UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. versus SHARVAN KUMAR on 6 July 2022

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

v.

SHARVAN KUMAR

(Civil Appeal Nos. 1942 of 2014)

JULY 06, 2022

[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]

Service Law – High Court held that the remitted proceedingsin the disciplinary enquiry against the respondent were renderednullity, for having not been concluded within the time limit fixed bythe Tribunal in its earlier order dated 03.09.2010 – Correctness of– Held: Fixing of the period of two months by the Tribunal in thiscase had only been to ensure expeditious proceedings because thematter was being restored for reconsideration in the year 2010,though the disciplinary proceedings related with the incident dated09.01.2005 – However, the said period of two months did not acquireany status akin to that of a statutory mandate that the disciplinaryproceedings would have automatically come to an end with its expiry– Proceedings in question neither abated nor could have beenconsidered nullity only because of passage of the expected timeperiod stated in the order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2010 – Therewas no reason or justification for the High Court to interfere withthe just and proper order passed by the Tribunal on 21.06.2013which inter alia held that the proceedings pursuant to the order dated03.09.2010 would have abated only if it was so directed in specificterms and not otherwise – Impugned order set aside and the orderdated 21.06.2013 passed by the Tribunal is restored.

Service Law – Conditional orders passed by Court/Tribunalto do something within a particular period, without providingconsequence of default – Enlargement of such time – Permissibilityof – Discussed.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Neither the approach of the High Court nor itsconclusion could be endorsed. The propositions of the High Court,treating the proceedings in question as having abated or havingbeen rendered nullity cannot be approved from any standpoint.

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Conclusion

AIt appears that the High Court has taken the period of two monthsfor completion of the proceedings, as stated in the order of theTribunal dated 03.09.2010, to be an inflexible mandate as also offatal consequence in the manner that after its expiry, thedepartment could not have taken the disciplinary proceedings totheir logical conclusion. This approach of the High Court cannotBbe supported even from a technical standpoint and obviouslystands at conflict with the substance of the matter. After therespondent was awarded the penalty of removal from service bythe order dated 23.02.2006 in conclusion of the disciplinaryproceedings, he challenged the same and the Appellate Authority,Cby its order dated 23.08.2006, altered the penalty to that ofdowngrading his pay. The Revisional Authority by its order dated14.03.2007 held that the negligence on the part of the respondentwas established and found no reason to interfere. However, theTribunal, in the earlier round of litigation, while dealing with OANo. 373 of 2007, chose not to examine the other materialDquestions involved in the matter but, disapproved the impositionof penalty on the respondent for the reason that the person actingas the Disciplinary Authority had been one of the members whohad earlier submitted the joint enquiry report. In this view of thematter, the Tribunal quashed the orders passed against theErespondent but, being conscious of the fact that the disciplinaryproceedings were otherwise required to be taken to the logicalconclusion, issued directions to ensure that the matter be dealtwith by the Disciplinary Authority other than the person who hadbeen a member of the joint enquiry team and the proceedings betaken up from the stage of consideration of representation of theFrespondent against the report of the Enquiry Officer. Whileconcluding on the matter, the Tribunal also expected that suchafresh exercise be completed within two months of the receipt ofthe order, after leaving all other contentions open. As noticed,the appellants attempted to seek enlargement of time in view ofGthe fact that the exercise could not be completed within the saidperiod of two months but, this prayer for enlargement was declinedby the Tribunal not on its merits but, for a different reason thatthe particulars like the time-frame laid down by the Railway Boardfor taking the decision on the enquiry report was not stated beforeit. The said order expecting conclusion of the proceedings withinH

two months from the date of receipt of copy of the order waspassed on 03.09.2010; the application seeking enlargement wasdismissed on 03.01.2011; and the Disciplinary Authority passedits order on 17.02.2011. Thus, the question was about the statusof such order so passed by the Disciplinary Authority beyond theperiod fixed by the Tribunal which had not been enlarged. TheTribunal in its order dated 21.06.2013 held that the proceedingspursuant to the order dated 03.09.2010 would have abated only ifit was so directed in specific terms and not otherwise. The Tribunalhad been correct in this approach and the High Court hasunjustifiably interfered with the just and proper order passed bythe Tribunal. [Paras 7-9][457-F-H; 458-A-H; 459-A]

