SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. & ORS. versus SHREE LAL MEENA on 15 March 2019

1. The undisputed fact is that as on the date whenrespondent was revolving the thought in his mind of voluntaryretirement, there was no such provision in the Life InsuranceCorporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 applicable. Thus,his repeated communications setting forth a thought process for‘voluntary retirement’ had no legal backing on that date. It is inthese circumstances that no response was forthcoming to hisletters, when he talked about a concept which did not exist.Conscious of this aspect and wanting to leave the services of theappellant-LIC, the respondent took recourse to what waspermissible on that date, i.e., ‘resignation’. Section 3 of the StaffRegulations has a heading ‘Termination’. The other expressionused before the relevant Regulation 18 is ‘Determination ofService’. The Regulation itself uses the expression ‘leave ordiscontinue’ service. In whatever manner these expressions areunderstood, in legal and common parlance, they amount to, firsta unilateral act on the part of an employee, desirous of notcontinuing with her/his service with the employer and then,theacceptance of the same by the employer, subject to a noticeperiod, which, in the present facts, had been waived at therequest of the employee. Thus, on the relevant date he took aconscious decision to dis-engage himself from the services ofthe appellant, on the terms & conditions as prevalent on that AB

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Adate. As to what happened five years hence, would have nobearing on any benefit, which can accrue to such employee as arespondent, except to the extent which is specifically madeapplicable to him. [Para 17] [403-D-H]

2. It is trite to say that statutory provisions must be givenBtheir clear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings.There is no ambiguity in the Life Insurance Corporation of India(Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 in question as to require anyimport to be given that is different from its plain words. ThePension Rules have been brought into force from aretrospective date of 1.11.1993. Thus, they would logically applyCto all employees in service on or after 1.11.1993. Therespondent was not such a person. There is only one furthertwist to the Pension Rules. Rule 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rulesrefers to applicability of these Pension Rules even to such of theemployees who “retired” on or after 1.1.1986 and beforeD1.11.1993. Even for such of the employees, there is arequirement for an option to be exercised, in writing, that withina period of time of 120 days from the notified date they becomemember of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees)Pension Fund, and refund within 60 days thereafter, the entireamount of LIC’s contribution to the Provident Fund, includingEinterest accrued thereon. This is so, as employees who retiredduring this period of time had availed of the contributoryprovident fund benefit under the then existing Staff Regulations,and would have to surrender the benefits under thoseRegulations to the extent they were contributed for by the LIC,Ffor the new Pension Rules to be made applicable to them. Theexpression used in Rule 3(1)(a) is clear andunequivocal– ‘retired’. It has not used any alternativeexpression also, for determination of the relationship ofemployer-employee, like ‘resignation’. In the same Rules, expressions like ‘resignation’, ‘dismissal’, ‘removal’ have beenGused, more specifically in Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. Whendifferent expressions are used in the same Rules, in differentcontexts then all of them cannot be given the same meaning.[Para 18] [404-A-F]

3. What is most material is that the employee in this casehad resigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and anemployee resigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service,under Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. Attempting to apply thePension Rules to the respondent would be a self-defeatingargument. As, suppose, the Pension Rules were applicable andthe employee like the respondent was in service and sought toresign, the entire past service would be forfeited, andconsequently, he would not qualify for pensionary benefits. Tohold otherwise would imply that an employee resigning duringthe currency of the Rules would be deprived of pensionarybenefits, while an employee who resigns when these Rules werenot even in existence, would be given the benefit of these Rules.[Para 19] [405-A-C]

4. There are some observations on the principlesof publicsectors being model employers and provisions of pension beingbeneficial legislations. When the Legislature, in its wisdom,brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of PensionRegulations from a particular date and on particular terms andconditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in itby implication. The provisions will have to be read as they readunless there is some confusion or they are capable of anotherinterpretation. It is also to be noted that while framing suchschemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a con-tributory nature and their financial implications. Such financialimplications are both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus,it would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemesbeyond their contours to extend them to employees for whomthey were not meant for by the Legislature. [Para 25] [411-C-E]

5. In the year 2011, this Court in Sheel Kumar Jain v. NewIndia Assurance Company Limited gave benefit of GeneralInsurance (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995 to certainemployees. The judgment was delivered on 28.7.2011. Onceagain, almost after two years, the appellant made arepresentation dated 4.4.2013 seeking pension on the basis of A

