THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus DHRUV GURJAR AND ANOTHER on 22 February 2019

[2019] 4 S.C.R. 433

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

v.

DHRUV GURJAR AND ANOTHER

(Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 2019)

FEBRUARY 22, 2019

[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 320 and 482 – InSLP (Crl.) No.9859/13, FIR was lodged against the accused personsfor offences punishable u/ss. 307, 294 and 34, IPC – Accused filedpetition u/s.482, CrPC before the High Court for quashing thecriminal proceedings arising out of the said FIR on the basis of acompromise arrived at between the accused and the complainant –High Court quashed the criminal proceedings – In SLP (Crl.)No.9860/13, FIR filed against the accused persons for offencespunishable inter alia u/s.394, IPC and 25/27, Arms Act – Accusedapproached the High Court for quashing said FIR – High Courtquashed the criminal proceedings – On appeal, held: High Courthas not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged werenon-compoundable offences as per s.320, CrPC – It did not at allconsider the seriousness of the offences, its social impact andmechanically quashed the respective FIRs – High Court did notconsider the distinction between a personal or private wrong and asocial wrong and its social impact – Without proper application ofmind to the relevant facts and circumstances, the High Courtmaterially erred in quashing the respective FIRs observing that inview of the compromise, there are no chances of recording convictionand/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility – In SLP(Crl.)No.9860/2013, all the accused were absconding – After a periodof approximately three months after the incident, alleged to happenon 21.12.12, accused approached the High Court u/s.482, Cr.P.C.,on 12.03.2013 – In the meantime, the accused managed to get theaffidavits of the complainant and the two witnesses dtd. 09.02.2013and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013, within threedays from the date of filing the petition – Accused persons werefacing number of trials for the serious offences – High Court didnot consider the antecedents of the accused – It ought to have been

A

B

CDE

FG

H

Amore vigilant and consider facts and circumstances under whichthe accused entered into the settlement – Impugned judgments setaside– Respective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings beproceeded against the respective accused – Penal Code, 1860 –ss. 34, 294 307 and 394 –Arms Act– ss.25 and 27.

BAllowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The High Court has not at all considered thefact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offencesas per Section 320, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. From theimpugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High Courthas not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances ofCthe case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences andits social impact. From the impugned judgments and orderspassed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court hasmechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of itspowers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at allDconsidered the distinction between a personal or private wrongand a social wrong and the social impact. In the case at hand, theHigh Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entireconspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed thecriminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of therespective FIRs by the High Court in the present cases inter aliaEfor the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and394 of the IPC and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively,and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.is just contrary to the law laid down by Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. [Para 16.1][444-E-G; 445-A, B]F

of decisions. [Para 16.1][444-E-G; 445-A, B]F

1.2 The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is notin every case where the complainant has entered into acompromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction.Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early toopine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution stillGcan prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examiningthe other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, moreparticularly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong. [Para 18]

[451-F, G]

1.3 Without proper application of mind to the relevant factsHand circumstances, the High Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the respective FIRs, by observing that inview of the compromise, there are no chances of recordingconviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility.Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case of theappeal arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, the High Court haserred in quashing the FIR. It is required to be noted that the FIRwas lodged on 21.12.2012 for the offence alleged to happen on21.12.2012. All the accused were absconding. After a period ofapproximately three months, they approached the High Court byway of filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e., on12.03.2013. The Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a proclamationunder Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons on14.03.2013. In the meantime, the accused managed to get theaffidavits of the complainant and the two witnesses dated09.02.2013, and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013,i.e., within a period of three days from the date of filing the petition.The High Court has also not considered the antecedents of theaccused. It has come on record that the accused persons werefacing number of trials for the serious offences. The aforesaidwould be relevant factors, while exercising the inherent powersunder Section 482 Cr.P.C and while considering the applicationfor quashing the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings. In fact, insuch a situation, the High Court ought to have been more vigilantand ought to have considered relevant facts and circumstancesunder which the accused got the settlement entered into. TheHigh Court has not at all considered the aforesaid relevantcircumstances, while exercising the power under Section 482Cr.P.C. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the HighCourt are set aside, and the respective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the respectiveaccused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.[Paras 18.1, 18.2, 19][452-H; 453-A-F]

Shiji @ Pappu and others v. Radhika and another(2011) 10 SCC 705 : [2011] 13 SCR 135 – heldinapplicable.

