SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS. versus SUBHASIS MITRA on 2 February 2023

[2023] 2 S.C.R. 297

SNEHASIS GIRI AND ORS.

v.

SUBHASIS MITRA

(Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 352 of 2022)

FEBRUARY 02, 2023

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]

Contempt of Court – Certain provisions of the West BengalMadrasa Service Commission Act, 2008 regulating the process ofappointment of teachers in aided Madrasas recognized as minorityinstitutions, were declared unconstitutional by High Court –However, Supreme Court declared the provisions of the Act to bevalid and binding – During the pendency of the appeals, someappointments were made by the madrasas – Contempt proceedingsfiled seeking release of salaries of teachers appointed after theprovisions of the Act were declared unconstitutional by the HighCourt – Held: Given the nature of the interim orders made duringthe pendency of the appeal, there is no doubt that the court declaredthe appointments to be valid to the extent, they conformed to theconcerned rules and norms – However, there was no discussionw.r.t whether the Court had applied its mind as to how the madrasashad proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff– Also, there was no discussion regarding rules/regulations,applicable circulars and guidelines in terms of which aided andunaided recognized institutions could make appointments – Incontempt proceeding, court cannot enlarge its scope and examinematters which are not part of the directions/orders contained in thejudgement of which contempt is alleged – Argument of therespondent-alleged contemnors that there ought to be an exerciseof verification, is merited – Further proceedings cannot becontinued as no determination can be made unless there is a dueverification in regard to the employment of each of the petitioners –Committee constituted to consider the claims of the petitioners –West Bengal Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008 – Constitutionof India – Art.142.

Disposing of the petitions, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The judgement of the High Court in the appealhad declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Act. This

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Acourt, in its judgement set aside those findings of the High Courtregarding validity of the Act. Consequently, the provisions of theAct were held to be valid and binding. In Para 58, the courtdeclared the nominations by the Commission in pursuance of theprovisions of the Act as valid, and the appointments made, afterdisposal of the matters by the High Court as deemed to be validBfor all purpose. However, there is no discussion with respect towhether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasashad proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff.Also there is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicablecirculars and guidelines in terms of which aided and unaidedCrecognized institutions could make appointments, having regardto the standard of education required and the requisiteexperience; whether a transparent method was followed; whetherthe madrasa concerned was recognized one or not; whether thecommittee or body selecting the individual was constituted inaccordance with the rules and regulations, etc. The argument ofDthe respondent/alleged contemnors that there ought to be anexercise of verification, therefore, appears to be merited andsubstantial. Thus, given the nature of the interim orders madeduring the pendency of the appeal, there can be no doubt that thecourt declared the appointments to be valid to the extent, theyEconformed to the concerned rules and binding norms. The court,in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examinematters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the directionor orders contained in the judgement of which contempt beingalleged. [Paras 6-9][302-F; 304-D-H; 305-B]

FSudhir Vasudeva v. M. George Ravishekaran (2014) 3SCC 373 : [2014] 4 SCR 27 – relied on.

1.2 Further proceedings cannot be continued as nodetermination can be made unless there is a due verification inregard to the employment of each of the petitioners. Furthermore,Gthis court, in lawful exercise of contempt jurisdiction, cannotexamine the merits of a decision, whether the state or themadrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to thebenefits of being treated as an employee, having regard to theconcerned rules and regulations. [Paras 10 and 11][306-E-G]

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J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (1996) 6 SCC 291 :[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 110; Midnapore Peoples’ Coop.Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 39 – reliedon.

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1.3 A Committee headed by retired Judge, Calcutta HighCourt is constituted exercising powers under Article 142 of theconstitution. Further directions issued. The Committee isrequested to consider the claims of the petitioner, keeping inmind the issues enumerated. [Para 17][309-G-H; 310-A]

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Shaikh Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, ContiRahamania High Madrasah & Ors 2020 (6) SCC 689 :[2020] 1 SCR 185 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION : ContemptPetition (Civil) No.352 of 2022. In Civil Appeal No.5808 of 2017.

From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2015 of the High Courtof Calcutta in AST No.192 of 2014.

