PHOOL SINGH versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH on 1 December 2021

[2021] 9 S.C.R. 317

PHOOL SINGH

v.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

(Criminal Appeal No. 1520 of 2021)

DECEMBER 01, 2021

[M.R. SHAH AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.376 – Rape – Prosecution case thatwhen the husband of the victim/prosecutrix was in another villageand she was alone and sleeping in her room, the accused jumpedthe wall, entered into the room of the prosecutrix and raped her –As per the case of the prosecutrix, she narrated the incident to hersister-in-law and mother-in-law but they did not believe her – Onthe contrary, she was beaten – Thereafter, she was compelled to goto her parental house – FIR was registered – The trial Courtconvicted the accused for the offence u/s. 376 IPC and sentencedthe appellant to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment – Feelingaggrieved, the appellant-accused preferred an appeal before theHigh Court, which was dismissed – Before the Supreme Court, itwas contended that the medical evidence does not support the caseof the prosecutrix, as the doctor in her deposition specifically statedthat on examination that there were no external or internal injuriesfound in the prosecutrix – It is further submitted that the prosecutioncase rests solely on the deposition of the prosecutrix only and therewas also delay of three days in filing FIR – Held: The prosecutrixhas fully supported the case of the prosecution – She was consistentright from the very beginning – Nothing was specifically pointedout why the sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be believed– Even after thorough cross-examination, she has stood by whatshe has stated and has fully supported the case of the prosecution– There is no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthinessof the prosecutrix – No question regarding the external and internalinjuries was asked, even remotely, to the prosecutrix in her cross-examination – Therefore, submission regarding external and internalinjuries is to be rejected outrightly – So far as the delay of threedays in lodging the FIR is concerned, it was the specific andconsistent case on behalf of the prosecutrix that immediately on the

317

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

318SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aoccurrence of the incident, she narrated the incident to her sister-in-law and mother-in-law but they did not believe the prosecutrix –No other family members in her matrimonial home supported theprosecutrix – She was compelled to go to her parental house andthereafter she was able to lodge the FIR – Therefore, when in sucha situation, the delay has taken place in lodging the FIR, the benefitBof such delay cannot be given to the accused who as such was therelative – The conviction and sentence awarded to the accused-appellant herein for the offence u/s. 376 IPC is confirmed.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

CHELD : 1. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Courtin various decisions to the facts of the case on hand and asobserved hereinabove, there is no reason to doubt the credibilityand/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. She is found to bereliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without any furthercorroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the soleDtestimony of the prosecutrix can be sustained. [Para 6][332-D-E]

2. So far as the submission on behalf of the accused that asthere were no external or internal injuries found on the body ofthe prosecutrix and therefore it may be a case of consent isconcerned, the aforesaid has no substance at all. No such questionEwas asked, even remotely, to the prosecutrix in her cross-examination. Therefore, the aforesaid submission is to berejected outright. [Para 7][332-E-F]

3. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accusedthat the trial Court erred in not believing DW1 and erred in notFbelieving the defence and the plea of alibi that on the night of theincident he had gone to Indore and was not present in the villageis concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that cogentreasons have been given by the trial Court not to believe DW1and not to believe the plea of alibi raised by the accused. DW1Gbelongs to the same village of the accused. The reason to go toIndore has been disbelieved by the court. It was the case onbehalf of the accused and the defence that as one ‘B’ had metwith an accident, DW1 and the accused had gone to Indore taking ‘B’ and they had stayed at Indore on that night. However, it wasfound that ‘B’ had an injury before two months. Defence had notproduced the record of the hospital or examined doctor oremployee of the hospital where the said ‘B’ was taken fortreatment. According to the defence, they had stayed in the houseof one ‘T’ at Indore but the said ‘T’ has not been examined. Even‘B’ has also not been examined. Under the circumstances, thetrial Court has rightly disbelieved the plea of alibi raised by theaccused and has rightly disbelieved DW1. On appreciation ofevidence, the trial Court has specifically observed thatthe deposition of DW1 does not inspire any confidence.[Para 8][332-G-H; 333-A-C]

4. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accusedthat there was a delay of three days in lodging the FIR isconcerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that it was thespecific and consistent case on behalf of the prosecutrix thatimmediately on the occurrence of the incident, she narrated theincident to her sister-in-law and mother-in-law but they did notbelieve the prosecutrix. On the contrary, they beat her. Even noother family members in her matrimonial home supported theprosecutrix and therefore she sent message to her parental houseand thereafter she was taken to her parental house and FIR waslodged. It is very unfortunate that in this case the sister-in-lawand mother-in-law though being women did not support theprosecutrix. On the contrary, she was compelled to go to herparental house and thereafter the FIR was lodged. Being womenat least the sister-in-law and mother-in-law ought to havesupported the prosecutrix, rather than beating her and notbelieving the prosecutrix. Therefore, when in such a situation,the delay has taken place in lodging the FIR, the benefit of suchdelay cannot be given to the accused who as such was the relative.[Para 9][333-C-F]

5. Now so far as the prayer on behalf of the accused toreduce the sentence considering the proviso to Section 376 IPCis concerned, as per section 376 IPC pre-amendment, theminimum punishment shall be seven years. However, as per theproviso, the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

[2021] 9 S.C.R.

Amentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonmentfor a term of less than seven years. No exceptional and/or specialreasons are made out to impose the sentence of imprisonmentfor a term of less than seven years. On the contrary and in thefacts and circumstances of the case, it can be said that accused17 has been dealt with lightly by imposing the minimum sentenceBof seven years rigorous imprisonment only. The victim was therelative. Nobody in the family at matrimonial home supportedher and she suffered the trauma. She was compelled to go to herparental house and thereafter she was able to lodge the FIR.The accused has come out with a false case/plea of alibi, which isCnot accepted by the courts below. Under the circumstances, theprayer of the appellant to reduce the sentence and/or to convertthe sentence from seven years rigorous imprisonment to sevenyears simple imprisonment is not accepted and it is rejected.[Para 10][333-F-H; 334-A-C]

DGanesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573; State (NCT ofDelhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary, (2019) 11 SCC 575: [2018] 14 SCR 78; Sham Singh v. State of Haryana,(2018) 18 SCC 34 – relied on.

Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443E: [2020] 2 SCR 798; State of H.P. v. Manga Singh,(2019) 16 SCC 759 : [2018] 14 SCR 904 – referredto.

Case Law Reference

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2019 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Criminal Appeal No.875 of2000.H

Aditya Gaggar, Adv. for the Appellant.

Abhay Prakash Sahay, AAG, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Ms. RashmiSinghania, Prakhar Srivastav, Ms. Sneh Bairwa, Advs. for theRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 05.09.2019 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradeshat Indore in Criminal Appeal No. 875/2000, by which the High Court hasdismissed the said appeal preferred by the appellant-accused and hasconfirmed the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated31.07.2000 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dewas (hereinafterreferred to as the learned ‘trial Court’) in Session Trial No. 05/2000convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 376IPC and sentencing him to undergo 7 years rigorous imprisonment withfine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation, the original accused has preferredthe present appeal.

2. As per the case of the prosecution, in the intervening night of9[th] August, 1999 and when the husband of the victim/prosecutrix wentto another village and she was alone and she was sleeping in her room,the accused jumped the wall and entered into the room of the prosecutrix.Seeing the accused the prosecutrix woke up and in the light of the bulbshe identified the accused. Then the accused pressed the mouth of theprosecutrix and committed rape and thereafter he fled away by jumpingthe wall. As per the case of the prosecutrix, she narrated the incident toher sister-in-law (Jethani) and mother-in-law but they did not believeher. On the contrary, she was beaten. That thereafter the prosecutrixalso told the incident to other family members of her matrimonial housebut nobody took any action. The prosecutrix sent the information to herparental house. Thereafter, her uncle and others came to her matrimonialhouse and the prosecutrix told them about the incident. They took her toparental house. Thereafter, an FIR was lodged on 12.08.1999. She wassent for medical examination. After completion of the investigation,charge-sheet was filed against the accused for the offence punishableunder Section 376 IPC. The case was committed to the learned Courtof Sessions. Accused pleaded not guilty and therefore he came to betried for the aforesaid offence.

