STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. versus CHETAN JEFF on 11 May 2022

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 04.03.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature forRajasthan at Jaipur Bench in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.1479 of 2018by which the High Court has dismissed the said appeal preferred by theState of Rajasthan and has confirmed the judgment and order passed bythe learned Single Judge directing the State to consider the case of therespondent herein - original writ petitioner for appointment to the post ofConstable (General), the State has preferred the present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present case in a nutshell are as under:

2.1 Applications were invited by the Director General of PoliceRajasthan, Jaipur vide Letter dated 07.04.2008, for recruitment to 4684vacant posts of Constable (General), Constable (Operator), Constable(Driver) and Constable (Band) in different Districts/Battalions/Units ofRajasthan Police. As per 2008 Recruitment Notification, all interestedcandidates were required to qualify the written test, physical efficiencytest, proficiency test, special qualification test and an interview forsecuring appointment for different posts of constable. As per paragraph9(e) of the said notification, the candidates were required to fill in thecorrect information in their application forms. It provided that if theinformation disclosed in the application form was found to be wrong andincomplete, such an application form was liable to be rejected at anystage of the selection process. The respondent applied for the said postand submitted the application form. In column 15 of the Job ApplicationForm dated 26.04.2008 the respondent herein - (hereinafter referred toas original writ petitioner) had categorically stated that there were no A

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Acriminal antecedents against him. He also stated that there were nopending FIRs or criminal cases against him. He also enclosed the signeddeclaration with the application form stating that the information disclosedin para 15 of the Job Application Form dated 26.04.2008 was correctand there was no concealment of any criminal record by him.

B2.2 The original writ petitioner cleared the written test as well asthe physical test. At this stage it is required to be noted that as such, theoriginal writ petitioner was already facing criminal proceedings in FIRbearing No.458/2007 dated 17.12.2007 registered against him at PoliceStation, Neem ka Thana, Sikar for the offences punishable under Sections143, 341 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as,C‘the IPC’). However, the same was not disclosed by him in the JobApplication Form. Thus, as such he suppressed the material fact aboutpendency of the FIR/Criminal Case against him.

2.3 The Superintendent of Police, District Sikar informed theSuperintendent of Police, Hanumangarh vide communication datedD21.08.2008 about the said FIR No.458 of 2007. Based upon the saidinformation, the candidature of the original writ petitioner was rejectedon the ground that the original writ petitioner suppressed the materialfact about his criminal antecedents in Column 15 and made an incorrectstatement in the job application form.

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2.4 Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of his candidature, the originalwrit petitioner preferred the writ petition before the learned Single Judgeof the High Court by way of Civil Writ Petition No.10250 of 2008. Itappears that one another FIR bearing No.102/2012 dated 27.01.2012was registered against the original writ petitioner at Police Station NeemFka Thana, Sikar for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,149, 452, 380, 352, 427 of the IPC. By the judgment and order dated30.07.2015, the learned trial Court acquitted him for the offences underSection 352 read with Section 149 IPC in view of the compromise arrivedat between the parties. For the offences under Sections 147, 148, 455,440 read with Section 149 of the IPC the original writ petitioner wasGacquitted extending the benefit of doubt. However, the learned ACJM –I, Neem ka Thana, Sikar vide judgment and order dated 21.01.2016convicted the original writ petitioner for offences punishable underSections 341 & 323 read with Section 34 IPC. However, he was accordedbenefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

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2.5 By the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2018, the learnedSingle Judge allowed the aforesaid writ petition and directed the State toconsider the case of the original writ petitioner for the post of Constable,inter alia, on the following grounds:

“1. That the Parties failed to place any material on record to showthat the Respondent suppressed the information with respect tothe criminal antecedents in the column 15 of the said Job ApplicationForm dated 26.04.2008.

2. That the Respondent in the instant case was charged with theoffences which were trivial in nature and the suppression of suchoffences by the Respondent should have been ignored by thePetitioners herein. In order to substantiate the aforesaid proposition,the Hon’ble High Court relied upon the judgment in Avtar Singhversus Union of India & Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471.

