M/S ALAGU PHARMACY & ORS. versus N. MAGUDESWARI on 14 August 2018

M/S ALAGU PHARMACY & ORS.

v.

N. MAGUDESWARI

(Civil Appeal Nos. 8256-8257 of 2018)

AUGUST 14, 2018

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE ANDUDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.]

Rent Control and Eviction:

Eviction petition – Appellant claiming to be tenant ofrespondent on the strength of a Lease Agreement – Respondent-landlord lodged complaint with police against appellant allegingthat the Lease Agreement was forged – Pursuant to suit by appellantfor permanent injunction against respondent, compromise enteredinto between parties, before the police – Thereafter eviction petitionby respondent – Rent Controller decreed the eviction petition relyingon compromise decree between the parties – Compromise decreechallenged by the tenant,, in appeal – There was 604 days delay infiling the appeal – Appellate Court condoned the delay – Revisionpetition of respondent allowed by High Court disallowingcondonation of delay – Review petition dismissed – On appeal, held:Eviction of a tenant cannot be ordered, unless and until groundseeking eviction in terms of the concerned Rent Act is made out,even if parties entered into compromise – Validity on that count caneven be raised in execution – In the present case, the complaintproceeded on the premise that the lease deed was forged and therewas no relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties – Thus,ground under the provision of the Rent Act was not made out – Theassertion of appellants that pressure was exerted through the policeto enter the compromise is prima facie acceptable – Tamil NaduBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 – s. 10(2)(ii)(a) and10(3)(c) – Compromise.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The order passed by the appellate court showsthat compromise Exh.P-11 was brought about on 29.01.2014 thatis even before the eviction petition was filed by the respondent.

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AFurther, said compromise Exh.P-11 was addressed to theInspector of Police, City Crime Branch. The appellate court hadfurther observed that complaint Exh.P-10 and compromise Exh.P-11 were not disputed by the respondent and no document inrebuttal was filed. The complaint (Exh.P-10) proceeds on apremise that the lease deed dated 22.02.2012 was a forgedBdocument and there was no relationship of landlord-tenantbetween the parties. Yet an eviction petition was filed, seekingeviction of the appellants under the concerned Rent Act. Thereis an inherent contradiction in the stand adopted by theRespondent. In the circumstances, the assertion made by theCappellants that pressure was exerted through the police and theywere compelled to enter into compromise is prima facieacceptable. [Para 10] [1076-A-C]

Ajad Singh v. Chatra and Others (2005) 2 SCC 567 –relied on.D2. It is true that there was a delay of 604 days in filing theappeal, but in cases where there is reasonable doubt that policemay have forced a party to enter into compromise, the process ofCourt ought to weigh in favour of a party who alleges to be victimof such pressure. The order passed by the High Court does notEeven deal with this aspect nor was any submission made that theassessment made by the appellate court was in any way incorrector imperfect. [Para 10] [1076-D-E]

3. The eviction in terms of s. 10(2)(ii)(a) of Tamil NaduBuildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 can be orderedFonly if the concerned Rent Controller or Court is satisfied thatthe ground seeking eviction is made out. Unless and until groundseeking eviction in terms of the concerned Rent Act is not madeout, no eviction of a tenant can be ordered, even if the partieshad entered into a compromise. Thus in cases where protectionunder a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unlessGground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had enteredinto a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that count caneven be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground underthe Rent Act was made out. [Paras 12 and 14] [1082-C-D; 1077-HD]

K. K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri (1973) 1 SCC 761 : [1973]3 SCR 691; Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharamalias Brijram and Others (1974) 1 SCC 242 : [1974] 2SCR 544 – relied on.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8256-8257 of 2018.

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From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2016 and 02.12.2016of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai in C.R.P.(NPD) No. 586 of 2016 and Review Petition No. 89 of 2016 in C.R.P.(NPD) No. 586 of 2016 respectively.

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Ratnakar Dash, Sr. Adv., G. Sivabalamurugan, Karuppiah, VasanthaKumar, Ms. Vandana, Advs. for the appellants.

S. Thananjayan, Adv. for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E

UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and orderdated 29.03.2016 in Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No.586 of 2016 aswell as against the order dated 02.12.2016 in Review Petition No.89 of2016 in said Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No.586 of 2016 passed bythe High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai.

