SURAZ INDIA TRUST versus UNION OF INDIA MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO.1630 OF 2020 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO.880 OF 2016 on 29 September 2021

[2021] 7 S.C.R. 1063

SURAZ INDIA TRUST

v.

UNION OF INDIA

Miscellaneous Application No.1630 of 2020 in Writ Petition (C) No.880 of 2016

SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

Contempt of Court – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 –Constitution of India – Articles 129, 142 – Petitioner – Trust filed alarge number of cases in Rajasthan and Delhi, canvassed in personby its Chairman – Mr. ‘D’ – 64 different proceedings in the 12 casesfiled in the Supreme Court alone – Litigation initiated by the Trustwas found to be frivolous – Direction issued to the Trust and Mr.‘D’ to refrain from filing any cause in public interest before anyCourt in the country, exemplary costs of Rs.25 lakhs imposed onMr. ‘D’ – Application filed by him for waiver of the costs, dismissed– Registry was directed to proceed for recovery of costs – Mr. ‘D’inter alia addressed letter to the Attorney General of India seekingconsent to initiate criminal contempt proceedings against threejudges including the then Chief Justice of India and also againstcertain Registry officers/officials – Continued to scandalise theCourt and prevent it from taking action to ensure recovery of costs– Contempt notice issued to Mr.‘D’ – Bailable warrants issued –Apology filed – Held: So-called unconditional apology is again arecital of his alleged grievances in the earlier proceedings seekingto canvas that the proceedings for recovery of costs had actuallycome to an end which is not correct as it was his endeavour to seekmodification of the order of costs – Contemnor has made aprofession of filing public interest petitions of subjects he may notknow much of and then scandalise the Court to grant him relieffailing which he will continue to scandalise the Court – He is guiltyof contempt of this Court – His actions to scandalise the Courtcannot be countenanced – He continues with his contumaciousbehaviour – Apologies submitted are only endeavours to get out ofthe consequences again followed by another set of allegations, thus,a charade – Last apology can hardly be called an apology – There

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Ais no remorse on the part of the contemnor – It is a contempt on theface of the Court, however one more chance given to hear him onthe question of final sentence.

Directing the listing of the petition, the Court HELD: 1.1 The raison d’etre of contempt jurisdiction is toBmaintain the dignity of the institution of judicial forums. It is nota vindictive exercise nor are inappropriate statements bythemselves capable of lowering the dignity of a Judge. These areoften ignored but where despite all latitude a perennial litigantseeks to justify his existence by throwing mud at all and sundry,Cthe Court has to step in. [Para 1][1067-B-C]

Conclusion

1.2 The so-called unconditional apology is again a recital ofhis alleged grievances in the earlier proceedings. It seeks tocanvas that the proceedings for recovery of costs had actuallycome to an end, which was factually not so as it was his endeavourto seek modification of the order of costs. The same was declinedDwhile permitting the Registry to take action for recovery. Sincethe recovery did not take place, the Registry had placed thematter before the Court. The Court has penned down all thedetails in the present judgment not only to record the conduct ofMr. ‘D’ as Chairman of the Trust prior to the order being passedEin WP(C) No.880/2016, but continuously thereafter. In thesubmissions he sought to suggest that he was compelled to takethis course of action to ensure that the proceedings he files indifferent courts are not interceded or terminated on account ofhis inability to pay costs. This can hardly be a course of actionFwhich is permissible. The State counsel referred tocommunications addressed by him to the State Government, onceagain, seeking to threaten the officers who had initiateddisciplinary proceedings against him. But for the fact thatMr. ‘D’ appears in person and seeks to canvas his case with suchclear understanding, it could possibly have given rise to theGapprehension that he was not all there. It also appears that he isunder constant legal advice beyond his abilities to address theCourt by the very nature of pleadings he files. Insofar asMiscellaneous Application No.1630/2020 is concerned, nothingmore has to be directed than what was already stated on H

