SENTHIBALAJI V versus A.P. GEETHA AND ORS on 19 May 2023

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[2023] 6 S.C.R.

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SENTHIBALAJI V.

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A.P. GEETHA AND ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 3895-3896 of 2023)

BMAY 19, 2023

[ABHAY S. OKA AND RAJESH BINDAL, JJ.]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – ss.83, 123 – Failureto plead material facts in the election petition concerning allegedCcorrupt practice – Held: s.123 defines corrupt practices – s.83(1)(a)mandates that an election petition must contain a concise statementof material facts – When the allegation is of corrupt practice, thebasic facts constituting corrupt practice must be pleaded in orderto comply with s.83(1)(a) – In the present case, such concise factswere not at all pleaded – Basic facts cannot be pleaded only byDstating that the same find place in the documents relied upon –Failure to plead material facts concerning alleged corrupt practiceis fatal to the election petition – As material facts regardingallegations of corrupt practice were not pleaded, the election petitiondoes not disclose any cause of action as far as the ground of corruptEpractice is concerned – Further, the ground of improper acceptanceof the nomination paper is also not supported by material facts – Inany case, the said ground is no longer relevant as the term of theappellant has already expired – No purpose will be served bykeeping the Election Petition pending – Impugned judgment setaside – Applications filed by the appellant for rejection of the petitionFand/or for deletion of irrelevant paragraphs allowed – Electionpetition filed by first respondent is dismissed – Code of CivilProcedure, 1908 – O.VI, r.16.

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Material Facts –Requirement of stating, non-compliance with – Effect of – Held:GThe material facts are the primary facts which must be proved ontrial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action –Non-compliance with the requirement of stating material facts mustresult in the rejection of the petition at the threshold.

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Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Section 123 of the RP Act of 1951 defines variouscorrupt practices for the purpose of the said enactment. Thecorrupt practice has to be qua the election subject matter ofchallenge in the Election Petition. In paragraph 5, the firstrespondent has relied upon the representation made by her tothe Returning Officer by pointing out that the appellant and 6[th]respondent have committed misconduct by suppressing thefindings of the Election Commission recorded in the order date27th May 2016. Presumably, paragraph 5 of the petition is insupport of the ground of improper acceptance of the nominationpapers of the appellant. However, the first respondent has notpleaded that under a particular statutory provision, the appellantand 6th respondent were under an obligation to disclose the orderdated 27th May 2016 passed by the Election Commission whilefiling nomination papers. It is not pleaded how on the ground ofthe failure to disclose the said order, the appellant and 6threspondent were disqualified from contesting the election. Thedisqualification must be based on a statutory provision. The firstrespondent has not pleaded that in law it was the obligation ofthe appellant to disclose in the nomination paper, the earlier orderof the Election Commission by which the election was postponed.The existence of no such obligation is pleaded. Therefore,averments made in paragraphs nos. 4 and 5 of the Election Petitionare unnecessary, thereby, attracting clause (a) of Rule 16 of OrderVI of CPC. Under clause (a) of Rule 16 of Order VI of CPC, theCourt has the power to strike out a pleading which is unnecessary.[Paras 9, 11][553-G; 554-A, C-H]

1.2 Section 123 of the RP Act of 1951 defines corruptpractices. In paragraphs 6 and 7, even bare particulars of any ofthe corrupt practices covered by Section 123 have not beenpleaded. What is the nature of corrupt practice is also notdescribed except for making a bald allegation that in therepresentations mentioned in paragraph 6, the first respondenthas set out electoral misconduct, corrupt practice, and briberyon the part of the appellant. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section83 mandates that an election petition must contain a concisestatement of material facts. When the allegation is of corrupt A

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Apractice, the basic facts constituting corrupt practice must bepleaded in order to make compliance with Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. In this case, such concise facts are notat all pleaded. Basic facts cannot be pleaded only by stating thatthe same find place in the documents relied upon. The firstrespondent has merely stated that the contents of representationsBmay be read as a part of the petition. This does not satisfy therequirement of incorporating a concise statement of material facts.Moreover, when the allegation is of corrupt practice, theproceedings virtually become quasi-criminal. Therefore, theelected candidate must get adequate notice of what is allegedCagainst him. That is why material facts concerning the ground ofcorrupt practice must be pleaded. The outcome of such a petitionis very serious. It can oust a popularly elected representative ofthe people. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirement ofstating material facts must result in the rejection of the petitionat the threshold. [Para 13][556-B-F]D

