaffey Ahmad, Addl. Sess. Judge, hereby charge you,Asar Mohammad, Asraf and Akhtar as follows:- That you on two months ago from 24.1.2004 (date ofinformation to the PS) at 1 am in the village of Panyati within thelimits of PS Didopli Distt. J.P. Nagar committed murder byEintentionally or knowingly causing the death of Smt. Zahida andIshlam and thereby committed an offence punishable underSection-302 IPC and within the cognizance of this court of session.

That you on above date, time and place having the reason tobelieve that certain offence to with murder punishable with deathFhas been committed, did cause certain evidence of, the said offence,to disappear, to with threw the dead bodies of victims, into gutterwith the intention of screening the said Asar Mohammad, Asrafand Akhtar from legal punishment, and thereby committed anoffence punishable u/s 201 of the Indian Penal Code and withinthe cognizance of this court of Sessions.

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And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge ofthis court of session.”

3. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses, namely, PW-1 BegumBano, PW-2 Haji Iqbal, PW-3 Nawab Jan, PW-4 Harendra Singh, PW-H5 Dr. Kuldeep Singh, PW-6 Doonger Singh Verma, PW-7 Shababul, PW-8 Jagdish, PW-9 V.K. Tyagi and PW-10 Surendra Singh. The defenceof the accused was of total denial. They did not produce any evidence.The Sessions Court, after evaluating the entire evidence on record,eventually found that even though it was a case of circumstantialevidence, the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of theaccused beyond all reasonable doubt and found them guilty of offencesunder Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. As aforesaid, the Sessions Courtvide judgment and order dated 1[st] March, 2008 awarded the deathsentence with fine, for having committed the offence under Section 302of IPC, and 2 years of imprisonment with fine in respect of offenceunder Section 201 of IPC to each of the appellants.

4. All the three appellants carried the matter in appeal before theHigh Court, being Criminal Appeal No.1631 of 2008, which was heardalong with the death reference received by the High Court, beingReference No.3 of 2008. The High Court reappreciated the evidenceon record and affirmed the view taken by the Trial Court, after referringto the relevant decisions cited before it. In conclusion, the High Courtobserved as follows:- “27. We have scrutinized the submission of learned Counsel forthe appellants and also decision of the Apex Court in the case ofAloke Nath Dutta (supra) in all its ramifications. Having gonethrough the decision, we must say that the said decision has beenrendered in different facts and circumstances and flows fromdifferent perspective. In the said case, the Apex Court hadrendered verdict acquitting other accused persons holdingquintessentially that there was no direct evidence from which itcould be deduced that other appellants also were part of the saidconspiracy and that their presence had not been noticed by any ofthe witnesses and further that nobody saw them together in thehouse and also that no body saw Mrinal Dutta coming to the houseeven once. In the said decision accused were acquitted undersection 120B I.P.C. In the present case the accused personswere residing in the same house and they were veryproximate relation of the deceased. Therefore, the facts ofthe said case cannot be imported for application to the facts ofthe present case.

28. We have carefully scanned the evidence on record. In thefacts and circumstances and evidence on record, it brooks AB

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Ano dispute that the prosecution has proved beyondreasonable doubt that the deceased died homicidal death.The doctor has clearly held that cause of death of ZahidaBegum was due to Asphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone andThyroid cartilage) and the death of Islam was also due toAsphyxia (fracture of Hyoid bone). The prosecution hasBproved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Anothercircumstance unerringly pointing to the guilt of the accusedis that, the dead bodies were recovered from the septictank situated inside the house of appellant that too, on thepointing out of Asar Mohammad. PW-3 Nawab Jan and PW-C8 Jagdish minced no words to say that dead bodies wererecovered on the pointing of Asar Mohammad from septictank, There is no dispute about the identity of the deceased.Yet another circumstance pointing accused finger at theappellants is that the appellants did not lodge any reportabout the missing of the deceased for about two monthsDnor offered any explanation about their death in theirstatement under section 313 Cr.P.C….”