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Athe 1995 Scheme, resting his case on the aforesaid judgment.There was no response to this representation, resulting in theappellant filing a writ petition before the Bombay High Court.The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in terms of theimpugned judgment dated 07.04.2016 rejected the same. Thereasoning of the Division Bench was that the case of theBappellant was of resignation and not of voluntary retirement. Theappellant had tendered his resignation before 1.11.1993, whilethe conditions for availing of the benefit were: (i) the employeesmust have retired on or after 1.11.1993, and before the notifieddate; and (ii) the employee must have exercised the option toCvoluntarily retire within120 days from the notified date, tobecome a member of the General Insurance Corporation(Employees’)Pension Fund while refunding the amount ofProvident Fund contributed by the insurance company. Thesetwo aspects were stated to be absent in the case of the appellant, who had never opted for voluntary retirement within theDrequisite period nor refunded the amount, which werepre-requisites for availing the benefit of the new pension scheme.The opinion of the Division Bench was also based on a relevantfact, that the condition in terms of clause 4(4A) requiredcompletion of 55 years of age, while the appellant was not of 55Eyears of age on the date of his resignation or its acceptance.[Paras 28, 29] [412-C-H; 413-A]6. Mere categorisation by the appellant himself of hisresignation as “premature retirement” is of no avail. Theprinciple of forfeiture of service, would be applicable here andFthe appellant did not have the requisite age when he resignedeven were the General Insurance (Termination, Superannuationand Retirement of Officers and Development Staff) Scheme, 1976to be made applicable. [Para 35] [414-G-H]

7. Also that the appellant remained silent for years together Gand that this Court,taking a particular view subsequently, in SheelKumar Jain, would not entitle stale claims to be raised on thisbehalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept overthe matter for almost a little over two years even after thepronouncement of the judgment. [Para 36] [415-A-B]

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Civil Appeal Nos. 3138-3141 of 2019 @ SLP(C) Nos.5716-5719of 2016

8. It is relevant to note that M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. dealtwith a similar scheme for employees of the Canara Bank, and theplea was that such of the employees who had resigned must beconstrued as voluntarily retired, thus, entitling them topensionary benefits. Suffice to say that, once again, the principlewas of differentiation between the concept of ‘voluntaryretirement’ and ‘resignation’. Regulation 2(y)as applicable tothe employees of Canara Bank, being pari materia to Rule 2(y)under the Pension Regulations of 1995,had brought in ‘volun-tary retirement’ in the definition of ‘retirement’, but had notconsidered it appropriate to bring in the concept of ‘resignation’.Service jurisprudence, recognising the concept of ‘resignation’and ‘retirement’ as different, and in the same regulations theseexpressions being used in different connotations, left no mannerof doubt that the benefit could not be extended, especially asresignation was one of the disqualifications for seekingpensionary benefits,under the Regulations. [Para 42] [416-A-D]

JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpurv. State of U.P., AIR 1990 SC 1808 : [1990] 3 SCR523 – distinguished.

Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. Cecil Dennis Solomon& Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 461: [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 465;UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal (2004) 4 SCC412 : [2004] 2 SCR 1125; M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. v.Canara Bank & Ors. (2012) 9 SCC 671 : [2012] 8SCR 1072 ; CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd.(1992) 4 SCC 363 : [1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 732;Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall[1955] 2 SCR 842 ; Kanhaiyalal Vishindas Gidwani v.Arun Dattatray Mehta (2001) 1 SCC 78; ShashikalaDevi v. Central Bank of India (2014) 16 SCC 260 ;Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia (2016) 13 SCC 797:[2015] SCR 865

– relied on.

J.M. Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation of India&Ors. CWP No.10157/1996 decided on 8.1.2010 ; Sheel A

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AKumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited(2011) 12 SCC 197 : [2011] 9 SCR 574; SudhirChandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors.(1984) 3 SCC 369 : [1984] 3 SCR 325 – referred to.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.08.2011 of the High CourtFof Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal(Writ) No. 172 of 2008 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6026 of 1997

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Civil Appeal Nos. 3138-3141 of 2019, 10904 of 2016.

GP. P. Malhotra, Sr. Adv., D. N. Goburdhan, Ms. Gauri Goburdhan,Ms. Pallavi Chopra, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Puneet Jain, Adv. Mr. R.K. Pathak,Abhinav Gupta, Bikash Chandra, Ms. Laxmi, Ms. Christi Jain, ManishKumar, Ms. Shehla Chaudhary, Md. Anas Chaudhary, Subrat, AnsarAhmad Chaudhary, T. V. Ratnam Mohit Paul, Vineet Malhotra, VishalGohri, Shubhendra, O. Ghosh, Advs. for the appearing parties.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. 1. Employees resigned fromservice. We are concerned with one employee of the Life InsuranceCorporation of India; one employee of the United India InsuranceCompany Limited and a batch of employees of Andhra Bank. Theseemployees resigned when the pension schemes in respect of theseinstitutions in question were not in force. The pension schemes cameinto force subsequently, but with retrospective effect. The question,which, thus, arose was whether these employees, who had resignedfrom service post the date from which the pension schemes were madeapplicable, but prior to the date on which the schemes got notified, wouldbe entitled to the benefit of the pension schemes in question. A Bench oftwo Judges of this Court found that there was a divergence of judicialviews of this Court, and the matter needed to be examined by a largerBench. The reference order was passed in CA No.14739/2015 and thatis how the matter is before us.

2. We deem it appropriate to set forth the factual matrix, relevantfor the determination of the controversy, in respect of the lead matterand thereafter, we will analyse the legal principles and accordinglydecide the connected matters.

