NILESH LAXMICHAND AND ANOTHER versus SHANTABEN PURUSHOTTAM KAKAD (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS on 8 May 2019

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2019] 7 S.C.R.

ANILESH LAXMICHAND AND ANOTHER

v.

SHANTABEN PURUSHOTTAM KAKAD (SINCE DECEASED)BY LRS

(Civil Appeal No. 4268 of 2019)

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MAY 08, 2019

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]

Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 – ss.16(1)(c), 16(1)(e)and 16(1)(n) – Respondents-plaintiffs rented out a premises to theCappellants-defendants – Appellants took the premises on rent forpurpose of carrying out business of book shop – Respondents fileda suit for eviction of the appellants u/ss.16(1)(c), 16(1)(e) and16(1)(n) of the Act – Respondents’ case that in July, 2015, theappellants closed down the business of the bookstore, and sinceDthen, the premises was not used for more than six months prior tothe suit, for the purpose for it was let out – It was also alleged thatappellants also started business of garments and foodstuff atdifferent intervals but the same was closed down – Further,appellants had also sublet the premises to the third party – Trialcourt found that all three grounds were not made out and suit wasEdismissed – However, Appellate Court allowed the appeal and inrevision, the High Court affirmed the findings of the Appellate Court– On appeal, held: The grounds of illegal subletting and nuisance(foodstuff) taken by the respondents unsustainable – Insofar asground relating to non-user is concerned, the requirement ofFs.16(1)(n) of Act need to be satisfied, it has to be established thatfor a period of six months continuously from 20.04.2006 till thedate of institution of the suit, i.e. 20.10.2006 the suit premises werenot used by the tenant/appellants without a reasonable ground forthe purpose for which it was let out i.e. business of book shop –Besides, under the Shops and Establishments Act, a person havingGa shop must be registered – In other words, carrying on a shop orestablishment, as defined in the Act, without registration, would makeit illegal – In the instant case, appellant did not pay any fees forrenewal of the registration during the year 2006 – Burden actuallyis on the landlord to establish the non-user – But since, there was H

no registration for the said period it showed that the appellant couldnot have lawfully conducted any business in the suit premises –Also, the two courts found the ground of non-user u/s.16(1)(n) ofAct established – Therefore, no need to interfere with the judgmentof the High Court – Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1. The following elements must be establishedunder Section 16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999- the premises must have been let out for a particular purpose;there must be non-user by the tenant for the purpose; the non-user must be without reasonable cause; the non-user must befor a continuous period of six months immediately preceding thedate of the suit. [Para 19] [469-B]

2. The requirement of Section 16(1)(n) will be satisfied if itis established that for a period of six months continuously from20.04.2006 till the date of institution of the suit i.e. 20.10.2006,the suit premises were not used by the tenant without a reasonableground for the purpose for which it was let out. Since even theappellants do not have a case that the appellants were carryingon the business in readymade garments or fast food during theperiod, the only business that the appellants can lay store by, isthe business in books. [Para 25] [470-G-H; 471-A-B]

3. Under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948under Section 7(2)(A), a registration certificate shall be valid uptothe end of the year for which it is granted. As it stands now, it isvalid for a period of twelve months from the date it is granted orrenewed. This is after the substitution by Act 25 of 2013.Therefore, the provision, which is relevant, is the previousprovision, under which, as noted, the registration certificate wouldbe valid upto the end of the year for which it was granted.Therefore, even going by the registration certificate producedand under the Act, issued on 09.09.2005, it came to an end by theend of the year. The word “year” is defined in Section 2(32) asmeaning that “a year commencing first day of January”. Thus,even the appellant apparently paid the fees for renewal of theregistration only on 09.01.2007. He did not pay any fees forrenewal of the registration during the year 2006. On 30.11.2007, A

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[2019] 7 S.C.R.