1.3 The failure to plead material facts concerning allegedcorrupt practice is fatal to the election petition. The material factsare the primary facts which must be proved on trial by a party toestablish the existence of a cause of action. In the present case,taking the averments made in the petition as it is, not a singleEmaterial fact is pleaded making out an allegation of corrupt practicecovered by Section 123 of the RP Act of 1951. [Para 15][558-B-C]

Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi(1987) Supp SCC 93 : [1987] SCR 369; V.S.FAchuthanandan v. P.J. Francis & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC737 : [1999] 2 SCR 99 – relied on.

1.4 Paragraphs 3 and 4 are unnecessary, which do not dealwith something which happened after the election was declared.Therefore, the said paragraphs being irrelevant will have to beGordered to be deleted under Rule 16 of Order VI of CPC.Paragraph 5 is not material for the alleged cause of action.Paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 do not disclose any material facts in relationto the allegations of corrupt practices. As material facts regardingallegations of corrupt practice have not been pleaded, the election H

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petition does not disclose any cause of action as far as the groundof corrupt practice is concerned. Therefore, even theseparagraphs deserve to be deleted. The ground of improperacceptance of the nomination paper is not supported by materialfacts. In any case, the ground of improper acceptance of thenomination paper is no longer relevant as the term of the appellanthas already expired. Therefore, in view of the findings whichrecorded, no purpose will be served by keeping the ElectionPetition pending. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the HighCourt is set aside and the applications filed by the appellant forrejection of the petition and/or for deletion of irrelevantparagraphs are allowed. [Para 21][561-F-G; 562-A-B]

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M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Hande & Ors. (1983) 2 SCC473 : [1983] 2 SCR 629; Mulayam Singh Yadav v.Dharam Pal Yadav & Ors. (2001) 7 SCC 98 : [2001] 3SCR 1103; Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri PratapReddy and Ors. (2012) 7 SCC 788 : [2012] 6 SCR851; Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain & Others [1960]3 SCR 91 – referred to.

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Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 3895-3896 of 2023.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.02.2018 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in OA Nos. 653 and 654 of 2017.

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Ranjith Kumar, Sr. Adv., Senthil Jagadeesan, Sajal Jain,Ms. Sonakshi Malhan, Advs. for the Appellant.

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ABalaji Srinivasan, D. Raghu, K. Kathiresan, Devamshu Behl, ScvVimal Pani, A. Lakshminarayanan, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha,Ms. Pallavi, Ms. Sakshi Upadhyaya, Ms. Aparna Singh, D.kumanan,Mrs. Deepa. S, Sheikh F Kalia, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byBABHAY S. OKA, J.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

1. These appeals arise out of an Election Petition filed by the firstrespondent under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act,C1951 (for short, ‘the RP Act of 1951’). The Election Petition was filedby the first respondent in the Madras High Court questioning the validityof the election of 134 - Aravakurichi Assembly Constituency (for short,“the said Constituency”). Polling was held on 19[th] November 2016 andthe result was declared on 22[nd] November 2016. The present appellantis the 5[th] respondent in the Election Petition filed by the first respondent.DThe present appellant was declared as elected. He was polled 88,068votes. The 6[th] respondent in the Election Petition (the 6[th] respondent inthis appeal) was polled 64,407 votes. Only 82 voters voted for the firstrespondent (Election Petitioner).

2. The first ground of challenge in the Election Petition is theEimproper acceptance of nomination papers of the appellant and the 6[th]respondent. The second ground of challenge is that the election is voidas the appellant has indulged in corrupt practices. The allegation is thatthe appellant’s agent and some other persons with the consent of theappellant have indulged in corrupt practices.F3. An application was made by the present appellant inter alia F3. An application was made by the present appellant inter aliapointing out that no cause of action has been set out in the ElectionPetition in support of the ground of corrupt practice. It was submitted bythe appellant that the Election Petition filed by the first respondent doesnot disclose any material particulars and material facts about the allegationof corrupt practice. It was contended that the allegations made inGparagraphs 3 to 9 are vague and therefore, the said paragraphs deserveto be struck out by exercising the power under Rule 16 of Order VI ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’). The second prayerwas for the rejection of the Election Petition on the ground that the samedoes not disclose the cause of action. A similar application was also filedHby the 6[th] respondent. By the impugned judgment, the learned Judge of the Madras High Court rejected the applications. While doing so, heobserved that the first respondent had forwarded copies of a compactdisc, photographs, etc. to the Returning Officer (5[th] respondent). Thelearned Judge directed the first respondent to file all relevant documentssuch as emails, photographs, video footage, etc. which were submittedto the Returning Officer within a period of 15 days from the order. Theappellant has challenged the said judgment and order dated 23[rd] February2018 by way of this Appeal.

