SANDEEP ALIAS KALA versus SUPREME COURT OF INDIA on 16 August 2022

468

[2022] 18 S.C.R. 468

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 18 S.C.R.

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SANDEEP ALIAS KALA

v.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 143 of 2018)

BAUGUST 16, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDA. S. BOPANNA, JJ.]

Supreme Court Rules, 1966 – Or. XXI, r.15–Supreme Court(2nd Amendment) Rules,1981 – Supreme Court (Amendment)CRules,1978 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Or.XX, rr.5(1),21–Constitution of India – Article 134(1)(a), (b) – Supreme Court(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 – s.2(a)–Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.379 – Appeals u/Article134(1)(a) or (b) or s.2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act,Dmodalities to be followed –Acquittal of the petitioner of the chargeof committing offences punishable u/s.302 r/w s.34, IPC was reversedby High Court and he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life– Conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner attainedfinality following the dismissal of the appeal as well as the reviewpetition by Supreme Court – Present petition filed inter alia seekingEa declaration that the deletion of clause (c) & (d) from sub-rule (1)of r.15 of Or. XXI of the 1966 Rules was contrary to the law laiddown by the Constitution Bench inSita Ram v State of Uttar Pradeshreported as [1979] 2 SCR 1085– Held: The primary reason fordeleting the provisions of r.15(1)(c) of Or.XXI was that the sub-Frule, as it was framed, envisaged that certain categories of appealswould be put up for hearing ex parte when it was open to the Courtto either dismiss summarily or, as the case may be, direct the issuanceof notice – In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in SitaRam case that the issuance of a notice must follow, the Full Courtdecided to delete r.15(1)(c) of Or.XXI – The 1966 Rules have sinceGgiven way to the 2013 Rules –Or.XX thereof contains provisions withrespect to the procedure for preliminary hearing of certain categoriesof criminal appeals before Supreme Court – r.5(1) of Or. XX indicatesthe categories of appeals which, on being registered, shall be putup for hearing ex parte but does not cover appeals falling u/ArticleH134(1)(a) or (b) or s.2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act –

Conclusion

Hence, and even otherwise as a matter of precept, the principleslaid down by the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram case must governthe procedure to be followed while disposing of appeals u/Article134(1)(a) or (b) or s.2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act –Ordinarily in all such appeals, notice must be issued – Whiledisposing of the appeal, it is only appropriate and proper that theCourt must record reasons– The object and intendment of thedeletion of r.15(1)(c) of Or. XXI of the 1966 Rules was to ensurethat such appeals are not disposed of summarily ex parte withoutthe issuance of a notice – The deletion must be so construed as togive effect to the fundamental postulate underlying the judgment ofthe Constitution Bench in Sita Ram case–Further, the deletion of aprovision in the 2013 Rules akin to r.15(1)(c) of Or.XXI of the 1966Rules should not be interpreted to confer an uncharted discretionto dismiss an appeal of that description summarily at an ex partehearing without the issuance of a notice – Principles propoundedin Sita Ram continue to hold effect and guide preliminary hearingof certain categories of criminal appeals u/Or.XX, including Or.XX,r.21 of the 2013 Rules – In the present case, the appealfiled by thepetitioner u/s.2(a) of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act r/w s.379,CrPC was listed before Supreme Court for a preliminary hearingand was dismissed in limine– The judgment dismissing the appealdoes not evidently furnish reasons – The difficulty in granting anyrelief to the petitioner in these proceedings is that an appeal havingbeen dismissed on the judicial side and a review having been sincedismissed against that judgment, it would not be open for this Courtwhile exercising jurisdiction u/Article 32 of the Constitution to issueany contrary direction – Petitioner at liberty to pursue the remediesavailable in law – Principles of Natural Justice – Constitution ofIndia – Article 21.

Disposing of the petition, the Court

HELD: 1.1 In Sita Ram, the constitutional validity of Rule15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the 1966 Rules and Section 384 CrPCwas called into question. Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for amajority of three learned Judges of the Constitution Bench,upheld the validity of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the 1966Rules and of Section 384 of CrPC “by reading down their scope,substance and intendement”. After the decision of the AB

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AConstitution Bench in Sita Ram, the provisions contained in Rule15(1)(c) of Order XXI were deleted on 21 May 1981 by theAmendment Rules 1981. [Paras 19, 20, 28][481-F-H; 488-G]

1.2 The primary reason for deleting the provisions of Rule15(1)(c) of Order XXI was that the sub-rule, as it was framed,Benvisaged that certain categories of appeals would be put up forhearing ex parte when it was open to the Court to either dismisssummarily or, as the case may be, direct the issuance of notice.In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench that the issuanceof a notice must follow, the Full Court decided to delete Rule15(1)(c) of Order XXI. The Full Court possibly contemplated thatCthe judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram containedsufficient guidance in regard to the procedure to be followed inthe case of appeals arising under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. The 1966 Rules havesince given way to the 2013 Rules which were published in theDGazette of India on 29 May 2014 and came into force on 19 August2014. Order XX contains provisions with respect to the procedurefor preliminary hearing of certain categories of criminal appealsbefore this Court.Rule 5(1) of Order XX indicates the categoriesof appeals which, on being registered, shall be put up for hearingex parte. The category of appeals specified in clauses (a), (b) andE(c) does not cover appeals falling under Article 134(1)(a) or (b)or Section 2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. Hence andeven otherwise as a matter of precept, the principles which havebeen laid down by the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram must governthe procedure to be followed while disposing of appeals underFArticle 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2 of the Enlargement ofJurisdiction Act. Ordinarily in all such appeals, notice must beissued. The issuance of notice would facilitate a properexamination by the Court of the dimensions of the appeal withthe assistance of both the sides on whether the judgment of theHigh Court, which is the subject matter of the appeal, wouldGwarrant further consideration. While disposing of the appeal, it isonly appropriate and proper that the Court must record reasons.The recording of reasons, in a matter where the accused has aconstitutional or statutory right of appeal against the conviction,lends assurance to the judicial process. The liberty of the accusedH

is fundamentally impacted by the outcome of the appeal. Therecording of reasons lays confidence to the process that a statutoryappeal which impinges upon the liberty of the accused has beenconsidered judiciously. The insistence on recording of reasonsemanates from the principles of natural justice and fairness indecision-making, which serve the precept that justice must notonly be done, but must also appear to be done. [Paras 33-35][490-E-H; 491-A, E-H; 492-A-B]

