SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S. S. DESWAL & ORS. versus VIRENDER GANDHI & ANR. on 8 January 2020

[2020] 1 S.C.R. 395

SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S. S. DESWAL & ORS.

v.

VIRENDER GANDHI & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1936-1963 of 2019)

JANUARY 08, 2020

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.s. 138, 143-A and 148– Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 – s.s. 389, 482 – RespondentNo.1 retired from a firm – Various cheques were issued by theappellants in favour of respondent against the retirement dues – Allthe cheques were dishonored – Complaints were filed by therespondent No.1 against the appellants u/s. 138 N.I. Act – JudicialMagistrate held appellants Nos. 1 & 2 guilty and were accordinglyconvicted – In appeal, appellants filed application u/s. 389 Cr.P.C.for suspension of sentence – The Appellate Court vide order dated01.12.2018 suspended the sentence during the pendency of theappeal, subject to furnishing of bail and also subject to deposit of25% of the amount of compensation awarded – Appellants wereconvicted and was ordered by the Appellate Court to deposit amountof Rs.9,40,24,999/- – Appellants filed application u/s.482 Cr.P.C.and sought quashing of part of the order which imposed a conditionto deposit 25% of the amount of compensation – The High Courtdismissed the petition filed u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. – The Supreme Courtalso dismissed the criminal appeals – The Appellate Court vide orderdated 20.07.2019 held that appellant having not complied with thedirection to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation, the orderof suspension of sentence shall be deemed to have been vacated –Another petition u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants against theorder dated 20.07.2019 was also dismissed – On appeal held: Theorder dated 01.12.2018 was upheld by the Supreme Court, thereforeany submission questioning the order of the Appellate Court directingthe suspension of the sentence subject to deposit of 25% of thecompensation amount needs no further consideration – It is for theAppellate Court who has granted suspension of sentence to takecall on non-compliance and take appropriate decision – What orderis to be passed by the Appellate Court in such circumstances is for

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Athe Appellate Court to consider and decide – However, non-compliance of the condition of suspension of sentence is sufficientto declare suspension of sentence as having vacated – The AppellateCourt was right in taking the view that order of suspension ofsentence shall be deemed to have been vacated.

BDismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. The Supreme Court having already upheld theorder of the Appellate Court dated 01.12.2018 suspending thesentence subject to deposit 25% of the amount of compensationany submission questioning the order of the Appellate CourtCdirecting the suspension of sentence subject to deposit of 25%of the compensation amount needs no further consideration. Bydismissal of the criminal appeals of the appellants on 29.05.2019by this Court the challenge stands repelled and cannot be allowedto be reopened. [Para 12] [404-C]

D2. The second round of litigation which was initiated by theappellant by filing application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. wasagainst the order dated 20.07.2019 passed by the AdditionalSessions Judge by which he held that the appellant having notcomplied with the direction dated 01.12.2018 to deposit 25% ofthe amount of compensation, the order of suspension of sentenceEshall be deemed to have been vacated. The order dated 20.07.2019was an order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge on accountof failure of the appellant to deposit 25% of the amount ofcompensation. The suspension of sentence on 01.12.2018 wassubject to the condition of deposit of 25% of the amount ofFcompensation, when the condition for suspension of sentencewas not complied with, Additional Sessions Judge was right intaking the view that order of suspension of sentence shall bedeemed to have been vacated. Challenge to order dated20.07.2019 has rightly been repelled by the High Court by itselaborate and well considered judgment dated 10.09.2019.G[Para 13] [404-D-F]

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3. The High Court is right in its opinion that question No.2as framed in Vivek Sahni’s case was not correctly considered.When suspension of sentence by the trial court is granted on a H

condition, non-compliance of the condition has adverse effect onthe continuance of suspension of sentence. The Court which hassuspended the sentence on a condition, after noticing non-compliance of the condition can very well hold that the suspensionof sentence stands vacated due to non-compliance. The order ofthe Additional Sessions Judge declaring that due to non-compliance of condition of deposit of 25% of the amount ofcompensation, suspension of sentence stands vacated is wellwithin the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and no error hasbeen committed by the Additional Sessions Judge in passing theorder dated 20.07.2019. [Para 18] [406-G-H; 407-A]

4. It is for the Appellate Court who has granted suspensionof sentence to take call on non-compliance and take appropriatedecision. What order is to be passed by the Appellate Court insuch circumstances is for the Appellate Court to consider anddecide. However, non-compliance of the condition of suspensionof sentence is sufficient to declare suspension of sentence as having been vacated. [Para 19] [407-B]

G.J. Raja v. Tejraj Surana (2019) 10 SCALE 168;Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal and othersv. Virender Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341 – referred to.