06.05.2021, i.e., the State Government should take steps tocommence process of recovery of costs as ‘arrears of landrevenue’ and the recovery amount be remitted to the beneficiaryas per the order already passed in WP(C) No.880/2016 on01.05.2017. In the direction passed by this Court on 01.05.2017it was observed “failing deposit, the above costs shall berecoverable from Mr. Rajiv Daiya, its Chairman, through hispersonal proceeds, if necessary.” In fact, if Mr. ‘D’ had just merelyexpressed his inability to pay the amount as per his affidavit, thematter could have been left at that, with, of course, the naturalconsequences as contained in the order dated 01.05.2017 whichdisabled him from filing public interest litigations. There cannotbe a birthright to file public interest litigations and the level ofassistance and the nature of causes as canvassed has alreadybeen adversely commented upon in the order dated 01.05.2017.M.A. No.1630/2020 is closed with the aforesaid order. [Paras 18,20-23][1073-C-D, F-H; 1074-A-F]

1.3 There is no absolute licence when appearing in personto indulge in making aspersions as a tendency to scandalise theCourt in relation to judicial matters. Motivated and calculatedattempts to bring down the image of the judiciary in estimation ofpublic and impair the administration of justice must besterthemselves to uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. In thecurrent context if seen, the grievance arises on account of theinability of the contemnor to file public interest petitions onaccount of costs being imposed, which he claims to be unable topay and the consequences thereof of not being able to prosecutehis petitions, which are large in number. The contemnor hasapparently made a profession of filing public interest petitions ofsubjects of which he may not know much and then seeking toscandalise the Court to grant him relief failing which he willcontinue to scandalise the Court. [Para 29][1077-B-D]

Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re: (1993) 4 Suppl. SCC 446

Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re: (1993) 4 Suppl. SCC 446

– relied on.

1.4 The power to punish for contempt is a constitutionalpower vested in this Court which cannot be abridged or taken AB

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1066SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 7 S.C.R.

Aaway even by legislative enactment. The notice issued on09.07.2021 was a composite notice issued to proceed against himas well as to sentence him for his endeavour to scandalise theCourt. The contemnor is clearly guilty of contempt of this Court.His actions to scandalise the Court cannot be countenanced. Hecontinues with his contumacious behaviour. The apologiesBsubmitted by him are only endeavours to get out of theconsequences again followed by another set of allegations, thus,a charade. The last apology can hardly be called an apology seeingthe contents. There is no remorse on the part of the contemnor.It is a contempt on the face of the Court by the reason of theCpleadings filed by him. This Court is not mandated in view of theaforesaid to give him a hearing on the issue of sentence but wouldstill give him one more chance and, thus, consider it appropriateto list the petition to hear the contemnor on the question of finalsentence. [Paras 31-34][1078-F-G; 1079-A-E]

DIn Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors. (2020) SCC Online SC 407;Mathews Nedumpara, In Re, (2019) 19 SCC 454;Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P (2011) 7SCC 776 : [2011] 8 SCR 105 – relied on.

Case Law ReferenceE

[2011] 8 SCR 105

relied onPara 33

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Miscellaneous ApplicationNo.1630 of 2020 in Writ Petition (C) No.880 of 2016.F

(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)

Rajiv Daiya, Petitioner-in-person.

Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv.,GMs. Ruchi Kohli, Mohd. Akhil, Sughosh Subramanyan, B. V. BalramDas, Sandeep Kumar Jha, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. The raison d’etre of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain thedignity of the institution of judicial forums. It is not a vindictive exercisenor are inappropriate statements by themselves capable of lowering thedignity of a Judge. These are often ignored but where despite all latitudea perennial litigant seeks to justify his existence by throwing mud at alland sundry, the Court has to step in.

