SURENDRAN versus STATE OF KERELA on 13 May 2022

[2022] 4 S.C.R. 675

SURENDRAN

v.

STATE OF KERELA

(Criminal Appeal No. 1080 of 2019)

MAY 13, 2022

[N. V. RAMANA CJI, A. S. BOPANNA ANDHIMA KOHLI. JJ.]

Evidence Act, 1872: s. 32 – Dying declaration – Admissibilityof – On facts, suicide attempt by the wife soon after marriage dueto harassment and dowry demands of husband and the familymembers – Settlement between the parties, however, harassmentcontinued and wife committed suicide within two years of marriage– Conviction of husband, his mother and two brothers u/ss. 304Band 498A – Appellate court acquitted the brothers but maintainedthe conviction of the husband and the mother – However, the HighCourt acquitted the husband and his mother u/s.304B while upheldtheir conviction u/s.498A and sentenced accordingly – Husband’scase before this Court that since he was acquitted u/s. 304B, thus,statement of wife could not be relied upon to sustain his convictionu/s. 498A as it would not fall within the ambit of s. 32(1) – Held:U/s. 32, the phrase ‘cases in which the cause of that person’s deathcomes into question’ is broader than merely referring only to caseswhere there is a charge of murder, suicide or dowry death – s. 32(1)has been used to admit statements in a case where the charge is ofa different nature or even in a civil action – Second part of the s.32(1) specifies that such statements are relevant ‘whatever may bethe nature of proceeding in which the cause of death comes intoquestion – Test of admissibility u/s. 32(1) is that ‘the cause of death’must come into question in the case regardless of the nature of thecase – Purpose for which such evidence is being sought should bea part of the ‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death– Whether the charge relating to death is proved or not is immaterialwith respect to its admissibility – On facts, it is not necessary toexamine whether the statement of the wife can be admitted u/s 32(1)– Other evidence on record clearly proves the husband’s guilt beyondreasonable doubt – Furthermore, evidence of the mother of thedeceased was reliable – Thus, the order passed by the High Court

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Adoes not call for interference – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 304B and498A.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 relates tothe admissibility of statements made by a person who cannot beBcalled as witness. The Section itself specifies the circumstancesunder which such statements become relevant. In the instantcase, the concern is with one such circumstance, that is, whenthe person who made the statement is dead. [Para 9][681-D-E]

1.2 To rely on Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, one of theCmain conditions laid out in the sub-section is that the issue mustarise “in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comesinto question”. [Para 11][682-D]

1.3 The phrase “cases in which the cause of that person’sdeath comes into question” is broader than merely referring onlyDto cases where there is a charge of murder, suicide, or dowrydeath. There have been instances where Courts have usedSection 32(1) of the Evidence Act to admit statements in a casewhere the charge is of a different nature or even in a civil action.This is abundantly clear from the second part of Section 32(1) ofEthe Evidence Act which specifies that such statements arerelevant “whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in whichthe cause of his death comes into question”. Illustration (a) toSection 32 of the Evidence Act refers to a statement made by adeceased in a rape case which may be admitted under the section,which was the position in India even prior to the enactment ofFthe Evidence Act. [Para 14][684-B-D]

1.4 The test for admissibility under the Section 32(1) of theEvidence Act, is not that the evidence to be admitted shoulddirectly relate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual,or that the charge relating to death could not be proved. Rather,Gthe test appears to be that the cause of death must come intoquestion in that case, regardless of the nature of the proceeding,and that the purpose for which such evidence is being sought tobe admitted should be a part of the ‘circumstances of thetransaction’ relating to the death. [Para 17][686-D-F]

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1.5 In some circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wifewith respect to cruelty could be admissible in a trial for a chargeunder Section 498A IPC under Section 32(1) of the EvidenceAct. There are, however, certain necessary pre-conditions thatmust be met before the evidence is admitted. The first conditionis that her cause of death must come into question in the matter.This would include, for instance, matters where along with thecharge under Section 498A IPC, the prosecution has also chargedthe accused under Sections 302, 306 or 304B IPC. It must benoted however that as long as the cause of her death has comeinto question, whether the charge relating to death is proved ornot is immaterial with respect to admissibility. The secondcondition is that the prosecution will have to show that theevidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section498A IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transactionof the death. How far back the evidence can be, and howconnected the evidence is to the cause of death of the deceasedwould necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of eachcase. No specific straitjacket formula or rule can be given withrespect to this. [Paras 20-22][689-F-H; 690-A-B]

Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619: [2002] 1 SCR 845; Inderpal v. State of MP (2001) 10SCC 736; Bhairon Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh(2009) 13 SCC 80 : [2009] 9 SCR 875; Kantilal MartajiPandor v. State of Gujarat (2013) 8 SCC 781 : [2013]8 SCR 137 – Partly Overruled.

1.6 It is not necessary for this Court to undertake theexercise to determine whether the statement of the deceasedcan be admitted under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Theappeal can be decided even without considering this aspect, asthe other evidence on record clearly proves the appellant’s guiltbeyond reasonable doubt. [Para 24][690-E]

1.7 The deceased’s wife was being harassed is clear fromthe evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased). She hadspecifically stated in her chief examination that within few days oftheir marriage, the appellant brought the deceased back to herparental home with the threat that if extra dowry was not given,he would leave her and marry another “beautiful” girl. As a result A

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Aof such harassment, the deceased allegedly attempted suicidefor the first time by consuming poison. While she was being treatedin the hospital, a settlement was reached between the parties, towhich appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreed that nofurther demands for dowry would be made. This agreement wasexhibited before the trial court. Although the High Court indicatedBthat the said settlement was not admissible in evidence, the factof its existence has been deposed by PW-9, who is an independentwitness, as well as by PW-3. Further, it was stated by PW-3 in herchief examination that even after the settlement, the appellanthad continued to ill-treat the deceased. The deceased, due toCthe ill-treatment faced by her had ultimately committed suicideby hanging herself with a saree. [Para 25][690-F-H; 691-A]1.8 There are concurrent findings of the courts belowupholding the reliability of the evidence of PW-3. The submissionof the appellant that the evidence of PW-3 is unreliable because

Dshe is the mother of the deceased, cannot be accepted. Theevidence tendered by the related or interested witness cannotbe discarded on that ground alone. However, as a rule of prudence,the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related or interestedwitness more carefully. [Para 26][691-B-C]

1.9 There is no reason to interfere with the impugnedEjudgment passed by the High Court in confirming the convictionof the appellant under Section 498A IPC and sentencing him toundergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. [Para 27][691-F]

Queen v. Bissorunjun Mookerjee (1866) 6 W.R. Cr.75; Lalji Dusadh v. King Emperor AIR 1928 Pat 162;FParmanand Ganga Prasad v. Emperor AIR 1940 Nag340; Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor AIR1939 PC 47; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State ofMaharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88;Ilangovan v. State of T.N. (2020) 10 SCC 533 - referredto.G

Case Law Reference

[2002] 1 SCR 845(2001) 10 SCC 736

partly overruledpartly overruled

Para 23Para 23

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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1080 of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2018 of the High Courtof Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 1801 of 2006.

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Adolf Mathew, Sanjay Jain, Advs. for the Appellant.

Harshad V. Hameed, Dileep Poolakkot, Mrs. Ashly Harshad,Muhammed Siddick, G. Prakash, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D

N. V. RAMANA, CJI.

1. The instant appeal, by way of special leave, is directed againstjudgment dated 12.09.2018 passed by the High Court of Kerala in CriminalRevision Petition No. 1801 of 2006, whereby the High Court partlyallowed the Revision Petition filed by the appellant-husband (accusedno. 5). By way of the impugned judgment, the High Court has set asidethe concurrent findings of conviction of the courts below and acquittedthe appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code [for short‘the IPC’] while confirming his conviction under Section 498A of theIPC. The High Court has further modified the sentence imposed on theappellant to rigorous imprisonment for one year.