The High Court, however, noted that the facts and circumstances of thepresent case would not come within the purview of a rarest of rareEcase, for which reason it did not confirm the sentence of death awardedto the appellants. The High Court, instead, commuted the sentence tolife imprisonment for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Thus, theappeal filed by the appellants was partly allowed to that extent and thereference came to be rejected vide the impugned judgment and orderFdated 30[th] July, 2009.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present appeal.The principal argument of the appellants is that although it is a case ofconcurrent finding of facts recorded by the two Courts below, the sameis replete with manifest errors and cannot stand the test of judicialGscrutiny. It is submitted that the evidence produced by the prosecutionfalls short of the quality evidence required for recording a finding of guiltagainst the accused in a case of circumstantial evidence. In that, themotive behind the commission of crime has not been established at all.No evidence is forthcoming in respect of identification of the two deadbodies, much less to establish the fact that it was of none other than theHsecond wife of appellant No.3 and son of appellant No.3 respectively. It is vehemently contended that the police has set up PW-7 as the informant,who was an obliging informant of the police. If his evidence is to bediscarded, the genesis of the prosecution case must collapse and, inwhich case, the rest of the circumstances or the evidence would be ofno avail. It is submitted that even the other reports prepared by thepolice purportedly during the investigation of the crime, were tailored tosuit the prosecution case. That ought to be discarded. It is submitted thatthe evidence produced by the prosecution, taken as a whole or even inpart, by no stretch of imagination establishes the complicity of theappellants in the commission of crime. The hypothesis on which theprosecution case rests is unsubstantiated. Further, the statement of theaccused allegedly made to the police, which is the fulcrum of theprosecution case, is inadmissible in evidence and, at any rate, cannot beused against the co-accused. For all these reasons, the finding of guiltrecorded against the appellants cannot be sustained either on facts or inlaw.

6. The learned counsel for the State, however, supported thejudgment under appeal and would submit that no interference is warrantedagainst the concurrent findings of fact. He submits that the prosecutionhas established the circumstances and the chain is complete in all respects,pointing towards the involvement of the appellants in commission of thecrime and ruling out any other possibility. He submits that the appealsdeserve to be dismissed.

7. We have heard Mr. S. K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel forthe appellants and Mr. Rajesh K. Singh, learned counsel for therespondent. We have perused the entire record, including the originalrecord.

8. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions, be it notedthat in the present case, no direct evidence has been produced by theprosecution regarding the involvement of the appellants in the commissionof the crime. The prosecution rests its case solely on circumstantialevidence. The legal position as to how such matter should be examinedhas been expounded in Padala Veera Reddy Vs. State of AndhraPradesh and Ors.[1] in the following words:- “10. ….. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently heldthat when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence such evidence 1 (1989) Supp. (2) SCC 706

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Amust satisfy the following tests:

(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt issought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmlyestablished;

(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendencyBunerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form achain so complete that there is no escape from theconclusion that within all human probability the crime wascommitted by the accused and none else; and C

(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain convictionmust be complete and incapable of explanation of anyother hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused andsuch evidence should not only be consistent with the guiltof the accused but should be inconsistent with hisinnocence. (See Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra[2].)

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11. See also Rama Nand v. State of Himachal Pradesh[3],Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab[4], Earabhadrapa aliasKrishnappa v. State of Karnataka[5], Gian Singh v. State ofPunjab[6], Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab.[7]"

E9. In Mulakh Raj & Ors. Vs. Satish Kumar & Ors.[8], the Courtsuccinctly restated the legal position in paragraph 4 as under:

“4. ……Undoubtedly this case hinges upon circumstantialevidence. It is trite to reiterate that in a case founded oncircumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove all theFcircumstances connecting unbroken chain of links leadingto only one inference that the accused committed the crime.If any other reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of theaccused can be inferred from the proved circumstances,the accused would be entitled to the benefit. What is G2 (1982) 2 SCC 351; AIR 1982 SC 11573 (1981) 1 SCC 511; AIR 1981 SC 7384 (1982) 3 SCC 462; (1983) 1 SCR 822; AIR 1983 SC 61

