JAI BHAVANI SHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL versus RAMESH & ORS. on 29 March 2022

[2022] 17 S.C.R. 601

JAI BHAVANI SHIKSHAN PRASARAK MANDAL

v.

RAMESH & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 7937 of 2011)

MARCH 29, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions ofService) Regulation Act, 1977 – ss. 2(9), 9 – Maharashtra Employeesof Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 – r.36(2)(b)–Doctrine of necessity – First respondent was appointed as thePrincipal of the Institute of Pharmacy being run by appellant-society– Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on certainallegations – After completion of inquiry, management passed anorder imposing penalty of removal from service – Appeal filed byrespondent, allowed by School Tribunal on the ground that theconstitution of the inquiry committee was not in accordance withr.36(2)(b) of 1981 Rules– Writ petition filed by the appellant wasdismissed by High Court – On appeal, held: Two expressions namely“Head” and “Chief Executive Officer” used in sub-rule (1) of r.36provide the fulcrum of the controversy on hand – Sub-rule (2) ofr.36 provides for the composition of the Inquiry Committee in aparticular manner in the case of “an employee” and it provides forthe composition of the Inquiry Committee in a different manner inthe case of “the Head” – In the present case, the DepartmentalInquiry Committee as originally constituted, had the President ofthe appellant as a Member – But the President requested the appellantto relieve him due to ill health – Thereafter, one of the Vice-Presidentswas requested to be part of the Inquiry Committee, however, thesaid Vice-President also recused due to family problems – Another Vice-President was nominated to be part of the Inquiry Committee – The said Vice-President also opted out – Thenmanagement decided to confer all the powers of the president toone ‘ASRP’ – However, school tribunal as well as High Court omittedto take note that the first respondent was informed about the illhealth of the President of the society and the appointment of ‘ASRP’inhis place – Tribunal as well as the High Court failed to take note ofthe very pleadings of the first respondent with regard to the

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Acircumstances in which the President of the Society could notcontinue as part of the Inquiry Committee – Therefore, the order ofthe School Tribunal was vitiated by perversity –Moreover, the HighCourtfailed to take the note of doctrine of necessity – Once it isadmitted, that the disciplinary proceedings commenced with anInquiry Committee of which the President was a member; and thatBsubsequently he was replaced by someone due to ill health, thedoctrine of necessity would come into play – Hence, the orders ofHigh Court and School Tribunal are liable to be reversed – Since,the School Tribunal rejected all other contentions of respondentNo.1, but upheld only the contention revolving around r.36(2)(b),Cthe penalty of removal from service imposed upon the first respondentis to be upheld.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

Conclusion

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Two expressions namely “Head” and “ChiefExecutive Officer” used in sub-rule (1) of Rule 36 provide theDfulcrum of the controversy on hand. The expression “Head” isnot defined in the Rules. However, the expression “ChiefExecutive Officer” is defined in Rule 2(1)(c). The word “Head”is defined in Section 2(9) of the Maharashtra Employees of PrivateSchools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. Sub-ruleE(2) of Rule 36 provides for the composition of the InquiryCommittee in a particular manner in the case of “an employee”and it provides for the composition of the Inquiry Committee in adifferent manner in the case of “the Head”. In other words, theInquiry Committee can comprise of (i) one member amongst themembers of the Management, nominated by the management orFthe President; (ii) one member nominated by the employee fromamongst the employees; and (iii) one member chosen by the ChiefExecutive Officer from the panel of teachers, if the inquiry isagainst “an employee”. But if the inquiry is against the Head,the Inquiry Committee should comprise of: (i) the President ofGthe Management; (ii) one member to be nominated by the Headfrom amongst the employees of any private schools; and (iii) onemember chosen by the President from the panel of Head Masters.[Paras 8-10][608-C-H; 609-A]