Ajay Vinodchandra Shah v. State of Maharashtra(2019) 4 Mah LJ 705 ; Vivek Sahni and another v.Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. CRM-M-29187 of 2019(O&M) – referred to.

Case Law Reference

(2019) 10 SCALE 168referred toPara 9

(2019) 11 SCC 341referred toPara 15

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNos. 1936-1963 of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.09.2019 of the High Courtof Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M Nos. 37243, 37249,37250, 37257, 37259, 37434, 37442, 37445, 37446, 37448, 37450, 37451,37463, 37466, 37474, 37477, 37495, 37497, 37498, 37503, 37533, 37534,37536, 37537, 37545, 37547 & 37550 of 2019 (O&M).

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ABalbir Singh, Sr. Adv., Ajay Marwah, Advs. for the Appellants.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

1. These appeals have been filed against a common judgment ofBthe Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 10.09.2019 dismissing 28petitions filed by the appellants under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

2. Brief facts of the case giving rise to these appeals are:

Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are partners of appellant No.3, M/s. BhoomiInfrastructure Co., now known as GLM Infratech Private Limited.CRespondent No.1, Virender Gandhi, who was also a partner of the Firmretired with respect of which Memorandum of Understanding dated30.11.2013 was entered into. A cheque No.665643 dated 31.03.2014drawn on Canara Bank amounting to Rs.45,84,915/- was issued by theappellant to respondent No.1 against the part payment of the retirementDdues. Similarly, 63 other cheques were issued by the appellants in favourof respondent arising out of the same transaction. On 06.04.2015,respondent No.1 deposited cheque No.665643 in his Bank that isKarnataka Bank Ltd., Sector-11, Panchkula. The cheque wasdishonoured and returned vide memo dated 07.04.2015 with the remarks“funds insufficient”. Other 63 cheques were also dishonoured.

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3. Respondent No.1 sent the statutory demand notice under Section138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as“NI Act”) on 06.05.2015. Complaints were filed by respondent No.1against the appellants under Section 138 of the NI Act before the JudicialMagistrate, Ist Class, Panchkula. In all 28 complaints were filed. TheFcomplaints were decided by Judicial Magistrate vide his judgment dated30.10.2018 holding the appellant Nos.1 and 2 guilty for the offencepunishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, who were accordinglyconvicted. By order dated 13.11.2018 the appellants were sentenced toundergo imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay jointly andseverally an amount equal to the amount involved in the present case i.e.Gcheque amount plus 1% of this amount as interest as well as litigationexpenses.

4. The appeal was filed by the appellants against the judgmentdated 30.10.2018 and sentence dated 30.11.2018 in the Court of SessionsJudge, Panchkula. In the appeal the appellants had filed an applicationH

under Section 389 of Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence. The learnedtrial court has suspended the sentence of the appellants by order dated13.11.2018 for 30 days. The Appellate Court vide order dated 01.12.2018entertained the appeal and suspended the sentence during the pendencyof the appeal, subject to furnishing of bail bond and surety bond in thesum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount and also subject todeposit of 25% of the amount of compensation awarded by the learnedtrial court in favour of the complainant. The appellants were directed todeposit the amount within four weeks by way of demand draft in thename of the Court.

5. The appellants were convicted in all 28 cases and the totalamount to be deposited under the order of the Appellate Court was, in allcases, Rs.9,40,24,999/-. The appellants preferred an application seekingextension of time to deposit the amount of 25% of the compensationamount. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the application on19.12.2018 granting time to deposit the amount till 28.01.2019. Theappellants filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashingof the part of the order dated 01.12.2018 passed by the learned AdditionalSessions Judge, Panchkula, whereby the said Court has imposed acondition to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation while suspendingthe sentence.

6. The High Court vide its judgment dated 24.04.2019 dismissedthe petition of the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and otherconnected petitions. The appellants preferred Special LeavePetition(Criminal) Nos.4948-4975/2019 before this Court against thejudgment dated 24.04.2019 of the Hight Court of Punjab and Haryana atChandigarh.

7. This Court vide its judgment dated 29.05.2019 dismissed thecriminal appeals arising out of the SLPs(Criminal). Learned AdditionalSessions Judge, Panchkula in view of the non-compliance of the orderdated 20.07.2019 directed the appellants to surrender in the trial courtwithin four days. The appellants were also not present when the casewas taken by the Additional Sessions Judge on 20.07.2019. Anotherpetition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed by the appellants challengingthe order dated 20.07.2019 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge.The 28 petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants havebeen dismissed by the impugned judgment of the Punjab and Haryana A

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AHigh Court dated 10.09.2019. Aggrieved by which judgment these appealshave been filed by the appellants.