1.2 Fixing of the period of two months by the Tribunal inthis case had only been to ensure expeditious proceedingsbecause the matter was being restored for reconsideration inthe year 2010, though the disciplinary proceedings related withthe incident dated 09.01.2005. However, the said period of twomonths did not acquire any status akin to that of a statutorymandate that the disciplinary proceedings would haveautomatically come to an end with its expiry. It remains trite thatif an Adjudicating Authority in exercise of its jurisdiction couldgrant or fix a time period to do a particular thing, in the absenceof a specific statutory provision to the contrary, the jurisdictionto fix such a time period inhers the jurisdiction to extend thetime initially fixed. Such conditional orders have regularly beenconstrued by this Court to be in terrorem so as to put a check onthe dilatory tactics by any litigant or to guard against any laxityon the part of the Adjucating Authority but, the Court is notpowerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorilyfixed the period at any earlier stage. When a conditional order ispassed by the Court/Tribunal to do a particular act or thing withina particular period but the order does not provide anything as tothe consequence of default, the Court/Tribunal fixing the timefor doing a particular thing obviously retains the power to enlargesuch time. As a corollary, even the Appellate Court/Tribunal orany higher forum would also be having the power to enlarge suchtime, if so required. In any case, it cannot be said that theproceedings would come to an end immediately after the expiry AB

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Aof the time fixed. In the present case, even the order dismissingthe application for enlargement of time on a technical ground ofnot placing before the Tribunal instructions of the Railway Board,had again been not of giving any such status of mandatory andrigid character to the period originally fixed that the proceedingswould have abated. [Paras 9.1-9.3][459-B-D, F-H; 460-A-B]B

Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das [1961] 3 SCR 763 –relied on.

1.3 While treating the proceedings as having abated and asnullity, the High Court has ignored the fundamental principlesCthat fixing of such time period was only a matter of procedurewith an expectation of conclusion of the proceedings in anexpeditious manner. This period of two months had not acquiredany such mandatory statutory character so as to nullify the entireof the disciplinary proceedings with its expiry. Moreover, whenno consequence of default was stated in the order datedD03.09.2010, the period as stated therein was only of expectationsand not of mandate. Very many times, such fixing of time periodcauses more complications and harm rather than serving the causeof justice. Fixing of such period could only be justified if thereare strong and compelling reasons for the same; and if at all suchEperiod is proposed to be fixed, not only the reasons for the samebut, even the consequences of default are also required to bestated if such period is, for any valid reason, expected to operatewith adverse consequences on the defaulter. The proceedings inquestion neither abated nor could have been considered nullityonly because of passage of the expected time period stated inFthe order of the Tribunal dated 03.09.2010. There was no reasonor justification for the High Court to interfere with the just andproper order passed by the Tribunal on 21.06.2013, whichdeserves to be restored with necessary consequential directions.[Paras 10-11][460-B-F]G

1.4 The impugned order dated 30.08.2013 is set aside andthe order dated 21.06.2013 passed by the Tribunal is restored.Resultantly, it would be permissible for the respondent to preferan appeal against the order dated 17.02.2011 before the AppellateAuthority. Before concluding, one more aspect is required to be H

dealt with; it relates to the payment of 50% back wages to therespondent and furnishing of security of immoveable property byhim in terms of the order passed by this Court on 14.08.2015. Itis informed that such payment has been made and the respondenthas received the same while furnishing the requisite security.Having regard to the totality of circumstances, the said orderdated 14.08.2015 is made absolute. However, the securityfurnished by the respondent stands discharged. [Paras 13,14][461-B-C, E-F]

Case Law Reference

[1961] 3 SCR 763 relied onPara 9.1

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1942of 2014.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.08.2013 of the High Courtof Calcutta in WPCT No. 330 of 2013.

Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Ms. Shreya Jain, Ms. Vimla Sinha,Amrish Kumar, Advs. for the Appellants.