3. Shree Lal Meena, the respondent in the appeal was anemployee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Limited (for short‘LIC’). On completion of more than 20 years of service, he addresseda letter dated 15.6.1990 to the LIC, expressing concerns about the poorhealth of his wife and himself and the possibility that he may be seekingvoluntary retirement on account thereof. There being no response tothis letter, Shree Lal Meena followed the said letter with another letterdated 18.6.1990, reiterating the same aspect. Once again, there was noresponse. Finally, he tendered a letter of resignation on 14.7.1990, for itto take effect immediately, by waiving off the mandatory notice periodof three months under Regulation 18 of the Life Insurance Corporationof India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘StaffRegulations’). The acceptance of the resignation was communicatedby the LIC vide letter dated 11.1.1991, to take effect from 14.7.1990,waiving off the statutory notice period.

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A4. It is pertinent to note that there was no scheme or provision forvoluntary retirement applicable to Shree Lal Meena during this period oftime. Shree Lal Meena was paid all his dues as were admissible to him.The beneficial scheme operating at the relevant time was aContributory Provident Fund Scheme under Regulation 76 of the StaffRegulations.B

5. More than 5 years later, the Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (for short ‘Pension Rules’) werepromulgated, on 28.6.1995, but were brought into force withretrospective effect, from 1.11.1993, unless expressly provided against.The applicability of Section 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rules made the schemeCapplicable to all the employees who were in service of the LIC on orafter 1.1.1986, but had retired before 1.11.1993, given that theemployees satisfied the other conditions provided for in the Pension Rules.

6. Shree Lal Meena was in service after 1.1.1986. He had,however, resigned with effect from 14.7.1990. Had he not resigned heDwould have continued in service and would have retired sometime aroundthe year 2000. He had also made an endeavour, prior to his resignation,proposing voluntary retirement for himself. Shree Lal Meena was, thus,of the view that the Pension Rules should be made applicable to him andaccordingly made a request, which was, however, declined on 6.4.1996Eby the LIC on the ground that he had ‘resigned’ from service. He, thus,issued a notice of demand vide letter dated 28.8.1997, which met withthe same fate and finally filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan HighCourt in 1997 itself, which was decided in his favour, by the learnedSingle Judge of that Court, vide judgment dated 8.9.2006.F7. The gravamen of the judgment of the learned Single Judge isthe request made by Shree Lal Meena for voluntary retirement and thatit was the absence of any provision for the same under the StaffRegulations, which had caused him to tender his resignation. This viewwas sought to be supported by the judgment of this Court in JK CottonSpinning &Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U.P.,[1] opiningGthat where an employee voluntarily tenders his resignation, terminationof service, post acceptance of such resignation by the employer wouldfall in the category of ‘voluntary retirement’, given all other ingredientsof voluntary retirement were being met. It may be noted that in the 1 AIR 1990 SC 1808H

factual contours of the controversy of that judgment, the question reallyposed was whether in the case of services of an employee beingterminated consequent toa voluntary resignation, such termination sobrought about would amount to retrenchment within the meaning ofSection 2(s) read with Section6N of the Uttar Pradesh IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947. As per the provisions of Section 2(s) of that Act,the definition of ‘retrenchment’ excludes a case of voluntary retirement.Since the employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily, and hadsubsequently claimed compensation on account of retrenchment, thisCourt, in that case had opined against the employee. The learned SingleJudge of the Rajasthan High Court also recorded that there was nodisputethat Shree Lal Meena had the requisite years of service to beentitled to pensionary benefits if the scheme had existed at the relevantpoint of time.

8. LIC, aggrieved by this order, appealed to the Division Bench ofthe High Court, which endeavour, however, failed as the appeal wasdismissed vide order dated 16.8.2011. The plea of the LIC, based on thejudgment of this Court in Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. CecilDennis Solomon &Anr.[2] and of the Division Bench of the Punjab &Haryana High Court in J.M. Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia& Ors.[3] was repelled.

9. The present appeal has thereafter been filed by the LIC, inwhich the reference order was passed.

10. In order to appreciate the reasoning of the Courts below,supported by the respondent in the appeal and the arguments advancedon behalf of the appellant also on the same lines, but repelled by theCourts below, we consider it necessary to first appreciate the PensionRules, which have been brought into force.