5 (1983)Cri LJ 846; (1983) 2 SCC 330

6 1986 Supp (1) SCC 676; AIR 1987 SC 1921

7 (1987) 1 SCC 1; AIR 1987 SC 350

H8 (1992) 3 SCC 43

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required is not the quantitative but qualitative, reliable andprobable circumstances to complete the chain connectingthe accused with the crime. If the conduct of the accused inrelation to the crime comes into question the previous andsubsequent conduct are also relevant facts. Therefore, theabsence of ordinary course of conduct of the accused andhuman probabilities of the case also would be relevant. Thecourt must weigh the evidence of the cumulative effect ofthe circumstances and if it reaches the conclusion that theaccused committed the crime, the charge must be heldproved and the conviction and sentence would follow.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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10. Let us revert to the circumstances which commended to thetrial court and also the High Court to take the view that the chain ofproved circumstances left no manner of doubt that the accused alonewere involved in the commission of the offence in question. Thoseproved circumstances can be delineated as follows :

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(i) Information regarding the missing persons (Zahida and Ishlam)was given by the village watchman, viz., Shababul (P.W.7).

(ii) The fact that the two named persons had gone missing forabout two months was reinforced after the police visited thevillage to verify the same and in particular the “admission ofEaccused - Asar Mohammed (appellant No.1)” that the twomissing persons have been murdered by him and the othertwo accused, viz., Asraf Mohammed and Akhtar (appellantNos.2 and 3 respectively) and “their dead bodies were dumpedby him in the septic tank in the backyard of their house.”F

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(iii) No ‘missing report’ was lodged by the appellants in respectof Zahida and Ishlam, for reasons best known to them.

(iv) Appellant No.1 told the police that he would show the placewhere the dead bodies were dumped and he led the policeparty to that spot in the backyard of the house of the appellants,Gwhich was within his exclusive knowledge and opened the lidof the septic tank himself to facilitate taking out the two deadbodies which he admitted as that of Zahida and Ishlam.

(v) One of the two dead bodies recovered from the septic tank in H

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the backyard of the house of the appellants was of a fullgrown-up female around 32 years of age and another of amale child of about 11 years of age which corresponded withthe age of Zahida and Ishlam respectively.

(vi) The dead bodies were dumped more than one month beforeBthe same were removed from the septic tank in a highlydecomposed condition.

(vii) Ante-mortem injuries were noticed on the vital part of theneck on both the dead bodies which, according to the medicalevidence, was the cause of death due to asphyxia and a caseof homicidal death.

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(viii) The accused neither disputed the identity of the two deadbodies being that of Zahida and Ishlam nor offered anyexplanation, even though they were confronted with theincriminatory evidence.

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(ix) No evidence has been produced nor any explanation has beenoffered by the accused regarding the reason as to why theydid not lodge a ‘missing complaint/report’ in respect of Zahidaand Ishlam, who were closely related to them and were stayingin the same house; nor have they produced any evidence thatEboth of them were still alive and were residing elsewhere.Similarly, no explanation has been offered by them regardingthe cause of death of Zahida and Ishlam, or for that matter,the circumstances in which their dead bodies were found inthe septic tank in the backyard of their house and also aboutthe ante-mortem injuries noticed on the vital part of the deadFbodies which, as per the medical evidence, was the cause ofdeath due to asphyxia.

