MURALI versus STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE on 5 January 2021

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. These connected appeals have been preferred against thejudgment dated 01.11.2018 of the High Court of Madras which upheldMurali’s (appellant in SLP (Crl) No 10813/2019) conviction underSections 324 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) with asentence of three months’ rigorous imprisonment, and Rajavelu’s(appellant in SLP (Crl) 10814/2019) conviction under Sections 307and 341 of IPC and sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment.

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 07.08.2005, one Senthilhad a verbal altercation with Kumar (original accused no. 3) andKrishnan (original accused no. 5) during a volleyball match. The injured-victim (Sathya @ Sathiyajothi) came to the aid of his friend Senthil andopposed both Kumar and Krishnan. Thereafter at about 2:30PM on09.08.2005, the appellants – Rajavelu and Murali (original accusednos. 1 and 2) along with Muthu, Kumar and Krishnan (originalaccusednos. 3, 4 and 5) cornered the victim and assaulted him. Murali allegedlystruck the victim on his head with a hockey stick and Rajavelu tried tokill him by giving a neck blow with a Veechu Aruval (sharp-edged object),which was fortunately blocked by the victim. In the process, the lefthand of the victim and the thumb and finger of his right hand got severed.The victim was able to escape and the matter was reported by his friend,PW-1. All five persons were arrested. It further led to registration ofCrime No. 531 of 2005 under Sections 147,148,341,352, 323, 324, 307and 34 of the IPC.

4. Relying upon the testimony of the victim (PW-3), which washeld to be unimpeachable and stellar, the Assistant Sessions Judge -cum- Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, vide his judgment dated28.01.2012 held Murali guilty of wrongfully restraining the victim andvoluntarily causing hurt with a dangerous weapon. Based upon themedical evidence and recovery of the Veechu Aruval from Rajavelu,the trial Court further opined that the second-appellant (Rajavelu) had aclear intention to murder the victim and that if not for the victim defendinghimself, a fatal injury would have been caused to his neck and he wouldhave died instantaneously. Consequently, a concurrent sentence of threemonths’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 324 IPC and one-month B

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Arigorous imprisonment under Section 341 IPC was imposed on Murali,and Rajavelu was awarded five years’ rigorous imprisonment underSection 307 IPC and another one month rigorous imprisonment underSection 341 IPC. Muthu, Kumar and Krishnan were acquitted as therewas no specific allegation by the victim and no weapon or injury hadbeen attributed to them by the prosecution.B

5. The convict-appellants challenged the afore-stated judgmentbefore two forums, both of which unanimously upheld their conviction.The Additional District-cum-Sessions Judge dismissed the first appealthrough an order dated 20.08.2013 and their criminal revision petitionbefore the High Court also met with the same fate vide an order datedC01.11.2018.

6. Unsatisfied still, the appellants have approached this Courtseeking special leave to appeal against the High Court’s dismissal oftheir conviction. However, through an application filed on 22.11.2019,they have sought to implead the injured-victim and get their offencesDcompounded based on mutual resolution and peaceful settlement betweenthe parties. This Court, nevertheless, issued limited notice only on thequantum of sentence.

7. The records of the case elicit that the findings of all threepreceding forums are concurrent and without fault. Not only have theEappellants been unable to mount an effective challenge founded upon aquestion of law, their learned Counsels, given the subsequent events andchange in circumstances, have very fairly restricted their prayer quareduction of sentence only.

8. A perusal of the applications for impleadment and compoundingFmakes it clear that the parties have on the advice of their elders enteredinto an amicable settlement. The appellants have admitted their fault,taken responsibility for their actions, and have maturely sought forgivenessfrom the victim. In turn, the victim has benevolently acknowledged theapology, and considering the young age of the appellants at the time ofGthe incident, has forgiven the appellants and settled the dispute. LearnedCounsel for the victim-applicant has reiterated the same stance duringoral hearings also.

9. There can be no doubt that Section 320 of the CriminalProcedure Code, 1973 (“CrPC”) does not encapsulate Section 324 and307 IPC under its list of compoundable offences. Given the unequivocalH

language of Section 320(9) CrPC which explicitly prohibits anycompounding except as permitted under the said provision, it would notbe possible to compound the appellants’ offences.

10. Notwithstanding thereto, it appears to us that the fact ofamicable settlement can be a relevant factor for the purpose of reductionin the quantum of sentence. In somewhat similar circumstances wherethe parties decided to forget their past and live amicably, this Court inRam Pujan v. State of UP[(1973) 2 SCC 456], held as follows:

“6. The only question with which we are concerned, asmentioned earlier, is about the sentence. In this respect wefind that an application for compromise on behalf of theinjured prosecution witnesses and the appellants was filedbefore the High Court. It was stated in the application thatthe appellants and the injured persons, who belong to onefamily, had amicably settled their dispute and wanted to livein peace. The High Court thereupon referred the matter tothe trial court for verification of the compromise. After thecompromise was got verified, the High Court passed an orderstating that as the offence under Section 326 of the PenalCode, 1860 was non-compoundable, permission to compoundthe offence could not be granted. The High Court all the samereduced the sentence for the offence under Section 326 readwith Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 from four years totwo years.