1.3 The decision of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram hasenunciated the following principles which it would be worthwhileto recapitulate:(i) An appeal falling within the ambit of Article134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2 of the Enlargement of JurisdictionAct should ordinarily not be disposed of at a preliminary hearingwithout the issuance of notice to the opposite party and callingfor the record;(ii) A hearing should be afforded in presence ofboth parties and with records on hand; and (iii) Reasons shouldbe indicated while disposing of the appeal. [Para 36][492-B-D]

1.4 With the deletion of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the1966 Rules, appeals falling within the ambit of Article 134(1)(a)or (b) or under the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act werespecifically taken out of the purview of appeals which would beput up for ex parte hearing upon registration and which the Courtmay either dismiss summarily or direct the issuance of notice tothe parties. The object and intendment of the deletion was toensure that such appeals are not disposed of summarily ex partewithout the issuance of a notice. The deletion must be soconstrued as to give effect to the fundamental postulateunderlying the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram.The deletion of a provision in the 2013 Rules akin to Rule 15(1)(c)of Order XXI of the 1966 Rules should not be interpreted toconfer an uncharted discretion to dismiss an appeal of thatdescription summarily at an ex parte hearing without the issuanceof a notice. To the contrary, the deletion of the provision, as thematerial in the counter affidavit indicates, was in order to fulfilthe mandate of the decision of the Constitution Bench. Theprinciples propounded in Sita Ram continue to hold effect andguide preliminary hearing of certain categories of criminal appeals AB

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Aunder Order XX, including Order XX, Rule 21 of the 2013 Rules.The principle enunciated by the Constitution Bench that reasonsshould be recorded while dismissing appeals falling within theambit of the above provisions has not been introduced by way ofan amendment to the Rules since it is expected that on the judicialside, the Court would follow the principles which have beenBenunciated by the Constitution Bench. [Para 37][492-E-H; 493-A]

1.5 In the present case, the acquittal of the petitioner ofthe charge of committing offences punishable under Section 302read with Section 34 of the IPC was reversed by the High CourtCand he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. The appeal,under Section 2(a) of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act readwith Section 379 CrPC, which was filed by the present petitionerwas listed before this Court for a preliminary hearing on 5 May2014 and was dismissed in limine. The judgment of this CourtDdismissing the appeal does not evidently furnish reasons. Thedifficulty in granting any relief to the petitioner in theseproceedings is that an appeal having been dismissed on thejudicial side and a review having been since dismissed againstthat judgment, it would not be open for this Court while exercisingjurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution to issue anyEcontrary direction. The petitioner would be at liberty to pursuethe remedies available in law. The view taken by this Court would,it is hoped, set at rest the modalities to be followed whileentertaining appeals under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. [Para 38][493-B-E]FSita Ram v State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 656 :[1979] 2 SCR 1085 – followed.

Case Law Reference

[1979] 2 SCR 1085followedPara 7(i)GCRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition(Criminal) No. 143 of 2018.

(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)

Shivendra Singh, Bikram Dwivedi, Dr. Mukut Nath Verma, Advs.for the Petitioner.H

Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, Sridhar Potaraju, Ms. Shruti Agarwal,Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Rajat Srivastava, Kartik Dey, Advs. for theRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

1. In Sessions Case 9 of 2005, four accused were put up for trial,inter alia, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 302read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1860[1] and Section 25 ofthe Arms Act 1959. The criminal case arose out of FIR No 59 dated 15February 2005 lodged at PS Civil Lines, Sonepat, which was committedupon the filing of the charge-sheet, for trial to the Sessions Court by anorder dated 6 June 2005 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,Sonepat. The petitioner - Sandeep alias Kala was tried as the secondaccused. By a judgment dated 1 September 2006, the Additional SessionsJudge, Sonepat held that the prosecution had established the guilt of twoof the accused, Arun (A-1) and Sunil (A-3), beyond reasonable doubtand held them guilty of offences under Section 302 read with Section 34IPC. The Additional Sessions Judge, however, acquitted the petitioner(A-2) and Ravi Kant (A-4). The Additional Sessions Judge made thefollowing observations while acquitting the petitioner and Ravi Kant:

“43.Thus, the plea of alibi set up by accused Ravi Kant iscorroborated by the inquiry conducted by the DeputySuperintendent of police concerned and his subsequentexoneration.

44. As regards accused Sandeep, the oral testimony ofwitnesses produced by the accused in his defence standscorroborated by the documentary medical evidence. It canbe reasonably held that accused Sandeep remained admittedin the Government Hospital, Mehrauli (Delhi) w.e.f.12.2.2005 to 16.2.2005.

Thus, in this manner, the prosecution has failed to bringhome the guilt of these two accused persons namely RaviKant and Sandeep by not proving their presence on thedate and time at the place of occurrence.”