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Conmt. Pet. (C) Nos.513/2022, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571,572, 573, 574, 575/2023, 514, 515, 498, 516, 517/2022, 576, 577, 578, 579,580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594/2023, 353, 354, 355, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374,494, 512/2022, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601/2023, 360, 361, 362, 363,375, 376, 377, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 378, 379, 380, 495, 496,497, 499, 500, 501, 502, 510, 511/2022, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608,609, 610, 611/2023 and Civil Appeal No.768 of 2023

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Vijay Hansaria, Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya, C. U. Singh, HuzefaA. Ahmedi, Sr. Advs., Abu Sahel, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, ParminderSingh Bhullar, Pijush K. Roy, Mrs. Kakali Roy, Nayeemul Haq, RajanK. Chourasia, Gaurav Choudhary, Chand Qureshi, Sanjay Saini, RahulMohod, Pradeep Mohod, Shiv Kumar Vats, Rama Kant Sharma, Dr.

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ARam Kishor Choudhary, Pulkit Agarwal, Atarup Banerjee, Sunando Raha,Abu Sohel, Nishant Kumar, Biswroop Bhattacharya, Golam Mohinddin,Anindo Mukherjee, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. MadhumitaBhattacharjee, Ms. Arushi Mishra, Shamshad, Aditya Samaddar, M RShamshad, Shashank Singh, Arijit Sarkar, Ms. Nabeela Jamil, Advs. forthe appearing parties.B

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 3352 of 2021. Permission to fileCContempt Petitions in Civil Appeal No. 5808/ 2017 is granted. These aretaken along with the remaining above-mentioned Contempt Petitions.

2. This order will dispose of several contempt petitions whichcomplained of willful and deliberate violation of judgment of this Court inShaikh Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Conti Rahamania HighDMadrasah & Ors[1]. This court had to consider the correctness of theview expressed by the Calcutta High Court which held that someprovisions of the West Bengal Madrasa Service Commission Act, 2008(hereafter, “the Act”) was unconstitutional. Those provisions regulatedthe process of appointment of teachers in aided Madrasas which wererecognized as minority institutions. This court recorded its finding thatEthe provisions in question, i.e., Sections 8, 10, 11 & 12 of the Act werevalid and constitutional. At the same time the court was conscious thatsome appointments were made by the madrasas during the pendencyof the appeals and held as follows:

F“58. In the end, we declare all nominations made by theCommission in pursuance of the provisions of the CommissionAct to be valid and operative. However, if after the disposalof the matters by the High Court any appointments are madeby the concerned Madarshas, such appointments of teachersshall be deemed to be valid for all purposes. But theGCommission shall hereafter be competent to select andnominate teachers to various Madarshas in accordance withthe provisions of the Commission Act and the Rules framedthereunder.”1 2020 (6) SCC 689H

3. All the petitioners argued that even during the pendency of theproceedings in appeal, contempt proceedings had been drawn seekingrelease of salaries of teachers who were appointed after the provisionsof the Act were declared unconstitutional by the High Court. Thepetitioners advert to interim orders dated 10.05.2016, 01.08.2016,17.05.2018, directing that those recruited or working during the pendencyof the proceedings ought to be paid salary. It is argued that the effect ofthe judgement is that even while upholding the provisions of the Act, thecourt at the same time protected the recruitment of the petitioners. Inthese circumstances, denial of the benefit of regular service to them onone pretext or the other by the respondent contemnors amounts todeliberate and willful disregard of the Act, and calls for appropriatestringent action.

4. After notice was issued in this contempt proceedings andconsidering the submissions of the parties, this Court had on 12.07.2022directed the respondents (alleged contemnors) to consider and verifythe claims of the petitioners to examine whether they were legal andvalid and release appropriate amounts. The subsequent order of23.02.2022 had observed that the terms of the final judgement of thiscourt, especially para 58 disclosed that benefits were not confined andrelief not granted only to the parties to the litigation but that the directionshad the effect of in rem adjudication. The court therefore directed therespondent contemnors to verify from the record with respect toentitlement of all petitioners. The contempt petitioners in their responseurged that there are express directions of this court to release salaries ofthe contempt petitioners without insisting on verifying genuineness oftheir claims of being teaching/non-teaching staff or having requisitequalifications as required by law. It is also pointed out that this Courtwas conscious that several appointments had been made which wereeither irregular or unsustainable having regard to the norms applicable.In this regard the respondent/alleged contemnors relied upon the orderdated 07.05.2018 to submit that in that order, the court had unequivocallyrecorded that no equity would be created on the arrangements made inthe stop gap arrangement which would be subject to the final orders inthe civil appeals.