Ano doubt, registration certificate was issued. The result is thatduring the year 2006, it can be concluded that there was noregistration for the business either in books or fast food.[Para 28] [471-F-H; 472-A-B]

4. This apart, the fact that under the Shops andBEstablishments Act, it is undoubtedly true that a person having ashop must get it registered. In other words, carrying on a shopor establishment, as defined in the Act, without registration, wouldmake it illegal. The fact that there is a registration, however,would not be sufficient to establish that there is use of thepremises. In other words, even if a person has registration, thatCby itself would not mean that the tenant is actually using thepremises for the purpose for which it is rented out to him. Actualuse of the premises can be established by various othercircumstances like electricity bills, payment of wages toemployees if there are employees, evidence relating toDtransactions of the business which is carried on etc. No doubt,the burden actually is on the landlord to establish the non-user.But since, in this case, it would appear that there is no registrationfor the period, it shows that the appellants could not have lawfullyconducted any business in the suit premises. There is, no doubt,the evidence of PW1 also. [Para 29] [472-B-E]E

5. In the circumstances of the case, having regard to thefact that two courts have found the ground of non-user underSection 16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999established and the facts as noted by this Court it is not a fit caseto interfere with the judgment of the High Court. [Para 31]F[472-F-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4268of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.09.2018 of the HighGCourt of Judicature at Bombay in C.R.A. No. 29 of 2018.

Mayil Samy K., Nihangam R. Maurya, G. Ananda Selvam, K.Muthu Ganesa Pandian, P. Soma Sundaram, Advs. for the Appellants.

Anirudh Joshi, Mahesh Agarwal, Abhinav Agrawal, HimanshuSatija, E. C. Agrawala, Advs. for the Respondents.H

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. M. JOSEPH, J.

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the Order dated24.09.2018 passed by the High Court of Bombay in Civil RevisionApplication No. 29 of 2018. By the impugned Order, the RevisionApplication filed by the appellants challenging the Order of the AppellateBench of the Small Causes Court at Bombay in Appeal No. 19 of 2013has been dismissed. Thereby the result is that the suit filed by therespondents for eviction of the appellants under Section 16(1)(c), 16(1)(e)and 16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (hereinafterreferred to as ‘the Act’, for short), has been decreed against the appellants.

2. The original RAE Suit No. 1681 of 2006 was filed by oneShantaben Purushottam Kakad (the respondents in this appeal are thelegal representatives of the original aforesaid plaintiff). The rentedpremises consisted of a shop on the ground floor of the building. Thecase of the plaintiff, inter alia, is as follows (parties will be referred to inthe position before the Trial Court):

The first defendant took the premises on rent for the purposeof carrying out business of bookshop and he, the first defendant,has, since the inception, been carrying on the business of bookshopin the name and style “Chetna Book Store”. In about July, 2005,the first defendant suddenly closed down the business of bookstore,and since then, is not using the premises for more than six monthsprior to the suit, for the purpose for which it was let and that toowithout reasonable or any cause. It was further stated that thefirst defendant had sublet the premises to third party. As regardsthe ground of nuisance, it was stated that the defendants havestarted business of preparation and sale of foodstuff from the suitpremises which does not have suitable layout or ventilation forthe same. It is further stated that as a result, there was pollutionand smell and smoke and this caused lot of nuisance and annoyancefor the plaintiff an old landlady and other occupants of the building.This business is now closed down. It is further stated that thebusiness of garments was also started and closed down and thatthe defendants have now given the suit premises to someone else.It is, on these allegations, the suit came to be filed.

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A3. A Written Statement came to be filed by the appellants. Thefirst appellant is actually the son of the second appellant. Their case is,inter alia, as follows:

In the year 1971, the second defendant, who is the father ofthe first defendant, approached the original landlord, the husbandBof the original plaintiff, for taking the suit premises on rent. Onfinalisation of negotiations, the premises were taken on rentsomewhere in the year 1971. At that time, the first defendant wasa minor aged five years. The premises were taken for commercial/business purpose to be carried on by the second defendant butthe second defendant, for certain spiritual reason and on the adviceCof the Astrologer, obtained receipt in the name of the firstdefendant. The rent receipts continued to be issued in the nameof the first defendant. After obtaining the building on rent, thesecond defendant used the rented premises for selling books inthe name and style “Chetna Book Store”. Second defendantDobtained necessary licence under The Shops and EstablishmentsAct. The second defendant was not able to get good business andsufficient earnings. He started business of readymade garmentsfor some time. That also did not succeed. Thereafter, he startedthe business in the name and style “Shree Krishna Food Corner”.However, though he applied, the Health Department did not issueEthe licence. The business in fast food was stopped and again thebusiness of selling books and stationery was continued. The caseof sub-tenancy was denied, so also the case relating to nuisance.”

