DR. G. SADASIVAN NAIR versus COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, & ORS. on 1 December 2021

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 9 S.C.R.

ADR. G. SADASIVAN NAIR

v.

COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYREPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, & ORS.

B(Civil Appeal No. 6994 of 2021)

DECEMBER 01, 2021

[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Service Law – Kerala Service Rules – r. 25(a), Part-III –Benefit under – Appellant was appointed as a Lecturer at theCrespondent University with effect from 07.09.1984 – Prior to suchappointment, he was a lawyer practised for eight years – Theappellant made a representation before the Registrar of therespondent University, requesting to reckon his practice of eightyears at the Bar for the purpose of determining his pensionaryDbenefits payable to him on his superannuation on the basis of Rule25 (a), Part III, Kerala Service Rules (KSR) – Registrar rejected hisrequest and relied on the proviso to Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR whichprovides that the benefit u/Rule 25 (a) would be available only tosuch employees who are recruited when practising at the Bar, tothose posts requiring a qualification in law and experience at theEBar – The experience at the Bar was not essential for appointmentin the instant case – The Chancellor also dismissed the appealpetition – Writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Courtwas dismissed – Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contendedthat in the case of one ‘Dr. PLK’, a Professor of Law who wasFsimilarly situated as the appellant, the respondent University dulyconsidered the period of practice at the Bar as a part of ‘Dr. PLK’qualifying service for the purpose of determining pension payableon his superannuation – Held: The appellant and Dr. PLK were infact similarly situated – Both these individuals were appointed asteaching faculty at the respondent University after practicing asGadvocates in various Courts – They were both appointed before theproviso to Rule 25 (a) came into effect, i.e. before 12.02.1985 andretired after the said proviso came into force – There are no validgrounds to sustain the application of the proviso in relation to theappellant – The action of the respondent University of selectivelyH

applying the proviso to Rule 25(a) in relation to the appellant, whilenot applying the said proviso in relation to similarly situated persons,is arbitrary and therefore illegal – Therefore, the appellant is entitledto receive pension having regard to his total qualifying service,inclusive of the period of his service at the respondent Universityand the period of his practice as an Advocate in various Courts ofthe State.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The respondents have relied upon the provisoto Rule 25 (a) of Part III, Kerala Service Rules in urging that therespondent University rightly denied the claim of the appellantfor reckoning the period of practice at the Bar. Rule 25 (a) togetherwith the proviso inserted by way of an Amendment, with effectfrom 12th February 1985. [Para 25][762-A-B]

2. The proviso limits the benefit of the Rule by restrictingits application only to such employees as are recruited whenpracticing at the Bar, to those posts requiring a qualification inlaw and experience at the Bar. The respondent University hascontended that since the post of a lecturer to which the appellantwas appointed in 1984, did not require prior experience at theBar, the proviso would be attracted thereby disentitling theappellant of the benefit under Rule 25(a). Although the provisowas inserted by way of an amendment, with effect from 12thFebruary 1985 and was not in force at the time of appointment ofthe appellant in 1984, the respondent University has contendedthat the rule applicable in the matter of determination of pensionis that which exists at the time of retirement. That the appellantsuperannuated on 30th April 2007, on which date the proviso toRule 25(a) was in force and therefore it would apply, limiting thebenefit of the Rule. [Para 26][762-F-H]

3. The appellant brought to our attention that in the case ofone Dr. PLK, a Professor of Law who was similarly situated asthe appellant herein, the respondent University duly consideredthe period of practice at the Bar as a part of Dr. PLK’s qualifyingservice for the purpose of determining pension payable on hissuperannuation. [Para 27][763-A-B]

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A4. This Court finds that the appellant and Dr. PLK were infact similarly situated. Both these individuals were appointed asteaching faculty at the respondent University after practicing asadvocates in various Courts of Kerala. They were both appointedbefore the proviso to Rule 25 (a) came into effect, i.e. before12th February 1985 and retired after the said proviso came intoBforce. [Para 30][763-D-E]

5. In the circumstances, This Court finds no valid groundto sustain the application of the proviso in relation to the appellant,thereby denying the benefit of Rule 25(a), when the same wasnot applied in the case of Dr. PLK, thereby allowing the benefitCof Rule 25(a). [Para 31][763-E-F]