11. The trial court as well as the High Court, after analysing theevidence on record including the evidence of PWs 4 to 10, had discernedthe above circumstances pointing towards the involvement of the accusedGin the commission of the crime. Both the courts have taken note of thefact that Begum Bano (PW-1); Haji Iqbal (PW-2); and Nawab Jan (PW-3) were declared hostile, as a result of which the factum of motivebehind the murder of Zahida and Ishlam could not be established by theprosecution. Notably, even these hostile witnesses (PWs 1 to 3) havenot disputed the relationship of Zahida and Ishlam with the accused and H

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the fact that they were residing with the accused in the same housebefore they went missing. Be that as it may, both the courts have ruledthat other proved circumstances emanating from the evidence producedby the prosecution, coupled with the abject silence of the accusedincluding having failed to offer any explanation with regard to theincriminatory circumstances referred to above, was sufficient to bringhome the guilt against them and no other conclusion could be deducedexcept that the accused were responsible for the murder of Zahida andIshlam. They were closely related to the deceased (as Zahida was thesecond wife of accused Akhtar (appellant No.3) and Ishlam was theson born in wedlock between them; and appellant nos.1 and 2 were thestep sons of Zahida and step brothers of Ishlam). All of them wereresiding in the same house before Zahida and Ishlam went missing forabout two months. That fact was reported by Shababul (PW-7) to thepolice. The fact that Shababul is on the payroll of the police cannot bethe basis to disregard the proved fact that Zahida and Ishlam had gonemissing for about two months before it was so reported to the police.None of the appellants have either disowned their relationship with Zahidaand Ishlam or bothered to produce any tittle of evidence in defence toshow that Zahida and Ashlam were still alive and residing elsewhere.This Court in Nika Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh[9], noted thatthe accused and deceased (his wife) resided together and as the accusedfailed to offer any cogent explanation about the circumstances in whichhis wife died, it pointed towards his guilt and thus, the Court deducedsuch inference. Suffice it to observe that the fact that PW-1, PW-2 andPW-3 became hostile and the prosecution could not establish the factumof motive cannot be the basis to doubt the correctness of the finding ofguilt recorded by the two courts against the accused on the basis ofother proved circumstances including the confession of the accused No.1about the murder of Zahida Begum and Ishlam and more importantly,having dumped the dead bodies in the septic tank in the backyard oftheir house and to have led the police to that place from where the twodead bodies, whose identity also has not been disputed, came to berecovered, coupled with the medical evidence that the cause of death ofthe two dead persons was due to the ante-mortem injury caused on theneck resulting in their death due to asphyxia and is a homicidal death.

12. After perusing the entire evidence and taking the totality of 9 (1972) 2 SCC 80

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Athe proved circumstances into account, we are in agreement with theconclusion reached by the trial court, which came to be affirmed by theHigh Court, regarding finding of guilt against appellant No.1 – AsarMohammed, who had confessed to the police and also led the policeparty to the place where the dead bodies were dumped. In TrimukhMoroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra[10], the Court explicated that ifBan offence takes place inside the privacy of a house where the accusedhave all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time andin circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for theprosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if thestrict principle of circumstantial evidence, is insisted upon. The CourtCexpounded thus:

“14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and insuch circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunityto plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstancesof their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution toDlead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strictprinciple of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insistedupon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminaltrial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. AJudge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape.Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of PublicEProsecution[11] - quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. inState of Punjab v. Karnail Singh[12]). The law does not enjoina duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such characterwhich is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremelydifficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to leadFsuch evidence which it is capable of leading, having regardto the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it isnecessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Actwhich says that when any fact is especially within theknowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact isupon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throwsGsome light on the content and scope of this provision and itreads:

‘(b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket.

10 (2006) 10 SCC 68111 1994 AC 315; (1994) 2 AII ER 13 (HL)H12 (2003) 11 SCC 271

The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.’

15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecyinside a house, the initial burden to establish the case wouldundoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature andamount of evidence to be led by it to establish the chargecannot be of the same degree as is required in other casesof circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of acomparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 ofthe Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden onthe inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as tohow the crime was committed. The inmates of the housecannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering noexplanation on the supposed premise that the burden toestablish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution andthere is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.

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21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where noeye- witness account is available, there is another principleof law which must be kept in mind. The principle is thatwhen an incriminating circumstance is put to the accusedand the said accused either offers no explanation or offersan explanation which is found to be untrue, then the samebecomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances tomake it complete. This view has been taken in a catena ofdecisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran[13](SCC para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal[14](SCC para 39 : AIR para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh[15](SCC para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan[16] (SCC para15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P.[17] (SCC para 4).]