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303: [2012] 8 SCR 753; State of Madhya Pradesh v.Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh AB

CDEF

G

H

436SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Av. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307 : [2015] 8 SCR 723;Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641;2019 SCC Online SC 7; State of Madhya Pradesh v.Kalyan Singh [2019] 1 SCALE 165; State ofMaharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi (2014) 15 SCC29; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCCB466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012 – relied on.

J. Ramesh Kamath v. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC179; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajveer Singh(2016) 12 SCC 471 : [2016] 2 SCR 1047; JitendraRaghuvanshi v. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCCC58 : [2013] 2 SCR 921; Anita Maria Dias v. State ofMaharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 290; Social Action Forumfor Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC443 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

D

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNo. 336 of 2019

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.04.2013 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal CaseNo. 2572 of 2013

With

Criminal Appeal No. 337 of 2019.

Issues

Varun K. Chopra, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. N. Dubey,Mukesh Kumar, Gurtej Pal Singh, Ms. Indira Bhakar, Ms. Aparna Trivedi,Santanu Singh Advs. for the Appellant.

Lakhan Singh Chouhan, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Narender Singh,Baby Devi Bonia, Binay Kumar Das, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by M.R. SHAH, J. 1. Leave granted in both the special leavepetitions.

2. As common question of law and facts arise in both these appeals,they are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013

3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 8.4.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572/2013, bywhich the High Court has allowed the said application preferred by therespondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accusedfor the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC,the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

4. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodgedagainst the accused at police station, Kotwali, District Datia for theoffences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, whichwas registered as Crime No. 552/2012. It was alleged that at about 8:00p.m. in the night on 17.12.2012 when after distributing the milk, Cheeni@ Devasik Yadav came in front of his house situated at RajghatViram,at the same time, Dhruv Gurjar (accused) being armed with 12 boregun, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3 to 4 otherpersons came there and asked him to take out his nephew, and they will A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Akill him as on account of enmity of scuffle took place between his nephewAnand and the accused persons. When complainant told them that mynephew is not here at the same time all of them started to abuse thecomplainant with filthy language and when he asked them not to do so,at the same time, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3-4other persons spoken that “kill this bastard”, at the same time, DhruvBGurjar made a fire with intention to kill him, whose pellets struck onthree places of his body, i.e., on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear,due to which, he sustained injuries and blood started oozing from it.According to the complainant, Rampratap Yadav and Indrapal Singhwere present on the spot, who had witnessed the incident. On hearingCthe noise of fire, when other people of vicinity reached there, then, all ofthese persons fled away from the spot of the incident.

4.1 On the basis of a report, a DehatiNalishi bearing No. 0/12was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. As thecomplainant sustained injuries, his MLC was performed. On the basisDof the contents of the said report, a Crime bearing No. 552/2012 wasregistered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and the criminalinvestigation was triggered. Thereafter, the investigation team reachedthe spot and prepared the spot map and articles were seized.

4.2 That on 18.12.2012, the statements of the witnesses wereErecorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. That on 21.03.2013, thepolice arrested the accused.

4.3 The accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of MadhyaPradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings againstFthe accused arising out of the FIR, on the basis of a compromise arrivedat between the accused and the complainant.

5. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, inexercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed thecriminal proceedings against the accused on the ground that the accusedGand the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While quashingthe criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court hasconsidered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji@ Pappu and others vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.