4. The Trial Court relied upon the deposition of PW1 to find thathe admitted that he did not know when the tenancy was created, whetherFany negotiations took place and on what terms and conditions, the tenancywas created. The suit premises, was found to be let out in the year 1971when the original landlord was looking after the affairs. The court reliedupon the deposition of the second defendant as DW1 as to the reasonswhy the rent receipt came to be issued in the name of the first defendant.GThe registration certificate under The Shops and Establishments Actwas found to be in the name of second defendant for the business ofbook selling and food centre. These are for the period from 1988 to 2003and for the period from 2006 to 2007. The lack of objection from theoriginal landlord in the year 1971 to the business being carried out by thesecond defendant, was noted. DW1 has deposed that the first defendant H

NILESH LAXMICHAND v. SHANTABEN PURUSHOTTAMKAKAD (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

was five years old in the year 1971. Relying upon Section 11 of theIndian Contract Act, 1872 and noting reciprocal obligations is a cast on alessee, tenancy in favour of the minor, was ruled out. From the inception,the second defendant was found to be in exclusive possession withoutinterruption. Tenancy was found to be created in favour of the seconddefendant, though the rent receipt stands in the name of the firstdefendant. It was found that defendants proved that second defendantwas then using the suit premises for selling books by obtaining licenseunder The Shops and Establishments Act for the year 2006 to 2007 andit was found that it could not be said that defendant was not using thepremises for the purpose for which it was let for the continuous periodof six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. The Trial courtdid not find favour with ground of illegal subletting. Regarding the illegalsubletting to Mr. Raja, the details were found wanting.

5. As regards ground of nuisance, it was found that the smell andsmoke of preparing foodstuff may cause nuisance and annoyance if thesame are on a large scale and for a continuous period. There are 16 to18 shops on the ground floor. The original plaintiff did not enter thewitness box. PW1 resided elsewhere and he occasionally visited thepremises. No adjoining occupier was examined as witness to supportthe case of nuisance. The particulars, as to what time in a day thedefendants particularly prepared foodstuff and on what scale, etc., wasnot given. Finding all the three grounds not made out, the suit wasdismissed.

6. The Appellate Court refers to the rent receipts in the name ofthe first defendant and found that nullifies the evidence of DW1 to theeffect that the premises was taken in the name of the second defendantsince inception. It was, therefore, found that there was no question ofinduction of the second defendant since inception. The reason regardingcreation of tenancy in the name of the first defendant being on the adviceof an Astrologer or Numerologist was found unbelievable as no suchAstrologer or Numerologist, on whose advice the same was done, wasexamined. Two letters dated 30.10.2005 and 01.12.2005 written by thedefendants were relied upon to conclude that the second defendant hadabsolute control over the suit premises and that he was in possession ofthe premises. As regards non-user of the premises, evidence of PW1showed that in or about 2005, the first defendant suddenly closed downthe business and the premises was locked for some time and first non- A

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Ause was commenced in July, 2005. Thereafter, plaintiffs received twoletters on 30.10.2005 and 01.12.2005 from the defendants. Under thoseletters, the second defendant intimated the original plaintiff that therewas leakage in the premises causing nuisance and due to which the suitpremises have become unwholesome and in a filthy condition. DW1 inhis evidence, it was found, has deposed as having run the Chetna BookBStore for quite a number of years. Then he switched over to business ofreadymade garments. Thereafter, he started business of Shree KrishnaFood Corner. Again, business in Book Centre was started. The Shopsand Establishments Act showed that the business was carried on from1988 to 1990, 1991 to 1993. The license was restricted to that period.CThe subsequent license is for the period from 2006 to 2007. This meantthat there was a break in 1993 and business was started again in 2006-2007. During the period 1993 to 2006, other businesses like selling ofreadymade garments and foodstuff centre was going on at the suitpremises. The suit was instituted on 19.10.2006. On the basis of newregistration certificate issued on 30.11.2007, the defendants have comeDout with a case that firm by name Chetna Book Centre was being carriedout since 2006. It was found that there was a gap of 13 months in betweenthe date of the suit and registration of the new firm. This establishesnon-use, it was found.