Shree Pal Singh, Adv. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.

1. By way of this appeal, the appellants - Union of India and itsofficers related with South Eastern Railway – have challenged thejudgment and order dated 30.08.2013 passed by the High Court ofCalcutta in WPCT No. 330 of 2013, whereby the High Court hasdisapproved the order dated 21.06.2013 passed by the CentralAdministrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench (‘the Tribunal’) in OA No. 293of 2011 and has also held that the remitted proceedings in the disciplinaryenquiry against the respondent were rendered nullity, for having notbeen concluded within the time limit fixed by the Tribunal in its earlierorder dated 03.09.2010.

1.1. In view of its findings and conclusion, the High Court hasdisposed of the writ petition filed by the respondent with directions to theappellants to reinstate him in service and to pay him 50% back wagesfrom the date of removal from service i.e., 17.02.2011 and until the dateof reinstatement.

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2. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the issuesarising for consideration in this appeal, all the factual aspects and meritsof the charges in the disciplinary proceedings need not be dilated upon.Only a brief reference to the relevant background aspects would suffice.

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2.1. It has been the case of appellants that on 09.11.2005, theBrespondent, an Electric Locomotive Driver, while piloting a locomotiveengine, overshot the signal and thereby, endangered the property andoperation of railways as also the life of citizens. As per railway manual,a joint enquiry was conducted in regard to the incident in question and itwas found that it had been a matter of averted collision, due to thelocomotive not being controlled; and that the brake adjustment rods wereCallegedly manipulated by the respondent-driver and his co- driver, in anattempt to justify their stand that the engine could not be controlled dueto the poor power of brakes. Based on the enquiry report, a major penaltycharge-sheet bearing No. RS/ACC/6/2005/SK/MJ dated 06.12.2005 wasissued to the respondent.D

2.2. After the enquiry proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority,having examined the record and the findings of the Enquiry Officer,ultimately served the respondent with the punishment notice dated23.02.2006, imposing the penalty of removal from railway service withimmediate effect.E

2.3. The respondent preferred an appeal before the AppellateAuthority against the aforesaid punishment notice dated 23.02.2006wherein, after considering the assurances given by the respondent toremain more careful in the future, the Appellate Authority, by its orderdated 23.08.2006, modified the penalty to that of downgrading his pay toFthe lowest stage in the scale of Rs. 4,000-6,000/-.

2.4. The respondent preferred a revision petition against the orderso passed by the Appellate Authority but the Revisional Authority, by itsorder dated 14.03.2007, declined to interfere while observing that as pertechnical review, nothing was wrong with the brakes of the locomotive;Gand that the respondent had encountered several down-gradientssuccessfully and fading of brakes could not occur abruptly.

2.5. The respondent, thereafter, filed OA No. 373 of 2007 beforethe Tribunal, challenging the orders passed against him and seekingreinstatement with all benefits. The Tribunal decided the OA so filed bythe respondent by its order dated 03.09.2010.H

2.5.1. Though the Tribunal noted the questions involved in the matteras to whether the report of the Commissioner, Railway Safety/JointEnquiry could hold somebody guilty or their role was only to ascertainsystemic defects so as to prevent recurrence in future; and as to whethersuch report could be accepted in evidence without examining the authors?The Tribunal, however, observed that these questions were not requiredto be answered and proceeded to hold that the proceedings sufferedfrom illegality and impropriety in view of the fact that one of the memberswho had submitted the joint enquiry report, Shri A. Sadasiva, was thesame person who had also issued major penalty charge-sheet and then,imposed the penalty in his capacity as the Disciplinary Authority. TheTribunal also noticed that this objection was duly taken by the respondentin his representation but, the Appellate Authority and the RevisionalAuthority did not consider the same.