6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgmentand order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for theH

offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, theState of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013

7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 15.3.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 1936/2013, bywhich the High Court has allowed the said application preferred by therespondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accusedfor the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 ofM.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of MadhyaPradesh has preferred the present appeal.

8. The facts leading to this appeal are, that on 21.12.2012 onetruck driver by name Janki Kushwah informed the complainant – MalkhanSingh Yadav, who is also a truck driver that his truck was having someproblem and he is near Sitapur village. The complainant reached thereand found that his brother Mangal had also reached there with his truck.It is alleged that when they were busy in repairing the truck, four personsat around 5:00 a.m. came from the Sitapur village and they had beatenall of them with legs and fists and snatched cash of Rs.7,300/- and twoNokia mobiles having Sim Nos. [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] from thecomplainant – Malkhan Singh Yadav, Rs.19,000/- from Mangal andRs.16,500/- from Janki Kushwah and a Spice mobile having Sim No.[REDACTED]. That the complainant is driving on that route since last 7 to8 years and sometimes also stayed in Sitapur village. According to thecomplainant, all the four persons were known to him and one of them,namely, accused Tinku Sharma was having ‘Addhi’ in his hand, the secondone was Ravi Sharma, who was having gun in his hand, and the othertwo were Babloo Sharma and Bhurerai. All the accused persons afterrobbing the complainant, Mangal and Janki Kushwah, went towardsSitapur village.

8.1 That at 6:30 a.m., the complainant went to Goraghat PoliceStation, District Datia and lodged the first information report, which wasregistered as Crime No. 159 of 2012 against the accused under Section394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.Thereafter, the investigation was started and the police reached the spot A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aof the incident and prepared spot map and also recorded the statementof witnesses. Thereafter, they sent the complainant and two other personsto the District Hospital, Datia for medical examination, where the MedicalOfficer found simple injuries on various body parts of them.

8.2 The police on 27.01.2013 reached to the house of the accusedBpersons and in the village but could not found them and ultimately preparedthe ascendance panchnama. On 14.03.2013, the learned Chief JudicialMagistrate, Datia issued proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C.against the accused persons to appear before him on 16.04.2013.Meanwhile, on 12.03.2013, the accused persons approached the HighCourt of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing of FIR No.C159/2012, registered against them at Police Station Goraghat, DistrictDatia for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 ofM.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.

9. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, inexercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed theDcriminal proceedings against the accused on the ground that the accusedand the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While quashingthe criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court hasconsidered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra).

E

10. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgmentand order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for theoffences punishable under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K.Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of Madhya Pradesh haspreferred the present appeal.F

11. So far as the criminal appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.9859/2013 is concerned, it is required to be noted that the accused werefacing the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. It was alleged against the accused that atthe time of commission of the offence, the accused Dhruv Gurjar firedGfrom his fire arm on the original complainant with an intention to kill him,and the original complainant sustained serious injuries and the pelletsstruck on three places of his body, i.e., on the forehead, left shoulder andleft ear. That incident took place on 17.12.2012 and the investigatingofficer commenced the investigation, recorded the statement of thewitnesses under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. on 18.12.2012. The H

investigating officer also seized the articles. The Investigating officeralso collected the medical evidence. It appears that one of the co-accused, namely, Rohit Gurjar was arrested on 21.03.2013. Nothing inon record to show, whether in fact the respondent no.1 herein, the mainaccused – original accused no.1 was arrested or not. It appears thatduring the investigation, immediately, the original accused no.1 – DhruvGurjar approached the High Court on 5.4.2013 by filing an applicationunder Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR. Immediately onthe fourth day of filing of the application, by the impugned judgment andorder dated 8.4.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on theground that there is a settlement arrived at between the complainant andthe accused. While quashing the FIR, the High Court has relied uponthe decision of this Court in the case of Shjji (supra), specially theobservations recorded by this Court “that where there is no chance ofrecording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exerciseof a trial destined to be exercise of futility, the criminal case registeredagainst the accused persons, though it may not be compoundable, canbe quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482of the Cr.P.C”.