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2. The conspectus of the facts necessary for the disposal of theappeal are as follows: the appellant married the deceased on 09.04.1995.After the marriage, the deceased resided with the appellant and his familymembers at their matrimonial home. It is alleged that the appellant, alongwith his family members, started harassing the deceased soon after themarriage and was demanding additional dowry. Allegedly, the deceased G

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Aattempted suicide by consuming Benzyl Hexa Chloride powder on11.02.1996 due to the mental harassment by the accused persons.Fortunately, she was able to recover after treatment at the GovernmentHospital, Palakkad. Subsequent to this incident, mediation between theparties took place and a settlement was reached between the partieswhereby the deceased continued to reside at the house of the accused.BDespite the above agreement, it is alleged that the harassment continuedand the deceased committed suicide by hanging on 21.10.1996, at herown home.

3. The prosecution charged the appellant, his parents and his twoCbrothers under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC. Pending trial, theappellant’s father passed away. The Trial Court, after examining all thewitnesses and perusing the documents produced by the prosecution anddefence, convicted the accused persons under Sections 304B and 498Aof the IPC. Vide judgment dated 12.05.2006, the Appellate Courtacquitted the appellant’s brothers of both the offences. However, theDconviction and sentence against the appellant and his mother wasconfirmed.

4. Aggrieved, the appellant and his mother filed the CriminalRevision Petition before the High Court of Kerala. As already mentionedabove, vide the impugned judgment, the High Court partly allowed theErevision petition and acquitted the appellant and his mother under Section304B of the IPC while confirming their conviction under Section 498Aof the IPC. The High Court, however, reduced the sentence imposed onthe appellant to rigorous imprisonment for one year, and, that of his motherto rigorous imprisonment for one month. The appellant’s mother has notfiled any appeal before this Court.F

5. The main thrust of the submissions made by the learned counselfor the appellant are two-fold. First, that the suicide note and otherstatements made by the deceased cannot be relied upon by the Courtfor convicting him under Section 498A of the IPC as they do not fallwithin the scope of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (forGshort ‘the Evidence Act’). Second, that the evidence of PW-3 (motherof the deceased) is contradictory and cannot be relied upon to convictthe appellant. On the strength of the above two arguments, the learnedcounsel for the appellant attempts to persuade this Court that there is nocredible evidence to convict the appellant under Section 498A of theHIPC, and therefore, he should be acquitted of the same.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that there are three concurrent finding of facts by theCourts below which do not merit any interference by this Court in exerciseof its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Learnedcounsel for the State also submits that there is sufficient evidence onrecord to make out a clear case for convicting the appellant under Section498A of the IPC.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent-State at length.

8. Before we proceed, it is expedient to advert to the submissionsof the learned counsel for the appellant particularly that in the presentcase, the appellant was acquitted under Section 304B of the IPC by theHigh Court in revision and therefore, the statements of the deceasedcould not have been relied upon by the High Court to sustain his convictionunder Section 498A of the IPC as it would not fall within the ambit ofSection 32(1) of the Evidence Act.

9. In this context, it is appropriate to refer to certain provisions ofSection 32 of the Evidence Act. Section 32 relates to the admissibility ofstatements made by a person who cannot be called as witness. TheSection itself specifies the circumstances under which such statementsbecome relevant. In the present case, we are concerned with one suchcircumstance, that is, when the person who made the statement is dead.The learned counsel for the appellant has focused predominantly onSection 32(1) of the Evidence Act in an attempt to exclude the evidenceof the deceased by suggesting that it does not fall within the scope of theabovesaid sub-section and therefore, is inadmissible. The relevant portionof Section 32 of the Evidence Act is extracted below:

32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by personwho is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. –

Statements, written or verbal, or relevant facts, made by a personwho is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapableof giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured,without an amount of delay or expense which under thecircumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable,are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:

(1) When it relates to cause of death. - When the statement ismade by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the A

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Acircumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, incases in which the cause of that person’s death comes intoquestion.

Such statements are relevant whether the person who made themwas or was not, at the time when they were made, underBexpectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of theproceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.

