RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. on 19 May 2023

[2023] 6 S.C.R. 643

RAMESH CHANDRA VAISHYA

v.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1617 of 2023)

MAY 19, 2023

[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.]

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention ofAtrocities) Act, 1989 – ss. 3(1)(x), 18 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 323,325, 392, 452, 504, 506 – Prosecution case that the appellant wasengaged in an altercation with the second respondent-complainantover the issue of drainage of water – It was alleged that during thisaltercation, the appellant verbally hurled caste related abusestowards the complainant and his family members, and subsequentlyphysically assaulted the complainant causing him multiple injuries– Two FIRs were filed – First FIR by the complainant against theappellant and second FIR by appellant against the complainant –First FIR was registered against the appellant u/ss. 323, 504, IPCand 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Charge-sheet filed – Appellantsought quashing of criminal proceedings u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. beforethe High Court – High Court held that without evidence, it was notpossible to ascertain the veracity of the allegations, thereforeapplication u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. was not sustained – On appeal, held:Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence ofa fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence(apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son)– Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “inany place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attractingsection 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent – Further, theallegation in the first F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up thecomplainant for which he sustained multiple injuries – Chargesheetneither refer to any eye-witnesses other than complainant’s wifeand son nor any medical report – The nature of hurt suffered by thecomplainant in the process is neither reflected from the first F.I.R.nor the charge-sheet – On the contrary, the appellant had the injuriessuffered by him treated immediately after the incident – High Courtmisdirected itself in failing to appreciate the challenge to the criminal

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Aproceedings including the charge-sheet in the proper perspectiveand occasioned a grave failure of justice in rejecting such challenge.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of thecomplainant, is silent about the place of occurrence and who,Bbeing a member of the public, was present when the appellant isalleged to have hurled caste related abuses at the complainant.However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at thebehest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place atthe house of the appellant. The first question that calls for anCanswer is whether it was at a place within public view that theappellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with anintent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. Fromthe charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., itappears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidenceof three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellantDof committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other thanthe complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R.nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual(a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from Ethe appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since theutterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any placewithin public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. This Court,therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident(of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by theFappellant), no member of the public was present. [Paras 16,17][651-C-G]

2. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant hadhurled caste related abuses at the complainant with a view toinsult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case ofGthe complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. It was noted from the first F.I.R. as wellas the charge-sheet that the same makes no reference to theutterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercationor to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for theHallegation/observation that caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult orintimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to anoffence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course,such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of hebeing a member of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If onecalls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor)in any place within public view, this would obviously constitutean act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive oroffensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to aperson, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, itmay not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such wordsare laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/STAct bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438,Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/STAct over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused issubjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within publicview are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to bean encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either on statements of witnessesrecorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enablethe court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a caseof an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed forforming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation beforeit, prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limitedtest that has to be applied in a case of the present nature, thecharge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 does not make out anycase of an offence having been committed by the appellant undersection 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial. [Para 18][651-G-H; 652-A-F]

3. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarilycausing hurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodilypain, disease or infirmity to any person. The allegation in thefirst F.I.R. is that the appellant had beaten up the complainant forwhich he sustained multiple injuries. Although the complainantalleged that such incident was witnessed by many persons andthat he sustained injuries on his hand, the charge-sheet doesneither refer to any eye-witness other than the complainant’s wifeand son nor to any medical report. The nature of hurt suffered by AB

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Athe complainant in the process is neither reflected from the firstF.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellant hadthe injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident.In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in thepresent proceeding, there is no material worthy of considerationin this behalf except a bald statement that the complainantBsustained multiple injuries “in his hand and other body parts”. Ifindeed the complainant’s version were to be believed, the I.O.ought to have asked for a medical report to support the same.Completion of investigation within a day in a given case could beappreciated but in the present case it has resulted in moreCdisservice than service to the cause of justice. The situationbecomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceedingthe parties including the first respondent are unable to apprisethe outcome of the second F.I.R. In any event, the court do notfind any ring of truth in the prosecution case to allow theproceedings to continue vis-à-vis section 323, IPC. [Para 21][652-DH; 653-A-D]

Fiona Shrikhande and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra(2013) 14 SCC 44 : [2013] 9 SCR 240 – relied on.

Mohd. Allauddin Khan v. The State of Bihar and Ors.(2019) 6 SCC 107 : [2019] 5 SCR 876;State ofEHaryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259;Hitesh Vermav. The State of Uttarakhand and Anr. (2020) 10 SCC710 : [2020] 9 SCR 593 – referred to.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2022 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.38374 of 2018.HMs. Vanshaja Shukla, Abhishek Chaterjee, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, AAG, Adarsh Upadhyay,Divyanshu Sahay, Ashish Madaan, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Ajay Marwah,Sanjay Shukla, Adhitya Srinivasan, Tapan Masta, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal, by special leave, questions the judgmentand order dated 23[rd] May, 2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of theHigh Court of Judicature at Allahabad (“High Court”, hereafter)dismissing an application under section 482 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973[1] (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) instituted by the appellant seekingquashing of the charge-sheet as well as the pending criminal proceedings[2].