11. Rule 2 is the definition rule, defining the various expressionsused in the Pension Rules. The relevant Rule 2(j) reads as under:

“2. Definitions – In these rules, unless the contextotherwise requires –

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(j) “employee” means any person employed in the service of theCorporation on full-time work on permanent basis and who opts 2 (2004) 9 SCC 461

3 CWP No.10157/1996 decided on 8.1.2010

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Aand is governed by these rules but does not include an employeeretired before the commencement of these rules and who isdrawing pension from the Pension Fund of the OrientalGovernment Security Life Assurance Company Limited inaccordance with sub-regulation(2) of regulation 76 of the LifeInsurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, madeBunder the Act;”

12. A reading of the aforesaid clause shows that there is aspecific exclusion of an employee in whose case the twin conditions ofhaving ‘retired’ before the commencement of the Pension Rules anddrawing of pension under the Staff Regulations is satisfied. Rule 2(s)Creads as under:

“2. Definitions – In these rules, unless the contextotherwise requires –

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D(s) “retirement” means,-

(i) retirement in accordance with the provisions contained insub-regulation (1) or sub-regulation (2) or sub-regulation (3) ofregulation 19 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff)Regulations, 1960 and rule 14 of the Life Insurance CorporationEof India Class III and Class IV Employees (Revision of Termsand Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985 made under the Act;

(ii) voluntary retirement in accordance with the provisionscontained in rule 31 of these rules;”

13. Thus, the definition of ‘retirement’ envisages two eventualitiesF– first a person who had retired in terms of the Staff Regulations; andsecondly, a voluntary retirement under the provisions of the PensionRules themselves.

14. Another relevant provision to be taken note of is Rule 23 ofthe Pension Rules, which reads as under:G

“23. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal or removalor termination or compulsory retirement of an employee from theservice of the Corporation shall entail forfeiture of his entire pastservice and consequently shall not qualify for pensionarybenefits.”

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15. The aforesaid Rules, thus, show that resignation entailsforfeiture of the entire past service and consequently would not qualifyfor pensionary benefits. Rule 31 deals with ‘Pension on voluntaryretirement’, which is admissible on completion of 20 years of qualifyingservice, with a notice of not less than 90 days in writing.

16. The moot point which, thus, arises for consideration is theeffect of the retrospective application of these Rules in the given factualscenario. Had the Pension Rules been only prospective in application,there is no doubt that Shree Lal Meena could not even haveendeavoured to prefer a claim. In order to appreciate this aspect, theextent to which retrospectivity applies would have to be analysed, strictlyon the basis of these Pension Rules, which are also contributory in theircharacter.

17. The undisputed fact is that as on the date when Shree LalMeena was revolving the thought in his mind of voluntary retirement,there was no such provision in the Staff Regulations applicable. Thus,his repeated communications setting forth a thought process for‘voluntary retirement’ had no legal backing on that date. It is in thesecircumstances that no response was forthcoming to his letters, when hetalked about a concept which did not exist. Conscious of this aspect andwanting to leave the services of the LIC, Shree Lal Meena tookrecourse to what was permissible on that date, i.e., ‘resignation’.Section 3 of the Staff Regulations has a heading ‘Termination’. Theother expression used before the relevant Regulation 18 is‘Determination of Service’. The Regulation itself uses the expression‘leave or discontinue’ service. In whatever manner these expressionsare understood, in legal and common parlance, they amount to, first aunilateral act on the part of an employee, desirous of not continuing withher/his service with the employer and then, the acceptance of the sameby the employer, subject to a notice period, which, in the present facts,had been waived at the request of the employee. Thus, on the relevantdate he took a conscious decision to dis-engage himself from theservices of the appellant, on the terms & conditions as prevalent on thatdate. As to what happened five years hence, in our view, would have nobearing on any benefit, which can accrue to such employee as arespondent, except to the extent which is specifically made applicable tohim.

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A18. It is trite to say that statutory provisions must be given theirclear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings.[4] There is noambiguity in the Pension Rules in question as to require any import to begiven that is different from its plain words. The Pension Rules havebeen brought into force from a retrospective date of 1.11.1993. Thus,they would logically apply to all employees in service on or after 1.11.1993.BThe respondent was not such a person. There is only one further twistto the Pension Rules. Rule 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rules refers toapplicability of these Pension Rules even to such of the employees who“retired” on or after 1.1.1986 and before 1.11.1993. Even for such ofthe employees, there is a requirement for an option to be exercised, inCwriting, that within a period of time of 120 days from the notified datethey become member of the Life Insurance Corporation of India(Employees) Pension Fund, and refund within 60 days thereafter, theentire amount of LIC’s contribution to the Provident Fund, includinginterest accrued thereon. This is so, as employees who retired duringthis period of time had availed of the contributory provident fund benefitDunder the then existing Staff Regulations, and would have to surrenderthe benefits under those Regulations to the extent they were contributedfor by the LIC, for the new Pension Rules to be made applicable tothem. The expression used in Rule 3(1)(a)is clear andunequivocal– ‘retired’. It has not used any alternative expression also,Efor determination of the relationship of employer-employee, like‘resignation’. In the same Rules, expressions like ‘resignation’, ‘dismissal’,‘removal’ have been used, more specifically in Rule 23 of the PensionRules. When different expressions are used in the same Rules, indifferent contexts then all of them cannot be given the same meaning.[5]

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4Grundy v. Pinniger (1852) 21 LJ Ch 405; Pinner v. Everett [1969] 3 All ER 257: “Indetermining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to askalways is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its contextin the statute. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonablybe supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for someGother possible meaning of the word or phrase“

5Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall (1955) 2 SCR 842;KanhaiyalalVishindasGidwani v. Arun Dattatray Mehta (2001) 1 SCC 78: “It is truethat when the same statute uses two different words then prima facie one has to construethat these two different words must have been used to mean differently.”