1.2 In the case on hand, there is and there can be no disputeHabout the fact that the first respondent was the Head within the meaning of the expression in terms of Section 2(9) of the Act, ashe was the Principal of the Institute. But admittedly the firstrespondent was not the Secretary, Trustee or Correspondent ofthe Institute, to fall within the definition of the expression “ChiefExecutive Officer” under Rule 2(1)(c) of the Rules. The maincontention of the first respondent which was accepted by theSchool Tribunal and the High Court was that by virtue of Rule36(2)(b) of the Rules, the President of the Management shouldhave been one of the members of the Inquiry Committee. Thereis no dispute about the fact that the President of theappellant-Society was not a member of the Inquiry Committee.But this fact provides only one part of the story. The other part ofthe story is that the Departmental Inquiry Committee as originallyconstituted, had the President of the Appellant-Society as aMember. But the case of the management is that by a letter dated13.06.2004, the President requested the appellant-Society torelieve him due to ill health. Therefore, by a letter dated14.06.2004 one of the Vice-Presidents was requested to be partof the Inquiry Committee. But the said Vice-President alsorecused due to family problems. Therefore, by a letter dated16.06.2004 another Vice-President was nominated to be part ofthe Inquiry Committee. The said Vice-President also opted out.Therefore, by a Resolution dated 22.06.2004, the Managementdecided to confer all the powers of the President to one Shri‘ASRP’. [Paras 11 and 13][609-B-F]

1.3 The School Tribunal as well as the High Court omittedto take note of the very pleadings of the first respondent in hisappeal before the Tribunal. In paragraph 7 of the Memorandumof Appeal submitted by the first respondent before the SchoolTribunal, he admitted that the chargesheet was signed by Shri‘ASRP’, the President of the Society. In paragraph 9 of theMemorandum of Appeal, the respondent No.1 also admitted thatby a letter dated 26.06.2004 he was informed about the ill healthof the President of the Society and the appointment of Shri ‘ASRP’in his place.Unfortunately the School Tribunal as well as the HighCourt failed to take note of the very pleadings of the firstrespondent with regard to the circumstances in which thePresident of the Society could not continue as part of the InquiryCommittee. Therefore, the order of the School Tribunal was AB

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Avitiated by perversity. In any case, the High Court, in theimpugned order, failed to take the note of doctrine of necessity.Once it is admitted, (i) that the disciplinary proceedingscommenced with an Inquiry Committee of which the Presidentwas a member; and (ii) that subsequently he was replaced bysomeone due to ill health, the doctrine of necessity would comeBinto play. Hence the impugned orders of the High Court and theSchool Tribunal are liable to be reversed. Since the SchoolTribunal rejected all other contentions of respondent No.1, butupheld only the contention revolving around Rule 36(2)(b), thepenalty of removal from service imposed upon the first respondentCis liable to be upheld.However, if by virtue of any interim orderpassed by any forum, the respondent No.1 has been granted anymonetary benefit, the same shall not be recovered fromhim. [Paras 15, 16 and 23][610-D-E; 611-B; 613-D-F]

National Education Society, Nagpur and anotherDvs. Mahendra, s/o Baburao Jamkar and another 2007(3) Mh.L.J 707 – disapproved.

Case Law Reference

2007 (3) Mh. L. J 707disapprovedPara 6

ECIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.7937of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.09.2009 of the High Courtof Bombay at Aurangabad in Letter Patent Appeal No.77 of 2006.

Anil Kumar, Adv. for the Appellant.FCharudatta Vijayrao Mahindrakar, Samrat K. Shinde, Sachin Patil,Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.G

1. The removal from service of respondent No.1 herein from thepost of Principal of the Institute of Pharmacy, having been set aside bythe School Tribunal, Aurangabad and the same having been confirmedby the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court,the Educational Society running the Institute of Pharmacy has come upHwith the above appeal.

2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the firstrespondent and the learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra.

3. The appellant is an Educational Society registered under theBombay Public Trusts Act. It is running an institute of Pharmacy atGadhi Georai Dist., Beed. In the year 1991, the first respondent hereinwas appointed as the Principal of the said Institute. In the year 2004disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him on certain allegationsof serious nature. The Departmental Inquiry Committee held an inquiryin which the first respondent was given all opportunities of fair hearing,including permission to be represented by a lawyer. After the completionof the inquiry, the Inquiry Committee submitted a report on 31.07.2004holding 7 out of 10 charges proved. Therefore, after issuing a showcause notice enclosing a copy of the Inquiry Report, the Managementpassed an order dated 19.08.2004 imposing upon the first respondent,the penalty of removal from service.