8. Shri Balbir Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for theappellants questioning the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated20.07.2019 and judgment of the High Court submits that by mere non-Bdeposit of 25% of the amount of compensation as directed on 01.12.2018cannot result in vacation of suspension of sentence. Learned counselsubmits that the direction to deposit 25% of the compensation as directedby the trial court could not have been made under Section 148 of the NIAct. Section 148 of the NI Act having come into force on 01.09.2018could not have been relied by the Courts below. Since, the complaintCwas filed in the year 2015 alleging offence under Section 138 of the NIAct which was much before the enforcement of Section 148 of the NIAct. He further submits that non-deposit of 25% of the amount ofcompensation could not lead to vacation of the order suspending thesentence rather it was open to the respondents to recover the said amountDas per the procedures prescribed under Section 421 Cr. P.C.

9. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that this Court inCriminal Appeal No.1160 of 2019 (G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana)decided on 30.07.2019 has held the provisions of Section 143A of NIAct to be prospective only that is to apply with respect to offenceEcommitted after insertion of Section 143A w.e.f. 01.09.2018. He submitsthat both Sections 143A and Section 148 inserted in NI Act by amendmentAct 20 of 2018, hence Section 148 was not attracted in the present casewhich was only prospective and could have been utilised in offenceswhich were committed after 01.09.2018. He has also placed reliance onthe judgment of Bombay High Court in Ajay Vinodchandra Shah vs.FState of Maharashtra, (2019) 4 Mah LJ 705 and another judgmentof Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh dated 18.07.2019 inCRM-M-29187 of 2019(O&M)(Vivek Sahni and another vs.Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.).

10. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel forGthe parties and have perused the records.

11. The appellants had challenged the order dated 01.12.2018passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula by which whileentertaining the criminal appeal of the appellants, Appellate Court hassuspended the substantive sentence of the appellants subject to deposit H

SURINDER SINGH DESWAL @ COL. S.S. DESWAL v.VIRENDER GANDHI [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

25% of the compensation awarded by the trial court in favour of thecomplainant. The petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by theappellants questioning the order dated 01.12,2019 were dismissed by theHigh Court vide its judgment dated 24.04.2019 against which judgmentthe appellants have also filed SLP(Criminal)Nos.4948-4975 of 2019)which were dismissed by this Court on 29.05.2019. All arguments raisedby the appellants questioning the order dated 01.12.2018 have beenelaborately dealt with by this Court and rejected. The submissionsregarding challenge to the order dated 01.12.2018 of the learnedAdditional Sessions Judge which have been addressed before us havebeen considered by this Court and rejected. It is useful to refer paragraph8., 8.1 and 9 of the judgment of this Court which are to the followingeffect:

“8. It is the case on behalf of the Appellants that as the criminalcomplaints against the Appellants Under Section 138 of the N.I.Act were lodged/filed before the amendment Act No. 20/2018 bywhich Section 148 of the N.I. Act came to be amended andtherefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be madeapplicable. However, it is required to be noted that at the timewhen the appeals against the conviction of the Appellants for theoffence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were preferred,Amendment Act No. 20/2018 amending Section 148 of the N.I.Act came into force w.e.f. 1.9.2018. Even, at the time when theAppellants submitted application/s Under Section 389 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure to suspend the sentence pending appealschallenging the conviction and sentence, amended Section 148 ofthe N.I. Act came into force and was brought on statute w.e.f.1.9.2018. Therefore, considering the object and purpose ofamendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and while suspendingthe sentence in exercise of powers Under Section 389 of theCode of Criminal Procedure, when the first appellate courtdirected the Appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial Court, the same canbe said to be absolutely in consonance with the Statement ofObjects and Reasons of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I.Act.