5. The respondents also argued that the judgement of this court –i.e. in the directions contained in paragraph 58 - nowhere contained an A

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Aexpress direction to release salary in favour of anyone including thecontempt petitioners without insisting upon verification of their claims oftheir being teaching/non- teaching staff or their having requisitequalification as prescribed by law. It is further submitted that even if thepetitioners rely upon earlier interim orders, those were only for releaseBof salary subject to eligibility and verification as per law. The respondentshave relied upon the judgement of this court in Sudhir Vasudeva v. M.George Ravishekaran[2], to submit that the court exercising contemptjurisdiction cannot traverse beyond the four corners of the judgement ororder alleged to have been flouted or examine questions which have notbeen dealt with or decided in the judgement of which violation is alleged.CIt is argued that all that this court did in the final judgement was to holdappointments of individuals made during the pendency of the appealsand the High Court judgement valid. The context of the judgement wasthe applicability of provisions of the Act. However, that did not meanthat other statutory conditions such as qualifications, recognition orDotherwise of the madrasa concerned; its eligibility for grant-in-aid; thequalifications held by the candidate at the time of appointment; existenceof vacancies and the manner in which the selection took place, etc.could not be considered. The alleged contemnors relied upon therecruitment rules in this regard which prescribed the manner ofErecruitment such as publication of employment notification; the roster ofvacancies; staffing pattern; whether the institution is eligible and admittedto aid or not.

6. As noted earlier, the judgement of the High Court in the appealhad declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Act. This court, inFits judgement set aside those findings of the High Court regarding validityof the Act. Consequently, the provisions of the Act were held to be validand binding. The Act sought to regulate appointments to variousinstitutions covered by it, including the madrasas in West Bengal. Thiscourt upheld the provisions of the Act after examining the relevant detailsand inter alia held as follows:G

“54. The regime put in place by the State legislature thusensures that the Commission comprising of experts in the fieldwould screen the talent all across the State; will adopt a fairselection procedure and select the best available talent purelyH2(2014) 3 SCC 373

on merit basis; and even while nominating, the interest of theminority institution will also be given due weightage and takencare of. The statutory provisions thus seek to achieve‘excellence’ in education and also seek to promote the interestof the minority institutions. The provisions satisfy the test asculled out in the decision of this Court in TMA Pai Foundationcase.

55. In our considered view going by the principles laid downin the decision in TMA Pai Foundation case, the concernedprovisions cannot, therefore, be said to be transgressing therights of the minority institutions. The selection of the teachersand their nomination by the Commission constituted underthe provisions of the Commission Act would satisfy the nationalinterest as well as the interest of the minority educationalinstitutions and said provisions are not violative of the rightsof the minority educational institutions.

56. The aforesaid conclusions have been arrived at by us inkeeping with the principles laid down by this Court in TMAPai Foundation case.

We are aware that in Brahmo Samaj Education Society,Sindhi Education Society and Chandana Das (Malakar),decided after TMA Pai Foundation, this Court had also dealtwith the question whether the concerned authorities couldvalidly nominate teachers to be appointed in minorityeducational institutions. Brahmo Samaj Education Society didnot specifically deal with the question whether rules were validor not and left it to the authorities to bring the rules andregulations in conformity with the principles in TMA PaiFoundation case. Sindhi Education Society dealt with the issuein the context of reservation. It also found that the teachersnominated by the concerned authorities would not becompatible to teach in educational institutions run by linguisticminorities. In Chandana Das (Malakar) the basic issue waswhether the concerned institution was a minority institutionor not. Sindhi Education Society and Chandana Das(Malakar) dealt with statutory regimes which did not have A

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Aany special features or matters concerning compatibility ofteachers which could be required going by the specialcharacteristics of the minority educational institutions.However, the additional feature in the present matter showsthat the composition of the Commission with special emphasisBon persons having profound knowledge in Islamic Cultureand Theology, would ensure that the special needs andrequirements of minority educational institutions will alwaysbe taken care of and thus the present case stands on a differentfooting.

CWe, therefore, have no hesitation in going by the test culledout in the TMA Pai Foundation and hold that the provisionsof the Commission Act are not violative of the rights of theminority educational institutions on any count.”

7. In Para 58, the court declared the nominations by theDCommission in pursuance of the provisions of the Act as valid, and theappointments made, after disposal of the matters by the High Court asdeemed to be valid for all purpose. However, there is no discussion withrespect to whether the court had applied its mind as to how the madrasashad proceeded to appoint teachers as teaching/non-teaching staff. AlsoEthere is no discussion regarding rules/regulations, applicable circularsand guidelines in terms of which aided and unaided recognized institutionscould make appointments, having regard to the standard of educationrequired and the requisite experience; whether a transparent methodwas followed; whether the madrasa concerned was recognized one or not; whether the committee or body selecting the individual wasFconstituted in accordance with the rules and regulations, etc. Theargument of the respondent/alleged contemnors that there ought to bean exercise of verification, therefore, appears to be merited andsubstantial.