SUBMISSIONS

SUBMISSIONS

4. Shri Ranjith Kumar, the learned senior counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant has invited our attention to the requirement ofclauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the RP Act of1951 of incorporating in an election petition a concise statement ofmaterial facts and full particulars of any corrupt practice which is allegedlycommitted by the returned candidate. He pointed out that clause (b) ofsub-section (1) of Section 83 also requires the election petitioner to makefull statement disclosing the names of the parties alleged to havecommitted such corrupt practice and the date and place of commissionof such practice. The learned senior counsel also pointed out that initially,the election to the said Constituency was to be held in May 2016. Byorder dated 14[th] May 2016, the Election Commission of India (“theElection Commission”) postponed the said election. There was a furtherorder passed on 27[th] May 2016 by the Election Commission holding thatthe election of the said Constituency cannot be allowed to proceed andought to be rescinded so that fresh elections could be held. Accordingly,on 17[th] October 2016, the Election Commission rescheduled the electionto the said Constituency and declared that the polling will be held on 19[th]November 2016. He pointed out that the first respondent filed a writpetition before the Madras High Court challenging acceptance of thenomination papers of the appellant and 6[th] respondent. He pointed outthat by the judgment and order dated 18[th] November 2016, the HighCourt rejected the said writ petition filed by the first respondent andimposed costs on the first respondent.

5. Inviting our attention to the averments made in the ElectionPetition filed by the first respondent, he pointed out that paragraphs 3and 4 of the Election Petition give the history of the declaration of thepoll and subsequent postponement. Paragraph 5 refers to the fact thatthe representation made by the first respondent for challenging the validity AB

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Aof the nomination papers of the appellant and 6[th] respondent was rejectedby the Returning Officer. He pointed out that in paragraph 6 of theElection Petition, the first respondent has relied upon four representationsmade from 17[th] November 2016 to 22[nd] November 2016 to the ReturningOfficer alleging that the appellant has committed electoral misconduct,corrupt practice, and acts of bribery. It is alleged that the first respondentBhanded over audio and video clippings to the Returning Officer to provethe allegations in the representations made by email addressed to theReturning Officer. In paragraph 7, the allegation is that result of theelection is vitiated due to improper acceptance of the nomination paperof the appellant. Paragraph 8 contains a chart showing the respectiveCvotes polled by various candidates. In paragraph 9, it is alleged that theearlier election was cancelled due to misconduct on the part of theappellant and the 6[th] respondent and that they have suppressed the findingsof the Election Commission recorded against them. He submitted thatalong with the Election Petition, copies of the representations made bythe first respondent were filed. He urged that material facts andDparticulars regarding the alleged corrupt practices are not found in theElection Petition. He submitted that on the basis of the applications madeby the appellant, the High Court has directed the first respondent to filecopies of emails, photographs, and video footage which do not find placein the list of documents filed along with the Election Petition. He urgedEthat the said direction is per se illegal.

6. Learned senior counsel relied upon decisions of this Court inthe case of (i) Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi[1] (ii)M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Hande & Ors.[2] and (iii) Mulayam SinghYadav v. Dharam Pal Yadav & Ors.[3]. He submitted that once theFparagraphs in the Election Petition concerning allegations of corruptpractice are struck out, nothing will survive in the Election Petition asthe term of the appellant is already over and a fresh election has beenheld thereafter.

7. Lastly, the learned senior counsel submitted that while decidingGthe applications made by the appellant, the High Court could have eitherallowed the applications or rejected the same. But the High Court has 1 1987 Supp SCC 932 (1983) 2 SCC 473H3 (2001) 7 SCC 98

committed an error by directing the first respondent to produce documentswhich she had not produced.