6. While we accept the settled position of law that the ruleapplicable in matters of determination of pension is that whichexists at the time of retirement, we are unable to find any legalbasis in the action of the respondent University of selectivelyDallowing the benefit of Rule 25 (a). However, the law does notallow the employer to apply the rules differently in relation topersons who are similarly situated. [Para 32][763-F-H]

7. Therefore, the action of the respondent University ofselectively applying the proviso to Rule 25(a) in relation to theEappellant, while not applying the said proviso in relation to similarlysituated persons, is arbitrary and therefore illegal. Suchdiscrimination, which is not based on any reasonable classification,is violative of all canons of equality which are enshrined in theConstitution of India. [Para 33][764-B-C]F8. Hence, in the instant case, the denial of the benefit under

8. Hence, in the instant case, the denial of the benefit underRule 25 (a), KSR, to the appellant is arbitrary and not inaccordance with law. Consequently, the appellant is entitled toreceive pension having regard to his total qualifying service,inclusive of the period of his service at the respondent UniversityGand the period of his practice as an Advocate in various Courts ofKerala. [Para 34][764-C-D]

Deoki Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1971 SC1409 : [1971] (0) Suppl. SCR 634; Government ofAndhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Syed Yousuddin Ahmed 1997(7) SCC 241 – referred to.H

Case Law Reference

[1971] (0) Suppl. SCR 634referred toPara 11 (a)1997 (7) SCC 241referred toPara 11 (a)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.6994of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2019 of the High Courtof Kerala at Ernakulam in W. A. No.988 of 2012.

Dr. K. P. Kylasanatha Pillay, Sr. Adv., Sajith P. Warrier, Advs. forthe Appellant.

Ms. Malini Poduval, Ms. Babita Sant, C. K. Sasi, Abdullah Naseeh,Ms. Meena K. P., G. Prakash, Ms. Priyanka Prakash, Ms. BeenaPrakash, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by NAGARATHNA, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated29[th] August 2019, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court ofKerala at Ernakulam in Writ Appeal No. 988/2012, wherein the aforesaidwrit appeal was dismissed.

2. Succinctly stated, the facts in the instant appeal are that theappellant herein was appointed as a Lecturer in the School of LegalStudies of the respondent No. 1 University, namely, Cochin Universityof Science and Technology, Kochi, with effect from 7[th] September 1984.Prior to such appointment, the appellant was a lawyer practising in theDistrict Court and Subordinate Courts at North Parur, Ernakulam, Keralafor the period between 11[th] March 1972 and 2[nd] February 1980. Duringthe period between March 1980 and February 1984, the appellant waspursuing his PhD programme on availing a University Grants CommissionFellowship. The appellant resumed practice as an advocate in the KeralaHigh Court and Subordinate Courts after obtaining his PhD, upto thedate of his appointment as a lecturer in the respondent University.

3. On 10[th] November 2004, the appellant made a representationbefore the Registrar of the respondent University, requesting to reckonhis practice of eight years at the Bar for the purpose of determining hispensionary benefits payable to him on his superannuation. In making

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Asuch a representation seeking consideration of his practice at the Bar,the appellant relied on Rule 25 (a), Part III, Kerala Service Rules(hereinafter referred to as “KSR” for brevity) which provides thatexperience at the Bar could be reckoned as qualifying service for thepurpose of determining superannuation pension, subject to a conditionthat only a person who was recruited into service after attaining the ageBof 25 years could avail such benefit. In such a situation, the Rule allowsaddition of as many years by which a person exceeds the age of 25years. The benefit of additional service shall also be limited to the actualnumber of years of practice at the Bar, subject to a maximum of tenyears.C4. The appellant received a letter on 7[th] January 2006, from theRegistrar of the respondent University declining appellant’s request toreckon his tenure of practice at the Bar for the purpose of determiningappellant’s superannuation pension. In rejecting the representation madeby the appellant, the Registrar relied on the proviso to Rule 25 (a), PartDIII, KSR which provides that the benefit under Rule 25 (a) would beavailable only to such employees who are recruited when practising atthe Bar, to those posts requiring a qualification in law and experience atthe Bar. Having regard to the aforestated proviso, the Registrar in hisletter dated 7[th] January 2006, stated that experience at the Bar was notessential for appointment to teaching posts at the University and therefore,Ethe question of reckoning previous experience at the Bar would not arisein relation to the appellant.