19. What is most material is that the employee in this case hadresigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and an employeeresigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23 of thePension Rules. In our view, attempting to apply the Pension Rules to therespondent would be a self-defeating argument. As, suppose, thePension Rules were applicable and the employee like the respondentwas in service and sought to resign, the entire past service would beforfeited, and consequently, he would not qualify for pensionarybenefits. To hold otherwise would imply that an employee resigningduring the currency of the Rules would be deprived of pensionarybenefits, while an employee who resigns when these Rules were noteven in existence, would be given the benefit of these Rules.

20. Now turning to the discussion of the judicial pronouncementsin this behalf, we are of the view that any judgment has to be read forthe law it lays down, by reference given to a factual matrix. Lines orsentences here and there should not be read in absolute terms, de horsthe factual matrix in the context of which those observations were made.[6]

21. The judgment in JK Cotton Spinning &Weaving Mills Co.Ltd., Kanpur[7] has, thus, to be considered in that context. What wasthe issue in that case? The first paragraph of the judgment itselfclarifies that aspect. Whether determination of an employer-employeerelationship amounted to retrenchment, within the meaning of theprovisions of the Act applicable is what was being looked into. We havealready noticed, while referring to the facts of that case hereinbefore,that the employee in question tried to act clever by half. He firstlyresigned. The resignation was accepted and the consequent monetarybenefit flowed to him. Thereafter, he sought to bring his resignationwithin the meaning of ‘retrenchment’ under Section 2(s) read withSection6N of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thedefinition of ‘retrenchment’ itself clearly excluded voluntary retirementof the workman. The employee, having voluntarily resigned, thetermination of relationship of employer and employee could not comewithin the meaning of ‘retrenchment’. This Court analysed thedifference between the meaning of resignation and retrenchment. Theresignation was voluntary. It is in this context tha tit was observed thata voluntary tendering of resignation would be similar to voluntary 6CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363.

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6CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363.

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Aretirement and not retrenchment. Nothing more and nothing less. Thus,in our view, the High Court, both the learned Single Judge and theDivision Bench, appeared to have read much more into this judgmentthan the legal proposition which it sought to propound. The principles inthe context of the controversy before us are well enunciated in thejudgment of this Court in Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. CecilBDennis Solomon &Anr.[8] On a similar factual matrix, the employeeshad resigned some time in 1988. The RBI Pension Regulations came inoperation in 1990. The employees who had resigned earlier soughtapplicability of these Pension Regulations to themselves. Theprovisions, once again, had a similar clause of forfeiture of service, onCresignation or dismissal or termination. The relevant observations areas under:

“10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions “superannuation”,“voluntary retirement”, “compulsory retirement” and “resignation”convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignationDinvolve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service.Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. Oneof the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can betendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, itcan only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifyingservice. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former,Enormally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, thesame is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice isnot mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employerconcerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateralconcept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competentFauthority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisionsto the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal [AIR 1989SC 1083] on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the PunjabNational Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation wouldautomatically take effect from the date specified in the notice asthere was no provision for any acceptance or rejection of theGresignation by the employer. In Union of India v. Gopal ChandraMisra [(1978) 2 SCC 301] it was held in the case of a judge ofthe High Court having regard to Article 217 of the Constitutionthat he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and 8 (supra)H

his resignation becomes effective from the date which he, of hisown volition, chooses. But where there is a provision empoweringthe employer not to accept the resignation, on certain circumstancese.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer canexercise the power.

11. On the contrary, as noted by this Court in Dinesh ChandraSangma v. State of Assam [(1977) 4 SCC 441] while theGovernment reserves its right to compulsorily retire a governmentservant, even against his wish, there is a corresponding right ofthe government servant to voluntarily retire from service. Voluntaryretirement is a condition of service created by statutory provisionwhereas resignation is an implied term of any employer-employeerelationship.”

22. In our view, the aforesaid principles squarely apply in the factsof the present case and the relevant legal principlesis that voluntaryretirement is a concept read into a condition of service, which has to becreated by a statutory provision, while resignation is the unilateraldetermination of an employer-employee relationship, whereby anemployee cannot be a bonded labour.