2. In order to understand the contours of the present dispute,nothing more is required than to turn to the judgment of this Courtin WP(C) No.880/2016 dated 01.05.2017. This judgment is not anorigination but in some sense a culmination. Mr. Rajiv Daiya, claims tobe the spirit behind Suraz India Trust (for short ‘Trust’), which has beenfiling a large number of cases both in Rajasthan and in Delhi. A perusalof the judgment dated 01.05.2017 would show that Mr. Daiya asChairman of the Trust has been canvassing matters in person. Thesepetitions are stated to be public interest litigations. A list of cases filed byhim was prepared in the proceedings in WP(C) No.880/2016, numbering12 before this Court alone. Further, as per the summary prepared by theRegistry, there were 64 different proceedings in these 12 cases asmentioned in para 3 of the aforementioned judgment. The Court formeda prima facie view that the litigation initiated by the Trust was thoughtlessand frivolous. Liberty was granted to Mr. Daiya to make a voluntarystatement, if he considered it appropriate that Suraz India Trust willhenceforth not file any petition urging a cause in public interest. Thereby,the Court made it clear to him that if he did so the matter would beclosed and no further consequences would follow. In the alternative, hewas asked to file a response to establish the bona fides of the Trust.Mr. Daiya wanted to prosecute the matter without filing a written responsedespite the opportunity. He claimed to have been dissatisfied by theCourt, both on the administrative and judicial side, with their manner ofdealing with his representations. Thereafter, he forwarded a disparagingcommunication tothe residential offices of Hon’ble Judges. Theendeavour, if one may say, was to browbeat the Registry at that time.He sought to make representations to the President of India and thePrime Minister too. In the text of grievances made by the Trust,disparaging remarks were contained therein not only with reference to A

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Athe Judges of the Rajasthan High Court but also with reference to theJudges of this Court. The vilification extended to all levels of judicialofficers in the State of Rajasthan as also the Chief Justice and otherJudges of that Court. The Bench opined that extremely important mattersare taken up for consideration on a daily basis and judicial time getswasted because individuals not competent to assist the Court insist withoutBdue cause to be granted a prolonged hearing. A misconceived petition inthat case was not only dismissed, but a direction was issued that theTrust shall henceforth refrain from filing any cause in public interestbefore any Court in this country and that it will equally apply to Mr. RajivDaiya. Exemplary costs of Rs. 25 lakhs were imposed on Mr. RajivCDaiya, to be deposited with the Supreme Court Advocates-on-RecordWelfare Trust within three months from the date of the order, failingwhich the costs would be recovered from Mr. Rajiv Daiya through hispersonal proceeds, if necessary. The matter was directed to be listed incase costs were not deposited.

D3. The costs were not deposited and Mr. Daiya filed an applicationon 21.08.2017 seeking to submit unconditional apology with a prayerthat the costs imposed on him of Rs. 25 lakhs be waived and that he bepardoned against charges of contempt. In MA No. 507 of 2017,Mr. Daiya requested the court to not enforce the judgment dated01.05.2017 passed in WP(C) No. 880 of 2016 as he had moved forEsanction of prosecution to the President of India. The Court, on 21.08.2017ordered that the letter requesting sanction of prosecution written by Mr.Daiya to the President of India qua the Judges who presided over theBench be placed on record. Thereafter on 05.12.2017, the application ofMr. Daiya was dismissed observing that the Bench was not inclined to Fmodify the order and the Registry was directed to proceed as per law.

4. MA No. 1158 of 2017 was placed before this Court by theRegistry as Mr. Daiya had failed to withdraw all pending cases filed bythe Trust in accordance with paragraph 27 of the judgment dated01.05.2017. Since costs were not deposited all applications and writGpetitions filed by the Trust and Mr. Daiya were directed to be dismissedwith the direction to the Registry not to accept any application or petitionfiled by either by the Trust or Mr. Daiya vide order dated 08.02.2018.

5. MA No.1630 of 2020 by way of an Office Report was placedbefore the Court on 29.09.2020 informing that the costs had not beenHdeposited by the Trust. This aspect was also confirmed by the Secretary of the Supreme Court AOR Welfare Trust since the costs had to bedeposited with the said entity. That being the position on the said date anorder was passed issuing notice to the Trust. Instead of responding tothe same, Mr. Daiya sought from the Registry the note sheets on thebasis of which the directions had been sought by the Registry videe-mail dated 16.10.2020. This was followed by an e-mail dated09.02.2021. In view of the peremptory nature of the order dated08.02.2018 the said letter was sought to be circulated for directions toaccept the applications at the filing counter. On 12.02.2021 the Courtnoted that there was no basis for demanding the note sheets. In view ofthe obdurate stand of Mr. Daiya and non-appearance in pursuance ofthe notices served, bailable warrants were directed to be issued for hisproduction in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount.

