Supreme Court of India
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus RAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS on 15 February 2022
Citations and Judicial Treatment
Cited by
6
Decisions in the index citing it
Cites
6
Decisions referred to
In this index
5
Of the decisions it cites
Overruled / Questioned
0
No negative treatment found
Loading the citing and cited decisions…
This judgment in the centre: on the left the decisions it cites, on the right the decisions citing it. Colour is the treatment; choose a decision to open it.
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
RAVINDRA KUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS
(Civil Appeal No. 382 of 2012)
FEBRUARY 15, 2022
[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Suit – Suit for declaration – The wife of respondent wasallotted a plot in Sector 15A, Noida on 10.3.1981 – She sworn onaffidavit dated 4.3.1983 that neither she nor her spouse ownedany other plot in Noida – On 6.10.1981 respondent was allottedresidential plot in Sector 30, Noida – The allotment was inter aliasubject to term and condition that a person himself owning, or incase of his spouse or dependent children owning a plot withinMunicipal Corporation of Delhi or New Delhi or Noida complex,will not be eligible for allotment of a plot in Noida – Respondentfiled affidavit alongwith his letter dated 1.12.1988 stating that he,his spouse and dependent children did not own in full or part anyresidential plot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi and New Delhi – Thewife of respondent transferred the Sec 15A plot vide transfer deedexecuted on 25.10.1990 – Respondent was served notice on12.6.1996 that the Sector 30 plot had been obtained by him bysubmitting a false affidavit as Sector 15A plot was already allottedto his wife – After reply to notice, the allotment was cancelled on18.10.1996 – Respondent filed suit for declaration restraining theappellant from re-allocating the Sec 30 plot & from dispossessingthe respondent – Trial court decreed the suit – First Appellate Courtand the High Court affirmed the findings of trial court – Held: Thesecond plot (Sector 30 plot) allotted to the respondent had beenallotted against the express terms of allotment – There is neitherequity nor any law in favor of the respondent – A person whomisleads the Authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitledto any relief – Judgment & decree of the Courts below set aside –Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976 – s.14.
Affidavit – Filing of false affidavit – Effect – Held: Affidavitsare not mere sheet of paper but a solemn statement made before aperson authorized to administer oath or to accept affirmation –
A
B
C
DE
F
G
H
AThe filing of a false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitablerelief – On facts, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained afterfiling false affidavit was a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease.
Fraud – Effect – Held: It vitiates all actions.
Allowing the appeal, the CourtB
HELD:1. The plaintiff had invoked the jurisdiction of theCivil Court even though he had filed a false affidavit that his spouseor dependent children have not been allotted any plot.[Para 14][1121-B]
Conclusion
C2. It is an admitted fact that the wife of the plaintiff wasallotted Sector 15A plot on 10.3.1981. The wife sworn an affidaviton 4.3.1983 that neither she nor her spouse owned any otherplot in Noida. It was on 6.10.1981 that the plaintiff was informedabout allotment of residential plot measuring 450 sq. yards inSector 30. The allotment was said to be subject to terms andDconditions as enclosed.Such terms show that a person himselfowning, or in case of his spouse or dependent children owning aplot within the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or New Delhi orNoida complex, will not be eligible for allotment of a plot in Noida.The affidavit of the wife of the plaintiff was false as the plotEmeasuring 450 sq. yards stood allotted to the plaintiff on 6.10.1981.Therefore, on the date the wife of the plaintiff had sworn theaffidavit, the Sector 30 plot was already allotted to the plaintiff.The argument that plot might have been allotted but thepossession was not with the wife of the plaintiff is incorrect. Theaffidavit was to the effect that she has not been allotted any plotFeither in her name or in the name of her husband. The affidavitwas not that the plot has been allotted but possession has notbeen delivered. On the other hand, the plaintiff had sworn anaffidavit, sent to the appellant with his letter dated 1.12.1988 thathe, his spouse and dependent children do not own in full or inGpart on leasehold or freehold basis any residential plot. Eventhis affidavit is in respect of allotment of a plot not in respect ofdelivery of possession. It may be stated that when in 1988, theplaintiff had sworn the affidavit, the lease deed dated 31.1.1983already stood executed in respect of Sector 15A plot. Since the H