22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murderof his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence toshow that shortly before the commission of crime they were seentogether or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where 13 (1999) 8 SCC 679

14 (1992) 3 SCC 300; AIR 1992 SC 2045

15 (2000) 1 SCC 471

16 (2002) 1 SCC 731

17 (1995) 3 SCC 574

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the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently heldthat if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wifereceived injuries or offers an explanation which is found to befalse, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he isresponsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State ofHimachal Pradesh[18] it was observed that the fact that the accusedalone was with his wife in the house when she was murderedthere with ‘khokhri’ and the fact that the relations of the accusedwith her were strained would, in the absence of any cogentexplanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State ofMaharashtra[19] the appellant was prosecuted for the murder ofhis wife which took place inside his house. It was observed thatwhen the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is underan obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of herdeath in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denialof the prosecution case coupled with absence of anyexplanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocenceof the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that theappellant is a prime accused in the commission of murderof his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal[20]the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulationduring late night hours or early morning and her body was set onfire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband wasthat wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that hewas not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife toher relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and theirrelations were strained and further the evidence showed that bothof them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chainof circumstances was complete and it was the husband whocommitted the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordinglythis Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting theaccused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State ofTamil Nadu v. Rajendran[21] the wife was found dead in a hutwhich had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accusedand his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and 18 Supra @ Footnote 9

19 (1992) 3 SCC 106

20 Supra @ Footnote 14

21 Supra @ Footnote 13

the accused came out in the morning through the roof when thehut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case ofaccidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and adaughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due toasphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burninjuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come tothe conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was theperpetrator of the crime.”

13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of theEvidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. Thediscovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information givenby the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of theinformant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discoveryof an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge ofthe accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the expositionin the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra[22], inparticular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus :

“23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certainprinciples are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in PulukuriKotayya v. King Emperor[23] has held thus: (IA p. 77)

“… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ withinthe section as equivalent to the object produced; thefact discovered embraces the place from which the objectis produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this,and the information given must relate distinctly to thisfact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of theobject produced is not related to its discovery in the setting inwhich it is discovered. Information supplied by a person incustody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof ofmy house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; kniveswere discovered many years ago. It leads to the discoveryof the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of theinformant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to 22 (2015) 1 SCC 253

23 AIR 1947 PC 67

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have been used in the commission of the offence, thefact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement thewords be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words areinadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of theknife in the house of the informant.”

24. In Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra[24], whiledealing with the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the EvidenceAct, the Court held that: (SCC pp. 831-32, paras 11-13)

“11. Although the interpretation and scope of Section 27 hasbeen the subject of several authoritative pronouncements, itsapplication to concrete cases is not always free from difficulty.It will therefore be worthwhile at the outset, to have a shortand swift glance at the section and be reminded of itsrequirements. The section says:

‘27. How much of information received from accusedmay be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed toas discovered in consequence of information received from aperson accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer,so much of such information, whether it amounts to aconfession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact therebydiscovered, may be proved.’

12. The expression ‘provided that’ together with the phrase‘whether it amounts to a confession or not’ show that the sectionis in the nature of an exception to the preceding provisionsparticularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not necessary in this caseto consider if this section qualifies, to any extent, Section 24,also. It will be seen that the first condition necessary forbringing this section into operation is the discovery of afact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of theinformation received from a person accused of anoffence. The second is that the discovery of such factmust be deposed to. The third is that at the time of thereceipt of the information the accused must be in policecustody. The last but the most important condition isthat only ‘so much of the information’ as relates distinctlyto the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of 24 (1976) 1 SCC 828 ; (1976) 1 SCR 715

the information has to be excluded. The word ‘distinctly’means ‘directly’, ‘indubitably’, ‘strictly’, ‘unmistakably’. Theword has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope ofthe provable information. The phrase ‘distinctly relates to thefact thereby discovered’ is the linchpin of the provision. Thisphrase refers to that part of the information supplied by theaccused which is the direct and immediate cause of thediscovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban againstconfessions and statements made to the police, is that if a factis actually discovered in consequence of information given bythe accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part,and that part only, of the information which was the clear,immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No suchguarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statementwhich may be indirectly or remotely related to the factdiscovered.