6. At that stage Mr. Daiya did a volte face and moved IA No.36444/2021 on 22.02.2021 seeking to submit an unconditional apology with anaudit report showing his assets in compliance with the order dated29.09.2020. The factum of this IA was placed on record by the Registry.The Court was informed that the same was not accepted on 22.02.2021,once again, because of the peremptory nature of the order.

7. Now there was another U-turn by Mr. Daiya, who addressed aletter dated 11.03.2021 to the Attorney General of India. In this letter,consent was sought to initiate proceedings for criminal contempt againstthe Assistant Registrar of the PIL Section, Section X and Section XVI-A and other officials for obstructing and interfering with administrationof justice by not letting the matter of Mr. Daiya be decided on merits ofthe case. Simultaneously consent was also sought for filing contemptproceedings against the then Chief Justice of India Shri J.S. Khehar(since retired), Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and one of us (Sanjay KishanKaul, J.) as they were the three Judges party to the judgment passed on01.05.2017 on the ground that the Judges were obstructing the meritoriousdecision making of various petitions under Article 32 of the Constitutionof India. On 14.03.2021, Mr. Daiya sent a letter to the Registrar statingthat he had filed an application for unconditional apology and producingdetails of assets in compliance with the order dated 29.09.2020, however,that the same be considered by a Bench comprising the Chief Justice ofIndia. On 15.03.2021, the Bench directed Mr. Daiya to place on recordhis current sources of income, more so, as he had claimed that he was ina Government job. He was directed to give a complete list of his movable AB

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Aand immovable assets, if any. Further, since he was claiming to be in aGovernment job he should give his last salary slip which would showemoluments being received by him along with deductions being made.

8. On 23.03.2021 the Attorney General sent two letters to Mr.Daiya denying him initiation of contempt proceedings in respect of bothBthe letters dated 11.03.2021. Mr. Daiya, however, addressed two lettersdated 26.03.2021 and 27.03.2021 to the Attorney General with identicalcontent, stating that he should be granted an opportunity to place theentire record before him. On 26.03.2021, an e-mail was addressed to theAssistant Registrar (PIL Section) stating that one of us (Sanjay KishanKaul, J.) should recuse himself as he had moved for sanction ofCprosecution before the President of India against him. The letter addressedto the President was also attached. This was in the context of the actionhe wanted to take against the Coram which passed the order dated01.05.2017 as according to him it fulfilled the requirements of an offenceunder Section 219 of the Indian Penal Code (Public servant in judicialDproceedings corruptly making reports, etc. contrary to law). On27.03.2021, an e-mail was sent reminding the Attorney General of theletter sent earlier on 26.03.2021.

9. On 02.04.2021, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to the Chief Justiceof India requesting information to take suo motu cognizance of the criminalEcomplaint against the Assistant Registrar and officers/officials of thePIL (Writ) Section.

10. In the aforesaid context when the matter was listed on05.04.2021, Mr. Daiya sought to excuse himself from appearing beforethe Court on account of Covishield vaccination. He had not compliedFwith the orders and was seeking to wriggle out of the proceedings byraising all kinds of objections, i.e., that the matter should not be heard bythe Bench but by a bench headed by the Chief Justice of India. It was,thus, observed that this was not the prerogative of Mr. Daiya, and theChief Justice had despite his letter continued to permit the same Benchto deal with the matter. Since Mr. Daiya was found to be bent uponGviolating the directions of the Court, the Court deemed it appropriate toissue notice of contempt to Mr. Daiya returnable on 12.04.2021.Incidentally, Mr. Daiya, despite the aforesaid request, was present inCourt and accepted notice. On the issue of Government job, he statedthat what he was referring to was the fact that he was a StenographerHin a legal office, but deployed with the State of Rajasthan. Notice was thus issued to State of Rajasthan to verify the factum in view of non-cooperative attitude of Mr. Daiya.