lease was executed, the wife of the plaintiff applied for permissionto transfer which was granted and transfer deed was executed on25.10.1990. The permission was granted by the appellant withouthaving knowledge of the fact that the husband of the allottee hasalready been allotted a separate plot. Once an affidavit has beenfiled which is on the face of it false to the knowledge of theexecutants, no benefit can be claimed on the ground that deliveryof possession was given. [Paras 15 & 16][1121-C-H; 1122-A-B]
3. Affidavits filed are not mere sheet of paper but a solemnstatement made before a person authorized to administer oathor to accept affirmation. The plaintiff had breached such solemnstatement made on oath. The terms and conditions of allotmentconveyed to the plaintiff on 1.12.1988 have a specific clause thatif allotment is obtained by any misrepresentation or misstatementor fraud, the lease may be cancelled and the possession of theplot and the building thereon may be taken by the Authority.Therefore, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained after filingfalse affidavit is a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease. Fraudvitiates all actions. [Paras 18 & 19][1122-F-H; 1123-A]
4. The argument that the lease was required to bedetermined by the Chief Executive Officer is not tenable. Thedetermination of lease by the Chief Executive Officer would ariseif in case there was any violation of the terms of lease. If thecondition precedent for grant of lease itself was fraudulent, thecancellation of lease was not required to be preceeded bypermission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still further, the ChiefExecutive Officer has granted permission on 13.9.1998, thoughthe cancellation order was passed on 18.10.1996. Thus, it is acase of irregularity at best which stands removed with thepermission of the Chief Executive Officer. The argument that ifthe statute prescribes a power to do a certain thing in a certainway, such thing must be done in that way and other modes ofperformance are necessarily forbidden is not applicable in thepresent case. Firstly, for the reason that admittedly, false affidavitswere filed by the plaintiff as well as by his wife. The filing of afalse affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitable relief.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
ASecondly, any irregularity in the process of cancellation standscured with Chief Executive Officer granting permission on13.9.1998. [Para 20][1123-E-H; 1124-A]
5. The fact is that the second plot allotted to the plaintiffhad been allotted against the express terms of allotment.BTherefore, there is neither equity nor any law in favor ofthe plaintiff. A person who misleads the Authority in obtainingallotment of a plot is not entitled to any relief. [Para 23][1124-C-D]
ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 7CSCC 493 : [2011] 7 SCR 66; Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd.v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 130 : [2003]6 Suppl. SCR 1235 and Managing Director, HaryanaState Industrial Development Corporation & Ors. v.Hari Om Enterprises & Anr. (2009) 16 SCC 208 : [2008]9 SCR 821 – distinguished.DM. Veerabhadra Rao v. Tek Chand 1984 (Supp) SCC571: 1985 SCR 1003 – referred to.
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath(Dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1: [1993] 3 Suppl.SCR 422 – relied on.E
Case Law Reference
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 382 of2012.GFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25.02.2010 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh in Second Appeal No.363 of2000.
Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Adv., Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das,Ms. Neha Das, Advs. for the Appellant.
P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., Manish K. Bishnoi, Ms. Pallavii Singh,Ms. Harshika Verma, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed by the original defendantagainst the judgment and decree passed by the High Court on 25.02.2010upholding the findings of the first Appellate Court dated 19.12.1999whereby the decree of the Trial Court was affirmed.
2. The plaintiff-respondent was allotted a residential plot No. D-49, Sector- 30, Noida[1] as a member of the Defence Services CooperativeHousing Society on 06.10.1981. The possession of the plot was handedover to him on 24.08.1991.
3. However, prior to the allotment of the said plot, plot No. 84,Sector- 15A, Noida[2] was allotted to Smt. Amila Singhvi, wife of theplaintiff on 10.03.1981. As per the pleaded case of the plaintiff, therewas an uncertainty on account of litigation between the Society of whichhe was a member with the appellant authority. Therefore, the plot atSector 15A was applied for, which was allotted to the plaintiff’s wife on10.3.1981. It was pleaded that since the plaintiff was interested in Sector30 plot as member of the Society, therefore, the wife of the plaintifftransferred the Sector 15A plot in favor of one Mrs. Kanta Modi afterobtaining permission from the appellant. Later, a transfer deed wasexecuted on 25.10.1990.