8.1. Having observed and found that because of the delay tacticsof unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing AB

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of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object andpurpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act wasbeing frustrated, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate Court, in an appealchallenging the order of conviction Under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted Accused- Appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20%of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. By theamendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it cannot be said thatany vested right of appeal of the Accused - Appellant has beentaken away and/or affected. Therefore, submission on behalf ofthe Appellants that amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Actshall not be made applicable retrospectively and more particularlywith respect to cases/complaints filed prior to 1.9.2018 shall notbe applicable has no substance and cannot be accepted, as byamendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, no substantive right ofappeal has been taken away and/or affected. Therefore thedecisions of this Court in the cases of Garikapatti Veeraya (supra)and Videocon International Limited (supra), relied upon by thelearned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants shallnot be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore,considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of theamendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act stated hereinabove, onpurposive interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended,we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended,shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order ofconviction and sentence for the offence Under Section 138 of theN.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for theoffence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior toamendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018. If such apurposive interpretation is not adopted, in that case, the objectand purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act wouldbe frustrated. Therefore, as such, no error has been committedby the learned first appellate court directing the Appellants todeposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed bythe learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act, asamended.

9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the Appellantsthat even considering the language used in Section 148 of the N.I.Act as amended, the appellate Court “may” order the Appellantto deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fineor compensation awarded by the trial Court and the word used isnot “shall” and therefore the discretion is vested with the firstappellate court to direct the Appellant - Accused to deposit suchsum and the appellate court has construed it as mandatory, whichaccording to the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants wouldbe contrary to the provisions of Section 148 of the N.I. Act asamended is concerned, considering the amended Section 148 ofthe N.I. Act as a whole to be read with the Statement of Objectsand Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act, thoughit is true that in amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the wordused is “may”, it is generally to be construed as a “rule” or “shall”and not to direct to deposit by the appellate court is an exceptionfor which special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amendedSection 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the AppellateCourt to pass an order pending appeal to direct the Appellant-Accused to deposit the sum which shall not be less than 20% ofthe fine or compensation either on an application filed by the originalcomplainant or even on the application filed by the Appellant-Accused Under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedureto suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be construedconsidering the fact that as per the amended Section 148 of theN.I. Act, a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awardedby the trial court is directed to be deposited and that such amountis to be deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of theorder, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as maybe directed by the appellate court for sufficient cause shown bythe Appellant. Therefore, if amended Section 148 of the N.I. Actis purposively interpreted in such a manner it would serve theObjects and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 ofthe N.I. Act, but also Section 138 of the N.I. Act. NegotiableInstruments Act has been amended from time to time so as toprovide, inter alia, speedy disposal of cases relating to the offenceof the dishonoured of cheques. So as to see that due to delaytactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured chequesdue to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining stay in the AB

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Aproceedings, an injustice was caused to the payee of a dishonouredcheque who has to spend considerable time and resources in thecourt proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and havingobserved that such delay has compromised the sanctity of thecheque transactions, the Parliament has thought it fit to amendSection 148 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, such a purposiveBinterpretation would be in furtherance of the Objects and Reasonsof the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Section138 of the N.I. Act.”

12. This Court having already upheld the order of the AppellateCourt dated 01.12.2018 suspending the sentence subject to deposit 25%Cof the amount of compensation any submission questioning the order ofthe Appellate Court directing the suspension of sentence subject to depositof 25% of the compensation amount needs no further consideration. Bydismissal of the criminal appeals of the appellants on 29.05.2019 by thisCourt the challenge stands repelled and cannot be allowed to be reopened.

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13. The second round of litigation which was initiated by theappellant by filing application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was against theorder dated 20.07.2019 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge,Panchkula by which Additional Sessions Judge held that the appellanthaving not complied with the direction dated 01.12.2018 to deposit 25%Eof the amount of compensation, the order of suspension of sentenceshall be deemed to have been vacated. The order dated 20.07.2019 wasan order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge on account of failureof the appellant to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation. Thesuspension of sentence on 01.12.2018 was subject to the condition ofdeposit of 25% of the amount of compensation, when the condition forFsuspension of sentence was not complied with, learned Additional SessionsJudge was right in taking the view that order of suspension of sentenceshall be deemed to have been vacated. Challenge to order dated20.07.2019 has rightly been repelled by the High Court by its elaborateand well considered judgment dated 10.09.2019.

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14. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on thejudgment of this Court dated 30.07.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.1160of 2019 (G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana). This Court in the above casewas considering provisions of Section 143A of the N.I. Act which wasinserted by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018 by which Section 148

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of the N.I. Act has been inserted. This Court took the view that Section143A is prospective in nature and confined to cases where offenceswere committed after the introduction of Section 143A i.e. after01.09.2018. In paragraph 22 of the judgment following has been held:

“22. In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must,therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined tocases where offences were committed after the introduction ofSection 143A, in order to force an accused to pay such interimcompensation.”