11. On 08.04.2021, Mr. Daiya filed a report with details of hismovable and immovable assets. He claimed to have regularly taken loansfor meeting various requirements, which were being deducted from hisemoluments. In the liabilities he sought to put forth the expenses towardshis daughter’s study apart from the liability of marriage of his daughter.He submitted that he had no sufficient funds to make payment of thecosts.

12. In the next proceedings held on 12.04.2021, the State ofRajasthan was asked to give information about the employment of Mr.Daiya and whether the activities he was carrying on were permissiblewhile being so engaged and drawing salary from the State. The requestmade for appointment of an Amicus for Mr. Daiya was declined as hehad been appearing in person practically in all cases.

13. On 03.05.2021, an affidavit was filed by the State of Rajasthaninforming that Mr. Daiya was working in the office of the GovernmentAdvocate-cum-Additional Advocate General at Jodhpur, which was anoffice separate from the office of the Advocate General of the State.He had been issued show cause notice under relevant service rulesapplicable and had been suspended and transferred since his conductbefore various courts as the Chairman of the Trust was in violation ofthe relevant service rules. Against this, Mr. Daiya had filed a writ petitionbefore the Rajasthan High Court, being S.B. Civil Writ No.6864/2021.Thus, on 06.05.2021 in the proceedings it was noted that the State hadmoved for vacation of interim order and the State would take steps tocommence the process for recovery of costs as ‘arrears of land revenue’.

14. On 10.05.2021, Mr. Daiya filed an application for recalling/review of the order dated 06.05.2021. It was claimed that he was notgiven a chance to be heard and that the proceedings for recovery werea nullity. It was his case that the dismissal of the recovery proceedingsin MA No.507/2017 by a Bench of three Judges on 21.08.2017 wasbinding on the present Bench. He conveniently ignored that the saidproceedings recorded only his submission with the direction to place anapplication that he had moved for sanction of prosecution before thePresident of India. The order passed in M.A. No.507/2017 on 05.12.2017was to the effect that Mr. Daiya’s prayer to modify the order was actually A

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Adeclined and the Registry was directed to proceed as per law (forrecovery of costs).

15. Once again on 08.07.2017, Mr. Daiya addressed a letter to theRegistrar stating that he had filed a complaint with the President of Indiaagainst one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.), for conducting an inquiryBunder In-House procedure vide letter dated 07.06.2021. A reminder wassent on 08.07.2021 and once again, requesting that the matter be listedbefore a Bench of which one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) was not amember. He had also sought some RTI query.

16. On 09.07.2021 the attention of the Court was invited to theCletter of Mr. Daiya. It was found that all kinds of pleadings were beingmade in an issue of what was simply of recovery of costs from theTrust/Mr. Daiya Letters were also written to scandalise the Court andprevent the Court from taking action to ensure recovery of costs. Itwas, thus, clearly an endeavour to browbeat the Court which the Courtwould not countenance. Contempt notice was issued to Mr. Daiya as toDwhy he should not be proceeded against and sentenced for his endeavourto scandalise the Court returnable on the next date, i.e., 04.08.2021.Thereafter, Mr. Daiya sought adjournment as he had undergone somesurgery and the State counsel was asked to verify when Mr. Daiyawould be able to attend the Court proceedings as per medical advice.EOn 18.08.2021 it was noticed that as per the affidavit filed on behalf ofthe State of Rajasthan, affirmed on 16.08.2021, in pursuance of the medicaladvice, the contemnor had resumed his duties on 11.08.2021. Hisendeavour to seek adjournment by four months was found not acceptable.It was further noted that the contumacious conduct continued and thatMr. Daiya was under a misconception that by endeavouring to scandaliseFthe Court he could get away with it. Bailable warrants in the sum ofRs.10,000/- with one surety of the like amount were issued directing hispresence.