7. The Appellate Court found that the businesses of book stall andEfoodstuff are diametrically opposite to each other. The former is carriedout during the day and later goes till late hours of night. As a result ofthat it can safely be said that starting of food corner in all probabilitiescould have resulted in causing nuisance and annoyance to the occupantsof the suit building, it was found. The evidence of PW1 was relied on toFfind that he used to take a round of the premises and that he was affectedwhenever he visited his mother, was found believable and nuisance wasfound established.

8. Regarding subletting, it was found there was no plea of protectedlicense. The court found that subletting was duly established. AppealGwas allowed.

9. As stated earlier, the High Court has affirmed the findings ofthe Appellate Court.

10. In regard to the contention that who was the tenant, it wasfound that the rent receipt showed that tenant was the first defendant. ItH

showed that second defendant had taken the tenancy in the name offirst defendant for his benefit. Secondly, it was found that after attainingmajority, the first defendant has not rescinded the contract. Once it wasfound that first defendant was tenant, it was for second defendant toestablish in what capacity he was in possession. It was found that seconddefendant was not in possession prior to 01.02.1973, and therefore, couldnot claim to be a protected sub-tenancy or protected tenancy.

11. Regarding ground of non-user, the High Court affirmed thefindings of the Appellate Court.

12. Regarding nuisance, the High Court relied on the evidence ofPW1. Noticing the limitations under Section 115 of Code of CivilProcedure, the Revision was dismissed.

13. We have heard the counsel for the parties.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that none ofthe grounds have been made out. First defendant was a minor in 1971.On account of the belief and on the advice of an Astrologer the suitpremises were taken on rent in the name of first defendant who wasonly five years of age. There could not be any tenancy in his favour.Second defendant was managing the business. License was in his name.There was neither illegal sub-tenancy nor nuisance. The case of non-user is also sought to be rebutted. Learned counsel for the respondentssupported the Order. He also submitted quite clearly that the case ofnon-user is clearly established at any rate and he prayed for the rejectionof the appeal.

15. As regards the case of nuisance, Section 16(1)(c), inter alia,declares that conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoiningor neighbouring occupier by the tenants or others under him, is the groundfor eviction. The nuisance, apparently, is attributed to the period of timewhen business of fast food was being carried out. We have noticed thefindings of the Trial court. The evidence of none of the neighbours, bethey any of the shopkeepers in the building itself or otherwise, isforthcoming. Details, as such, thereof are not seen established. Theoriginal plaintiff who resided in the same building has not given evidence.The evidence essentially constitutes of the deposition of PW1, the sonof the original plaintiff and the complaint in writing. Admittedly, he doesnot reside in the building. He resides elsewhere. No doubt, his evidencethat when he came to visit his mother and he would go around, is relied AB

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Aupon to conclude that he has experienced nuisance and that nuisance isestablished. We would think that having regard to the seriousconsequences which arise out of ground of nuisance, being established,the facts of this case may not justify eviction of appellants on the saidground. In fact, the High Court has not independently gone into the matterand it has affirmed the findings of the Appellate Forum. These findings,Bwe have adverted to. We do not think that there was justification for theAppellate court or the High Court to sustain eviction on the ground ofnuisance.

16. As regards, the question whether there is subletting, it isnecessary to notice the plea relating to subletting. It is to the effect thatCdefendant no.1 has unlawfully sublet, assigned or transferred to thirdparty for unlawful consideration. It is further alleged that plaintiff’s sonAnil met the person who confirmed to him that it has been given to himon license basis. It is also stated in paragraph 5 that the defendants havenow given the suit premises to someone else. From this, we take it thatDthe case of subletting is built around the act of putting the third party,who is named as Mr. Raja, in possession. There is no case, as such, setup that there is illegal subletting by defendant no.1 putting defendantno.2 in possession and the allegation is specific, as noted above.