4. The plaintiff was served with a notice on 12.06.1996 that theSector 30 plot had been obtained by him by submitting a false affidavitas Sector 15A plot was already allotted to his wife. The grievance of theplaintiff was that since the Sector 15A plot has been sold after obtainingpermission from the appellant, therefore, the Sector 30 plot was the onlyplot in possession of the plaintiff. With the said claim, the suit fordeclaration was filed restraining the defendant from re-allocating theSector 30 plot and from dispossessing the plaintiff from the same. Afterconsidering the reply, the plot was cancelled on 18.10.1996.
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sector 30 Plot’
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Sector 15A Plot’
A
B
C
DE
F
G
H
A5. In the written statement filed by the appellant, it was assertedthat there was no litigation in respect of the Sector 15A plot and that theplaintiff was aware of the allotment of the Sector 15A plot when Sector30 plot was allotted. However, the plaintiff intentionally concealed suchfactum of allotment and filed a false affidavit for the Sector 30 plot. Itwas also pleaded that the plaintiff was aware of the terms and conditionsBof allotment that the plaintiff and his wife cannot retain both the plotsseparately. The Sector 15A plot was sold only to conceal the fact ofobtaining double allotment. It was further contended that Sector 15Aplot was allotted on 10.03.1981 and the wife of the plaintiff sworn anaffidavit on 04.03.1983 that the allotee, her spouse and dependent childrenChave not been allotted residential plot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi or NewDelhi. The plaintiff was allotted Sector 30 plot on 06.10.1981. The plaintiffhad also filed an affidavit along with his letter dated 1.12.1988 that he,his spouse and dependent children did not own in full or part any residentialplot/house/flat in Noida, Delhi and New Delhi. The affidavit filed by theplaintiff reads thus:D
“AFFIDAVIT
I, Ravindra Kumar Singhvi S/o Late Shri K.M. Singhvi R/o of E-227, East of Kailash, New Delhi-110065, aged about 39 years dohereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as under:- E1.That I have attained the age of majority on 26.01.1968.
2. That I am a bonafide and registered member of the DefenceServices Cooperative Housing Society (Regd.) in my ownname and right on May 1, 1976.
3. That I have deposited Rs.125/- as membership fee of theFabove cooperative housing society on 18.07.1975.
4. That I, my spouse and dependent children do not own in fullor in part on lease hold or free hold basis any residentialplot or house in NOIDA and have not been allotted anyplot, or house on hire purchase basis in NOIDA complex.”
G6. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit inter alia on the groundthat the lease executed in favour of the plaintiff cannot be determinedmerely by passing the subject order in terms of Section 111 (g) of theTransfer of Property Act, 1887 as no notice for determination of leaseunder the said section has been issued. Therefore, all rights in the leaseHwould survive. The first Appellate Court and the High Court affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court. The High Court further heldthat plaintiff and his wife had no ulterior motive to perpetrate fraud onthe appellants. It was noted that there was no willful or dishonest intentionon the part of the plaintiff and his wife.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant herein argued that the entirebasis of the decree passed by the Courts was erroneous and whollyuntenable in law. Lease was not cancelled for the reason that there wasany violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. The allotment wascancelled as false affidavits were filed by the allotees of both the plotswhich knocks down the very allotment since it was obtained by concealingmaterial facts. The appellant had a policy that a family would not getmore than one plot so as to provide housing to large number of citizens.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the letter ofallotment of plot to the plaintiff dated 6.10.1981 along with the terms andconditions for the sale of developed leasehold rights of residential plotsto the members of the Cooperative Housing Building Societies in NewOkhla Industrial Development Area (NOIDA). It was contended thatsuch terms and conditions were applicable to all the Cooperative HousingBuilding Societies. The relevant conditions read thus:
“1. ELIGIBILITY:
Any person who is competent to contract. A person himself owningor in the case of his/her spouse or dependent children owning aplot or house within municipal corporations of Delhi or New Delhior Noida Complex will not be eligible for allotment of a plot inNOIDA.