A

B

CDE

F

G

H

A2.1 In order to prove the charge against the accused, prosecutionexamined six witnesses including the doctor who examined theprosecutrix on 12.08.1999, prosecutrix-PW3 and the InvestigatingOfficer-PW6. One of the witnesses Rajaram-PW2 did not support theprosecution story and he was declared hostile. The accused took theplea of alibi and according to him he had gone to Indore on the day ofBincident and he was not in the village on that day. He examined thedefence witness as DW1. The learned trial Court did not believe theplea of alibi and DW1 by giving cogent reasons. That thereafter afterappreciating the evidence on record, by judgment and order dated31.07.2000, the learned trial Court convicted the accused for the offenceCunder Section 376 IPC and sentenced the appellant as mentionedhereinabove.

2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and orderof conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court, the appellantherein-accused preferred an appeal before the High Court. By theDimpugned judgment and order, the High Court has dismissed the saidappeal. Hence, the present appeal is at the instance of the accused.

3. Shri Aditya Gaggar, learned Advocate appearing on behalf ofthe accused has vehemently submitted that in the present case the medicalevidence does not support the case of the prosecutrix. It is submittedEthat the doctor in her deposition specifically stated that on examination itwas found that there were no external or internal injuries found in theperson of the prosecutrix.

3.1 It is further submitted that therefore the prosecution case restssolely on the deposition of the prosecutrix only. It is submitted that noFother independent witnesses have been examined and/or supported thecase of the prosecutrix.

3.2 It is further submitted that there was a delay in lodging theFIR. It is submitted that the incident took place on 9.8.1999 and the FIRwas lodged on 12.08.1999, i.e., after a period of three days. It is submittedGthat therefore the prosecution story does not find any corroboration frommedical evidence and in the absence of any signs of injuries, it cannot beruled out that the physical intercourse even if assumed it had happened,was entire consensual.

3.3 It is further submitted that both, the learned trial Court as wellas the High Court have materially erred in not believing DW1, whoH

categorically stated that on the date/night of the alleged incident, theaccused was not in the village and was at Indore along with DW1.

3.4 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the presentappeal. In the alternative, it is prayed to reduce the sentence to theperiod already undergone by submitting that by now the accused hasundergone two and half years of sentence against the seven yearssentence imposed by the courts below. It is also prayed to convert theseven years rigorous imprisonment to seven years simple imprisonment.

4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri AbhayPrakash Sahay, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalfof the respondent-State.

4.1 It is submitted that in the present case both, the learned trialCourt as well as the High Court have rightly convicted the accused forthe offence under Section 376 IPC, relying upon the sole testimony ofthe prosecutrix/victim. It is submitted that as such there is no reason todoubt the credibility and trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. It is submittedthat even no question was asked to the prosecutrix while cross-examiningthe prosecutrix that a false case was filed against the accused.

4.2 It is submitted that once it is found that the prosecutrix isreliable and trustworthy, in that case, there can be a conviction for theoffence of rape – Section 376 IPC, relying upon the deposition of thesole witness/victim. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this Court inthe cases of Ganesan v. State, (2020) 10 SCC 573; Santosh Prasadv. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443; State of H.P. v. Manga Singh,(2019) 16 SCC 759; and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary,(2019) 11 SCC 575.

4.3 It is submitted that in the case of Pankaj Chaudhary (supra),it is specifically observed and held by this Court that conviction can besustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidenceand that there is no rule of law or practice that the evidence of theprosecutrix cannot be relied upon without corroboration.

4.4 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused, relyingupon the deposition of the doctor-PW1 that there were no external orinternal injuries found in the person of the prosecutrix and therefore theprosecution case is not to be believed, as not supported by anycorroborative evidence and/or that it is to be presumed that it was acase of consent is concerned, it is submitted that first of all the prosecutrix AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Ahas been medically examined after three days of the incident. It issubmitted that the prosecutrix is consistent in her evidence right fromthe very beginning and even in the cross-examination also she has stoodby what she has stated and she has fully supported the case of theprosecution. It is submitted therefore that in the facts and circumstancesof the case and even in the absence of any external or internal injuries inBthe person of the prosecutrix, the conviction can be sustained.4.5 It is further submitted that even there is no suggestion in thecross-examination of the prosecutrix that it was a case of consent.