2.5.2. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the orders passed againstthe respondent but, provided for the proceedings afresh in the followingwords: - “10. The orders passed by the Disciplinary AuthorityAppellate Authority & Revisional Authority are quashed and setaside. In case the same Disciplinary Authority continues an ad-hoc Disciplinary Authority shall be appointed. The DisciplinaryAuthority shall proceed from the stage of consideration or (sic)representation against the report of Enquiry Officer uninfluencedby the earlier decisions. This exercise be completed within twomonths of receipt of order. All other contentions are left open. Nocosts.”

2.6. After the directions aforesaid, the matter was taken up forreconsideration but, the Disciplinary Authority required additional timeto complete the proceedings, and hence, an application seekingenlargement of time for deciding the case was filed before the Tribunal,being Miscellaneous Application No. 436 of 2010. However, thisapplication was dismissed by the Tribunal on 03.01.2011, essentially forthe reason that the same was lacking in material particulars like thetimeframe laid down by the Railway Board for taking a decision on theEnquiry Report.

2.7. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed its order on17.02.2011, once again imposing the major penalty of removal from A

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Arailway service on the respondent, while concluding that the respondentdid not stop the engine on time due to his negligence. It was also mentionedin the order of the Disciplinary Authority that the respondent could preferan appeal before the Appellate Authority within 45 days from the dateof receipt of a copy of the order.

B2.8. The respondent did not challenge the order so passed by theDisciplinary Authority on 17.02.2011 in appeal. Instead, he moved theTribunal and filed OA No. 293 of 2011 with the contention, inter alia,that the Tribunal had stipulated a time limit of two months to completethe proceedings by its order dated 03.09.2010 and the proceedings hadabated for having not been completed within the prescribed time limit.C

2.8.1. The Tribunal, after hearing the parties, dismissed the OA sofiled by the respondent by its order dated 21.06.2013 while holding thatthe proceedings would have abated only if it were so directed in specificterms. The Tribunal found that in the instant case, while directing thatrespondent’s case be decided within two months, it had not beenDspecifically provided that the proceedings would abate if not completedwithin two months. It was also noted that the respondent had not preferredan appeal against the order dated 17.02.2011, and two years had alreadyelapsed. However, in the interest of justice, it was directed that if therespondent were to file an appeal against the order dated 17.02.2011,Ethe Appellate Authority would consider and decide the same within aperiod of one month in accordance with law. The Tribunal referred to adecision of its Full Bench and observed, inter alia, as under: - “8. Further it has been observed by the Tri- bunal by inserting thereference that it is only when in an order a specific direction ofFabating of the proceedings not completed within a spe- cific timelimit the proceedings abates but not otherwise. It is clear that inthe earlier O.A. time limited was given but not specifically pro-vided that the proceedings will abate if not done within the stipulatedtime frame. Considering the observation made above, since theapplicant has also not preferred the appeal against the order datedG17.2.2011. However, more than two years have already elapsedbut considering the interest of justice we deem it appropriate toissue a di- rection to the applicant that in case he prefers an appealagainst the order dated 17.2.2011 the appellate authority shallconsider and decide the same within the next period of one month H

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. v. SHARVAN KUMAR[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

in accordance with law and the decision so taken be communicatedto the applicant.

9. However, in regard to considering the prayer of the applicantis concerned we are not inclined to interfere in the same. Assuch, the O.A. is dismissed, no orders as to costs.”

3. The aforesaid order dated 21.06.2013 as passed by the Tribunalin OA No. 293 of 2011 was challenged in WPCT No. 330 of 2013,which has been considered and allowed by the High Court by way of theimpugned order dated 30.08.2013.

3.1. The High Court has taken the view that the DisciplinaryAuthority had no jurisdiction or authority to complete the proceedingsbeyond the period prescribed by the Tribunal. The High Court hasobserved that even though Miscellaneous Application No. 436 of 2010,seeking enlargement of time was dismissed by the Tribunal on 03.01.2011,the Disciplinary Authority proceeded with the matter; and suchproceedings beyond the time prescribed were nullity in the eyes of law.It has further been held that once the proceedings were held to be anullity, there could be no question of preferring a statutory appeal, andsuch proceedings could only be challenged before a Court of law. Therelevant observations and reasoning of the High Court read as under: -