12. Now so far as the criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013 is concerned, original accused were facing the criminal proceedingsfor the offences under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K.Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. The incident was alleged tohappen on 21.12.2012. Immediately, the investigating officer started theinvestigation. All the accused were absconding. That when theinvestigation was in progress, the original accused approached the HighCourt by way of an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on12.03.2013 and prayed for quashing of the FIR. That on 14.03.2013, thelearned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued proclamation under Section 82of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before him on16.04.2013. That, by the impugned judgment and order dated 15.03.2013,the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that the originalcomplainant and the accused has entered into a compromise. Hence,the present appeals.

13. Shri Varun K. Chopra, learned advocate appearing on behalfof the State of Madhya Pradesh has vehemently submitted that in boththese cases, the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing therespective FIRs which were for the offences under Sections 307, 294

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Aand 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act andSections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively.

13.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearingon behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High Courthas quashed the respective FIRs mechanically and solely on the basis ofBthe settlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused,without even considering the gravity and seriousness of the offencesalleged against the accused persons.

13.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers underCSection 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the respective FIRs, the HighCourt has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged wereagainst the society at large and not restricted to the personal disputesbetween the two individuals.

13.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onDbehalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the decisionof this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respectiveFIRs. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the HighCourt ought to have appreciated that in all the cases where the complainanthas compromised/entered into a settlement with the accused, that neednot necessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording convictionEand/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility. Itis vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe appellant-State that in a given case despite the complainant may notsupport in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromisewith the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against theFaccused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on thebasis of the medical evidence and/or other evidence/material. It issubmitted that in the present cases the investigation was in progress andeven the statement of the witnesses was recorded and the medicalevidence was also collected. It is submitted that therefore in the factsand circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly erred inGconsidering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the case ofShiji (supra).

13.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant-State that as such in the appeal arising out ofSLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, in fact, the accused were absconding fromH

the day of the commission of the offence and, in fact, the learned ChiefJudicial Magistrate, Datia issued a proclamation under Section 82 of theCr.P.C. against the accused persons to appear before him. It is submittedthat in between the day of the alleged commission of the offence andfiling of the application before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,and while they were absconding, the accused managed to get the affidavitsof the complainant and other witnesses, which were dated 9.2.2013. Itis submitted that all these aforesaid circumstances and the conduct onthe part of the accused were required to be considered by the HighCourt while quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent powers underSection 482 of the Cr.P.C., and more particularly when the offencesalleged were against the society at large, namely, robbery and under theArms Act, and in fact non-compoundable. In support of his submissions,learned counsel for the appellant-State has placed reliance on thedecisions of this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab(2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014)10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179;State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471;ParbatbhaiAAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641; and2019SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh,decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019.

13.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaiddecisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of theappellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeals and quash andset aside the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Courtquashing and setting aside the respective FIRs, in exercise of its inherentpowers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accusedhas supported the impugned judgments and orders passed by the HighCourt.

14.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned advocate appearingon behalf of the accused that in the facts and circumstances of the caseand when the complainant and the accused entered into a compromiseand settled the disputes amicably among themselves, and therefore whenthe High Court found that there is no chance of recording convictionagainst the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would bean exercise of futility, the High Court has rightly exercised the powers AB

C

D

E

F

GH

Aunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has rightly quashed the respective FIRs.In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the accused has placedreliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of JitendraRaghuvanshi vs. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCC 58; Anita MariaDias vs. State of Maharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 290; and Social ActionForum for Manav Adhikar vs. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443.B14.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaiddecisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.

15. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length.

16. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the presentCappeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 ofthe Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIRs for the offences under Sections 307,294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Actand Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively, solely on the basis of acompromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view ofDthe compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering thedecision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court hasobserved that there is no chance of recording conviction against theaccused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise infutility, the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs.