4. The first respondent challenged the penalty before the SchoolTribunal by way of an appeal under Section 9 of the MaharashtraEmployees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,1977 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The School Tribunal framedfive issues as arising for consideration namely: (i) Whether the InquiryCommittee constituted by the Management to conduct further inquiryagainst the employee was proper, legal and permissible by law? (ii)Whether the Management did not pay subsistence allowance and whethernon-payment of subsistence allowance vitiated the inquiry?; (iii) Whetherthe inquiry was vitiated on account of the fact that the Managementconducted the inquiry by engaging a lawyer?; (iv) Whether theManagement conducted the inquiry by following Rule 37 of MEPS Rules,1981?; and (v) Whether the impugned dismissal order was legal andsustainable in law. Out of these five issues, the Tribunal found only theissue relating to the constitution and composition of the Inquiry Committeeto be not in accordance with the Rules. Therefore, the said appeal wasallowed by the Tribunal by an order dated 22.06.2006, primarily on theground that the constitution of the Inquiry Committee was not inaccordance with Rule 36(2)(b) of the Maharashtra Employees of PrivateSchools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred toas the “MEPS Rules”).

5. The appellant-Management filed a writ petition in WP No.5387of 2006 on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, AB

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AAurangabad Bench. A learned Judge of the High Court dismissed thewrit petition, affirming the view taken by the School Tribunal.

6. The intra-court appeal filed by the appellant-Management wasdismissed by the division Bench, by placing reliance upon the decision ofthe Full Bench of the High Court in National Education Society, NagpurBand another vs. Mahendra, s/o Baburao Jamkar and another[1].Aggrieved by the said order the Management is on appeal before us.

7. Since the entire dispute revolves around the constitution of theDepartmental Inquiry Committee with reference to Rule 36 of the MEPSRules, it is necessary first to look into Rule 36.C“

“36. Inquiry Committee.- (1) If an employee is allegedly foundto be guilty on (any of the grounds specified in sub-rule (5) ofRule 28) and the Management decides to hold an inquiry, it shalldo so through a properly constituted Inquiry Committee. Such acommittee shall conduct an inquiry only in such cases where majorDpenalties are to be inflicted. The Chief Executive Officer authorisedby the Management in this behalf (and in the case of an inquiryagainst the Head who is also the Chief Executive Officer, thePresident of the Management) shall communicate to the employeeor the head concerned by Registered Post acknowledgement duethe allegations and demand from him a written explanation withinEseven days from the date of receipt of the statement of allegations.

(2) If the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as thecase may be, finds that the explanation submitted by the employeeor the Head referred to in sub-rule (1) is not satisfactory, he shallplace it before the Management within fifteen days from the dateFof receipt of the explanation. The Management shall in turn decidewithin fifteen days whether an inquiry be conducted against theemployee and if it decides to conduct the inquiry, the inquiry shallbe conducted by an Inquiry Committee constituted in the followingmanner, that is to say- G

(a) in the case of an employee-

(i) one member from amongst the members of theManagement to be nominated by the Management,or by the President of the Management if so H1 2007(3) Mh.L.J 707

authorised by the Management whose name shall beAcommunicated to Chief Executive Officer within 15days from the date of the decision of the Management;

(ii) One member to be nominated by the employee fromamongst the employees of any private school; B

(iii) one member chosen by the Chief Executive Officerfrom the panel of teachers on whom state/NationalAward has been conferred;

(b) in the case of the Head referred to in sub-rule (1)- C(i)one member who shall be the President of theManagement;

(ii) one member to be nominated by the Head fromamongst the employees of any private school;

(iii) one member chosen by the President from the panelof Head Masters on whom State/National Awardhas been conferred.