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A2. Besides the appeals which were filed by the co-accused, theacquittal of the petitioner was challenged by the State of Haryana inCRM No 53-MA of 2007 (O&M). The acquittal of the co-accused RaviKant was also challenged by the State of Haryana in CRM No 604-MAof 2007 (O&M). The appeals against the conviction of two accused aswell as the appeals against the acquittal of the petitioner and Ravi KantBwere heard and disposed of by a common judgment dated 2 September2013 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.The High Court upheld the conviction of Arun (A-1) and Sunil (A-3),while dismissing their appeals.The appeals filed by the State of Haryanaagainst the acquittal of the petitioner and Ravi Kant were allowed andCboth these accused were held guilty of offences punishable under Section302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment forlife along with a fine of Rs 20,000/- each. The High Court made thefollowing observations while examining the plea of alibi by the petitionerand Ravi Kant:D“Before going through the plea of alibi set up by Ravi Kant andSandeep, the evidence led by them has to be examined. Thedefence had examined Raj Singh whose son is said to have gotmarried on 14.02.2005. It is their case that Ravi Kant had attendedthat function. But the testimony is neither convincing nor can berelied upon. The accused were unable to show that any suchEfunction was held on that da. It is their admitted case that noinvitation cards were printed nor any video was prepared. Eventhe tent was not set up. The witnesses have come forward onlybecause Ravi Kant’s father was Sarpanch of the village. It isclear that during the course of inquiry conducted earlier, the nameFof the Ravi Kant had been dropped because of the influence ofhis father. He was given a clean chit. But subsequently, the DSPheld an inquiry and submitted a challan against him. The witnessesof the defence are not reliable and their evidence is not acceptableand hence rejected.

GIn the case of Sandeep, the Medical Officer posted at Mehraulihas created documents to show that Sandeep was admitted in theprimary health centre from 12.02.2005 to 16.02.2005 . All theproceedings have been drawn up on plain papers. It is strangethat no other doctor had attended to Sandeep. Sandeep wassuffering from gastroenteritis for which admission is not necessary.H

Only oral tablets had been prescribed. The record shows thatthere were two - three other patients with similar complaints butthey were treated as outdoor patients. No admission was given tothem. Whereas in the case of Sandeep he was admitted.Surprisingly Dr. A.K.Pandey was the only doctor, who attendedto him in the morning and at night during his so call admission inthe govt. hospital. The falsity of the evidence is apparent from therecord. The documents had been prepared. The father of theaccused had sent a complaint to the Chief Minister but he did notmention in his complaint that in which hospital he was admitted. Itseems that the record on plain papers was prepared with theassistance of Dr. A.K.Pandey to help the accused, which wasintentionally kept back as the inquiry would have revealed thefalsehood.”

3. A criminal appeal was instituted before this Court by the co-accused, Ravi Kant (A-4), whose acquittal, like the petitioner, wasreversed by the High Court. In the appeal filed by Ravi Kant, notice wasissued on 4 April 2014. The appeal[2] has been dismissed in a detailedjudgment dated 27 March 2019. The court held

“The prosecution case stands proved in view of the fact that PremSingh (PW-5) and Rakesh Chaudhary (PW-11) are found to bereliable and it was a priority for them to first take the injured tothe hospital at Sonepat and thereafter to Jaipur Golden Hospital,Rohini and at Rohini itself the statement has been recorded as thepolice had been informed. In the first police statement that hasbeen recorded by Sunil Kumar, names of the assailants have beenmentioned clearly. In fact, Ravi Kant’s role has been clearlymentioned. Even if the first information report recordedsubsequently is discarded, no dent is caused in the prosecutioncase. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are notinclined to interfere in the judgment and order of conviction andsentence imposed by the High Court.”

4. The conviction of the petitioner was called into question inCriminal Appeal Diary No 8073 of 2014. The appeal was dismissed by athree-Judge bench of this Court on 5 May 2014 in terms of the followingorder:

2 Criminal Appeal No 471 of 2014

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A“1.Delay in filing and refiling the appeal is condoned.

2. The Criminal Appeal, being devoid of any merit, deservesto be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.

Ordered accordingly.”

5. A review petition, being Review Petition (Criminal) No 469 ofB2014 in Criminal Appeal No 1135 of 2014 was filed before this Court on2 June 2014. The same was dismissed by the three-Judge bench on 21August 2014.

6. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner haveattained finality following the dismissal of the appeal as well as the reviewCpetition.7. The petitioner instituted the present Writ Petition under Article32 of the Constitutionseeking:

(i) a declaration that the deletion of clause (c) and clause (d)from sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 of Order XXI of the SupremeDCourt Rules 1966[3] by the Supreme Court (2[nd] Amendment)Rules 1981[4] was contrary to the law laid down by aConstitution Bench of this Court in Sita Ram v State ofUttar Pradesh;[5]

(ii) a declaration that in the absence of any guidelines in OrderEXX, Rule 21 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013[6] for thepreliminary hearing of appeals under Section 2(a) of theSupreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal AppellateJurisdiction) Act 1970,[7] the provision is unconstitutional asoffending the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution;andF

(iii) a direction restraining the respondent from giving effect toOrder XX, Rule 21 of the 2013 Rules.

8. The Supreme Court is impleaded as the respondent through theSecretary General.A counter affidavit has been filed. Notice was issuedGon 9 July 2018.

3 “1966 Rules”

4 “Amendment Rules 1981”

5 (1979) 2 SCC 6566 “2013 Rules”

H7 “Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act”

9. We have heard Mr Shivendra Singh, counsel appearing on behalfof the petitioner and Mr Vikramjit Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General,[8]counsel for the respondent.

10. The submission which has been articulately urged on behalfof the petitioner by Mr Shivendra Singh is that the judgment of theConstitution Bench in Sita Ram (supra) considered the challenge to thevires of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the 1966 Rules in the context ofthe Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. It has been submitted that whileaffirming the validity of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI, Justice KrishnaIyer, speaking for the majority, held that while the provision is valid, thisdoes not mean that all appeals falling within its fold should be routinelydisposed of at the preliminary hearing. According to this Court,if everyappeal under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2(a) of the Enlargementof Jurisdiction Act were to be set down for preliminary hearing andsummary disposal, the difference between Article 134 and Article 136,between right and leave, may be obliterated. However, the ConstitutionBench did recognize that in an exceptional category of cases wherethere is no point at all, an appeal which falls within the purview of eitherArticle 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2(a) of the Enlargement of JurisdictionAct can be disposed of at the preliminary hearing.In this backdrop, it hasbeen submitted that the deletion of theprovisions of Rule 15(1)(c) ofOrder XXI by the Amendment Rules 1981 is not consistent with thejudgment in Sita Ram (supra).