“….Since the authorities concerned failed to complete thedisciplinary proceedings in terms of the earlier order passed bythe learned Tribunal, an application was filed on behalf of therespondents before the said learned Tribunal for extension of timeand the said application was numbered as M.A. 436 of 2010. Thelearned Tribunal, however, dismissed the aforesaid application on3rd January, 2011. Even though the learned Tribunal by the specificorder dated 3[rd] January, 2011 passed in M.A. 436 of 2010 refusedto extend the time limit for completion of the disciplinaryproceedings in respect of the petitioner herein, the DisciplinaryAuthority in an illegal manner proceeded with the disciplinaryproceedings and passed the order of punishment removing thesaid petitioner from Railway service.

The Disciplinary Authority namely, Sri A.K. Mukherjee, Sr.Divisional Electrical Engineer (OP), S.E. Railway, Adra refusedto show any respect to the solemn order passed by the learnedTribunal and in a most illegal manner, passed the order of A

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punishment in respect of the petitioner herein by conducting thedisciplinary proceedings even after expiry of the prescribed timelimit fixed by the learned Tribunal.

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The petitioner herein, however, challenged the aforesaidorder of dismissal before the learned Tribunal by filing anotherapplication being O.A. 293 of 2011. The learned Tribunal,unfortunately, failed to appreciate that the order passed by theDisciplinary Authority was nullity in the eye of law since the saidDisciplinary Authority conducted the disciplinary proceedings inrespect of the petitioner herein after the expiry of the prescribedtime limit fixed by the said learned Tribunal.

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When a proceeding is nullity in the eye of law, question ofpreferring any statutory appeal before the Appellate Authoritycannot and does not arise and the same can be directly challengedbefore any court of law. The learned Tribunal, most unfortunately,dismissed the application filed by the petitioner herein on the groundDthat no appeal was preferred before the Appellate Authority withoutrealizing the fact that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authoritywas nullity in the eye of law since the final order of punishmentwas passed by the Disciplinary Authority after expiry of theprescribed time limit fixed by the learned Tribunal.

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The impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authoritydated 17th February, 2011 cannot be sustained in the eye of lawsince the Disciplinary Authority had no authority and/or jurisdictionto conduct and complete the disciplinary proceedings beyond theprescribed time limit.

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The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, should not havedismissed the writ petition for not preferring any appeal beforethe Appellate Authority since the order passed by the DisciplinaryAuthority was nullity in the eye of law….”

3.2. For the aforesaid reasons, the High Court set aside the orderGof the Tribunal dated 21.06.2013 and also quashed the order dated17.02.2011 passed by the Disciplinary Authority as being illegal, invalidand nullity in the eyes of law. The High Court even proceeded to makeadverse observation against the officer who had acted as the DisciplinaryAuthority; and proceeded to order reinstatement of the respondent with50% of back wages from the date of removal from service, i.e.,H

17.02.2011 and until the date of reinstatement. The High Court observedand directed as under: - “For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned order passedby the Disciplinary Authority dated 17[th] February, 2011 standsquashed being illegal, invalid and nullity in the eye of law.

For the identical reasons, the impugned order passed bythe learned Tribunal cannot be sustained and the same is, therefore,set aside. We do not approve the conduct of Sri A. K. Mukherjee,Sr. Divisional Electrical Engineer (OP), S.E. Railway, Adra andDisciplinary Authority since the said Disciplinary Authority did notshow any respect to the solemn order passed by the learnedTribunal and we record our strong displeasure in this regard. Wehope the superior authority will take note of our displeasure inrespect of the aforesaid conduct of the Disciplinary Authorityfor not showing proper respect to the solemn order passed by thelearned Tribunal.

Since the disciplinary proceedings initiated on the basis ofthe charge-sheet could not be completed within the prescribedtime limit, the same stood automatically quashed.

The respondent authorities are directed to reinstate thepetitioner in service forthwith. We are also of the opinion thatjustice will be done in the facts of the present case if 50% of theback wages is paid to the petitioner herein.