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(3) The Chief Executive Officer or, as the case may be, thePresident shall communicate the names of members nominatedunder sub-rule (2) by Registered Post acknowledgement due tothe employee or the Head referred to in sub-rule (1), as the casemay be, directing him to nominate a person on his behalf on theproposed Inquiry Committee and to forward the name alongwiththe written consent of the person so nominated to the ChiefExecutive or to the President, as the case may be, within fifteendays of the receipt of the communication to that effect.

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(4) If the employee or the Head, as the case may be, communicatesthe name of the person nominated by him the Inquiry Committeeof three members shall be deemed to have been constituted onthe date of receipt of such communication by the Chief ExecutiveOfficer or the President, as the case may be. If the employee orsuch head fails to communicate the name of his nominee withinthe stipulated period, the Inquiry Committee shall be deemed tohave been constituted on expiry of the stipulated period consistingof only two members as provided in sub-rule (2).

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A(5) The Convener of the respective Inquiry Committee shall bethe nominee of the President, or as the case may be, the Presidentwho shall initiate action pertaining to the conduct of the InquiryCommittee and shall maintain all the relevant record of theInquiry.

B(6) The meetings of the Inquiry Committee shall be held in theSchool premises during normal school hours or immediatelythereafter, if the employee agrees and even during vacation.”

8. Two expressions namely “Head” and “Chief ExecutiveOfficer” used in sub-rule (1) of Rule 36 provide the fulcrum of theCcontroversy on hand. The expression “Head” is not defined in the Rules.However, the expression “Chief Executive Officer” is defined in Rule2(1)(c) as follows:- “Chief Executive Officer” means the Secretary, Trustee,Correspondent or a person by whatever name called who isDempowered to execute the decisions taken by the Management.”

9. The word “Head” is defined in Section 2(9) of the MaharashtraEmployees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,1977 as follows:- E“Head of a school” or “Head” means the person, by whatevername called in charge of the academic and administrative dutiesand functions of a school conducted by any Management andrecognised or deemed to be recognised under this Act, and includesa principal, vice principal, head-master, head-mistress, assistanthead-master, assistant head-mistress or superintendent thereof”F

10. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 36 provides for the composition of theInquiry Committee in a particular manner in the case of “an employee”and it provides for the composition of the Inquiry Committee in a differentmanner in the case of “the Head”. In other words, the Inquiry Committeecan comprise of (i) one member amongst the members of theGManagement, nominated by the management or the President; (ii) onemember nominated by the employee from amongst the employees; and

(iii) one member chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the panelof teachers, if the inquiry is against “an employee”. But if the inquiry isagainst the Head, the Inquiry Committee should comprise of: (i) thePresident of the Management; (ii) one member to be nominated by theH

Head from amongst the employees of any private schools; and (iii) onemember chosen by the President from the panel of Head Masters.

11. In the case on hand, there is and there can be no dispute aboutthe fact that the first respondent was the Head within the meaning ofthe expression in terms of Section 2(9) of the Act, as he was the Principalof the Institute. But admittedly the first respondent was not the Secretary,Trustee or Correspondent of the Institute, to fall within the definition ofthe expression “Chief Executive Officer” under Rule 2(1)(c) of theRules.

12. The main contention of the first respondent which wasaccepted by the School Tribunal and the High Court was that by virtueof Rule 36(2)(b) of the Rules, the President of the Management shouldhave been one of the members of the Inquiry Committee. There is nodispute about the fact that the President of the appellant-Society wasnot a member of the Inquiry Committee. But this fact provides only onepart of the story.