11. On the other hand, Mr Vikramjit Banerjee, ASG, submittedthat the deletion of Rule 15(1)(c) and (d) of Order XXI of the 1966Rules in 1981 does not run a foul of the judgment of the ConstitutionBench in Sita Ram (supra). Mr Banerjee has adverted to the basis ofthe deletion in the amended rules of 1981, as explained in the counteraffidavit. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that theConstitution Bench in Sita Ram (supra) recognized that the Court doespossess the power to dismiss an appeal, which is instituted either underArticle 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2 of the Enlargement of JurisdictionAct, at a preliminary hearing. It has been submitted that in terms of thedecision in Sita Ram (supra), there is a discretion left with this Court tosummarily dismiss a criminal appeal before it on an ex parte basis withoutcalling for records in certain exceptional circumstances on a case-to- AB

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Acase basis.The ASG submitted that besides the fact that the appeal andthe review filed by the petitioner have been dismissed, the appeal by theco-accused has been dealt with in a comprehensive judgment dated 27March 2019 where the case of the prosecution based on the testimonyof the eye-witnesses has been upheld while confirming the convictionwhich was recorded by the High Court in the case of the co-accusedB(Ravi Kant - A4). Moreover, it was urged that the absence of guidelinesin Rule 21 of Order XX of the 2013 Rules would not make itunconstitutional as the guidelines indicated in Sita Ram (supra) continueto hold force.

12. Article 134 of the Constitution confers appellate jurisdictionCon this Court in criminal matters. The provision is in the following terms:

“134. Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminalmatters.—

(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment,Dfinal order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a HighCourt in the territory of India if the High Court (a)has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accusedperson and sentenced him to death; or (b)has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any courtEsubordinate to its authority and has in such trial convictedthe accused person and sentenced him to death; or

(c) certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the SupremeCourt:

Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subjectFto such provisions as may be made in that behalf underclause (1) of Article 145 and to such conditions as the HighCourt may establish or require.

(2) Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court anyfurther power to entertain and hear appeals from anyGjudgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceedingof a High Court in the territory of India subject to suchconditions and limitations as may be specified in such law.”

13. Sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Article 134 provides for anappeal to this Court where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed anH

order of acquittal of an accused and sentenced him to death. Sub-clause(b) provides for an appeal to this Court where the High Court haswithdrawn for trial before itself any case from a court subordinate to itsauthority and in the course of such a trial convicted the accused andsentenced him to death. Sub-clause (c) deals with a certification by theHigh Court that the case is fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. Clause(2) of Article 134 empowers Parliament by law to confer on the SupremeCourt any further power to entertain and hear appeals from a judgment,final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court subjectto such conditions and limitations as may be specified in law.

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14. In exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by Article 134(2) ofthe Constitution, Parliament expanded the jurisdiction of this Court toentertain appeals in criminal cases by enacting the Enlargement ofJurisdiction Act. Section 2 of the statute provides as follows:

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“2.Enlarged appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regardto criminal matters.—Without prejudice to the powersDconferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) of Article134 of the Constitution, an appeal shall lie to the SupremeCourt from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminalproceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if theHigh Court—

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(a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accusedperson and sentenced him to imprisonment for, life or toimprisonment for a period of not less than ten years; (b)has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any courtsubordinate to its authority and has in such trial convictedthe accused person and sentenced him to imprisonment forlife or to imprisonment for a period of not less than tenyears.”

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15. By virtue of clause (a) of Section 2 of the Enlargement ofJurisdiction Act, an appeal lies before this Court where the High Courthas, while reversing the acquittal of an accused, sentenced him to sufferimprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a period of at least tenyears. Clause (b) provides for an appeal to this Court where the HighCourt has withdrawn for trial before itself any case and in the course ofsuch a trial either sentenced the accused to suffer imprisonment for lifeor imprisonment for not less than ten years.

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A16. Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973[9] providesfor an appeal to this Court where the High Court has, on appeal, reversedan order of acquittal of an accused and, while convicting him, sentencedhim to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a term often years or more. The Joint Select Committee by its report dated 4December 1972 suggested the incorporation of provision to bring theBposition in line with the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. Section 379 is inthe following terms:

“379. Where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an order ofacquittal of an accused person and convicted him andCsentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or toimprisonment for a term of ten years or more, he may appealto the Supreme Court.”

17. Article 145 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court,with the approval of the President, to make Rules regulating its practiceDand procedure, including various matters which are spelt out thereunder.Article 145 provides as follows:

“145. Rules of Court, etc.—(1) Subject to the provisions of anylaw made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time totime, with the approval of the President, make rules for regulatingEgenerally the practice and procedure of the Court including:

(a) ***

(b) rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals and other matterspertaining to appeals including the time within which appeals toFthe Court are to be entered;

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(d) rules as to the entertainment of appeals under sub-clause (c)of clause (1) of Article 134; G(e) to (h) ***

(i) rules providing for the summary determination of any appealwhich appears to the Court to be frivolous or vexatious or broughtfor the purpose of delay;”

H9 “CrPC”

18. The Supreme Court (Amendment) Rules 1978[10] inserted anamendment into Rule 15(1)of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules,1966 on 13 March 1978. Order XXI, Rule 15(1) of the Supreme CourtRules as amended in 1978 provided as follows:

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“15. (1) The petition of appeal shall be registered and numberedas soon as it is lodged. Each of the following categories of appeals,on being registered, shall be put up for hearing ex parte before theCourt which may either dismiss it summarily or direct issue ofnotice to all necessary parties, or may make such orders, as thecircumstances of the case may require, namely:

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(a) an appeal from any judgment, final order or sentence in acriminal proceeding of a High Court summarily dismissingthe appeal or the matter, as the case may be, before it; C

(b) an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court underArticle 132(1) and/or 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, or underany other provision of law if the High Court has not recordedDthe reasons or the grounds for granting the certificate;

(c) an appeal under sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of clause(1) of Article 134 of the Constitution, or under the SupremeCourt (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act,1970 (28 of 1970) or under Section 379 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); E

(d) an appeal under Section 476B of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1898 (5 of 1898); (e)an appeal under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 19of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971).”