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3. The appellants 2 to 4 are doing business in the name and styleof M/s Alagu Pharmacy i.e. the appellant No.1. The appellants claim tobe tenants in the suit property owned by the respondent herein since1998. On or about 22.02.2012 a lease agreement was entered into,which according to the appellants was signed by the respondent,extending/renewing the period of lease. On 13.11.2013 and 07.12.2013the respondent had issued legal notices calling upon the appellants tovacate the suit property alleging inter alia that the lease agreement dated22.02.2012 was not signed by the respondent and was a forged document,to which reply was given by the appellants on 17.01.2014. On 17.01.2014

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Aitself a complaint (Exh.P-10) was lodged by the respondent allegingcommission of forgery. According to the appellants, on 20.01.2014 therespondent alongwith her husband and some henchmen tried to evict theappellants which attempt was successfully resisted by the appellants.In the circumstances, O.S. No.135 of 2014 was filed by the appellantson 21.01.2014 seeking relief of permanent injunction against theBrespondent from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoymentof the suit property save and except by due process of law. After hearingthe appellants, an ad interim injunction was granted by the District Munsif,Coimbatore.

4. It appears that on 29.01.2014 a compromise (Exh.P-11) wasCentered into between the appellants and the respondent. It is the case ofthe appellants that they were summoned to the police station in connectionwith the complaint lodged by the respondent (Exh.P-10) and under thepressure employed by the police, said Exh. P-11 was entered into. Soonthereafter an Eviction Petition i.e. R.C.O.P. No.29 of 2014 was filed by Dthe respondent before the Principal Rent Controller-cum-District Munsif,Coimbatore for eviction of the appellants. It is the case of the appellantthat they were again asked to appear before the police on 27.03.2014and under the pressure exerted by the police a compromise deed wasentered into under which the appellants agreed to vacate the suit property.Said compromise deed was presented before the Court on 28.03.2014Eand following order was passed by the Rent Controller and PrincipalDistrict Munsif, Coimbatore:

“Petition dated 08.02.2014 filed under Section 10(2)(ii)(a),10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,1960 and the petitioner filed this petition against the respondentsFto vacate the premises and to deliver the vacant possession ofthe petition mentioned property more fully described hereunderin the schedule and cost of this petition.

This petition coming on this day for hearing before me in thepresence of Thiru. M. Sanjaiyan, Advocate for petitioner and of Thiru.GSomasundaram, Advocate for respondent. Both parties filed compromisememo and both parties present and this day this Court doth order directas follows:

1. That the respondents be and are hereby granted time upto31.10.2015 to vacate the petition mentioned property and toH

handover the vacant possession of the same to the petitioner/landlord and

2. That the respondents are hereby directed to pay the presentmonthly rent of Rs.19080/- pm to the petitioner/landlord till thedate of delivery of possession of the property (i.e. upto31.10.2015) by way of cheque; and

3. That in case of default to do so by the respondents, the petitionersare entitled to take appropriate action through court of law againstthe respondents.

4. The compromise petition do form part of this final order, and

5. That there be no order as to cost.”

5. On 07.10.2015, a letter was sent by the respondent callingupon the appellants to vacate the premises by 31.10.2015 in terms of theaforesaid compromise decree. On 07.12.2015, an appeal being R.C.A.(CFR) No.31591 of 2015 was filed by the appellants before the PrincipalSubordinate Judge, Coimbatore against the aforesaid compromise decreedated 28.03.2014. Along with said appeal IA No.465 of 2015 was alsopreferred seeking condonation of delay of 604 days in filing said appeal.

6. The respondent having contested the matter, said IA No.465of 2015 was taken up for consideration by the appellate court. It wassubmitted on behalf of the appellants that they were pressurized intosigning the compromise deed and said compromise was brought aboutbecause of pressure exerted by the police. Reliance was placed oncomplaint Exh.P-10 by the respondent and compromise letter Exh.P-11dated 29.01.2014. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of therespondent that there were numerous occasions for the appellants toraise a grievance that the compromise in question was brought about bycoercion and yet no such objection was ever raised. It was, therefore,submitted that the delay of 604 days in preferring the appeal ought not tobe condoned.