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10. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is famously referred to asCthe “dying declaration” section, although the phrase itself does not findmention under the Evidence Act. The Courts have had occasion toconsider the scope and ambit of Section 32, particularly Section 32(1) ofthe Evidence Act on various occasions.

11. To rely on Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, one of the mainDconditions laid out in the sub-section is that the issue must arise “incases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question”.The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, in thepresent case, with the acquittal of the appellant by the High Court underSection 304B of the IPC, and the absence of any appeal challenging theEsame, the present case pertains to only Section 498A of the IPC.Therefore, the present case does not fall within the scope of theaforementioned sub-section as it is no longer a case in which the causeof the deceased’s death comes into question. As such, Section 32(1) ofthe Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court to admit thestatements of the deceased to convict him under Section 498A of theFIPC.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant has primarily relied uponthe judgment of this Court in Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa,(2002) 2 SCC 619, wherein the Court had observed as under:

“10. Another circumstance of cruelty is with respect to takingGaway of the child from the deceased. To arrive at such aconclusion, the trial court has referred to the statement of PW 5,who is the sister of the deceased. In her deposition recorded inthe court on 4-5-1990 PW 5 had stated:

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SURENDRAN v. STATE OF KERELA[N. V. RAMANA, CJI.]

“Whenever I had gone to my sister, all the times shewas complaining that she is not well treated by her husbandand in-laws for non-fulfilment of balance dowry amount of ascooter and a two-in-one.”

and added:

“On 3-6-1987 for the last time I had been to the houseof the deceased i.e. to her separate residence. Sworna, Snigdha,Sima Apa, Baby Apa accompanied me to her house on thatday. At that time the deceased complained before us as usualand added to that she said that she is being assaulted by theaccused nowadays. She further complained before us that theaccused is taking away the child from her, and that her mother-in-law has come and some conspiracy is going against her (thedeceased). She further told that ‘mate au bancheidebenahin’.”

Such a statement appears to have been taken on recordwith the aid of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act at atime when the appellant was being tried for the offence underSection 304-B andsuch statement was admissible underclause (1) of the said section as it related to the cause ofdeath of the deceased and the circumstances of thetransaction which resulted in her death. Such a statementis not admissible in evidence for the offence punishableunder Section 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860 and has to betermed as being only a hearsay evidence. Section 32 is anexception to the hearsay rule and deals with the statements ordeclarations by a person, since dead, relating to the cause of hisor her death or the circumstances leading to such death. If astatement which otherwise is covered by the hearsay rule doesnot fall within the exceptions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act,the same cannot be relied upon for finding the guilt of the accused.”

13. Although not cited by the learned counsel, the proposition putforth by him appears to be supported by three other judgments of thisCourt in Inderpal v. State of MP, (2001) 10 SCC 736, Bhairon Singhv. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2009) 13 SCC 80 and Kantilal MartajiPandor v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 8 SCC 781. All of these judgments A

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Aalso appear to follow the same line of reasoning as followed by thisCourt in Gananath Pattnaik case (supra), i.e., that once the Court hasacquitted an accused of the charge relating to the death of an individual,the evidence of the deceased would not be admissible to prove the chargeunder Section 498A of the IPC simpliciter as then the case would nolonger relate to the death of the deceased.B

14. It may bear mentioning that the phrase “cases in which thecause of that person’s death comes into question” is broader thanmerely referring only to cases where there is a charge of murder, suicide,or dowry death. There have been instances where Courts have usedSection 32(1) of the Evidence Act to admit statements in a case whereCthe charge is of a different nature or even in a civil action. This isabundantly clear from the second part of Section 32(1) of the EvidenceAct which specifies that such statements are relevant “whatever maybe the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his deathcomes into question”. Illustration (a) to Section 32 of the Evidence ActDrefers to a statement made by a deceased in a rape case which may beadmitted under the section, which was the position in India even prior tothe enactment of the Evidence Act, as held by the Court in the case ofQueen v. Bissorunjun Mookerjee, (1866) 6 W.R. Cr. 75.