13. At one time it was held that the expression ‘fact discovered’in the section is restricted to a physical or material fact whichcan be perceived by the senses, and that it does not include amental fact (see Sukhan v. Emperor[25]; Ganu ChandraKashid v. Emperor[26]). Now it is fairly settled that theexpression ‘fact discovered’ includes not only thephysical object produced, but also the place from whichit is produced and the knowledge of the accused as tothis (see Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor[27]; Udai Bhanv. State of U.P.[28]).”

(emphasis in original)

25. In Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal[29] afterreferring to the decision in Pulukuri Kotayya[30], the Court advertedto seizure of clothes of the deceased which were concealed bythe accused. In that context, the Court opined that (Aftab AhmadAnasari case, SCC p. 596, para 40)

“40. … the part of the disclosure statement, namely, that the 25 AIR 1929 Lah 344

26 AIR 1932 Bom 286

27 Supra @ Footnote 23

28 AIR 1962 SC 1116 ; (1962) 2 Cri LJ 251 ; 1962 Supp (2) SCR 830

29 (2010) 2 SCC 583

30 Supra @ Footnote 23

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Aappellant was ready to show the place where he had concealedthe clothes of the deceased is clearly admissible under Section27 of the Evidence Act because the same relates distinctly tothe discovery of the clothes of the deceased from that veryplace. The contention that even if it is assumed for the sake ofargument that the clothes of the deceased were recoveredBfrom the house of the sister of the appellant pursuant to thevoluntary disclosure statement made by the appellant, theprosecution has failed to prove that the clothes so recoveredbelonged to the deceased and therefore, the recovery of theclothes should not be treated as an incriminating circumstance,Cis devoid of merits.”

26. In State of Maharashtra v. Damu[31] it has been held as follows:(SCC p.283, para 35)

“35. … It is now well settled that recovery of an object is notdiscovery of a fact as envisaged in [Section 27 of the EvidenceAct, 1872]. The decision of the Privy Council in PulukuriKotayya v. King Emperor[32] is the most quoted authority forsupporting the interpretation that the ‘fact discovered’ envisagedin the section embraces the place from which the object wasproduced, the knowledge of the accused as to it, but theinformation given must relate distinctly to that effect.”

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The similar principle has been laid down in State of Maharashtrav. Suresh[33], State of Punjab v. Gurnam Kaur[34], Aftab AhmadAnasari v. State of Uttaranchal[35], Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCTof Delhi)[36], Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)[37] and RumiBora Dutta v. State of Assam[38].

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27. In the case at hand, as is perceptible, the recoveryhad taken place when the appellant was accused of anoffence, he was in custody of a police officer, the recovery G31 (2000) 6 SCC 26932 Supra @ Footnote 2333 (2000) 1 SCC 47134 (2009) 11 SCC 22535 (2010) 2 SCC 58336 (2011) 6 SCC 39637 (2010) 6 SCC 1H38 (2013) 7 SCC 417

had taken place in consequence of information furnishedby him and the panch witnesses have supported the seizureand nothing has been brought on record to discredit theirtestimony.