8. Shri Balaji Srinivasan, the learned counsel representing the firstrespondent pointed out that material facts in support of the allegations ofcorrupt practice are already pleaded in the Election Petition. He pointedout that the first respondent has relied upon representations made by herto various authorities in which specific details of corrupt practices havebeen set out. He submitted that as material facts have already beenpleaded, the High Court rightly did not exercise its powers under Rule16 of Order VI of CPC. Relying upon a decision of this Court in thecase of V.S. Achuthanandan v. P.J. Francis & Anr.[4], the learnedcounsel submitted that material particulars can always be supplied lateron even if the period of limitation for filing the election petition is over.He also relied upon another decision of this Court in the case of PonnalaLakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy and Ors.[5]. He submittedthat while dealing with applications under Rule 11 of Order VII or Rule16 of Order VI of CPC, the Court cannot adopt a hypertechnicalapproach. Relying upon what is held in paragraph 9 of a judgment of aConstitution Bench of this Court in the case of Balwan Singh v. LakshmiNarain & Others[6], he submitted that an opportunity is always availableto the election petitioner to apply for amendment of the election petitionfor incorporating particulars or for amplifying the particulars. He invitedour attention to the impugned order and urged that the High Court hascorrectly applied settled legal principles and therefore, no interference iscalled for.

OUR VIEW

9. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. Wehave carefully perused the Election Petition filed by the first respondent.As noted earlier, the election to the said Constituency was postponed interms of the order dated 27[th] May 2016 passed by the ElectionCommission. The challenge to the election was on two grounds. Firstly,that the nomination of the appellant was improperly accepted andsecondly, corrupt practices have been committed by the appellant or byother persons with his consent. Section 123 of the RP Act of 1951 definesvarious corrupt practices for the purpose of the said enactment. Naturally, 4 (1999) 3 SCC 737

5 (2012) 7 SCC 788

6 (1960) 3 SCR 91

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Athe corrupt practice has to be qua the election subject matter of challengein the Election Petition.

10. Now, coming to the Election Petition filed by the firstrespondent, paragraphs 1 and 2 are formal paragraphs which containthe first respondent’s address and description of the respondents.BParagraph 3 only records that by a notification dated 16[th] October 2016,the Election Commission announced the election for the said Constituency.

Paragraph 4 quotes the order of the Election Commission by which theelection earlier scheduled was postponed due to reasons incorporated inthe said order. Paragraphs 3 and 4 are completely irrelevant to adjudicateupon the grounds pleaded in the Election Petition.

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11. In paragraph 5, the first respondent has relied upon therepresentation made by her on 3[rd] November 2016 to the ReturningOfficer by pointing out that the appellant and 6[th] respondent havecommitted misconduct by suppressing the findings of the ElectionCommission recorded in the order dated 27[th] May 2016. The firstDrespondent called upon the Returning Officer to disqualify the appellantand the 6[th] respondent. It is further stated that the representation wasrejected by communication dated 5[th] November 2011. Therefore, thefirst respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissedby the order dated 18[th] November 2016 with costs of Rs.3,000/- on theEfirst respondent. Presumably, paragraph 5 of the petition is in support ofthe ground of improper acceptance of the nomination papers of theappellant. However, the first respondent has not pleaded that under aparticular statutory provision, the appellant and 6[th] respondent were underan obligation to disclose the order dated 27[th] May 2016 passed by theElection Commission while filing nomination papers. It is not pleadedFhow on the ground of the failure to disclose the said order, the appellantand 6[th] respondent were disqualified from contesting the election. Thedisqualification must be based on a statutory provision. The firstrespondent has not pleaded that in law it was the obligation of the appellantto disclose in the nomination paper, the earlier order of the ElectionGCommission by which the election was postponed. The existence of nosuch obligation is pleaded. Therefore, in our view, averments made inparagraphs nos. 4 and 5 of the Election Petition are unnecessary, thereby,attracting clause (a) of Rule 16 of Order VI of CPC. Under clause (a)of Rule 16 of Order VI of CPC, the Court has the power to strike out apleading which is unnecessary.H

12. We will have to examine the averments regarding corruptpractice in the light of Section 83 of R.P. Act of 1951 which reads thus:

“83. Contents of petition.—(1) An election petition—

(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material factson which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practicethat the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement aspossible of the names of the parties alleged to havecommitted such corrupt practice and the date and place ofthe commission of each such practice; and

(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laiddown in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for theverification of pleadings:

[Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice,the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in theprescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practiceand the particulars thereof.]