17. The petitioner filed a response to the contempt proceedingsand on 06.09.2021 filed an application for impleading the Secretary, LawGand Legal Affairs Department, Government of Rajasthan, Registrar,Supreme Court of India, one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) and B.Sunita Rao, Secretary of the Supreme Court AOR Welfare Trust. Healso sought the placement of the complaint before the Chief Justice ofIndia and, on 07.09.2021, he further sought adjournment by 4-5 monthsHso as to enable response by the Chief Justice of India to his earlier letter as reasoned orders were not being passed by the Bench. On 08.09.2021,in pursuance of the bailable warrants Mr. Daiya appeared and we heardhim at some length along with learned Additional Solicitor General andlearned counsel for the State. As had transpired earlier, in the end thepetitioner stated that he wanted to tender an unqualified apology andsought to withdraw all what he had said. We told him that he was atliberty to file what he pleased within three days and we would take thatinto consideration while passing our orders and the judgment wasreserved. Thereafter, an application was filed, being IA No.114626/2021seeking to place what he calls an “unconditional apology” and furtherseeking review by IA No.114629/2021. It does not mention as to whatreview was being sought.

18. The so-called unconditional apology is again a recital of hisalleged grievances in the earlier proceedings. It seeks to canvas that theproceedings for recovery of costs had actually come to an end, whichwas factually not so as it was his endeavour to seek modification of theorder of costs. The same was declined while permitting the Registry totake action for recovery. Since the recovery did not take place, theRegistry had placed the matter before the Court. Thereafter, he hadmade a grievance about the chargesheet served on him by the StateGovernment in terms of his employment, an aspect with which we arenot directly concerned with. He has mentioned that he seeks redressal

of various grievances in various proceedings he has filed, claiming theapplicability of the doctrine of impossibility in relation with payment ofcosts. He has referred to various petitions filed before the RajasthanHigh Court.

19. On a careful reading of the aforesaid we can hardly categorisethe same as an unconditional apology.

20. We have penned down all these details not only to record theconduct of Mr. Daiya as Chairman of the Trust prior to the order beingpassed in WP(C) No.880/2016, but continuously thereafter. In thesubmissions he sought to suggest that he was compelled to take thiscourse of action to ensure that the proceedings he files in different courtsare not interceded or terminated on account of his inability to pay costs.This can hardly be a course of action which is permissible. We wouldlike to emphasise on the kind of actions Mr. Daiya has embarked upon ina simple issue of recovery of costs. In fact, the State counsel referred tocommunications addressed by him to the State Government, once again, A

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Aseeking to threaten the officers who had initiated disciplinary proceedingsagainst him. But for the fact that Mr. Daiya appears in person and seeksto canvas his case with such clear understanding, it could possibly havegiven rise to the apprehension that he was not all there. It also appearsthat he is under constant legal advice beyond his abilities to address theCourt by the very nature of pleadings he files.B

21. Insofar as Miscellaneous Application No.1630/2020 isconcerned, in our view, nothing more has to be directed than what wasalready been stated on 06.05.2021, i.e., the State Government shouldtake steps to commence process of recovery of costs as ‘arrears ofland revenue’ and the recovery amount be remitted to the beneficiary asCper the order already passed in WP(C) No.880/2016 on 01.05.2017.Other than that, no further directions are required as the recovery wouldnaturally depend on the available resources of both the Trust and Mr.Daiya. In the direction passed by this Court on 01.05.2017 it was observed“failing deposit, the above costs shall be recoverable from Mr. RajivDDaiya, its Chairman, through his personal proceeds, if necessary.”

22. In fact, if Mr. Daiya had just merely expressed his inability topay the amount as per his affidavit, the matter could have been left atthat, with, of course, the natural consequences as contained in the orderdated 01.05.2017 which disabled him from filing public interest litigations.EAfter all, there cannot be a birthright to file public interest litigations andthe level of assistance and the nature of causes as canvassed has alreadybeen adversely commented upon in the order dated 01.05.2017.

23. M.A. No.1630/2020 is thus closed with the aforesaid order.

24. However, that unfortunately cannot be the end of the matter.

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25. Let us say at the inception that the easier path is to recuse orgive up the matter instead of inviting so much trouble. But then that isnot the course for which the Judges have taken oath. Sometimes thetask is unenviable and difficult but it must be performed for the largergood of the institution. Such litigants cannot be permitted to have theirGway only because they can plead and write anything they feel like andkeep on approbating by sometimes apologising and then again bringingforth those allegations. We have thus chosen the more difficult path.

