GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. versus MOHD. ZUBAIR AND ANR. on 2 December 2022

GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.

v.

MOHD. ZUBAIR AND ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 8930 of 2022)

DECEMBER 02, 2022

[M. R. SHAH AND AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –Subsequent purchaser – Entitlement of, to claim lapsing of theacquisition proceedings under s.24(2) of the Act, 2013 – Held: Inview of the decision in Godfrey Philips (I) Ltd. & Ors., subsequentpurchaser is not entitled to claim lapsing of the proceedings underthe Act, 2013.

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) –Land Acquisition – Possession taken on 16.07.2007 – It was specificcase of appellant that the possession of land in question was takenover by preparing a possession proceeding on the spot – High Courtdeclared that the land acquisition with respect to the land in questionis deemed to have lapsed solely on the ground that the compensationwas not tendered to the original writ petitioner – Held: Notsustainable in view of the Constitution Bench decision in the caseof Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. – In the saiddecision, it was observed that for lapsing of the acquisition unders.24(2) of the Act, 2013, twin conditions, of not taking over thepossession and not paying/tendering the compensation, are requiredto be satisfied and that if one of the conditions is not satisfied, thereshall not be deemed lapse of the acquisition proceedings unders.24(2) of the Act, 2013 – In view of the fact that the possessionwas taken, acquisition proceedings is not deemed to be lapsed.

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors.(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

Delhi Development Authority v. Godfrey Philips (I) Ltd.& Ors.Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022;Government(NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust and Anr.(2017)6 SCC 751 : [2017] 4 SCR 232 – relied on.

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ACase Law Reference

[2017] 4 SCR 232relied onPara 2.1[2020] 3 SCR 1followedPara 2.2

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8930Bof 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2018 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 2674 of 2017.

Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Adv. for the Appellants.

Ashwani Kumar, Ishaan Sharma, Anshay Dhatwalia, Advs. forCthe Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentDand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WritPetition(C) No. 2674 of 2017 by which the High Court has declared thatthe acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894(hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1894”) with regard to the subject landis deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to FairECompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), theGovernment of NCT of Delhi and Anr. have preferred the present appeal.

2. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt, it appears that a specific objection was raised on behalf of theFappellants – original respondents that the original writ petitioner beingsubsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge the acquisitionproceedings. Before the High Court, it was also specifically pointed outand so stated in the counter that the possession of the land in questionwas taken over on 16.07.2007. However, thereafter, overruling theobjection on behalf of the appellants on the maintainability of the writGpetition by the subsequent purchaser – original writ petitioner and ignoringthe stand taken on behalf of the appellants that the possession was takenover on 16.07.2007, the High Court has declared the acquisitionproceedings lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 solely on theground that the compensation has not been tendered to the original writHpetitioner.

2.1 On the maintainability of the writ petition, challenge to theland acquisition proceedings by the subsequent purchaser, in the recentdecision of this Court in the case of Delhi Development AuthorityVs. Godfrey Philips (I) Ltd. & Ors., - Civil Appeal No. 3073 of2022 after considering the catena of decisions on the point and evenafter taking into consideration the decision of this Court in the case ofGovernment (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Manav Dharam Trust & Anr.,(2017) 6 SCC 751, in the decision, which has been relied upon by theHigh Court, it is specifically observed and held that the subsequentpurchaser has no locus to challenge the acquisition proceedings. In viewof the decision of this Court in the case of Godfrey Philips (I) Ltd. &Ors. (supra) taking the view that the subsequent purchaser is not entitledto claimlapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013, theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court taking the viewthat the writ petition at the instance of the subsequent purchaser claiminglapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 2013 would bemaintainable, is unsustainable.

2.2 Even otherwise, the impugned judgment and order passed bythe High Court declaring that the acquisition proceedings under the Act,1894 with respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed underSection 24(2) of the Act, 2013 on the ground that the compensation wasnot tendered to the original writ petitioner is unsustainable in view of theConstitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of IndoreDevelopment Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC129. At this stage, it is required to be noted that before the High Court,it was the specific case on behalf of the appellants that the possession ofthe land in question was taken over by preparing a possession proceedingon the spot. In paragraph 366, the Constitution Bench of this Court in thecase of Indore Development Authority (supra) has observed andheld as under:- “366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within the windowperiod of five years excluding the period covered by an interim ABC

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order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as providedunder Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if ithas not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possessionand compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemedlapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for fiveyears or more prior to commencement of the said Act, thepossession of land has not been taken nor compensation has beenpaid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly,if compensation has been paid, possession has not been takenthen there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation incourt. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) dueto non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to betreated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act andas contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemedlapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have faileddue to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation forfive years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in aproceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concernedas on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passedby court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to newcause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedingsof land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending onthe date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does notrevive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concludedproceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of modeof taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit ofcompensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidateacquisition.”

3. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves to bequashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside.

Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.

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