The respondent authorities are, therefore, directed to pay50% of the back wages to the petitioner herein from the date ofremoval of the said petitioner herein from the date of removal ofthe said petitioner from service i.e. with effect from 17th February,2011 till the date of reinstatement of the said petitioner in servicein terms of this order. The respondent authorities are also directedto calculate the aforesaid back wages within three weeks fromdate and disburse the same to the petitioner herein within a periodtwo weeks thereafter positively.”

4. The appellants have challenged the judgement and order sopassed by the High Court by way of this appeal.

4.1. It may be pointed out that in this matter, leave to appeal wasgranted by this Court on the very first date of consideration i.e., 07.02.2014

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Aand, having regard to the circumstances of the case, this Court stayedthe operation of all the judgments passed in this matter. Thereafter, byan order dated 14.08.2015, this Court directed the appellants to deposit50% back wages in terms of the directions of the High Court and providedthat the respondent would be entitled to withdraw the same against thesecurity of immoveable property. We are informed that such paymentBhas indeed been made and the respondent has received the same whilefurnishing the requisite security.

5. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for theappellants has submitted that the High Court was not justified in upsettingand reversing the well- considered order of the Tribunal dated 21.06.2013,Cwhich did not suffer from any infirmity.

5.1. The learned ASG has referred to the charges against therespondent and the findings recorded against him that he did not stopthe locomotive before the danger starter and advance starter, whichdirectly endangered the safety of railway operations. The learned ASGDwould submit that the High Court has proceeded merely on technicalgrounds while ignoring the gravity of charges in this case.

5.2. The learned ASG has further submitted that the Tribunal in itsorder dated 21.06.2013 had rightly held that even if time limit was setearlier for conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the said proceedingsEdid not abate, if not finalised within the time limit fixed by the Tribunalbecause no such directions were contained in the earlier order requiringcompletion of the proceedings within two months. According to the learnedASG, the order passed in the earlier round by the Tribunal having notsignified that the proceedings would come to an end after expiry of twoFmonths, the view of the High Court in treating the proceedings as nullityremains unjustified.

Analysis

5.3. The learned ASG has further submitted that the Tribunal in itsorder dated 21.06.2013 had also taken note of the fact that the respondenthad not preferred the statutory appeal and even while dismissing theGOA, reserved such liberty for the respondent. Hence, there was no reasonfor the High Court to interfere with the justified order of the Tribunal.

5.4. We may observe in the passing that the learned ASG alsoattempted to refer to the merits of the case and to support the findings ofthe Disciplinary Authority but, we do not consider it necessary to enterinto the merits of case, for the same having not formed the subject ofH

consideration of the Tribunal in its order dated 21.06.2013 and of theHigh Court in its impugned order dated 30.08.2013.

6. While countering the submissions made on behalf of theappellants, learned counsel for the respondent has duly supported theorder impugned and has submitted that in the given set of facts andcircumstances, no case for interference is made out.

6.1. Learned counsel for the respondent has strenuously arguedthat in view of the mandate of the previous order of the Tribunal dated03.09.2010, the Disciplinary Authority was duty bound to decide thematter within two months and it having failed to do so and then, even theapplication seeking extension of time having been dismissed by theTribunal on 03.01.2011, the Disciplinary Authority could not havecontinued with the matter. Hence, according to the learned counsel, theorder passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 17.02.2011 is a nullity inthe eyes of law, for the stipulated period of time, as provided for by theTribunal, having expired and no extension having been granted.

6.2. The learned counsel has submitted that Courts and Tribunalshave inherent powers to prescribe time limits to conduct proceedingsand any such prescription remains binding on the authority conductingthe proceedings. According to the learned counsel, if such directionsare not properly and punctually complied with, the proceedings wouldcome to an end with the expiry of the time fixed by the Court or theTribunal. Thus, learned counsel would contend, the view taken by theHigh Court remains justified and calls for no interference.

7. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissionsand having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that neitherthe approach of the High Court nor its conclusion could be endorsed. Inother words, the propositions of the High Court, treating the proceedingsin question as having abated or having been rendered nullity cannot beapproved from any standpoint.