2. NOTE MORE THAN ONE PLOT:
An eligible person will be allotted not more than one residentialplot in the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority. Areaseparately eligible for allotment of plot and for this purpose theyshall be treated as a single eligible person.
xxxxxxxxx
15. LEASE DEED AND OTHER CONDTIONS OF LEASE
xxxxxxxxx
(I) If the allotment of lease of the plot is obtained by anymisrepresentation misstatement or fraud or if there is any breach A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
Aof the conditions of the lease, the allotment or as the case may be,the lease may be cancelled and the possession of the plot and thebuilding thereon may be taken over by the Authority and the lesseewill not be entitled to any compensation.”
9. Thus, it was averred that the allotment was cancelled for theBreason that the wife of the plaintiff was allotted a plot earlier in point oftime but still, the plaintiff filed an affidavit not disclosing the allotment ofsuch plot to his spouse. Thus, it was a violation of the terms and conditionsof the allotment.
10. On the other hand, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counselCfor the plaintiff argued that the terms and conditions of the sale ofdeveloped leasehold rights have not been produced on record. The plaintiffbecame the member of the Cooperative Housing Society in the year1976 but the disputes were pending for a long time. Therefore, the plotat Sector 15A was sought, which was allotted to his wife. Subsequently,after the settlement of the dispute, such plot was allotted to the SocietyDand as a member of the Society, he has been allotted a residential plot.
11. It has been admitted by the plaintiff-respondent that on accountof dispute regarding the allotment, no construction has been raised overthe said plot.
12. It was further submitted that in terms of Section 14 of theEUttar Pradesh Industrial Development Act, 1976, the Chief ExecutiveOfficer can resume the site or building in case of non-payment ofconsideration or any installment or breach of any condition of suchtransfer or breach of any rule or regulation made. The judgment of thisCourt reported as ITC Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[3 ]hasFbeen relied upon to submit that in case a lessee commits default in payingeither the premium or lease amount or commits breach of any term ofthe lease, the Chief Executive Officer alone can resume the plot. TheAuthority to resume implies and includes the Authority to unilaterallycancel the lease as well.G13. It was also argued that the finding of fact recorded by the trialcourt and affirmed by the First Appellate Court was not interfered withby the High Court in the second appeal as no substantial question of lawarose for consideration. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied H3 (2011) 7 SCC 493
upon judgments of this Court reported as Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v.U.T., Chandigarh & Ors.[4]and Managing Director, Haryana StateIndustrial Development Corporation & Ors. v. Hari Om Enterprises& Anr.[5]to contend that determination of lease has to be the last resort.
14. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and find thatthe plaintiff had invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Court even thoughhe had filed a false affidavit that his spouse or dependent children havenot been allotted any plot.
15. It is an admitted fact that the wife of the plaintiff was allottedSector 15A plot on 10.3.1981. The wife sworn an affidavit on 4.3.1983that neither she nor her spouse owned any other plot in Noida. It was on6.10.1981 that the plaintiff was informed about allotment of residentialplot measuring 450 sq. yards in Sector 30. The allotment was said to besubject to terms and conditions as enclosed. The relevant extract fromsuch terms and conditions have been reproduced above. Such termsclearly show that a person himself owning, or in case of his spouse ordependent children owning a plot within the Municipal Corporation ofDelhi or New Delhi or Noida complex, will not be eligible for allotmentof a plot in Noida. The affidavit of the wife of the plaintiff was false asthe plot measuring 450 sq. yards stood allotted to the plaintiff on 6.10.1981.Therefore, on the date the wife of the plaintiff had sworn the affidavit,the Sector 30 plot was already allotted to the plaintiff. The argumentthat plot might have been allotted but the possession was not with thewife of the plaintiff is incorrect. The affidavit was to the effect that shehas not been allotted any plot either in her name or in the name of herhusband. The affidavit was not that the plot has been allotted butpossession has not been delivered.
16. On the other hand, the plaintiff had sworn an affidavit, sentto the appellant with his letter dated 1.12.1988 that he, his spouse anddependent children do not own in full or in part on leasehold or freeholdbasis any residential plot. Even this affidavit is in respect of allotmentof a plot not in respect of delivery of possession. It may be stated thatwhen in 1988, the plaintiff had sworn the affidavit, the lease deeddated 31.1.1983 already stood executed in respect of Sector 15A plot.Since the lease was executed, the wife of the plaintiff applied for 4 (2004) 2 SCC 130
A
B
E
F
G
H
Apermission to transfer which was granted and transfer deed wasexecuted on 25.10.1990. The permission was granted by the appellantwithout having knowledge of the fact that the husband of the allotteehas already been allotted a separate plot. Once an affidavit has beenfiled which is on the face of it false to the knowledge of the executants,no benefit can be claimed on the ground that delivery of possessionBwas given.