26. Now turning to the conduct of Mr. Daiya, which is apparentfrom the judgment as aforesaid.

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27. We are enlightened in respect of the course of action wefollow by judicial precedents. We would first like to turn to the judgmentin Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re:[1]. Disparaging remarks and aspersionsdeliberately and repeatedly made against the Supreme Court and itsJudges in memorandum of writ petition and in representation made beforethe President of India in connection with order of reduction in rank andsubsequent dismissal from service of the contemnor was held to bringdown the image of judiciary in the estimation of public and to bringadministration of justice into disrepute. The contemnor was directed tosuffer four months simple imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-.

28. Suffice to note that even in the said proceedings, after tenderingapology, ostensibly on the ground that it was desired by the Judges, onceagain, the contemnor showed no redemption for his behaviour. Theobservations by Justice A.S. Anand (as he then was) in paras 11, 12 &13 are as under:

“11. The tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officersby disgruntled elements who fail to secure an order which theydesire is on the increase and it is high time that serious note istaken of the same. No latitude can be given to a litigant to browbeatthe court. Merely because a party chooses to appear in person, itdoes not give him a licence to indulge in making such aspersionsas have the tendency to scandalise the court in relation to judicialmatters.

12. Ordinarily, courts of law do not initiate proceedings to commita person for contempt of court where there is mere technicalcontempt or where the contemnor satisfies the court that he wastruly repentant for his action. Judgments of the court are open tocriticism. Judges and courts are not unduly sensitive or touchy tofair and reasonable criticism of their judgments. Fair comments,even if, put-spoken, but made without any malice or attempting toimpair the administration of justice and made in good faith in properlanguage do not attract any punishment for contempt of court.Lord Denning in Reg v. Commissioner of Police of theMetropolis, Ex parte Blackburn, 1968 (2) WLR 1204 madesome pertinent observations in this regard. In the words of theMaster of Rolls:

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Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done ina court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and ourdecisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal ornot. All we would ask is that those who criticise us willremember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot replyto their criticism. We cannot enter into public controversy. Stillless into political controversy.

However, when from the criticism a deliberate, motivated andcalculated attempt is discernible to bring down the image ofjudiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administrationof justice or tend to bring the administration of justice into disreputethe courts must bester themselves to uphold their dignity and themajesty of law. No litigant can be permitted to over step the limitsof fair, bona fide and reasonable criticism of a judgment and bringthe courts generally in disrepute or attribute motives to the Judgesrendering the judgment. Perversity, calculated to undermine thejudicial system and the prestige of the court, cannot be permittedfor otherwise the very foundation of the judicial system is boundto be undermined and weakened and that would be bad not onlyfor the preservation of Rule of Law but also for the independenceof judiciary. Liberty of free expression is not to be confused witha licence to make unfounded, unwarranted and irresponsibleaspersions against the Judges or the courts in relation to judicialmatters. No system of justice can tolerate such an unbridledlicence. Of course “Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must beallowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even thoughoutspoken, comments of ordinary men”, but the members of thepublic have to abstain from imputing improper motives to thosetaking part in the administration of justice and exercise their rightof free criticism without malice or in any way attempting to impairthe administration of justice and refrain from making any commentwhich tends to scandalise the court in relation to judicial matters.

13. The contemnor in the present case let alone showing anyremorse or regret has adopted an arrogant and contemptuousattitude. His conduct in circulating the ‘note for directions’ addsinsult to injury. Of course, the dignity of the court is not so brittleas to be shattered by a stone thrown by a mad man, but, when thecourt finds that the contemnor has been reckless, persistent and guilty of undermining the dignity of the court and his action is,motivated, deliberate and designed, the law of contempt of courtmust be activised.”