13. The other part of the story is that the Departmental InquiryCommittee as originally constituted, had the President of the appellant-Society as a Member. But the case of the management is that by a letterdated 13.06.2004, the President requested the appellant-Society to relievehim due to ill health. Therefore, by a letter dated 14.06.2004 one of theVice-Presidents was requested to be part of the Inquiry Committee. Butthe said Vice- President also recused due to family problems. Therefore,by a letter dated 16.06.2004 another Vice-President was nominated tobe part of the Inquiry Committee. The said Vice-President also optedout. Therefore, by a Resolution dated 22.06.2004, the Managementdecided to confer all the powers of the President to one Shri AmarsinghShivaji Rao Pandit. The said resolution reads as follows:- “Resolution no. 4:- The President Mr. Shivajirao Ankushrao Panditis the president and inviter of the Departmental Enquiry Committeefor inquiry of Mr. Kalkotwar R. S. (Suspended Principal).Therefore, he is president of the enquiry committee forDepartmental enquiry of Mr. Kalkotwar, but Mr. ShivajiraoAnkushrao Pandit by his application due to ill health and as peradvice of doctors have intimation to take rest. His application anddocuments annexed thereto have been considered and his excuseappears reasonable. Therefore, all the powers of the president of AB

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AJaibhawani Shikshan Prasarak regarding the work to conduct theEnquiry id hereby given to Mr. Amarsingh Shivajirao Pandit.Therefore, it was unanimously decided by all that, henceforth,Mr. Amarsingh Shivajirao Pandit will see the work as presidentand inviter of the departmental enquiry committee conductinginquiry of Mr. Kalkotwar R.S.”B

14. But the School Tribunal held that the aforesaid Resolutiondated 22.06.2004 surfaced only after the conclusion of the arguments inthe appeal and that, therefore, it could have been prepared as anafterthought. The learned Single Judge of the High Court refused tointerfere with this finding of fact, on the ground that the supervisoryCjurisdiction of the High Court was limited under Article 227 of theConstitution.

15. But the School Tribunal as well as the High Court omitted totake note of the very pleadings of the first respondent in his appealbefore the Tribunal. In paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of AppealDsubmitted by the first respondent before the School Tribunal, he admittedthat the charge-sheet was signed by Shri Shivaji Rao Pandit, the Presidentof the Society. In paragraph 9 of the Memorandum of Appeal, therespondent No.1 also admitted that by a letter dated 26.06.2004 he wasinformed about the ill health of the President of the Society and theEappointment of Shri Amarsingh Shivaji Rao Pandit in his place. Paragraphs9 and 10 of the Memorandum of Appeal filed by the first respondentherein, before the School Tribunal reads as follows:- “The appellant states that when the inquiry was under progress,the Administrative officer of the Respondent No. 1 Society, videFhis letter dated 26.6.2004, informed the appellant that since thePresident of the Society was ill, his representative Shri. AmarsingShivajirao Pandit, who is the Member of the Respondent No. 1Society, shall be the Convenor of the Inquiry Committee. A copyof this letter dated 26.6.2004 issued by the Administrative officerGof the Respondent No.1 Society is annexed herewith and markedas EXHIBIT “G”.

The appellant further states that vide letter dated 30.6.2004, theAdministrative Officer of the Respondent No. 1 Society has issueda Corrigendum whereby it was informed that Shri Amarsinh PanditHwould act as the Convenor of the Inquiry Committee and the President during the course of the Inquiry. A copy of the saidCorrigendum dated 30.6.2004, issued by the Administrative Officerof the Respondent No. 1 is annexed herewith and marked asEXHIBIT “H”.”

16. Unfortunately the School Tribunal as well as the High Courtfailed to take note of the very pleadings of the first respondent withregard to the circumstances in which the President of the Society couldnot continue as part of the Inquiry Committee. Therefore, the order ofthe School Tribunal was vitiated by perversity.

17. In any case, Rule 36(2)(a) begins with the words “in the caseof an employee”. Rule 36(2)(b) begins with the words “in the case ofthe Head referred to in sub-rule (1)”.

18. The interpretation given by the School Tribunal and the HighCourt to the aforesaid Rule would have been acceptable, if Rule 36(2)(b)had began only with the words “in the case of the Head”. But it beginswith the words “in the case of the Head referred to in sub-rule (1)”.

19. Sub-rule (1) refers to the Head who is also the Chief ExecutiveOfficer. Therefore, clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 36 should beconstrued to apply only to a person who is the “Head” and who is alsothe “Chief Executive Officer”. Otherwise the words “referred in sub-rule (1)” appearing in clause (b) would become redundant.