5. The appellant preferred an appeal petition against the decisionof the Registrar of the respondent University dated 7[th] January 2006,before respondent No. 3 herein, namely, the Chancellor of CochinFUniversity of Science and Technology, contending that the Registrarhad rejected his request for reckoning his tenure of practice at the Barfor the purpose of determining his superannuation pension, withoutfollowing the relevant rules in their proper perspective. The appellantstated in his appeal petition before the Chancellor – respondent no.3 thatGthe proviso to Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR was inserted in said Rule witheffect from 12[th] February 1985. The appellant contended that the provisocould not be made applicable to him as the same was not in force as onthe date on which he joined service at the respondent University, i.e., 7[th]September 1984. The appellant also stated in his representation that oneDr. Leela Krishnan, who was similarly situated as the appellant, wasHgranted the benefits prescribed under Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR.

6. As there was no response to his representation, the appellanton the same grounds as those urged in the appeal petition preferredbefore respondent No. 3, also preferred a writ petition before the HighCourt of Kerala at Ernakulam being W.P. (C) No. 10057/2006. TheHigh Court in its judgment dated 3[rd] April 2006 directed respondent No.3 to decide, within a period of four months from the date of receipt ofthe judgment of the High Court, the question, as to, whether the appellantwas entitled to get the benefit under Rule 25(a), Part III, KSR.

7. In accordance with the High Court’s judgment dated 3[rd] April2006, respondent No. 3 afforded an opportunity of hearing to the appellanton 12[th] July 2006 and subsequently dismissed the appeal petition preferredby the appellant on 7[th] October, 2006 by holding that the Government orany other statutory body has the right to modify the service conditions,even retrospectively. Respondent No. 3 further held that since the provisowas introduced in Rule 25 (a) while the appellant herein was still inservice of the respondent University, the proviso would apply to him,thereby limiting the benefit of Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR.

8. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal petition by respondentNo. 3, the appellant preferred a writ petition before the High Court ofKerala at Ernakulam, being W.P. (C) No. 28410/2006. The Single Judgeof the High Court by judgment dated 25[th] January 2012 dismissed thewrit petition preferred on the ground that it was open to the Governmentto unilaterally alter the service conditions of employees during their serviceand therefore, what was applicable was the rule prevailing as on thedate of retirement and not that which existed as on the date of enteringservice.

9. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appellant was tosuperannuate from service of the respondent University on 19[th] October2006. But by virtue of Rule 60 (C), Part I, KSR, the appellant wasentitled to continue in service till the last day of the month in which theacademic year ends i.e. until 30[th] April 2007. The appellant retired on30[th] April 2007 from the post of Professor and Director, School of LegalStudies, Cochin University of Science and Technology.

10. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Single Judge of the HighCourt of Kerala, dated 25[th] January 2012 in W.P. (C) No. 28410/2006,the appellant herein preferred an intra-court writ appeal being W.A. No.988/2012. The Division Bench of the High Court, in its judgment dated29[th] August 2019, confirmed the findings of the Single Judge and dismissed A

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Athe writ appeal preferred by the appellant. Being aggrieved, a specialleave petition was filed by the appellant before this Court in which leavewas granted on 22[nd] November 2021.

11. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to encapsulatethe reasoning of the High Court of Kerala in dismissing the writ appealBfiled by the appellant herein, as under:

(a) The High Court relied on the decision of this Court in DeokiNandan Prasad v. State of Bihar - AIR 1971 SC 1409,wherein it was held that the rule applicable in matters ofdetermination of pension is that which is existing at the timeCof retirement. Similarly, in Government of Andhra Pradesh& Ors. v. Syed Yousuddin Ahmed - 1997 (7) SCC 241, itwas held that the emoluments forming a part of the pensionpayable to an employee shall be determined on the basis ofthe rule existing as on the date of retirement.