(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also besigned by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as thepetition.”

Now we come to paragraphs 6 and 7 which read thus:

“6. The petitioner filed representations to 4th Respondents on17.11.2016 two representations, 19.11.2016, 20.11.2016, 22.11.2016explaining that the 5th Respondent committed electoral misconduct,corrupt practice and bribery to the electorate. The 4th Respondentdid not consider the representations. She submitted that the 5thRespondent used Government vehicles for election campaign. Thepetitioner filed audio and video clippings to prove the allegationsmade in the representation by electronic mail to the 4thRespondent. She craves leave of the Court to treat the avermentsin the above representations has part and parcel of this petition.

7. The petitioner submits that the returned candidate wasdisqualified to be chosen to fill the said seat that he has committedcorrupt practice and the result of the election so far as it concerned A

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Ato the 5th Respondent has been materially affected by improperacceptance of his nomination, by corrupt practice and non-compliance of by not disclosing the earlier order of the electioncommission for same constituency.”

13. Section 123 of the RP Act of 1951 defines corrupt practices.BIn paragraphs 6 and 7, even bare particulars of any of the corruptpractices covered by Section 123 have not been pleaded. What is thenature of corrupt practice is also not described except for making a baldallegation that in the representations mentioned in paragraph 6, the firstrespondent has set out electoral misconduct, corrupt practice, and briberyon the part of the appellant. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83Cmandates that an election petition must contain a concise statement ofmaterial facts. When the allegation is of corrupt practice, the basic factsconstituting corrupt practice must be pleaded in order to make compliancewith Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. In this case, such concisefacts are not at all pleaded. Basic facts cannot be pleaded only by statingDthat the same find place in the documents relied upon. The first respondenthas merely stated that the contents of representations may be read as apart of the petition. This does not satisfy the requirement of incorporatinga concise statement of material facts. Moreover, when the allegation isof corrupt practice, the proceedings virtually become quasi-criminal.Therefore, the elected candidate must get adequate notice of what isEalleged against him. That is why material facts concerning the ground ofcorrupt practice must be pleaded. The outcome of such a petition is veryserious. It can oust a popularly elected representative of the people.Therefore, non-compliance with the requirement of stating material factsmust result in the rejection of the petition at the threshold.

F14. At this stage, we may make useful reference to a well-knowndecision of this Court of a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges in the case ofV.S. Achuthanandan[4]which is in fact relied upon by the first respondent.Paragraph 15 of the said decision reads thus:

“15. It would thus appear that the election petition was rejectedGmainly on the ground that it did not disclose the cause of action asaccording to the learned trial Judge the allegations regardingcorrupt practice were vague and did not disclose “material factsand full particulars” of the corrupt practice alleged. It is evidentthat the learned trial Judge did not distinguish between the “materialHfacts” and the “material particulars” of allegations regarding

corrupt practices as defined under Section 123 of the Act. Thelaw on the point is well settled which appears to have not beentaken note of or appreciated by the learned trial Judge. Afterreferring to various pronouncements of this Court including casesin Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain [AIR 1960 SC 770 : (1960)3 SCR 91], Samant N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez [(1969)3 SCC 238] , Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan [(1972) 1SCC 826], Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia [(1977) 1 SCC511], F.A. Sapa v. Singora [(1991) 3 SCC 375] and GajananKrishnaji Bapat v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe [(1995) 5 SCC347] and a host of other authorities, this Court in L.R.Shivaramagowda v. T.M. Chandrashekar [(1999) 1 SCC 666: (1998) 6 Scale 361] held that while failure to plead “materialfacts” is fatal to the election petition and no amendment ofthe pleading is permissible to introduce such material factsafter the time-limit prescribed for filing the election petition,the absence of “material particulars” can be cured at a laterstage by an appropriate amendment. An election petition wasnot liable to be dismissed in limine merely because full particularsof corrupt practice alleged were not set out. It is, therefore, evidentthat material facts are such primary facts which must be provedat the trial by a party to establish existence of a cause of action.Whether in an election petition a particular fact is a material factor not, and as such, required to be pleaded is a question whichdepends on the nature of the charge levelled, the ground reliedupon, and in the light of the special circumstances of the case.In Udhav Singh case [(1977) 1 SCC 511] the Court held: (SCCp. 523, paras 42-43)

“In short, all those facts which are essential to clothethe petitioner with a complete cause of action, are‘material facts’ which must be pleaded, and failure toplead even a single material fact amounts to disobedienceof the mandate of Section 83(1)(a).

