Supreme Court of India
SHRI SHIVAJI EDUCATION SOCIETY, AMRAVATI THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT versus OMPRAKASH S/O DINKAR DESHMUKH & ORS. on 22 November 2021
SHRI SHIVAJI EDUCATION SOCIETY,AMRAVATI THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT
v.
OMPRAKASH S/O DINKAR DESHMUKH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 6981 of 2021)
NOVEMBER 22, 2021
[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Wills – Bequest made under the Will – Nature of – Testatorexecuted Will (in respect of property) in favour of his wife (plaintiffno.1) who in turn gifted the property in question to appellant(plaintiff no. 2) – Contention of defendants that the gift deed executedby plaintiff no.1 was null and void in view of a limited life estateconferred upon her under the Will – Held: While the trial Courttook the view that under the Will, the testator’s wife was given onlya limited right of enjoyment for life, the First Appellate Court heldthat what was bequeathed was full rights of enjoyment, includingthe right to transfer – High Court did not overturn the finding offact recorded by the First Appellate Court – Instead, the High Courtwrongly proceeded to analyse sub-sections (1) and (2) of s.14 ofthe Hindu Succession Act, to come to the conclusion that the limitedestate did not get enlarged into full ownership – The question offact whether what was conveyed under the Will, was only a limitedright of enjoyment or full ownership, was settled by the FirstAppellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs – This finding was notheld by the High Court to be perverse – Though the High Courtthought that one of the substantial questions of law arising forconsideration was whether testator’s wife was full owner or limitedowner, the High Court chose to answer this question not on thebasis of the recitals contained in the Will but on the basis of thewrong understanding of an inapplicable Judgment of this Court –High Court overlooked the fact that in a civil dispute, the FirstAppellate Court is a final Court of fact and law and the High Court’sinterference u/s.100 is only on a substantial question of law – Oncethe First Appellate Court had found that the recitals contained inthe Will clearly conveyed full ownership, there was no occasion forthe High Court to go into s.14 of the Hindu Succession Act at all –Further, the First Appellate Court was concerned with two regular
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Afirst appeals, one filed by the defendants (R.C.A No. 408 of 1986)and another filed by the appellant / plaintiff no.1 (R.C.A No. 416 of1986) – First Appellate Court dismissed R.C.A No.408 of 1986 andallowed R.C.A No. 416 of 1986 – The defendants chose to file onlyone second appeal and that was against the decree in RCA No. 408of 1986 – Decree in R.C.A No. 416 of 1986 was allowed to attainBfinality – Even on this ground, the High Court ought to havedismissed the second appeal – Judgment of High Court set aside –Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908– s.108.
Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike and Ors.C(2006) 8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799 – heldinapplicable.
Case Law Reference
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799held inapplicablePara 11
DCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6981of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.10.2014 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Nagpur in Second Appeal No.154 of1992.E
Satyajit A. Desai, Gaurav Chaudhary, Siddharth Gautam,Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Advs. for the Appellant.
Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya A. Pande, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Advs.for the Respondents.FThe following Order of the Court was passed :
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O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved by the Judgment and decree dated 14.10.2014 passedGby the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, allowing asecond appeal and reversing the Judgment of the First Appellate Court,which itself was a reversing Judgment, plaintiff No. 1 in a suit for recoveryof possession and for past and future mesne profits, has come up withthe above appeal.
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3. We have heard Mr. Gaurav Chaudhary, learned counsel for theappellant and Mr. Rahul Chitnis, learned counsel appearing for respondentNos. 1 and 4.
4. The suit property is a house, which originally belonged to oneShri Kashirao Sampatrao Deshmukh. The said Kashirao SampatraoDeshmukh died on 1.05.1977, leaving behind him surviving, his wife Smt.Shevantabai.
5. Contending that after the death of her husband, Shevantabaigifted the suit property to the appellant herein under a registered GiftDeed dated 9.04.1981 and that the defendants who came into the houseunder the pretext of helping Smt. Shevantabai and her husband in theirold age, slowly took complete control of the suit property and drove Smt.Shevantabai out, the appellant herein and Smt. Shevantabai joined togetherto file a civil suit in Regular C.S No. 24 of 1982 in the Court of the CivilJudge (J.D.), Akot. The suit was for recovery of possession. Thedefendants in their written statement, set up a Will allegedly executed byShri Kashirao Sampatrao Deshmukh on 4.05.1976. It was the contentionof the defendants that under the said Will, Smt. Shevantabai was grantedonly a life estate and that after her lifetime, the property was to devolveupon the first defendant. The defendants claimed that the gift deedexecuted by Shevantabai was null and void in view of a limited life estateconferred upon her under the Will.
6. The trial Court, by a Judgment and decree dated 17.12.1986held
(i) that the Will set up by the defendants was proved; (ii) thatShevantabai who was plaintiff No. 2 was bequeathed only a right ofenjoyment during her life time and (iii) that therefore, the Gift Deedexecuted by Smt. Shevantabai in favour of the appellant herein whowas the plaintiff No.1 was not valid and binding on the defendants.Accordingly, the trial Court dismissed the claim of the appellant herein,but granted a decree in favour of plaintiff No. 2, as she was alive at thattime and admittedly she was entitled to possession and enjoyment of thesuit property during her lifetime.