3. That the judgment dated 01.03.2017 in the case of BhanjaRam versus State of Rajasthan & Ors. S.B. Civil WritPetition No.6884 of 2008, applied squarely to the factsmentioned in the said Writ Petition.”

2.6 The third FIR bearing No.348/2018 dated 05.09.2018 wasregistered against the original writ petitioner at Police Station Neem kaThana, Sikar for the offences punishable under Sections 341 & 323 ofthe IPC.

2.7 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and orderpassed by the learned Single Judge allowing the Civil Writ PetitionNo.10250 of 2008 and directing the State to consider the case of theoriginal writ petitioner for the post of Constable, the State preferred theWrit Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.

2.8 During the pendency of the Writ Appeal, the learned ACJM,Neem ka Thana, Sikar vide judgment and order dated 09.09.2019acquitted the original writ petitioner for the offences punishable underSections 341 & 323 of the IPC in view of the compromise arrived atbetween the parties in FIR No.348/2018.

2.9 One another FIR bearing No.505/2018, dated 20.12.2018 wasregistered at Neem ka Thana, Sikar against the original writ petitionerfor the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 382, 427 IPC.

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A2.10 Despite the above, by the impugned Judgment and Orderdated 04.03.2020, the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissedthe said appeal and has confirmed the judgment and order passed by thelearned Single Judge, by which the learned Single Judge directed theState to consider the case of the original writ petitioner for the appointmentas Constable. That, in the meantime, the original writ petitioner has beenBcharge-sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323,382, 427 of the IPC in relation to the FIR No.505/2018 and the trial ispending.

2.11 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dismissingCthe writ appeal and confirming the judgment and order passed by thelearned Single Judge directing the appellant – State to consider the caseof the original writ petitioner for appointment as Constable, the State haspreferred the present appeal.

3. We have heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior AdvocateDand AAG appearing on behalf of the State of Rajasthan and Mr. R.K.Shukla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioner.

4. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocate, has vehementlysubmitted that considering the criminal antecedents which weresuppressed by the original writ petitioner, both the learned Single JudgeEas well as the Division Bench have committed a grave error in directingthe appellant - State to consider the case of the original writ petitionerfor appointment as a constable.

4.1 It is contended by Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocateappearing on behalf of the State of Rajasthan that despite Column 15 ofFthe Job Application Form of the original writ petitioner by which he wasrequired to state true and correct facts of criminal antecedents and despitethe fact that he was facing criminal prosecution by way of FIR No.458/2007, the original writ petitioner suppressed the same and did not disclosethe same. It is submitted that on the contrary in the column of “whetherGany criminal case has been registered against the applicant?” hesaid “No”.

4.2 It is submitted therefore, when the candidate at the initial stageitself did not state the true and correct facts and as such suppressed thematerial facts, he is not entitled to be appointed on the post as Constable.

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4.3 It is submitted that the post of Constable whose duty is tomaintain law and order, first of all should be honest. It is submitted thata candidate who, at the initial stage and before even getting theappointment as a constable has suppressed the material facts of havingcriminal antecedents and he has made a false statement in the applicationform. How can he be trusted and be appointed as a Constable? It issubmitted that as such the State was justified in rejecting his candidatureas a constable. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of this Court in thecase of Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 as well asDaya Shankar Yadav v. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 103.

4.4 It is urged by Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Senior Advocatefor the State that even otherwise and till the Division Bench decided thewrit appeal, the original writ petitioner faced 3 to 4 more FIRs, out ofwhich, in two cases he was acquitted by entering into a compromise andin one case he has been convicted, however has been given the benefitof the Probation of Offenders Act. It is submitted that one criminal caseis still pending against him. That such a person cannot be appointed as aconstable. Therefore, it is requested that this Court must consider thesubsequent events also.

5. Present appeal is opposed by Mr. R.K. Shukla, learned counselappearing on behalf of the original writ petitioner.

5.1 It is vehemently submitted by Mr. R.K. Shukla, learned counselappearing on behalf of the original writ petitioner that having found thatthe offences against the original writ petitioner were trivial in nature andhe was acquitted and in one case he has been granted the benefit ofProbation of Offenders Act, both, the learned Single Judge as well asthe Division Bench of the High Court have rightly directed the State toconsider the case of the original writ petitioner for the post of Constable.