17. Regarding this allegation, we are of the view that the finding,Egiven by the Trial Court, correctly brings out the position found in fact.The details, as to when Shri Raja was put in possession, as to when ShriRaja was found in possession, whether this possession was exclusive,the purpose for which Shri Raja was using the premises, are neitherpleaded nor proved. The alternate case of subletting, apparently set upat the stage of argument, is that there is unlawful subletting to the secondFdefendant. We have noted the pleading. The pleading of subletting isabout subletting to a third party which was rejected by the Trial Court.In the Appellate Court, such subletting is found qua the second appellant.Having regard to the facts, beginning with the fact that first appellantwas only nearly five years old, the registration was in the name of secondGappellant, the nature of the relationship between the appellants, viz., thesecond appellant is the father of the first appellant and also the casewhich was pleaded in the suit, we are of the view that finding of illegalsubletting cannot be sustained.

18. The remaining ground is a ground relating to non-user. SectionH16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, reads as follows:

“16(1)(n). that the premises have not been used withoutreasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for acontinuous period of six months immediately preceding the dateof the suit.”

19. The following elements must be established under Section16(1)(n) - the premises must have been let out for a particular purpose;there must be non-user by the tenant for the purpose; the non-user mustbe without reasonable cause; the non-user must be for a continuousperiod of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit.

20. Suit in this case was instituted on 20.10.2006. therefore, it isincumbent on the respondents to establish that the premises were notbeen used for a continuous period of six months which means from20.04.2006 till the date of institution of the suit.

21. The pleading of the plaintiff is, it was let out for the purpose ofbusiness of book shop. It is further case of the plaintiffs that about in orabout 2005, the first appellant suddenly closed down the business inbook store, and since then, till the date of the suit, was not using the suitpremises for more than six months. It is also stated, in paragraph 5, thatthe defendants have started the business of preparation and sale offoodstuffs. As a result of tremendous pollution and smell and smoke, itcaused lot of nuisance. Complaints were made and this business wasclosed. The business of readymade garments was also started and closeddown. This is in short, the pleading of the plaintiff.

22. The defendants, on the other hand, set up the case that onacquiring the premises for the business purpose, i.e., selling of booksand stationery, defendant no.2 ran the business for a number of years.Instead of aforesaid business, defendant no.2 started doing business ofreadymade garments and he did not succeed. Then he started fast foodbusiness and the same also could not be continued because no licensewas issued for running the same business. He instead started again thebusiness of selling books under the name and style “M/s. Chetna BookCentre” and he continued to do the said business from the suit premisestill date.

23. What stands out from the aforesaid pleadings is that the seconddefendant, after taking over the premises under the lease, has startedthe business of selling books. Thereafter, from the pleadings of both theplaintiff and defendants, it is clear that appellant also carried on the A

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Abusiness in readymade garments and also, still further, business in fastfood. As to when the other businesses were carried on, is not clear fromthe plaint or written statement.

24. The case sought to be set up before this Court would, however,reveal the following:

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It is the appellant’s that the book stall business was runningslow. It was in the year 2005 that the second appellant decided tostart new business. It is their case that the business in clotheswas closed down immediately after it was started. Thereafter, in2005, we must indeed find that the business of fast food wasstarted. The fact that the business of fast food was being run, isclearly established by one circumstance and that is the complaintdated 27.10.2005 given regarding conduct of the business of fastfood. This is the case of the respondents. Therefore, the fast foodwas also started and it apparently was closed down. Thereafter,it is to be noticed that according to the appellants, the secondappellant started again business of book stall in the name andstyle as “Chetna Book Corner” in the year 2006 onwards (seeGround ‘F’ in the Special Leave Petition). It is further stated thatas the license was originally renewed in the name of Shree KrishnaFast Food Corner, the Municipal Corporation did not change thename later on and informed the second appellant that it will bechanged at the time of renewal. Therefore, it is quite clear thatthe appellant’s case must be taken to be that till 2005, businesswas been carried out in books from the suit premises. Interestingly,the plaintiff also, in paragraph 3, would state that in or around July2005, the defendant no.1 suddenly closed down the business ofbook store. Therefore, it is clear, as day light, and it can be takenas established that the premises was being used for running thebook store and it continued, even according to the plaintiff, till July2005. This is also the stand taken by the appellants, as we havenoted. In quick succession, the business in garments was startedwhich was short lived. Equally business in fast food was conductedand the same was also stopped.