4.6 It is further submitted by the learned Additional AdvocateCGeneral appearing on behalf of the State that in the present case on onehand the accused took the plea that it was a case of consent and on theother hand accused took the plea of alibi and that he was not in thevillage on the date/night of the incident. It is submitted that both arecontradictory to each other. It is submitted that in any case cogent reasonshave been given by the learned trial Court not to believe DW1 and it isDspecifically observed by the learned trial Court that deposition of DW1does not inspire any confidence.

4.7 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaiddecisions, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.

E5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective partiesat length. We have gone through the judgment and order of convictionpassed by the learned trial Court convicting the accused for the offenceunder Section 376 IPC and the impugned judgment and order passed bythe High Court.F5.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case,the prosecutrix has fully supported the case of the prosecution. She hasbeen consistent right from the very beginning. Nothing has beenspecifically pointed out why the sole testimony of the prosecutrix shouldnot be believed. Even after thorough cross-examination, she has stoodby what she has stated and has fully supported the case of theGprosecution. We see no reason to doubt the credibility and/ortrustworthiness of the prosecutrix. The submission on behalf of theaccused that no other independent witnesses have been examined and/or supported the case of the prosecution and the conviction on the basisof the sole testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be sustained is concerned,the aforesaid has no substance.H

5.2 In the case of Ganesan (supra), this Court has observed andheld that there can be a conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to betrustworthy, unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality.

In the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to consider theseries of judgments of this Court on conviction on the sole evidence ofthe prosecutrix. In paragraphs 10.1 to 10.3, it is observed and held asunder:

10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment,molestation, etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence ofthe prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC191], it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98)

“9. In State of Maharashtra v. ChandraprakashKewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtrav. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550] thisCourt held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, isnot an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of anotherperson’s lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be testedwith the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice.The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para 16)

‘16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a parwith an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. TheEvidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot beaccepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. Sheis undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and herevidence must receive the same weight as is attached to aninjured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of careand caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as inthe case of an injured complainant or witness and no more.What is necessary is that the court must be alive to andconscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of aperson who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelledby her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that itcan act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule oflaw or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar toIllustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look forcorroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place A

B

C

D

EF

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

G

H

A

B

C

D

EF

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

G

H

implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may lookfor evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony shortof corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. Thenature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimonyof the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts andcircumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adultand of full understanding the court is entitled to base a convictionon her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and nottrustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing onthe record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does nothave a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, thecourt should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting herevidence.’

10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005)3 SCC 594] this Court held that even in a case where it isshown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated tosexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve theaccused from the charge of rape. It has to be established thatthere was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absenceof injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads thecourt to absolve the accused. This Court further held that therecan be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of theprosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial,by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Courtheld as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12)

‘12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of havingbeen a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice afterthe crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot beacted upon without corroboration in material particulars. Shestands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the lattercase, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former itis both physical as well as psychological and emotional.However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept theversion of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search forevidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assuranceto her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration asunderstood in the context of an accomplice, would do.’

11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State ofPunjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384], this Court heldthat in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. thecourt is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmostsensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepanciesin the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground forthrowing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidenceof the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and itdoes not require any corroboration unless there are compellingreasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for someassurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. Thestatement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of aninjured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court furtherheld that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not beeven properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannotbe given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under:(SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21)

‘8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a poorhelpless minor girl had found herself in the company of threedesperate young men who were threatening her and preventingher from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officerdid not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent innot being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can thatbecome a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix?The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agencyand the negligence of an investigating officer could not affectthe credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. … The courtsmust, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact thatin a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would comeforward in a court just to make a humiliating statement againsther honour such as is involved in the commission of rape onher. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposedconsiderations which have no material effect on the veracityof the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statementof the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are suchwhich are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwisereliable prosecution case. … Seeking corroboration of herstatement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

amounts to adding insult to injury. … Corroboration as acondition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrixis not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence undergiven circumstances. …

***

21. … The courts should examine the broader probabilities ofa case and not get swayed by minor contradictions orinsignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix,which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwisereliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspiresconfidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroborationof her statement in material particulars. If for some reason thecourt finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony,it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to hertestimony, short of corroboration required in the case of anaccomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must beappreciated in the background of the entire case and the trialcourt must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive whiledealing with cases involving sexual molestations.’