5.2 It is submitted that when both, the learned Single Judge aswell as the Division Bench have concurred on directing the State toconsider the case of the original writ petitioner for the post of Constableand by giving cogent reasons, the same may not be interfered with bythis Court in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution ofIndia.

6. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the respectiveparties at length.

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A6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that the post on whichthe writ petitioner is seeking the appointment is the post of constable. Itcannot be disputed that the duty of the constable is to maintain law andorder. Therefore, it is expected that he should be honest, trustworthyand that his integrity is above board and that he is reliable. An employeein the uniformed service presupposes a higher level of integrity as suchBa person is expected to uphold the law and on the contrary any act indeceit and subterfuge cannot be tolerated. In the present case the originalwrit petitioner has not confirmed to the above expectations/ requirements.He suppressed the material facts of his criminal antecedents. He did notdisclose in the application form that against him a criminal case/FIR isCpending. On the contrary, in the application form, he made a falsestatement that he is not facing any criminal case. Therefore, due to theaforesaid suppression, his candidature came to be rejected by theappropriate authority. Despite the above, the learned Single Judge allowedthe writ petitioner and directed the State to consider the case of theoriginal writ petitioner for appointment as a constable mainly on the groundDthat the offences were trivial in nature and the suppression of suchoffences should have been ignored. The same has been confirmed bythe Division Bench.

6.2 The question is not whether the offences were trivial in natureor not. The question is one of suppression of material fact by the originalEwrit petitioner in respect of his criminal antecedents and making a falsestatement in the application form. If in the beginning itself, he hassuppressed the material fact in respect to his criminal antecedents andin fact made an incorrect statement, how can he be appointed as aconstable. How can he be trusted thereafter in future? How it is expected Fthat thereafter he will perform his duty honestly and with integrity?

6.3 Therefore, as such the authorities were justified in rejectingthe candidature of the respondent for the post of constable.

6.4 At this stage the decision of this Court in the case of DayaShankar Yadav (supra) is required to be referred to. In paras 14 andG16, it is observed and held as under:

“14. Rule 14 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules,1955 relevant in this case relates to verification. Clauses (a) and(b) of the said Rule are extracted below:

“14. Verification.—(a) As soon as a man is enrolled, hischaracter, antecedents, connections and age shall be verified inaccordance with the procedure prescribed by the CentralGovernment from time to time. The verification roll shall be sentto the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner of the Districtof which the recruit is a resident.

(b) The verification roll shall be in CRP Form 25 and afterverification shall be attached to the character and service roll ofthe member of the force concerned.”

The purpose of seeking the said information is to ascertain thecharacter and antecedents of the candidate so as to assess hissuitability for the post. Therefore, the candidate will have to answerthe questions in these columns truthfully and fully and anymisrepresentation or suppression or false statement therein, byitself would demonstrate a conduct or character unbefitting for auniformed security service.

16. Thus an employee on probation can be discharged from serviceor a prospective employee may be refused employment : (i) onthe ground of unsatisfactory antecedents and character, disclosedfrom his conviction in a criminal case, or his involvement in acriminal offence (even if he was acquitted on technical groundsor by giving benefit of doubt) or other conduct (like copying inexamination) or rustication or suspension or debarment fromcollege, etc.; and (ii) on the ground of suppression of materialinformation or making false statement in reply to queries relatingto prosecution or conviction for a criminal offence (even if hewas ultimately acquitted in the criminal case). This ground isdistinct from the ground of previous antecedents and character,as it shows a current dubious conduct and absence of characterat the time of making the declaration, thereby making him unsuitablefor the post.”

6.5 In State of A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu, (2005) 2 SCC 746,this Court has observed that the object of requiring information in theattestation form and the declaration thereafter by the candidate is toascertain and verify the character and antecedents to judge his suitabilityto enter into or continue in service. It is further observed that when acandidate suppresses material information and/or gives false information,he cannot claim any right for appointment or continuance in service.