E16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the factthat the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it appearsthat the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts andcircumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of theoffences and its social impact. From the impugned judgments and ordersFpassed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanicallyquashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the distinctionbetween a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the socialimpact. As observed by this Court in the case of State of MaharashtraGvs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principalduty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quashthe criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find outthe thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed,it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the saidexperience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and H

courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at alltaken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in properperspective and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically.Even, the quashing of the respective FIRs by the High Court in thepresent cases for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of theIPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27of the Arms Act respectively, and that too in exercise of powers underSection 482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by thisCourt in a catena of decisions.

16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, thisCourt has observed and held as under:

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can besummarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing acriminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherentjurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to acriminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutorylimitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelineengrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what casespower to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR maybe exercised where the offender and the victim have settled theirdispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of eachcase and no category can be prescribed. However, before exerciseof such power, the High Court must have due regard to the natureand gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mentaldepravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot befittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and theoffender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not privatein nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, anycompromise between the victim and the offender in relation tothe offences under special statutes like the Prevention of CorruptionAct or the offences committed by public servants while workingin that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashingcriminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminalcases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavourstand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularlythe offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes wherethe wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the partieshave resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, theHigh Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,because of the compromise between the offender and the victim,the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuationof the criminal case would put the accused to great oppressionand prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him bynot quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlementand compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Courtmust consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interestof justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuationof the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of processof law despite settlement and compromise between the victimand the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it isappropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answerto the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shallbe well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

B

C

D

16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014)6 SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:

E

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay downthe following principles by which the High Court would be guidedin giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the partiesand exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code whileaccepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusingFto accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminalproceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to bedistinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compoundthe offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, underSection 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powerto quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which arenot compoundable, where the parties have settled the matterbetween themselves. However, this power is to be exercisedsparingly and with caution.

G

H

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on thatbasis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, theguiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinionon either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutionswhich involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravityor offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are notprivate in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,for the offences alleged to have been committed under specialstatute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offencescommitted by public servants while working in that capacity arenot to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise betweenthe victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularlythose arising out of commercial transactions or arising out ofmatrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed whenthe parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examineas to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak andcontinuation of criminal cases would put the accused to greatoppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be causedto him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the categoryof heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generallytreated as crime against the society and not against the individualalone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merelybecause there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or thecharge is framed under this provision. It would be open to theHigh Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collectedsufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving thecharge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whethersuch injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, natureof weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries sufferedby the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis ofthis prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whetherthere is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances ofconviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuseto accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedingswhereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the HighCourt to accept the plea compounding the offence based oncomplete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Courtcan also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between theparties is going to result in harmony between them which mayimprove their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately afterthe alleged commission of offence and the matter is still underinvestigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting thesettlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It isbecause of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still onand even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, thosecases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to startor the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can showbenevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after primafacie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almostcomplete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is atthe stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrainfrom exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as insuch cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the casefinally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether theoffence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, inthose cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trialcourt and the matter is at the appellate stage before the HighCourt, mere compromise between the parties would not be aground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offenderwho has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recordedof a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparinga convict found guilty of such a crime.”

16.4 In the case of ParbatbhaiAahir (supra), again this Courthas had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash theFIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdictionunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of decisions of thisCourt on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions:

“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of theHigh Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or tosecure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer newpowers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere inthe High Court.

(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court toquash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on theground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offenderand the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction forthe purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding anoffence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions ofSection 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 isattracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding orcomplaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction underSection 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends ofjustice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wideambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends ofjustice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

(5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first informationreport should be quashed on the ground that the offender andvictim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the factsand circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration ofprinciples can be formulate.

(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and whiledealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the HighCourt must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravityor offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriatelybe quashed though the victim or the family of the victim havesettled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not privatein nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision tocontinue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overridingelement of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminalcases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of acivil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exerciseof the inherent power to quash is concerned.