29. The aforesaid shows that there is no absolute licence whenappearing in person to indulge in making aspersions as a tendency toscandalise the Court in relation to judicial matters. Motivated andcalculated attempts to bring down the image of the judiciary in estimationof public and impair the administration of justice must bester themselvesto uphold their dignity and the majesty of law. In the current context ifseen, the grievance arises on account of the inability of the contemnor tofile public interest petitions on account of costs being imposed, which heclaims to be unable to pay and the consequences thereof of not beingable to prosecute his petitions, which are large in number. The contemnorhas apparently made a profession of filing public interest petitions ofsubjects of which he may not know much and then seeking to scandalisethe Court to grant him relief failing which he will continue to scandalisethe Court.

30. In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors.[2]which arose in suo motu contemptpetition after the conviction of Mr. Mathews Nedumpara, an advocate.In those proceedings, the Court while not finally sentencing him toimprisonment instead gave him a suspended sentence and barred himfrom practice for a specified period of time before this Court[3]. Thisresulted in another round on account of complaints against the IndianBar Association and by some person claiming to be the National Secretaryof Human Rights Security Council wherein they had sought to sendcontemptuous complaints to the President of India and the Chief Justiceof India (a somewhat similar situation in the case at hand). ShriNedumpara sought discharge on the ground that he did not really knowthose people. A Bench of this Court debated the powers of the SupremeCourt in relation to dealing with the contempt in the light of Articles 129and 142 of the Constitution of India read with in conjunction with theContempt of Courts Act, 1971. The provisions read as under:

“9. Article 129 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

“129. Supreme Court to be a court of record. The SupremeCourt shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers 2 2020 SCC Online SC 407.

3 Mathews Nedumpara, In Re, (2019) 19 SCC 454.

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of such a court including the power to punish for contempt ofitself.”

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A bare reading of Article 129 clearly shows that this Court beinga Court of Record shall have all the powers of such a Court of Recordincluding the power to punish for contempt of itself. This is a constitutionalBpower which cannot be taken away or in any manner abridged by statute.

10. Article 142 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

“142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Courtand orders as to discovery, etc. (1) The Supreme Court in theexercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make suchorder as is necessary for doing complete justice in any causeor matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orderso made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of Indiain such manner as may be prescribed by or under any lawmade by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is somade, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

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(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf byParliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole ofthe territory of India, have all and every power to make anyorder for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person,the discovery or production of any documents, or theinvestigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”

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31. In the context of the aforesaid it was opined that the comparisonof the two provisions show that whereas the founding fathers felt thatthe powers under clause (2) of Article 142 could be subject to any lawFmade by the Parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article129 is concerned. The power to punish for contempt is a constitutionalpower vested in this Court which cannot be abridged or taken awayeven by legislative enactment. We have little doubt that what thecontemnor has been endeavouring is to have his way or, alternatively, Iwill throw mud at all and sundry, whether it be the Court, its administrativeGstaff or the State Government so that people, apprehensive of this mudthrown, may back off.

We refuse to back off and are clear in our view that we must takeit to its logical conclusion.

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32. We may note that the notice issued on 09.07.2021 was acomposite notice issued to proceed against him as well as to sentencehim for his endeavour to scandalise the Court.

33. We are of the view that the contemnor is clearly guilty ofcontempt of this Court. His actions to scandalise the Court cannot becountenanced. He continues with his contumacious behaviour. Theapologies submitted by him are only endeavours to get out of theconsequences again followed by another set of allegations, thus, acharade. The last apology can hardly be called an apology seeing thecontents. This Court has held that an apology cannot be a defence, ajustification can be accepted if it can be ignored without compromisingthe dignity of the Court (Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P.[4]).

There is, as already stated, no remorse on the part of the contemnorwhich we find in the present case.

34. The only next question is whether he has a right to be heardon sentence in the background of the facts that the notice sent to him byour order is both to be proceeded against him on merits and on sentencefor his endeavour to scandalise the Court. It is a contempt on the face ofthe Court by the reason of the pleadings filed by him. We are not mandatedin view of the aforesaid to give him a hearing on the issue of sentencebut would still give him one more chance and, thus, consider it appropriateto list the petition to hear the contemnor on the question of final sentence.

Divya Pandey

Directions issued.

4 (2011) 7 SCC 776.

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