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25. We must remind ourselves that the requirement of Section16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 will be satisfied if itis established that for a period of six months continuously from 20.04.2006Htill the date of institution of the suit, the suit premises were not used by the tenant without a reasonable ground for the purpose for which it waslet out. Since even the appellants do not have a case that the appellantswere carrying on the business in readymade garments or fast food duringthe period, the only business that the appellants can lay store by, is thebusiness in books.

26. The contention of the appellants would appear to be that theAppellate Court has proceeded on the basis that the registration wasobtained on 30.11.2007. Appellate Court further finds that there is a gapof 13 months from the date of the institution of the suit and the date onwhich the registration was obtained on 30.11.2007. It is the case of theappellants that what the provision in question requires is that there mustbe non-user by the tenant for the period of six months immediately andcontinuously prior to the institution of the suit. The period of 13 months,if calculated from 30.01.2007 backwards, in point of time, would be aperiod commencing from 30.10.2006. The contention appears to be thatthe cause of action is the continuous non-user for six months prior to theuse. Therefore, the relevant question has not been posed and answered,appears to be the argument of the appellants.

27. Let us consider the registration certificates which have beenproduced. The registration certificate, under the Bombay Shops andEstablishments Act, 1948, is seen to be certified on 9[th] day of September,2005. It is in the name of the second appellant. Under the heading “Natureof business”, it is stated “Sale of books, Sale of snacks, juice, cold drinkand ice cream”. The name of the establishment is known as “ChetnaBook Centre”, “Shree Krishna Food Corner”.

28. We can say the date of receipt, as far as 2005 is concerned, is06.09.2005. Still further, there is a reference to receipt dated 09.01.2007.Under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, under Section 7(2)(A),a registration certificate shall be valid upto the end of the year for whichit is granted. As it stands now, it is valid for a period of twelve monthsfrom the date it is granted or renewed. This is after the substitution byAct 25 of 2013. Therefore, the provision, which is relevant, is the previousprovision, under which, as noted, the registration certificate would bevalid upto the end of the year for which it was granted. Therefore, evengoing by the registration certificate produced and under the Act, wewould think that as it has been issued on 09.09.2005, it came to an endby the end of the year. The word “year” is defined in Section 2(32) asmeaning that “a year commencing first day of January”. Thus, even the A

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Aappellant apparently paid the fees for renewal of the registration only on09.01.2007. He did not pay any fees for renewal of the registrationduring the year 2006. On 30.11.2007, no doubt, registration certificatewas issued. The result is that during the year 2006, it can be concludedthat there was no registration for the business either in books or fastfood.B

29. This apart, the fact that under the Shops and EstablishmentsAct, it is undoubtedly true that a person having a shop must get itregistered. In other words, carrying on a shop or establishment, as definedin the Act, without registration, would make it illegal. The fact that thereis a registration, however, would not be sufficient to establish that thereCis use of the premises. In other words, even if a person has registration,that by itself would not mean that the tenant is actually using the premisesfor the purpose for which it is rented out to him. Actual use of the premisescan be established by various other circumstances like electricity bills,payment of wages to employees if there are employees, evidence relatingDto transactions of the business which is carried on etc. No doubt, theburden actually is on the landlord to establish the non-user. But since, inthis case, it would appear that there is no registration for the period, itshows that the appellants could not have lawfully conducted any businessin the suit premises. There is, no doubt, the evidence of PW1 also.

E30. Appellants have attempted to produce additional documents.The document is a notice issued for keeping open the shop on a Mondayon 11.09.2006. It is also stated, fine was paid of Rs.4,000/-. We findconsiderable substance in the contention of the respondent that additionalevidence can be admitted only if the grounds of Order 41 Rule 27 areestablished. We find no merit in the said application. Consequently, itFfails and it is dismissed.

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31. We would think that in the circumstances of the case, havingregard to the fact that two courts have found the ground of non-userunder Section 16(1)(n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999established and the facts as noted by us, particularly in an appeal afterGSpecial Leave, we do not deem it fit to interfere with the judgment of theHigh Court. The appeal shall stand dismissed.

Ankit Gyan

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