3. In a nutshell, the prosecution’s case is that on 14[th] January,2016, at about 7.00 am, the appellant was engaged in an altercation withthe second respondent (“complainant”, hereafter) over the issue ofdrainage of water. It is alleged that during this altercation, the appellantverbally hurled caste related abuses towards the complainant and hisfamily members, and subsequently physically assaulted the complainantcausing him multiple injuries. Consequently, on 20[th] January, 2016, a FirstInformation Report (“first F.I.R”, hereafter) was registered against theappellant under sections 323 and 504, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”,hereafter) and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”, hereafter).

4. Investigation was conducted by the concerned Circle Officer(“I.O.”, hereafter). Upon investigation, which was completed within aday, the I.O. reached the conclusion that there were materials againstthe appellant to send him up for trial and consequently, a charge-sheetdated 21[st] January, 2016 under sections 323, 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act was filed before the concerned court against him. The courttook cognizance of the offence on 3[rd] May, 2016.

5. It is important to emphasize at this juncture that the appellantintended to lodge an F.I.R. arising out of the same incident. According tohim, he was badly beaten up by the complainant and his son with canes 1 Application u/s 482 No. 38374 of 2018

2 Case Crime No. 23 of 2016; Criminal Case No. 376 of 2016

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Aand lathis on 14[th] January, 2016, as a result of which he too sustainedinjuries. On the same date, when the appellant approached the policestation to lodge the F.I.R., it was not registered; instead, the appellantwas challaned and kept under detention by the concerned inspector in-charge under sections 151, 107, and 116, Cr. PC. He was subsequentlyreleased upon furnishing bail bond. Owing to the failure of the Police toBregister the F.I.R., the appellant moved an application under section156(3), Cr. PC. Pursuant to the order passed by the Magistrate, an F.I.R.dated 18[th] February, 2016 (“second F.I.R.”, hereafter) was registeredfor the offences under sections 323, 325, 392, 452, 504, 506, IPC against the complainant (second respondent).C

6. It is also noted that the appellant has instituted a suit[3] beforethe civil court seeking permanent injunction against the complainant’scontinued encroachment upon the appellant’s lands. The same is pendingconsideration before the competent court.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid charge-sheet, the appellant invokedDthe jurisdiction of the High Court on 5[th] October, 2018 by applying undersection 482, Cr. PC. He sought quashing thereof as well as the criminalproceedings against him on the grounds that the said charge sheetdiscloses no offence and the present prosecution has been institutedwith mala fide intention for the purposes of harassment.

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8. Having held that a prima facie case for grant of interim reliefwas set up, the High Court, vide interim order dated 15[th] November,2018, directed that no coercive action be taken against the appellant,pending consideration of the application under section 482, Cr. PC.

9. However, upon a contested hearing, the High Court found noFmaterial irregularity in the charge-sheet or the procedure followed bythe Court below in taking cognizance, and proceeded to dismiss theappellant’s application under section 482, Cr. PC vide the impugnedjudgment and order. The High Court held that, at this stage, it cannot beconcluded that a cognizable offence has not been disclosed, as theGallegations are factual in nature and would require leading of evidenceby the parties. Relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. AllauddinKhan vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.[4], the High Court emphasizedthat at the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under 3 C.S. No. 07 of 2017

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section 482, Cr. PC, the court has limited jurisdiction and it cannotappreciate the evidence in order to determine whether, prima facie,acase has been made out against the accused. The High Court noted thatwithout evidence, it is not possible to ascertain the veracity of theallegations at this stage; the application for quashing of a charge-sheetor criminal proceedings under section 482 Cr. PC, therefore, cannotsustain.

10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Shukla, learnedcounsel advanced the following submissions:

a.The first F.I.R., which was registered after a delay of sixdays, is an afterthought and creates serious doubts overthe allegations of the complainant.

b.The charge-sheet was filed on the very next day ofregistration of the first F.I.R., without conducting properinvestigation. The charge-sheet fails to take note of thesecond F.I.R. registered at the instance of the appellantand the medical report.

c.The complainant, being an influential person in the village,maliciously initiated criminal proceedings against theappellant with an ulterior motive to scuttle the alreadypending civil dispute in the civil court between the parties.

d.The Police did not act on the appellant’s complaint. Thesecond F.I.R. dated 18[th] February, 2016 was registered onlyafter an order was passed on the appellant’s applicationunder section 156(3), Cr. PC by the Magistrate.

e.State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.[5]was placedin support of the contentionthat if the contentsof the F.I.R., taken on their face value, does not make outany case against the appellant, such an F.I.R. registeredwith ulterior motive deserves to be quashed.

f.Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.[6]was also placed to support the contention that the HighCourt ignored the misuse and abuse of the provisions of theSC/ST Act by the complainant; neither the contents of the 5 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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Afirst F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet discloses the precise contentof abusive language employed by the appellant so as toattract the provisions of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

11. It was, accordingly, prayed that relief prayed for by the appellantbe granted.B

12. Mr. Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General appearingfor the first respondent (State) while seeking dismissal of this appealcontended as follows:

a.The appellant had committed a serious crime as a result ofwhich the complainant had sustained multiple injuries in theCresultant altercation.

b.The Police, on the basis of the statement given by thecomplainant and the investigation that followed, filed thecharge-sheet dated 21[st] January, 2016 before the trial courtafter following due procedure.