8. It appears that the High Court has taken the period of twomonths for completion of the proceedings, as stated in the order of theTribunal dated 03.09.2010, to be an inflexible mandate as also of fatalconsequence in the manner that after its expiry, the department couldnot have taken the disciplinary proceedings to their logical conclusion.This approach of the High Court cannot be supported even from a A

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[2022] 19 S.C.R.

Atechnical standpoint and obviously stands at conflict with the substanceof the matter.

9. As noticed, after the respondent was awarded the penalty ofremoval from service by the order dated 23.02.2006 in conclusion of thedisciplinary proceedings, he challenged the same and the AppellateBAuthority, by its order dated 23.08.2006, altered the penalty to that ofdowngrading his pay. The Revisional Authority by its order dated14.03.2007 held that the negligence on the part of the respondent wasestablished and found no reason to interfere. However, the Tribunal, inthe earlier round of litigation, while dealing with OA No. 373 of 2007,chose not to examine the other material questions involved in the matterCbut, disapproved the imposition of penalty on the respondent for the reasonthat the person acting as the Disciplinary Authority had been one of themembers who had earlier submitted the joint enquiry report. In this viewof the matter, the Tribunal quashed the orders passed against therespondent but, being conscious of the fact that the disciplinaryDproceedings were otherwise required to be taken to the logical conclusion,issued directions to ensure that the matter be dealt with by the DisciplinaryAuthority other than the person who had been a member of the jointenquiry team and the proceedings be taken up from the stage ofconsideration of representation of the respondent against the report ofthe Enquiry Officer. While concluding on the matter, the Tribunal alsoEexpected that such afresh exercise be completed within two months ofthe receipt of the order, after leaving all other contentions open. Asnoticed, the appellants attempted to seek enlargement of time in view ofthe fact that the exercise could not be completed within the said periodof two months but, this prayer for enlargement was declined by theFTribunal not on its merits but, for a different reason that the particularslike the time-frame laid down by the Railway Board for taking the decisionon the enquiry report was not stated before it. The said order expectingconclusion of the proceedings within two months from the date of receiptof copy of the order was passed on 03.09.2010; the application seekingenlargement was dismissed on 03.01.2011; and the Disciplinary AuthorityGpassed its order on 17.02.2011. Thus, the question was about the statusof such order so passed by the Disciplinary Authority beyond the periodfixed by the Tribunal which had not been enlarged. The Tribunal in itsorder dated 21.06.2013 held that the proceedings pursuant to the orderdated 03.09.2010 would have abated only if it was so directed in specificHterms and not otherwise. The Tribunal had been correct in this approach and, in our view, the High Court has unjustifiably interfered with the justand proper order passed by the Tribunal.

9.1. It needs hardly any elaboration to say that fixing of the periodof two months by the Tribunal in this case had only been to ensureexpeditious proceedings because the matter was being restored forreconsideration in the year 2010, though the disciplinary proceedingsrelated with the incident dated 09.01.2005. However, the said period oftwo months did not acquire any status akin to that of a statutory mandatethat the disciplinary proceedings would have automatically come to anend with its expiry. It remains trite that if an Adjudicating Authority inexercise of its jurisdiction could grant or fix a time period to do a particularthing, in the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary, thejurisdiction to fix such a time period inhers the jurisdiction to extend thetime initially fixed. Such conditional orders have regularly been construedby this Court to be in terrorem so as to put a check on the dilatorytactics by any litigant or to guard against any laxity on the part of theAdjucating Authority but, the Court is not powerless to enlarge the timeeven though it had peremptorily fixed the period at any earlier stage. Inthe case of Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das: (1961) 3 SCR 763, thisCourt examined the peremptory order of the Court fixing the period ofpayment of deficit court fees in the backdrop of the fact that the applicationfor extension of time came up for hearing only after the time fixed bythe Court had expired and the application was rejected. This Court putthe things in perspective while observing, inter alia, as under: - “5…Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and thePersians. Cases are known in which Courts have moulded theirpractice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored asuit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed…”

9.2. We may elaborate a little. When a conditional order is passedby the Court/Tribunal to do a particular act or thing within a particularperiod but the order does not provide anything as to the consequence ofdefault, the Court/Tribunal fixing the time for doing a particular thingobviously retains the power to enlarge such time. As a corollary, eventhe Appellate Court/Tribunal or any higher forum would also be havingthe power to enlarge such time, if so required. In any case, it cannot besaid that the proceedings would come to an end immediately after theexpiry of the time fixed.