15. In Lalji Dusadh v. King-Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 162, theEPatna High Court upheld the admissibility of statements made by thedeceased in a case concerning charges under Sections 302, 392 and 397of the IPC. In that case, the deceased victim was robbed and killed as apart of the same transaction. The submission of the learned counsel forthe accused in that case, inter alia, was that the dying declaration of thedeceased could not be admitted under Section 32(1) of the EvidenceFAct with respect to the charges under Section 392 and 397 of the IPC.Negativing this contention, the High Court observed as follows:

“A further legal point is taken with regard to the dying declarations.

It is contended that so far as the charges for the offences underGsections 392 and 397 are concerned the dying declarations arenot admissible under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Actinasmuch as the cause of the deceased’s death does not come inquestion in the trial of those charges. It is contended that on thispoint the Indian law is the same as the English law and that adying declaration as to the cause of the death is only admissibleHwhen the causing of the death is the subject of the charge. I

cannot agree with this view. The words of section 32 arevery wide and it is not necessary that the charge should beone of homicide. The evidence as to the cause of death wasrelevant to the charge of robbery and consequently thecause of death that is to say the assault committed by theappellant came in question in the trial. Before the IndianEvidence Act was enacted it was held in Queen v. BissorunjunMookerjee [(1866) 6 W.R. (Cr.) 75.] that there was no necessityin India for following the very narrow rule of English law and thata dying declaration could be used as evidence in a charge of rape.One of the illustrations to section 32 of the present Indian EvidenceAct expressly provides for such evidence where the charge is notculpable homicide but rape.”

16. Further, in a proceeding with multiple charges, where onedirectly relates to the death of a declarant and the other does not, theCourt has admitted the evidence of the declarant even if the prosecutionfailed to prove the charge relating to death. For instance, in ParmanandGanga Prasad v. Emperor, AIR 1940 Nag 340, the High Court ofNagpur held as follows:

“7. …The prosecution story as narrated by us shows thatthroughout the enquiry the cause of death of Munde was material.That being so, the mere fact that a charge of murder failedand was not brought home to the accused would not makethe statement inadmissible for the purposes of otheroffences which were committed in the course of the sametransaction and with which the accused were charged.

8. We may also observe that in all cases regarding admissibility ofa particular piece of evidence the material time when theadmissibility has got to be decided is the time when the Courtreceived the evidence and not the eventual result. In this casewhen the statements were filed by the prosecution and proved inthe case it could under no circumstances be argued that the causeof death of the deceased was not in question. The cause of deathof Munde was in question as there was also a charge under S.302, and this charge was joined with other charges in the caseunder Section 239(d) as forming part of the same transaction. So, A

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Aat the stage at which these statements were put up by theprosecution before the Court as admissible, it could not beargued that they were not admissible and a document onceadmitted in evidence remains admissible for all purposesin the case. The subsequent result of the case, viz., failureof the charge of murder should not make any differenceBwhatsoever to the admissibility of the document.Just as theirLordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1938 PC 130 [Babulal v.Emperor, (1938) 25 AIR PC 130 : 174 IC 1 : 65 IA 158 : 32 SLR476 : 39 Cr LJ 452 : ILR (1938) 2 Cal 295 (PC).] stated that therelevant point of time in the proceedings at which the condition asCto sameness of transaction must be fulfilled is the time ofaccusation and not that of the eventual result we think we wouldbe justified in stating the same with respect to the admissibility ofa document…”

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17. From the above pronouncements, and the wordings of Section32(1) of the Evidence Act, it appears that the test for admissibility underthe said section is not that the evidence to be admitted should directlyrelate to a charge pertaining to the death of the individual, or that thecharge relating to death could not be proved. Rather, the test appears toEbe that the cause of death must come into question in that case, regardlessof the nature of the proceeding, and that the purpose for which suchevidence is being sought to be admitted should be a part of the‘circumstances of the transaction’ relating to the death.