‘Particulars’, on the other hand, are ‘the details of the case set upby the party’. ‘Material particulars’ within the contemplation ofclause (b) of Section 83(1) would therefore mean all the detailswhich are necessary to amplify, refine and embellish the materialfacts already pleaded in the petition in compliance with the ABC

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Arequirements of clause (a). ‘Particulars’ serve the purpose offinishing touches to the basic contours of a picture already drawn,to make it full, more detailed and more informative.”

15. The consensus of judicial opinion is that the failure to pleadBmaterial facts concerning alleged corrupt practice is fatal to the electionpetition. The material facts are the primary facts which must be provedon trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action. In thepresent case, taking the averments made in the petition as it is, not asingle material fact is pleaded making out an allegation of corrupt practiceCcovered by Section 123 of the RP Act of 1951. All that the first respondenthas pleaded is that he made representations to the Returning Officerand other authorities complaining about the corrupt practice on the partof the appellant. What is the nature of the corrupt practice is notmentioned even in brief. Therefore, material facts, which according tothe first respondent constitute corrupt practice were not pleaded in theDElection Petition.

16. At this stage, we may refer to a decision of this Court in thecase of Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal[1 ]and in particular paragraphnos. 13 and 14 which reads thus:-

E“13. The appellant’s grievance that in entertaining the preliminaryobjections and rejecting the election petition under Order VII Rule11 the High Court deprived the appellant’s opportunity to amendthe petition and to make good the deficiencies by supplying thenecessary particulars and details of the corrupt practice allegedin the petition, is devoid of any merit. Firstly, the appellant wasFfree to file amendment application, but at no stage heexpressed any desire to make any amendment applicationnor he made any application to that effect before the HighCourt. It was open to the appellant to have made thatapplication but he himself did not make any such application.GThe High Court was under no legal obligation to direct theappellant to amend pleadings or to suo moto grant time forthe same. Secondly, the allegations of corrupt practice asrequired by Section 83 were not complete and the samedid not furnish any cause of action, any amendment madeafter the expiry of the period of limitation could not be H

permitted which would amount to raise a new ground ofchallenge. The question, however, does not arise as the appellantdid not file any amendment application. During the course ofhearing of this appeal before us the appellant has made applicationsfor amendment of the election petition which we shall deal withlater.

14. Before we consider various paragraphs of the election petitionto determine the correctness of the High Court order we think itnecessary to bear in mind the nature of the right to elect, the rightto be elected and the right to dispute election and the trial of theelection petition. Right to contest election or to question the electionby means of an election petition is neither common law norfundamental right, instead it is a statutory right regulated by thestatutory provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1951.There is no fundamental or common law right in these matters.This is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court in N.P.Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer [(1952) 1 SCC 94: AIR 1952SC 64 : 1952 SCR 218 : 1 ELR 133], Jagan Nath v. JaswantSingh [AIR 1954 SC 210 : 1954 SCR 892 : 9 ELR 231], JyotiBasu v. Debi Ghosal [(1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983 :(1982) 3 SCR 318]. These decisions have settled the legal positionthat outside the statutory provisions there is no right to dispute anelection. The Representation of People Act is a complete andself-contained Code within which any rights claimed in relation toan election or an election dispute must be found. The provisionsof the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the extent aspermissible by Section 87 of the Act. The scheme of the Act asnoticed earlier would show that an election can be questionedunder the statute as provided by Section 80 on the grounds ascontained in Section 100 of the Act. Section 83 lays down amandatory provision in providing that an election petitionshall contain a concise statement of material facts and setforth full particulars of corrupt practice. The pleadings areregulated by Section 83 and it makes it obligatory on theelection petitioner to give the requisite facts, details andparticulars of each corrupt practice with exactitude. If theelection petition fails to make out a ground under Section100 of the Act it must fail at the threshold. Allegations ofcorrupt practice are in the nature of criminal charges, it is AB

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Anecessary that there should be no vagueness in theallegations so that the returned candidate may know thecase he has to meet. If the allegations are vague and generaland the particulars of corrupt practice are not stated in thepleadings, the trial of the election petition cannot proceedfor want of cause of action. The emphasis of law is to avoid aBfishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the Courtto scrutinise the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a strictmanner.”