7. The appellants during the pendency of the appeal werenot released on bail and are stated to have already undergonea sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of morethan four months. As the parties who belong to one familyhave settled their dispute, it is, in our opinion, not necessaryto keep the appellants in jail for a longer period. The majoroffence for which the appellants have been convicted is nodoubt non-compoundable, but the fact of compromise can betaken into account in determining the quantum of sentence.It would, in our opinion, meet the ends of justice if the sentenceof imprisonment awarded to the appellants is reduced to theperiod already undergone provided each of the appellantspays a fine of Rs 1500 in addition to the period ofimprisonment already undergone for the offence under AB

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ASection 326 read with Section 34 of the of the Penal Code,1860. In default of payment of fine, each of the appellantsshall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a total period ofone year for the offence under Section 326 read with Section34 of the of the Penal Code, 1860. Out of the fine, if realised,Rs 2000 should be paid to Ram Sewak and Rs 2000 to RamBSamujh as compensation. We order accordingly.”

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(emphasis supplied)

11. The afore-cited view has been consistently followed by thisCourt including in Ishwar Singh v. State of MP [(2008) 15 SCCC667],laying down that:

“13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan [(2006) 9 SCC 255 :(2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 561] , Murugesan v. GanapathyVelar [(2001) 10 SCC 504 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1032]and Ishwarlal v. State of M.P. [(2008) 15 SCC 671 : JT (1988)D3 SC 36 (1)] this Court, while taking into account the fact ofcompromise between the parties, reduced sentence imposedon the appellant-accused to already undergone, though theoffences were not compoundable. But it was also stated thatin Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan [1990 Supp SCC 681: 1991 SCC (Cri) 159 : AIR 1988 SC 2111] such offence wasEordered to be compounded.

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14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate toorder compounding of an offence not compoundable underthe Code ignoring and keeping aside statutory provisions. Inour judgment, however, limited submission of the learnedFcounsel for the appellant deserves consideration that whileimposing substantive sentence, the factum of compromisebetween the parties is indeed a relevant circumstance whichthe Court may keep in mind.

15. In the instant case, the incident took place before morethan fifteen years; the parties are residing in one and thesame village and they are also relatives. The appellant wasabout 20 years of age at the time of commission of crime. Itwas his first offence. After conviction, the petitioner was takeninto custody. During the pendency of appeal before the HighCourt, he was enlarged on bail but, after the decision of the G

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High Court, he again surrendered and is in jail at present.Though he had applied for bail, the prayer was not grantedand he was not released on bail. Considering the totality offacts and circumstances, in our opinion, the ends of justicewould be met if the sentence of imprisonment awarded to theappellant (Accused 1) is reduced to the period alreadyundergone.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. In later decisions including in Ram Lal v. State of J&K,[(1999) 2 SCC 213], Bankat v. State of Maharashtra, [(2005) 1SCC 343], Mohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(2015) 11 SCC 226],Nanda Gopalan v. State of Kerala [(2015) 11 SCC 137], Shankar v.State of Maharashtra, [(2019) 5 SCC 166], this Court has taken noteof the compromise between parties to reduce the sentence of the convictseven in serious non-compoundable offences.

13. Given this position of law and the peculiar circumstances arisingout of subsequent events, we are of the considered opinion that it is a fitcase to take a sympathetic view and reconsider the quantum of sentencesawarded to the appellants. We say so because: first, the parties to thedispute have mutually buried their hatchet. The separate affidavit of thevictim inspires confidence that the apology has voluntarily been acceptedgiven the efflux of time and owing to the maturity brought about by age.There is no question of the settlement being as a result of any coercionor inducement. Considering that the parties are on friendly terms nowand they inhabit the same society, this is a fit case for reduction ofsentence.

14. Second, at the time of the incident, the victim was a collegestudent, and both appellants too were no older than 20-22 years. Theattack was in pursuance of a verbal altercation during a sports match,with there being no previous enmity between the parties. It does raisehope that parties would have grown up and have mended their ways.Indeed, in the present case, fifteen years have elapsed since the incident.The appellants are today in their mid-thirties and present little chance ofcommitting the same crime.

15. Third, the appellants have no other criminal antecedents, noprevious enmity, and today are married and have children. They are thesole bread earners of their family and have significant social obligations AB

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Ato tend to. In such circumstances, it might not serve the interests ofsociety to keep them incarcerated any further.

16. Finally, both appellants have served a significant portion oftheir sentences. Murali has undergone more than half of his sentenceand Rajavelu has been in jail for more than one year and eight months.

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17. Considering all these unique factors, including the compromisebetween the parties, we deem it appropriate to reduce the quantum ofthe sentence imposed on the appellants. The appeals are, therefore, partlyallowed and sentence of both the appellants is reduced to theperiod already undergone by them. Consequently, they are set free andCtheir bail bonds, if any, are discharged. Any pending applications aredisposed of accordingly.

Devika Gujral

Appeals partly allowed.

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