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19. In Sita Ram (supra), the constitutional validity of Rule 15(1)(c)of Order XXI of the 1966 Rules and Section 384 CrPC was called intoquestion.

20. Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for a majority of three learnedJudges of the Constitution Bench, upheld the validity of Rule 15(1)(c) ofOrder XXI of the 1966 Rules and of Section 384 of CrPC “by readingdown their scope, substance and intendement”. The Could held thatordinarily, save where nothing is served by a fuller hearing, “notice must G

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Ago”. The premise of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Courtis that if every appeal under Article 134(1)(a) and (b) or Section 2(a) ofthe Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act were to be set down for preliminaryhearing and summary disposal, the meaningful difference between Article134 and Article 136 may stand eroded and the intent of Parliament wouldbe stultified. The Court held that if the punishment which was beingBimposed for the first time in the appeal was not a death sentence, therecan be no constitutional infirmity in the disposal of the appeal at thepreliminary hearing where the appeal belongs to an exceptional categoryin which “there is no point at all”.

21. In order to appreciate the ambit of the judgment of theCConstitution Bench, it would be necessary to extract the illustrativeexamples which are furnished in paragraph 50 of the judgment, that is,when an appeal could be conceivably disposed of at the preliminaryhearing itself:

“50.What are those cases where a preliminary hearing is aDworthwhile exercise? Without being exhaustive, we mayinstance some. Where the only ground urged is a point oflaw which has been squarely covered by a ruling of thisCourt to keep the appeal lingering longer is survival afterdeath. Where the accused has pleaded guilty of murderEand the High Court, on the evidence, is satisfied with thepleas and has awarded the lesser penalty, a mere appeal exmisericordia is an exercise in futility. Where a minorprocedural irregularity, clearly curable under the Code, isall that the appellant has to urge, the full panoply of anappellate bearing is an act of supererogation. Where theFgrounds, taken at their face value, are frivolous, vexatious,malicious, wholly dilatory or blatantly mendacious, theprolongation of an appeal is a premium on abuse of theprocess of court. Maybe other cases can be conceived of,but we merely illustrate the functional relevance of OrderG21 Rule 15(1)(c).”

22. Having said this and observed that the instances which wereadverted to in paragraph 50 were illustrative and not exhaustive, theCourt nonetheless held that its decision to uphold Rule 15(1)(c) of OrderXXI could not be construed as a charter for the disposal of all appealsHroutinely on a preliminary hearing. This, the Court held, would obliterate the difference between Article 134 and Article 136, “between right andleave”. Consequently, the Court held that the rule in cases of appealsunder Article 134(1)(a) and (b) or Section 2(a) of the Enlargement ofJurisdiction Act was “notice, records and reasons”.The exception wouldbe a preliminary hearing on all such materials as may be placed by theappellant and brief grounds for dismissal.

23. In paragraphs 53 to 55 of the judgment, the Court has formulatedthe principle in the following terms:

“53.The common embankments applicable to Order 21, Rule15(1)(c) and Section 384 of the Code to preventunconstitutional overflow may now be concretised, not asrigid manacles but as guidelines for safe exercise. We arehopeful that the Supreme Court will if found necessary,make- clarificatory rules in this behalf.

54. To conclude, we uphold the vires of Order 21, Rule 15(1)(c)of the Supreme Court Rules and also Section 384 of theCriminal Procedure Code but hold that in their applicationboth the provisions shall be restricted-by certain criteria asa permissible exercise in constitutionalisation.

55. Order 21 Rule 15(1)(c) in action does not mean that allappeals falling within its fold shall be routinely disposed of,as far as possible, on a preliminary hearing. Such a course,as earlier mentioned, obliterates the difference betweenArticles 134 and 136, between right and leave. The rule, incases of appeals under Article 134(1)(a) and (b) and Section2(a) is notice, records and reasons, but the exception ispreliminary hearing on all such materials as may be placedby the appellant and brief grounds for dismissal. Thisexceptional category is where, in all conscience, there is nopoint at all. In cases of real doubt the benefit of doubt goesto the appellant and notice goes to the adversary — even ifthe chances of allowance of the appeal be not bright. Wethink it proper to suggest that with a view to invest clarityand avoid ambiguity. Order 21, Rule 15(1)(c) may be suitablymodified in conformity with this ruling.”

24. The Constitution Bench has considered the challenge to Rule15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the 1966 Rules from the perspective of Article A

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A21. Procedure established by law, it is well-settled, must be fair, just andreasonable. The Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act was enacted byParliament in pursuance of the power conferred by clause (2) of Article134 of the Constitution. The object of Parliament in enacting the lawwas, inter alia, that where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed anacquittal and sentenced the accused to a sentence of imprisonment ofBlife or to imprisonment for not less than ten years, a right of appealshould be made available to the Supreme Court. A parity of principleapplies where the High Court has withdrawn for trial before itself anycase pending before a court subordinate to its authority and sentencedthe accused to either imprisonment for life or to a term of not less thanCten years. There is a doctrinal parity between the conferment of a rightto appeal by Article 134(1)(a) and (b) and Sections 2(a) and (b) of theEnlargement of Jurisdiction Act, save and except for the fact that theformer deals with a case where the High Court has imposed a sentenceof death, while, the latter deals with a situation where the High Courthas, while reversing an order of acquittal, imposed a sentence of eitherDimprisonment for life or for a term of not less than ten years.