(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise fromcommercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similartransactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriatesituations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminalproceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of acriminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out inPropositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving thefinancial and economic well-being of the State have implicationswhich lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between privatedisputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quashwhere the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial oreconomic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the actcomplained of upon the financial or economic system will weighin the balance.”

16.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specificallyobserved and held that, when it comes to the question of compoundingan offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC (as in the appeal @SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013) along with Sections 25 and 27 of the ArmsAct (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013), by no stretch ofimagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private partiessimpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impacton the society at large. It is further observed that where the accusedare facing trial under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 IPC as well as Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, as the offences are definitelyagainst the society, accused will have to necessarily face trial and comeout unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.

16.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specificallyobserved that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundableand as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute betweenthe parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of theproceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar isthe view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the caseof Kalyan Singh (supra).

17. Now so far as the decisions of this Court upon which thelearned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has placed reliance,referred to hereinabove, are concerned, none of the decisions shall be ofany assistance to the accused in the present case. In all the aforesaidcases, the dispute was a matrimonial dispute, and/or the disputepredominantly of a civil dispute, and/or of the dispute where the wrongis basically private or personal.

18. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of thisCourt in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respective FIRsby observing that as the complainant has compromised with the accused,there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trialwould be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion thatthe High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIRs on the aforesaidground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied thesaid decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought tohave appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant hasentered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be anyconviction.Such observations are presumptive and many a time too earlyto opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still canprove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the otherwitnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly whenthe dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this Court foundthat the case had its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, whichdispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court observed that,‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant isnot ready to support the allegations…will be a futile exercise that willserve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed A

B

CD

E

FG

H

A‘that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to thecomplainant, were not supporting the prosecution version’, and to thatthis Court observed and held ‘that the continuance of the proceedings isnothing but an empty formality and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in suchcircumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuseof the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by theBcourts below. Even in the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observedas under:

“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude ofthe power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatoryfor the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care andCcaution. The width and the nature of the power itself demandsthat its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Courtis, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuanceof the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the processof law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate theDsituations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 maybe justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of powermust be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases whererefusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of theprocess of law. The High Court may be justified in declininginterference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannotEassume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petitionunder Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to theabove, the High Court will have to consider the facts andcircumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit casein which the inherent powers may be invoked.”F

18.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a casewhich has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the partieshave resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society atlarge and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicableGin a case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences,having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC and 25/27 ofthe Arms Act etc. Therefore, without proper application of mind to therelevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court hasmaterially erred in mechanically quashing the respective FIRs, byobserving that in view of the compromise, there are no chances ofH

recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise infutility. The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaiddecision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), without consideringthe relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

18.2 Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the caseof the appeal arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, the High Court haserred in quashing the FIR. It is required to be noted that the FIR waslodged on 21.12.2012 for the offence alleged to happen on 21.12.2012.All the accused were absconding.After a period of approximately threemonths, they approached the High Court by way of filing a petition underSection 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e., on 12.03.2013. The learned Chief JudicialMagistrate issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. againstthe accused persons on 14.03.2013. In the meantime, the accusedmanaged to get the affidavits of the complainant and the two witnessesdated 09.02.2013, and the High Court quashed the FIR on 15.03.2013,i.e., within a period of three days from the date of filing the petition. TheHigh Court has also not considered the antecedents of the accused. Ithas come on record that the accused persons were facing number oftrials for the serious offences. The aforesaid would be relevant factors,while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C and whileconsidering the application for quashing the FIR/complaint/criminalproceedings. In fact, in such a situation, the High Court ought to havebeen more vigilant and ought to have considered relevant facts andcircumstances under which the accused got the settlement entered into.The High Court has not at all considered the aforesaid relevantcircumstances, while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, both theseappeals succeed, and are hereby allowed. The impugned judgmentsand orders passed by the High Court are hereby set aside, and therespective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded againstthe respective accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance withlaw.

Divya Pandey

Appeals allowed.

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H