7. The appellate court by its Order dated 19.01.2016 acceptedsaid IA No.465 of 2015 and condoned the delay subject to payment ofRs.2000/- by the appellants to the respondent. It was observed by theappellate court as under:

“8. The main contention of the respondent is compromise madebefore the trial court with free will and now the respondent is A

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tried to drag on the matter and preventing the respondent fromenjoying the fruit source of the compromise decree. On the sideof respondent Ex.R1 and R4 marked. Ex.R1 compromise memo;R2 document for already received the certified copy of fair andfinal order; R3 letter from the respondent to the petitioner; R4postal acknowledgement. On perusal of respondent sidedocuments to disprove the facts of Ex.P-10 and Ex.P-11 nodocuments have been filed. The landlord-tenant relationship isadmitted. The allegations made by the respondent against thepetitioners is lease deed dated 22.02.2012 is forged one andcomplaint has been given to the police regarding the forgeddocuments and the petitioners themselves come to the agreementthey are undertake to vacate the petition mentioned property,there is no police threat or complaint or coercion by the police orby the respondent. In order to consider the documents filed bythe petitioners Ex.P-10 is the police complaint, prepared by therespondent Magudeswari against the 2[nd] petitioner/appellant. Inthe complaint the allegations made against the 2[nd] petitioner isthat there is life threat to the respondents and the lease deed hasbeen created by the 2[nd] petitioner by forging the signature of therespondent and requesting the police to take proper legal actionagainst the 2[nd] petitioner. Once the written complaint filed beforethe police mentioning the name of the accused, if the policefinds it is true for that police have to register FIR against theaccused and proceed with the investigation as per law. But onperusing of Exh.P-11 compromise letter dated 29.01.2014between the respondent and the 2[nd] petitioner addressing to theinspector of police, City Crime Branch. In continuation the RCOPhas been filed and memo of compromise filed, compromise decreehas been passed. As stated above the duty of the police is onlyto register the case against the accused and proceed against theaccused for the offence committed for the crime, they are notentitled to make any compromise against the crime unless anduntil it is provided by law and further before when compromisearrived at court, the previous compromise has been arrived atpolice station. From Ex.P-11 itself there arises suspicion whetherthe petitioner has put into any force or any threat to make thecompromise before the court. Hence from the above discussions there is a police force with regard to file the compromise regardingRCOP 29/14 and previously compromise letter has been arrivedbefore the police. Hence there is a suspicion arises petitionermust be put into any threat or coercion at the time of filing thecompromise memo in RCOP and now the petitioner filed thepetition to condone the delay of 604 days. Hence from the abovediscussions it is clear the petitioners have explained the delay of604 days in filing the appeal and the explanation submitted bythe petitioners is acceptable one.”

8. The aforesaid order was challenged by the respondent bypreferring Civil Revision Petition before the High Court of Judicature atMadras which Revision Petition was allowed by the High Court vide itsorders dated 29.03.2016. It was observed by the High Court as under:

“5.There are two courses open to the tenants. One is thatthe tenants would have stated before the Court which recordedthe compromise that the compromise was out of compulsion orcoercion on the part of the police during enquiry of the complaintpreferred by the landlady. In that case, the Court which recordedthe compromise would have dealt with that issue. That is notthe case here. When that is not the case, it is far fetched for theappellate court to come to a conclusion that the tenants mighthave been put into coercion or force before entering into thecompromise. It is equally probable that in order to get the closureof complaint, the tenants would have opted to enter into acompromise and thereafter, the tenants are put forth an allegationof invalidity of compromise. Even if the tenants had somedifficulty in expressing themselves before the trial court, theappeal would have been filed immediately after the compromisedecree, if there had been any vitiating factors while entering intothe compromise. But, the appeal had not been filed in time.Therefore, the conduct of the tenants would only indicate theprocrastinating approach in dealing with their case.”

9. The appellants preferred a review petition which was rejectedby the High Court on 02.12.2016. This appeal challenges the correctnessof both the orders passed by the High Court. We heard Mr. RatnakarDash, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants and Mr. S. Thananjayan,learned Advocate appearing for the respondent.

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A10. The order passed by the appellate court shows that compromiseExh.P-11 was brought about on 29.01.2014 that is even before the evictionpetition was filed by the respondent. Further, said compromise Exh.P-11 was addressed to the Inspector of Police, City Crime Branch. Theappellate court had further observed that complaint Exh.P-10 andcompromise Exh.P-11 were not disputed by the respondent and noBdocument in rebuttal was filed. The complaint (Exh.P-10) proceeds ona premise that the lease deed dated 22.02.2012 was a forged documentand there was no relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties.Yet an eviction petition was filed, seeking eviction of the appellants underthe concerned Rent Act. There is an inherent contradiction in the standCadopted by the Respondent. In the circumstances, the assertion madeby the appellants that pressure was exerted through the police and theywere compelled to enter into compromise is prima facie acceptable. InAjad Singh v. Chatra and Others[1], compromise recorded in PoliceStation inter alia was not found to be acceptable by this Court and the matter was remanded. It was observed, “…..the appellate court oughtDto have taken note of the fact that the said compromise was recorded inthe Police Station and during the pendency of the suit.” It is true thatthere was a delay of 604 days in filing the appeal, but in cases wherethere is reasonable doubt that police may have forced a party to enterinto compromise, the process of Court ought to weigh in favour of aEparty who alleges to be victim of such pressure. It may be pertinent tonote that the order passed by the High Court does not even deal withthis aspect nor was any submission made that the assessment made bythe appellate court was in any way incorrect or imperfect.