25. Article 136 of the Constitution deals with the power of thisCourt to grant special leave to appeal. The Constitution Bench in SitaRam (supra) has noted the distinction between the right of appeal whichis provided by Article 134, on the one hand, and Section 2 of theEEnlargement of Jurisdiction Act, on the other, while distinguishing this,from the special leave provisions which are embodied in Article 136.The Constitution Bench has cautioned that if all appeals were to beheard and disposed of routinely on a preliminary hearing, the distinctionbetween the right of appeal and the grant of leave would stand obliteratedFcontrary to the intent of Constitution makers and of Parliament, whileformulating the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. It is from this perspectivethat in Sita Ram (supra), the Constitution Bench has observed that therule in cases which are governed by Article 134(1)(a) and (b) or Section2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act is “notice, records and reasons”.

The dismissal of an appeal at a preliminary hearing is by way of anGexception. The exceptional situations which the Court contemplated,without being exhaustive, have been elucidated in paragraph 50 of thejudgment of the Constitution Bench.26. The judgment of the Constitution Bench lays down theinvariable principle that where the Constitution, on the one hand, as inH

the case of Article 134(1)(a) and (b) and Parliament, on the other hand,as in the case of Section 2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, confera right of appeal, a meaningful substantive content must be imported tothe conferment of that right of the accused. The Court, as the ConstitutionBench held, may undoubtedly have the power to dispose of the appeal ata preliminary hearing, but, this again is in the nature of an exception. It isin the nature of an exception because the conferment of a right of anappealis intended to facilitate and protect the right under Article 21 ofthe Constitution. The Constitution Bench emphasized that the right ofappeal under Article 134 is “a part of the procedure established by lawfor the protection of life and personal liberty”. Consequently, not onlywould a notice have to be issued, but the Court would be well advised togo through the record and indicate reasons for its decision. In paragraphs28 to 31 of the judgment, the Court observed that the right of appeal incriminal cases is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution and thatno provision, that renders this right illusory, can interfere with the mandateof Article 21:

“28. It is just as well that we remind ourselves of a value-setterhere. Life and liberty have been the cynosure of specialconstitutional attention in Article 21, the fuller implicationswhereof have been unravelled in Maneka Gandhi case. Whenwe read the signification of the right of appeal under Article134 we must remember that it is a part of the procedureestablished by law for the protection of life and personal liberty.Surely, law, in this setting, is a pregnant expression. Bhagwati,J., in Maneka Gandhi stated the position emphatically and sincethen this Court has followed that prescription and evendeveloped it in humane directions, a striking example of whichis the recent judgment in Presidential Reference No. 1 of 1978.“Is the prescription of some sort of procedure enough or mustthe procedure comply with any particular requirements?” asksBhagwati, J., (SCC p. 281, para 5) in the leading opinion, andanswers: (SCC p. 281, para 5 and p. 284, para 7)

“Obviously, the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair orunreasonable.... The principle of reasonableness, whichlegally as well as philosophically, is an essential element ofequality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like abrooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by A

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Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in orderto be in conformity with Article 14. It must be ‘right andjust and fair’ and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive;otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and therequirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.

Holding that natural justice was part of Indian Constitutionaljurisprudence the learned Judge quoted Lord Morris ofBorthy—Gest in Wiseman v. Borneman [1971 AC 297 : (1961)3 All ER 275] :

“... that the conception of natural justice should at all stagesguide those who discharge judicial functions is not merelyan acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy ofthe law.”

Bhagwati, J., brought out the essence of the concept of naturaljustice as part of reasonable procedure when he observed:(SCC p. 291)

“The core of it must, however, remain, namely, that theperson affected must have a reasonable opportunity of beingheard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and notan empty public relations exercise. That is why Tucker, L.J.,emphasised in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER109] that ‘whatever standard of natural justice is adopted,one essential is that the person concerned should have areasonable opportunity of presenting his case’. Whatopportunity may be regarded as reasonable wouldnecessarily depend on the practical necessities of thesituation. It may be a sophisticated full-fledged hearing or itmay be a hearing which is very brief and minimal.”

One of us (Krishna Iyer, J.) emphasised the fundamentalfairness required by Article 21 in every law that abridges lifeor liberty: (SCC p. 337, para 81)

‘Procedure established by law’, with its lethal potentiality,will reduce life and liberty to a precarious plaything if wedo not ex necessitate import into those weighty words anadjectival rule of law, civilised in its soul, fair in its heart andfixing those imperatives of procedural protection absentwhich the processual tail will wag the substantive head....

An enacted apparition is a constitutional illusion. Processualjustice is writ patently on Article 21.”

29. We have set out the sweep of Article 21 because therule framed by this Court, namely. Order 21, Rule15(1)(c), cannot transcend this obligation, nor indeedcan Section 384 of the Code. On the contrary, as Bhagwati,J., has observed in Maneka Gandhi case (SCC p. 314):

“It is a basic constitutional assumption underlying everystatutory grant of power that the authority on which thepower is conferred should act constitutionally and not inviolation of any fundamental rights.”

30. We have made these general remarks to set the interpretativetone when translating the sense of the expression “appeal shalllie to the Supreme Court”. Nothing which will render thisright illusory or its fortune chancy can square with themandate of Article 21.What applies to the right of appealunder Section 2(a) of the Enlargement Act must applyto an appeal under Article 134(1)(a) and (b) and,therefore, it is wiser to be assumed of what comportswith reasonableness and fairplay in cases covered bythe latter category.