G8. In these circumstances, given the nature of the interim ordersmade during the pendency of the appeal, there can be no doubt that thecourt declared the appointments to be valid to the extent, they conformedto the concerned rules and binding norms. To hold otherwise would be todisregard the provisions, norms and guidelines constituting the essential H

and basic standards which every educational institution is expected toconform to.

9. Furthermore, there is merit in the respondents’ submission thatthe court, in contempt proceeding cannot enlarge its scope and examinematters which are not part of its remit, i.e. extent of the direction ororders contained in the judgement of which contempt being alleged. Infact, in the decision in Sudhir Vasudeva (supra), it was held as follows:

“19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Courtto punish for contempt is a special and rare power availableboth under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of CourtsAct, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, couldeven curb the liberty of the individual charged with commissionof contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred dutyin the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of careand caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not,adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the orderin respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts mustnot, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the orderwhich is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questionsthat have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment orthe order violation of which is alleged. Only such directionswhich are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose ofconsideration as to whether there has been any disobedienceor wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot bereopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. TheCourts must also ensure that while considering a contemptplea the power available to the Court in other correctivejurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. Noorder or direction supplemental to what has been alreadyexpressed should be issued by the Court while exercisingjurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such anexercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested inthe Court, as noticed above. The above principles would A

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Aappear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents citedat the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak NathGanguly [(2002) 5 SCC 352 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 703] , V.M.Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju [(2004) 13 SCC 610 :2006 SCC (L&S) 907] , Bihar Finance Service HouseBConstructionCoop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami [(2008)5 SCC 339] and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV[(2006) 1 SCC 613].”

10. In the present case too, this court is of the opinion that therespondents’ stand that without verification of the petitioners’ appointmentCand whether the procedures prescribed were duly followed in respect ofmatters such as fulfilling eligibility conditions (essential qualifications andrelevant experience); availability of vacancy; staff pattern in respect ofmadrasas where recognition was granted and if so for what period;whether the institution was aided and recognized or not or recognizedDand non-aided, and if so for what duration; whether a duly empoweredselection body or bodies considered the candidature of the claimant beforehe/she was appointed and whether the committee or body selecting theindividual/claimant was constituted in accordance with the rules orguidelines, etc is justified. In these circumstances, this court is of theopinion that further proceedings cannot be continued as no determinationEcan be made unless there is a due verification in regard to the employmentof each of the petitioners.

11. Furthermore, this court, in lawful exercise of contemptjurisdiction, cannot examine the merits of a decision, whether the stateFor the madrasa’s stand that any of the petitioners is entitled to the benefitsof being treated as an employee, having regard to the concerned rulesand regulations. In J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar[3]this court explainedthe limited scope of contempt proceedings, as follows, in the facts of thecase:

G“6. The question then is whether the Division Bench was rightin setting aside the direction issued by the learned SingleJudge to redraw the seniority list. It is contended by Mr S.K.Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, thatunless the learned Judge goes into the correctness of the H3 (1996) 6 SCC 291

decision taken by the Government in preparation of theseniority list in the light of the law laid down by three Benches,the learned Judge cannot come to a conclusion whether ornot the respondent had wilfully or deliberately disobeyed theorders of the Court as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act.Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Courtnecessarily has to go into the merits of that question. We donot find that the contention is well founded. It is seen that,admittedly, the respondents had prepared the seniority list on2-7-1991. Subsequently promotions came to be made. Thequestion is whether seniority list is open to review in thecontempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformitywith the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seenthat once there is an order passed by the Government on thebasis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a freshcause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum.The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may beright or may or may not be in conformity with the directions.But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrievedparty to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But thatcannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order.After re-exercising the judicial review in contemptproceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judgecannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words,the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to considerthe matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It wouldnot be permissible under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, theDivision Bench has exercised the power under Section 18 ofthe Rajasthan High Court Ordinance being a judgment ororder of the Single Judge; the Division Bench corrected themistake committed by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, itmay not be necessary for the State to file an appeal in thisCourt against the judgment of the learned Single Judge whenthe matter was already seized of the Division Bench.”

12. In a later decision, Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v.Chunilal Nanda[4]this court explained the limitations of a court exercisingcontempt jurisdiction:4 (2006) 5 SCC 399

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“11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard toappeals against orders in contempt proceedings may besummarised thus:

I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only againstan order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise ofits jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an orderimposing punishment for contempt.