11. Further, eviction petition was filed seeking eviction of theFappellants under Section 10(2)(ii)(a), 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Said Sections are as under:

“10(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to theController for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, aftergiving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing causeGagainst the application, is satisfied-

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(ii) that the tenant has after the 23rd October 1945 without thewritten consent of the landlord- H1 (2005) 2 SCC 567 (para 8)

(a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entirebuilding or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer onhim any right to do so, or

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(3) …….

(c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whetherresidential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anythingcontained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an orderdirecting any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of theremaining part of the building to put the landlord in possessionthereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residentialpurposes or for purposes of a business which he is carryingon, as the case may be.”

12. The eviction in terms of the aforesaid provisions can be orderedonly if the concerned Rent Controller or Court is satisfied that the groundseeking eviction is made out. It has been held by this Court that unlessand until ground seeking eviction in terms of the concerned Rent Act isnot made out, no eviction of a tenant can be ordered, even if the partieshad entered into a compromise. For example, in K.K. Chari v. R.M.Seshadri[2] this Court considered its earlier decisions in three cases asunder:- “20. There are three decisions of this Court which require to beconsidered. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass[3] a decreefor eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between theparties, was held, by this Court, to be a nullity as contraveningSection 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.The facts therein were as follows:

“The tenant and the son of the landlord referred the disputesbetween them to arbitration. The landlord was not a party tothis agreement. The arbitrators passed an award whereunderthe tenant was to give vacant possession of the premises infavour of the landlord within a particular time. This award wasmade a decree of court. The landlord, who was neither a party 2 (1973) 1 SCC 761

3 (1969) 2 SCR 432

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Ato the award nor to the proceedings, which resulted in the awardbeing made a decree of court, applied for eviction of the tenanton the basis of the award. The tenant resisted execution byraising various objections under Section 47 of the Code of CivilProcedure. One of the objections was that the decree foreviction based upon the award was a nullity as being opposedBto the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. This Courtheld that the decree directing the tenant to deliver possessionof the premises to the landlord was a nullity, as it was passedin contravention of Section 13(1) of the relevant statute. Afterquoting the sub-section, this Court further held that the decreeCfor eviction passed according to an award, in a proceeding towhich the landlord was not a party and without the courtsatisfying itself that a statutory ground of eviction existed, wasa nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. It will be seenfrom this decision that the decree was held to be a nullitybecause the landlord was not a party thereto, and also becauseDthe court had not satisfied itself that a ground for eviction, asrequired by the statute, existed. This decision is certainly anauthority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction hasto satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has beenmade out by a landlord. How exactly that satisfaction is to beEexpressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has notbeen laid down in this decision, as this court was not facedwith such a problem.”

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21. In Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K.L. Bansal[4 ]the question againrose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity of aFdecree passed for eviction on compromise. The plaintiff thereinfiled a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds—

(a) the premises were required for their own use; and (b)the tenant had committed default in payment of rent.

22. The tenant filed a written statement denying both theseallegations. He disputed the claim of the landlord regarding hisrequiring the premises for his own use bona fide and also thefact of his being in arrears. When the pleadings of the landlordand the tenant were in this state, both parties filed a compromise G

memo in and by which they agreed to the passing of a decree ofeviction against the tenant. Representations to the same effectwere also made by the counsel for both parties. The court passedthe following order:

“In view of the statement of the parties’ counsel and the writtencompromise, a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff againstthe defendant.”

The tenant did not vacate the premises within the timementioned as per the compromise memo. On the other hand,he filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil ProcedureCode pleading that the decree is void as being in contraventionof Section 13 of the Delhi statute. The High Court held thatthe decree was a nullity, as the order was passed solely on thebasis of the compromise without indicating that any of thestatutory grounds mentioned in Section 13 existed. Followingthe decision in Bahadur Singh this Court upheld the order ofthe High Court. Here again, it will be seen that the manner inwhich the court’s satisfaction is to be expressed or gatheredhas not been dealt with.