31. When an accused is acquitted by the trial court, the initialpresumption of innocence in his favour is reinforced by thefactum of acquittal. If this reinforced innocence is not onlyreversed in appeal but the extreme penalty of death is imposedon him by the High Court, it stands to reason that it requiresthorough examination by the Supreme Court. A similarreasoning applies to cases falling under Article 134(1)(b). Whenthe High Court trying a case sentences a man to death a highercourt must examine the merits to satisfy that a human lifeshall not be haltered without an appellate review. The nextstep is whether a hearing that is to be extended or the reviewthat has to be made by the Supreme Court in suchcircumstances can be narrowed down to a consideration, in asummary fashion, of the necessarily limited record thenavailable before the Court and total dismissal of the appeal ifon such a prima facie examination nothing flawsome is brought A

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Aout by the appellant to the satisfaction of the Court. A singleright of appeal is more or less a universal requirementof the guarantee of life and liberty rooted in theconception that men are fallible, that Judges are menand that making assurance doubly sure, beforeirrevocable deprivation of life or liberty comes to pass,Ba full-scale re-examination of the facts and the law ismade an integral part of fundamental fairness orprocedure.”

(emphasis supplied)

C27. Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of Rules 1966, inter alia, providedthat an appeal under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or under the Enlargementof Jurisdiction Act or Section 379 of CrPC could be placed for ex partehearing before the Court and which the Court may either dismisssummarily or direct the issuance of notice to all necessary parties. TheRule also contemplated that the Court may make such orders as theDcircumstances of the case may require. The decision of the ConstitutionBench regarded a summary dismissal without the issuance of notice asan exception, the ordinary rule being ‘notice, record and reasons’. TheConstitution Bench, after having laid down the principles of law, observedthat in order to invest clarity and to avoid ambiguity, Order XXI, RuleE15(1)(c) may be suitably modified in conformity with the judgement.The purpose of the Constitution Bench in doing so was to bring greaterclarity to the provisions of Rule 15(1)(c) by ensuring that the powerwhich would confer was duly channelized in conformity with the principlesembodied in Article 21. In fact, that is the perspective from which theCourt observed that it was hopeful that the Supreme Court would, ifFfound necessary, make clarificatory rules in this behalf and that OrderXXI, Rule 15(1)(c) may be suitably modified in conformity with the ruling.The clarity which it sought in the provisions of the rule was in order tostreamline the power of a summary dismissal without the issuance of anotice.G28. After the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram(supra), the provisions contained in Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI weredeleted on 21 May 1981 by the Amendment Rules 1981.

29. In the counter affidavit, which has been filed in theseproceedings by the Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court, the basisH

for the deletion has been sought to be explained. A note was put up bythe then Registrar (Judicial) of the Supreme Court on 22 June 1979submitting that the decision in Sita Ram (supra) basically enunciatedthree criteria:

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“(i)Ordinarily the records shall be sent for and are available.Counsel’s assistance apart, the Court itself must apply itsBmind. (Page 21)

(ii) The appeal shall not be dismissed summarily or after a merepreliminary hearing even with the records on hand but onlyafter notice and debate at the Bar. (Page 21)

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(iii) The reasons for decision be given. (Page 23)”

30. Having set out the above criteria, the note of the Registrarstates:

“The above three criteria taken as a whole, could only mean thatan appeal can be listed for so-called preliminary hearing only afterthe records are called for and the respondent is given notice thereof which amounts to final hearing and not a preliminary hearing,which is usually ex parte on the papers filed by the appellant.Since the rule has been held to be intra vires, the appeals underArticle 134(1)(a) & (b) may be listed for preliminary hearing asthey are being done now but the Judges hearing the matter mayapply the above criteria and call for the records and order noticeto the Respondent and pass suitable orders after perusing therecords and hearing the respondent. If the appeal is admitted, thepaper-book of the appeal will be prepared subsequently.”

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31. Following the above note of the Registrar (Judicial), aCommittee of three Judges was set up by the then Chief Justice of Indiato consider the matter and examine whether the amendments proposedby the office were in order. The minutes of the meeting of the Committeeof Judges recorded the following view:

“A meeting of the Committee consisting of the Hon’ble Mr. JusticeV.D. Tulzapurkar, Hon’bleMr. Justice D.A. Desai and the Hon’bleMr. Justice E.S. Venkataramiah, was held in the Chamber of theHon’ble Mr. Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar on Wednesday the 25thJuly 1979 at 1:30 P.M. in order to consider the amendments to theSupreme Court Rules suggested in the note of the Registrar dated G

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A22.06.1979, pursuant to the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act,1978, etc. The Committee unanimously recommended that theproposed amendments to the Rules should not be made. It wasfurther of the opinion that the Full Court should consider thequestion whether the majority view in Sita Ram’s case (CriminalAppeal No.264 of 1978 decided on 24.01.1978) should be reflectedBin the Rules by adding the following proviso to clause (c) of rule15(1) of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules:- “Provided that before summarily dismissing such appeal, therecords of the case shall be called for and the appellant be heard.”

C32. Following the report of the Committee, the amendment wasplaced before a meeting of the Full Court on 6 August 1979, when thefollowing decision was recorded:

“As regards clause (c) of rule 15(1), which provides for the exparte hearing of an appeal under sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b)Dof clause (1) of Art.134 of the Constitution or under the SupremeCourt (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970(28 of 1970) or under section 379 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), after discussion, it was decided thatthe aforesaid clause shall be deleted.”