DIn light of the above citations of this Court, the High Courtstated that the right to receive pension arises and crystallisesinto a vested right only on the date of superannuation. TheHigh Court held that the appellant was entitled to obtainpension in accordance with the rules existing as on the dateof superannuation.E

(b) The High Court found that the argument advanced on behalfof the appellant herein, that other Universities requirecandidates to possess Bar experience for appointment asteaching faculty, was irrelevant and inconsequential.

F(c)The High Court held that the Government was authorisedunder Article 309 of the Constitution of India, to make lawsdetermining service conditions of Government employeesand to amend such laws, even retrospectively.

12. The writ appeal preferred by the appellant herein wasdismissed by the High Court on making the aforestated observations.G

13. We have heard Dr. K.P. Kylasanatha Pillay, learned SeniorCounsel along with Mr. Sajith P. Warrier, learned counsel for the appellant,Ms. Malini Poduval, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2, andMr. G. Prakash, learned counsel for respondent-State and perused thematerial on record.H

14. Dr. Pillay, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submittedthat the Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR as it stood at the time of appointmentof the appellant to the post of lecturer in the School of Legal Studies ofthe respondent University, allowed experience at the Bar to be reckonedas qualifying service for the purpose of determining superannuationpension. The said Rule prescribed a condition that only a person whowas recruited into service after attaining the age of 25 years could claimsuch benefit of additional service. The Rule allowed for addition of asmany years by which a person exceeds the age of 25 years. The benefitof additional service was limited to the actual number of years of practiceat the Bar, subject to a maximum of ten years.

15. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that theproviso to Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR, which limited the scope of thebenefit conferred under Rule 25(a) by stating that such benefit wouldonly be available to such employees as are recruited to those postsrequiring a qualification in law and experience at the Bar, was introducedwith effect from 12[th] February 1985. That the said proviso could nothave been made applicable to the appellant as it was not in force at thetime of his appointment, i.e., on 7[th] September 1984. That the benefit ofthe Rule could not be denied by applying the proviso retrospectively, inthe absence of express direction to that effect in the Amendment to theRule by which the proviso was inserted in Rule 25(a). It was submittedthat the intention of inserting the proviso in Rule 25 (a) was not to excludepreviously appointed law teachers from the purview of the said Rule,but to streamline the condition regarding pension for future appointees.It was stated that the appellant had acquired a vested right to his pensionwhen he joined service which could not have been taken away at thetime of his retirement.

16. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant highlighted that Dr.P. Leela Krishnan, former Head of the Department of Law and Dean,Faculty of Law, Cochin University of Science and Technology whosuperannuated from service of the respondent University with effectfrom 30[th] April 1996, was granted the benefit of additional service asprovided for under Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR; that Dr. P. Leela Krishnanhad practiced as an advocate at the Kerala Bar during the period between29[th] March 1962 and 24[th] June 1969, i.e. for a period of 7 years, 2months and 26 days. Dr. P. Leela Krishnan served in the Law Faculty ofthe respondent University from 24[th] June 1969 to 30[th] April 1996. His A

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Aretirement benefits were granted, having regard to the period of servicerendered at the University as well as the period of practice at the Bar.The respondent University found his length of qualifying service for thepurpose of grant of pension to be 33 years, 7 months and 4 days, whichincluded 26 years, 9 months and 2 days of service at the respondentUniversity and 7 years, 2 months and 26 days of practice at the Bar.B

17. In that context, learned counsel for the appellant contendedthat the appellant is similarly situated as Dr. P. Leela Krishnan as theyboth were appointed from the Bar before the proviso to Rule 25 (a)came into effect, i.e. before 12[th] February 1985; and that they bothsuperannuated after the proviso was brought into force. However, whileCthe proviso to Rule 25(a) was applied in relation to the appellant, therebydenying him the benefit of Rule 25(a), but the said proviso was not appliedin the case of Dr. P. Leela Krishnan. That the respondent University hassingled out the appellant without any legal basis and has arbitrarily deniedto him the benefit of Rule 25(a), Part III, KSR, which is discriminatoryDand in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