23. A similar question came up again before this Court in FeroziLal Jain v. Man Mal[5]. The landlord filed an application foreviction of the tenant on the ground that he had sublet the premiseswithout obtaining his consent in writing. Subletting, without theconsent of the landlord in writing, was one of the grounds, underSection 13(1) of the Delhi statute entitling a landlord to ask foreviction. The tenant denied the allegation that he had sublet thepremises. Both the landlord and the tenant entered into acompromise and the court, after recording the same, passed thefollowing order:

“As per compromise, decree for ejectment and for Rs 165with proportionate costs is passed in favour of the plaintiff andagainst the defendant. The parties shall be bound by the termsof the compromise. The terms of the compromise beincorporated in the decree-sheet....”

24. As the tenant did not surrender possession of the propertieswithin the time mentioned in the compromise memo, the landlord A

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Alevied execution. It was resisted by the tenant on various groundsone of which was that the decree for eviction was a nullity, beingin contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi Statute. Thiscontention was accepted by the execution court, as well as bythe High Court. This Court, after a reference to the provisionsof Section 13, held that a decree for recovery of possession canBbe passed only if the court concerned is satisfied that one orother of the grounds mentioned in the section is established. ThisCourt, further observed:

“From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage,the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the questionwhether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by itdoes not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complainedof has taken place, nor is there any other material on record toshow that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record thatthe court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromisearrived at between the parties. That being so there can behardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass theimpugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must beheld to be a nullity.”

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13. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam aliasEBrijram and Others[6]it was stated:-

“17.It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act and theMadras Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the Tribunalfrom passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which isnot any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant Sections ofthose statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to theRent Court that it shall not travel beyond the statutory groundsmentioned in Sections 12 and 13, and to the parties that theyshall not contract out of those statutory grounds, is inherent inthe public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act).

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18. In Rasiklal Chunilal case, a Division Bench of the GujaratHigh Court has taken the view that in spite of the fact that thereis no express provision in the Bombay Rent Act prohibitingcontracting out, such a prohibition would have to be read byimplication consistently with the public policy underlying this G

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welfare measure. If we may say so with respect, this is a correctapproach to the problem.

19. Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of theBombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeatesthe entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escapefrom the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is notcompetent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum orwith the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors theAct or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutorygrounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua non tothe exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under theseprovisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer suchjurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, accordingto the legislative mandate, it could not do.

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22. The mere fact that Order 23 Rule 3, of the Code of CivilProcedure is applicable to the proceedings in a suit under theBombay Rent Act, does not remove that fetter on the Rent Courtor empower it to make a decree for eviction de hors the statute.Even under that provision of the Code, the Court, before orderingthat the compromise be recorded, is required to satisfy itselfabout the lawfulness of the agreement. Such lawfulness orotherwise of the agreement is to be judged, also on the groundwhether the terms of the compromise are consistent with theprovisions of the Rent Act.

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27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principlethat emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree,there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which,the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence ofa statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Courtwas so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparentlypassed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Suchmaterial may take the shape either of evidence recorded orproduced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shapeof an express or implied admission made in the compromiseagreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the A

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Abest proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicialadmissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act,made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing ofthe case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions.The former class of admissions are fully binding on the partythat makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They byBthemselves can be made the foundation of the rights of theparties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which arereceivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, notconclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”

14. The common thread that runs through the aforesaidCpronouncements of this Court is – in cases where protection under aRent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seekingeviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise.Moreover, the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution.In the present case, the order dated 28.03.2014 did not remotely noteDthat any particular ground under the Rent Act was made out.

15. In the circumstances, in our considered view, the order passedby the appellate court was absolutely correct and did not call for anyinterference on part of the High Court. We, therefore, allow the presentappeals and restore the order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the appellateEcourt in IA No.465 of 2015. The appeal shall now be heard on meritsand disposed of in accordance with law. Since there was delay of morethan 600 days on part of the appellants, we direct that the appellantsshall pay costs of Rs.50,000/- to the respondent which shall be over andabove that already imposed by the appellant court and shall be madeover within six weeks from this Judgment. The appeals stand allowed inFthe aforesaid terms.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.

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