28. Additionally, another aspect can also be taken note of.The fact that the appellant had led the police officer to find outthe spot where the crime was committed, and the tap where hewashed the clothes eloquently speak of his conduct as the sameis admissible in evidence to establish his conduct. In this contextwe may refer with profit to the authority in Prakash Chand v.State (Delhi Admn.)[39] wherein the Court after referring to thedecision in H.P. Admn. v. Om Prakash[40] held thus: (Prakash Chandcase, SCC p.95, para 8)

“8. … There is a clear distinction between the conductof a person against whom an offence is alleged, which isadmissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if suchconduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant factand the statement made to a police officer in the courseof an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of theCriminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section 162of the Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to apolice officer in the course of investigation and not the evidencerelating to the conduct of an accused person (not amounting toa statement) when confronted or questioned by a police officerduring the course of an investigation. For example, the evidenceof the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused person led apolice officer and pointed out the place where stolen articlesor weapons which might have been used in the commission ofthe offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct,under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whetherany statement by the accused contemporaneously with orantecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section27 of the Evidence Act.”

29. In A.N. Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka[41] it has been ruledthat: (SCC p.721, para9)

39 (1979) 3 SCC 9040 (1972) 1 SCC 249

41 (2005) 7 SCC 714

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“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct ofthe accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or isinfluenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidenceof the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointedout to the police officer, the place where the dead bodyof the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointingout the body was exhumed, would be admissible asconduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whetherthe statement made by the accused contemporaneouslywith or antecedent to such conduct falls within thepurview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court inPrakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.). Even if we holdthat the disclosure statement made by the appellants-accused (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible underSection 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant underSection 8. The evidence of the investigating officer and PWs1, 2, 7 and PW 4 the spot mahazar witness that the accusedhad taken them to the spot and pointed out the place where thedead body was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence underSection 8 as the conduct of the accused. Presence of A-1and A-2 at a place where ransom demand was to befulfilled and their action of fleeing on spotting the policeparty is a relevant circumstance and are admissible underSection 8 of the Evidence Act.”

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14. Applying the principle expounded by this Court, we have nohesitation in affirming the finding of guilt recorded against appellant No.1F– Asar Mohammed.

15. The question is whether the same evidence or provedcircumstances can be used against the other two appellants, namely,Asraf Mohammed and Akhtar Mohammad. Indisputably, except theconfession of the co-accused – Asar Mohammed (appellant No.1), theGprosecution has not produced any independent substantive evidence toeven remotely suggest that appellant Nos.2 and 3 were involved incommitting the murder of Zahida and Ishlam. By now, it is well settledthat confession of the co-accused by itself cannot be the basis to proceedagainst the other accused unless something more is produced to indicatetheir involvement in the commission of the crime. This Court in KashmiraH

Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh[42], relying upon the decision of thePrivy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R.[43], Periaswami Moopan, In re[44]as well as in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty[45], has explicatedthe efficacy of confession of an accused person and whether it can beused against the co-accused. The exposition in Kashmira Singh hasbeen approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in HaricharanKurmi v. State of Bihar[46], in particular paragraph 12 which reads thus :

“12. As we have already indicated, this question has beenconsidered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it hasbeen consistently held that a confession cannot be treated asevidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accusedperson. In dealing with a criminal case where theprosecution relies upon the confession of one accusedperson against another accused person, the properapproach to adopt is to consider the other evidence againstsuch an accused person, and if the said evidence appearsto be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that thesaid evidence may sustain the charge framed against thesaid accused person, the court turns to the confession witha view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclinedto draw from the other evidence is right. As was observedby Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit MohanChuckerbutty a confession can only be used to ‘lend assuranceto other evidence against a co-accused’. In Periaswami Moopan,In re Reilly, J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes notfurther than this :

‘…where there is evidence against the co-accusedsufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then thekind of confession described in Section 30 may be throwninto the scale as an additional reason for believing thatevidence.’

In Bhuboni Sahu v. R. the Privy Council has expressed the sameview. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that:

42 1952 SCR 52643 (1948-49) 76 IA 14744 ILR (1931) 54 Mad 7545 ILR (1911) 38 Cal 55946 (1964) 6 SCR 623; AIR 1964 SC 1184

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‘…A confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of avery weak type. It does not indeed come within the definitionof ‘evidence’ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It isnot required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of theaccused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is amuch weaker type of evidence than the evidence of anapprover, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.Section 30, however, provides that the court may act;but the section does not say that the confession is toamount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence.The confession is only one element in the considerationof all the facts proved in the case; it can be put into thescale and weighed with the other evidence.’