18. As opposed to the aforesaid arguments, Ms. Poduval, learnedcounsel for respondent no.1 and 2, relied on the proviso to Rule 25(a),Part III, KSR and contended that the benefit under the said Rule wasrightly withheld by the respondent University in light of the proviso. ThatEthe proviso would be applicable in relation to the appellant as it is tritelaw that the rule applicable in the matter of determination of pension isthat which exists at the time of retirement. In the case of the appellant,the date of superannuation was 30[th] April 2007, on which date the provisoto Rule 25(a) was in force and therefore it would apply, limiting thebenefit of the Rule.F

19. In relation to the appellant’s contention that other employeesof the respondent University who were similarly situated as the appellant,had been granted the benefit under Rule 25(a), it was submitted that theappellant cannot claim such relief relying on an earlier illegal order. Thatsuch a claim based on negative equality in favour of the appellant wasGuntenable.

20. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that theappellant made a representation before the Registrar of the respondentUniversity after an inordinate delay and had not adhered to the time limitprescribed under Rule 22C, Part I, KSR, for making such claim. RuleH22C, Part I, KSR stipulates that an officer who wishes to get his prior service counted shall apply for the same within a period of five yearsfrom the date of his entry into service. Rule 22C also provides that anorder reckoning previous service shall not be issued by the CompetentAuthority within a period of less than five years before the date ofretirement on superannuation.

21. The respondents relied on the aforestated rule and submittedthat the appellant made a representation before the Registrar of therespondent University requesting him to reckon appellant’s practice ofeight years at the Bar, only on 10[th] November 2004, i.e. over 20 yearsafter his appointment as a lecturer at the respondent University. Thatthe claim of the appellant was rightly not entertained by the authoritiesof the respondent University after such an inordinate delay.

22. Learned counsel for respondents urged that the case of theappellant has been rightly appreciated in its true perspective, having dueregard to the relevant law, by the High Court in its judgment whiledismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant herein, which judgmentwould not call for any interference in this appeal.

Points for consideration:

23. Having regard to the submissions of the learned Senior Counseland learned counsel for the respective sides, the following points wouldarise for our consideration:

(i) Whether the appellant herein is entitled to the benefit ofRule 25(a), Part III, Kerala Service Rules?

(ii) Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing theappeal preferred by the appellant herein?

(iii) What Order?

24. The fact that the appellant was appointed to the post of lecturerin the School of Legal Studies of the respondent University with effectfrom 7[th] September 1984, is not in dispute. The appellant practised as anAdvocate at the District Court and Subordinate Courts at North Parur,Ernakulam, Kerala for the period between 11[th] March 1972 and 2[nd]February 1980. The appellant sought for reckoning of his experience atthe Bar as qualifying service for the purpose of determination ofsuperannuation pension, as provided under Rule 25 (a), Part III, KSR.The same was denied by the authorities of the respondent University.During the pendency of litigation in this regard before the High Court, A

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Athe appellant retired from service of the respondent University on attainingthe age of superannuation with effect from 30[th] April 2007.

25. Learned counsel for the respondents have relied upon theproviso to Rule 25 (a) of Part III, KSR in urging that the respondentUniversity rightly denied the claim of the appellant for reckoning theBperiod of practice at the Bar. Rule 25 (a) together with the proviso insertedby way of an Amendment, with effect from 12[th] February 1985, isreproduced hereunder:

“25 (a) Persons recruited from the Bar after the age of 25 yearsto appointments in Government service may add to their servicequalifying for superannuation pension (but not for any other kindCof pension) the actual period (not exceeding ten years) by whichtheir age at the time of recruitment exceeded 25 years providedthat no employee can claim the benefit of this rule unless his actualqualifying service at the time he becomes eligible for superannuationpension is not less than eight years. This concession is also subjectDto the condition that the period that may be so added shall not atany time exceed the actual period of the employee’s practice atthe Bar. No application will be entertained for pension on theground that the appointee did not get an opportunity for servicefor the qualifying period.

Provided that the benefit under this sub-rule shall be availableEonly to employees who are recruited when practicing at the Bar to posts requiring law qualification and experience at the Bar.”

