RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION versus BHARAT SINGH JHALA (DEAD) SON OF SHRI NATHU SINGH, THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS & ANR. on 30 September 2022

Conclusion

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentEand order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Division Bench of the HighCourt of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur passed in D.B. Civil SpecialAppeal (Writ) No.645 of 2020 by which the Division Bench of the HighCourt has dismissed the said appeal challenging the order passed by thelearned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellantFconfirming the order passed by the Labour Court setting aside the orderof termination passed against the workman, the Rajasthan State RoadTransport Corporation has preferred the present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are asunder:G2.1 The workman was serving on the post of Conductor. Adepartmental enquiry was initiated against him alleging not issuing thetickets to 10 passengers though he collected the amount of tickets. In thedepartment inquiry he was found guilty for the misconduct alleged. Theemployer – Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation terminated hisservices vide Order dated 31.07.2001.H

2.2 An application for approval of punishment order under Section33(2)(b) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as “theI.D. Act”) was submitted before the Industrial Tribunal on 31.07.2001.The Industrial Tribunal held the enquiry bad. However, the IndustrialTribunal vide Order dated 12.12.2012 allowed the appellant – Corporationto prove the charges before the Tribunal. Both the parties led the evidencebefore the Tribunal on the charges alleged. The appellants led, both, oralas well as documentary evidences. That on appreciation of entireevidence on record and considering the submissions made on behalf ofboth the parties, the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.07.2015 allowedthe application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act and granted theapproval of the order of termination. That thereafter and after a periodof approximately 19 years from the date of passing the order oftermination, the workman again raised the Industrial Dispute challengingthe order of termination of 2001. By Judgment and Award dated19.11.2019 the Labour Court, Jaipur allowed the said reference and setaside the order of termination. As in the meantime the workman diedand the dispute was raised after a period of 19 years, the Labour Courtpassed an order awarding 50% back wages from the date of terminationtill his death i.e. 10.12.2018. The Judgment and Award passed by theLabour Court was challenged before the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Againstthe award passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petitionthe appellant preferred the appeal before the Division Bench. Byimpugned judgment and order the High Court has dismissed the saidappeal which has given rise to the present appeal.

3. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently submittedthat in the facts and circumstances of the case the Hon’ble High Courthas committed a serious error in dismissing the writ appeal/writ petitionconfirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court.

3.1 It is submitted that once in an application under Section 33(2)(b)of the I.D. Act and pursuant to the earlier order passed by the IndustrialTribunal, the appellant was permitted to lead the evidence and prove thecharge/misconduct and thereafter when the order of termination wasapproved by the Industrial Tribunal, thereafter it was not open for theworkman to again raise the Industrial Dispute that too after a period of19 years. It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court has materiallyerred in confirming the judgment and award passed by the learned Labour AB

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ACourt quashing and setting aside the order of termination which assuch was approved by the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.

3.2 Making above submissions, it is prayed to allow the presentappeal.

4. Present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri H.D. Thanvi,Blearned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of JohnD’Souza vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (2019)14 Scale 57, it is vehemently submitted that as observed and held bythis Hon’ble Court the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and SectionC10 of the I.D. Act are distinct and different. It is submitted that asobserved and held by this Hon’ble Court in the aforesaid decision theproceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act are summary innature and findings recorded while deciding the application under Section33(2)(b) of the Act shall not affect the substantive right in a referenceunder Section 10 of the I.D. Act.D

4.2 It is submitted that therefore, the Labour Court did not commitany error in considering the validity of the order of termination andthereafter quashing and setting aside the same and ordering 50% backwages.

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4.3 It is submitted that considering the fact that the workman hasdied and his heir - widow is awarded 50% back wages only, the samemay not be interfered by this Court in exercise of powers under Article136 of the Constitution of India.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective partiesFat length.

5.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the workman wassubjected to departmental enquiry and the charge against the deceasedworkman was not issuing the tickets to 10 passengers though he collectedthe fare. On conclusion of the departmental enquiry his services wereGterminated. The termination was the subject matter of the approvalapplication before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. In the said proceedings the management waspermitted to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct beforethe Tribunal. In the said application the parties led the evidence, both,oral as well as documentary. Thereafter on appreciation of evidence onH

record, the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015 approved theorder of termination. That thereafter the workman raised the IndustrialDispute challenging the order of termination which as such was provedby the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015. Therefore, oncethe order of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal and themanagement was permitted to lead the evidence and prove themisconduct before the Court and thereafter on appreciation of evidencethe order of termination was approved, thereafter the fresh referenceunder Section 10 of the I.D. Act challenging the order of terminationwas not permissible. It is required to be noted that the order dated21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such is a higherforum than the Labour Court had attained the finality. Though theaforesaid fact was pointed out before the High Court, the High Courthas not at all considered and/or appreciated the same and has confirmedthe judgment and award passed by the Labour Court for setting asidethe order of termination which as such was approved by the IndustrialTribunal.

5.2 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision ofthis Court in the case of John D’Souza (supra) by the learned counselappearing on behalf of the respondent is concerned, on facts the saiddecision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In thepresent case by specific order the Industrial Tribunal permitted themanagement to lead the evidence and prove the misconduct before theCourt which as such was permissible. That thereafter the IndustrialTribunal approved the order of termination. Once the order of terminationwas approved by the Industrial Tribunal on appreciation of evidence ledbefore it, thereafter the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal werebinding between the parties. No contrary view could have been takenby the Labour Court contrary to the findings recorded by the IndustrialTribunal.

6. In view of the above, the judgment and award passed by theLabour Court confirmed by the High Court is unsustainable. The HighCourt has committed a very serious error in dismissing the writ petition/writ appeal confirming the judgment and award passed by the LabourCourt setting aside the order of termination.

7. In view of the above and for the reason stated above the presentappeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt confirming the judgment and award passed by the Labour Court AB

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[2022] 7 S.C.R.

Asetting aside the order of termination and the judgment and award passedby the Labour Court setting aside the order of termination are herebyquashed and set aside.

The Present Appeal is Allowed to the aforesaid extent. However,in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as toBcosts.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by: Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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