18. The phrase ‘circumstances of the transaction’, as occurringFin the section, has been interpreted by the Privy Council in the judgmentthat is considered the locus classicus on admissibility of evidence underSection 32(1) of the Evidence Act, Pakala Narayana Swami v. King-Emperor, AIR 1939 PC 47. In that case, the Privy Council was dealingwith a case of murder wherein one of the main pieces of evidence againstthe accused was the statement made by the deceased to his wife. TheGdefence argued that such evidence had to be excluded due to the hearsayrule. However, the said evidence was admitted under Section 32(1) ofthe Evidence Act and the accused was convicted. In appeal, one of thequestions the Privy Council had to answer related to whether thedeceased’s statement was properly admitted or not. In that context, theHPrivy Council observed as under:

“A variety of questions has been mooted in the Indian courts as tothe effect of this section. It has been suggested that the statementmust be made after the transaction has taken place, that the personmaking it must be at any rate near death, that the “circumstances”can only include the acts done when and where the death wascaused. Their Lordships are of opinion that the natural meaningof the words used does not convey any of these limitations. Thestatement may be made before the cause of death has arisen, orbefore the deceased has any reason to anticipate being killed.The circumstances must be circumstances of thetransaction : general expressions indicating fear orsuspicion whether of a particular individual or otherwiseand not directly releated to the occasion of the death willnot be admissible. But statements made by the deceasedthat he was proceeding to the spot where he was in factkilled, or as to his reasons for so proceeding, or that hewas going to meet a particular person, or that he had beeninvited by such person to meet him would each of them becircumstances of the transaction,and would be so whetherthe person was unknown, or was not the person accused. Such astatement might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused.“Circumstances of the transaction” is a phrase no doubtthat conveys some limitations. It is not as broad as theanalogous use in “circumstantial evidence” which includesevidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other handnarrower than “res gestae.” Circumstances must have someproximate relation to the actual occurrence : though, as forinstance in a case of prolonged poisoning, they may berelated to dates at a considerable distance from the date ofthe actual fatal dose.

It will be observed that “the circumstances” are of the transactionwhich resulted in the death of the declarant. It is not necessarythat there should be a known transaction other than that the deathof the declarant has ultimately been caused, for the condition ofthe admissibility of the evidence is that “the cause of [thedeclarant’s] death comes into question.” In the present case thecause of the deceased’s death comes into question. The transactionis one in which the deceased was murdered on March 21 or 22 :and his body was found in a trunk proved to be bought on behalf AB

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of the accused. The statement made by the deceased on March20 or 21 that he was setting out to the place where the accusedlived, and to meet a person, the wife of the accused, who lived inthe accused’s house, appears clearly to be a statement as to someof the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death.The statement was rightly admitted.”

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19. This principle of law has been upheld by this Court on variousoccasions. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,(1984) 4 SCC 116, this Court summarized the principles of SectionC32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to “circumstances of thetransaction”:

“21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above andthe clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, thefollowing propositions emerge:

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(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makesadmissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the deathis a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to thecause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. Inthis respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in viewof the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse natureand character of our people, has thought it necessary to widenthe sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.

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(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construedand practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula ofuniversal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket.Distance of time would depend or vary with thecircumstances of each case. For instance, where death is alogical culmination of a continuous drama long in processand is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statementregarding each step directly connected with the end of thedrama would be admissible because the entire statementwould have to be read as an organic whole and not tornfrom the context. Sometimes statements relevant to orfurnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible asbeing a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest thatall these statements come to light only after the death of F

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the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, wherethe death takes place within a very short time of the marriageor the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.

(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet anotherexception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a personwho was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of beingcross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because theplace of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctityof oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of deathis not likely to make a false statement unless there is strongevidence to show that the statement was secured either byprompting or tutoring.

(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak ofhomicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all thecircumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicidewould be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.

(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements andletters written by the deceased which are directly connectedwith or related to her death and which reveal a tell-talestory, the said statement would clearly fall within the fourcorners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. Thedistance of time alone in such cases would not make thestatement irrelevant.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. A reading of the above pronouncements makes it clear that, insome circumstances, the evidence of a deceased wife with respect tocruelty could be admissible in a trial for a charge under Section 498A ofthe IPC under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There are, however,certain necessary pre-conditions that must be met before the evidenceis admitted.