26. The proviso limits the benefit of the Rule by restricting itsapplication only to such employees as are recruited when practicing atthe Bar, to those posts requiring a qualification in law and experience atFthe Bar. The respondent University has contended that since the post ofa lecturer to which the appellant was appointed in 1984, did not requireprior experience at the Bar, the proviso would be attracted therebydisentitling the appellant of the benefit under Rule 25(a). Although theproviso was inserted by way of an amendment, with effect from 12[th]GFebruary 1985 and was not in force at the time of appointment of theappellant in 1984, the respondent University has contended that the ruleapplicable in the matter of determination of pension is that which existsat the time of retirement. That the appellant superannuated on 30[th] April2007, on which date the proviso to Rule 25(a) was in force and thereforeit would apply, limiting the benefit of the Rule.H

27. The appellant brought to our attention that in the case of oneDr. P. Leela Krishnan, a Professor of Law who was similarly situatedas the appellant herein, the respondent University duly considered theperiod of practice at the Bar as a part of Dr. P. Leela Krishnan’s qualifyingservice for the purpose of determining pension payable on hissuperannuation.

28. Perusal of extracts from the pension book of Dr. P. LeelaKrishnan, reveals that his experience of practice at the Bar, of 7 years,2 months and 26 days was added to the period of his service at theUniversity, being 26 years, 9 months and 2 days. The respondentUniversity in determining his superannuation pension, considered 33 years,7 months and 4 days as the qualifying period of service.

29. No argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondentsas to the manner in which the case of the appellant is different from thatof Dr. P. Leela Krishnan and on what basis the benefit of Rule 25 (a)was granted to Dr. P. Leela Krishnan but was withheld in relation to theappellant.

30. We find that the appellant and Dr. P. Leela Krishnan were infact similarly situated. Both these individuals were appointed as teachingfaculty at the respondent University after practicing as advocates invarious Courts of Kerala. They were both appointed before the provisoto Rule 25 (a) came into effect, i.e. before 12[th] February 1985 and retiredafter the said proviso came into force.

31. In the circumstances, we find no valid ground to sustain theapplication of the proviso in relation to the appellant, thereby denying thebenefit of Rule 25(a), when the same was not applied in the case of Dr.P. Leela Krishnan, thereby allowing the benefit of Rule 25(a).

32. While we accept the settled position of law that the ruleapplicable in matters of determination of pension is that which exists atthe time of retirement, we are unable to find any legal basis in the actionof the respondent University of selectively allowing the benefit of Rule25 (a). The law, as recognized by this Court in Deoki Nandan Prasadand Syed Yousuddin Ahmed(supra) unequivocally states that the pensionpayable to an employee on retirement shall be determined on the rulesexisting at the time of retirement. However, the law does not allow theemployer to apply the rules differently in relation to persons who aresimilarly situated.

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A33. Therefore, we are of the view that if the respondent Universitysought to deny the benefit of Rule 25 (a), in light of the proviso whichwas subsequently inserted thereby limiting the benefit of the Rule, itought to have done so uniformly. The proviso could have been madeapplicable in relation to all employees who retired from service of therespondent University following the introduction of the proviso, i.e. afterB12[th] February 1985. However, the action of the respondent Universityof selectively applying the proviso to Rule 25(a) in relation to the appellant,while not applying the said proviso in relation to similarly situated persons,is arbitrary and therefore illegal. Such discrimination, which is not basedon any reasonable classification, is violative of all canons of equalityCwhich are enshrined in the Constitution of India.

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34. Hence, in the instant case, the denial of the benefit under Rule25 (a), KSR, to the appellant is arbitrary and not in accordance with law.Consequently, the appellant is entitled to receive pension having regardto his total qualifying service, inclusive of the period of his service at theDrespondent University and the period of his practice as an Advocate invarious Courts of Kerala.

35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we set aside the judgmentof the Division Bench as well as that of the learned Single Judge of theHigh Court dated 29[th] August 2019 and 3[rd] April, 2006 respectively andallow the instant appeal.E

36. The respondent University is directed to calculate the amountof pension short paid to the appellant from the date of his superannuationi.e. 30[th] April 2007, till date and disburse such amount together withinterest at the rate 5% p.a. till date of payment in favour of the appellantwithin a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of thisFjudgment. It is needless to observe that such calculation shall be carriedout after considering the period of practice of the appellant as an advocateat the Bar and the service rendered at the respondent University.

37. Parties to bear their respective costs.

GAnkit Gyan

Appeal allowed.

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