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c.The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order,has rightly dismissed the application for quashing presentedby the appellant.

d.It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.PC should be sparingly exercised with completeEcircumspection and caution and the High Court was not inerror in refusing to exercise jurisdiction.

13. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the complainant(second respondent) supported the impugned judgment and order of theHigh Court. According to him, completion of investigation within a dayFby the I.O. may seem to be unusual but is not an impossibility. He also contended that the charge-sheet having been filed, the law must beallowed to take its own course; and, if at all the appellant is aggrievedby framing of charges, he may seek his remedy in accordance with law.No case for interference having been set up by the appellant, Mr. ShuklaGprayed for dismissal of the appeal.

14. We have heard the parties and perused the judgment andorder of the High Court together with the materials on record.

15. Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendmentnotified vide S.O. 152(E) dated 18[th] January, 2016, read as follows:H

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever,not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

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(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate amember of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any placewithin public view; ***”

16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant,is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of thepublic,was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled casterelated abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the secondF.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incidenttook place at the house of the appellant.

17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was ata place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abusesat the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent tohumiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21[st] January, 2016 filed bythe I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidenceof three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant ofcommitting offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, hiswife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers tothe presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the placeof occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife andtheir son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not“in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attractingsection 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore,hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of casterelated abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of thepublic was present.

18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurledcaste related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliatehim, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any furtherto bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We havenoted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that the samemakes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course A

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Aof verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged,except for the allegation/observation that caste-related abuses werehurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult orintimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offenceunder section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult orintimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of aBparticular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot(bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within publicview, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliateby user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directedgenerally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe,Cper se, it may not be sufficient to attractsection 3(1)(x) unless suchwords are laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/STAct bars invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PCand having regard to theoverriding effect of the SC/ST Act over otherlaws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial foralleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances madeDby him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R.(which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events),but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based either onstatements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise)so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makesEout a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committedfor forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it,prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test thathas to be applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet dated21[st] January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence havingbeen committed by the appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting himFto stand a trial.

19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra)cited by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that wehave taken above.G20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whetherthe criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to betaken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offencespunishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC.

21. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causingHhurt. Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person. The allegation in the first F.I.R. is that theappellant had beaten up the complainant for which he sustained multipleinjuries. Although the complainant alleged that such incident waswitnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his hand,the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye-witness other than thecomplainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. The nature ofhurt suffered by the complainant in the process is neither reflectedfrom the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary, the appellanthad the injuries suffered by him treated immediately after the incident.In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent (State) in the presentproceeding, there is no material worthy of consideration in this behalfexcept a bald statement that the complainant sustained multiple injuries“in his hand and other bodyparts”. If indeed the complainant’sversion were to be believed, the I.O. ought to have asked for a medicalreport to support the same. Completion of investigation within a day ina given case could be appreciated but in the present case it has resultedin more disservice than service to the cause of justice. The situationbecomes all the more glaring when in course of this proceeding theparties including the first respondent are unable to apprise us the outcomeof the second F.I.R. In any event, we do not find any ring of truth in theprosecution case to allow the proceedings to continue vis-à-vis section323, IPC.

22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande andAnr. vs. State of Maharashtra[7], this Court had the occasion to holdthat:

“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz.(a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to giveprovocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intendor know that such provocation would cause another to break thepublic peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insultmust be of such a degree that should provoke a person to breakthe public peace or to commit any other offence. The person whointentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it willgive provocation to any other person and such provocation willcause to break the public peace or to commit any other offence,in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied.One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there 7 (2013) 14 SCC 44

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Ashould have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insultand the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, assuch, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section504 IPC.”

23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we haveBlittle hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have abusedthe complainant but such abuse by itself and without anything more doesnot warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in t h eclear absence of the ingredient of intentional insult of such a degree thatit could provoke a person to break public peace or commit any otheroffence.C

24. We record that the High Court misdirected itself in failing toappreciate the challenge to the criminal proceedings including the charge-sheet in the proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure of justicein rejecting such challenge.

D25. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it wouldbe an abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal CaseNo.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and orderof the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of 2016.

26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however,bear their own costs.E

Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.

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