23. In UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal[9], once again, in thecase of a similar pension scheme, the observations were made as under:“6. To sum up, the Pension Scheme embodied in the regulation isa self-supporting scheme. It is a code by itself. The Bank is acontributor to the pension fund. The Bank ensures availability offunds with the trustees to make due payments to the beneficiariesunder the Regulations. The beneficiaries are employees coveredby Regulation 3. It is in this light that one has to construeRegulation 22 quoted above. Regulation 22 deals with forfeitureof service. Regulation 22(1) states that resignation, dismissal,removal or termination of an employee from the service of theBank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service andconsequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits. In otherwords, the Pension Scheme disqualifies such dismissedemployees and employees who have resigned from membershipof the fund. The reason is not far to seek. In a self-financingscheme, a separate fund is earmarked as the Scheme is not basedon budgetary support. It is essentially based on adequate 9 (2004) 4 SCC 412

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contributions from the members of the fund. It is for this reasonthat under Regulation 11, every bank is required to cause aninvestigation to be made by an actuary into the financial conditionof the fund from time to time and depending on the deficits, theBank is required to make annual contributions to the fund.Regulation 12 deals with investment of the fund whereasRegulation 13 deals with payment out of the fund. In the case ofretirement, voluntary or on superannuation, there is a nexusbetween retirement and retiral benefits under the Provident FundRules. Retirement is allowed only on completion of qualifyingservice which is not there in the case of resignation. When such aretiree opts for self-financing Pension Scheme, he brings inaccumulated contribution earned by him after completingqualifying number of years of service under the Provident FundRules whereas a person who resigns may not have adequate creditbalance to his provident fund account (i.e. bank’s contribution)and, therefore, Regulation 3 does not cover employees who haveresigned. Similarly, in the case of a dismissed employee, theremay be forfeiture of his retiral benefits and consequently theframers of the Scheme have kept out the retirees (sic resigned)as well as dismissed employees vide Regulation 22. Further, thepension payable to the beneficiaries under the Scheme woulddepend on income accruing on investments and unless there isadequate corpus, the Scheme may not be workable and,therefore, Regulation 22 prescribes a disqualification to dismissedemployees and employees who have resigned. Lastly, as statedabove, the Scheme contemplated pension as the second retiralbenefit in lieu of employers’ contribution to contributory providentfund. Therefore, the said Scheme was not a continuation of theearlier scheme of provident fund. As a new scheme, it wasentitled to keep out dismissed employees and employees who haveresigned.

7. In the light of our above analysis of the scheme, we nowproceed to deal with the arguments advanced by both the sides. Itwas inter alia urged on behalf of the appellant bank that underRegulation 22, category of employees who have resigned fromthe service and who have been dismissed or removed from theservice are not entitled to pension, that the pension scheme SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v.SHREE LAL MEENA [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

constituted a separate fund to be regulated on self-financingprinciples, that prior to the introduction of the pension scheme,there was in existence a provident fund scheme and the presentscheme conferred a second retiral benefit to certain classes ofemployees who were entitled to become the members/beneficiaries of the fund, that the membership of the fund wasnot dependent on the qualifying service under the pension scheme,that looking to the financial implications, the scheme framed mainlycovered retirees because retirement presupposed larger numberof years of service, that in the case of resignation, an employeecan resign on the next day of his appointment whereas in the caseof retirement, the employee is required to put in a certain numberof years of service and consequently, the scheme was a separatecode by itself, that the High Court has committed manifest errorin decreeing the suit of the respondent inasmuch as it has notconsidered the relevant factors contemplated by the said schemeand that the pension scheme was introduced in terms of thesettlement dated 29.10.1993 between the IBA and All-India BankEmployees’ Association, which settlement also categorically rulesout employees who have resigned or who have been dismissed/removed from the service.”

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“9. We find merit in these appeals. The words “resignation” and“retirement” carry different meanings in common parlance. Anemployee can resign at any point of time, even on the second dayof his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires onlyafter attaining the age of superannuation or in the case ofvoluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. Theeffect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there isseverance of employment (sic is the same) but in servicejurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently.Under the Regulations, the expressions “resignation” and“retirement” have been employed for different purpose and carrydifferent meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based onactuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does notdepend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes acomplete code by itself. The Scheme essentially covers retireesas the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as A

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compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover,resignation brings about complete cessation ofmaster-and-servant relationship whereas voluntary retirementmaintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiralbenefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance ofresignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereasretirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rulesframed by the Bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective ofthe length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement,the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiralbenefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria forsubmitting resignation vis-à-vis voluntary retirement andacceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulations disqualify anemployee, who has resigned, from claiming pension, therespondent cannot claim membership of the fund. In our view,Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who haveresigned from service and for those who have been dismissed orremoved from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in thearguments advanced on behalf of the respondent that Regulation22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnantto Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class ofemployees. The view we have taken is supported by thejudgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v.Cecil Dennis Solomon & Anr. (supra). Before concluding wemay state that Regulation 22 is not in the nature of penalty asalleged. It only disentitles an employee who has resigned fromservice from becoming a member of the fund. Such employeeshave received their retiral benefits earlier. The Pension Scheme,as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence,there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employeesas alleged. The Pension Scheme only provides for an avenue forinvestment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in theirsavings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature ofan eligibility criterion, the Scheme disentitles such category ofemployees as are out of it.”