7. Aggrieved by the decree of possession granted in favour ofSmt. Shevantabai (plaintiff No. 2), the defendants filed a regular firstappeal in R.C.A No. 408 of 1986. Aggrieved by the findings regardingthe nature of the bequest under the Will and the validity of the Gift Deed, A
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Athe appellant herein (plaintiff No. 1) filed an independent first appeal inR.C.A No. 416 of 1986.
8. The Additional District Judge, Akola, by a Judgment and decreedated 22.01.1992 dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants and allowedthe appeal filed by the appellant herein, holding that the Will set up by theBdefendants clearly gave Shevantabai all rights of enjoyment includingthe right to dispose of the same and that, therefore, she was the fullowner of the suit property entitled to gift it to the appellant herein.
9. Though the Judgment of the First Appellate Court was acommon Judgment in two first appeals, namely, RCA Nos. 408 and 416Cof 1986, the defendants filed only one second appeal in SA No. 154 of1992, on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, NagpurBench. The said appeal was allowed by the High Court by a Judgmentand decree dated 14.10.2014, holding that what was granted in favourof Shevantabai was only a life estate and that her estate could not haveenlarged under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It isDagainst the said Judgment of the High Court that the appellant hereinwho was plaintiff No.1 has come up with the above appeal.
10. Before we proceed further, we must take note of the fact thatthe plaintiff No. 2 Smt. Shevantabai died on 20.08.2005. Admittedly,Shevantabai did not leave behind any legal heir to succeed. The firstEdefendant was also not a legal heir, but was described in the Will set upby him, as the nephew of the testator.
10. Keeping the above facts in mind, let us now come to the coreissue on hand. All the three Courts proceeded on the basis that theexecution of the Will dated 4.05.1976 by Shri Kashirao SampatraoFDeshmukh stood proved. It is only on the question of the nature of thebequest made under the Will that each of the three Courts took differentviews. While the trial Court took the view that under the Will, the testator’swife (plaintiff No. 2) was given only a limited right of enjoyment for life,the First Appellate Court held that what was bequeathed was full rightsGof enjoyment, including the right to transfer. The First Appellate Courthighlighted the most important recital in the Will to the effect “as mywife Smt. Shevantabai Kashirao Sampatrao Deshmukh has no otherlegal heirs, after her death whatever property remains that propertyshall go to my near nephew…..”. The words “after her death whatever H
property remains” were clearly indicative of the fact that the bequestwas not of a life estate but was complete.
11. Interestingly, the High Court did not overturn the finding offact recorded by the First Appellate Court. Instead, the High Courtwrongly proceeded to analyse Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 ofthe Hindu Succession Act, to come to the conclusion that the limitedestate did not get enlarged into full ownership. The question of factwhether what was conveyed under the Will, was only a limited right ofenjoyment or full ownership, was settled by the First Appellate Court infavour of the plaintiffs. This finding was not held by the High Court to beperverse. Though the High Court thought that one of the substantialquestions of law arising for consideration was whether Smt. Shevantabaiwas full owner or limited owner, the High Court chose to answer thisquestion not on the basis of the recitals contained in the Will but on thebasis of the wrong understanding of an inapplicable Judgment of thisCourt in Sadhu Singh vs. Gurudwara Sahib Narike and Ors.[1] TheHigh Court overlooked the fact that in a civil dispute, the First AppellateCourt is a final Court of fact and law and the High Court’s interferenceunder Section 100 is only on a substantial question of law. Once the FirstAppellate Court had found that the recitals contained in the Will clearlyconveyed full ownership, there was no occasion for the High Court togo into Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act at all. Therefore, theJudgment and decree of the High Court are clearly erroneous and liableto be set aside.
12. There is also one more reason why the High Court could nothave interfered with the Judgment of the First Appellate Court. As wehave pointed out earlier, the First Appellate Court was concerned withtwo regular first appeals, one filed by the defendants and another filedby the appellant herein who was plaintiff No. 1. The First AppellateCourt dismissed R.C.A No. 408 of 1986 filed by the defendants andallowed R.C.A No. 416 of 1986 filed by the appellant herein. Thedefendants chose to file only one second appeal and that was againstthe decree in RCA No. 408 of 1986. The decree in R.C.A No. 416 of1986 has been allowed to attain finality. Even on this ground, the HighCourt ought to have dismissed the second appeal.
1 (2006) 8 SCC 75
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1122SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2021] 7 S.C.R.
A13. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed, the impugnedJudgment and decree of the High Court are set aside. The suit filed bythe appellant along with Smt. Shevantabai will stand decreed as prayedfor, as decided by the First Appellate Court in its Judgment dated22.01.1992. There will be no order as to costs.
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Appeal allowed.
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