21. The first condition is that her cause of death must come intoquestion in the matter. This would include, for instance, matters wherealong with the charge under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecutionhas also charged the accused under Sections 302, 306 or 304B of theIPC. It must be noted however that as long as the cause of her death A

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Ahas come into question, whether the charge relating to death is provedor not is immaterial with respect to admissibility.

22. The second condition is that the prosecution will have to showthat the evidence that is sought to be admitted with respect to Section498A of the IPC must also relate to the circumstances of the transactionBof the death. How far back the evidence can be, and how connected theevidence is to the cause of death of the deceased would necessarilydepend on the facts and circumstances of each case. No specificstraitjacket formula or rule can be given with respect to this.

23. To the above extent therefore, the judgments of this Court inCGananath Pattnaik (supra), Inderpal (supra), Bhairon Singh (supra)and Kantilal Martaji Pandor (supra), wherein it has been held that theevidence of the deceased cannot be admitted under Section 32(1) of theEvidence Act to prove the charge under Section 498A of the IPC onlybecause the accused stands acquitted of the charge relating to the deathof the deceased, may not be correct. These judgments stand overruledDto that limited extent.

24. Coming to the present case, we are of the opinion that it is notnecessary for this Court to undertake the exercise to determine whetherthe statement of the deceased can be admitted under Section 32(1) ofthe Evidence Act. As the learned counsel for the State rightly points out,Ethis appeal can be decided even without considering this aspect, as theother evidence on record clearly proves the appellant’s guilt beyondreasonable doubt.

25. The fact that the deceased’s wife was being harassed is clearfrom the evidence of PW-3 (mother of the deceased). She had specificallyFstated in her chief-examination that within few days of their marriage,the appellant brought the deceased back to her parental home with thethreat that if extra dowry was not given, he would leave her and marryanother “beautiful” girl. As a result of such harassment, the deceasedallegedly attempted suicide for the first time by consuming poison. WhileGshe was being treated in the hospital, a settlement was reached betweenthe parties, to which appellant was also a part, wherein it was agreedthat no further demands for dowry would be made. This agreement wasexhibited before the Trial Court as Ext P-3. Although the High Courtindicated that the said settlement was not admissible in evidence, thefact of its existence has been deposed by PW-9, who is an independentHwitness, as well as by PW-3. Further, it was stated by PW-3 in her chief-examination that even after the settlement, the appellant hadcontinued to ill-treat the deceased. The deceased, due to the ill-treatmentfaced by her had ultimately committed suicide by hanging herself with asaree.

A

26. The learned counsel for the appellant, despite his best efforts,could not persuade this Court that the evidence of PW-3 was unreliable.There are three concurrent findings of the Courts below upholding thereliability of the evidence of PW-3. The submission of the learned counselfor the appellant that the evidence of PW-3 is unreliable because she isthe mother of the deceased, cannot be countenanced. It is a settledprinciple of law that the evidence tendered by the related or interestedwitness cannot be discarded on that ground alone. However, as a rule ofprudence, the Court may scrutinize the evidence of such related orinterested witness more carefully. This Court in Ilangovan v. State ofT.N., (2020) 10 SCC 533 has held as follows:

B

C

B

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“7. With respect to the first submission of the counsel for theDappellant, regarding the testimonies of related witnesses, itis settled law that the testimony of a related or an interestedwitness can be taken into consideration, with the additionalburden on the Court in such cases to carefully scrutinisesuch evidence (see Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435).As such, the mere submission of the counsel for the appellant,Ethat the testimonies of the witnesses in the case should bedisregarded because they were related, without bringing to theattention of the Court any reason to disbelieve the same, cannotbe countenanced.”

27. In view of the above, we see no reason to interfere with theimpugned judgment passed by the High Court in confirming the convictionof the appellant under Section 498A of the IPC and sentencing him toundergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

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28. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The appellant is on bail.His bail bonds stand cancelled and he is directed to surrender within aperiod of one week from today before the concerned authorities to serveout the remaining period of sentence.

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Nidhi Jain

(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)

H