II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings forcontempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contemptnor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor anorder acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealableunder Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances,they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of theConstitution.

III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decidewhether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so,what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate ordecide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute betweenthe parties.

IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Courton the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be inthe exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and,therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act.The only exception is where such direction or decision isincidental to or inextricably connected with the orderpunishing for contempt, in which event the appeal underSection 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental orinextricably connected directions.

V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides anissue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of thedispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, theaggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is opento challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of alearned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra- court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal underArticle 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).”

13. It is thus, apparent, that if this court were to pronounce uponthe merits of the respondents’ position, it would necessarily have toconsider the facts of each case, and decide whether the stand of thealleged contemnors – wherever a decision adverse to the petitioners istaken, is correct on its merits. That exercise, plainly is not admissible inproper exercise of contempt jurisdiction.

14. The above observations would have ordinarily been conclusiveand dispositive of the present petitions. However, this court is consciousof the fact that the process of verification undertaken by the state wouldresult in further delay and may lead to multifarious litigation, spellinguncertainty to individuals and members of staff of madrasas who wereappointed after following all norms and procedures.

15. During the hearing this court had suggested constitution of acommittee which would examine all relevant factors and verify the claimsof the petitioners which could then be considered and acted upon by thesame. This suggestion was acceptable to the state, the commission andconcerned madrasas who are represented by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Mr.C.U. Singh, Sr. Advocates and other counsel.

16. During the hearing, the court had suggested constitution of acommittee which would go into all relevant factors and verify the claimsof the petitioners which would then be considered and acted upon by thesame. This suggestion was acceptable to the state, the concernedmadrasas and the petitioners, represented by M/s. Rakesh Dwivedi,C.U. Singh, and Huzeffa Ahmadi, Sr. Advocates, Ms. MadhumitaBhattacharjee, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, and other counsel.

17. Accordingly, this Court exercising its powers under Article142 hereby constitutes a Committee headed by Justice Debi PrasadDey, retired Judge, Calcutta High Court. The Committee shall also consistof a Principal Secretary ranking officer of the IAS, who had served inthe West Bengal cadre and stationed in Kolkata with experience in theHigher Education Department as well as a retired Registrar of one ofthe State Universities in West Bengal, residing in Kolkata. The StateGovernment shall nominate the members other than the Chairman. The AB

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ACommittee is requested to consider the claims of the petitioner, keepingin mind the following:

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(a) Whether the madrasa or its managing committee wasrecognized by the state government on the date on which theappointment was made?

(b) Whether such appointments were made, of candidates whopossessed the requisite prescribed qualifications and fulfilled theexperience and other eligible conditions stipulated for the postconcerned?

(c) Whether such an appointment was made by following therecruitment procedure indicated in the Kolkata Gazette Notificationdated 11-03- 2015 (No. 93-SE/S/10R-14/2013-9[th] February, 2015)and in Kolkata Gazette Notification dated 04-03-2016 (No. 486-MD/O/2M-11/2016)?

(d) Whether the appointments were made against vacancies thatexisted and whether the vacancies conformed to the staffingpattern for the concerned institution/madrasas (e) Whether after the appointments were made, the personsEappointed actually worked on their respective posts?

(f) Whether the appointments were actually made on the date ofthe appointment letter, or were backdated?

18. The remuneration of the Chairperson of the Committee shallFbe ` 10,00,000/- and that of each member shall be ` 5,00,000/-. Thecommittee shall complete its task expeditiously; and, within four monthsfrom today, submit a report to the State Government, which shall thenpass appropriate orders in respect of the petitioners within two monthsthereafter.

G19. Ms. Madhumita Bhattacharjee submitted that all necessaryco-operation would be extended by the State Government, which isdirected to provide infrastructure, and the necessary staff to the committeeto complete its task. The State Government is directed to notify thecommittee, within four weeks from today, and give appropriate publicityto those interested to seek verification of their claim. Such publicity shallH

be through appropriate advertisement in newspapers, both in Englishand in Bengali. In addition, the notification shall also be placed on thewebsite of the State Government’s Minority Affairs & MadrasahEducation Department, Nabanna, Howrah. The notification shall indicatethe time within which representations can be made. It is open to thoseclaiming benefit, as well as those likely to be affected by the report, torepresent to the committee, within the time stipulated. The committeeshall also consider a suitable and practicable method of giving hearing tothose interested.

20. These petitions and pending applications/appeal(s) are disposedof in the above terms.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Petitions disposed of.

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