C17. This Court held that Section 83 makes it obligatory for theelection petitioner to give requisite facts, details, and particulars of eachcorrupt practice with exactitude. In this case, requisite facts arecompletely missing. The allegations are very vague and general in natureand, therefore, there is no cause of action to proceed on the ground ofcorrupt practice. Therefore, in our view, the averments made inDparagraphs 6 and 7 do not constitute a cause of action available to proceedon the ground of corrupt practices contemplated by Section 123.Paragraph 8 contains the details of the result of the election. Paragraphs2 to 4 and 8 are formal in nature and not at all relevant.

18. In paragraph 9, again there are vague and general allegationsEthat the appellant and 6[th] respondent committed electoral misconductand corrupt practice. Even this paragraph is bereft of material facts.Paragraph 9 (a) has been added which contains only one sentence thatacceptance of nomination of the appellant and 6[th] respondent is illegal.Not a single material fact is pleaded in support of the plea that theFacceptance of the nomination paper is improper.

19. While rejecting the applications made by the appellants, thelearned Single Judge of the High Court had issued directions in paragraphs19 and 20 which read thus:- “19. In this case, as already held that the election petition disclosesGmaterial facts and particulars and copy of the CD, photographsetc sent to the respondent/returning officer has not been given tothe applicants herein/respondents 5 & 6. The 1st respondent/election petitioner has not stated anything new in the electionpetition, these documents have already been sent to the 5[th]respondent/returning officer during election. The ReturnedH

candidate/5[th] respondent has not denied and the same can bedecided at the time of trial. Therefore, it is necessity on thepart of the first respondent/election petitioner to producethe copies of emails, photographs, CD and video footagesetc., before this Court and serve the same to the applicantsherein/contesting respondents 5 and 6.

20. With the above observation, all the three applications aredismissed. This Court directs the first respondent/ electionpetitioner to file all the relevant documents before thisCourt within 15 days from the date of this order viz., emails,photographs and video footages etc., if any filed before the5th respondent/returning officer during the Election andalso to serve those materials to applicants herein/contestingrespondents 5 and 6.”

20. We must note here that the emails, photographs, and videofootage have not been relied upon in the list of documents filed alongwith the Election Petition. At the highest, these documents will constituteparticulars and not material facts. Secondly, the High Court had no reasonto direct the election petitioner to file the said documents on record whiledismissing applications filed by the appellant and the 6[th] respondent. Itwas for the first respondent to seek permission to produce the documents.The first respondent never sought such permission. Even if the documentsare produced, the same will be without any foundation in the pleadings.Therefore, it is very difficult to sustain the said direction as well.

21. As held earlier, paragraphs 3 and 4 are unnecessary, which donot deal with something which happened after the election was declared.Therefore, the said paragraphs being irrelevant will have to be orderedto be deleted under Rule 16 of Order VI of CPC. Paragraph 5 is notmaterial for the alleged cause of action. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 do notdisclose any material facts in relation to the allegations of corruptpractices. As material facts regarding allegations of corrupt practicehave not been pleaded, the election petition does not disclose any causeof action as far as the ground of corrupt practice is concerned. Therefore,even these paragraphs deserve to be deleted. As stated earlier, the groundof improper acceptance of the nomination paper is not supported bymaterial facts. In any case, the ground of improper acceptance of thenomination paper is no longer relevant as the term of the appellant has AB

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GH

Aalready expired. Therefore, in view of the findings which we haverecorded above, no purpose will be served by keeping the Election Petitionpending. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned judgment of the HighCourt and allow the applications filed by the appellant for rejection ofthe petition and/or for deletion of irrelevant paragraphs. Election PetitionNo.1 of 2017 pending before the High Court of Judicature at MadrasBstands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by Varun Dhond and Shevali Monga, LCRAs]

Appeals disposed of.

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H