17. In M. Veerabhadra Rao Vs. Tek Chand[6], this Court wasconsidering an affidavit attested by an Advocate in terms of Section3(2) of the Oaths Act, 1969. The conduct of appellant to attest an affidavitwithout oath and the attestation on the representation of the respondentCthat it bears his signatures, came up for consideration. In thesecircumstances, this Court held as under:
“17. The expression ‘affidavit’ has been commonly understood tomean a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath oron affirmation before an authorised Magistrate or officer. AffidavitDhas been defined in sub-clause (3) of Section 3 of the GeneralClauses Act, 1897 to include ‘affirmation and declaration in thecase of person by law allowed to affirm or declare instead ofswearing.’ The essential ingredients of an affidavit are that thestatements or declarations are made by the deponent relevant toEthe subject matter and in order to add sanctity to it, he swears oraffirms the truth of the statements made in the presence of aperson who in law is authorised either to administer oath or toaccept the affirmation……”
18. Therefore, affidavits filed were not mere sheet of paper but aFsolemn statement made before a person authorized to administer oath orto accept affirmation. The plaintiff had breached such solemn statementmade on oath.
19. The terms and conditions of allotment conveyed to the plaintiffon 1.12.1988 have a specific clause that if allotment is obtained by anyGmisrepresentation or misstatement or fraud, the lease may be cancelledand the possession of the plot and the building thereon may be taken bythe Authority. Therefore, cancellation of allotment of plot obtained afterfiling false affidavit is a legitimate ground of cancellation of lease. Fraud NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. RAVINDRAKUMAR SINGHVI (DEAD) THR. LRS [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]
vitiates all actions as laid down by this Court in S.P. ChengalvarayaNaidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.[7]whereinit was held as under:
“5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The shortquestion before the High Court was whether in the facts andcircumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminarydecree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however,went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse.We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal dutycast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and proveit by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannotbe pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes anengine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts oflaw are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One whocomes to the court, must come with clean hands. We areconstrained to say that more often than not, process of the courtis being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of lifefind the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gainsindefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’scase is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. Hecan be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.”
20. The argument that the lease was required to be determinedby the Chief Executive Officer is not tenable. The determination of leaseby the Chief Executive Officer would arise if in case there was anyviolation of the terms of lease. If the condition precedent for grant oflease itself was fraudulent, the cancellation of lease was not required tobe preceeded by permission of the Chief Executive Officer. Still further,the Chief Executive Officer has granted permission on 13.9.1998, thoughthe cancellation order was passed on 18.10.1996. Thus, it is a case ofirregularity at best which stands removed with the permission of theChief Executive Officer. The argument that if the statute prescribes apower to do a certain thing in a certain way, such thing must be done inthat way and other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden isnot applicable in the present case. Firstly, for the reason that admittedly,false affidavits were filed by the plaintiff as well as by his wife. The A
B
D
E
F
G
Afiling of a false affidavit disentitles the plaintiff for any equitable relief.Secondly, any irregularity in the process of cancellation stands curedwith Chief Executive Officer granting permission on 13.9.1998.
21. The judgment in ITC Limited as relied upon by the respondentis on altogether different facts. In that case, the allotment made in favourBof ITC Limited was subject matter of challenge in Public Interest Litigationin writ petitions filed before the Allahabad High Court. The issue was inrespect of cancellation of lease on account of violation of the terms, notbased upon fraud in obtaining the lease.
22. The judgments of this Court in Teri Oat Estates and HariCOm Enterprises are also on different facts wherein the Doctrine ofProportionality was applied.
23. The fact is that the second plot allotted to the plaintiff hadbeen allotted against the express terms of allotment. Therefore, there isneither equity nor any law in favor of the plaintiff. A person who misleadsDthe Authority in obtaining allotment of a plot is not entitled to any relief.
24. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decreeof the courts below are set aside and the suit is thus dismissed.
E
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose(Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)
Appeal allowed.
F
G
H