24. We may only note that in the above discussed judgement, anargument assailing the Regulation for forfeiture of service, based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India was repelled. The provisionsunder the new Regulations were held not to be in the nature of penalty,but a disentitlement, as a consequence of having resigned from serviceand, thus, being disentitled from having become a member of the fund.There are other judgments also in the same line, but not laying down anyadditional principles and, thus, it would suffice to just mention them, i.e.M.R. Prabhakar &Ors. v. Canara Bank &Ors.[10 ]and J.M. Singh v.Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors.[11]

25. There are some observations on the principlesof publicsectors being model employers and provisions of pension beingbeneficial legislations.[12] We may, however, note that as per what wehave opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charityprinciple. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain ben-eficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particulardate and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excludedcannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to beread as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable ofanother interpretation. We may also note that while framing suchschemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a contributorynature and their financial implications. Such financial implications areboth, for the contributors and for the State. Thus, it would beinadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours toextend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by theLegislature.

26. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned orders in this casecannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside, and the writ petitionfiled by the respondent consequently stands dismissed.

27. The appellant joined the respondent United India InsuranceCompany Limited as a Clerk on 13.8.1960 and served for a long periodof 32 years. He, however, tendered his resignation on 1.10.1993 for“family reasons”, but on his own, termed it as “premature retirement”,so as to claim future benefits. Request for waiving of notice period wasalso made. The letter of resignation was accepted on 30.11.1993, giving 10(2012) 9 SCC 67111(supra)

12Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (2014)16SCC260 : Asger Ibrahim Amin v.Life Insurance Corporation of India (2016)13SCC797

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Aeffect to such resignation from that day itself. It is relevant to note thatat the time the appellant resigned, he was governed by the GeneralInsurance (Termination, Superannuation and Retirement of Officers andDevelopment Staff) Scheme, 1976 (for short ‘1976 Scheme’), whichhad no concept of voluntary retirement. However, almost three yearsafter the appellant resigned, an amendment was made to the 1976 SchemeBby inserting clause 4(4A), introducing the concept of VoluntaryRetirement Scheme on 1.11.1996. This clause, however, was maderetrospectively applicable from 1.11.1993. It appears that the objectwas to have consonance with the General Insurance (Employees’)Pension Scheme, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1995 Scheme’).

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28. It is in the year 2011 that the judicial pronouncement by thisCourt in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance CompanyLimited[13] gave benefit of this scheme to certain employees. Thejudgment was delivered on 28.7.2011. Once again, almost after twoyears, the appellant made a representation dated 4.4.2013 seekingDpension on the basis of the 1995 Scheme, resting his case on theaforesaid judgment. There was no response to this representation, re-sulting in the appellant filing a writ petition before the Bombay HighCourt. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in terms of theimpugned judgment dated 07.04.2016 rejected the same. The reasoningof the Division Bench was that the case of the appellant was ofEresignation and not of voluntary retirement. The appellant had tenderedhis resignation before 1.11.1993, while the conditions for availing of thebenefit were: (i) the employees must have retired on or after 1.11.1993,and before the notified date; and (ii) the employee must have exercisedthe option to voluntarily retire within120 days from the notified date, to Fbecome a member of the General Insurance Corporation(Employees’)Pension Fund while refunding the amount of Provident Fundcontributed by the insurance company. These two aspects were statedto be absent in the case of the appellant, who had never opted forvoluntary retirement within the requisite period nor refunded the amount,which were pre-requisites for availing the benefit of the new pensionGscheme.

29. The opinion of the Division Bench was also based on arelevant fact, that the condition in terms of clause 4(4A) required 13 (2011) 12 SCC 197H

completion of 55 years of age, while the appellant was not of 55 years ofage on the date of his resignation or its acceptance. The said clausereads as under:

“(4A) Not-withstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-paragraphs, an Officer or a person of the Development staff maybe permitted, subject to vigilance clearance, to seek voluntaryretirement, - (a) on completion of 55 years of age or at any time thereafter ongiving ninety days notice in writing to the appointing authority ofhis intention to retire; or Provided that on a written request from an officer or a person ofthe Development Staff, such notice may be waived in full or inpart by the appointing authority; or

(b) in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraph 30of the General Insurance (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995,made under section 17A of the General Insurance Business(Nationalisation) Act, 1972, (57 of 1972) and published undernotification of the Government of India, in the Ministry of Finance(Department of Economic Affairs) Insurance Division numberS.O. 585 (E) dated 28th June, 1995.”

30. The last relevant aspect is that the 1995 Scheme provided inclause 22 as under:

“22. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal or removal ortermination or compulsory retirement of an employee from theservice of the Corporation or a Company shall entail forfeiture ofhis entire past service and consequently shall not qualify forpensionary benefits.”