20. The Division Bench of the High Court relied upon the fullBench decision of the High Court in National Education Society (supra),to come to the conclusion that irrespective of whether the Head of theInstitute is also the Chief Executive Officer or not, Rule 36(2)(b)mandates the President to be a member of the Inquiry Committee. Aperusal of the Judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombayin National Education Society (supra) shows that the full Bench framedtwo questions for its consideration. Question No.2 framed by the FullBench reads as follows:- “Whether the President of the management has to be a memberof the Enquiry Committee as specified in Rule 36(2)(b)(i) forholding disciplinary enquiry against the Head, whether or not he isthe Chief Executive Officer within the meaning of Rule 2(c) ofthe Rules of 1981.”

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21. The above question was taken up for consideration by the fullBench in Paragraph 17 of its decision. In paragraphs 18 and 19, the fullBench held as under:- “18. Rule 36(1)(a) of the Rules provides for constitution of InquiryCommittee in respect of an employee while Rule 36(2)(b) providesfor constitution of Inquiry Committee for the Head. We havealready quoted the definition of “Head” in terms of Section 2(9)of the Act. If it is held that there is no requirement for the Presidentof the management to be a member of the Inquiry Committee incase of the Head who is not the Chief Executive Officer, providingseparate Inquiry Committee for the Head in Rule 36(2)(b) wouldbe nugatory. In case such an interpretation is accepted Head ofthe school would be an employee for the purposes of Rule 36(2)(a)and there was no need to have separate constitution of InquiryCommittee in terms of Section 36(2)(b). It is well settled that theLegislature does not use any word unnecessarily. It would beappropriate to quote paragraph 9 of the judgment of the ApexCourt in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Orissareported in MANU/SC/0077/1987 : [1987]3SCR317. In para 9,the Apex Court observed as under:

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…Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessaryEexpressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itselfunnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any wordwithout meaning something, Parliament does not legislatewhere no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumedto legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed toFmake pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge inlegislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or todo what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumedto legislate unnecessarily….

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19. We, therefore, hold that in case of Head whether or not he isGempowered to act as Chief Executive Officer, the President ofthe management shall be a member of the Inquiry Committee ascontemplated by Rule 36(2)(b)(i) of the Rules of 1981.”

22. As could be seen from the portion of the Judgment extractedabove, the full Bench was unduly carried away by the fact that theHHead of an Institution will become equated to an employee, if it was held that the President of the Society need not be a member of theInquiry Committee. But what the Full Bench omitted to take note of wasthat the Chief Executive Officer of a Society, such as the President,Secretary or Treasurer cannot be an employee of the Institution run bythe Society and that a Chief Executive Officer such as the President orSecretary is liable to get elected and not entitled to remuneration. On theother hand, the Head of the Institution is essentially an employee who isentitled to remuneration, seniority, promotion, continuance in service tillthe age of superannuation etc., and who is subject to the disciplinarycontrol of the Management. In fact the President or Secretary of theSociety cannot be removed under the MEPS Rules. But the Head of theInstitution can be removed only in terms of the Rules. Therefore, theinterpretation given by the Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay inNational Education Society (supra), under Rule 36(2)(b) may not becorrect.

23. In any case, the High Court, in the impugned order, failed totake the note of doctrine of necessity. Once it is admitted, (i) that thedisciplinary proceedings commenced with an Inquiry Committee of whichthe President was a member; and (ii) that subsequently he was replacedby someone due to ill health, the doctrine of necessity would come intoplay. Hence the impugned orders of the High Court and the School Tribunalare liable to be reversed. Since the School Tribunal rejected all othercontentions of respondent No.1, but upheld only the contention revolvingaround Rule 36(2)(b), the penalty of removal from service imposed uponthe first respondent is liable to be upheld. However, if by virtue of anyinterim order passed by any forum, the respondent No.1 has been grantedany monetary benefit, the same shall not be recovered from him. Theappeal is accordingly allowed on the above terms and there shall be noorder as to costs.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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