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A9.3. In the present case, even the order dismissing the applicationfor enlargement of time on a technical ground of not placing before theTribunal instructions of the Railway Board, had again been not of givingany such status of mandatory and rigid character to the period originallyfixed that the proceedings would have abated.

B10. We are impelled to observe that while treating the proceedingsas having abated and as nullity, the High Court has ignored thefundamental principles that fixing of such time period was only a matterof procedure with an expectation of conclusion of the proceedings in anexpeditious manner. This period of two months had not acquired anysuch mandatory statutory character so as to nullify the entire of theCdisciplinary proceedings with its expiry.

10.1. Moreover, when no consequence of default was stated inthe order dated 03.09.2010, the period as stated therein was only ofexpectations and not of mandate. We may also observe that very manytimes, such fixing of time period causes more complications and harmDrather than serving the cause of justice. Fixing of such period could onlybe justified if there are strong and compelling reasons for the same;and if at all such period is proposed to be fixed, not only the reasons forthe same but, even the consequences of default are also required to bestated if such period is, for any valid reason, expected to operate withEadverse consequences on the defaulter.

11. The upshot of the discussion foregoing is that the proceedingsin question neither abated nor could have been considered nullity onlybecause of passage of the expected time period stated in the order ofthe Tribunal dated 03.09.2010. There was no reason or justification forFthe High Court to interfere with the just and proper order passed by theTribunal on 21.06.2013, which deserves to be restored with necessaryconsequential directions.

12. Before concluding, we also deem it necessary to observe thatthe High Court in the impugned order proceeded to pass unnecessaryGstrictures against the Disciplinary Authority who had passed the orderdated 17.02.2011. As noticed, the displeasure as expressed by the HighCourt has itself been founded on a wrong premise where the High Courtassumed that the proceedings were rendered nullity and as if theDisciplinary Authority could not have touched the same at all after expiryof the expected period of time. We are clearly of the view that even ifH

the High Court were to proceed on the premise that the proceedingsshould not have continued, there was no justification to observe that theDisciplinary Authority had been disrespectful towards the judicial process.In any case, when the order impugned is not being approved, suchobservations/strictures shall also stand annulled.

13. Accordingly, and in view of the above, the impugned orderdated 30.08.2013 is set aside and the order dated 21.06.2013 passed bythe Tribunal is restored.

13.1. Resultantly, it would be permissible for the respondent toprefer an appeal against the order dated 17.02.2011 before the AppellateAuthority. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and thebackground, we deem it appropriate to provide that if the respondentfiles such an appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy ofthis order, the same shall be considered by the Appellate Authority onmerits, but strictly in accordance with law and without being influencedby any observations occurring in any of the orders passed by the Tribunalor by the High Court or for that matter, any observations occurring in thepresent judgment. All the contentions of the parties are, therefore, leftopen to be examined by the Appellate Authority on merits, who wouldalso be expected to deal with the appeal expeditiously and while assigningthe same a priority for consideration.

14. Before concluding, one more aspect is required to be dealtwith; it relates to the payment of 50% back wages to the respondent andfurnishing of security of immoveable property by him in terms of theorder passed by this Court on 14.08.2015. We are informed that suchpayment has been made and the respondent has received the same whilefurnishing the requisite security. Having regard to the totality ofcircumstances, the said order dated 14.08.2015 is made absolute.However, the security furnished by the respondent stands discharged.

15. The appeal stands allowed to the extent and in the mannerindicated above. No order as to costs. Pending applications also standdisposed of.

Divya Pandey and Anurag Bhaskar

Appeal partly allowed.

(Assisted by : Shivani Pundir, LCRA)

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