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A6.6 In Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2013) 9 SCC363, while joining the training, the employee was asked to submit anaffidavit giving certain information, particularly, whether he had everbeen involved in any criminal case. The employee submitted an affidavitstating that he had never been involved in any criminal case. Theemployee completed his training satisfactorily and it was at this time thatBthe employer in pursuance of the process of character verification cameto know that the employee was in fact involved in a criminal case. Itwas found that the final report in that case had been submitted by theprosecution and accepted by the Judicial Magistrate concerned. On thebasis of the same, the employee was discharged abruptly on the groundCthat since he was a temporary government servant, he could be removedfrom service without holding an enquiry. The said order was challengedby the employee by filing a writ petition before a Single Judge of theHigh Court which was dismissed. The Division Bench upheld that order,which was the subject-matter of appeal before this Court. Dismissing the appeal, this Court observed and held that the question is not whetherDthe employee is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency.The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude butsuppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. It isfurther observed that the information sought by the employer if notEdisclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of materialinformation and in that eventuality, the service becomes liable to beterminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concernedstood acquitted/discharged.

6.7 In the case of Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8FSCC 748, in para 29.4, this Court has observed and held that “a candidatehaving suppressed material information and/or giving false informationcannot claim right to continue in service and the employer, having regardto the nature of employment as well as other aspects, has the discretionto terminate his services. In para 29.6, it is further observed that the person who suppressed the material information and/or gives falseGinformation cannot claim any right for appointment or continuity in service.In para 29.7, it is observed and held that “the standard expected of aperson intended to serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from otherservices and, therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regardinga vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision ofHthe appointing authority cannot be faulted.

6.8 In Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC103, this Court had an occasion to consider the purpose of seeking theinformation with respect to antecedents. It is observed and held that thepurpose of seeking the information with respect to antecedents is toascertain the character and antecedents of the candidate so as to assesshis suitability for the post. It is further observed that when an employeeor a prospective employee declares in a verification form, answers tothe queries relating to character and antecedents, the verification thereofcan lead to any of the following consequences: (SCC pp. 110-11, para15)

“15. … (a) If the declarant has answered the questions inthe affirmative and furnished the details of any criminal case(wherein he was convicted or acquitted by giving benefit of doubtfor want of evidence), the employer may refuse to offer himemployment (or if already employed on probation, discharge himfrom service), if he is found to be unfit having regard to the natureand gravity of the offence/crime in which he was involved.

(b) On the other hand, if the employer finds that the criminalcase disclosed by the declarant related to offences which weretechnical, or of a nature that would not affect the declarant’sfitness for employment, or where the declarant had beenhonourably acquitted and exonerated, the employer may ignorethe fact that the declarant had been prosecuted in a criminal caseand proceed to appoint him or continue him in employment.

(c) Where the declarant has answered the questions in thenegative and on verification it is found that the answers werefalse, the employer may refuse to employ the declarant (ordischarge him, if already employed), even if the declarant hadbeen cleared of the charges or is acquitted. This is because whenthere is suppression or non-disclosure of material informationbearing on his character, that itself becomes a reason for notemploying the declarant.

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form, then the candidate cannot be found fault with, for notfurnishing the relevant information. But if the employer by othermeans (say police verification or complaints, etc.) learns aboutthe involvement of the declarant, the employer can have recourseto courses (a) or (b) above.”

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Thereafter, it is observed and held that an employee can bedischarged from service or a prospective employee may be refusedemployment on the ground of suppression of material informationor making false statement in reply to queries relating to prosecutionor conviction for a criminal offence (even if he was ultimatelyacquitted in the criminal case).

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6.9 In State of M.P. v. Abhijit Singh Pawar, (2018) 18 SCC733, when the employee participated in the selection process, he tenderedan affidavit disclosing the pending criminal case against him. The affidavitwas filed on 22-12-2012. According to the disclosure, a case registeredin the year 2006 was pending on the date when the affidavit was tendered.DHowever, within four days of filing such an affidavit, a compromise wasentered into between the original complainant and the employee and anapplication for compounding the offence was filed under Section 320CrPC. The employee came to be discharged in view of the deed ofcompromise. That thereafter the employee was selected in theEexamination and was called for medical examination. However, aroundthe same time, his character verification was also undertaken and afterdue consideration of the character verification report, his candidaturewas rejected. The employee filed a writ petition before the High Courtchallenging rejection of his candidature. The learned Single Judge of theHigh Court of Madhya Pradesh allowed the said writ petition. TheFjudgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge directing theState to appoint the employee came to be confirmed by the DivisionBench which led to appeal before this Court. After considering a catenaof decisions on the point including the decision in Avtar Singh v. Unionof India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, this Court upheld the order of the StateGrejecting the candidature of the employee by observing that as heldin Avtar Singh (supra), even in cases where a truthful disclosure abouta concluded case was made, the employer would still have a right toconsider antecedents of the candidate and could not be compelled toappoint such candidate.