(emphasis in original)

12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State ofOrissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86], this Court heldthat rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts(sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapistdegrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore,the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in thebackground of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a seriousinfirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where thewitnesses had not seen the commission of the offence.

13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State ofH.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622], this Court heldthat there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidenceto corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recordingan order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and notcounted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony ofthe prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity.A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in WahidKhan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010)2 SCC 9] placing reliance on an earlier judgmentin Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State ofRajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54].

14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effectthat the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy ofcredence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The courtmay convict the accused on the sole testimony of theprosecutrix.”

10.2. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [KrishanKumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130], it isobserved and held by this Court that to hold an accused guilty forcommission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of theprosecutrix is sufficient, provided the same inspires confidenceand appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and shouldbe of sterling quality.

10.3. Who can be said to be a “sterling witness”, has been dealtwith and considered by this Court in Rai Sandeep v. State (NCTof Delhi) [Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC21]. In para 22, it is observed and held as under: (SCC p. 29)

“22. In our considered opinion, the “sterling witness” shouldbe of a very high quality and calibre whose version should,therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the versionof such witness should be in a position to accept it for its facevalue without any hesitation. To test the quality of such awitness, the status of the witness would be immaterial andwhat would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statementmade by such a witness. What would be more relevant wouldbe the consistency of the statement right from the starting pointtill the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes theinitial statement and ultimately before the court. It should benatural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua theaccused. There should not be any prevarication in the versionof such a witness. The witness should be in a position towithstand the cross-examination of any length and howsoever A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should giveroom for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, thepersons involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a versionshould have co-relation with each and every one of othersupporting material such as the recoveries made, the weaponsused, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidenceand the expert opinion. The said version should consistentlymatch with the version of every other witness. It can even bestated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case ofcircumstantial evidence where there should not be any missinglink in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty ofthe offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such awitness qualifies the above test as well as all other such similartests to be applied, can it be held that such a witness can becalled as a “sterling witness” whose version can be acceptedby the court without any corroboration and based on which theguilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of thesaid witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remainintact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral,documentary and material objects should match the said versionin material particulars in order to enable the court trying theoffence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supportingmaterials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged.”

A

B

C

D

E

5.3 In the case of Pankaj Chaudhary (supra), it is observedand held that as a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can bebased on sole testimony, without corroboration. It is further observedand held that sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted byFcourt merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In paragraph 29, it isobserved and held as under:

“29. It is now well-settled principle of law that conviction can besustained on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspiresconfidence. [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. Stateof Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283]. It is well-settled by a catenaof decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or practicethat the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be relied upon withoutcorroboration and as such it has been laid down that corroborationis not a sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. If the evidenceof the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the G

H

“probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of credence, asa general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration exceptfrom medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstancesof the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming.[State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K., (2000)5 SCC 30].”

5.4 In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 18SCC 34, it is observed that testimony of the victim is vital and unlessthere are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroborationof her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimonyof the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where hertestimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is furtherobserved that seeking corroboration of her statement before relying uponthe same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Inparagraphs 6 and 7, it is observed and held as under:

“6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great responsibilitywhile trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal withsuch cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine thebroader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minorcontradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement ofthe prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out anotherwise reliable prosecution case. If the evidence of theprosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon withoutseeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. Iffor some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit relianceon her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lendassurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in thecase of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must beappreciated in the background of the entire case and the courtmust be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealingwith cases involving sexual molestations or sexual assaults.[See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State ofPunjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384] (SCC p. 403, para21).]

