GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. versus BHAGRATI & ANR on 13 January 2023

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 29.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at NewDelhi in Writ Petition (C) No. 12139 of 2015 by which the High Courthas allowed the said writ petition preferred by the private respondentDno.1 herein –original writ petitioner and has declared that the acquisitionwith respect to the land in question is deemed to have lapsed underSection 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency inLand Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafterreferred to as “Act, 2013”), the Government of NCT of Delhi hasEpreferred the present appeal.

2. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt and the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant/LACbefore the High Court, it appears that it was the specific case on behalfof the appellant and others – original respondents that the award withFrespect to the land in question was declared on 19.06.1992 and theactual vacant physical possession of the subject land was taken on21.03.2007, out of which the original writ petitioner is claiming 1/12[th]share. It was also the case on behalf of the appellant that the possessionwas handed over to the DDA after preparing possession proceedingson the spot. It was also the case on behalf of the appellant/LAC that theGoriginal writ petitioner is not the recorded owner and the recorded ownernever came forward to receive any compensation and hence the sameis lying unpaid. Despite the above and even after observing that the landin question was taken over thereafter relying upon the decision of thisCourt in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs.

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Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, theHigh Court has erred in keeping the question of title of the subject landopen to be decided in the appropriate court of jurisdiction, has declaredthat the acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed tohave lapsed when the compensation had not been paid.

2.1 From the aforesaid, it appears that the title with respect to theland in question in favour of the original writ petitioner was yet to beestablished. The original petitioner was not the recorded owner. Therecorded owner never came forward to receive the compensation andtherefore the same was lying unpaid. Therefore, unless and until theright and title of the original writ petitioner was established the HighCourt has materially erred in entertaining the writ petition.

2.2 Even otherwise on merits also the impugned judgment andorder passed by the High Court is unsustainable. While passing theimpugned judgment and order the High Court has heavily relied upon thedecision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation andAnr. (supra), which has been subsequently specifically over-ruled bythe Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore DevelopmentAuthority versus Manoharlal and others reported in (2020) 8 SCC129. In paragraphs 365 and 366, the Constitution Bench of this Courthas observed and held as under:- “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn.[Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC183] is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014)3 SCC 183] has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in SreeBalaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v.State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353] cannot be said to be laying down goodlaw, is overruled and other decisions following the same are alsooverruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [(2018) 3 SCC412], the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether“or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for consideration.Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussionin the present judgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

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366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within thewindow period of five years excluding the period covered by aninterim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue asprovided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensationin court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case a person has been tendered thecompensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, itis not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court.The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount underSection 31(1). The landowners who had refused to acceptcompensation or who sought reference for higher compensation,cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed underSection 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is tobe treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Actand as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for adeemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authoritieshave failed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence ofinterim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise tonew cause of action to question the legality of concludedproceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceedingpending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopenconcluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question thelegality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings ormode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of courtto invalidate acquisition.”

3. In view of the above and applying the law laid down by thisCourt in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves to bequashed and set aside.

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[2023] 1 S.C.R.

A4. In view of the above and for the reason stated above presentappeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt declaring that the acquisition with respect to the land in question isdeemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is herebyquashed and set aside BPresent appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Nidhi Jain

(Assisted by : Abhishek Pratap Singh and Shashwat Jain, LCRAs)

Appeal allowed.

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