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6.10 After reproducing and/or reconsidering para 38.5 of thedecision in Avtar Singh (supra), in Abhijit Singh Pawar (supra), inpara 13, this Court observed and held as under:

“13. In Avtar Singh [Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016)8 SCC 471, though this Court was principally concerned with thequestion as to non-disclosure or wrong disclosure of information,it was observed in para 38.5 that even in cases where a truthfuldisclosure about a concluded case was made, the employer wouldstill have a right to consider antecedents of the candidate andcould not be compelled to appoint such candidate.”

6.11 Recently, in the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut PrasaranNigam Limited v. Anil Kanwariya, (2021) 10 SCC 136, this Courthad an occasion to consider the submission on behalf of an employeewhose services were terminated on the ground of filing a false declarationto the effect that neither a criminal case is pending against him nor hashe been convicted by any Court of law, that subsequently he has beengranted the benefit of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act andtherefore his services ought not to have been terminated. This Court hasobserved in paras 13 & 14 as under:

“13. Even otherwise, subsequently getting the benefit of Section12 of the 1958 Act shall not be helpful to the respondent inasmuchas the question is about filing a false declaration on 14-4-2015that neither any criminal case is pending against him nor has hebeen convicted by any court of law, which was much prior to theorder passed by the learned Sessions Court granting the benefitof Section 12 of the 1958 Act. As observed hereinabove, even incase of subsequent acquittal, the employee once made a falsedeclaration and/or suppressed the material fact of pending criminalcase shall not be entitled to an appointment as a matter of right.

14. The issue/question may be considered from another angle,from the employer’s point of view. The question is not aboutwhether an employee was involved in a dispute of trivial natureand whether he has been subsequently acquitted or not. Thequestion is about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of such anemployee who at the initial stage of the employment i.e. whilesubmitting the declaration/verification and/or applying for a postmade false declaration and/or not disclosing and/or suppressing A

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Amaterial fact of having involved in a criminal case. If the correctfacts would have been disclosed, the employer might not haveappointed him. Then the question is of TRUST. Therefore, in sucha situation, where the employer feels that an employee who at theinitial stage itself has made a false statement and/or not disclosedthe material facts and/or suppressed the material facts andBtherefore he cannot be continued in service because such anemployee cannot be relied upon even in future, the employer cannotbe forced to continue such an employee. The choice/optionwhether to continue or not to continue such an employee alwaysmust be given to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it isCobserved and as observed hereinabove in catena of decision suchan employee cannot claim the appointment and/or continue to bein service as a matter of right.”

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7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases,it cannot be said that the authority committed any error in rejecting theDcandidature of the original writ petitioner for the post of constable in theinstant case.

8. Even otherwise it is required to be noted that subsequently andduring the proceedings before the learned Single Judge as well as theDivision Bench, there are three to four other FIRs filed against the originalwrit petitioner culminating into criminal trials and in two cases he hasEbeen acquitted on the ground of compromise and in one case thoughconvicted, he has been granted the benefit of Probation of OffendersAct. One more criminal case is pending against him. Therefore, theoriginal writ petitioner cannot be appointed to such a post of constable.

9. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons statedFabove, both, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Benchhave erred in directing the State to consider the case of the respondentfor appointment as a constable. The judgment and order passed by theHigh Court is unsustainable, both, on facts as well as on law. Under thecircumstances, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and isaccordingly quashed and set aside. It is held that the candidature of theGrespondent – original writ petitioner for the post of constable had beenrightly rejected by the appropriate authority. Present appeal is accordinglyallowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be noorder as to costs.HNidhi JainAppeal allowed.(Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.