E33. From the above narration, what emerges is that the primaryreason for deleting the provisions of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI wasthat the sub-rule, as it was framed, envisaged that certain categories ofappeals would be put up for hearing ex parte when it was open to theCourt to either dismiss summarily or, as the case may be, direct theissuance of notice. In view of the decision of the Constitution BenchFthat the issuance of a notice must follow, the Full Court decided to deleteRule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI (we are not concerned in these proceedingswith the other amendments which were made). The Full Court possiblycontemplated that the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram(supra) contained sufficient guidance in regard to the procedure to beGfollowed in the case of appeals arising under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) orSection 2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act.

34. The 1966 Rules have since given way to the 2013 Rules whichwere published in the Gazette of India on 29 May 2014 and came intoforce on 19 August 2014. Order XX contains provisions with respect tothe procedure for preliminary hearing of certain categories of criminalH

appeals before this Court. Rule 5(1) of Order XX contains the followingprovision:

“5.(1) The petition of appeal shall be registered and numbered assoon as it is found to be in order. Each of the following categoriesof appeals, on being registered, shall be put for hearing ex partebefore the Court, which may either dismiss it summarily or directissue of notice to all necessary parties, or may make such orders,as the circumstances of the case may require, namely:

(a) an appeal from any judgment, final order or sentence in acriminal proceeding of a High Court summarily dismissing theappeal or the matter, as the case may be, before it;

(b) an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court underArticle 134-A of the Constitution being a certificate of the naturereferred to in clause (1) of Article 132 or sub-clause (c) of clause(1) of Article 134 of the Constitution or under any other provisionof law if the High Court has not recorded the reasons or thegrounds for granting the certificate;

(c) an appeal under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 ofthe Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971).”

35. Rule 5(1) of Order XX indicates the categories of appealswhich, on being registered, shall be put up for hearing ex parte. Thecategory of appeals specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) does not coverappeals falling under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2 of theEnlargement of Jurisdiction Act.Hence and even otherwise as a matterof precept, the principles which have been laid down by the ConstitutionBench in Sita Ram (supra) must govern the procedure to be followedwhile disposing of appeals under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2 ofthe Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. Ordinarily in all such appeals, noticemust be issued. The issuance of notice would facilitate a properexamination by the Court of the dimensions of the appeal with theassistance of both the sides on whether the judgment of the High Court,which is the subject matter of the appeal, would warrant furtherconsideration. While disposing of the appeal, it is only appropriate andproper that the Court must record reasons.The recording of reasons, ina matter where the accused has a constitutional or statutory right ofappeal against the conviction, lends assurance to the judicial process.The liberty of the accused is fundamentally impacted by the outcome of AB

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Athe appeal. The recording of reasons lays confidence to the process thata statutory appeal which impinges upon the liberty of the accused hasbeen considered judiciously. Our insistence on recording of reasonsemanates from the principles of natural justice and fairness in decision-making, which serve the precept that justice must not only be done, butmust also appear to be done.B36. The decision of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram (supra)has enunciated the following principles which it would be worthwhile torecapitulate:

(i) An appeal falling within the ambit of Article 134(1)(a) orC(b) or Section 2 of the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act shouldordinarily not be disposed of at a preliminary hearing withoutthe issuance of notice to the opposite party and calling forthe record;

(ii) A hearing should be afforded in presence of both partiesDand with records on hand; and

(iii) Reasons should be indicated while disposing of the appeal.

37. With the deletion of Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI of the 1966Rules, appeals falling within the ambit of Article 134(1)(a) or (b) orunder the Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act were specifically taken out ofEthe purview of appeals which would be put up for ex parte hearing uponregistration and which the Court may either dismiss summarily or directthe issuance of notice to the parties. The object and intendment of thedeletion was to ensure that such appeals are not disposed of summarilyex parte without the issuance of a notice. The deletion must be soFconstrued as to give effect to the fundamental postulate underlying thejudgment of the Constitution Bench in Sita Ram (supra). The deletionof a provision in the 2013 Rules akin to Rule 15(1)(c) of Order XXI ofthe 1966 Rules should not be interpreted to confer an uncharted discretionto dismiss an appeal of that description summarily at an ex parte hearingwithout the issuance of a notice. To the contrary, the deletion of theGprovision, as the material in the counter affidavit indicates, was in orderto fulfil the mandate of the decision of the Constitution Bench.Theprinciples propounded in Sita Ram (supra) continue to hold effect andguide preliminary hearing of certain categories of criminal appeals underOrder XX, including Order XX, Rule 21 of the 2013 Rules.The principleenunciated by the Constitution Bench that reasons should be recordedH

while dismissing appeals falling within the ambit of the above provisionshas not been introduced by way of an amendment to the Rules since it isexpected that on the judicial side, the Court would follow the principleswhich have been enunciated by the Constitution Bench.

38. In the present case, the acquittal of the petitioner of the chargeof committing offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section34 of the IPC was reversed by the High Court and he was sentenced tosuffer imprisonment for life. The appeal, under Section 2(a) of theEnlargement of Jurisdiction Act read with Section 379 CrPC, whichwas filed by the present petitioner was listed before this Court for apreliminary hearing on 5 May 2014 and was dismissed in limine. Thejudgment of this Court dismissing the appeal does not evidently furnishreasons. The difficulty in granting any relief to the petitioner in theseproceedings is that an appeal having been dismissed on the judicial sideand a review having been since dismissed against that judgment, it wouldnot be open for this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 32of the Constitution to issue any contrary direction. The petitioner wouldbe at liberty to pursue the remedies available in law. The view which wehave taken would, it is hoped, set at rest the modalities to be followedwhile entertaining appeals under Article 134(1)(a) or (b) or Section 2 ofthe Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act. Before concluding, we may notethat we have not made any specific finding in regard to the consequenceof the dismissal of the appeal by the co-accused (A4) by a reasonedjudgment dated 27 March 2019 on the remedies available to the petitionerin law.

39. The petition is accordingly disposed of.

40. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

Divya Pandey

Petition disposed of.

(Assisted by : Deepak Panwar, LCRA)

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