It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained inSection 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded asamounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever isconsidered by the court is evidence; circumstances which areconsidered by the court as well as probabilities do amount toevidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may beregarded as evidence in that generic sense because of theprovisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence asdefined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the courtcannot start with the confession of a co-accused after it hasformed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect ofthe said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to theconfession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the saidother evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisionscontained in Section 30. The same view has been expressed bythis Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. where the decisionof the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited withapproval.”

16. In view of the above, it is not permissible to proceed againstappellant nos.2 and 3 solely on the basis of the confession of appellantNo.1 made before the police, even if the relevant part of the confession is admissible and has been duly proved. As no substantive evidence isforthcoming to show the involvement of appellant nos.2 and 3 for havingcaused the murder of Zahida and Ishlam, it is not open to convict themfor offence punishable under Section 302, IPC. This is also because thecharge, as has been framed, is simpliciter for offence under Section 302and not for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34of IPC or Section 302 read with Section 120-B of IPC. No evidence hasbeen produced by the prosecution in this regard. Resultantly, the findingof guilt albeit concurrently recorded by the two courts against appellantnos.2 and 3 for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC cannot besustained on facts or in law. These appellants, therefore, will have to beacquitted in connection with offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

17. The next question is whether appellant Nos.2 and 3 can beheld guilty for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC. The fact thatappellant nos.2 and 3 cannot be convicted for offence punishable underSection 302 IPC does not extricate them from the offence under Section201 IPC. We say so because the proved circumstances discerned fromthe record leave no manner of doubt that Zahida and Ishlam were residingalong with the appellants in the same house. Further, Zahida was thesecond wife of appellant No.3 and Ishlam was none other than the sonof appellant No.3 born in wedlock with Zahida. Zahida was the stepmother of appellant Nos.1 and 2 and Ishlam was their step brother. Thisrelationship has not been disputed. It is also an established fact thatZahida and Ishlam had suddenly gone missing for over two months.Obviously, no efforts were made by appellant nos.2 and 3 to trace Zahidaand Ishlam nor did they think it necessary to report that fact to the localpolice. This indeed cannot be a natural behavior or conduct of appellantNo.3, the husband of Zahida and father of minor son Ishlam. Further,appellant nos.2 and 3 have not challenged the identity of two dead bodiesfound from the septic tank in the backyard of their house at the instanceof appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed. No explanation whatsoever hasbeen offered by them as to why they did not report about the suddendisappearance of Zahida and Ishlam (until their bodies were recoveredfrom the septic tank in the backyard of their house after two months).The concomitant is that appellant Nos.2 and 3 had knowledge that Zahidaand Ishlam had been murdered and their dead bodies were dumped inthe septic tank in the backyard of their house and yet, they did not disclosethat fact with an intention to screen appellant No.1 – Asar Mohammed, AB

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Athe offender, from legal punishment. In other words, even though theycannot be made liable for the murder of Zahida and Ishlam for want oflegal evidence in that regard, they would certainly be guilty of havingcommitted offence under Section 201 IPC as established from the provedcircumstances coupled with their abject failure to offer any explanation,much less cogent explanation, about their conduct. The inevitable andBlegitimate conclusion to be deduced is that they are guilty of offencepunishable under Section 201 IPC for which they have been rightlyconvicted and sentenced by the trial court and which opinion of the trialcourt has been affirmed by the High Court. As a result, the appeal filedby appellant nos.2 and 3 would partly succeed only to the extent ofCacquitting them for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

18. In view of the above, the appeal filed by appellant No.1 –Asar Mohammed is dismissed. Whereas, the appeal filed by appellantNos.2 and 3 – Asraf Mohammed and Akhtar, respectively, is partlyallowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded againstDthem for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC but the convictionand sentence for offence punishable under Section 201 IPC against themis upheld. Ordered accordingly.

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Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal disposed of.

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