7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must, while evaluatingevidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make ahumiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the A

B

C

DE

F

G

H

Acommission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation,supposed considerations which have no material effect on theveracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in thestatement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepanciesare such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out anotherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness ofBthe females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexualaggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. Thetestimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there arecompelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroborationof her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on theCtestimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accusedwhere her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable.Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon thesame, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury.(See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam [RanjitHazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC 635).”D

6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaiddecisions to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove,we see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or trustworthiness of theprosecutrix. She is found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, withoutany further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying upon the Esole testimony of the prosecutrix can be sustained.

7. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that asthere were no external or internal injuries found on the body of theprosecutrix and therefore it may be a case of consent is concerned, theaforesaid has no substance at all. No such question was asked, evenFremotely, to the prosecutrix in her cross-examination. Therefore, theaforesaid submission is to be rejected outright.

8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that thelearned trial Court erred in not believing DW1 and erred in not believingthe defence and the plea of alibi that on the night of the incident he hadGgone to Indore and was not present in the village is concerned, at theoutset, it is required to be noted that cogent reasons have been given bythe learned trial Court not to believe DW1 and not to believe the plea ofalibi raised by the accused. DW1 belongs to the same village of theaccused. The reason to go to Indore has been disbelieved by the court.It was the case on behalf of the accused and the defence that as oneH

Babulal had met with an accident, DW1 and the accused had gone toIndore taking Babulal and they had stayed at Indore on that night.However, it was found that Babulal had an injury before two months.Defence had not produced the record of the hospital or examined doctoror employee of the hospital where the said Babulal was taken fortreatment. According to the defence, they had stayed in the house ofTulsiram at Indore but the said Tulsiram has not been examined. Eventhe Babulal has also not been examined. Under the circumstances, thelearned trial Court has rightly disbelieved the plea of alibi raised by theaccused and has rightly disbelieved DW1. On appreciation of evidence,the learned trial Court has specifically observed that the deposition ofDW1 does not inspire any confidence.

9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused thatthere was a delay of three days in lodging the FIR is concerned, at theoutset, it is required to be noted that it was the specific and consistentcase on behalf of the prosecutrix that immediately on the occurrence ofthe incident, she narrated the incident to her sister-in-law (Jethani) andmother-in-law but they did not believe the prosecutrix. On the contrary,they beat her. Even no other family members in her matrimonial homesupported the prosecutrix and therefore she sent message to her parentalhouse and thereafter she was taken to her parental house and FIR waslodged. It is very unfortunate that in this case the sister-in-law and mother-in-law though being women did not support the prosecutrix. On thecontrary, she was compelled to go to her parental house and thereafterthe FIR was lodged. Being women at least the sister-in-law and mother-in-law ought to have supported the prosecutrix, rather than beating herand not believing the prosecutrix. Therefore, when in such a situation,the delay has taken place in lodging the FIR, the benefit of such delaycannot be given to the accused who as such was the relative.

10. Now so far as the prayer on behalf of the accused to reducethe sentence considering the proviso to Section 376 IPC is concerned,as per section 376 IPC pre-amendment, the minimum punishment shallbe seven years. However, as per the proviso, the court may, for adequateand special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentenceof imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. No exceptionaland/or special reasons are made out to impose the sentence ofimprisonment for a term of less than seven years. On the contrary andin the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be said that accused AB

C

D

E

F

G

H

Ahas been dealt with lightly by imposing the minimum sentence of sevenyears rigorous imprisonment only. The victim was the relative. Nobodyin the family at matrimonial home supported her and she suffered thetrauma. She was compelled to go to her parental house and thereaftershe was able to lodge the FIR. The accused has come out with a falsecase/plea of alibi, which is not accepted by the courts below. Under theBcircumstances, the prayer of the appellant to reduce the sentence and/or to convert the sentence from seven years rigorous imprisonment toseven years simple imprisonment is not accepted and it is rejected.

11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, thepresent appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and isCaccordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence awarded to theaccused – appellant herein for the offence under Section 376 IPC ishereby confirmed.

D

Ankit Gyan

Appeal dismissed.

E

F

G

H