31. Thus, once again, there is this clause of forfeiture of servicein case of resignation.

32. In order to elucidate the legal principle further, we may notethat Sheel Kumar Jain[14] took note of the judgment of the three Judges’Bench in Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. &Ors.[15] An uncovenanted employee of respondent-Company, paid on a 14 (supra)

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Amonthly basis, sought to recover a sum as gratuity, for continued servicerendered over 29 years, under the Retiring Gratuity Rules, 1937, afterhaving resigned from service. The employee was paid the providentfund dues. The High Court of Patna opined against the employee. Whenthe matter reached this Court, one of the contentions raised by therespondent-Company was that the employee had resigned and notBretired from service. It was noticed that Rule 1(g) defines ‘retirement’as “the termination of service by reason of any cause other thanremoval by discharge due to misconduct.” The employee had not beenremoved by discharge due to misconduct. The termination of service,being on account of resignation, it was held to qualify within theCdefinition of ‘retirement’ under the Rules. The rest of the judgment,dealing with the principles as to how gratuity should be treated, is notrelevant.

33. We, thus, notice that all that was opined by the three Judges’Bench in the aforesaid case was based on the definition of ‘retirement’Das per the Retiring Gratuity Rules, 1937, which was expansive and allinclusive, excluding only the removal by discharge due to misconduct.Thus, nothing more could have been read into this judgment.

34. We may also add that there are some observations in theaforesaid case that pension and gratuity are both retiral benefits and anEemployee, with long years of service should be assured social securityto some extent, in the form of either pension or gratuity or providentfund, whichever retiral benefit is operative in the industrial establish-ment. In the given facts of the appeal before us, the benefit of providentfund has been given as that was the scheme applicable at the relevantstage of time. The principle laid down is not that all of them should beFsimultaneously be granted, but that, at least one of them should be granted,though there is no prohibition against more than one being granted.

35. In view of what we have discussed aforesaid, all threeaspects stated by us are relevant and disentitle the appellant to anyrelief. We have already explained the difference between resignationGand voluntary retirement. Mere categorisation by the appellant himselfof his resignation as “premature retirement” is of no avail. The sameprinciple discussed aforesaid, of forfeiture of service, would beapplicable here and the appellant did not have the requisite age when heresigned even were the 1976 Scheme to be made applicable.

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36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent for yearstogether and that this Court, takinga particular view subsequently, inSheel Kumar Jain[16], would not entitle stale claims to be raised on thisbehalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over thematter for almost a little over two years even after the pronouncementof the judgment.

37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach this Courtseeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a misadventure, which isliable to be rejected, and the appeal is dismissed.

-SLP(C) Nos.57165719 of 2016

38. Leave granted.

39. The appellants in this case were employees of the respon-dent-Bank, viz., Andhra Bank, who resigned from service during thewindow period of 1991 and 1993 after giving three months’ notice. Thegrounds for resignation varied. The employees were governed by thethen existing Service Rules, being the Andhra Bank Officers’ ServiceRegulations, 1982. It was much later that Andhra Bank (Employees)Pension Regulations, 1995(for short ‘Pension Regulations’) wereintroduced, effective from its date of notification. There was noretrospectivity involved in this case. But the Pension Regulations weremade applicable for employees, who ‘retired’ on or after 01.01.1986 butbefore 01.11.1993.

40. The appellants sought benefit under these Pension Regula-tions, even though they had ‘resigned’ from their job, which request wasrejected.

41. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in termsof the impugned order dated 09.10.2015 rejected the petition filed by theappellants on the ground that when the appellants resigned, there wasno Pension Regulationsproviding for voluntary retirement in existence,and merely because the Pension Regulations have been made appli-cable for persons retiring within a past period of window, it would notgive the same benefit to the employees who had resigned from service.The reasoning of the judgment is predicated on M.R. Prabhakar &Ors.v. Canara Bank &Ors.[17]

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A42. It is relevant to note that M.R. Prabhakar &Ors.[18] dealt witha similar scheme for employees of the Canara Bank, and the plea wasthat such of the employees who had resigned must be construed asvoluntarily retired, thus, entitling them to pensionary benefits. Suffice tosay that, once again, the principle was of differentiation between theconcept of ‘voluntary retirement’ and ‘resignation’. Regulation 2(y)asBapplicable to the employees of Canara Bank, being pari materia toRule2(y) under the Pension Regulations of 1995,had brought in ‘volun-tary retirement’ in the definition of ‘retirement’, but had not consideredit appropriate to bring in the concept of ‘resignation’. Service jurispru-dence, recognising the concept of ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’as dif-Cferent, and in the same regulations these expressions being used in dif-ferent connotations, left no manner of doubt that the benefit could not beextended, especially as resignation was one of the disqualifications forseeking pensionary benefits, under the Regulations.

43. In view of the legal principles discussed by us hereinbefore,Dthis appeal, thus, must also fail and, is accordingly dismissed.

44. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that C.A. No.14739of 2015 is allowed while C.A.No.10904 of 2016 and C.A. Nos. 3138-3141 of 2019 @ SLP © Nos.5716-5719 of 2016 are dismissed, leavingthe parties to bear their own costs.

E45. The reference is answered accordingly.

46. We, however, make it clear that for amounts already paid tothe respondent in C.A. No. 14739 of 2015, under the interim directionsdated 26.11.2015, refund of the same would not be claimed.

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Ankit Gyan

Reference answered.

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