15. The judgment of this Court which was delivered in the case ofthe present appellants i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos.917-944 of 2019(Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal and others vs.Virender Gandhi) (in which one of us M.R.Shah, J was also amember) was also cited before the Bench deciding the case of G.J.Raja. This Court in its judgment dated 29.05.2019 has rejected thesubmission of the appellants that Section 148 of N.I. Act shall not bemade applicable retrospectively. This Court held that considering theStatement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 ofthe N.I. Act, on purposive interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Actas amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against theorder of conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 138 ofthe N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offenceunder Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to amendment ActNo.20/2018 i.e. prior to 01.09.2018.

16. The Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s case has noticed the judgmentof this Court in the appellants’ case i.e. Surinder Singh Deswal’s caseand has opined that the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal’scase was on Section 148 of the N.I. Act which is a stage after convictionof the accused and distinguishable from the stage in which the interimcompensation was awarded under Section 143A of the N.I.Act. Whenthe Bench deciding G.J. Raja’s case(supra) itself has considered anddistinguished the judgment of this Court in appellants’ own case i.e.Surinder Singh Deswal’s, reliance by the learned counsel for theappellants on the judgment of this Court in G.J. Raja’s case is misplaced.It is useful to refer to paragraph 23 of the judgment in G.J. Raja’s casewhich is to the following effect:

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“23. We must, however, advert to a decision of this Court inSurinder Singh Deswal and Ors. v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 8SCALE 445 where Section 148 of the Act which was alsointroduced by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018 from01.09.2018 was held by this Court to be retrospective in operation.As against Section 143A of the Act which applies at the trialstage that is even before the pronouncement of guilt or order ofconviction, Section 148 of the Act applies at the appellate stagewhere the Accused is already found guilty of the offence UnderSection 138 of the Act. It may be stated that there is no provisionin Section 148 of the Act which is similar to Sub-Section (5) ofSection 143A of the Act. However, as a matter of fact, no suchprovision akin to Sub-section (5) of Section 143A was required asSections 421 and 357 of the Code, which apply post-conviction,are adequate to take care of such requirements. In that sensesaid Section 148 depends upon the existing machinery andprinciples already in existence and does not create any freshdisability of the nature similar to that created by Section 143A ofthe Act. Therefore, the decision of this Court in Surinder SinghDeswal (2007) 13 SCC 492 stands on a different footing.”

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In view of the above, the judgment of this Court in the case ofG.J. Raja does not help the appellants.

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17. The judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in VivekSahni and another(supra) which has been relied by the learned counselfor the appellants has been noted and elaborately considered by theHigh Court in the impugned judgment. In paragraph 14 and 15 of theimpugned judgment of the High Court reasons have been given forFdistinguishing the Vivek Sahni’ case.

18. The High Court is right in its opinion that question No.2 asframed in Vivek Sahni’s case was not correctly considered. Whensuspension of sentence by the trial court is granted on a condition, non-compliance of the condition has adverse effect on the continuance ofsuspension of sentence. The Court which has suspended the sentenceon a condition, after noticing non-compliance of the condition can verywell hold that the suspension of sentence stands vacated due to non-compliance. The order of the Additional Sessions Judge declaring thatdue to non-compliance of condition of deposit of 25% of the amount of G

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compensation, suspension of sentence stands vacated is well within thejurisdiction of the Sessions Court and no error has been committed bythe Additional Sessions Judge in passing the order dated 20.07.2019.

19. It is for the Appellate Court who has granted suspension ofsentence to take call on non-compliance and take appropriate decision.What order is to be passed by the Appellate Court in such circumstancesis for the Appellate Court to consider and decide. However, non-compliance of the condition of suspension of sentence is sufficient todeclare suspension of sentence as having been vacated.

20. Insofar as the judgment of the Bombay High Court in AjayVinodchandra Shah (supra) which has been relied by the learnedcounsel for the appellant, it is sufficient to observe that the High Courtdid not have benefit of judgment of this Court dated 29.05.2019 inSurinder Singh Deswal’s case. The judgment of the Bombay HighCourt was delivered on 14.03.2019 whereas judgment of this Court inappellants’ case is dated 29.05.2019. In view of the law laid down bythis Court in Surinder Singh Deswal’s case decided on 29.05.2019,the judgment of Bombay High Court in Ajay Vinodchandra Shah’scase cannot be said to be a good law insofar as consequences of non-compliance of condition of suspension of sentence is concerned.

21. It is further to note that even Bombay High Court whilemodifying the direction to deposit 25% of the amount of total compensationdirected the accused to deposit 20% of the amount of compensationwithin 90 days.

22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any meritin the submission of the appellants. The appeals are dismissed.

Ankit Gyan

Appeals dismissed.

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